Republic of the Philippines 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special
SUPREME COURT proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA
MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse
Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,1 granted
the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report2 and accordingly
declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years
earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited
Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal
the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of
appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of
disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a
Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals
requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics
petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in
form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the
assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for
Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its
Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial
courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente
Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not
even a copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the
petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with
Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve
deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the
assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for
declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30
days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal,
file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal.
Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal
is 15 days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and
the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule
41, Rules of Court).
 As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil
action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong"
while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is
defined as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario,
et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the
instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not
an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by
the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse
Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of
a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it
involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced
against any person.
the petition was returned unserved with postmasters notation "Party
refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special
Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special
proceedings are provided for in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated (b) Escheat;
January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal (c) Guardianship and custody of children;
was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of
a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its (d) Trustees;
Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section
19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129
and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and (e) Adoption;
underscoring supplied)
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding involving (g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner. (h) Habeas corpus;

Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates (i) Change of name;
the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is
required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the
enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor
natural children;
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the
September 27, 2004 Resolution9requiring respondent to file her comment on
(l) Constitution of family home;
 (m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall
be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
(Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial
court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal,
invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal,
provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases
of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that
the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared
presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid
subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter
alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is,
therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the
filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the
filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.

That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are
hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

seals the case in petitioners favor.

Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the

appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the
appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily
fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense.
Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should
have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.

As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts
observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page
petition10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed
the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for
appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an
action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of
the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of
which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT
No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper
court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT
No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each
of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT
No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in
the name of Graciano and the Six children. 1wphi1.nt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of
Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under
Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land
subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots
where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered
under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the
first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to
his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence
of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed,
in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents
may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein
petitioner's property.
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle
through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the
case."

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in and special proceedings, in this wise:
favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
a wrong.
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the
rules prescribed for a special civil action.
New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased."
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's
decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an
ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand
of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings,
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds
as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
further:
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
 "It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions.
XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a
distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as
may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks
of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of
a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased
to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a
quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court
(then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated
the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
 "In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely
an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which
does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would
have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject
to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined,
the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the

present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules
of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario.
This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these
well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the
SUPREME COURT properties in question."2 Since it was established that there were no known
Manila heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower
court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of
SECOND DIVISION the Philippines.

G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002 By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos.
129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs. In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this
H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents. development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition
before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision
alleging, among other, that3 -
BELLOSILLO , J.:

13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of
properties to the petitioner in 1983 (for TCT No. 7807) and 1984
Appeals dated 12 November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course to the
(for TCT No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part
petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent Amada H.
of her estate when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently,
Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion for
they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;
reconsideration.

13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject

For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent
of escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for
Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government,
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins'
which is not authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The
lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
property should have been escheated in favor of the Republic of
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court
relative was available to tend to her needs.
xxxx

In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins

On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public
executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an
land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private
answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction
respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the
nowhere to be found.
statute of limitations.

