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HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY*
ROBERT I. WATSON
Over the last decade or so, the history of psychology as a scholarly discipline
has been making considerable strides. Early in this period the refrain was heard
tha t we were all amateurs attempting to pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps
and eager to learn our trade from our more experienced confreres in other historical
disciplines. It would, of course, be a serious mistake if we were ever to lose this
eagerness to learn from workers in related fields. More recently, coincident with an
increasing confidence in our own abilities, there has come to the psychologist a
realization that, by the very nature of his training and background, he brings to
the study of history, certain positive skills in which he may well be better equipped
than is the typical historian. Instances of these skills are expertise in quantitative
procedures, knowledge of social psychology, and familiarity with personality
research and theory-all of which bring a direct enrichment to historical research.
Just as knowledge of history adds a depth to one's knowledge of psychology, so,
too, psychology can help to add another dimension to history.
This is an account of the search for a psychologically authentic approach to
historical study which draws upon the already established thought patterns of a
psychologist. It is motivated by a desire to extend psychological thinking to
historical approaches. Although a means of teaching of the field to students is
one of my considerations, I am more desirous of providing a framework in which
to carry on research and to write in the field. Illustrations, in fact, will ignore
teaching in favor of research stimulation and writing.
I have found this framework for historical research and writing in what I have
called prescriptive theory (Watson, 1967). A prescription is a n attitude taken by
a psychologist toward one or another aspect of his psychological concerns. By con-
ceiving prescriptions in attitudinal terms, in effect, I am opening u p the possibility
of placing them in the setting of social psychology. T h e major function of pre-
scriptions is conceived to be orientative or attitudinal in th a t it tells the psycholo-
gist how he should behave. A quantitative prescription is manifested by a psy-
chologist when, faced by a psychological problem, he forthwith starts to ask how
he might quantify it without necessarily first inquiring whether the problem is
suitable for quantification. Moreover, in order to be of historical value, the pre-
scriptions isolated for study must have existed over some appreciable period of
time. The rational and empirical prescriptions have served a guidance function
for centuries while more specific manifestations such as logical empiricism have
been of historical moment for much shorter temporal periods. Empiricism and
rationalism then are the prescriptions; logical empiricism a manifestation of them.
*Earlier versions of this paper were given at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological
Association, September,'l970 in Miami Florida and as the Presidential Address at the Annual Meet-
ing of the New England Psychological Association, November, 1970 in Boston, Massachusetts.
311
312 ROBERT I. WATSON
respects. For example, these pioneers tended to be free from the more stifling
aspects of the academic atmosphere by what might appear to be the somewhat
dubious advantage of not having regular academic appointments.
I would argue, then, that there is some value to a Zeitgeist approach but all
too often it is so generally stated as to be meaningless. By explaining everything
it explains nothing. When used without supplementation by other approaches,
it also may be said to be profoundly ahistorical. That is to say, often the Zeitgeist
account of a particualr period is stated in such fashion th a t historical continuity
is impossible. One Zeitgeist is seen as succeeding another with the characteristics
attributed to the former bearing little or no relation to those of the latter.
But what about that well-worn approach to conceptualizing history in terms
of the content of relevant research and speculation a t a given temporal period?
For example, Helmholtzs major work might be examined in terms of the speed of
neural impulse, theory of color vision, a n account of space perception and explo-
ration of pitch discrimination. This approach seems, at first glance, to have much
to recommend it since it solves the problem of needing a framework by dismissing
it as unnecessary. It seems as if all one had to do was just report the facts and
nothing but the facts. But here, as always, there is some principle of selection
operating through the historian since he never does report all of the facts. There
is an inevitable selection.
What seems to be the most common principle of selection by historians is to
emphasize presentation of historical material most relevant to the content of
current science. It was this characteristic of fact collection that caused Agassi
(1963) t o call misdirected efforts along this line the inductive approach to history.
This approach he traced back to Francis Bacon and his impossible demand that
collection of facts be made without appeal to preformed opinions. We know now
that we are always guided by some implicit or explicit hypothesis. Quite apart
from the weakness that the contentual inductivist who says he is only collecting
facts is actually being guided by some implicit hypotheses which by that very fact
weakens his grasp of the material, there are certain traps to the unwary historian
to which this approach makes him susceptible. Agassi based his central attack upon
what is often referred to as presentism (e.g., by Stocking, 1965) th a t is, the view
that the past facts leads to the present facts, the past is to be judged as it leads to
the highest point of development, and normative point of departure, the present.
