What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power

Author(s): Jeffrey W. Legro

Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 515-534
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articies

What China Will Want: The Future

Intentions of a Rising Power
W Legro
Jeffrey

China's nationalpower isgrowingrapidly, butwhat China will do with itsnewfoundcapabilitiesremainsan issueof contentious
debateamong scholarsand policymakers. At theheartof theproblem is thedifficulty
ofdiviningfutureintentions.Two arguments
have dominated thedebate.One focuseson power and likelyChinese revisionism. The otherhighlights China's growinginter
dependenceand likelyfuturesatisfaction. Both areproblematicin termsof logicand evidence.They offerlinearprojectionsthat
ignoretheway thatChina's futureislikelytobe contingent-especiallyon theinteraction policy ideasand events.Relative
of foreign
power and interdependence are importantbut theirimpact ismediated throughthedoctrinesleadersuse to justifyaction and
establishauthority:thoseideasareprone to change in regular
ways-and with themChina's intentions.If thisargumentis right,
policyprescriptionsthatadvocatecontaining,engaging,or somemix of thetwo (i.e.,hedging) in relations
withChina need tobe
reconfigured.

The China" problemisnot justaboutpower,

"rising lead toenduringsatisfaction
in theexistinginternational
butpurpose.China has consistently stressed thatits order? Today
China appears
to be a "status
quo" power.4
development Will itremainso?
as amajor powerwill be peacefuland
non-obtrusive. Yet in theUnited States thereis,as oneExistinganswersto thisquestionlack theverything
U.S. DeputySecretary ofStateput it,a "cauldron of anx
needed:a generalexplanation ofcontingent changein the
iety"overChina's future.1 Expert testimony beforethe
intentionsofChina.5The problemisnot simplyan issue
U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReviewCommis ofChina'ssecrecy or repressionof freeexpression sincethe
sion,a body thatmonitorsand reportstoCongresson problemof futureintentions applies to democraciesas
has focused
bilateralrelations, heavilyon uncertainty over Even ifwe had accessto theinner
well as dictatorships.6
China's intentions.2 workingsof theChinesegovernment
In February2007, Vice President today,it isunlikely
Cheney cautionedthatChina's recentanti-satellite test
thatinformation would tellus about future aims.Even if
and general militarybuild-upwere "notconsistent with
China todayhas somesecretplan for worldhegemony or
China'sstatedgoalof a 'peaceful rise."'3The stomachs of
world harmony,thoseaimswill be subjectto changeby
arechurning.
strategists China'sverygrowthand theprocessbywhich itunfolds.
It israre
when a pressing policyissueconnectssodirectly
IronicallyevenChina's top leaders,despitetheirconcen
gap in thescholarly
toa critical literature. tratedpoliticalpower,cannotknowwith certainty
Such is thecase what
with the impactof theriseofChina on world politics. theircountrywillwant.
Will growingpower lead Beijing to challenge inter Indeed,thatiswhat thetwoviewsdominating thedebate
nationalnorms,rules,and institutions-possibly on China argue,althoughtheysee different
generat inevitable
ingdangerousconflict amongmajorpowers inEast Asia ifThe first
futures. focuses onChina'spowerand claimsthat
not elsewhere? Or mightChina's integration in inter
China's desireforrevision
the will growas China's relative
its
nationaleconomy, growing middle class,and increas
capabilitiesincreasedespitewhatBeijing thinkstoday.In
ingparticipationininternational thisviewothercountries
andexchanges
institutions mustdo all theycan tocontaina
risingChina becauseat somepointChina willwield its
new-found powerto challengeglobalorder.The second
W LegroisProfessor
Jejfrey and Chair in the
Woodrow viewhighlights China'sgrowinginterdependence andargues
WilsonDepartmentofPoliticsand Co-Directorof the thatsuchconflict can be avoidedbycontinuingtoengage
GoverningAmericaina GlobalAgeProgram at the
Miller China,whichwill builddomesticinterests inChina that
University
CenterofPublicAJfairs, ofVirginia(legro@ and accommodationto the
favorpoliticalliberalization
Theauthorthanks
virginia.edu). RobertRoss,TangShip rulesof theprevailing international
system.Both answers
ing, Womack,andZhu Fengforhelpful
Brantly comments tap intodeep-seatedforcesshapingChina, but both are
andDaniel AaronWeirforexcellent assistance.
research flaweddue to theirlinearprojectionof the futureof

DOI: 10.1017/Si537592707071526 September 2007 Vol. 5/No. 3 515

1
Art'icles IWhat China Will Want

Chinesepolicytowards international order-be itthecon vis theirdomesticcritics.Likewise, whenChina displays

flictualrevision
expectedbypowertheorists or theharmo consistentrevisionist tendencies,such ideas should be
niousintegration predicted by interdependence advocates.7 penalized-but onlywhen influential oppositiongroups
China'sdiplomaticfuture, however,is likelytobemore are promoting more attractive alternativeideas.Other
contingent thaneitherthepoweror interdependence posi wise,nomatterhow loathsome anyparticular approach,if
tionsallow.To highlight contingency requiresthatsome thealternative isevenlessdesirable, dramaticpressurefor
thingbe saidaboutwhat thefuture dependson-no small rapidchange isproblematic. Therefore,itbehoovesthe
problemwith a countrylikeChina thatisauthoritarian international community tobe proactive(notjustreactive
and non-transparent onmany issues. What policymakers tobehavior)bynurturing groupsand ideasinChina that
most need,scholars havefounddifficult tostudy.8Clearly offermore benign replacementsto the less desirable
in thecaseofChina both itsrelative powerand itseco alternatives.
nomic interdependence affectitsforeign policy.The issue Naturallyin all theseareas,thepotentialforoutside
of courseishow thetwowill do so overtime.9 influence on a country ofChina's sizeand regimetypehas
I arguethattheirinfluence dependson a third meshing significant limits.
Yetwe knowfromtheSovietexperience
gear-national ideasabouthow toachieveforeign policy thateven in authoritarian states,slowpatientefforts to
goals. Such ideasperformthreecriticalfunctions:they supportreformers can have an impact.'2The futureof
empowercertaindomesticinterests groupsoverothers, Chinawill notbe decidedby theactionsofothers, but the
theygenerateexpectations againstwhich performance is actionsofoutsidepartieshave influenced China'sorienta
assessed,and theyeitherfacilitate or impedethepossibil tion in thepast (e.g.,Nixon and theopeningofChina)
ityfora new strategy to emerge.Specifically, whenChi andmay do so again in thefuture.
neseexpectations about thebenefits of integrating in the I approachtheproblemof theriseofChina fromthe
extantinternational orderaredefiedbyevents with nega perspective of international relations theory,not as an area
tiveconsequences, anopportunity existsfordomesticcrit Thus I will emphasizehow developmentsin
specialist.
ics to challengethatorthodoxy. Whether changeactually China relatetoa generalpatternseeninothergreatpow
occursdepends,however, on thedistribution of replace ersin theirattempts to revise,join,or separatefrom global
ment ideasthataffects whethercriticscan coordinate on a order.The goal is topointout theproblemsin thecurrent
feasiblealternative
worldview. debate,offeran alternative view,and exploreitscontem
This approachoffers some twists on familiar thinking. poraryrelevance. A good starting point is todefine what
Contraryto thepower-centric viewofChina, themost exactly"future intentions"meansand tooutlinethenature
dangerousscenarioin thefutureisnot the"rise"ofChina, of current Chinese intentions. The articlethenexplores
but ruptures inChina'seconomicgrowth. Opposed to the how power and interdependence argumentsdeal with
economic interdependence position, economic engage intentions, offers an explanationforchangeand continu
mentneednot leadtoharmony. Countriesthatundertake ity, and explorestheimplications forthefuture ofChina's
rapidintegrationhavegenerated considerable systemic con intentions.
flict.'0China itselfhas displayedwide variationin its
approach,be itcooperate with,challenge, or separateitself
frominternational societyover thepast twocenturies. China and Contemporary
The point isnot thatpoweror economicliberalization is International Order
unimportant, but ratherthatthosefactorsinteract with Intentions refers towhatChina plans todo. Here I focus
dominantideasinparticular ways toshapeenduring pat specificallyon plansfordealing with theinternational order.
terns of nationalbehavior. In generalterms,statesdealwith international order in
In termsof policy thismeans thatneithera contain threeidealways: integration, revision, and separation. The
mentnorengagement policyisa reliable consistent choice. first,integration, refersto nationalstrategies thataccept
Indeed, thedominantview todayamongpolicymakers thedominantprinciples, rules,andnormsofwhatHedley
acceptsthisadvicebyadvocating a "hedging"strategy that Bull called"international society." 13Typicallysuchstates
pursuesbothoptionssimultaneously with theparticular areseenas "status quo," "satisfied," or "conservative" pow
mix of strategy(conflictual vs. cooperative) dependenton ersbasedon theirdesiretoworkwithin theinternational
Chinesebehavior.'I system.A secondcategoryincludesthosestatesthatana
The argument hereoffers a somewhat differentandmore lystsrefertoas "dissatisfied"or "revisionist,"but themean
proactiveview: it suggeststhatmanaginga rising China ingisthesame:theyinvolve effortstofundamentally revise
will dependnot on behaviorper sebut on thenatureof the international system.Such revisiontypically breeds
thedominantideas. When China espousesideasandaction conflictsinceothercountriesare prone to defendthat
thatfavorcooperativeintegration, itmakes sensetodo as same order.14 A thirdapproach is seen in statesthat
much as possibleto ensurethattheirinternal supporters attemptto removeor separatethemselves fromtheorbit
gainpositivefeedback and "I toldyou so" leverage vis-ai of prevailinginternational normsand practices, much as