While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for
the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial
annulment, the Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its
Court of Pasay City.1 During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was
assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of
filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio
Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the
judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory
of respondent Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that -
Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings
x x x because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to
herein petitioner in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of said
Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered
the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, assign them to respondent Pasay City government,
order the cancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and
order the properties registered in the name of respondent Pasay
City x x x x The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down
the grounds of annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and this jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of
the complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently
the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus whether or not the properties in
question are no longer part of the estate of the deceased Hankins
at the time of her death; and, whether or not the alleged donations
are valid are issues in the present petition for annulment which can
be resolved only after a full blown trial x x x x
It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute
of limitations against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper
at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that a person entitled to
the estate must file his claim with the court a quo within five (5)
years from the date of said judgment. However, it is clear to this
Court that herein petitioner is not claiming anything from the estate
of the deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985;
rather she is claiming that the subject parcels of land should not
have been included as part of the estate of the said decedent as
she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her
favor.
In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the
premises in question, is claiming ownership of the properties in
question and the consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor
which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance
of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Herein
petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under Article
1144, to wit:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a
written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3)
Upon a judgment.
And Article 1456, to wit:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.4
In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City
and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the merits for
June 15 and 16, 2000.
In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner
points out that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying petitioner's
affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration,
and in setting the case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving
due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of decision despite
the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file
claims before the court a quo set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the
properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a
petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of
the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the
matter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
only provides for two (2) grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the discovery of the deeds of
donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings is an
extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a
ground to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of
donation in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations
within which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth in Rule 91 of
the Revised Rules of Court has set in.
The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land
purportedly donated to private respondent which will ultimately determine
whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in
favor of the state.
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession
or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and
claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving
no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state
to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5 Since
escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to
such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated
property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit
is imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim
not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it
is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not
being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant
within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this
regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal
Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at
least insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested
party" in an escheat proceeding -
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person
alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be
escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and
oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de
San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a
material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former
because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and
the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a
contract legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied).
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower
court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or
less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before
the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of
her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held
in Hamilton v. Brown,8 "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on
the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any
right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice
having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
"discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the
escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent
during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the
lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of
Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the
escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in
question."9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a
claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the
property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering
the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no
transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by
the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and
convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by
Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least
before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court
was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot
perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of
the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision
on the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been
disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close
scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate
precision and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by
speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

 Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 114217
SUPREME COURT
Manila On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition
against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and
THIRD DIVISION Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy,
Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy,
G.R. No. 114217 October 13, 2009 Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.4
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR
SY,1 Petitioners, Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy,
vs. Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy
ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY, Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while
BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY, JULIETA SY, and petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy
ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents. Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma.
Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and
Iluminada Tan.5
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties,
G.R. No. 150797
including several businesses.6

ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA

During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it
TAN, and MA. EMMA SY, Petitioners,
was agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the
vs.
common properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall
BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY, FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY,
be placed temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee,
LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-
with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or
SY, Respondents.
private respondents. Thus, the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated
by Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of
DECISION management and operation of the business of cinema of the common
ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro
NACHURA, J.: Sy.7

Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the
Decision2 dated May 6, 1993 and the Resolution3 dated February 28, 1994 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other hand, the
second Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February
28, 2001 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46244.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three
cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall
exclusively pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance, pending
the termination of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income
from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their
common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year
1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken
charge of the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with
the income derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their
support and maintenance.8
On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on
the Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil
Case No. 8578 by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and
Julian Sy. On April 2, 1981, the Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision
based on the pretrial order of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into
by and between respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First
Partial Decision and Second Partial Decision had long become final, without
an appeal having been interposed by any of the parties.9
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision,10 the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their
income, produce and improvements, as well as all the rights,
interests or participations (sic) in the names of defendants Jose Sy
Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants
Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian
Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang,
including the properties in the names of said defendants which are
enumerated in the Complaints in this case and all those properties,
rights and interests which said defendants may have concealed or
fraudulently transferred in the names of other persons, their agents
or representatives;
(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his
surviving widow, Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique,
Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita
and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children by his first wife,
namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato
Sy;
(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs
entitled thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined
at the conclusion of the proper accounting which the parties in this
case, their agents and representatives, shall render and after
segregating and delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half
(1/2) share in the conjugal partnership between her and her
deceased husband Sy Bang;
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for
partition of properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome,
Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy.
SO ORDERED.
On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for
Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown
partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied
on August 16, 1982.11
On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition
(Disqualification) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme
Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for
Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order
was Noted.12
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first
Order,13 Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners
Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their
Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit;
and (2) in the second Order,14 the Judge ordered the immediate cancellation
of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the
names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.
On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the
receiver, Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino
Sy.15
While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before
the First Division of the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No.
61519. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on August 31, 1982, to
enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise,
restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution dated
August 16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and the Order
dated August 18, 1982.
On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus
with Restraining Order, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by
petitioners on September 24, 1982. 16
After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the
petition to the CA for proper determination and disposition.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision17 on May 6, 1993, denying due
course to and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge
Puno acted correctly in issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA
said that the act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in accord
with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated that in an
action against several defendants, the court may, when a judgment is
proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to
proceed against the others. It found that the judges decision to defer
resolution on the properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando,
and Enrique would not affect the resolution on the properties in the names of
Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the
properties were separable and distinct from one another such that the claim
that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the subject of
separate suits.
The CA also upheld the judges appointment of a receiver, saying that the
judge did so after both parties had presented their evidence and upon
verified petition filed by respondents, and in order to preserve the properties
under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the order to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino,
Rolando and Bartolome.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994.18
On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and
19-91 for failure of petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.
In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision
and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the nullification
of the Third Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in Civil Case No.
8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the trial court to proceed with the
reception of further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578.19 In particular,
petitioners allege that the CA decided questions of substance not in accord
with law when it upheld the trial courts Third Partial Decision which, they
alleged, was rendered in violation of their rights to due process.
Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days May
26 and 27, 1982 to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on May
26, the judge forced them to terminate the presentation of their evidence. On
June 2, 1982, following petitioners submission of additional documentary
evidence, the trial court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8 and 9,
1982, at 2 oclock in the afternoon "in view of the importance of the issue
concerning whether all the properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome
Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as
those in the names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be declared or
included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous
documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan." At
the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented additional evidence. Unknown to
them, however, the trial court had already rendered its Third Partial Decision
at 11 oclock that morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third Partial
Decision is void.20
They also question the trial courts First Order dated August 17, 1982 and
Order dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and
appointing a receiver, respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing
and without showing the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they
question the Second Order dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis
pendens ex parte and without any showing that the notice was for the
purpose of molesting the adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.21
On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widows
Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an
