G.R. No.

L-23956 July 21, 1967

ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS LUTERO, Judge of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City and the ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF JARO, defendants-appellees.

Hautea and Hinojales for plaintiff-appellant.

Luisito C. Hofilea for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425) dismissing a petition for relief directed against the judgment
rendered by the municipal court of Iloilo City in its civil case 7220.

On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio Javellana with the municipal court of Iloilo
City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure of the defendant to receive
summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was thereafter postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and finally to August
27, all at the behest of the defendant's Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not finished his business transactions in Manila" and that "he
hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was granted by the municipal court with the warning that no further postponement would be
entertained.

When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea
who was present in court verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business
transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the court's previous
admonition that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff
were ready for presentation on that date. The verbal motion for postponement was denied and the plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence.
During the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting postponement of the hearing.
The trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, the court on the same date rendered judgment for the plaintiff and
against the defendant. The latter's counsel received a copy of the decision on September 9, 1963. On the following September 11, he filed a motion
to set aside judgment and for new trial. This motion was denied on September 26; a copy of the order of denial was received by him on the same
date.

On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the judgment of the municipal
court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits,
and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that
his absence on the date of the trial was excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his departure for the
latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the
case as set; that he called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him of the desired
postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that
while in Manila he sent a telegram to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the municipal court
nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and
rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a
good and substantial defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to buy the premises subject-matter of the complaint
below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the private respondent no real injury.

This petition was given due course, the respondents were required to file their answers, and a cease-and-desist order was issued as prayed for. On
February 22, 1964, after due hearing, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the petition.1wph1.t

Hence the present recourse.

From the perspective of the environmental circumstances obtaining in this case, the present appeal is palpably devoid of merit.

A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with due regard for the elementary standards of fair
play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such as the
one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in
this respect.

The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963
with the unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on August
27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict
between his business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His
absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him
from appearing in court.

In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential attention to the case. As things were, he
regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more than
just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.

Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the appearance in court on August 27 of another attorney who verbally moved for postponement nor by
his telegram received by the municipal judge on the same date asking for continuance. These circumstances, upon the contrary, emphasize his
presumptuousness vis-a-vis the municipal judge.

It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition that the petitioner-appellant was not deprived of his day in court, and that the respondent
municipal judge did not err in proceeding with the trial, allowing the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and thereafter rendering
decision for the plaintiff-appellee. It follows that the petitioner was not entitled to the remedy of a petition for relief.

Moreover, after the denial of his motion to set aside judgment and for new trial, the appellant had ample time to appeal; instead he allowed the
judgment to become final and executory. His argument that an appeal would have been futile as there was no evidence upon which such appeal
could be based, merits scant consideration. An appeal from the decision of a municipal court to the Court of First Instance has the effect of vacating
the decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of Court; sec. 9, Rule 40, of the old Rules), and the action is to be tried de novo without regard to the proof
presented in the municipal court or the conclusions reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 56 Phil. 344, 351; Lizo vs. Carandang, 73 Phil.
649; Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). To grant the appellant's petition for relief would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he
had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa vs. Yatco, etc., et al., L-16435, Jan. 31, 1963, and the cases therein
cited). This in law cannot be done.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. As this appeal is patently frivolous and dilatory, this Court, under the authority of section 3 of
Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, hereby assesses treble costs against the petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by his counsel,
Atty. Jose Hautea.

24 GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO

A.C. No. 6504, 9 August 2005, SECOND DIVISION (Tinga,J .)

FACTS:

Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by
spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when theGenito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the
spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying theGenito
Apartments.Solatans sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to Solatan and othermembers of her family. A complaint
for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and adecision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the
premises. Solatan was occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange execution of
a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty.
Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of theGenito Apartments.During the meeting with
Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainantagreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorneys
fees and costs of suit.Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorneys fees.Complainant failed to make
any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camanoenforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject
apartment. Complainantrenegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain atthe apartment.
Acting on Atty. Camanos advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to thesheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove
was not returned to the complainant but waskept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily
staying.Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty.Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors
resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 yearand to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.

ISSUE:

1)Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

2)Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:

All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.

An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without beingretained. No employment relation was offered or
accepted in the instant case.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in alltransactions and dealings with their clients.
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party withan interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However,
the advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly leviedproperties was in consonance
with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being inconflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest
over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hintat infidelity
to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.2. Atty. Inocentes failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of hislaw firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked withthe responsibility to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility. Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters dealings withcomplainant. This is the linchpin
of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtuethereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally
responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over which they are
exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under
their charge

ARSENIO A. VILLAFUERTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANTE H. CORTEZ, respondent.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:
 Feeling aggrieved by what he perceives to be a neglect in the handling of his cases by respondent lawyer, despite the latter's receipt
of P1,750.00 acceptance and retainer fees, complainant Arsenio A. Villafuerte seeks, in the instant proceedings, the disbarment of Atty. Dante H.
Cortez.

