Enrile Et Al v. Salazar

3/1/2017 G.R.No.
92163
TodayisWednesday,March01,2017
CustomSearch
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.92163June5,1990
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUS.JUANPONCEENRILE,petitioner
vs.
JUDGEJAIMESALAZAR(PresidingJudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCity[Br.103],SENIOR
STATEPROSECUTORAURELIOTRAMPE,PROSECUTORFERDINANDR.ABESAMIS,ANDCITYASSISTANT
CITYPROSECUTOREULOGIOMANANQUIL,NATIONALBUREAUOFINVESTIGATIONDIRECTOR
ALFREDOLIM,BRIG.GEN.EDGARDULATORRES(SuperintendentoftheNorthernPoliceDistrict)AND/
ORANYANDALLPERSONSWHOMAYHAVEACTUALCUSTODYOVERTHEPERSONOFJUANPONCE
ENRILE,respondents.
G.R.No.92164June5,1990
SPS.REBECCOE.PANLILIOANDERLINDAE.PANLILIO,petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORSFERNANDODELEON,AURELIOC.TRAMPE,FFRDINANDR.ABESAMIS,ANDEULOGIOC.
MANANQUIL,andHON.JAIMEW.SALAZAR,JR.,inhiscapacityasPresidingJudge,RegionalTrialCourt,
QuezonCity,Branch103,respondents.
NARVASA,J.:
Thirtyfour years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes
centerstageasthefocusofaconfrontationatlawthatwouldreexamine,ifnotthevalidityofitsdoctrine,thelimitsofits
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the rulingall with a
markedlackofsuccessbutnone,itwouldBeem,whereseasonandcircumstancehadmoreeffectivelyconspiredtoattract
wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind
andrangeofargumentsthatarenowbroughttobearonthesamequestion.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
EnrilewasarrestedbylawenforcementofficersledbyDirectorAlfredoLimoftheNationalBureauofInvestigation
onthestrengthofawarrantissuedbyHon.JaimeSalazaroftheRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCityBranch103,
inCriminalCaseNo.9010941.Thewarranthadissuedonaninformationsignedandearlierthatdayfiledbya
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
andErlindaPanlilio,andGregorioHonasanwiththecrimeofrebellionwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
nonehavingbeenrecommendedintheinformationandnonefixedinthearrestwarrant.Thefollowingmorning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custodyoftheSuperintendentoftheNorthernPoliceDistrict,Brig.Gen.EdgardoDulaTorres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus
herein(whichwasfollowedbyasupplementalpetitionfiledonMarch2,1990),allegingthathewasdeprivedof
hisconstitutionalrightsinbeing,orhavingbeen:
(a)heldtoanswerforcriminaloffensewhichdoesnotexistinthestatutebooks
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminaryinvestigationwasconducted,hencewasdenieddueprocess
(c)deniedhisrighttobailand
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jun1990/gr_92163_1990.html 1/21
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
havingpersonallydeterminedtheexistenceofprobablecause.4
TheCourtissuedthewritprayedfor,returnableMarch5,1990andsetthepleaforhearingonMarch6,1990. 5
OnMarch5,1990,theSolicitorGeneralfiledaconsolidatedreturn 6fortherespondentsinthiscaseandinG.R.No.92164
7WhichhadbeencontemporaneouslybutseparatelyfiledbytwoofSenatorEnrile'scoaccused,thespousesRebeccoand
ErlindaPanlilio,andraisedsimilarquestions.Saidreturnurgedthatthepetitioners'casedoesnotfallwithintheHernandez
ruling becauseand this is putting it very simplythe information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
chargedmurderandfrustratedmurdercommittedontheoccasion,butnotinfurtherance,ofrebellion.Statedotherwise,the
SolicitorGeneralwoulddistinguishbetweenthecomplexcrime("delitocomplejo")arisingfromanoffensebeinganecessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the
subjectoftheHernandezruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concernedandtowhich,therefore,itshouldnotapply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolutionofthesamedate 8grantingSenatorEnrileandthePanliliospousesprovisionallibertyconditionedupontheir
filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the
Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the
matteroftheprovisionallibertyofthepetitionersandstressedthatitwasnotpassinguponthelegalissuesraisedinboth
cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the
Panlilios.
TheCourtnowaddressesthoseissuesinsofarastheyareraisedandlitigatedinSenatorEnrile'spetition,G.R.
No.92163.
Theparties'oralandwrittenpleaspresentedtheCourtwiththefollowingoptions:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayorinsaidcasethatrebellioncannotabsorbmoreseriouscrimes,andthatunderArticle48
of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, socalled
this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his
writtenpleadings
(b)holdHernandezapplicableonlytooffensescommittedinfurtherance,orasanecessarymeans
for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also
constitute"common"crimesofgraveorlessgravecharacter
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its
course,whetherornotnecessarytoitscommissionorinfurtherancethereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members
felt that the doctrine should be reexamined. 10A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive
enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercisingherpowersunderthe1986FreedomConstitution,sawfittorepeal,amongothers,PresidentialDecreeNo.942of
theformerregimewhichpreciselysoughttonullifyorneutralizeHernandezbyenactinganewprovision(Art.142A)intothe
RevisedPenalCodetotheeffectthat"(w)henbyreason,orontheoccasion,ofanyofthecrimespenalizedinthisChapter
(ChapterIofTitle3,whichincludesrebellion),actswhichconstituteoffensesuponwhichgraverpenaltiesareimposedby
lawarecommitted,thepenaltyforthemostseriousoffenseinitsmaximumperiodshallbeimposedupontheoffender."' 11
Inthusacting,thePresidentineffectbylegislativeflatreinstatedHernandezasbindingdoctrinewiththeeffectoflaw.The
Courtcandonolessthanaccorditthesamerecognition,absentanysufficientlypowerfulreasonagainstsodoing.
Onthesecondoption,theCourtunanimouslyvotedtorejectthetheorythatHernandezis,orshouldbe,limitedin
its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling
shouldnotbeinterpretedasprohibitingthecomplexingofrebellionwithothercommoncrimescommittedonthe
occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments
werenotentirelydevoidofmerit,theconsensuswasthattheywerenotsufficienttoovercomewhatappearstobe
therealthrustofHernandeztoruleoutthecomplexingofrebellionwithanyotheroffensecommittedinitscourse
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority
opinioninthatcase:
ThereisoneotherreasonandafundamentaloneatthatwhyArticle48ofourPenalCodecannotbe
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punishedseparately(assumingthatthiscouldbedone),thefollowingpenaltieswouldbeimposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
mayor,inthecorrespondingperiod,dependinguponthemodifyingcircumstancespresent,butnever
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximumperiodtodeath,dependinguponthemodifyingcircumstancespresent.inotherwords,in
the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However,underArticle48saidpenaltywouldhavetobemetedouttohim,evenintheabsenceofa
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
theprosecution,wouldbeunfavorabletothemovant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performedbyhimwerepunishedseparately.InthewordsofRodriguezNavarro:
Launificaciondepenasenloscasosdeconcursodedelitosaquehacereferenciaeste
articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II
DoctrinaPenaldelTribunalSupremodeEspana,p.2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal
Code(thecounterpartofourArticle48),asamendedin1908andthenin1932,reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo
hechoconstituyadosomasdelitos,ocuandoelunodeellosseamedionecesariopara
cometerelotro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su

gradomaximo,hastaellimitequerepresentslasumadelasquepudieranimponerse,
penandoseparadamentelosdelitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por
separado.(RodriguezNavarro,DoctrinaPenaldelTribunalSupremo,Vol.II,p.2163)
andthatourArticle48doesnotcontainthequalificationinsertedinsaidamendment,restrictingthe
impositionofthepenaltyforthegraveroffenseinitsmaximumperiodtothecasewhenitdoesnot
exceedthesumtotalofthepenaltiesimposableiftheactschargedweredealtwithseparately.The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
saidArticle48.Indeed,ifoneactconstitutestwoormoreoffenses,therecanbenoreasontoinflicta
punishmentgraverthanthatprescribedforeachoneofsaidoffensesputtogether.Indirectingthat
thepenaltyforthegraveroffensebe,insuchcase,imposedinitsmaximumperiod,Article48could
havehadnootherpurposethantoprescribeapenaltylowerthantheaggregateofthepenaltiesfor
each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing
himforeachcrimeindependentlyfromtheother,hemustsufferthemaximumofthepenaltyforthe
moreseriousone,ontheassumptionthatitislessgravethanthesumtotaloftheseparatepenalties
foreachoffense.12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez
remainsbindingdoctrineoperatingtoprohibitthecomplexingofrebellionwithanyotheroffensecommittedonthe
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutesrebellion.
This,however,doesnotwritefinistothecase.Petitioner'sguiltorinnocenceisnothereinquiredinto,muchless
adjudged.Thatisforthetrialcourttodoatthepropertime.TheCourt'srulingmerelyprovidesatakeoffpointfor
thedispositionofotherquestionsrelevanttothepetitioner'scomplaintsaboutthedenialofhisrightsandtothe
proprietyoftherecoursehehastaken.
TheCourtrulesfurther(byavoteof11to3)thattheinformationfiledagainstthepetitionerdoesinfactchargean
offense.Disregardingtheobjectionablephrasingthatwouldcomplexrebellionwithmurderandmultiplefrustrated
murder,thatindictmentistobereadaschargingsimplerebellion.Thus,inHernandez,theCourtsaid:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant
appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredientsofthecrimeofrebellionallegedlycommittedbysaiddefendants,asmeans"necessary"
(4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amendedinformationis,therefore,simplerebellion,notthecomplexcrimeofrebellionwithmultiple
murder, arsons and robberies that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prisionmayor and a fine of P2H,HHH and that, in conformity with the
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
policyofthiscourtindealingwithaccusedpersonsamenabletoasimilarpunishment,saiddefendant
maybeallowedbail.13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committedontheoccasionthereof,mustthereforebedismissedasamereflightofrhetoric.Readinthecontext
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
RevisedPenalCode:simplerebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation
conducted?Therecordshowsotherwise,thatacomplaintagainstpetitionerforsimplerebellionwasfiledbythe
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an
offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the
preliminaryinvestigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally
determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his
witnesses,inviolationofArt.III,sec.2,oftheConstitution. 15ThisCourthasalreadyruled,however,thatitisnotthe
unavoidabledutyofthejudgetomakesuchapersonalexamination,itbeingsufficientthathefollowsestablishedprocedure
bypersonallyevaluatingthereportandthesupportingdocumentssubmittedbytheprosecutor.16Petitionerclaimsthatthe
warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardlygavethelattersufficienttimetopersonallygooverthevoluminousrecordsofthepreliminaryinvestigation. 17Merely
becausesaidrespondenthadwhatsomemightconsideronlyarelativelybriefperiodwithinwhichtocomplywiththatduty,
gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcomethelegalpresumptionthatofficialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformed.