51 6 Perspectives on Politics
Figure 1 "worldrevolution" and "three worlds theory" rhetoricof
China's outlook on international order revisionism and giveslessemphasisto itsself-proclaimed
role as "leaderof theThirdWorld."20 InsteadChina
Dominant Orthodoxy todayshowsmost of themarkersof a conservative great
Qing (1800-1860) Separatist poweracceptingthebasicprinciples of theexistinginter
nationalorder.21 China joined the World TradeOrgani
zation,has cooperated more fully with theUnited States
Republican (1896-1939) Integrationist
sincethe9/11 attacks,and regularly participatesinG-8
meetings.China's continuedpromotionof "theFive
Era Mao (1949-1976) Revisionist Principles of PeacefulCoexistence"or thecall fora "new
politicaland economicorder that is fairand rational"
Deng (1978 - ) Integrationist seemvague.22China's commitmentto revisingthesys
temtobenefitdevelopingcountriesseemsmost relevant
when it involves measuresrelatedtoChina'sown growth
or toconcerns of sovereignty relatedto itsownhistoryas
a target of imperialism.23
TokugawaJapanattemptedtodo in thenineteenth cen To suggestthatChina acceptsthebasic principlesof
tury, orMyanmar has done in the contemporary period. today'sinternational orderisnot to saythatitprefers no
isa termthatisoftenassociated
Intentions withaimsor changeinworld politics.CertainlyChina is dissatisfied
goals or interests.It is useful,however,to distinguish with someaspects.Three important ones areU.S. domi
betweeninterests and theideasthatstatesadopt toattain nance, the statusof Taiwan, and externalpressureto
Broad interests
theirinterests. showrelatively littlevaria democratize.
tionbothwithin and among states.Stateshave always China favors"multipolarization" and "democratiza
soughtsecurity fromexternalthreats and especiallyin the tion"in international relations-i.e.,thatall states(orat
twentieth century,economicprosperity has also emerged leastgreatpowers)haveamore equal sayand theUnited
of government.'5
as a core responsibility As JiangZemin States"hegemonism" (oranyotherpredominant country)
declaredin 1997,China seeks"thegoalof beingprosper lessinfluence-especially in terms of theU.S. abilityto
ous and strong"-anaim sharedbyChinese leaders(and use forcetoachieveitsgoalsor to intervene in thedomes
othernations)throughout theages.China'sdesiretobe a ticpoliticsofothercountries.24 That sentiment, however,
"richand strong country" and to"enrichthepeople"dates ishardlyunusualand is sharedbymostmajor powers,
back toat leastthelatenineteenth TodayChina
century.16 includingAmerica'sEuropeanallies.China has a special
iscertainly
intenton increasingits"comprehensive national sensitivity in suchmattersdue to the linkbetweenits
power."
17 colonialpast, subsequentindependence, and the legiti
Ifsuchfundamental goalsseemrelativelyconstantover macyof theCommunistregime(whichbases itsauthority
of
longperiods time, ideasabout how to achieve those inparton successfully restoringChina'sautonomy).
goals arenot.They have rangedfromtheviolentover The second,and related,issueisTaiwan.China favors
throw orderto thedesireto remainaloof
of international reunificationand rejectsanymove thatenhances Taiwan
fromit,to an urge to integratewithin it.As seen in fig ese independence. Since 1979 ithas advocatedpeaceful
ure 1,China's own historyover thepast twocenturies reunificationover"liberation" (buthasalsodeveloped mil
showsvariationamongthesepositions. itarycapabilitiessuitedtoTaiwan as a target). China in
By thistypology,China'scurrentintentions aremostly thisissue,aswithTibet or otherdisputedterritories, por
China is joiningandworkingwithin the
integrationist. traysitself
asdefender of theextantrules. Unificationwith
rulesof theextantsystem. The wellspringof thisstatus Taiwan inChina'sview isa "domesticissue"overwhich a
quo approachisfoundinDeng Xiaoping'sascentto lead sovereign statemustmake itsown internal decisions.As
ershipin 1978. Since thattime,China has not sought to
Mao proclaimed theUnited Statesin 1970, "Youhave
separationfromthesystem norhas itaspiredtooverturn occupiedourTaiwan Island,but I have neveroccupied
it.Insteadithas increasingly
opted forinvolvement.This yourLong Island."25
orientation hasmanifesteditselfinsignificant
increasesin The combination of a desireforautonomyand reuni
international membershipas well as more
institutional ficationwith Taiwan is fueling what is also anomalous
informalcooperativebehavior with theexistingpowers.'8 forgreatpowers(withtheexception of theUnitedStates)
This integrativeorientationwas cautiousin theearly in thecontemporary system-a relatively rapiddefense
Deng period,but in thepast fifteen yearshas pickedup buildup.Althoughit isdifficult to fathomexactnumbers
considerable momentum.There is room to debate the and levelsof spendingdue toChina's secrecyon these
depthof Chinese integration whether it is shallowor issues,ithas bumped itsmilitaryspendingsome 15 per
enmeshed-butthetrendisclear.'9China has leftbehind centa yearfrom1990-2005with a 17.8 percentincrease

September 2007 1Vol. 5/No. 3 517

Articles IWhat China Will Want

announcedfor2007. The overalllevel-withestimates aspiresto greaterdemocraticreforms, the"mostimpor

rangingfrom$45-100 billion isstill,however, a fraction tantand fundamental principlefordevelopingsocialist
of est.U.S. militaryspendingof $440 billion (fy2007, politicaldemocracy inChina" istheleadership of theCom
excluding the $50 billion supplementfor Iraq and munistParty.30 In short, politicalcompetition israre,pop
Afghanistan).26 ularpoliticalchoice forthe leadership of thecountryis
China hasmade significant progressin itscapabilities notpermitted, thepressistightly managed,theinternet is
(includinginballisticand cruise missiles,submarines, air filteredand blockedwith amazingsophistication, religion
craft, and amphibiousoperations)thataremostlyrelated iscontrolled by thegovernment, andhumanrights accords
to regionalchallenges, with regardto scenarios
especially areverbally acknowledged butnot fullyimplemented.31
involving Taiwan.AssumingthattheChinese economy Despite thisstanding,it isnotable thatChina isnot
triples by2025,Chinesemilitaryspendingisexpectedto advocatingthatstatesadoptsimilar politicalsystems to its
climbtosomewhere between$185 billionto$400 billion own,or thathumanrights normsareillegitimate.32 Instead
(i.e., lessthanthecurrent U.S. defensebudget).The Chi Beijingemphasizesthatprinciples suchas sovereignty, sta
nese continueto facesignificant geopoliticalchallenges and territorial
bility, integrityshouldtrumpsuchconsid
from neighbors suchas India,Russia,Japan,and theUnited erations.33
China doesnot ruleoutdemocracy initsfuture,
States,not tomention internal challengesand demands itjustinsiststhatitwill followitsownpath,style ofdemoc
on publicspending. Given thisoutlook,itisunlikelythat racy,and timing.For the timebeing, the international
thecurrent scaleofChina'smilitarymodernization signals norm seemsto emphasizedemocratization (i.e.,moving
more thana desireto protectitsversionof autonomy, in a liberaldirection)not theend stateof democracy(a
which problematically includesTaiwan and raisesissues somewhat undefined goal).China'sstatements andactions
overotherdisputedareas in theEast and SouthChina fitthatprofile-asdiscussedlater,itisslowlyliberalizing
Seas.27 albeitat a slowpace andwith reversals. Overall,despite
Finally,China may havemost of theattributes of a thetension overhumanrights anddemocratization, China's
in
normalmajor power theinternational system,but it is current outlook ismostlyintegrationist.
distinctfromothercontemporary greatpowers in one
important way: it is theonlynon-democracy. This trait The Limits of Power and
suggeststensions and disagreement with emergent norms Interdependence
of international societyregarding human and political
The debateoverChina isnot aboutwhat China wants
rights.28 In its international China isquick to
relations,
today,butwhat itmightwant tomorrow. The riseof
makehayoutof relations withcountries, thatbya democ
China could lead to a fundamental reorientationofChi
racy standard,may be stigmatizedor less desirable
nese thinking and perhapsa challengetoworld order,as
partners-as seen in thestrongrelationship China has
thosewho focuson powerpredict. Or China could increas
beenbuilding with Iran, NorthKorea, theSudan,Myan
inglyenmeshitselfin and supporttheexistingrulesof
mar,andRussia.
internationalsociety,evenundergoing politicaldemocra
To theextentdemocracy becomesa definingfeature of
tization,asmostwho emphasizeChina's growinginter
international society-and countries are forcedtochoose
dependenceforesee. Both offeran important vision,but
betweendemocracies andnon-democracies-China might
both arehalfblind in ignoringthecontingent natureof
indeedbecome a revisionist power.Indeed,some have
China's futureintentions.
argued(andChina has not disagreed)thatChina offers a
differentmodel ofdevelopment-"the Beijingconsensus"
thatchallengestheU.S.-dominated"Washington consen Power
sus."29That view featuresstronggovernment-directedPower theories expecta clearshiftin a revisionistdirec
growth,rigorous protectionof sovereignty,and thedevel tion.As RobertGilpin onceput it,"As itsrelative power
opmentof asymmetric forms of defensetocombatother increases, a risingstateattemptstochangetherulesgov
more powerfulcountries(e.g., theUnited States). In erningthesystem."34 John Mearsheimerconcludesthat
extreme circumstances (perhapsa globaleconomicmelt China'sgrowingcapabilities willmean it"wouldnotbe a
down), such a vision a
might become rallying point for statusquo power,but an aggressive statedeterminedto
resistance to thesocietythatnow exists. achieveregionalhegemony."35 Denny Roy expectsthat
At thepresenttime,China's notionof democracyis "China'sgrowthfrom aweak,developing statetoa stronger,
"thedemocracy of dictatorship"or onewherepeople are more prosperousstateshould resultin a more assertive
the"master of thestate"-Kafkaesquetermsthatreferto foreignpolicy ... bolder,more demanding,and less
somethingthatisnot democracyas it isgenerally under inclinedtocooperate with theothermajor powersin the
stood.Insteadpowerresidesin thehandsof theCommu region."36The basic thrust of theseanalysesis thatrising
nistPartyand all otherpoliticalentities must followits powerleadstoa growing geopoliticalappetiteand a likely
lead or pay a blood price. Indeed even todaywhen China changetowardrevisionism.