extensive estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to
be their conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bangs death in 1971 until
the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widows allowance as
provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in
possession and control of her husbands estate, or her share in the conjugal
partnership.22
In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance,
petitioners argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate"
of the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now
Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of
property" during the liquidation of the inventoried properties.23 Considering
that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for partition under
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled to widows allowance.
On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of
Widows Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay
Rosita P25,000.00 as the widows allowance to be taken from the estate of
Sy Bang, effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the
estate is finally settled or until further orders from the Court.24
In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that
Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present
and future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties
to the case.25 Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita
and Enrique stated that they were given P1 million and a 229-square meter
parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing as plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 8578.26
Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and
Opposition to Drop Rosita Sy as a Party.27They said that it would be
ridiculous for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bangs estate, amounting to
hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned
by the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They
alleged that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties when she
affixed her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age,
her frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed
a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City for
guardianship over her person and properties. They also alleged that Enrique
and some of Jose Sy Bangs children would stealthily visit Rosita in
Rosauros house while the latter was away. On one of those occasions, she
was asked to affix her thumbmark on some documents she could not read
and knew nothing about. They claim that Rosita has never received a single
centavo of the P1 million allegedly given her.
In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,28 petitioners countered that
respondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge the
Sinumpaang Salaysay. Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public
document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-
Manifestation was filed without Rositas authorization as, in fact, she had
written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading.29 Further, they
averred that Rosita executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay while in full
possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the
petition for guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn certification
from Rositas physician that "she (Rosita) is physically fit and mentally
competent to attend to her personal or business transactions."30
On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Courts September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique
executed their Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 29, 1996. However, this
development was made known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence,
the Court was not aware of this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners
prayed for the reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and
dropping Rosita and Enrique as parties to the case.31
In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents
maintained that the Court should not consider the Motion for
Reconsideration. Respondents alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the
Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the contents of the document
or the implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that
their mother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to
by exhibiting four documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay
and thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay. The second was a reproduction of the earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay with the amount changed to P100.00, the Transfer
Certificate of Title number changed to 12343567, and the size of the
property to "as big as the entire Lucena City." The third purported to
bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership of gains to Rosauro,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance to
Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the
third in that it was in favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while
disinheriting Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino. These,
respondents assert, clearly show that their mother would sign any document,
no matter the contents, upon the request of any of her children.32
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996.33
Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing
that the Third Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without
due process, but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of
Torrens titles.34
G.R. No. 150797
Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the
Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of
Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court), docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be
named as the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion
to Order Court Deposit of Widows Allowance Ordered by the Supreme
Court.35 Then, he filed a Motion before this Court seeking an Order for
petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00 in widows allowance
and P25,000.00 every month thereafter, as ordered by this Court in its
September 23, 1996 Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners
imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith.36
On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their
children, Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa
Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit to this Court, jointly and severally, the
amount of P250,000.00 representing the widows allowance of the
incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from
September 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00
per month and every month thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each
month.37
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed
guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution.
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8, 1997
Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship court.38
In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents favor,
finding "nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sys
filing of the motion to order the deposit of the widows allowance ordered by
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the public
respondents grant thereof in the order herein assailed. More so, when the
public respondents actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme Courts
denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated
September 23, 1996."40 Thus it held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5,
2001,41 petitioners filed this Petition for Review42 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying for this Court to reverse the CAs February 28, 2001
Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to
declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing
the deposit of the widows allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-
34.43 They argued that the Guardianship courts jurisdiction is limited to
determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon finding in the
affirmative, appointing a guardian. Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of
the Rules of Court, a widows allowance can only be paid in an estate
proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition were to be considered as
estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had the
exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the widows allowance.44
They raised the following issues:
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship Courts Order
dated 8 July 1997, and Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that:
I
The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had
no authority to enforce payment of widows allowance.
II