Petitionerfinallyclaimsthathewasdeniedtherighttobail.InthelightoftheCourt'sreaffirmationofHernandez
as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him
shouldbeconsideredaschargingonlythecrimeofsimplerebellion,whichisbailablebeforeconviction,thatmust
nowbeacceptedasacorrectproposition.Butthequestionremains:Giventhefactsfromwhichthiscasearose,
wasapetitionforhabeascorpusinthisCourttheappropriatevehicleforassertingarighttobailorvindicatingits
denial?
ThecriminalcasebeforetherespondentJudgewasthenormalvenueforinvokingthepetitioner'srighttohave
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent.Thecorrectcoursewasforpetitionertoinvokethatjurisdictionbyfilingapetitiontobeadmittedto
bail,claimingarighttobailpersebyreasonoftheweaknessoftheevidenceagainsthim.Onlyafterthatremedy
wasdeniedbythetrialcourtshouldthereviewjurisdictionofthisCourthavebeeninvoked,andeventhen,not
withoutfirstapplyingtotheCourtofAppealsifappropriatereliefwasalsoavailablethere.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non
existentcrimeor,contrarily,theorizingonthesamebasisthatitchargesmorethanoneoffense,wouldnotexcuse
or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a
motiontoquashbroughtinthecriminalactionbeforetherespondentJudge.18
TherethusseemstobenoquestionthatAllthegroundsuponwhichpetitionerhasfoundedthepresentpetition,
whetherthesewentintothesubstanceofwhatischargedintheinformationorimputederrororomissiononthe
partoftheprosecutingpaneloroftherespondentJudgeindealingwiththechargesagainsthim,wereoriginally
justiciableinthecriminalcasebeforesaidJudgeandshouldhavebeenbroughtupthereinsteadofdirectlytothis
Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or
competenceoftherespondentJudgeindeedsuchanassumptionwouldbedemeaningandlessthanfairtoour
trial courts none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
everycourt,exceptthisCourt,fromdecidingthemnone,inshortthatwouldjustifybypassingestablishedjudicial
processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the
reasonbehindthevoteoffourMembersoftheCourtagainstthegrantofbailtopetitioner:theviewthatthetrial
courtshouldnotthusbeprecipitatelyoustedofitsoriginaljurisdictiontograntordenybail,andifiterredinthat
matter,deniedanopportunitytocorrectitserror.ItmakesnodifferencethattherespondentJudgehereissueda
warrantofarrestfixingnobail.Immemorialpracticesanctionssimplyfollowingtheprosecutor'srecommendation
regardingbail,thoughitmaybeperceivedasthebettercourseforthejudgemotuproprio to set a bail hearing
where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommendedorfixedtoclaimtherighttoabailhearingandtherebyputtoproofthestrengthorweaknessoftheevidence
againsthim.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
ItisapropostopointoutthatthepresentpetitionhastriggeredarushtothisCourtofotherpartiesinasimilar
situation,allapparentlytakingtheircuefromit,distrustfulorcontemptuousoftheefficacyofseekingrecoursein
the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the
petitionermayhavehopedtoavoidbycomingdirectlytothisCourt.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to
wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone
through,theCourtnowdecidesthesameonthemerits.Butinsodoing,theCourtcannotexpresstoostrongly
theviewthatsaidpetitioninterdictedtheorderedandorderlyprogressionofproceedingsthatshouldhavestarted
withthetrialcourtandreachedthisCourtonlyifthereliefappealedforwasdeniedbytheformerand,inaproper
case,bytheCourtofAppealsonreview.
LetitbemadeveryclearthathereaftertheCourtwillnolongercountenance,butwillgiveshortshriftto,pleaslike
thepresent,thatclearlyshortcircuitthejudicialprocessandburdenitwiththeresolutionofissuesproperlywithin
theoriginalcompetenceofthelowercourts.Whathasthusfarbeenstatedisequallyapplicabletoanddecisiveof
thepetitionofthePanliliospouses(G.R.No.92164)whichisvirtuallyIdenticaltothatofpetitionerEnrileinfactual
milieuandisthereforedeterminableonthesameprinciplesalreadysetforth.Saidspouseshaveuncontestedly
pleaded20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as coaccused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 9010941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody
anddetainedwithoutbailonthestrengthofsaidwarrantsinviolationtheyclaimoftheirconstitutionalrights.
Itmaybethatinthelightofcontemporaryevents,theactofrebellionhaslostthatquitessentianyquixoticquality
thatjustifiestherelativeleniencywithwhichitisregardedandpunishedbylaw,thatpresentdayrebelsareless
impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom
nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhemsomuchinthenewsthesedays,asoftenperpetratedagainstinnocentciviliansasagainstthemilitary,
butbyandlargeattributableto,orevenclaimedbysocalledrebelstobepartof,anongoingrebellion.
ItisenoughtogiveanyonepauseandtheCourtisnoexceptionthatnoteventhecrowdedstreetsofourcapital
City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at
national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the
penaltythereforortoclearlydefineanddelimittheotheroffensestobeconsideredasabsorbedthereby,sothatit
cannotbeconvenientlyutilizedastheumbrellaforeverysortofillegalactivityundertakeninitsname.TheCourt
hasnopowertoeffectsuchchange,foritcanonlyinterpretthelawasitstandsatanygiventime,andwhatis
neededliesbeyondinterpretation.Hopefully,Congresswillperceivetheneedforpromptlyseizingtheinitiativein
thismatter,whichisproperlywithinitsprovince.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questionedinformationfiledagainstpetitionersJuanPonceEnrileandthespousesRebeccoandErlindaPanlilio
mustbereadaschargingsimplerebelliononly,hencesaidpetitionersareentitledtobail,beforefinalconviction,
as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
postedbythepetitioners.Oncebailisfixedbysaidrespondentforanyofthepetitioners,thecorrespondingbail
bondfliedwiththisCourtshallbecomefunctusoficio.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Cruz,GancaycoandRegalado,JJ.,concur.
Medialdea,J.,concursinG.R.No.92164buttooknopartinG.R.No.92163.
CortesandGrioAquino,JJ.,areonleave.
SeparateOpinions
MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,concurring:
IjoinmycolleaguesinholdingthattheHernandezdoctrine,whichhasbeenwithusforthepastthreedecades,
remainsgoodlawand,thus,shouldremainundisturbed,despiteperiodicchallengestoitthat,ironically,haveonly
servedtostrengthenitspronouncements.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
Itakeexceptiontotheview,however,thathabeascorpuswasnottheproperremedy.
HadtheInformationfiledbelowchargedmerelythesimplecrimeofRebellion,thatpropositioncouldhavebeen
plausible.ButthatInformationchargedRebellioncomplexedwithMurderandMultipleFrustratedMurder,acrime
whichdoesnotexistinourstatutebooks.Thechargewasobviouslyintendedtomakethepenaltyforthemost
seriousoffenseinitsmaximumperiodimposableupontheoffenderpursuanttoArticle48oftheRevisedPenal
Code.Thus,nobailwasrecommendedintheInformationnorwasanyprescribedintheWarrantofArrestissued
bytheTrialCourt.
Undertheattendantcircumstances,therefore,tohavefiledaMotiontoQuashbeforethelowerCourtwouldnot
havebroughtaboutthespeedyrelieffromunlawfulrestraintthatpetitionerwasseeking.Duringthependencyof
saidMotionbeforethelowerCourt,petitionercouldhavecontinuedtolanguishindetention.Besides,theWritof
Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs.
CourtofAppeals,24SCRA663).
Itistruethathabeascorpuswouldordinarilynothewhenapersonisundercustodybyvirtueofaprocessissued
byaCourt.
TheCourt,however,musthavejurisdictiontoissuetheprocess.Inthiscase,theCourtbelowmustbedeemedto
havebeenoustedofjurisdictionwhenitillegallycurtailedpetitioner'sliberty.Habeascorpusisthusavailable.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the
detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the
process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be
assailed.Evenifithadauthoritytoactattheoutset,itisnowtheprevailingdoctrinethatadeprivation
of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus
couldbereliedupontoregainone'sliberty(Celestevs.People,31SCRA391)[Emphasisemphasis].
The Petition for habeascorpuswas precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail
inasmuchasrebellion,underthepresentstateofthelaw,isabailableoffenseandthecrimeforwhichpetitioner
standsaccusedofandforwhichhewasdeniedbailisnonexistentinlaw.
Whilelitigantsshould,asarule,ascendthestepsofthejudicialladder,nothingshouldstopthisCourtfromtaking
cognizanceofpetitionsbroughtbeforeitraisingurgentconstitutionalissues,anyproceduralflawnotwithstanding.
Therulesonhabeascorpusaretobeliberallyconstrued(Ganawayv.Quilen,42Phil.805),thewrit
of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitraryandlawlessstateaction.Thescopeandflexibilityofthewrititscapacitytoreachallmanner
ofillegaldetentionitsabilitytocutthroughbarriersofformandproceduralmazeshavealwaysbeen
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of
Prisons,37SCRA420)[emphasissupplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought about by the
insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses
notwithstandingthefactthatthisCourthadnotyetruledonthevalidityofthatchargeandhadgrantedprovisional
libertytopetitioner.
If,indeed,itisdesiredtomakethecrimeofRebellionacapitaloffense(nowpunishablebyreclusionperpetua),
theremedyliesinlegislation.ButArticle142A1oftheRevisedPenalCode,alongwithP.D.No.942,wererepealed,for
being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others
enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory
decrees."Havingbeensorepealed,thisCourtisbereftofpowertolegislateintoexistence,undertheguiseofreexamining
asettleddoctrine,a"creatureunknowninlaw"thecomplexcrimeofRebellionwithMurder.Theremandofthecasetothe
lowerCourtforfurtherproceedingsisinorder.TheWritofHabeasCorpushasserveditspurpose.
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.,concurring:
IjointheCourt'sdecisiontograntthepetition.Inreiteratingtherulethatunderexistinglawrebellionmaynotbe
complexedwithmurder,theCourtemphasizesthatitcannotlegislateanewcrimeintoexistencenorprescribea
penaltyforitscommission.ThatfunctionisexclusivelyforCongress.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
IwritethisseparateopiniontomakeclearhowIviewcertainissuesarisingfromthesecases,especiallyonhow
thedefectiveinformationsfiledbytheprosecutorsshouldhavebeentreated.
Iagreewiththeponentethatapetitionforhabeascorpusisordinarilynottheproperproceduretoasserttheright
tobail.Underthespecialcircumstancesofthiscase,however,thepetitionershadnootherrecourse.Theyhadto
cometous.
First,thetrialcourtwascertainlyawareofthedecisioninPeoplev.Hernandez,99Phil.515(1956)thatthereis
nosuchcrimeinourstatutebooksasrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,thatmurdercommittedinconnectionwith
a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or
propertyconstitutesneithertwoormoreoffensesnoracomplexcrimebutonecrimerebellionpureandsimple.
Second,Hernandezhasbeenthelawfor34years.Ithasbeenreiteratedinequallysensationalcases.Alllawyers
and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine reexamined have been
consistentlyrejectedbythisCourt.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby
installingthenewcrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithoffenseslikemurderwheregraverpenaltiesareimposedby
law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec.
Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the
Hernandezdoctrineremainsthecontrollingrule.Theprosecutionhasnotexplainedwhyitinsistsonresurrecting
anoffenseexpresslywipedoutbythePresident.Theprosecution,ineffect,questionstheactionofthePresident
inrepealingarepressivedecree,adecreewhich,accordingtotherepealorder,isviolativeofhumanrights.
Fourth,anyreexaminationoftheHernandezdoctrinebringstheexpostfactoprincipleintothepicture.Decisions
ofthisCourtformpartofourlegalsystem.Evenifwedeclarethatrebellionmaybecomplexedwithmurder,our
declarationcannotbemaderetroactivewheretheeffectistoimprisonapersonforacrimewhichdidnotexist
untiltheSupremeCourtreverseditself.
Andfifth,theattemptstodistinguishthiscasefromtheHernandezcasebystressingthatthekillingschargedin
theinformationwerecommitted"ontheoccasionof,butnotanecessarymeansfor,thecommissionofrebellion"
resultinoutlandishconsequencesandignorethebasicnatureofrebellion.Thus,undertheprosecutiontheorya
bomb dropped on PTV4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a
necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the
neighborhood,thedroppingofthebombbecomesrebellioncomplexedwithmurderbecausethekillingofcivilians
isnotnecessaryforthesuccessofarebellionand,therefore,thekillingsareonly"ontheoccasionofbutnota
'necessarymeansfor'thecommissionofrebellion.
Thisargumentispuerile.
Thecrimeofrebellionconsistsofmanyacts.Thedroppingofonebombcannotbeisolatedasaseparatecrime
ofrebellion.Neithershouldthedroppingofonehundredbombsorthefiringofthousandsofmachinegunbullets
bebrokenupintoahundredorthousandsofseparateoffenses,ifeachbomboreachbullethappenstoresultin
thedestructionoflifeandproperty.Thesameactcannotbepunishablebyseparatepenaltiesdependingonwhat
strikesthefancyofprosecutorspunishmentforthekillingofsoldiersorretributionforthedeathsofcivilians.The
prosecutionalsolosessightoftheregrettablefactthatintotalwarandinrebellionthekillingofcivilians,thelaying
wasteofcivilianeconomies,themassacreofinnocentpeople,theblowingupofpassengerairplanes,andother
actsofterrorismareallusedbythoseengagedinrebellion.Wecannotandshouldnottrytoascertaintheintent
ofrebelsforeachsingleactunlesstheactisplainlynotconnectedtotherebellion.WecannotuseArticle48of
the Revised Penal Code in lieu of stillto beenacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on
militaryfacilitiesfurtherstherebellionandispartoftherebellion.
Thetrialcourtwascertainlyawareofalltheaboveconsiderations.IcannotunderstandwhythetrialJudgeissued
the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner
was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested withoutbail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court
forgottoapplyanestablisheddoctrineoftheSupremeCourt.Worse,itissuedawarrantwhichreversed34years
ofestablishedprocedurebasedonawellknownSupremeCourtruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system they do not belong to the
prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its
erroneousmanifestations.Facedwithaninformationchargingamanifestlynonexistentcrime,thedutyofatrial
courtistothrowitout.Or,attheveryleastandwherepossible,makeitconformtothelaw.
AlowercourtcannotreexamineandreverseadecisionoftheSupremeCourtespeciallyadecisionconsistently
followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his
reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment he renders, any order he
prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
jurisdictiontoreverseorignoreprecedentsoftheSupremeCourt.Inthisparticularcase,itshouldhavebeenthe
Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of
arrestwithoutbail.ItshouldhavebeentheSolicitorGeneralprovokingtheissueofreexaminationinsteadofthe
petitionersaskingtobefreedfromtheirarrestforanonexistentcrime.
Theprinciplebearsrepeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any
other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as
simpleasthat.ThereisrelevancetothisexcerptfromBarrerav.Barrera.(L31589,July31,1970,
34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutoryprovision,anexecutiveorder,aproceduralnormoramunicipalordinanceiscommittedto
the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid
confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highestjudicialorgan,thisCourt.Whatitsaysthenshouldbedefinitiveandauthoritative,bindingon
those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid,
107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraphoftheopinioninBarrerafurtheremphasizesthepoint:Suchathoughtwasreiteratedin
anopinionofJusticeJ.B.L.Reyesandfurtheremphasizedinthesewords:'JudgeGaudencioCloribel
need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial
administration,hasthelastwordonwhatthelawisitisthefinalarbiterofanyjustifiablecontroversy.
ThereisonlyoneSupremeCourtfromwhosedecisionsallothercourtsshouldtaketheirbearings.
(Ibid.JusticeJ.B.L.ReyesspokethusinAlbertv.CourtofFirstInstanceofManila(Br.VI),L26364,
May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also
Albertv.CourtofFirstInstance,23SCRA948[1968]andVirJenShippingandMarineServices,Inc.
v.NLRC,125SCRA577[1983])
IfindthesituationinSpousesPanliliov.ProsecutorsFernandodeLeon,etal.evenmoreinexplicable.Inthecase
ofthePanlilios,anyprobablecausetocommitthenonexistentcrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurderexists
onlyinthemindsoftheprosecutors,notintherecordsofthecase.
IhavegoneovertherecordsandpleadingsfurnishedtothemembersoftheSupremeCourt.Ilistenedintentlyto
theoralargumentsduringthehearinganditwasquiteapparentthattheconstitutionalrequirementofprobable
causewasnotsatisfied.Infact,inanswertomyqueryforanyotherproofstosupporttheissuanceofawarrantof
arrest,theanswerwasthattheevidencewouldbesubmittedinduetimetothetrialcourt.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the records of
these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a coconspirator in the
rebellion.Theabsurdityofthispropositionisapparentifwebearinmindthatrebelsrideinbusesandjeepneys,
eatmealsinruralhouseswhenmealtimefindstheminthevicinity,joinweddings,fiestas,andotherparties,play
basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily
followthattheformerarecoconspiratorsinarebellion.
TheonlybasisforprobablecauseshownbytherecordsofthePanliliocaseistheallegedfactthatthepetitioners
servedfoodtorebelsattheEnrilehouseholdandahotelsupervisoraskedtwoorthreeoftheirwaiters,without
reason,togoonavacation.Clearly,amuch,muchstrongershowingofprobablecausemustbeshown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the
heinousbombingofinnocentciviliansbecausethemanwhoplantedthebombhad,sometimeearlier,appeared
inagroupphotographtakenduringabirthdaypartyintheUnitedStateswiththeSenatorandotherguests.Itwas
acaseofconspiracyprovedthroughagrouppicture.Here,itisacaseofconspiracysoughttoprovedthrough
thecateringoffood.
TheCourtinSalongastressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensivetrials.(Trociov.Manta,118SCRA241citingHashimnv.Boncan,71Phil.216).Theright
to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutionaldueprocess.(SeePeoplev.Oandasa,25SCRA277)However,inordertosatisfythe
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of
makingsurethatatransgressorshallnotescapewithimpunity.Apreliminaryinvestigationservesnot
onlythepurposesoftheState.Moreimportant,itisapartoftheguaranteesoffreedomandfairplay
which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertainedthattheevidenceisinsufficienttosustainaprimafaciecaseorthatnoprobablecause
existstoformasufficientbeliefastotheguiltoftheaccused.Althoughthereisnogeneralformulaor
fixedruleforthedeterminationofprobablecausesincethesamemustbedecidedinthelightofthe
conditionsobtainingingivensituationsanditsexistencedependstoalargedegreeuponthefinding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts
before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez,129SCRA391).Thejudgeorfiscal,therefore,shouldnotgoonwiththeprosecutionin
the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violationofabasicrightwhichthecourtsarecreatedtouphold.Itbearsrepeatingthatthejudiciary
livesuptoitsmissionbyvitalizingandnotdenigratingconstitutionalrights.Soithasbeenbefore.It
shouldcontinuetobeso.(id.,pp.461462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as
charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its
contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these
cases,however,thereisadeliberateattempttochargethepetitionersforanoffensewhichthisCourthasruled
asnonexistent.TheprosecutionwantedHernandeztobereversed.Sincetheprosecutionhasfiledinformations
foracrimewhich,underourrulings,doesnotexist,thoseinformationsshouldbetreatedasnullandvoid.New
informationschargingthecorrectoffenseshouldbefiled.AndinG.R.No.92164,anextraeffortshouldbemade
toseewhetherornotthePrincipleinSalongav.CruzPatio,etal.(supra)hasbeenviolated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress
rebellion.IftheGovernmentfeelsthatthecurrentsituationcallsfortheimpositionofmoreseverepenaltieslike
deathorthecreationofnewcrimeslikerebellioncomplexedwithmurder,theremedyiswithCongress,notthe
courts.
I,therefore,votetoGRANTthepetitionsandtoORDERtherespondentcourttoDISMISSthevoidinformations
foranonexistentcrime.
FELICIANO,J.,concurring:
IconcurintheresultreachedbythemajorityoftheCourt.
IbelievethattherearecertainaspectsoftheHernandezdoctrinethat,asanabstractquestionoflaw,couldstand
reexaminationorclarification.Ihaveinmindinparticularmatterssuchasthecorrectorappropriaterelationship
betweenArticle134andArticle135oftheRevisedPenalCode.Thisisamatterwhichrelatestothelegalconcept
of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or
InsurrectionHow Committed"), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal
purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the
crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts
comprisingrebellion),"forthepurposeof(i.e.,thespecificcriminalintentorpoliticalobjective)removingfromthe
allegiancetosaidgovernmentoritslawstheterritoryoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesoranypartthereof,orany
bodyofland,navalorotherarmedforces,ordeprivingtheChiefExecutiveortheLegislature,whollyorpartially,
of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.")
setsoutalistingofactsorparticularmeasureswhichappeartofallundertherubricofrebellionorinsurrection:
"engaging in war against the forces of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence,
exactingcontributionsordivertingpublicfundsfromthelawfulpurposeforwhichtheyhavebeenappropriated."
Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of participation in a
rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the
distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the
RevisedPenalCodeand,ontheotherhand,differingoptionalmodesofseekingtocarryoutthepoliticalorsocial
objectiveoftherebellionorinsurrection.
Thedifficultythatisatonceraisedbyanyefforttoexamineoncemoreeventheabovethresholdquestionsisthat
theresultsofsuchreexaminationmaywellbethatactswhichundertheHernandezdoctrineareabsorbedinto
rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be
prosecutedseparatelyfromrebellionorprosecutedundertheprovisionsofArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCode,
which(bothClause1andClause2thereof)clearlyenvisagetheexistenceofatleasttwo(2)distinctoffenses.To
reachsuchaconclusioninthecaseatbar,would,asfarasIcansee,resultincollidingwiththefundamentalnon
retroactivityprinciple(Article4,CivilCodeArticle22,RevisedPenalCodebothinrelationtoArticle8,CivilCode).