518 Perspectives on Politics

 This view of China has twovariations,the "patient The problem with thisargument howeveristhatpower
hegemon"and the "innocentgiant." In the firstview, isnotdestiny. There areanalyticand empiricalanomalies
China is likeGermanyin the Weimar period,patiently thatconfoundsucha spareview. We might,forexample,
biding itstimeuntil it is strongenough to reconfigure assumethatstatesareconcernedfirst and foremost with
an oppressiveinternational order.Hans Von Seeckt,the power,but thattellsus nothingabout how theythink
headof theoutlawed(shadow)Germanyarmyis reputed theycan bestachievepower-by challengingtheworld,
to have declaredin the 1920s, "Firstwe'll get strong, cooperating with it,or ignoringit.Because international
thenwe'll takebackwhatwe lost."37 Deng supposedly relations arecomplexand roadtesting grandstrategies is
advised,"Observecalmly;secureourposition;copewith statesshow laggedresponses
difficult, at best to external
affairscalmly;hide our capacitiesand bide our time;be conditions.The possibility ofeffective adjustment tointer
good atmaintaininga lowprofile;and neverclaim lead nationaldemandsisfurther impededby thefactthat"the
ership."38 The implication, of course,is thatafterpower state"isnot a singleactorbut an aggregation of leaders
isachieveddifferent policies will follow.Lieutenant Gen with different constituencies, eachwith varyingpercep
eralMi Zhenyu,Vice Commandantof theAcademyof tionsandpreferences.45 Aggregating thosepreferences into
MilitarySciences,put itmorebluntly:"[AsfortheUnited a coherent collectivechoicefacesa variety ofhurdles.46 In
States,]fora relatively long time itwill be absolutely short, grandstrategy isfiltered through domesticpolitics.
necessary thatwe quietly nurse our sense of ven Empirically, statesdo not alwaysexpandtheirforeign
geance.... We must concealour abilitiesand bide our policyas power increases(nordo theylimitit as power
time."39 Historicalanomaliesarecommon.47In theFirst
declines).
A secondviewofChina isas an "innocentgiant"that WorldWar,Americaemergedas thedominantpowerin
may not be revisionist rightnow,but is likelyto shiftin international relations,but itsinvolvement and goalsdid
thatdirectionas it gainspower.China may genuinely notexpand,but contractedin theinterwar period.China
believe its risewill be peaceful,but once it has gained in theQing eradid notalteritsisolationist ideastodeal
enoughresources, it is likelytowantmore and bewilling with theencroaching and threatening Europeanpowers
to concede lessand henceput upwith lessof thestatus even thoughthe securitysituationindicated mounting
quo. Sometimes suchshifts will beprovoked, notbyChina, dangers.And in terms of powertrajectories, Britainand
but by theinsecure actionsof thedeclininghegemon,in theUnitedStatesdid notgo towarwith eachotherat the
thiscase theUnited States.40 turnof thetwentieth century, evenas theUnited States
Not only isrevisionism likelyaccordingtopowertheo surpassed Britainas thedominantinternational power.48
rists,but so too isconflict. Powertransitions areviewedas National strategy can rarely be understood by reference to
a quintessential sourceofwar in theinternational arena.41 external conditionsalone.
This isespeciallythecasewhen nationshavehistoriesthat Nor have ideasfollowedthebalanceof powerin lock
leavethemaggrieved. Thus thereisconcernthatChina, step.China has been consistently weaker thanthedom
likeothercountriesthatfeeltheyhavehistorically gotten inantpowersof world politics since at least the late
theshortendof thestick,areparticularly pronetoattempt nineteenth century, yet itsideashavevariedbetweensep
to revisetheinternational system.42 arationinQing China to integration inRepublicanand
These powerarguments correctly identifykeyelements contemporary China to revisionism duringMao (see fig
shapingChinese foreignpolicy and international rela ure 2). We might viewChina's power trajectory, not
tions.Chinese leaderspay closeattentionto powerand staticpositionas beingmost important, but thattrajec
geopolitics.43 Indeed,to theextentthatChina is inter toryhas been rising(withfitsand starts)sincethecom
ested in joininginternational society,it should,by the munists seizedcontrolof themainland.China's ideas,
veryprinciples of thesystem, havean interest inbalance however,have made shiftsbetween revisionismand
ofpowerpolitics. AndChina iscertainly focusedon increas integration.
ing itsown powerand balancingU.S. power inAsia.44 And contraryto the"rising China" thesis-i.e., that
There arealsogood reasonstobelievethatChinese aims foreignpolicy ambitionsgrowwith relativepower
and influence will growinsomerespects asChina'spower Chinawasmost revisionist when itwas atone of itsweak
grows.Itwould be a trueanomalyifsomeportionof estpointsin terms of relativepower-i.e., afterMao came
China'snew-found wealthwerenot directedto increased topower.
andmoremodernmilitarycapabilities. Scholarshaveattemptedtomodifythepowerview to
Likewisepowertransition theoristsrightlypoint to the take intoconsideration such anomalies.One notion is
higherprobability of international tensions when power thatstatesare shapednot justby rawpower,but also by
transitionsoccur.It iseasyto imaginethatamorepower "intentions."50 Powertransition scholars
have longnoted
fulChinamightuse itscapabilities inwaysthatraisehackles that"nationalsatisfaction with thestatusquo" isas impor
of those(e.g.,theUnitedStates)used tocallingtheshots tantas transitions. Inbothinstances thesefactorsareviewed
inAsiawithoutsuchconstraints. as distinctfrom, andnot reducibleto,power. They clearly

September 2007 IVol. 5/No. 3 519

 ArticIes iWhat China Will Want

Figure 2
Relative power (CINC) of China, the United States, and Russia
-
0.45

C 0.4

~0.35

Z- 0.3

-
0.25

02
0.
0
Cooooom Ajcrl scJsSsa:a

o co0 c\J 00 o o. c\ 01t 0 CD0 C\j CO 0 (O C\j CO 't 0 (O C\J co

(o ~O(O C a- oo
0O COco Coco
0) a) 0 0
CO0 C) 0') 0)C) 0)
C '\j CO CO '
0') 0) 0Y) 0)
LO cO
0) 0) (O 0),- 0Y)
(O 0)
0)
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Year

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implythat we cannotunderstand what states

and predict Overall,themore that China iseconomically and socially
will dowithoutknowinghow theythinkaboutappropri entwined withother majorpowers(e.g.,theUnitedStates)
Yet theydo notaddressthekeyissueofwhen
ateaction.51 themore itgainsfromtheoverallsystem and themore it
such thinkingis likelytochange-or not. has to lose inchangingthesystem or engaginginmajor
We mightalsoanticipatethatasChina partici
conflict.57
pates in thesystemitwill also changeit,inconsultation
Interdependence and agreement withothercountries, more to itsliking.
A differentresponsetoChinesepowercomesfromthose These relatedarguments thatsupportengagement cer
who believethatChina'smaterialimprovement and social tainlycapturean important influenceon Beijing'sthink
evolutionthroughinterdependence with theworld give ingtoday.China has becomecaptivated by theeconomic
risetodomesticpoliticalforcesthatfavorintegration
and growththathas accruedfromitsopennessto the inter
supporttheexistingsystem. This will occur througha nationaleconomy.Such interaction has generatedmore
numberofmechanisms.First,government officialsthat significantdomesticpoliticalinterests thatfavoropening.
takepartininternational
diplomacy andnegotiationsover While thegrowthof theChinesemiddle class is still
timecome todefinetheirinterests inwaysmore consis nascent,thereissomeevidencetosuggestincreasing wealth
tent
with thesystem.52 may affect foreign policyopinions.58 The People'sRepub
Second,China's increasing
participationin theworld licofChina remainsan authoritarian stateyetChinese
economyis expectedto give riseto domesticeconomic citizenswill also attestto thefactthattheirpoliticalsitu
andpoliticalinterests
thatpressforevengreaterliberaliza ation today is vastlymore liberal and open than itwas in
For example,asChinamodernizes,itsmiddleclass
tion.53 thepre-reform more so.59
periodandbecoming And finally
and its resources grow (see figure 3) 54-a trend that has China realizes that it does have much at stake in the cur
been a forceforpoliticaldemocratization.
historically rentsystem-withincentives tobecomemore engaged.60
Finally as China opens, the increase in travel and edu pointsus to thefactthat
usefully
This explanation world
cationabroad (see figure 4),55 thespreadof freespeech politicsisenactedthrough domesticpoliticsandwhathap
and ideason theinternet (seefigure5),56and experiments pens inChina's foreign can affectthosepolitics,
relations
withevenlimited votingand choiceareexpectedto inspire potentially changingthemdramaticallyovertime.
a tasteforlibertythatfeedsdemocratizing impulsesthat The problem with theseinterdependence argumentsis
willmorehappilyalignChinawith international standards. thatthey,liketheir debatingopponents,are
power-centric