From the records of the case and the Report submitted by the Commission on Bar Discipline ("CBD") of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP"), it would appear that sometime in January 1987, complainant, upon the referral of Atty. Rene A. V. Saguisag, went to the office of respondent
lawyer to discuss his case for "reconveyance" (Civil Case No. 83-18877). During their initial meeting, complainant tried to reconstruct before
respondent lawyer the incidents of the case merely from memory prompting the latter to ask complainant to instead return at another time with the
records of the case. On 30 January 1987, complainant again saw respondent but still sans the records. Complainant requested respondent to accept
the case, paying to the latter the sum of P1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee for January
1987. Respondent averred that he accepted the money with much reluctance and only upon the condition that complainant would get the records of
the case from, as well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose Dizon, the former counsel of complainant. Allegedly, complainant never
showed up thereafter until November 1989 when he went to the office of respondent lawyer but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 062160-CV, a case for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never priorly mentioned to him by complainant. Indeed, said
respondent, he had never entered his appearance in the aforenumbered case.

In its report, IBP-CBD concluded that the facts established would just the same indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of duty on the part of
respondent. The CBD rejected the excuse proffered by respondent that the non-receipt of the records of the case justified his failure to represent
complainant. The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for three months with a warning that a repetition of similar acts could be dealt with more severely than a mere 3-month
suspension.

On 30 August 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-191 which -

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex `A;' and, finding the recommendation therein to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Dante Cortez is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a warning that a repetition of the acts/omission complained of will be dealt with more severely." [1]

Both respondent lawyer and complainant filed with the IBP-CBD their respective motions for the reconsideration of the foregoing resolution.

On 23 August 1997, the Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-66 that -

"RESOLVED to CONFIRM Resolution NO. XII-96-191 of the Board of Governors Meeting dated August 30, 1996 SUSPENDING Atty. Dante
Cortez from the practice of law for three (3) months with a warning that repetition of the acts/omission complained of will be dealt with more
severely."[2]

The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD in its findings and conclusion that respondent lawyer has somehow been remiss in his responsibilities.

The Court is convinced that a lawyer-client relationship, given the circumstances, has arisen between respondent and
complainant. Respondent lawyer has admitted having received the amount of P1,750.00, including its nature and purpose, from complainant. His
acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. It would
not matter really whether the money has been intended to pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or to include Civil Case No. 062160-CV, there
being no showing, in any event, that respondent lawyer has attended to either of said cases. It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to
find out what might have happened to his client's cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the
responsibilities that should be expected of him. [3] He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his
client. The Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence,"[4] decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." [5]

Complainant, nevertheless, is not entirely without fault himself. He cannot expect his case to be properly and intelligently handled without
listening to his own counsel and extending full cooperation to him. It is not right for complainant to wait for almost two years and to deal with his
lawyer only after receiving an adverse decision.

All considered, the Court deems it proper to reduce the recommended period of suspension of the IBP from three months to one month.
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante H. Cortez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one month from notice hereof, with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts and other administrative lapses will be dealt with more severely than presently.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made a part of the personal records of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, and let copies thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

MOTON vs. ATTY. CADIAO

Adm. Case. No. 5169, November 24, 1999

Facts: Atty. Cadia was Motons counsel in a civil complaint against Castillo. It appeared that Atty. Cadiao failed to present evidence in
Motons behalf because he was handling another case in Antique.

Issue: Is the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence for his failure to present evidence in his clients behalf?

Held: YES. Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Conduct provides than a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

By reason of Atty. Cadiaos negligence, actual loss has been caused to his client. He should give adequate attention,
care and time to his cases, this is why a practicing lawyer may accept only so many cases that he can efficiently handle otherwise his clients will be
prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to
his oath.

ALCALA VS. DE VERA

56 SCRA 30 Legal Ethics Duty of a lawyer to update his client of the status of the case

Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.

On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.

On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera failed to inform Alcala about the adverse decision.

On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because
of Atty. De Veras failure to inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal his case had already lapsed.

As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to collect damages as he averred that he sustained damages
due to Atty. De Veras negligence. The court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to damages.
Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his client of the status of the case.

HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he
failed to update him of the status of the case, however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage by reason of such negligence. But this is
not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found
Atty. De Vera guilty of simple negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Veras failure to notify his clients of the decision
in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to the clients interest expected of Atty. De Vera under the lawyers oath.

In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to collect damages from the negligent lawyer.

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO
CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE
ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.

Romerico F. Flores for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that
the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.

The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement
of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of
his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and
Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the
estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente,
Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.

On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the
estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral
relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a
counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory
that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at
which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased
Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half
share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the
donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate
proceeding but in a separate civil action.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
 The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original
conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation
was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in
his will.

On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making
any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the
first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered
under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same
Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file
another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the
deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena
Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor
filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of
Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on
which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.

The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had
generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.

In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the
probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we have also held
that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property,
and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73
Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in
the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).

In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate
court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal
partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?

