LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG, complainants, vs. ATTY. Respondent knows this fact.
ndent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion decided to sell
GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her mother,
Concepcion Tabang, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
verified complaint for disbarment or suspension against respondent Atty.
Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit and gross dishonesty.
Complainants allege as follows:
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought the legal
advice of then incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father of herein
respondent, regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare agricultural land in
Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consists of several
parcels of land belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia
that under the agrarian reform program of the government, she is prohibited
from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural land, as she already owns other
parcels of land. Judge Gacott then advised her to put the title of the lands in
the names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for easy
disposition. Following the advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of
land using fictitious names. Eventually, Lilia was able to secure individual
titles over these parcels of land in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit:
TCT No. 12790 Agnes Camilla
TCT No. 12794 Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 Amelia Andes
the subject parcels of land because they needed money for their medication
and other necessary expenses. On the pretext that he is going to help them
sell the subject property to prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the
seven land titles from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year
from the time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the
sale of the property. He informed herein complainants that he lost all the
seven land titles. Respondent then advised complainants to file a petition in
court for re-issuance of title. Following respondents advice, Lilia Tabang, in
the guise of acting as the authorized agent-representative of the fictitious
owners, filed a case for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of land.
However, in the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed that
the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven individual Special Power of
Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang appear to have been signed by the
same person because of the similarities in their strokes. The public
prosecutor informed the trial court of this fact prompting the latter to summon
the alleged principals. To avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from
the court because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia withdrew
the case without prejudice to the re-filing of the same. Subsequently, Lilia
filed a new set of cases for re-issuance of title, changing the signatures of the
fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a new set of cases was filed,
respondent executed or caused to be executed several documents, among
which were Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits of
Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent
caused the annotation of these documents in the land titles covering the
subject properties. Thereafter, respondent caused the publication of a notice
representing himself as the owner of the subject parcels of land and
indicating therein his desire to sell the said properties. Eventually, respondent
was able to sell the seven parcels of land to seven individuals. However, only
three of these buyers were legitimate, while the remaining four are dummies
of respondent. As a result of selling the three parcels of land, respondent was
able to receive P3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was remitted
to complainants.
Complainants contend that in executing the various Revocation of
Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit of Recovery, affixing thereon the
signatures of the fictitious registered owners of the disputed parcels of land,
and in arrogating the ownership over the said lands upon himself, respondent
committed gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise
allege that this is not the only case wherein respondent sold properties of his
clients to third persons without his clients knowledge and consent. [1]
 Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying the material
allegations of the complainants. He claims that the seven land titles covering
the subject properties are valid and duly executed; and denies complainants
allegations that the alleged owners are fictitious. Respondent further claims
that the registered owners voluntarily sold the seven parcels of land to
different individuals and his only participation in the said sale is that he was
authorized by the registered owners to collect from the buyers the full
payment of the lands sold. He further denies that complainant Lilia Tabang is
the real owner and that she merely acted as a broker who was trying to
promote the sale of the properties; that when she came to know that the
properties were sold by their registered owners, she called up the law office
of respondent and demanded that she be given her share or balato in the
sale of the properties equivalent to 20% of the gross sales because of her
alleged efforts exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of land;
that when respondent turned her down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad
light and seek his disbarment. Respondent further denies complainants
allegation that he sold real properties of some of his clients to third persons
claiming that in all these cases his role was merely to notarize the documents
of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the buyers of their properties. [2]
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was assigned by the
IBP to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro for report and recommendation.
Commissioner Navarro conducted a mandatory conference on November 25,
2003 after which she required the parties to submit their respective position
papers, together with all the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits
of their witnesses, if any. In a report dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner
Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [3] Accordingly she
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.[4]
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
resolution adopting the report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the Board
modified the recommended penalty and imposed the supreme punishment of
disbarment.[5]
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should be remanded
for further proceedings.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an
attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court are deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of
law, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, corrupt or
willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough
as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits
in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to
his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.[6]
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Indeed, considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.[7]
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a
mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and
compelling reasons.[8] Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of investigation
in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP,
thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent
to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the
investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas
and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to
defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself
and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to
appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from
the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board
of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued
by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The
corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board
of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter
conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in
this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as
practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen
(15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and
if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the formal
investigation by conducting a mandatory conference between the
complainants and the respondent after both parties have filed their complaint
and answer, respectively. The mandatory conference was supposedly held
for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the parties to stipulate
facts. However, no definitive result was reached during the conference as
respondent continued to deny all the allegations of the complainants. After
the mandatory conference was held, no further hearings were conducted.
Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely required the parties to
submit their respective position papers, including all the necessary
documents and duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole basis
of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the documents attached thereto,
the Investigating Commissioner submitted her Report and Recommendation
to the IBP Board of Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the respondent
and the imposition of the penalty of disbarment being prayed for by
complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should not have simply relied
on the parties position papers and the pieces of documentary evidence
submitted by them. She should have proceeded with the investigation by
conducting formal hearings and calling upon the parties to present additional
evidence to support their respective contentions. In the case of the
complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should have required the
presentation of the persons who allegedly executed the affidavits presented
in evidence to prove the veracity of the allegations contained in said
affidavits, at the same time affording respondent the opportunity to cross-
examine the supposed affiants. The failure of the complainants to move for
the presentation of the persons alleged to have executed the subject
affidavits does not render the IBP powerless to conduct further investigation,
considering its power to issue subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should have
compelled the persons named by the respondent as the original owners as
well as the buyers of the subject properties to appear before her. The
appearance of these witnesses could have easily been facilitated considering
that the residence and office addresses of the three of the supposed buyers
are all located in Makati while the residence of three of the original owners
are located within Manila and the remaining four are residing in the province
of Cavite which is very near Metro Manila. To repeat, under the above-quoted
Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is authorized to issue subpoena to
compel the appearance of persons and witnesses before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by
complainants and respondent consists of affidavits and photocopies of
documents. Not one of the persons who executed these affidavits and
instruments was presented or subpoenaed by the Commissioner to identify
their affidavits and give the adverse party opportunity to confront the
witnesses in a formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and squarely on the
issues raised in the subject administrative matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.