52!O Perspectives on Politics

Figure 3 Figure 4
Disposable income of Chinese city dwellers Chinese students studying abroad
800 140000

700 120000

8 600/ a 100000

.
CD 500/ g 80000

2 400 60000
0
U
E
I 300
Z 40000
X
t 200
20000

100
0 -,.,,,,,,
LO } 0
D 0) O
ocL a) roc'a88
a)) cy)a)8co 0 b 0a)
o) a) a) cotoN
CY ) ,C,,,
a)eorn9 z ,C,
) 0 o)
CY)crn0 11......Co...o
o) o|) ?)9crnoc'3
a) C c
LO-' '
c' 0' ) cm co)''- ' 1O N M O
X E X0 8 O O O a ?8 8 O O ? N ?NO NO cmN Year
- Abroad-
Studentsstudying -RetumedStudeents]s
-Urban PerCapitaDisposable Income(Indexedto1978)]

overlydeterministic.61They assumethatonceChina has benefitedmost fromChina's opennessare eitherin,or

beenhookedup to theinternational systemthereis little linkedto,theCommunistpartythatrules China andpro
chanceitwill everchangedirections. fac
Internationalist videsforstabilitythatattractsinternational investment.63
tionsprofitingor learningfromintegration areexpected Indeed,itmay be thata democratic China-one where
to snowball,pushingthecountryfurther in thatdirec ruralpeasantsand otherdisenfranchised groupshave a
tion.This view,however,also runsintoanalyticaltraps say-would be distinctly opposed to thetypeof integra
anomalies.
and historical tionnow occurring.64
Analytically, timeaccountingforhow
ithas a difficult Democratization isa precarious
process-democratizing
within societies"add up" to nationalpolicy
interests statesareoftenprone to conflict under thepressures of
choices.62For example,what numberof internet users new-foundnationalismstokedby exaggerated expecta
translatesintoa freespeechsocietythatprefers democ tionsunrestrained by fledgling institutions. Contempo
racy?Right now theChinese governmentismatching raryChinesenationalismthreatens tobe the Mr. Hyde to
stridestowardfreedom with itsown control
of expression theDr. Jekyllof the"reform and opening"policy that
of theinternetand press.Likewiseit isdifficulttodeter Deng initiated.65Economic interdependence may be a
mine how a growing middle classor expansioninChina's forcethat
worksagainstconflict, but it isnot a failsafe-as
internationalsectorswill fitwith politicalliberalization seenin theinterdependence of theearly1900s inEurope
compatible with international society.Those who have thatended in theGreatWar.

Figure 5 Figure 6
Chinese Internetusers Chinese economic interdependence
10.00% 0.8

9.00% 0.7

E 8.00%
0.6
o 7.00%
I 0.5
V 6.00%
0.4
o 5.00% XOI

4.00%
4.00% 0.3
c! 3.00%/
0.2
& 2.00%

1.00% 0.1

0.00% . . 0 ...........................
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
N z sco i g8 8 >SN g@ O 8X 8 8 8O
Year N C%JC'J

September 2007 jVol. 5/No. 3 521

Articles IWhat China WillWant

Nor doesglobalization-theshrinking of theglobeand economicpressures) and tomake senseofhow they might

increased densityof contacts within international society conjointlycause outcomes-i.e., how powerand inter
due to technological advances-guarantee Chinese inte dependenceinteract with ideasthrough predictablemech
gration.The potentialinterdependence ofChina in the anismsto causeoutcomes.The centralemphasisinwhat
system-interms of thedecliningcostsof transportation followsison theroleof ideas(simply becauseitistheleast
andcommunication and therelative opennessof the world understood)but the importance of powerand transna
tradeorder-has been occurringfordecades.Whether tionalpressures will also be clear.
China tookadvantage of thepotential gainsof interdepen
dencewas at leastin part a Chinese policychoice that
ForeignPolicy Ideas and Intentions
needstobe explained.66 Forexample,as seeninfigure 6,67
Chinese interdependence has not beendrivensimplyby Statestendto formulate broad concepts-almostopera
themarch of technology, but insteadbyChinese ideas tional philosophies-that orienttheirinternational behav
ior.
As largesocieties, nationsrequire ideas thatsignifyto
(and thoseof others)abouthowmuch China shouldbe
engaged in theworld.Thus, Chinese interdependence their members what theystand for; as largeorganizations
declinedfollowing theriseofMao's revisionism andwhen they require ideas toguide them in their interactionsin
China began to recalibrate afterthedisastrous Cultural the international arena. "Ideas,"as I use the term here,are
notmentalconstructs of individuals, but insteadthecol
Revolution,interdependence begantorise-especially after
1978. lective beliefs
of societies and organizations abouthow to
The historyof nationaleconomicmodernizationvia act. Examples of beliefsabout "good policies"fromthe
engagement with the international arena is filledwith foreign policiesof major powers include:
storiesof countriesundertaking integrationand thenlater * "non-entanglement" in European politics (United
moving in theoppositedirection. Here we might think States,1776-1941)
ofWeimarGermany'sshiftunderHitler or Japan'sshift * territorialexpansionon the continent(Germany
fromTaish6 democracyto theShowa era or even the 1890-1945)
retreatof theUnited Statesin theinterwar period.China * isolationfromextensiveforeigninteraction or pres
itselfreverseddirectionsinmoving from Qing China to ence (Japan1640-1868)
NationalistChina and thenreversed again in thetransi * integration as a normalpower(SovietUnion/Russia
tiontoCommunistChina. 1986-present)
In sum,both power and economic interdependence
maypush strategy inparticular directions but suchmoves They areembeddednot only in somehumanbrains,but
havealsobeen reversed evenwhen powerand interdepen most importantly inthecollective
memories, nationalsym
denceconditionsremainfairly constant.Similarly, some bols,government procedures, educations systems,and rhet
timesstates may stickto theirplansevenas conditionsof oricof statecraft.69
powerand interdependence altersignificantly.
Why? Suchviewsmatterbecausetheyarea guide tonational
actionand can shapewhat stateswant to achieveover
time. Naturallystateleadersstrategically plan theiractions
The Meshing Gear: Collective Ideas but theyoftendo so againsta backdropof certaindomi
Neitherpowernor interdependence directly shapedChi nantnationalideasaboutwhat generalbehaviorisappro
nese grand strategy because such systemicfactorsare priate. These ideasmaybe contested bysomegroups within
enactedthrough domesticpoliticsand decisionmaking. societies butstillserveas a guideforthecollective "nation."
There areof coursemany typesof domestictheories of Promotedby thosewho benefitand nurturedby habit,
politics.Here, however,I want to concentrate on the theygrowroots. As organizationtheorists pointout,par
central(andmisunderstood)roleof enduringforeign pol ticularlywhen groupshave intangible goalssuchas "secu
icy ideas in domesticpoliticsand subsequentnational rity"or "wealth"stateswill focus theirefforts around
behavior. doctrinesof action ratherthanactualgoals.Put differ
There is a largeand veryinsightful literatureon how ently,ideasbecome intentions.70 In foreign such
affairs,
collectiveideas (e.g.,beliefs,norms,discourses,culture, ideas arewhat ErnestMay has called "axiomatic"
etc.) "matter"in foreign policy.68What isusually missing formulations derivedfromhistorythatbecomeaccepted
in theseargumentsishow ideasmatterin their own trans assumptions of policy.71
formation. The literature isverygood on how collective National ideasabout international orderaredifficult to
ideasmightkeep intentions fixed,but lessclearon how changefora numberof reasons.First,theyhaveconstit
theyaffect change.To suggestthatideasplaya rolein their uenciesthatbenefitfromthemand thusareenergizedto
own transformation is not to argue thatoutcomesare promoteand defendthem.Second,suchdominantideas
wholly caused by ideas.It isusefultodistinguish theimpact becomeingrained inpublicrhetoric andbureaucratic pro
of ideasfrom otherfactors (e.g.,strategic
circumstances or ceduresthat make themresilient likeall traditions thatare