At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had
completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even
those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action
can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been
stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is
within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of
the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a
mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the
person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties
alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding
is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the
estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. 3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to
succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community
property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of
the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected. 4

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased
widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being
sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it
complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming
title under the testator.

Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the
determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that
they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing
so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to
insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the
properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition including
therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of
ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not
thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise
the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. 5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question
against them.6

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow
herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but
also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel,
the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence
without knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in
favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the
required formalities similar to a will.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

GCP-MANNY TRANSPORT G.R. NO. 141484

SERVICES, INC.,

Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, Chairman,*

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

- versus - TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO,* * JJ.

HON. ABRAHAM Y. PRINCIPE,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,

CAGAYAN PROVINCIAL SHERIFF

or his deputies, and NELSON Promulgated:

RECOLIZADO,

Respondents. November 11, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. is now before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43441 promulgated on May 26, 1999 and the Resolution[2] dated December 29, 1999.

The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

On April 18, 1990, private respondent filed the herein complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 4142 for physical
injuries sustained by him as a passenger of petitioners bus.

On November 2, 1995, respondent court [3] rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay
the former the amount of P58,207.35 as actual and compensatory damages; P150,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and costs. Copy of the decision sent to petitioner was returned for the
reason that it had moved (residence), while copy sent to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino, then petitioners counsel, was returned unserved
being unclaimed. Petitioner states that a copy of the decision was personally delivered by the Civil Docket Clerk of the trial court
on Atty. Aquino who had refused to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel for the petitioner, although no notice of
withdrawal as counsel was filed by him in court.

On April 11, 1996, private respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment, copy furnished to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino and
petitioner which the court granted on October 9, 1996. The assailed writ of execution was correspondingly issued, which
petitioner received on October 30, 1996.

On November 5, 1996, Atty. Jose de Luna entered his appearance as new counsel for the petitioner with motion for
reconsideration of the order dated October 9, 1996 granting the motion for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on
the ground that petitioner had not been duly notified of the decision.

On November 9, 1996, petitioner received a Notice of Demand for Payment from the deputies of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC
of Cagayan attaching thereto copies of the writ of execution and the decision. On November 14, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal. Two(2) months later, on January 23, 1997, the respondent court issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration or to quash writ of execution. [4] (citations omitted)
Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari claiming that the denial of the respondent Judge of its motion for reconsideration was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion since he was not duly notified of the decision and there is no legal and factual basis for the issuance of the writ of
execution.[5] The appellate court found no such abuse of discretion and dismissed the petition. [6] It likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[7]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR
IN EXCESS OF IT IN FINDING THAT THE UNJUSTIFIABLE REFUSAL OF PETITIONERS COUNSEL ON RECORD TO
RECEIVE IN OPEN COURT A COPY OF THE SUBJECT DECISION IS ONLY A MERE NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL AND
THEREFORE, BINDS PETITIONER, HENCE, THE DECISION HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE, BY CITING JURISPRUDENCE ON NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL BINDS HIS CLIENT WHICH IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT FACTS. [8]

Petitioner argues that: when a copy of the decision which the court sent to Atty. Aquino was returned to sender, respondent Judge resorted in
causing the service of the decision to said counsel in open court, as petitioners counsel on record, when said lawyer appeared in the sala of
respondent Judge for another case; petitioner should be deemed as having no notice of the trial court decision since its counsel, who had not
withdrawn as such, refused to receive a copy of the same; such act of its counsel constitutes gross negligence which does not bind petitioner; there
was also no valid service to Atty. Aquino because when he refused to receive a copy of the decision, what the civil docket clerk of the trial court
should have done under the premises was to resort to substituted service; since there was no notice to petitioner regarding the trial court decision,
the issuance of the writ of execution and the denial of petitioners notice of appeal by respondent Judge are null and void; and the case of Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco[9] held that when the lawyer failed to notify his client about the receipt of the decision, such lawyer is
irresponsible and notice to him is not notice to client, such as in the case at bar. [10]

Petitioner prays that the decision and the resolution promulgated by the CA be reversed; that an order be issued nullifying the writ of execution
issued by respondent Judge; and that the notice of appeal of petitioner be granted as it has a very meritorious defense based on fortuitous event. [11]

Respondent in his Comment contends that: since Atty. Aquino is the counsel of petitioner from the trial up to its termination and there is nothing in the
record to show that he withdrew as counsel of petitioner, the copy of the decision mailed to him by registered mail although returned unserved is
sufficient to serve as notice to him and to his client following Sec. 5 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court; it was the duty of petitioner to notify the court
that Atty. Aquino was no longer its lawyer; petitioner was negligent in hiring a new counsel more than a year from July 1995 when Atty. Aquino was
no longer its lawyer; the implication is that Atty. Aquino was still its counsel when the decision was rendered and when a copy of the decision was
sent to him by registered mail since it is elementary that if a lawyer is going to withdraw as counsel for his client, he should file a motion to withdraw
as such with the conformity of the client; in this case, Atty. Aquino did not file any motion to withdraw as counsel for the petitioner thus he remained to
be counsel of record of petitioner especially since it was only on October 26, 1996 when the services of Atty. Jose de Luna was engaged by
petitioner; and the writ of execution issued is valid and proper considering that the decision of the court has already become final and executory. [12]

Before going to the merits, this Court reiterates the distinction between petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. It should be recalled that a petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment while a petition under Rule 65 concerns errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule
45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the
respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions. [13] Such is the case at bar.