The payment of widows allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present
because the estate of Sy Bang the source from which payment is to be
taken has not been determined with finality.
III
The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widows
allowance unduly modified the express terms of this Honorable Courts
Resolution granting it.45
Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship courts omission of the
phrase "to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang" from the July 8, 1997 Order.
They interpreted this to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that
the widows allowance be taken from their own properties and not from the
estate of Sy Bang an "undue modification" of this Courts September 23,
1996 Resolution.46
On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217
and G.R. No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on
May 21, 2003 and June 19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in
its August 11, 2003 Resolution.
Pending the issuance of this Courts Decision in the two cases, respondent
Rosauro Sy filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court
of Supreme Courts Ordered Widows Allowance Effective September 23,
1996 and Upon Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to Comply Therewith to
Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had
been ill and had no means to support herself except through his financial
assistance, and that respondents had not complied with this Courts
September 23, 1996 Resolution, promulgated seven years earlier.47 He
argued that respondents defiance constituted indirect contempt of court.
That the Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect contempt did
not help his mother because she was still unable to collect her widows
allowance.48
Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the
widows allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated
that Rosita, together with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no legal
ground to cite them in contempt.49
On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauros Motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow
of deceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners
Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latters wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY
of contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita
Ferrera-Sy by way of a widows allowance pursuant to this Courts
Resolution of September 13, 1996, and accordingly ORDERS their
immediate imprisonment until they shall have complied with said Resolution
by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,600,100.00), representing her
total accumulated unpaid widows allowance from September, 1996 to April,
2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) a
month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court further DIRECTS
petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widows allowance
for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.
This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.50
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of P260,010.00 on
April 5, 2005.51
Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for
Execution52 before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner
Rosa Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for
Clarification.53She alleged that, in accordance with Chinese culture, she had
no participation in the management of the family business or Sy Bangs
estate. After her husbands death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts
and liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on
how these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had not
disobeyed its Resolution and to consider her motion.
Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification.54 They stressed that the P1
million and the piece of land Rosita had already received from Jose Sy Bang
in 1996 should form part of the widows allowance. They also argued that
whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate
of Sy Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay the
allowance when none of them participated in the management of Sy Bangs
estate; Zenaida and Ma. Emma being minors at the time of his death, while
Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in the family business.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring
Respondents to Deposit with the Supreme Courts Cashier its Ordered
Widows Allowance55 and a Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4,
2005.56Petitioners opposed the same.57
On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of
respondents motions and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.58
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a
Manifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clarification.59 They maintained
that the issues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not
been duly resolved. They argued that when this Court issued its September
23, 1996 Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causes of action
against petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, the
Guardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a "temporary
agreement" based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial
assistance of P5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was pending.
Moreover, as a manifestation of good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma paid the P430,000.00 out of their own funds in partial
compliance with the Courts Resolution. However, the same did not in any
way constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in the present case. They
underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the estate of Sy
Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of the latters heirs, the extent of
which remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to adjudicate
the liability for the widows allowance to be equally divided between them
and the other set of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.
On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an
Order for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply
with the Courts resolution.60 They aver that the period within which
petitioners were to comply with the Courts Resolution had now lapsed, and
thus, petitioners must now be incarcerated for failure to abide by said
Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to refer petitioners counsel, Atty.
Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations
of the Canons of Professional Responsibility or to declare him in contempt of
court. They alleged that despite the finality of the Courts denial of
petitioners motion for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a Manifestation
with compliance arguing the same points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not
petitioners counsel of record in this case since he never formally entered his
appearance before the Court.61
In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to
refer Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy.62
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus
Motion,63 seeking an extension of time to comply with the Courts Resolution
and Motion to delete the penalty of "fine" as a consequence of voluntary
compliance. They insist that their compliance with the order to pay the
widows allowance should "obliterate, expunge, and blot out" the penalty of
fine and imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to comply with this
Courts Resolution, the RTC, Lucena City, found them guilty of indirect
contempt and imposed on them a fine of P30,000.00. They had appealed
said order to the CA.
They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms "joint and several"
in the September 23 Resolution, and "collectively" in the April 5, 2005
Resolution. They argued that "joint and several" creates individual liability for
each of the parties for the full amount of the obligation, while "collectively"
means that all members of the group are responsible together for the action
of the group. Hence, "collectively" would mean that the liability belongs
equally to the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60
days to raise the necessary amount. They also asked the Court to hold their
imprisonment in abeyance until their "just and reasonable compliance" with
the Courts orders.
Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another
Manifestation stressing that Sy Bangs marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void.
They claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts
into believing that Rositas marriage to Sy Bang is valid.
The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of
Petitioners,64 which petitioners opposed.65
In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005,66 the Court issued a Warrant of