Thenonretroactivityruleappliestostatutesprincipally.But,statutesdonotexistintheabstractbutratherbear
upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
decisionsconstruingstatutorynormsgivespecificshapeandcontenttosuchnorms.Intime,thestatutorynorms
become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the
norms(CfCaltexv.Palomar,18SCRA247[1966]).Thus,whileinlegaltheory,judicialinterpretationofastatute
becomespartofthelawasofthedatethatthelawwasoriginallyenacted,Ibelievethistheoryisnottobeapplied
rigorouslywhereanewjudicialdoctrineisannounced,inparticularoneoverrulingapreviousexistingdoctrineof
long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the
newdoctrineismoreonerousfortheaccusedthanthepreexistingone(Peoplev.Jabinal,55SCRA607[1974]
Peoplev.Licera,65SCRA270[1975]Gumabonv.DirectorofPrisons,37SCRA420[1971]).Moreover,thenon
retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The
prevailingruleintheUnitedStatesisthatajudicialdecisionthatretroactivelyrendersanactcriminalorenhances
theseverityofthepenaltyprescribedforanoffense,isvulnerabletoconstitutionalchallengebasedupontherule
againstexpostfactolawsandthedueprocessclause(Bouiev.CityofColumbia,378US347,12L.Ed.2d894
[1964]Marksv.U.S.,43US188,51L.Ed.2d260[1977]Devinev.NewMexicoDepartmentofCorrections,866
F.2d339[1989]).
ItisurgedbytheSolicitorGeneralthatthenonretroactivityprincipledoesnotpresentanyrealproblemforthe
reasonthattheHernandezdoctrinewasbaseduponArticle48,secondclause,oftheRevisedPenalCodeand
not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here
invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply
characterized.AndassumingtheHernandezcouldbesocharacterized,subsequentcasesrefertotheHernandez
doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48
(e.g.,Peoplev.Geronimo,100Phil.90[1956]Peoplev.Rodriguez,107Phil.659[1960]).Thus,itappearstome
that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or
understoodtheHernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly different
terms,theimportantquestionwouldbewhetherthenewdoctrinehereproposedbytheGovernmentcouldfairly
have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an
examinationofArticles134and135oftheRevisedPenalCodeasinterpretedbytheCourtintheHernandezand
subsequent cases. To formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer,
especiallyinviewoftheconclusionsreachedbytheCourtanditsseveralMemberstoday.
Finally,thereappearstobenoquestionthatthenewdoctrinethattheGovernmentwouldhaveusdiscoverforthe
firsttimesincethepromulgationoftheRevisedPenalCodein1932,wouldbemoreonerousfortherespondent
accusedthanthesimpleapplicationoftheHernandezdoctrinethatmurderswhichhavebeencommittedonthe
occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple
rebellion.
Iagreethereforethattheinformationinthiscasemustbeviewedaschargingonlythecrimeofsimplerebellion.
FERNAN,C.J.,concurringanddissenting:
Iamconstrainedtowritethisseparateopiniononwhatseemstobearigidadherencetothe1956rulingofthe
Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
(1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it
conformablewithacceptedandwellsettledprinciplesofcriminallawandjurisprudence.
Tomymind,theHernandezdoctrineshouldnotbeinterpretedasanallembracingauthorityfortherulethatall
commoncrimescommittedontheoccasion,orinfurtheranceof,orinconnectionwith,rebellionareabsorbedby
the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez
constitutesrebellion"(p.9,Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the
communistinspiredrebellionoftheHuks.Thechangesinoursocietyinthespanof34yearssincethenhavefar
reachingeffectsontheallembracingapplicabilityofthedoctrineconsideringtheemergenceofalternativemodes
ofseizingthepowersofthedulyconstitutedGovernmentnotcontemplatedinArticles134and135oftheRevised
PenalCodeandtheirconsequenteffectsonthelivesofourpeople.Thedoctrinewasgoodlawthen,butIbelieve
thatthereisacertainaspectoftheHernandezdoctrinethatneedsclarification.
WithallduerespecttotheviewsofmybrethrenintheCourt,IbelievethattheCourt,intheinstantcase,should
have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of
rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the
commissionofrebellion,ontheother.ThemajorityoftheCourtiscorrectinadopting,albeitimpliedly,theviewin
Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an
elementofthelatter,theresultinginterlockingcrimesshouldbeconsideredasonlyonesimpleoffenseandmust
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
bedeemedoutsidetheoperationofthecomplexcrimeprovision(Article48)oftheRevisedPenalCode.Asinthe
caseofHernandez,theCourt,however,failedintheinstantcasetodistinguishwhatisindispensablefromwhatis
merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder,
arson,robbery,etc.committedinthecourseorontheoccasionofrebellionareabsorbedorincludedinthelatter
aselementsthereof.
Therelevanceofthedistinctionissignificant,moreparticularly,ifappliedtocontemporaneouseventshappening
inourcountrytoday.Theoretically,acrimewhichisindispensableinthecommissionofanothermustnecessarily
be an element of the latter but a crime that is merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of
anotherisnotanelementofthelatter,andifandwhenactuallycommitted,bringstheinterlockingcrimewithinthe
operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common
crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensableovertactsofrebellionandarelogicallyabsorbedinitasvirtualingredientsorelementsthereof,but
common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in
furtherancethereof,maybenecessarybutnotindispensableincommittingthelatter,andmay,therefore,notbe
considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed
confrontationorclashesbetweengovernmentforcesandtherebelsareabsorbedintherebellion,andwouldbe
thoseresultingfromthebombingofmilitarycampsandinstallations,astheseactsareindispensableincarrying
outtherebellion.Butdeliberatelyshootingdownanunarmedinnocentciviliantoinstillfearorcreatechaosamong
thepeople,althoughdoneinthefurtheranceoftherebellion,shouldnotbeabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellionas
the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Codeshouldapply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the dulyconstituted
governmentbystagingsurpriseattacksoroccupyingcentersofpowers,ofwhichthisCourtshouldtakejudicial
notice,hasintroducedanewdimensiontotheinterpretationoftheprovisionsonrebellionandinsurrectioninthe
RevisedPenalCode.Generally,asamodeofseizingthepowersofthedulyconstitutedgovernment,itfallswithin
the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a
classbyitself.Themannerofitsexecutionandtheextentandmagnitudeofitseffectsonthelivesofthepeople
distinguishacoupd'etatfromthetraditionaldefinitionandmodesofcommissionattachedbytheRevisedPenal
CodetothecrimeofrebellionasappliedbytheCourttothecommunistinspiredrebellionofthe1950's.Acoup
d'etatmaybeexecutedsuccessfullywithoutitsperpetratorsresortingtothecommissionofotherseriouscrimes
suchasmurder,arson,kidnapping,robbery,etc.becauseoftheelementofsurpriseandtheprecisetimingofits
execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the
occasionofacoupd'etat,thedistinctionreferredtoaboveonwhatisnecessaryandwhatisindispensableinthe
commissionofthecoupd'etatshouldbepainstakinglyconsideredastheCourtshouldhavedoneinthecaseof
hereinpetitioners.
IconcurintheresultinsofarastheotherissuesareresolvedbytheCourtbutItakeexceptiontothevoteofthe
majorityonthebroadapplicationoftheHernandezdoctrine.
BIDIN,J.,concurringanddissenting:
Iconcurwiththemajorityopinionexceptasregardsthedispositiveportionthereofwhichorderstheremandofthe
casetotherespondentjudgeforfurtherproceedingstofixtheamountofbailtobepostedbythepetitioner.
Isubmitthattheproceedingsneednotberemandedtotherespondentjudgeforthepurposeoffixingbailsince
wehaveconstruedtheindictmenthereinaschargingsimplerebellion,anoffensewhichisbailable.Consequently,
habeascorpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple
rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of
petitioner'sconstitutionalrighttobail.Inviewthereof,theresponsibilityoffixingtheamountofbailandapproval
thereofwhenfiled,devolvesuponus,ifcompletereliefistobeaccordedtopetitionerintheinstantproceedings.
Itisindubitablethatbeforeconviction,admissiontobailisamatterofrighttothedefendant,accusedbeforethe
RegionalTrialCourtofanoffenselessthancapital(Section13ArticleIII,ConstitutionandSection3,Rule114).
Petitioneris,beforeUs,onapetitionforhabeascorpuspraying,amongothers,forhisprovisionalreleaseonbail.
Sincetheoffensecharged(construedassimplerebellion)admitsofbail,itisincumbentuponusmtheexerciseof
ourjurisdictionoverthepetitionforhabeascorpus(Section5(1),ArticleVIII,ConstitutionSection2,Rule102),to
grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the
court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall
forthwithbecertifiedtotherespondenttrialcourt(Section14,Rule102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release
pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his
provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge, without necessity of a
remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its
orderorjudgmentinthesaidcase.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
SARMIENTO,J.,concurringanddissenting:
IagreethatPeoplev.Hernandez1shouldabide.Morethanthreedecadesafterwhichitwaspenned,ithasfirmlysettled
inthetomesofourjurisprudenceascorrectdoctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government," 2 which implies
"resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to
property,physicalinjuriesandlossoflife,andthehunger,illnessandunhappinessthatwarleavesinitswake...."3whether
committedinfurtherance,ofasanecessarymeansforthecommission,orinthecourse,ofrebellion.Tosaythatrebellion
may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly,
rebellionincludesmurder,amongotherpossiblecrimes.
Ialsoagreethattheinformationmaystandasanaccusationforsimplerebellion.Sincetheactscomplainedofas
constitutingrebellionhavebeenembodiedintheinformation,mentionthereinofmurderasacomplexingoffense
isasurplusage,becauseinanycase,thecrimeofrebellionisleftfullydescribed.4
Atanyrate,thegovernmentneedonlyamendtheinformationbyaclericalcorrection,sinceanamendmentwill
notalteritssubstance.
Idissent,however,insofarasthemajorityorderstheremandofthematterofbailtothelowercourt.Itakeitthat
whenwe,inourResolutionofMarch6,1990,grantedthepetitioner"provisionalliberty"uponthefilingofabond
ofP100,000.00,wegrantedhimbail.Thefactthatwegavehim"provisionalliberty"isinmyview,ofnomoment,
because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident
againwhenweourselveshavebeensatisfiedthatthepetitionerisentitledtotemporaryfreedom.
PADILLA,J.,dissenting:
IconcurinthemajorityopinioninsofarasitholdsthattherulinginPeoplevs.Hernandez,99Phil.515"remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
constitutesrebellion."
Idissent,however,fromthemajorityopinioninsofarasitholdsthattheinformationinquestion,whilechargingthe
complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging simple
rebellion."
ThepresentcasesaretobedistinguishedfromtheHernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the

Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealedcase, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the
trialcourtofthecomplexcrimeofrebellionwithmurder,arsonandrobbery,andhispleatobereleasedonbail
beforetheSupremeCourt,pendingappeal,gavebirthtothenowcelebratedHernandezdoctrinethatthecrimeof
rebellioncomplexedwithmurder,arsonandrobberydoesnotexist.Inthepresentcases,ontheotherhand,the
Courtisconfrontedwithanoriginalcase,i.e.,whereaninformationhasbeenrecentlyfiledinthetrialcourtand
thepetitionershavenotevenpleadedthereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "groundbreaking" on the issue of whether
rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
prosecutionandthelowercourt,notonlyhadtheHernandezdoctrine(ascaselaw),butExecutiveOrderNo.187
ofPresidentCorazonC.Aquinodated5June1987(asstatutorylaw)tobindthemtothelegalpropositionthatthe
crimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,andmultiplefrustratedmurderdoesnotexist.