It is petitioners position that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that the unjustifiable refusal of its counsel on record to
receive in open court a copy of the subject decision is only mere negligence of counsel which binds it. It then contends that the writ of execution
should be quashed because the decision of the trial court had not become final and executory due to non-service of the decision upon its counsel.

The Court does not agree.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. [14] If it were
otherwise, and a lawyers mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. [15]

The only exception to the general rule is when the counsels actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client, that
courts should accord relief to the party. [16] Indeed, if the error or negligence of the counsel did not result in the deprivation of due process to the client,
nullification of the decision grounded on grave abuse of discretion is not warranted. [17]

In this case, while Atty. Aquino, counsel of petitioner, was far from being vigilant in protecting the interest of his client, his infractions cannot be said to
have deprived petitioner of due process that would justify deviation from the general rule that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel.

As may be gleaned from the records, petitioner was able to actively participate in the proceedings a quo. It was duly represented by
counsel during the trial. While it may have lost its right to appeal, it was not denied its day in court. As enunciated by this Court, the right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process but only a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. [18] As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it would have no reason to complain, for it is the
opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. [19]

The Court has also held that when petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to
interpret the rules liberally in its favor. [20] Where petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the right to due
process cannot elicit this Courts approval or even sympathy. [21] It is petitioners duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly
posted about the case.[22] It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect
that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. [23] It is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for
the receipt of mail intended for them.[24]

Petitioner was wanting in all these areas. Not only did it fail to regularly check on the status of the case, it also failed to ensure that it could
be notified of the decision as soon as it was promulgated. Petitioner did not inform the court that it has severed its relationship with Atty. Aquino, its
counsel of record.[25] Thus, insofar as the trial court was concerned, Atty. Aquino was still its counsel. Neither did it hire a new lawyer soon after Atty.
Aquino allegedly ceased to be its counsel. Atty. Jose de Luna, its subsequent lawyer, stated that his services were engaged by petitioner only on
October 26, 1996 or a year after the decision was rendered by the trial court, while Atty. Aquino is supposed to have resigned as petitioners counsel
in July of 1995 or three months before the questioned decision was promulgated. [26] Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it knew that it did not have any
counsel when the decision of the trial court was due for promulgation yet it did not engage the services of a new one to safeguard its interests.
Petitioner also claims that it had no valid notice of the trial court decision therefore the writ of execution subsequently issued by the respondent
Judge is null and void; and claims that the trial court should have resorted to substituted service when its counsel on record refused to receive a
copy of the decision.

Such claims have no merit.

The fact that Atty. Aquino refused to receive a copy of the decision and no substituted service was effected does not erase the fact that a
copy of the trial court decision had earlier been sent by registered mail to Atty. Aquino which was returned for the reason that he has moved. [27] This
is sufficient service of the decision on petitioner since service upon counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. [28] As explained
in Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Provident Insurance Corp.:[29]

If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will
not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has
moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel could
possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office. [30]

The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel in an action in court, notices of all kinds including motions, pleadings and orders must be
served on the counsel. And notice to such counsel is notice to the client. [31] Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect
or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid
and regular on its face.[32]

While the rule admits of exceptions, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, [33] no such circumstance is here present as petitioner was
duly accorded due process.

This Court has also held that in cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself
is not even necessary.[34] Even then, in the present case, the trial court had sent a copy of the decision to petitioners known address which was
returned however for the reason that it has moved. [35]

Petitioner also claims that the ruling of the Court in Peoples Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco [36] should be applied in the present
case.

The Court disagrees. The differences in Peoples Homesite with the case at bar are apparent.

In Peoples Homesite, the counsel failed to inform the petitioners of the scheduled hearing and the case was heard in their absence. The
counsel also did not inform the petitioners that he had received a copy of the decision neither did he file a motion for reconsideration or a petition to
set aside judgment to protect the interests of his clients. As soon as petitioners learned of the decision they contacted their counsel and failing to do
so, hired the services of a new one. When asked to explain, the counsel merely said that he did not inform the petitioners because the case escaped
his attention. Because of these actions, the Court found that there was something fishy and suspicious. Indeed, there was nothing which could have
prevented the petitioners from attending the trial of the case themselves or moved for a reconsideration of the decision or took the necessary appeal
from the judgment if only their counsel had informed them of the courts processes. [37]

In this case, petitioner was able to actively defend its case in court. It also knew that Atty. Aquino was no longer its counsel months before
the decision was rendered, unlike in Peoples Homesite, yet it did not take steps to hire a new one to protect its interests.