Agassi took somewhat savage delight in arguing th a t much practice in the writing
of history is guided b y comparing the past to the truth as reported in the latest
textbook in the particular field. Inductive historians were seen as behaving as if
they were grading compositions-those in the past who were seen as being pre-
cursors of present truths were given good marks while those who held different or
contrary views were given bad marks and often charged perjoratively with being
non-scientific, philosophical, and perhaps most damning of all, metaphysical.
There are practicing historians who stand sturdily opposed to presentism but
still follow a n inductive-contentual approach. I n denying presentism, they say,
in effect, we must report the facts as the individual at the particular historical
period in question saw them. We must not anticipate, we must play fair, immerse
ourselves in the past and see it as they did. I n my view, this is much truer to the
historians craft than is presentist variation of inductivism and yet can we ever
3 14 ROBERT I. WATSON
free ourselves from the present? I doubt we can. Moreover, the more the anti-
quarian goal, the past for its own sake, is achieved by historical workers, the more
difficult it is for contemporary readers to find it either comprehensible or relevant.
We all have had the experience of reading history, including the history of psy-
chology, and finding the material almost meaningless, and certainly dull. We
might have even congratulated ourselves for not being psychologists a t the time of
Wundt when we would have to have been trained as introspectors and report our
sensory experiences. Did the psychologists of that time find the material dull and
meaningless? Not a t all. Just as we do, they paid rapt attention to their work and
engaged in vehement controversies about events, research problems, pieces of
apparatus, and theories that today are forgotten, considered insignificant or even
found incomprehensible. To mention only two or three examples, the Beast-
Uachine controversy, imageless thought and the influence of the speed on reaction
time of the attitude taken toward it, were as vital and gripping to psychologists
then as behavior therapy, computer programming and student involvement are
today. Something must be wrong, then, if history to be true to the past must be
dull and meaningless to those of us of the present. At the moment, we seem to be
trapped between the enticing evils of contentual presentism and the dullness of
contentual antiquarianism.
What I have said to this point applied to the history of science in general as
well as the history of psychology in particular. I n order to be able to turn to a
variant of the non-contentual presentist approach based on a decision as to what
is its current subject matter, I will now turn specifically to psychology as a field
which in some way or another we must distinguish from and relate to other dis-
ciplines, such as physiology, philosophy or physics. At first glance the question
might be framed as to what is psychologys subject matter-an account of the
kind of things with which it deals. With Popper, I hold that there is no subject
matter-be it physics or psychology-distinguished by the subject matter that
its practitioners investigate. Disciplines are distinguished partly for administrative
convenience such as organization of academic departments and partly because
problems we investigate tend to grow into a system of interrelated problems and
theories. These are not salient means of demarcating a field. W e are not students
of some subject matter but students of problems. And problems may cut right across
the borders of any subject matter of discipline. This is the reason th a t physiology
and philosophy are inescapable parts of our heritage insofar as they have dealt
with the same problems as we do.
I am now in a position to turn to a presentist but noncontentual approach to
history. I n an attempt to answer the question of what is relevant to its history,
some historians of psychology, (e.g., Kantor, 1963) concluded that the appropriate
solution is t o first decide about the nature of psychology of today on other grounds
than content. What they do is this. They judge psychology today as possessing
certain characteristic trends. If todays scientific psychology is judged to be ob-
jective, monistic and inter-personal then a n y material f r o m the past that i s objective,
monistic, inter-personal was scientific psychology then. In short, these historians
search the past theories, problems, methods and trends that support selected
current conceptions and ignore or decry the rest on the ground that it was not
part of scientific psychology then because, as they see it, it is not part of psychology
PRESCRIPTIONS AS OPERATIVE I N THE HISTORY O F PSYCHOLOGY 315
now. This way of limiting scope is of course a fertile ground for exercise of special
pleading and straining, and results, for example, in attempting to prove that Plato,
insofar as he was a psychologist, was a behaviorist. It arrives a t its delimitation
of the field by excluding many facets that at least some psychologists to this very
day think is part of the field. Limiting myself to only the polar opposites of the
three trends mentioned, i.e., subjectivism, dualism, and for lack of a better term
on my part, non-personalism, each surely have some contemporary supporters
among psychologists. To marshal1 evidence to show that psychology has become
increasingly objective, quantitative or whatever is entirely defensible. (Indeed,
with similar and even identical prescriptions I do precisely this). To the extent
that the selected trends leave out some aspects of psychology and yet claims to be
the whole field, the view is short-sighted and limited, not only in denying that other
trends may have been a t work in shaping psychology of the present, but also in
denying that they did so in the past, and, implicitly a t least, in denying that these
other trends might also function in the future.
Table I presents the prescriptions arranged in terms of contrasting pairs-
only one among several ways that they relate to one other. Some manifestations
of prescriptive function can be no more than mentioned on this account. Instead
of polarity, gradations may be exhibited as often happens in the setting of ra-
tionality-irrationality. Some prescriptions are held implicitly a t a particular
temporal period as is the case with monism a t the present time despite being a
very explicit prescription in the past.