Andyet,notwithstandingtheseunmistakableandcontrollingbeaconlightsabsentwhenthisCourtlaiddownthe
Hernandez doctrinethe prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an
information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That
informationisclearlyanullityandplainlyvoidabinitio.Itsheadshouldnotbeallowedtosurface.Asanullityin
substantivelaw,itchargesnothingithasgivenrisetonothing.Thewarrantsofarrestissuedpursuanttheretoare
asnullandvoidastheinformationonwhichtheyareanchored.And,sincetheentirequestionoftheinformation's
validityisbeforetheCourtinthesehabeascorpuscases,Iventuretosaythattheinformationisfatallydefective,
evenunderprocedurallaw,becauseitchargesmorethanone(1)offense(Sec.13,Rule110,RulesofCourt).
IsubmitthenthatitisnotforthisCourttoenergizeadeadand,atbest,fatallydecrepitinformationbylabellingor
"baptizing"itdifferentlyfromwhatitannouncesitselftobe.Theprosecutionmustfileanentirelynewandproper
information,forthisentireexercisetomerittheseriousconsiderationofthecourts.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for
rebellioncomplexedwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurderinCriminalCaseNos.9010941,RTCofQuezon
City,DISMISSED.
Consequently,thepetitionersshouldbeorderedpermanentlyreleasedandtheirbailscancelled.
Paras,J.,concurs.
SeparateOpinions
MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,concurring:
IjoinmycolleaguesinholdingthattheHernandezdoctrine,whichhasbeenwithusforthepastthreedecades,
remainsgoodlawand,thus,shouldremainundisturbed,despiteperiodicchallengestoitthat,ironically,haveonly
servedtostrengthenitspronouncements.
Itakeexceptiontotheview,however,thathabeascorpuswasnottheproperremedy.
HadtheInformationfiledbelowchargedmerelythesimplecrimeofRebellion,thatpropositioncouldhavebeen
plausible.ButthatInformationchargedRebellioncomplexedwithMurderandMultipleFrustratedMurder,acrime
whichdoesnotexistinourstatutebooks.Thechargewasobviouslyintendedtomakethepenaltyforthemost
seriousoffenseinitsmaximumperiodimposableupontheoffenderpursuanttoArticle48oftheRevisedPenal
Code.Thus,nobailwasrecommendedintheInformationnorwasanyprescribedintheWarrantofArrestissued
bytheTrialCourt.
Undertheattendantcircumstances,therefore,tohavefiledaMotiontoQuashbeforethelowerCourtwouldnot
havebroughtaboutthespeedyrelieffromunlawfulrestraintthatpetitionerwasseeking.Duringthependencyof
saidMotionbeforethelowerCourt,petitionercouldhavecontinuedtolanguishindetention.Besides,theWritof
HabeasCorpusmaystillissueevenifanotherremedy,whichislesseffective,maybeavailedof(Chavezvs.
CourtofAppeals,24SCRA663).
Itistruethathabeascorpuswouldordinarilynothewhenapersonisundercustodybyvirtueofaprocessissued
byaCourt.
TheCourt,however,musthavejurisdictiontoissuetheprocess.Inthiscase,theCourtbelowmustbedeemedto
havebeenoustedofjurisdictionwhenitillegallycurtailedpetitioner'sliberty.Habeascorpusisthusavailable.
Thewritofhabeascorpusisavailabletorelievepersonsfromunlawfulrestraint.Butwherethe
detentionorconfinementistheresultofaprocessissuedbythecourtorjudgeorbyvirtueofa
judgmentorsentence,thewritordinarilycannotbeavailedof.Itmaystillbeinvokedthoughifthe
process,judgmentorsentenceproceededfromacourtortribunalthejurisdictionofwhichmaybe
assailed.Evenifithadauthoritytoactattheoutset,itisnowtheprevailingdoctrinethatadeprivation
ofconstitutionalright,ifshowntoexist,wouldoustitofjurisdiction.Insuchacase,habeascorpus
couldbereliedupontoregainone'sliberty(Celestevs.People,31SCRA391)[Emphasisemphasis].
ThePetitionforhabeascorpuswaspreciselypremisedontheviolationofpetitioner'sconstitutionalrighttobail
inasmuchasrebellion,underthepresentstateofthelaw,isabailableoffenseandthecrimeforwhichpetitioner
standsaccusedofandforwhichhewasdeniedbailisnonexistentinlaw.
Whilelitigantsshould,asarule,ascendthestepsofthejudicialladder,nothingshouldstopthisCourtfromtaking
cognizanceofpetitionsbroughtbeforeitraisingurgentconstitutionalissues,anyproceduralflawnotwithstanding.
Therulesonhabeascorpusaretobeliberallyconstrued(Ganawayv.Quilen,42Phil.805),thewrit
ofhabeascorpusbeingthefundamentalinstrumentforsafeguardingindividualfreedomagainst
arbitraryandlawlessstateaction.Thescopeandflexibilityofthewrititscapacitytoreachallmanner
ofillegaldetentionitsabilitytocutthroughbarriersofformandproceduralmazeshavealwaysbeen
emphasizedandjealouslyguardedbycourtsandlawmakers(Gumabonv.DirectorofBureauof
Prisons,37SCRA420)[emphasissupplied].
TheproliferationofcasesinthisCourt,whichfollowedinthewakeofthisPetition,wasbroughtaboutbythe
insistenceoftheprosecutiontochargethecrimeofRebellioncomplexedwithothercommonoffenses
notwithstandingthefactthatthisCourthadnotyetruledonthevalidityofthatchargeandhadgrantedprovisional
libertytopetitioner.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
If,indeed,itisdesiredtomakethecrimeofRebellionacapitaloffense(nowpunishablebyreclusionperpetua),
theremedyliesinlegislation.ButArticle142A1oftheRevisedPenalCode,alongwithP.D.No.942,wererepealed,for
being"repressive,"byEONo.187on5June1987.EO187furtherexplicitlyprovidedthatArticle134(andothers
enumerated)oftheRevisedPenalCodewas"restoredtoitsfullforceandeffectasitexistedbeforesaidamendatory
decrees."Havingbeensorepealed,thisCourtisbereftofpowertolegislateintoexistence,undertheguiseofreexamining
asettleddoctrine,a"creatureunknowninlaw"thecomplexcrimeofRebellionwithMurder.Theremandofthecasetothe
lowerCourtforfurtherproceedingsisinorder.TheWritofHabeasCorpushasserveditspurpose.
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.,concurring:
IjointheCourt'sdecisiontograntthepetition.Inreiteratingtherulethatunderexistinglawrebellionmaynotbe
complexedwithmurder,theCourtemphasizesthatitcannotlegislateanewcrimeintoexistencenorprescribea
penaltyforitscommission.ThatfunctionisexclusivelyforCongress.
IwritethisseparateopiniontomakeclearhowIviewcertainissuesarisingfromthesecases,especiallyonhow
thedefectiveinformationsfiledbytheprosecutorsshouldhavebeentreated.
Iagreewiththeponentethatapetitionforhabeascorpusisordinarilynottheproperproceduretoasserttheright
tobail.Underthespecialcircumstancesofthiscase,however,thepetitionershadnootherrecourse.Theyhadto
cometous.
First,thetrialcourtwascertainlyawareofthedecisioninPeoplev.Hernandez,99Phil.515(1956)thatthereis
nosuchcrimeinourstatutebooksasrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,thatmurdercommittedinconnectionwith
arebellionisabsorbedbythecrimeofrebellion,andthataresorttoarmsresultinginthedestructionoflifeor
propertyconstitutesneithertwoormoreoffensesnoracomplexcrimebutonecrimerebellionpureandsimple.
Second,Hernandezhasbeenthelawfor34years.Ithasbeenreiteratedinequallysensationalcases.Alllawyers
andevenlawstudentsareawareofthedoctrine.Attemptstohavethedoctrinereexaminedhavebeen
consistentlyrejectedbythisCourt.
Third,PresidentMarcosthroughtheuseofhisthenlegislativepowers,issuedPres.Decree942,thereby
installingthenewcrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithoffenseslikemurderwheregraverpenaltiesareimposedby
law.However,PresidentAquinousingherthenlegislativepowersexpresslyrepealedPD942byissuingExec.
Order187.Shetherebyerasedthecrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurderandmadeitclearthatthe
Hernandezdoctrineremainsthecontrollingrule.Theprosecutionhasnotexplainedwhyitinsistsonresurrecting
anoffenseexpresslywipedoutbythePresident.Theprosecution,ineffect,questionstheactionofthePresident
inrepealingarepressivedecree,adecreewhich,accordingtotherepealorder,isviolativeofhumanrights.
Fourth,anyreexaminationoftheHernandezdoctrinebringstheexpostfactoprincipleintothepicture.Decisions
ofthisCourtformpartofourlegalsystem.Evenifwedeclarethatrebellionmaybecomplexedwithmurder,our
declarationcannotbemaderetroactivewheretheeffectistoimprisonapersonforacrimewhichdidnotexist
untiltheSupremeCourtreverseditself.
Andfifth,theattemptstodistinguishthiscasefromtheHernandezcasebystressingthatthekillingschargedin
theinformationwerecommitted"ontheoccasionof,butnotanecessarymeansfor,thecommissionofrebellion"
resultinoutlandishconsequencesandignorethebasicnatureofrebellion.Thus,undertheprosecutiontheorya
bombdroppedonPTV4whichkillsgovernmenttroopersresultsinsimplerebellionbecausetheactisa
necessarymeanstomaketherebellionsucceed.However,ifthesamebombalsokillssomeciviliansinthe
neighborhood,thedroppingofthebombbecomesrebellioncomplexedwithmurderbecausethekillingofcivilians
isnotnecessaryforthesuccessofarebellionand,therefore,thekillingsareonly"ontheoccasionofbutnota
'necessarymeansfor'thecommissionofrebellion.
Thisargumentispuerile.
Thecrimeofrebellionconsistsofmanyacts.Thedroppingofonebombcannotbeisolatedasaseparatecrime
ofrebellion.Neithershouldthedroppingofonehundredbombsorthefiringofthousandsofmachinegunbullets
bebrokenupintoahundredorthousandsofseparateoffenses,ifeachbomboreachbullethappenstoresultin
thedestructionoflifeandproperty.Thesameactcannotbepunishablebyseparatepenaltiesdependingonwhat
strikesthefancyofprosecutorspunishmentforthekillingofsoldiersorretributionforthedeathsofcivilians.The
prosecutionalsolosessightoftheregrettablefactthatintotalwarandinrebellionthekillingofcivilians,thelaying
wasteofcivilianeconomies,themassacreofinnocentpeople,theblowingupofpassengerairplanes,andother
actsofterrorismareallusedbythoseengagedinrebellion.Wecannotandshouldnottrytoascertaintheintent
ofrebelsforeachsingleactunlesstheactisplainlynotconnectedtotherebellion.WecannotuseArticle48of
theRevisedPenalCodeinlieuofstilltobeenactedlegislation.Thekillingofciviliansduringarebelattackon
militaryfacilitiesfurtherstherebellionandispartoftherebellion.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
Thetrialcourtwascertainlyawareofalltheaboveconsiderations.IcannotunderstandwhythetrialJudgeissued
thewarrantofarrestwhichcategoricallystatesthereinthattheaccusedwasnotentitledtobail.Thepetitioner
wascompelledtocometoussohewouldnotbearrestedwithoutbailforanonexistentcrime.Thetrialcourt
forgottoapplyanestablisheddoctrineoftheSupremeCourt.Worse,itissuedawarrantwhichreversed34years
ofestablishedprocedurebasedonawellknownSupremeCourtruling.