The trial court was therefore correct when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the writ of execution. As ably
discussed by respondent Judge in his resolution:

The sole issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not there was a valid service of the courts decision to
defendants herein and their former counsel.

Defendants main theory is that there was no valid service of the decision to them by registered mail, and that, neither
was there a valid service of the decision to their former counsel, Atty. Arnold Aquino, who refused to receive it when the Civil
Docket Clerk of this court personally handed a copy of the decision to him.

Section 7, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

Section 7 Service of Final orders of Judgments.

Final orders of Judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail xxx

For the Rule to apply, service must have been made on the counsel de parte (FOJAS VS. NAVARRO, L-26365, April
30, 1970) and if it was sent to his address on record and he fails to receive it for causes imputable to him it is not necessary to
effect further service upon the party he represent (MAGNO, ET AL VS. C.A., et al. G.R. No. 58781, July 31, 1987).

As borne by the records itself, a copy of this courts decision was sent thru registered mail on December 6, 1995 to Atty.
Arnold Aquino, who was at that time defendants counsel of record, at his given address on record but the same was returned
with the annotation on the envelope that said counsel had moved. A separate copy of the decision was later sent thru registered
mail to the defendant GCP Manny Transport Service, Inc. at its given address on record but was also returned to the Court with
the same annotation that said defendant had moved. It is not disputed that the address on record of Atty. Arnold Aquino and GCP
Manny Transport Service Inc. is 1310 Espaa Corner Galicia St., Sampaloc, Manila. It was there where copies of the decision
were sent.
 In the case of Magno, et al. vs. C.A., et al., (G.R. No. 58781, July 31, 1978 [sic]) it was held that:

(But) where a copy of the decision was sent to counsel at his address of record but the same was not received
because he moved to another address without informing the court thereof, such omission or neglect will not stay the finality of the
decision.

Neither Atty. Arnold Aquino or defendant GCP Manny Transport Service, Inc. informed the court of their change of
address. Naturally, copies of the decision in this case were sent at their address of record. It is not incumbent upon the court to
determine the new address of party-litigants. On the contrary, it is the duty of the parties to inform the court of such change
address. Moreover, notices of the court processes are ordinarily taken cared of by clerks who are naturally guided by addresses
of record. To require the court and its personnel before sending out the notices to be continuously checking the records and the
various addresses from which a counsel may have filed his pleadings and sending them to such addresses instead of his
address of record is to show (sic) confusion and add an intolerable burden which is not permitted by the Rules of Court (INANA
VS. GARCIA 25 SCRA 801, see Rule 7, Sec. 5, Rule 13, Sec.5).

Notwithstanding separate service of copy of decision to herein defendant GCP Manny Transport Inc., and its counsel
de parte thru registered mail, the Court, likewise, available of personal service of decision pursuant to Section 7 of said Rule 13.

Be it noted that the Civil Docket Clerk personally handed a copy of the decision to Atty. Arnold Aquino who was in court
but who refused to receive it alleging that he is no longer the counsel for the defendant. However, at the time of such service,
Atty. Aquino remained to be defendants counsel of record since he did not formally withdraw as counsel for the GCP Manny
Transport Inc. It has been held time and again that personal service of decision cannot be avoided by counsels declining to
accept it and service is deemed complete regardlessof such refusal to accept. And notice to counsel operates as notice to
clients.

It is now too late for herein defendants to advance the theory that they have not received a copy of the decision in this
case, especially if the records thereof, would show otherwise. The Court was not amiss in seeing to it that its final orders and
judgment were duly served or furnished the party-litigants and their respective counsels and if they refuse to receive the same,
they must suffer the consequences thereof. The decision rendered by this Court has already attained finality, hence, may no
longer be set aside not even reconsidered without militating against the provisions of our procedural laws. [38]

As a final note, let it be emphasized that before a counsel of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such counsel on account of
withdrawal, it is necessary that Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 26 Change of Attorneys An attorney may retire at anytime from an action or special proceeding, by the written consent of
his client filed in court. He may also retire at anytime from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
 should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of
substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
the written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

should be observed. Unless said procedure is complied with, the counsel of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of
the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case. [39] Indeed, a lawyers withdrawal as counsel must be made in a
formal petition filed in the case, without which, notice of judgment rendered in the case served on the counsel of record, is, for all legal purposes,
notice to the client, the date of receipt of which is considered the starting point from which the period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin to run.
[40]
Petitioner having failed to appeal in due time, the trial court did not commit any error or grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for
execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SUSAN CUIZON, complainant, vs. ATTY. RODOLFO MACALINO, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The saga of a clients one decade-long travails caused by a recalcitrant lawyer who defrauds his client and flouts the directives of the highest
court of the land must deservedly end in tribulation for the lawyer and in victory for the higher ends of justice. The opening verses of the narrative
may have been composed by the lawyer, but it is this Court that will have to, as it now does, write finis to this sordid tale, as well as to the lawyers
prized claim as a member of the Bar.