522 Perspectives on Politics

 Figure 7
Collapse
Desirable Results - Continuity

Events Contradict <1

Ideas on UndesirableResults-* Collapse
WorldOrder change
(potential
EventsConfirm-* Continuity see Consolidation)

institutionallyentrenched. Third, becauseof thiseffect triesthenuse thosebaselinesto assess-and supportor

they becomenormalized not justasmeans toachieveends, critique-existingpolicies,dependingon events. When
but also as a standardofwhat thenationshoulddo, or eventscontradictcollectiveexpectations and theconse
evenwhat it is (i.e., identity). quencesarestarkly undesirable,changeismore likely. Such
TokugawaJapancame to be definedby itspolicyof situationsfacilitate changeby givingammunitionto the
excludingforeigners and itsleadersappealed to thattra opponentsof thecurrentorthodoxy, allowingthemto
ditiontosustaintheir position.Similarly,theUnitedStates rallysupportto theirsidewhile supporters of thecurrent
was distinguished by itsrefusal to"getentangled" with the orthodoxy areputon thedefensive. For example,thesep
suspecttraditional powersofEurope in thefirst 150 years aratistapproachof theQing Empirewas finally disrupted
of itsexistence and presidents paid homageto thatnorm by the1895 Japanese victoryin theSino-Japanese War.
in
(e.g.,Harding in the1920s) ordertobolstertheir pop That event setoff a raceamong outsiders tocontrolChina
ularity.72 China in thenineteenth centuryin thefaceof and encouragedforces withinChina to challengetradi
foreign incursionsattemptedtohew toa traditional Qing tion,includingin foreign policy.74
Middle Kingdommentalitydespiteitswaningauthority. Inmost othercircumstances, continuityis likely. For
It isthereforenot surprising thatcontinuity isthenorm example, continuity canbe expected whendeviations from
in foreign policyideas.Thosewhowant tochallengetra existingideasleadtoundesired outcomes. When the United
ditionfacesignificant hurdles.It isoftenhardforindivid Statesintervened inWorldWar I itviolateditslongstand
uals toknow ifothersdesirechangeand iftheydo, how ingtabooagainstentanglement inEurope'spolitics.The
much they will riskactingon suchpreferences. Lacking results ofWorldWar I brought widespreaddisillusion
such information, theycannotbe sureiftheirowndesire ment in theUnited Statesand theAmericansembraced
and efforts forchange(shouldtheyexist)will have any anew theirtradition of "no-entanglement" inEurope. In
effect. Theymustmount a case for why theold ideaswere suchsituations, defenders of theold ideas(as theAmeri
defunct, whichcan involve considerable andbecause can isolationists
effort, did) will be able tomake politicalhay
itthreatens tradition, invitessocialand politicalcriticism. by claiming"toldyou so,we shouldneverhave strayed
Likewisetheformation and institutionalization ofnew fromour triedand truetradition." Intervention in
World
ideasbreedsstrife and uncertainty becauseparticular ori War I, theyargued,had been a disastrous mistake.
entationsofferdiffering costsand benefitsto domestic Likewisecontinuity isevenlikelywhendominantideas
groupsthatcan stalemate overwhich, ifany,new direc are ignored yetdesirableresults occur.It ishard togather
tion ismore desirable. Continuity,therefore, is a potent momentumtochangecollectiveideaswhen outcomesare
force. Yet asMay pointsout, entrenchedforeign policy agreeable. Consider,forexample,thedearthof investiga
conceptsarenonetheless vulnerableto transformation "as tionsof largestock marketincreases thatno one expected
history grows" andcountries "seethepastina new light."73 versusthespecialcommissionsthatalwaysseem to form
The interesting questionsarewhen and how? to examineunexpectedstockmarket crashes. When
outcomesaredesirable,it isdifficult togeneratemomen
VWhen Orthodoxy Disintegrates tum to reorient bureaucracies and altertraditions. The
Implicitin theabovediscussionis thefactthatchangeis delegitimation of an extantorthodoxy requireseventsthat
not a singlephenomenonbut involvestwo stagesthat both contradictits logic and have undesiredconse
must be explained:collapseof theold ideasand consoli quences.In suchcircumstances, individuals will bemore
dationof thenew.Both stages,I argue,are affected by motivatedandmore likelytochallengethoseideas,believe
pre-existing ideas. othersareof a likemind, and hence thepossibilities for
In thecollapsestage,pre-existing ideasaffect how lead changearemore significant.
ersjustify policyand seta baselineof socialexpectations Figure7 depictsthebranchinglogicof collapseinvolv
ofwhat should result.Politicalopponentswithincoun ingthisinteraction of ideasand consequences.

September 2007 iVol. 5/No. 3 523

Articles IWhat China Will Want

Figure 8
Consolidation
None orMany -* Continuity(ofoldideas)
Replacement
Ideas Undesirable Feedback -* Continuity

One
Desirable Feedback * Consolidation
(change)

ConditionsofNew Orthodoxy relativepowercan lead todisappointing resultsthatcon

Evenwhen dominantideasare delegitimated, however, tributeto theirdelegitimation.Consider thedeclineof
change is not automatic.Consolidation, like collapse, theQing-era tributesystemand sinocentrism under the
faceshurdlesthatfeedinertia.Individuals may agreethat weightof superiorEuropean and Japanesecapabilities
theold viewhas to go butmay not be able to agreeor thatexposedtheirfragility in thelatenineteenth century.
coordinateonwhat neworthodoxyshouldbe theguide. Likewise,thenumberand natureof replacement ideasso
Such a dynamichas been chartedin thestudyof revolu centraltoconsolidationisshapedby thepoliticalactivity
tion,but it also existsin foreignpolicydisputesand and resources of interest
groupsand individuals thatpro
debates.75The consolidationof a new foreignpolicy mote them.Economic interdependence and thepromises
approachdependsnot only on thecollapseof theold of growthinherentin itcan indeedstrengthen thosein
ideas,but also on thedistribution of replacement ideas, favorof such ideas.78 Long-termefforts thatencourage
especiallytheexistence of a prominent When
alternative. international exchangecan facilitatethe riseof replace
thereare no developedalternatives or when thereare ment ideas in particularsocieties.79Thus thesuccessof
many equallystrongalternatives, the resultcould be a ideascanalsobe shapedby thedegreea countryisinvolved
returnto theold thinking due todefaultin thefirst case in theinternational economy.
and deadlockamong factionsin thesecond.For exam Overall,then,theaccountof foreign policychange(and
ple, inQing China in thenineteenth century, Sinocen continuity) offeredhere iscontingent. Itdependson the
tricseparationfromtheencroaching international society interaction of thedominantforeign policy ideasof states
was so dominantthatthere were virtuallyno groupsof with theresults encountered,aswell as thedistribution of
any import with developedreplacement ideas to guide replacement ideasin a particularsocietyand theirinitial
China's foreignpolicy.76 success,ifany.To stresscontingency isnot to forgoexpla
The sustainability of a neworthodoxy(whena promi nation.80We canposit thatfutureintentions will depend
nent replacement does exist)overa longerperiodoften on thedegreetowhich theexpectations ofparticular dom
hingeson somedemonstration of itsefficacy. Ideas that inantideasare defiedby events,negativeconsequences
enduredo so because theyappear to generatedesirable result,and somesociallyviablereplacement ideaexists.
When thosenotionsdo not,revanchists
results. oftenfind This generallogicseemstohavewide applicationin the
fertilegroundtoarguefora returnto theold ideas.This history of greatpowers,and thoughtherearedifferences,
was thecase inWeimarGermany when theresults ofVer coversbothdemocratic andauthoritarian What
regimes.8'
saillesunderminedtheliberalinternational policyof the followsis a briefillustration
of how someof thecentral
fledglingSocialDemocraticgovernment. Versaillesalso dynamicscapturedby the logicmight play out in the
spawnedthe May Fourth Movement inChina thathelped future ofChina's current"reform and opening"viewon
discreditfledglingliberaldemocracy notions.77 internationalorderdescribedabove.
Figure8 depictstheway thatthedistribution of replace
ment ideasand their demonstrated efficacyfosteror inhibit The Contingent Path of China's
change. Future Intentions
This argumentfeaturesideasas a meshinggear-one The argumentabove highlights particularsignpostsas
thatinteractswith otherfactors and indoing so has its important forunderstanding whatChinamightdo with
own influence.National strategies thereforearea product itsgrowingpowerin thefuture. Most centrally, thelon
ofmulti-causalinfluence. Prior ideasplay a rolebut of gevityofChina's integrationistorthodoxy dependon
will
coursedo not unilaterally determineall aspectsof new theexpectations itgeneratesin thedomesticarenaand the
orthodoxies.Consider,forexample,theroleof therelative resultsthatare experienced(collapseconsiderations), as
powerof actors, whichoftenshapesnegativeandpositive well as on thenatureof theideasthat might replaceinte
feedback toprevailing ideas.
Dominantconceptsthatignore gration(consolidationfactors).I addresseach in turn.