Allcourtsshouldrememberthattheyformpartofanindependentjudicialsystemtheydonotbelongtothe
prosecutionservice.Acourtshouldneverplayintothehandsoftheprosecutionandblindlycomplywithits
erroneousmanifestations.Facedwithaninformationchargingamanifestlynonexistentcrime,thedutyofatrial
courtistothrowitout.Or,attheveryleastandwherepossible,makeitconformtothelaw.
AlowercourtcannotreexamineandreverseadecisionoftheSupremeCourtespeciallyadecisionconsistently
followedfor34years.WhereaJudgedisagreeswithaSupremeCourtruling,heisfreetoexpresshis
reservationsinthebodyofhisdecision,order,orresolution.However,anyjudgmentherenders,anyorderhe
prescribes,andanyprocessesheissuesmustfollowtheSupremeCourtprecedent.Atrialcourthasno
jurisdictiontoreverseorignoreprecedentsoftheSupremeCourt.Inthisparticularcase,itshouldhavebeenthe
SolicitorGeneralcomingtothisCourttoquestionthelowercourt'srejectionoftheapplicationforawarrantof
arrestwithoutbail.ItshouldhavebeentheSolicitorGeneralprovokingtheissueofreexaminationinsteadofthe
petitionersaskingtobefreedfromtheirarrestforanonexistentcrime.
Theprinciplebearsrepeating:
RespondentCourtofAppealsreallywasdevoidofanychoiceatall.Itcouldnothaveruledinany
otherwayonthelegalquestionraised.ThisTribunalhavingspoken,itsdutywastoobey.Itisas
simpleasthat.ThereisrelevancetothisexcerptfromBarrerav.Barrera.(L31589,July31,1970,
34SCRA98)'Thedelicatetaskofascertainingthesignificancethatattachestoaconstitutionalor
statutoryprovision,anexecutiveorder,aproceduralnormoramunicipalordinanceiscommittedto
thejudiciary.Itthusdischargesarolenolesscrucialthanthatappertainingtotheothertwo
departmentsinthemaintenanceoftheruleoflaw.Toassurestabilityinlegalrelationsandavoid
confusion,ithastospeakwithonevoice.Itdoessowithfinality,logicallyandrightly,throughthe
highestjudicialorgan,thisCourt.Whatitsaysthenshouldbedefinitiveandauthoritative,bindingon
thoseoccupyingthelowerranksinthejudicialhierarchy.Theyhavetodeferandtosubmit.'(Ibid,
107.TheopinionofJusticeLaurelinPeoplev.Vera,65Phil.56[1937]wascited).Theensuing
paragraphoftheopinioninBarrerafurtheremphasizesthepoint:Suchathoughtwasreiteratedin
anopinionofJusticeJ.B.L.Reyesandfurtheremphasizedinthesewords:'JudgeGaudencioCloribel
neednotberemindedthattheSupremeCourt,bytraditionandinoursystemofjudicial
administration,hasthelastwordonwhatthelawisitisthefinalarbiterofanyjustifiablecontroversy.
ThereisonlyoneSupremeCourtfromwhosedecisionsallothercourtsshouldtaketheirbearings.
(Ibid.JusticeJ.B.L.ReyesspokethusinAlbertv.CourtofFirstInstanceofManila(Br.VI),L26364,
May29,1968,23SCRA948,961.(Tugadev.CourtofAppeals,85SCRA226[1978].Seealso
Albertv.CourtofFirstInstance,23SCRA948[1968]andVirJenShippingandMarineServices,Inc.
v.NLRC,125SCRA577[1983])
IfindthesituationinSpousesPanliliov.ProsecutorsFernandodeLeon,etal.evenmoreinexplicable.Inthecase
ofthePanlilios,anyprobablecausetocommitthenonexistentcrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurderexists
onlyinthemindsoftheprosecutors,notintherecordsofthecase.
IhavegoneovertherecordsandpleadingsfurnishedtothemembersoftheSupremeCourt.Ilistenedintentlyto
theoralargumentsduringthehearinganditwasquiteapparentthattheconstitutionalrequirementofprobable
causewasnotsatisfied.Infact,inanswertomyqueryforanyotherproofstosupporttheissuanceofawarrantof
arrest,theanswerwasthattheevidencewouldbesubmittedinduetimetothetrialcourt.
ThespousesPanlilioandoneparenthavebeenintherestaurantbusinessfordecades.Undertherecordsof
thesepetitions,anyrestaurantownerorhotelmanagerwhoservesfoodtorebelsisacoconspiratorinthe
rebellion.Theabsurdityofthispropositionisapparentifwebearinmindthatrebelsrideinbusesandjeepneys,
eatmealsinruralhouseswhenmealtimefindstheminthevicinity,joinweddings,fiestas,andotherparties,play
basketballwithbarrioyouths,attendmassesandchurchservicesandotherwisemixwithpeopleinvarious
gatherings.Evenifthehostsrecognizethemtoberebelsandfailtoshoothemaway,itdoesnotnecessarily
followthattheformerarecoconspiratorsinarebellion.
TheonlybasisforprobablecauseshownbytherecordsofthePanliliocaseistheallegedfactthatthepetitioners
servedfoodtorebelsattheEnrilehouseholdandahotelsupervisoraskedtwoorthreeoftheirwaiters,without
reason,togoonavacation.Clearly,amuch,muchstrongershowingofprobablecausemustbeshown.
InSalongav.CruzPao,134SCRA438(1985),thenSenatorSalongawaschargedasaconspiratorinthe
heinousbombingofinnocentciviliansbecausethemanwhoplantedthebombhad,sometimeearlier,appeared
inagroupphotographtakenduringabirthdaypartyintheUnitedStateswiththeSenatorandotherguests.Itwas
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
acaseofconspiracyprovedthroughagrouppicture.Here,itisacaseofconspiracysoughttoprovedthrough
thecateringoffood.
TheCourtinSalongastressed:
Thepurposeofapreliminaryinvestigationistosecuretheinnocentagainsthasty,maliciousand
oppressiveprosecution,andtoprotecthimfromanopenandpublicaccusationofcrime,fromthe
trouble,expenseandanxietyofapublictrial,andalsotoprotectthestatefromuselessand
expensivetrials.(Trociov.Manta,118SCRA241citingHashimnv.Boncan,71Phil.216).Theright
toapreliminaryinvestigationisastatutorygrant,andtowithholditwouldbetotransgress
constitutionaldueprocess.(SeePeoplev.Oandasa,25SCRA277)However,inordertosatisfythe
dueprocessclauseitisnotenoughthatthepreliminaryinvestigationisconductedinthesenseof
makingsurethatatransgressorshallnotescapewithimpunity.Apreliminaryinvestigationservesnot
onlythepurposesoftheState.Moreimportant,itisapartoftheguaranteesoffreedomandfairplay
whicharebirthrightsofallwholiveinourcountry.Itis,therefore,imperativeuponthefiscalorthe
judgeasthecasemaybe,torelievetheaccusedfromthepainofgoingthroughatrialonceitis
ascertainedthattheevidenceisinsufficienttosustainaprimafaciecaseorthatnoprobablecause
existstoformasufficientbeliefastotheguiltoftheaccused.Althoughthereisnogeneralformulaor
fixedruleforthedeterminationofprobablecausesincethesamemustbedecidedinthelightofthe
conditionsobtainingingivensituationsanditsexistencedependstoalargedegreeuponthefinding
oropinionofthejudgeconductingtheexamination,suchafindingshouldnotdisregardthefacts
beforethejudgenorruncountertothecleardictatesofreason(SeeLaChemiseLacoste,S.A.v.
Fernandez,129SCRA391).Thejudgeorfiscal,therefore,shouldnotgoonwiththeprosecutionin
thehopethatsomecredibleevidencemightlaterturnupduringtrialforthiswouldbeaflagrant
violationofabasicrightwhichthecourtsarecreatedtouphold.Itbearsrepeatingthatthejudiciary
livesuptoitsmissionbyvitalizingandnotdenigratingconstitutionalrights.Soithasbeenbefore.It
shouldcontinuetobeso.(id.,pp.461462)
Becauseoftheforegoing,Itakeexceptiontothatpartoftheponenciawhichwillreadtheinformationsas
chargingsimplerebellion.Thiscasedidnotarisefrominnocenterror.Ifaninformationchargesmurderbutits
contentsshowonlytheingredientsofhomicide,theJudgemayrightlyreaditascharginghomicide.Inthese
cases,however,thereisadeliberateattempttochargethepetitionersforanoffensewhichthisCourthasruled
asnonexistent.TheprosecutionwantedHernandeztobereversed.Sincetheprosecutionhasfiledinformations
foracrimewhich,underourrulings,doesnotexist,thoseinformationsshouldbetreatedasnullandvoid.New
informationschargingthecorrectoffenseshouldbefiled.AndinG.R.No.92164,anextraeffortshouldbemade
toseewhetherornotthePrincipleinSalongav.CruzPatio,etal.(supra)hasbeenviolated.
TheCourtisnot,inanyway,preventingtheGovernmentfromusingmoreeffectiveweaponstosuppress
rebellion.IftheGovernmentfeelsthatthecurrentsituationcallsfortheimpositionofmoreseverepenaltieslike
deathorthecreationofnewcrimeslikerebellioncomplexedwithmurder,theremedyiswithCongress,notthe
courts.
I,therefore,votetoGRANTthepetitionsandtoORDERtherespondentcourttoDISMISSthevoidinformations
foranonexistentcrime.
FELICIANO,J.,concurring:
IconcurintheresultreachedbythemajorityoftheCourt.