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rodolfo Macalino was initiated by a letter-complaint [1] dated October 27, 1994 filed by Susan
Cuizon with the Office of the Court Administrator charging the respondent with Grave Misconduct.

The antecedents[2] are as follows:

The legal services of the respondent was sought by the complainant in behalf of her husband Antolin Cuizon who was convicted for Violation of
Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. When the spouses had no sufficient means to pay the legal fees, the respondent suggested that he be given
possession of complainants Mistubishi car, which was delivered to the respondent. Later respondent offered to buy the car for Eighty Five Thousand
Pesos (P85,000.00) for which he paid a down payment of Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P24,000.00). After the sale of the car, respondent failed to
attend to the case of Antolin Cuizon, so complainant was forced to engage the services of another lawyer.

The respondent was required to comment on the complaint lodged against him as early as December 5, 1994.
On December 29, 1995 the respondent was ordered to show cause why he should not be meted with disciplinary action or declared in contempt for
failure to comply with the order of the court, to comment on complaint.

On June 17, 1996, for failure to comply with the previous orders of the court, a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) was imposed upon him and the
order requiring him to file his comment on the complaint was reiterated.

On July 24, 1996 respondent paid the Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) fine imposed on him, however he failed to fully comply with the order of the
court.

On December 5, 1996 the Supreme Court received a letter from Antolin Cuizon informing the court that the respondent again committed another
infraction of the law by issuing a check against a closed account.

On February 12, 1997 the Supreme Court issued a resolution increasing the imposed fine on respondent in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) to One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and again the order requiring the respondent to file his comment was reiterated.

On Noveber 13, 1997 the cashier of the Disbursement and Collection Division issued a certification that the imposed fine of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) has not been paid by the respondent.

On December 10, 1997 the Supreme Court issued a warrant of arrest directing the National Bureau of Investigation to detain the respondent until
further Orders from the Court.

On February 23, 1998, Allen M. Mendoza Intelligence Agent of the NBI of San Fernando, Pampanga rendered a Report and Return of the Service of
Warrant of Arrest to the effect that the warrant could not be served for reason that the subject is no longer residing at his given address.

On April 22, 1998 the court again issued another resolution requesting the complainants to furnish the court with the correct and present address of
the respondent.

In compliance with this directive, the complainant reported that the respondent had not changed his residence. In fact, upon the information
given by his own son, the respondent comes home at midnight and leaves at dawn. [3]

In the Resolution[4] dated July 27, 1998, the Court resolved to consider the Resolution of December 10, 1997 finding the respondent guilty of
contempt of court and ordering his imprisonment until he complies with the Resolution of February 12, 1997, requiring him to pay a fine of P1,000.00
and to submit his comment on the instant administrative complaint served on the respondent by substituted service. The Court likewise declared the
respondent to have waived his right to file his comment on the administrative complaint and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigating Commissioner forthwith filed her Report and Recommendation[5] dated October 27, 1998 finding the respondent unfit to
remain a member of the Bar and recommending that he be disbarred. The IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation with the modification that
the respondent instead be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years. [6]

In its Resolution[7] dated July 19, 2000, the Court resolved to return the case to the IBP which, in turn, remanded the case to the Investigating
Commissioner for further investigation and compliance with procedural due process. [8]

As directed, the Investigating Commissioner conducted further investigation and submitted her Report and Recommendation[9] dated
November 16, 1999 stating that the respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearings on January 5, 1999 and March 23, 1999. Moreover,
despite his counsels motion for extension of time within which to file a comment on the complaint having been granted, the respondent failed to file
his comment. Hence, the Investigating Commissioner reiterated her recommendation that the respondent be disbarred.

The IBP modified the Investigating Commissioners recommendation and urged instead that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for five (5) years.[10] The Court noted the recommendation in its Resolution[11] dated September 8, 2003.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. However,
once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve his client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with whole-hearted fidelity. [12] Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. [13]

In the instant case, after agreeing to represent the complainants husband, taking possession of their car and persuading the complainant to
sell the same to him for a nominal amount, the respondent refused to carry out his duties as counsel prompting the complainant to secure the
services of another lawyer to defend her husband. The respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

The respondents infraction is compounded by the fact that he issued a check in favor of the complainants husband which was later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account. [14] Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.[15]

The fact that the respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court exacerbates his
offense. His repeated failure to comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his comment on the complaint should also be taken into
account. By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court. [16]

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is
shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes. [17] A lawyer who willfully disobeys a court order requiring him to do something may not
only be cited and punished for contempt but may also be disciplined as an officer of the court. [18]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The foregoing acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct which renders him unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of
the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. [19] His disbarment is consequently warranted.[20]

WHEREFORE, respondent Rodolfo Macalino is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondents personal
records and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