524 Perspectives on Politics

justifications and Expectations These twothemes,economicmodernizationand sov
Contemporary Chinese leadersjustify and promotethe ereignty,may look closelylinkedto therealistfocuson
dominantintegration idea-i.e., "reformandopening" -in powerand autonomy. The keydifference, however,isthat
twodifferent ways. Chineseleaders justify
them notbasedon increasing China's
The first,andmost important, justification
of current security,but on betteringthelivingstandardofChinese
policyis thatintegrationwithintheexistinginternational citizens.
Likewise, China'sobsession withTaiwanandother
orderprovidesthebestmeans fornationaleconomicdevel territoriesishardtounderstand fromstrictlya powerper
opment.82 China remains a government runbya commu Without knowingChina'shistoryand thecen
spective.
nistparty.Yet thelegitimacy and popularsupportof the tralityofTaiwan toCPC legitimacy gains,it is impossible
government doesnot reston socialistideology,but instead tounderstandtherolethisissuecan play inChinesepol
on economicperformance. "Well-offSociety"not "Work iticsand securitydecision-making.
mantra.President
ersUnite" is thenational JiangZemin's Economicdevelopment and sovereigntycan of course
2002 addressto the16thPartyCongressput thisclaim alsobe in tension withone another, a factthatdoesmuch
starkly: toexplainthecomplexity of contemporary Chinesepoli
cies.86Integration can lead to deep inroadson issuesof
It isessentialforthePartytogive topprioritytodevelopmentin sovereignty. Forexample, membershipin the WorldTrade
governingand rejuvenatingthecountryand open up new pros Organizationbrings with ita numberof significant impli
pects forthemodernizationdrive . . . theprogressiveness
of the
cationsfortheChinese socialand politicalorder,not the
Partyisconcreteand historical,and itmust be judgedbywhether
thePartypromotesthedevelopmentof theadvancedproductive
leastofwhich ismajor turmoilin themassiveChinese
forces.83 agricultural sectorandgrowinginequality withinChinese
society.87
The FifthPlenaryof the 16th PartyCongressof the
CPC inOctober 2005 calleddevelopment"theoverrid
ingprincipleand thekeyto resolving allproblemsfacing AnticipatingEvents thatFavor Change
China."84The dominanceof theintegration orientation The durability ofChina'sintegrationist foreign
policy,there
in contemporary Chinese foreignpolicy is largelybased fore,will dependon how results match socialexpectations
on economicconsiderations.Integration accordingto relatedtoeconomicgrowth and sovereignty.Eventsrelated
the reform and openingorthodoxyservesChina's rapid toChina's integration thatrepresent setbacks
significant
development. toeitherof thoseissues would be occasionsforChina to
The secondmajor justification forintegration within rethink integration.
the existing internationalorder is that it enhances The first situationwhere theintegrationist orthodoxy
sovereignty-understood in termsof independence and would be vulnerableinvolvestroublesinChina's eco
territorial That is, integration
integrity. shouldprevent nomicmodernization. From thisviewpoint(and incon
the typeof colonialsubordination of thepast and the trastto theriseofChina debate) themost likelyscenario
infringement of China by outsidepowers.A defining inwhichChinawill alteritsintegrationist mindsetisnot
pointof historyfortheCommunistParty(CPC) leader with thegrowthof Chinese powerbut, instead, major
shipis the"century ofhumiliation"
China enduredunder ruptures in thattrajectory thatcould put thedominant
theinfluence powers(e.g.,the
of imperialist West, Japan). "openness" viewon a slippery defensive.A reasonable case
One of theCPC's main claims to authorityis that it can bemade thata leveling ofChineseeconomicgrowth
China fromthatoutside influence.85
liberated Integra is as likelyin thefuture as isChina's riseto supremacy.88
tionfacilitatessucha goal byprovidingaccessto institu Especially current
vis-'a-vis Chineseexpectations, this
would
tionalforawhereglobalpoliticsare decided thatmight be a deeplydisillusioning experienceifChina's govern
affectChina's autonomy.Such integration also provides ment is somehowimplicated. That is, in theabsenceof
the imprint ofmajor powerstatus,confirming thatthe downturnsthataffectall countriesor unforeseen crises,
countryis no longersimplyan objectmanipulatedby criticsof thecurrent orthodoxy will have incentivetouse
more powerful Westerncountries or Japan, but an impor faltering Chinese economicprospectsto rallypolitical
tantactor itself. authority arounda newapproachto theinternational sys
The most concrete markerof sovereignty forChina in
tem.The motivatingsource sucha scenario will be the
todayisTaiwan.China expectsthatitsparticipationin combination of surprising economicsetbackscontrasted
theextantinstitutions and conventions ofworld politics with optimistic expectations generated by leadersseeking
will help to fulfill
a desire(seemingly widespreadacross legitimacy.
thepoliticalspectrum)tounitethemainlandandTaiwan. The declineof economicgrowth would encourage pre
Such participation allowsChina to stymieefforts byTai China'srapid
viouslysilentgroupsthatopposeintegration.
wan toclaimsovereign international
standing and tobuild development has led todauntinggapsbetweenrichand
itSown international support. poor.89Social protestsand disturbances
appear to have

September 2007 1Vol. 5/No. 3 525

Articles IWhat China WillWant

risensteadilyin recentyears,increasing from8,700 in Jiangalso identified a secondgroup withalternative pref

1993 to 87,000 in 2005.90 Involvementin theWorld erencesforChina'sforeign policy.He calledit"those with
TradeOrganization(W1TO) is puttingsignificant pres leftist
tendencies" (distinctfromtheoldMarxistvariety)
sureson poor farmersand peasantswho cannotcompete. who critiquereform-and international involvement
As longas theeconomyisbooming,someof thesepeople as contributing to social injusticeand inequality. In the
can transfertoothertypes of jobsor thegovernment can current context,this mightincludefarmers, ruralcitizens,
providesomeformof subsidy.91 Yet ifgrowthfaltersina inlandcities,andpartsof the militaryorCommunistparty
way that makes thegovernment seemcomplicit,thissys who havenot sharedequallyinChina'sdevelopment and
temlooksbrittle. couldrightly blamereform andopeningorparticipation in
Second,eventssupported by theinternationalcommu theglobalorder(think WTO) as thecause.In foreign pol
nitythatChina seesas neo-colonialorwhichmove Tai icysuchtendencies translate intosocialsupportforhalting
wan towardsindependencecould help to undermine and reversing China's integration in thecurrent order.If
China's currentintegrationorthodoxy. For example,the thecommuniquefromtheFifth Plenary Sessionof the16th
1999 bombingof theChineseembassyinBelgradefueled PartyCongressinOctober2005 isan indicator, thechal
nationalismand strengthened opponentsof opening.92 lengefromtheLeft-and theinequality ofgrowth-isof
Much, of course,will dependon theparticularcircum particular concernto theleadership ofHu Jintao who has
stancesandwhetherthey makeBeijinggovernment seem emphasizedthemoreegalitarian goalof "harmonious soci
complicit.Taiwaneseefforts to establishformalindepen ety"incontrasttoJiang's mantraof "well-off society."97
dencecausedeepconcerninChina-indeed thetypethat A third position would comefromthose who arecritical
can setthestagefor China to takeaggressiveefforts
on an ofglobalization andwesternvalues,butarenotnecessarily
issueseen as priorityevenby "reformist" governments. isolationist or anti-capitalist.These peoplemight advo
Taiwaneseindependence effortsin2004-2005 weremet catea nationalistrealpolitik policythatfavors amore con
by a strong(and self-defeating)reactionfrom Hu Jintao frontational strategywith the West, stability and central
andNationalPeople'sCongresspassinganti-secession leg authority athome,whilepursuinga softlineand integra
islation
which authorized China touse forceagainstTai tioninAsia.Thinkof thisperhaps,as theplatform forthe
wan ifitcontinuedtopush forindependence.93 resurgence ofamodernday"MiddleKingdom"rolewhere
China would exerciseincreasing hegemony withinAsia
while perhapsdistancingitselffromoverallinternational
Replacementsfor "Reform and Opening" order.98
If reform and openingdoes falter, what then? Presumably Absentbetterinformation, itwould appearthatthose
some sortof alternative path.Anticipatingsuch a new who would emphasize withdrawal-eitherthenew Left
approach,however, dependson a keyfactorthatisespe or realpolitikers-would occupytherhetorical highground
ciallyelusivein theChinese case: thenatureanddistribu shouldfutureeventsdefythe"opening"justifications of
tionof replacement ideasaboutinternationalsocietywithin theChinesegovernment with cleardisappointing results.
China.94The outlinesof threereplacements arediscern Both offer a greaterdifference withcurrent dominantinte
able inan admittedly opaque view.95 grationideas(Rightists want evenmore integration) and
The firstwas identified byJiangZemin as a challenge would likelybe in a betterpositiontodrawoffthelan
to his own "reform and opening"emphasisin theyears guageof nationalismtomake theircase.99Chinese strat
followingthe 1989 Tiananmen Square fiasco.96Jiang egywill of course alwaysbe a mix of thesedifferent
labeledthisthethreatfromthe"Right."For thegovern approaches;theissueisthedirection of shiftand thedegree
ment,thedangerfromtheRightinvolves thosewhowould towhich one orientation dominates.
attempttopursueeconomicand politicalliberalization at To theextentthata factional accountofChinesepoli
an evenmore rapidpace at theexpenseof thePartyand tics is overdrawn(e.g., because the decisionmaking
socialstability.
In recentyearstheCPC hasbeenespecially dynamicis one of consensus,not groupsfighting over
focusedon thischallengeand has gone togreateffort to control)thenanychange in foreign policythinking will
luresuccessful businessmenintothepartyandwelcome demandespecially negativeresults and could takeconsid
thereturn ofChinese fromabroadwho mightotherwise erabletime,justas itdid inQing China.'00 If thereis a
be a voice formore forceful politicalchange.Think here continuedsharedview that"isolationis themajor factor
of those who havebenefited most fromrapidintegration explaining China's decline"and "openingfueledChina's
butwho arenowchafing underCPC constraints or believe rise,"thenshifting significantly away fromreformand
Chinamust takereforms to thenextlevel(e.g.ruleof law, openingwould not happenquickly.101 Althoughnot so
education)at a fasterpace-e.g., thenewprivatebusiness dominantas theseparatist mentality ofQing China, inte
men or state-owned enterpriseexecutives,artists
or intel gration todayenjoysa privilegedstatusagainstwhich
lectuals,coastalcityregionsand theirofficials, or even replacement ideaproponents may havea hard timemak
partsof thebureaucracy thathavean interestin integration. ingheadway.