IbelievethattherearecertainaspectsoftheHernandezdoctrinethat,asanabstractquestionoflaw,couldstand
reexaminationorclarification.Ihaveinmindinparticularmatterssuchasthecorrectorappropriaterelationship
betweenArticle134andArticle135oftheRevisedPenalCode.Thisisamatterwhichrelatestothelegalconcept
ofrebellioninourlegalsystem.IfoneexaminestheactualtermsofArticle134(entitled:"Rebellionor
InsurrectionHowCommitted"),itwouldappearthatthisArticlespecifiesboththeovertactsandthecriminal
purposewhich,whenputtogether,wouldconstitutetheoffenseofrebellion.Thus,Article134statesthat"the
crimeofrebellioniscommittedbyrisingpubliclyandtakingarmsagainsttheGovernment"(i.e.,theovertacts
comprisingrebellion),"forthepurposeof(i.e.,thespecificcriminalintentorpoliticalobjective)removingfromthe
allegiancetosaidgovernmentoritslawstheterritoryoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesoranypartthereof,orany
bodyofland,navalorotherarmedforces,ordeprivingtheChiefExecutiveortheLegislature,whollyorpartially,
oftheirpowersorprerogatives."Atthesametime,Article135(entitled:"PenaltyforRebellionorInsurrection.")
setsoutalistingofactsorparticularmeasureswhichappeartofallundertherubricofrebellionorinsurrection:
"engaginginwaragainsttheforcesoftheGovernment,destroyingpropertyorcommittingseriousviolence,
exactingcontributionsordivertingpublicfundsfromthelawfulpurposeforwhichtheyhavebeenappropriated."
Arethesemodalitiesofrebelliongenerally?Oraretheyparticularmodesbywhichthose"whopromote[],
maintain[]orhead[]arebellionorinsurrection"commitrebellion,orparticularmodesofparticipationina
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
rebellionbypublicofficersoremployees?Clearly,thescopeofthelegalconceptofrebellionrelatestothe
distinctionbetween,ontheonehand,theindispensableactsoringredientsofthecrimeofrebellionunderthe
RevisedPenalCodeand,ontheotherhand,differingoptionalmodesofseekingtocarryoutthepoliticalorsocial
objectiveoftherebellionorinsurrection.
Thedifficultythatisatonceraisedbyanyefforttoexamineoncemoreeventheabovethresholdquestionsisthat
theresultsofsuchreexaminationmaywellbethatactswhichundertheHernandezdoctrineareabsorbedinto
rebellion,maybecharacterizedasseparateordiscreteoffenseswhich,asamatteroflaw,caneitherbe
prosecutedseparatelyfromrebellionorprosecutedundertheprovisionsofArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCode,
which(bothClause1andClause2thereof)clearlyenvisagetheexistenceofatleasttwo(2)distinctoffenses.To
reachsuchaconclusioninthecaseatbar,would,asfarasIcansee,resultincollidingwiththefundamentalnon
retroactivityprinciple(Article4,CivilCodeArticle22,RevisedPenalCodebothinrelationtoArticle8,CivilCode).
Thenonretroactivityruleappliestostatutesprincipally.But,statutesdonotexistintheabstractbutratherbear
uponthelivesofpeoplewiththespecificformgiventhembyjudicialdecisionsinterpretingtheirnorms.Judicial
decisionsconstruingstatutorynormsgivespecificshapeandcontenttosuchnorms.Intime,thestatutorynorms
becomeencrustedwiththeglossesplaceduponthembythecourtsandtheglossesbecomeintegralwiththe
norms(CfCaltexv.Palomar,18SCRA247[1966]).Thus,whileinlegaltheory,judicialinterpretationofastatute
becomespartofthelawasofthedatethatthelawwasoriginallyenacted,Ibelievethistheoryisnottobeapplied
rigorouslywhereanewjudicialdoctrineisannounced,inparticularoneoverrulingapreviousexistingdoctrineof
longstanding(here,36years)andmostspeciallynotwherethestatuteconstruediscriminalinnatureandthe
newdoctrineismoreonerousfortheaccusedthanthepreexistingone(Peoplev.Jabinal,55SCRA607[1974]
Peoplev.Licera,65SCRA270[1975]Gumabonv.DirectorofPrisons,37SCRA420[1971]).Moreover,thenon
retroactivityrulewhetherinrespectoflegislativeactsorjudicialdecisionshasconstitutionalimplications.The
prevailingruleintheUnitedStatesisthatajudicialdecisionthatretroactivelyrendersanactcriminalorenhances
theseverityofthepenaltyprescribedforanoffense,isvulnerabletoconstitutionalchallengebasedupontherule
againstexpostfactolawsandthedueprocessclause(Bouiev.CityofColumbia,378US347,12L.Ed.2d894
[1964]Marksv.U.S.,43US188,51L.Ed.2d260[1977]Devinev.NewMexicoDepartmentofCorrections,866
F.2d339[1989]).
ItisurgedbytheSolicitorGeneralthatthenonretroactivityprincipledoesnotpresentanyrealproblemforthe
reasonthattheHernandezdoctrinewasbaseduponArticle48,secondclause,oftheRevisedPenalCodeand
notuponthefirstclausethereof,whileitispreciselythefirstclauseofArticle48thattheGovernmenthere
invokes.Itis,however,opentoseriousdoubtwhetherHernandezcanreasonablybesosimplyandsharply
characterized.AndassumingtheHernandezcouldbesocharacterized,subsequentcasesrefertotheHernandez
doctrineintermswhichdonotdistinguishclearlybetweenthefirstclauseandthesecondclauseofArticle48
(e.g.,Peoplev.Geronimo,100Phil.90[1956]Peoplev.Rodriguez,107Phil.659[1960]).Thus,itappearstome
thatthecriticalquestionwouldbewhetheramanofordinaryintelligencewouldhavenecessarilyreador
understoodtheHernandezdoctrineasreferringexclusivelytoArticle48,secondclause.Putinslightlydifferent
terms,theimportantquestionwouldbewhetherthenewdoctrinehereproposedbytheGovernmentcouldfairly
havebeenderivedbyamanofaverageintelligence(orcounselofaveragecompetenceinthelaw)froman
examinationofArticles134and135oftheRevisedPenalCodeasinterpretedbytheCourtintheHernandezand
subsequentcases.Toformulatethequestionillthesetermswouldalmostbetocompelanegativeanswer,
especiallyinviewoftheconclusionsreachedbytheCourtanditsseveralMemberstoday.
Finally,thereappearstobenoquestionthatthenewdoctrinethattheGovernmentwouldhaveusdiscoverforthe
firsttimesincethepromulgationoftheRevisedPenalCodein1932,wouldbemoreonerousfortherespondent
accusedthanthesimpleapplicationoftheHernandezdoctrinethatmurderswhichhavebeencommittedonthe
occasionofandinfurtheranceofthecrimeofrebellionmustbedeemedabsorbedintheoffenseofsimple
rebellion.
Iagreethereforethattheinformationinthiscasemustbeviewedaschargingonlythecrimeofsimplerebellion.
FERNAN,C.J.,concurringanddissenting:
Iamconstrainedtowritethisseparateopiniononwhatseemstobearigidadherencetothe1956rulingofthe
Court.ThenumerouschallengestothedoctrineenunciatedinthecaseofPeoplevs.Hernandez,99Phil.515
(1956)shouldatoncedemonstratetheneedtoredefinetheapplicabilityofsaiddoctrinesoastomakeit
conformablewithacceptedandwellsettledprinciplesofcriminallawandjurisprudence.
Tomymind,theHernandezdoctrineshouldnotbeinterpretedasanallembracingauthorityfortherulethatall
commoncrimescommittedontheoccasion,orinfurtheranceof,orinconnectionwith,rebellionareabsorbedby
thelatter.Tothatextent,Icannotgoalongwiththeviewofthemajorityintheinstantcasethat'Hernandez
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
occasionthereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasanunintendedeffectofanactivitythat
constitutesrebellion"(p.9,Decision).
TheHernandezdoctrinehasservedthepurposeforwhichitwasappealedbytheCourtin1956duringthe
communistinspiredrebellionoftheHuks.Thechangesinoursocietyinthespanof34yearssincethenhavefar
reachingeffectsontheallembracingapplicabilityofthedoctrineconsideringtheemergenceofalternativemodes
ofseizingthepowersofthedulyconstitutedGovernmentnotcontemplatedinArticles134and135oftheRevised
PenalCodeandtheirconsequenteffectsonthelivesofourpeople.Thedoctrinewasgoodlawthen,butIbelieve
thatthereisacertainaspectoftheHernandezdoctrinethatneedsclarification.
WithallduerespecttotheviewsofmybrethrenintheCourt,IbelievethattheCourt,intheinstantcase,should
havefurtherconsideredthatdistinctionbetweenactsoroffenseswhichareindispensableinthecommissionof
rebellion,ontheonehand,andthoseactsoroffensesthataremerelynecessarybutnotindispensableinthe
commissionofrebellion,ontheother.ThemajorityoftheCourtiscorrectinadopting,albeitimpliedly,theviewin
Hernandezcasethatwhenanoffenseperpetratedasanecessarymeansofcommittinganother,whichisan
elementofthelatter,theresultinginterlockingcrimesshouldbeconsideredasonlyonesimpleoffenseandmust
bedeemedoutsidetheoperationofthecomplexcrimeprovision(Article48)oftheRevisedPenalCode.Asinthe
caseofHernandez,theCourt,however,failedintheinstantcasetodistinguishwhatisindispensablefromwhatis
merelynecessaryinthecommissionofanoffense,resultingthusintherulethatcommoncrimeslikemurder,
arson,robbery,etc.committedinthecourseorontheoccasionofrebellionareabsorbedorincludedinthelatter
aselementsthereof.
Therelevanceofthedistinctionissignificant,moreparticularly,ifappliedtocontemporaneouseventshappening
inourcountrytoday.Theoretically,acrimewhichisindispensableinthecommissionofanothermustnecessarily
beanelementofthelatterbutacrimethatismerelynecessarybutnotindispensableinthecommissionof
anotherisnotanelementofthelatter,andifandwhenactuallycommitted,bringstheinterlockingcrimewithinthe
operationofthecomplexcrimeprovision(Art.48)oftheRevisedPenalCode.Withthatdistinction,common
crimescommittedagainstGovernmentforcesandpropertyinthecourseofrebellionareproperlyconsidered
indispensableovertactsofrebellionandarelogicallyabsorbedinitasvirtualingredientsorelementsthereof,but
commoncrimescommittedagainstthecivilianpopulationinthecourseorontheoccasionofrebellionandin
furtherancethereof,maybenecessarybutnotindispensableincommittingthelatter,andmay,therefore,notbe
consideredaselementsofthesaidcrimeofrebellion.Toillustrate,thedeathsoccurringduringarmed
confrontationorclashesbetweengovernmentforcesandtherebelsareabsorbedintherebellion,andwouldbe
thoseresultingfromthebombingofmilitarycampsandinstallations,astheseactsareindispensableincarrying
outtherebellion.Butdeliberatelyshootingdownanunarmedinnocentciviliantoinstillfearorcreatechaosamong
thepeople,althoughdoneinthefurtheranceoftherebellion,shouldnotbeabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellionas
thefeloniousactismerelynecessary,butnotindispensable.Inthelattercase,Article48oftheRevisedPenal
Codeshouldapply.