LINDA VILLARIASA-RIESENBECK, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a Verified Letter-Complaint[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 11, 2000, complainant Linda Villariasa-
Riesenbeck charged respondent Atty. Jaynes C. Abarrientos with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.
 Complainant alleges that respondent was her lawyer in CA-G.R. CV No. 45655, a case she had elevated to the Court of Appeals. The case
was unfortunately decided against her, so she asked respondent to prepare a Motion for Reconsideration. [2] She paid him P5,000 for the motion, with
the understanding that if it became necessary to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court, she will pay him another P5,000 for the petition.
Nevertheless, without first waiting for a resolution of the motion and barely a day after the Motion for Reconsideration was filed, she paid respondent
the P5,000.[3]

Respondent, who anticipated a denial of the motion, then asked her to get certified true copies of the Court of Appeals adverse decision. She
went to Manila on March 23, 2000, and got what respondent had requested. But after she had given him the copies of the decision, respondent failed
to apprise her about the status of her case. Respondent never even called her at her landladys phone number which she left with him. [4]

Fearful that the period to appeal might lapse, she and her husband, Johannes, visited respondent several times in May 2000 to ask if a
resolution on the motion had already arrived. In June 2000, she made the inquiries by herself while Johannes, who had meanwhile left the country,
continued to write and call respondent from Holland. [5]

When she heard that a resolution had arrived, it was not from respondent but from Johannes. In the first week of June 2000, when Johannes
called from Holland, respondent told Johannes that a copy of a Resolution denying the motion had already arrived. Respondent also said that a
Motion for Extension of Time to File the Petition had also been filed with the Supreme Court. She was surprised to hear this because respondent
never told her about the Resolution or the Motion for Extension of Time he supposedly filed, despite her follow-up visits to him in the last week of
May and early in June.[6]

She returned to respondents law office on June 23, 27, and 30, 2000, [7] to ask for a copy of the Resolution and to follow up on the petition,
which she expected respondent was preparing already. Respondent, who never gave her a copy of the Resolution, kept assuring her that the petition
would be filed on time.[8]

On July 3, 2000, respondent told her that the petition was ready to be filed the next day. [9] When she arrived at his office on July 4, 2000,
however, respondent astounded her with the truth that the period to file the petition had already expired. Respondent confessed that he received the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on April 18, 2000. She burst into tears because she knew that because of respondent, she had lost all her
hopes concerning the case.[10]

In his Answer filed on November 14, 2000, respondent insists he was diligent in the performance of his duties. He claims that after he received
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on April 18, 2000, he tried to reach complainant. He had his secretaries call her several times at the
phone number she gave and even repeatedly sent a messenger to her house at Humay-humay, Lapu-lapu City. Despite the messages they left for
her, complainant never showed up.[11]

When complainant did go to his office, it was only on June 23, 2000, long after the period to appeal had lapsed. [12] He blamed her for coming
late, and told her that even if she came on time, he would tell her to look for another lawyer, as he was convinced that filing the petition was futile. He
also told her that filing a petition that merely reiterates the arguments in the motion for reconsideration would render him liable for contempt. He
advised her to tell her husband these things.[13]

Complainant had agreed with him, according to respondent, adding that she had lost interest in her case. She said that she was only there
because her husband, Johannes, had been pressing her to pursue the case even when she lacked the money to do as he wished. [14]

The next time he saw complainant was a few days after, on June 27, 2000. Although she knew that the period to appeal had expired,
respondent said she pleaded with him to file the petition. He refused. On June 30, 2000, she returned to his office and reiterated her request. At that
point, he said that he returned the records to her. [15]

Respondent further alleges that from the very start, he made it clear to complainant and her husband that she stood to lose the case even
before the Supreme Court.[16] Still, complainant and her husband insisted that the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals be appealed. [17]

His apprehension to appeal the case notwithstanding, he agreed to file the Motion for Reconsideration. He did not, however, categorically
agree to file the petition. Accordingly, he apprised complainant that the P5,000 for the petition will only be paid if he decided to file one. [18]
 Respondent admits instructing complainant to secure certified true copies of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals, but denies
instructing her to go to Manila to get it. [19] He likewise denies ever telling Johannes in the first week of June 2000 that a Motion for Extension of Time
to File a Petition for Review had been filed.[20]

In her Reply[21] to respondents answer, complainant points to the Joint Affidavit [22] of Nesa Y. Bentulan, her landlady, and Marilyn Baay, the
latters housemaid, who both averred that neither of them received any phone call or visit from respondent or any of his personnel. Complainant
avers that they are the ones with whom respondents personnel would have to talk to because the phone number she left with respondent belonged
to Bentulan. They are also the ones with whom respondents messenger would have to talk to in the compound where she lived. [23]

After investigating the matter, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found respondent to have violated
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [24] In Resolution No. XVI-2003-173, issued on September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the CBD findings, and recommended to this Court that respondent be suspended for four months. It was likewise recommended
that respondent be ordered to refund the P5,000 complainant alleges she paid for the petition. [25]

We are in full accord with the recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

The proven facts of this case are contrary to respondents assertion that his sole obligation to complainant was to file the Motion for
Reconsideration. The description of legal services in the official receipts that he himself issued for the two partial payments complainant made shows
the extent of legal services he contracted to render. The first receipt reads as follows:

Received from LINDA RIESENBECK the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) representing the following:

PARTICULARS AMOUNT

Re: Partial Payment for Preparation of Motion

for Reconsideration & eventually Petition

for Review to the Supreme Court case

of Linda Riesenbeck vs. MAGICCORP

CA-G.R. CV-45655 - - - P5,000.00

Balance Remaining:

P5,000.00 to be paid upon filing of the Motion

for Reconsideration;

P5,000.00 to be paid on or before October 30, 2000.