526 Perspectives on Politics

Influencing Intentions The pointhere isnot topursuewhat has come to be
Understanding futureintentions isa significant and crit theperceived wisdom indealingwithChina'sunknown
icalchallengeforboth scholarsand policymakers. I have futureintentions-i.e.,a hedgingstrategy. Such an ap
arguedthatoneway (bynomeans theonlyway) to think proachcounselsthattheothercountriespreparethem
about theevolution of intentions isas a productofchange selvesforanyeventuality and respondinkind.However,
and continuityin dominantideasabout foreign policy. doingso suffers fromtwoproblems.It isoverlypassivein
Situationsinvolving thecombination of unmetexpecta itsdependenceon simplyreactingtowhat happens in
tionsand undesiredconsequencesare likelyto facilitate China.Andmost important itisoverlyfocusedonChina's
collapsewhile thosewhere conceptualexpectations are behaviorand not attentive enough to the ideasbehind
fulfilledor desiredconsequences occurfavorthecontinu actionand how theyrelateto thedomesticpoliticsof
ityof orthodoxy. Consolidationof a new foreign policy authorityinChina. A simpleresponseto behavior may
approach-and hence setof intentions-isenhancedby unnecessarily strengthen revisionistforcesinBeijing.
theexistence of a prominentreplacement idea thataligns Ifthegoal istoincorporate China intotheinternational
with desirableresults. systeminaway that makes thesystem operateina fashion
If thisargumentis right,it impliesthatunderstanding acceptabletoall,however, itisimportant toreinforcethose
thefuture of a "rising
China"means lookingbeyond,but Chineseleaders andmovementsthathavestakedtheirlegit
notover,powerand interdependence. The effects ofpower imacy on thepositiveaspectsof integration. A modern-day
and interdependence are certainlyimportant forunder repeatof theundermining of pro-liberalization
advocates
standing China'sattitudetowards international order.Rel byWesternaction-as occurred when theVersaillesTreaty
ativepowerhas shapedChina'spast thinking towardsthe producedtheMay FourthMovementand a reactionary
dominantrulesandnormsof theinternational system.The China-would bea disaster. Thismaymeanmakinganextra
penetrating geopoliticalreachofWesternpowerhadmuch efforttoassurepayoffs toChina forparticularly boldmoves
todowithwhyQing China had theincentive tochangeits in terms of integration-orin terms of restraint
vis-a-vis
longenduringtributary systemand sinocentrism. Like Taiwan.The point isnot simplyto impedehardliners and
wise, theinterdependence approachrightly highlights how help softliners.Indeed,doingeither mightbe desirable
theopennessofChina and growthof international trade depending on theideasandexpectations arepromoting.
they
and contacts hashelpeddevelopconstituencies and liberal There isof coursea riskin supporting Chinesedevel
forcesinChina thatotherwise mightnot exist.But these opmentthrough integration. Itmay lead-throughunfore
twoconstantstructural forcescannotaccountforthevari seenevents, ormiscalculation, or inadequatesupport-to
ationovertimeinChineseideasabouthow torelatetointer aChina thatstrengthens enoughtobe dangerous, buthas
nationalsociety.To do thatwemustalsoheedthecontingent notyetchangedenoughinternally tobe satisfied
with the
ways thatforeign policyideasrelatetoevents, aswell as the normsof thesystem.'02 In suchcircumstances, whereinte
replacement ideasthatform withinChina. grationistideasareundermined, Chinamaywell look to
In termsof policy,thisargument cautionsagainstthe anotherandmuch lessdesirablesetof ideastoguide its
choice thatexistsamong the three main alternatives in foreignpolicy.
thecurrent U.S. policydebate:engaging, containing, or To dealwith thisscenario,itmakes sense,then,tobe
hedgingagainsttheriseofChina.Anymightbe appro proactive-topay attentionto thepotentialreplacement
priatedependingonwhat particular policyChina ispur ideascirculating inChina and theirbackers-ones that
suingand how thatrelatesto theChinese government's may someday be conceptual kings.Forexample,itisimpor
rationaleforitsactions.To theextentBeijing leadersare tantthatlong-term efforts bemade to strengthen those
attempting to build theirauthority and legitimate their Chinese groupsand individuals who would support,in
rulebased on actionsthatchallengeinternational order, theeventof significant setbacksto reform and opening,
otherstatesshouldobjecttoorpenalizesuchactions.For replacement ideasthataremore desirablethanan aggres
example,U.S. policies towardtheSovietUnion-e.g., nationalist
sive,separatist approachtoforeign There
policy.
theCarter and Reagan defensebuildup, the response arehistorical precedentsforsucha transformative influ
to theSoviet deploymentof new SS-20 Euromissiles, ence.Efforts takenovermanyyearsbya variety ofgroups
and the aid to theMuhjahadeen in thewake of the in theUnited States(and inBritain)after WorldWar I
Soviet invasionofAfghanistan-helpedtoundercutthe hadmuch todo withwhy internationalism (a fusingof
Brezhnev"correlation of forces"thinking thatarguedthat geopoliticsandWilsonianism)was a coherentreplace
theexercise of SovietpowerservedtheUSSR's interests. ment forisolationism inAmericanstrategy after
World
The dynamicwas not justa balancingof powerbut an War II.103LikewiseduringtheColdWar,U.S. andEuro
undermining of ideas.Likewise,shouldChina pursue pean interaction withan even moreauthoritarian andclosed
aggressive policies thatundermineinternational order, SovietUnion helped"newthinking" (andnot someother
othercountriesand organizations should sanctionand thinking) takeshapeas a viablereplacement when theold
delegitimize them. Sovietforeign policydogmadisintegrated.'04