Theoccurrenceofacoupd'etatinourcountryasamodeofseizingthepowersofthedulyconstituted
governmentbystagingsurpriseattacksoroccupyingcentersofpowers,ofwhichthisCourtshouldtakejudicial
notice,hasintroducedanewdimensiontotheinterpretationoftheprovisionsonrebellionandinsurrectioninthe
RevisedPenalCode.Generally,asamodeofseizingthepowersofthedulyconstitutedgovernment,itfallswithin
thecontemplationofrebellionundertheRevisedPenalCode,but,strictlyconstrued,acoupd'etatperseisa
classbyitself.Themannerofitsexecutionandtheextentandmagnitudeofitseffectsonthelivesofthepeople
distinguishacoupd'etatfromthetraditionaldefinitionandmodesofcommissionattachedbytheRevisedPenal
CodetothecrimeofrebellionasappliedbytheCourttothecommunistinspiredrebellionofthe1950's.Acoup
d'etatmaybeexecutedsuccessfullywithoutitsperpetratorsresortingtothecommissionofotherseriouscrimes
suchasmurder,arson,kidnapping,robbery,etc.becauseoftheelementofsurpriseandtheprecisetimingofits
execution.Inextremecaseswheremurder,arson,robbery,andothercommoncrimesarecommittedonthe
occasionofacoupd'etat,thedistinctionreferredtoaboveonwhatisnecessaryandwhatisindispensableinthe
commissionofthecoupd'etatshouldbepainstakinglyconsideredastheCourtshouldhavedoneinthecaseof
hereinpetitioners.
IconcurintheresultinsofarastheotherissuesareresolvedbytheCourtbutItakeexceptiontothevoteofthe
majorityonthebroadapplicationoftheHernandezdoctrine.
BIDIN,J.,concurringanddissenting:
Iconcurwiththemajorityopinionexceptasregardsthedispositiveportionthereofwhichorderstheremandofthe
casetotherespondentjudgeforfurtherproceedingstofixtheamountofbailtobepostedbythepetitioner.
Isubmitthattheproceedingsneednotberemandedtotherespondentjudgeforthepurposeoffixingbailsince
wehaveconstruedtheindictmenthereinaschargingsimplerebellion,anoffensewhichisbailable.Consequently,
habeascorpusistheproperremedyavailabletopetitionerasanaccusedwhohadbeenchargedwithsimple
rebellion,abailableoffensebutwhohadbeendeniedhisrighttobailbytherespondentjudgeinviolationof
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
petitioner'sconstitutionalrighttobail.Inviewthereof,theresponsibilityoffixingtheamountofbailandapproval
thereofwhenfiled,devolvesuponus,ifcompletereliefistobeaccordedtopetitionerintheinstantproceedings.
Itisindubitablethatbeforeconviction,admissiontobailisamatterofrighttothedefendant,accusedbeforethe
RegionalTrialCourtofanoffenselessthancapital(Section13ArticleIII,ConstitutionandSection3,Rule114).
Petitioneris,beforeUs,onapetitionforhabeascorpuspraying,amongothers,forhisprovisionalreleaseonbail.
Sincetheoffensecharged(construedassimplerebellion)admitsofbail,itisincumbentuponusmtheexerciseof
ourjurisdictionoverthepetitionforhabeascorpus(Section5(1),ArticleVIII,ConstitutionSection2,Rule102),to
grantpetitionerhisrighttobailandhavingadmittedhimtobail,tofixtheamountthereofinsuchsumsasthe
courtdeemsreasonable.Thereafter,therulesrequirethat"theproceedingstogetherwiththebond"shall
forthwithbecertifiedtotherespondenttrialcourt(Section14,Rule102).
Accordingly,thecashbondintheamountofP100,000.00postedbypetitionerforhisprovisionalrelease
pursuanttoourresolutiondatedMarch6,1990shouldnowbedeemedandadmittedashisbailbondforhis
provisionalreleaseinthecase(simplerebellion)pendingbeforetherespondentjudge,withoutnecessityofa
remandforfurtherproceedings,conditionedforhis(petitioner's)appearancebeforethetrialcourttoabideits
orderorjudgmentinthesaidcase.
SARMIENTO,J.,concurringanddissenting:
IagreethatPeoplev.Hernandez1shouldabide.Morethanthreedecadesafterwhichitwaspenned,ithasfirmlysettled
inthetomesofourjurisprudenceascorrectdoctrine.
AsHernandezputit,rebellionmeans"engagingmwaragainsttheforcesofthegovernment,"2whichimplies
"resorttoarms,requisitionofpropertyandservices,collectionoftaxesandcontributions,restraintofliberty,damageto
property,physicalinjuriesandlossoflife,andthehunger,illnessandunhappinessthatwarleavesinitswake...."3whether
committedinfurtherance,ofasanecessarymeansforthecommission,orinthecourse,ofrebellion.Tosaythatrebellion
maybecomplexedwithanyotheroffense,inthiscasemurder,istoplayintoacontradictionintermsbecauseexactly,
rebellionincludesmurder,amongotherpossiblecrimes.
Ialsoagreethattheinformationmaystandasanaccusationforsimplerebellion.Sincetheactscomplainedofas
constitutingrebellionhavebeenembodiedintheinformation,mentionthereinofmurderasacomplexingoffense
isasurplusage,becauseinanycase,thecrimeofrebellionisleftfullydescribed.4
Atanyrate,thegovernmentneedonlyamendtheinformationbyaclericalcorrection,sinceanamendmentwill
notalteritssubstance.
Idissent,however,insofarasthemajorityorderstheremandofthematterofbailtothelowercourt.Itakeitthat
whenwe,inourResolutionofMarch6,1990,grantedthepetitioner"provisionalliberty"uponthefilingofabond
ofP100,000.00,wegrantedhimbail.Thefactthatwegavehim"provisionalliberty"isinmyview,ofnomoment,
becausebailmeansprovisionalliberty.Itwillservenousefulpurposetohavethetrialcourtheartheincident
againwhenweourselveshavebeensatisfiedthatthepetitionerisentitledtotemporaryfreedom.
PADILLA,J.,dissenting:
IconcurinthemajorityopinioninsofarasitholdsthattherulinginPeoplevs.Hernandez,99Phil.515"remains
bindingdoctrineoperatingtoprohibitthecomplexingofrebellionwithanyotheroffensecommittedonthe
occasionthereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasanunintendedeffectofanactivitythat
constitutesrebellion."
Idissent,however,fromthemajorityopinioninsofarasitholdsthattheinformationinquestion,whilechargingthe
complexcrimeofrebellionwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurder,"istobereadaschargingsimple
rebellion."
ThepresentcasesaretobedistinguishedfromtheHernandezcaseinatleastone(1)materialrespect.Inthe
Hernandezcase,thisCourtwasconfrontedwithanappealedcase,i.e.,Hernandezhadbeenconvictedbythe
trialcourtofthecomplexcrimeofrebellionwithmurder,arsonandrobbery,andhispleatobereleasedonbail
beforetheSupremeCourt,pendingappeal,gavebirthtothenowcelebratedHernandezdoctrinethatthecrimeof
rebellioncomplexedwithmurder,arsonandrobberydoesnotexist.Inthepresentcases,ontheotherhand,the
Courtisconfrontedwithanoriginalcase,i.e.,whereaninformationhasbeenrecentlyfiledinthetrialcourtand
thepetitionershavenotevenpleadedthereto.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
Furthermore,theSupremeCourt,intheHernandezcase,was"groundbreaking"ontheissueofwhether
rebellioncanbecomplexedwithmurder,arson,robbery,etc.Inthepresentcases,ontheotherhand,the
prosecutionandthelowercourt,notonlyhadtheHernandezdoctrine(ascaselaw),butExecutiveOrderNo.187
ofPresidentCorazonC.Aquinodated5June1987(asstatutorylaw)tobindthemtothelegalpropositionthatthe
crimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,andmultiplefrustratedmurderdoesnotexist.
Andyet,notwithstandingtheseunmistakableandcontrollingbeaconlightsabsentwhenthisCourtlaiddownthe
Hernandezdoctrinetheprosecutionhasinsistedinfiling,andthelowercourthaspersistedinhearing,an
informationchargingthepetitionerswithrebellioncomplexedwithmurderanmultiplefrustratedmurder.That
informationisclearlyanullityandplainlyvoidabinitio.Itsheadshouldnotbeallowedtosurface.Asanullityin
substantivelaw,itchargesnothingithasgivenrisetonothing.Thewarrantsofarrestissuedpursuanttheretoare
asnullandvoidastheinformationonwhichtheyareanchored.And,sincetheentirequestionoftheinformation's
validityisbeforetheCourtinthesehabeascorpuscases,Iventuretosaythattheinformationisfatallydefective,
evenunderprocedurallaw,becauseitchargesmorethanone(1)offense(Sec.13,Rule110,RulesofCourt).
IsubmitthenthatitisnotforthisCourttoenergizeadeadand,atbest,fatallydecrepitinformationbylabellingor
"baptizing"itdifferentlyfromwhatitannouncesitselftobe.Theprosecutionmustfileanentirelynewandproper
information,forthisentireexercisetomerittheseriousconsiderationofthecourts.
ACCORDINGLY,IvotetoGRANTthepetitions,QUASHthewarrantsofarrest,andORDERtheinformationfor
rebellioncomplexedwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurderinCriminalCaseNos.9010941,RTCofQuezon
City,DISMISSED.
Consequently,thepetitionersshouldbeorderedpermanentlyreleasedandtheirbailscancelled.
Paras,J.,concurs.
Footnotes
199Phil.515(1956).
2Peoplevs.Lava,28SCRA72(1956)Peoplevs.Geronimo,100Phil.90(1956)Peoplevs.
Romagosa,103Phil.20(1958)andPeoplevs.Rodriguez,107Phil.659(1960).
3Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.3234.
4Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.34etseq.
5Rollo,G.R.No.92163,p.26.
6Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.305359.
7OriginallyapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionwhichtheCourt,uponmotionofthepetitioners,
resolvedtotreatasapetitionforhabeascorpusRollo,G.R.No.92164,pp.128129.
8Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.407411.
9Fernan,C.J.,andNarvasa,CortesandGrinoAquino,JJ.
10Fernan,C.J.andNarvasa,J.
10ATwoMembersaonleave.
11ExecutiveOrderNo.187issuedJune5,1987.
12Peoplevs.Hernandez,supraat541543.
13Id.,at551.
14Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.7879and7376.
14Supra,footnote4.
15Solivenvs.Makasiar,167SCRA394.
17Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.4647.
3/1/2017 G.R.No.92163
18Sec.2,Rule117,RulesofCourt.
19Ocampovs.Bernabe,77Phil.55.
20Rollo,G.R.No.92164,pp.124125.
MelencioHerrera,J.,Opinion
1"ART.142ACaseswhereotheroffensesarecommitted.Whenbyreasonorontheoccasionof
anyofthecrimespenalizedinthisChapter,actswhichconstituteoffensesuponwhichgraver
penaltiesareimposedbylawarecommitted,thepenaltyforthemostseriousoffenseinitsmaximum
periodshallbeimposedupontheoffender."
Sarmiento,J.,Concurring
199Phil.515(1956).
2Supra,520.
3Supra,521.
4USv.Santiago,41Phil.793(1917).
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

Enrile Et Al v. Salazar

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Enrile Et Al v. Salazar

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

3/1/2017 G.R.No.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su

ThepresentcasesaretobedistinguishedfromtheHernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the

You might also like