(SGD.)

ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS

Cebu City, Philippines, February 24, 2000.[26]

The second reads as follows:

Received from LINDA RIESENBECK the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) representing the following:

PARTICULARS AMOUNT
Re: Additional Partial Payment for the

Preparation of Motion for Reconsideration

& Petition for Review case of Linda Riesenbeck

vs. MAGICCORP - - - P5,000.00

Balance Remaining:

P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the

Petition for Review to the Supreme Court.

(SGD.)

ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS

Cebu City, Philippines, March 04, 2000.[27]

As the first receipt shows, respondent bound himself to file not only the Motion for Reconsideration, but also the petition for review. This is clear
from the words Partial Payment for Preparation of Motion for Reconsideration & eventually Petition for Review to the Supreme Court in the first
receipt. The second receipt, on its face, bears the words Balance Remaining: P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the Petition for Review to the
Supreme Court. The tenor of these words, which respondent himself had written, clearly shows the respondents obligations concerning complainants
case.

That respondent was supposed to elevate complainants case is consistent with the fact that as early as March 2000, during the pendency of
the Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, respondent instructed complainant to secure certified true copies of the adverse decision
to be attached to the petition. [28] Not only is his action proof that he was obliged to elevate complainants case, his action is also proof he considered
her cause meritorious. Respondents present claim that he apprised complainant from the very start that further appeal or petition would be
unmeritorious is, therefore, clearly a ruse.

Likewise unbelievable is respondents claim that he repeatedly sent his messenger and had his secretaries call complainant several times.
Respondent alleges that complainant could not be reached in time for him to withdraw his services while allowing complainant sufficient time to hire
other counsel. We note, however, that respondent never attempted to write complainant to apprise her that he had already received the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration. Sending a letter to her by registered mail would have been the simplest thing he could have done to protect himself from
liability if it were true that complainant could not be found in time.

What is more, complainants landlady and the latters housemaid averred in a joint affidavit that none of respondents personnel ever visited or
called and left a message for complainant. Their declarations, coming as they do from disinterested persons, are entitled to greater credence than
the statements from respondents own personnel. We have little doubt that respondent had invented a scenario to explain his negligence.

Respondent should be reminded that once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause. [29] The
lawyer must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the clients cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.
[30]
Otherwise stated, the lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of the clients rights, and
the exertion of the lawyers utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally
applied.[31] This simply means that the client is entitled to the benefit of any remedy and defense that is authorized by law and may expect the lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense.[32] Until the lawyers withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to do his or her best for the interest
of the client.

As clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility,

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. [33]

Canon 19. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. [34]

Aggravating his negligence, respondent failed to demonstrate the candor he owed complainant. Respondent kept hiding from complainant the
fact that he had received a copy of the Resolution as early as April 18, 2000, despite complainants many visits to his law office. Worse, respondent
made complainant believe that the petition would be filed in time before this Court.

Needless to emphasize, a lawyer must not keep a client in the dark as to the status of and developments in the clients case. The lawyer is
obliged to respond within a reasonable time to a clients request for information. [35] A client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner
by which that clients interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or omitted. [36]A lawyer who repeatedly fails to answer the inquiries or
communications of a client violates the rules of professional courtesy and neglects the clients interests. [37]

Respondents failure to exercise due diligence in attending to the interest of complainant caused her grave material prejudice. Respondent has
indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client. In line with our ruling in Abay v. Montesino,[38] respondents suspension is fully
warranted. As recommended, we find that his immediate suspension from the practice of law for four months is called for under the circumstances.

As to the alleged overpayment of attorneys fees, the IBP recommends that respondent be made to refund the P5,000 that complainant claims
she paid for the petition for review. We find that based on the receipts complainant submitted, the entire amount of fees and expenses agreed upon
was P15,000. Of this amount, complainant already paid P10,000, corresponding to the attorneys fees and expenses related to making the Motion for
Reconsideration. From the second receipt, it is clear that the remaining balance of P5,000 was payable upon the filing of the petition for review with
the Supreme Court, which was never done. Since evidence shows that he did file a motion but he was thereafter negligent and lacking in honesty
and candor in dealing with his client, a refund is fair and proper, not of the entire amount of P10,000 but only of P5,000.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS is found LIABLE for serious misconduct and negligence in the performance of
his duties as a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for four (4) months, with warning that commission of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely. He is also ORDERED to refund the amount of P5,000.00 soonest to complainant.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent, Atty. Jaynes C. Abarrientos, in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies hereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., on leave.