September 2007 1Vol. 5/No. 3 527

Articles IWhat China Will Want
Of course,thelimits of outsideinfluenceon a country
ofChina's sizeand complexity, especially
giventhepopu
larChinesedesireforautonomy andnon-interference from
foreigners,
are significant.
Moreover,China's authoritar
iangovernment and lackof transparency limittheability
tocloselyfollowand shapeinternaldevelopments. China's
futurein theworldwill be largelyof itsownmaking.Yet
as seeninhistory,outsideinfluence has sometimes played
a role in the evolutionof China's approach to inter
nationalsociety-fromthe OpiumWars tothe May Fourth
Movement to theearlyCold War period to thecurrent
integration.
Centraltothishistory-andChina'sfuture
arenot just theperilsof poweror thepromisesof inter
dependence,but also how theyrelateto theway China
thinksabout theworld.
Notes
1 Zoellick2005.
2 See, for example the hearings held from the summer
of 2006 up to now. http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/
hearingarchive.php
3 Vice President sRemarks to theAustralian-American
Leadership Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel Sydney,
Australia, February 27, 2007. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/
20070223.html
4 Johnston 2003.
5 Friedberg 2005 offers a typology and contingent
analysis of future relations that lacks a general expla
nation to tell us whether eventswill move in one
direction or another.
6 Copeland 2000a.
7 Friedberg 2005 documents that there is some varia
tion in this
dichotomy?some who focus
do not see inevitable conflict and some liberals are
more
pessimistic.
8 For a study that explores the link between uncer
tainty about intentions and cooperative
tual strategies, see Edelstein 2000.
9 The classic synthesis of power and interdependence
(without ideas) isKeohane and Nye, 1977.
10 See Snyder 1991 and Solingen 1998.
11 The National Security Strategy of theUnited States
of
America (March 2006) "seeks to encourage China to
make the right strategic choices for itspeople, while
we
hedge against other possibilities." http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/. See also Carter and
Perry 2007, 16-22; Council on Foreign Relations,
U.S.-China Relations: An AffirmativeAgenda, A
Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report
59 (April2007).
12 Thomas 2001; Evangelista 1999.
13 See Bull 1995.
14 See Morgenthau 1966, 38ff;Wolters
528 Perspectives on Politics
15 Rosecrance 1986.
16 Jiang Zemins Report at the 15* National Congress
of
theCommunist Party ofChina, September 12, 1997.
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.
htm; Hao andWang 1978, 171.
17 Pillsbury 2000.
18 See Kent 2002; Johnston 2003, 2004a.
19 Cf.Wang 2000 and Johnston 2001.
20 Such themes are common in speeches from the
1970s. See for example, the keynote speeches at the
10th(1973) and 11th(1978) PartyCongresses.In
Jiang's address to the 16thNational Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party inNovember 2002, there
was virtually no mention of this traditional role.Hu
Jintao's leadership has placed somewhat more em
phasis on it.
21 Ross 1997.
22 The five principles, which have been included in the
Chinese constitution, are 1) respect for sovereignty
2) non-aggression 3) non-interference 4) equal and
mutual benefit 5) peaceful co-existence.
23 Jiang Zemins Report to the 16thNational Congress
of theChinese Communist Party,November 8,
2002.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/
49007.htm. Chinas recent "reassurance diplomacy"
in South East Asia suggests a mode of cooperative
not easily
leadership equated with domination or
behavior, but is nonetheless compatible
balancing
with extant norms. See Medeiros and Fravel 2003;
Shambaugh 2005.
24 Wen, 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2007-03/03/content_818952.htm
25 As quoted inWestad et al. 1998, 135.
26 Yardley and Lague 2007 and Office of the Secretary
on power of Defense, 2006.
27 Crane et al. 2005 and Annual Report toCongress: The
Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina 2006.
28 See Foot 2000; Barkin 1998; Payne and Samhat
or conflic 2004.
29 Ramos 2004.
30 "Building of Political Democracy inChina," Infor
mation Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, October 2005, Beijing, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/
content_3645750.htm. and Kahn 2007.
31 Foot 2000, 3.
32 Chinas respect for human rights saw a downturn in
2006 as China cracked down on dissent likely in
anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. See Human
RightsWatch, World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/
englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867.htm.
Small advances are also sometimes made. For exam
ple, theHuman RightsWatch report in 2005 noted
thatChina amending its constitution inMarch
1962, 81-102. 2004 to include guarantees on private property and
 human rights "signals a growing acknowledgment of PremierWen Jaibao have argued thatChinas mod
human rights."Human RightsWatch, "Human ernization depends on peace and thatChina's "rise"
Rights Overview: China," inWorld Report 2005. would not lead to policies that pose threats or come
http://hrw.Org/english/docs/2005/01/13/ at the expense of other countries. See
Suettinger
china9809.htm. 2004. (http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/
33 Zhang 1998, 177-193; Wen 2007. ) andZheng 2005.
20044/rs.pdf
34 Gilpin 1981, 187. See also Zakaria 1992. 61 For a synthesis of the two that overcomes some of
35 Mearsheimer 2001, 402. these problems, see Copeland 2003.
36 Roy 1994, 149-168, 159-160. 62 See Garrett and Lang 1996. It also applies to social
37 Geyer 1981, 107. ization arguments about China as well.
38 Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991), 63 For an argument thatChina is unlikely to liberalize
84-86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, 28-30 as in any foreseeable time frame seeMann 2007.
cited inWhiting 1995. 64 Waldron 2004.
39 Quoted inMosher 2001, ch. 1. 65 Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000. Gries
40 See Copeland 2000b. 2004.
41 E.g., seeOrganski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; 66 The Western powers of course had a say on this
Kim and Morrow 1992; Copeland 2000b. For dif outcome as well. U.S.
policy
after Mao came to

ferent strategies ofmanaging such a situation, see power was largely aimed at isolating China.
Schweller 1999. 67 Trade data is the total current value of imports and
42 Waldron 1995. exports over the total currentGDP. See http://
43 For an argument thatChina has a long strategic chinadataonline.org/member/macroy/.
tradition of realpolitik thought, see Johnston 1995. 68 Berman 2001; Adler 2002.
44 Pillsbury
2000;Qin 2001. 69 See Anderson 1983; Halbwachs 1992; Kertzer 1988.
45 In theChinese case see,Dittmer 1995, 1-39. 70 E.g., themission statement for theUnited States
46 Gilbert 1987, 185-204 Department of State is "Create a more secure, demo
47 For a variety of examples, seeWalt 1987; Snyder cratic, and prosperous worldfor the benefitof the
1991; Stein and Rosecrance 1993; Kupchan 1994. American people and the international community'?
48 Most power transitions occur without conflict. See see
http://www.state.gov/rn/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/
De Soysa, Oneal, and Park 1997. 23503.htm. On the general organizational dynamic
49 Relative power is given as a composite of the relative see Selznick, 1949, 69-70, 250-259; Selznick 1957,
share of absolute total global data on six categories: 16;Wilson 1989.
energy consumption, iron& steel production, mili 71 May 1962.
tary expenditure, military personnel, total popula 72 SeeToby 1997,323-364;Adler 1957.
tion, and urban population. See National Material 73 May 1962, 667.
Capabilities Study (v3.01) http://www.correlatesof 74 Gong 1984; Zhang 1991.
war.org and Singer et al. 1972, Singer 1987. 75 On consolidation in the literature on revolutions,
50Walt 1987; Schweller
2006. see e.g., Goldstone 1991.
51 Lemke 2002. Ruggie 1982 speaks to the need to 76 As the future revolutionary Sun Yatsen wrote to
consider purpose
as well as
power. an official in 1893, "the reason why we have not
52 Johnston 2001. achieved much (relative to other countries that had
53 Frieden and Rogowski, 1996. opened up); public opinion and entrenched ideas
54 The index number of 100 for real disposable income simplywill not allow it."Mitter 2004, 32.
in 1978 was equal to 343.4 RMB. See http:// 77 See Hunt 1996, 77ff.
chinadataonline.org/member/yearbook/default. 78 This is the thrust of Frieden and Rogowski 1996
asp?StartYear= 1984&EndYear=2006. and ties inwell with Copeland 2003.
55 www.chinadataonline.org. For data prior to 1985, 79 See Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thomas 2001.
see China Statistical Yearbook, 633. 80 Friedberg 2005 rightlypoints out the difficultyof
56 Statistical Reports on theDevelopment ofChinese predicting the futurewhen itdepends on events that
we cannot foresee.Nonetheless, it is
possible to
Internet, available at
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/
index/index.htm explicate the conditions and mechanisms through
57 Rosecrance 1986; Russett and Oneal 2000. which eventswill produce different futures.
58 Johnston 2004b, 603-628. 81 See Legro 2005.
59 Zhao 2000, 11-12; Johnson 2003, 551-554. 82 Downs and Saunders 1998/99 argue thatChina has
60 Building on arguments offered by scholars, Chinas valued economic development ahead of nationalist
leaders such as General SecretaryHu Jintao and goals.

September 2007 1Vol. 5/No. 3 529

Articles IWhat China Will Want

83 Jiang Zemins Report to the 16thNational Congress of Adler, Selig. 1957. The Isolationist Impulse. New York:
theChinese Communist Party-,Fewsmith 2003, 3. Free Press.

See too recent speeches by Hu Jintao, successor to Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities:
Jiang, that offer similar themes, e.g. "President Hu Reflections upon theOrigin and Spread ofNationalism.
Outlines Work Agenda for 2005," http://www. 2d ed. London: Verso.

chinaembassy.org.il/eng/xwdt/tl78046.htm. Barkin, Samuel. 1998. The evolution of the constitution

84 Communique of the 15th CPC Central Commit of sovereignty and the emergence of human rights
tee Plenum, October 9-11, 2005. http://www. norms.Millennium 27 (2): 29-53.

china.org.cn/english/features/45280.htm. Berman, Sheri. 2001. Ideas, norms, and culture in

85 Lampton 2001, 25Iff.; Zhao 2004. For an example political analysis. Comparative Politics 33 (2):
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white paper "Building Political Democracy in Bull, Hedley. 1995. The Anarchical Society: a Study of
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86 Wu2001. Carter, Ashton, andWilliam Perry. 2007. China on the
87 Riskin and Khan 2000; Lardy 2002; Eckholm march. National Interest 88 (March/April), 16-22.
2002, 1;Kahn 2004a, 2004b. Checkel, JeffreyT 1997. Ideas and International Political
88 Goldstein and Lardy 2004. Dollar 2005, 48-58. Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and theEnd of the
89 Wang et al. 2007. www.l32.203.59.36:81/Group/ Cold War. New Haven: Yale University Press.
"Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session
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90 Data based on figures released by Chinas Public Communiqu??Text." 2005. Xinhua News Agency
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Domestic Service, Beijing, October 11.
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91 Lin 2007. it bring a new maturity inChinese security policy?
92 See Zhen 2000; Gries 2004. China LeadershipMonitor 5,Winter, http://www.
93 Cody 2005. chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20031 /tc.html,4-6.
94 Seasoned China specialists note the difficulty as -. 2006. Fostering stability or creating a monster?
sessing the nature and strengthof competing coali The rise of China and U.S. policy toward East Asia.
tions, e.g., Christensen 2003, 4-6. International Security 31 (1): 81-126.
95 On different factions, see Swaine and Tellis 2000, Cody, Edward. 2005. "China SendsWarning toTaiwan
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Gray 2001, 5-16. In see Dittmer 1995, A12.
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to
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96 Jiang Zemins Report at the 14* National Congress of structural realism: A review essay. International Secu
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97 "Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session 2000b. Origins of Major War. Ithaca: Cornell
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