THEPRESCRIPTIONS
OF PSYCHOLOGY
ARRANGED FAIRS
IN CONTRASTING
Conscious mentalism-Unconscious mentalism (emphasis on awareness of mental
structure or activity-unawareness)
Contentual objectivism-Contentual subjectivism (psychological data viewed as b e
havior of individual-as mental structure or activity of individual)
Determinism-Indeterminism (human events completely explicable in terms of
antecedents-not completely so explicable)
Empiricism-Rationalism (major, if not exclusive source of knowledge is experience
-is reason)
Functionalism-Structuralism (psychological categories are activities-are contents)
Inductivism-Deductivism (investigations begun with facts or observations-with
assumed established truths)
Mechanism-Vitalism (activities of living beings completely explicable by physio-
chemical constituents-not SO explicable)
Methodological objectivism-Methodological subjectivism (use of methods open to
verification by another competent observer-not so open)
Molecularism-Molarism (psychological data most aptly described in terms of
relatively small units-relatively large units)
M onism-Dualism (fundamental principle or entity in universe is of one kind-is
of two kinds, mind and matter)
Naturalism-Supernaturalism (nature requires for its operation and explanation
only principles found within it-requires transcendent guidance as well)
Nomotheticism-Idiographicism (emphasis upon discovering general laws-upon
explaining particular events or individuals)
316 ROBERT I. WATSON
gator. Without an explicit theory, which historians often lack, this safeguard is
not possible within the context of his own work. Related if not identical with
this, explicating a theory in some detail in advance of study has the advantage of
making it possible to see more clearly than otherwise would be the case when
deliberate or accidental deviations are made.
I have reached the last aspect of this paper-research studies in the narrower
sense of data collection and analysis th at have been generated by prescriptive
theory. Over-determined in my own behavior by a n allegiance to quantitativism
and methodological objectivism in the setting of a more general empirical bent,
several studies have served to submit prescriptive theory to test other than th a t
of validation by the method of plausibility. Prescriptive categories are judged
sufficiently testable to permit investigation including the possibility of finding
results t ha t call for their own demise or modification, a not inconsiderable virtue
not always present even in theories in research areas much more explored than is
that of history.
The first dissertation in our doctoral program in the history of psychology
used prescriptive theory as a major aspect of its framework. Completed by Barbara
Ross, now of the University of Massachusetts, Boston, it is entitled Psychological
Thought within the Context of the Scientific Revolution, 1665-1700. Contrary to
general opinion which places the beginning of the scientific study of man in the
nineteenth century, she hypothesized th at events of the seventeenth century served
to place psychology in the same conceptual framework as that of the other sciences.
This, of course, does not conflict with the incontroversible fact that the major
interests, of the seventeenth century scientists were in the problems of the natural
sciences.
The scientific literature of the period scrutinized was the papers in the Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society during the years mentioned. Although
not replacing the hard intellectual labor of the historian, content analyses provided
the major tool. It allows organization of the complex framework of prescriptions
in a systematic way through the definition of the categories, treatment of the data
and interpretation of the findings.
Two judges, other than Dr. Ross, were given definitions and trained in their
application with some material similar to but not identical with the papers in the
Transactions. The judgment made about each paper was whether or not a category
under consideration was relevant or not relevant. Intra coder and inter-coder
reliabilities were in the range of .SO to .96. The information the coding provided
was used in a computer analysis through a joint frequency matrix and a n asso-
ciation matrix for the 125 variables as well as for each of seven, five-year periods.
Of the over 1900 papers published in the Transactions, 367 or 19% were judged
to be relevant t o psychological thought and the study of man. These papers formed
the basis of further study. Something should be said about general findings before
considering what was found about prescriptions. Many of the principles accepted
8s basic assumptions of nineteenth century psychology were found to be embedded
in these papers. These include the beginnings of the physical science model for
psychology and physiology, the natural mechanical explanation applied to the
study of the body of man and also applied to that of abnormal behavior, mechanical
treatment of animal motion leading to the concept of reflex and explanation of body
320 ROBERT I. WATSON
REFERENCES
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Ross, BARBARA. Psychological thought within the context of the scientific revolution, 1665-1700.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation University of New Hampshire, 1970.
STOCKING, G. W., JR. On the limits of presentism and historicism in the historiography of the
behavioral sciences. J. hist. Behau. Sci., 1965, 1, 211-217.
BORING, E. G. Dual role of the Zeitgeist in scientific creativity. Sci. Mon., 1955, 80, 101-106. (Re-
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