Arrest67 against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to detain them until they complied with this Courts April 4, 2005 and
July 25, 2005 Resolutions.
Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion.68 She informed the
Court that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the
Court and its orders, she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise
money to comply, but concedes that she was only able to raise a minimal
amount since she has no source of income herself and needs financial
support to buy her food and medicines. She obtained her brothers help and
the latter issued six checks in the total amount of P650,000.00. She also
alleged that she was not informed by her husbands counsel of the
developments in the case, and remained unconsulted on any of the matters
or incidents of the case. She reiterated that she had no participation in the
management of the Sy Bang estate and received nothing of value upon her
husbands death. She prayed that the Court would not consider her failure to
raise any further amount as contempt or defiance of its orders.
The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.
In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions
with Payment of Widows Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of
Warrant of Arrest on Humanitarian Grounds,69 petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma asked the Court to delete the penalty of indefinite
imprisonment considering their partial compliance and the partial compliance
of Rosa Tan. They expressed willingness to deposit the widows allowance
with the Supreme Courts Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bangs
estate. They reasoned that the money to be deposited is their own and does
not belong to Sy Bangs estate. The deposit is made for the sole purpose of
deleting the penalty of indefinite imprisonment. They claim that they are not
willfully disobeying the Courts order but are merely hesitating to comply
because of pending incidents such as the falsification charges against
Rosita, the resolution of the partition case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay
executed by Rosita, and the pendency of Rositas guardianship proceedings,
as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they prayed for the Court to
reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the warrant of arrest.
On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution70 lifting the warrant of
arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the
condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued
widows allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to submit
proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice.
In a Manifestation71 dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in
favor of Rosita with the RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the
proceedings on February 28, 2006.72
Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit
of said checks, amounting to P1,073,053.00, does not amount to full
compliance with the Courts order considering that the accrued widows
allowance now amounted to P4,528,125.00. 1avvph!1
Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to
include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as
Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang
as they may also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang.73 They
argued that it is denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single
out only the two children of the first marriage Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy
and their heirs, as the ones responsible for the widows allowance. This
ruling, they aver, does not take into consideration the numerous and
valuable properties from the estate of Sy Bang being held in the names of
Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. They alleged that two
compromise agreements, both approved by the trial court, transferred
properties to Rolando and Renato. They further alleged that respondents
Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita, Rosalino, Enrique, and Rosita Ferrera-Sy
have executed separate waivers and quitclaims over their shares in the
estate of Sy Bang for certain considerations. However, out of respect for the
Court and their fear of incarceration, they complied with the Courts orders
using their personal funds which they claim is unfair because they have
never participated in the management of the properties of Sy Bang. They
prayed that the Court pronounce that the liability for the widows allowance
be divided proportionately among the following groups: Iluminada, Zenaida,
and Ma. Emma; Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome Sy
and wife Virginia Lim; Rolando Sy and wife Anacorita Rioflorido; and the
heirs of Enrique Sy, namely, Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.
On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents
Comment on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition74 to the motion
filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest
petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. They
argued that they had fully complied with the Courts orders. They alleged that
on three occasions within the period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated
checks to the Courts cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy
of the Court not to issue receipts on postdated checks. They then filed a
motion before the RTC of Lucena City praying for authority to deposit the
checks with the trial court. The motion was denied but, on reconsideration,
was later granted. The checks are now in the custody of the RTC. The only
issue respondents raise, they claim, is the amount of the checks. Hence,
there is no basis for the Court to direct the NBI to effect their arrest.
The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to
comment on the motion to include some of them in the payment of widows
allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were required to comment on a
motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to the NBI to
arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006
Resolution.75
Petitioners filed their Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
March 29, 2006 Resolution.76 They reiterated their arguments in their Urgent
Reply to respondents Comment on the manifestation of compliance with
Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a Resolution by the
Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, San Pablo City, finding probable
cause to charge respondents with falsification of three marriage contracts
between Sy Bang and Rosita Ferrera. According to them, this development
now constitutes a "highly prejudicial question" on whether they should
comply with the order to pay widows allowance. They claim that, while the
filing of the information is merely the first step in the criminal prosecution of
respondents, it already casts doubt on whether Rosita is legally entitled to
the widows allowance. They now seek partial reconsideration of the
Resolution inasmuch as it requires them to deposit with the Clerk of Court,
RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58, new checks payable to Rosita Ferrera.
Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation77 on
why they should not be made to pay the widows allowance. They argued
that the RTC had already decided that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised
of properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma.
Emma, Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the same was affirmed by the CA.
Pending the resolution of the appeal before this Court, this Decision stands.
Thus, petitioners claim that the estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is
false. They also claim that, contrary to petitioners claims of being poor, they
still hold enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate, which had been
transferred in their names through falsification of public documents, now
subject of several cases which respondents filed against them before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents further claim that the validity of
their mothers marriage to Sy Bang has been recognized by the courts in
several cases where the issue had been raised, including the case for
recognition of Rositas Filipino citizenship, the guardianship proceedings,
and the partition proceedings.
On June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of
Parties.78 They averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001,
leaving behind his widow Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on
August 28, 2004, leaving behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The
claims against Jose and Julian were not extinguished by their deaths. It was
the duty of petitioners counsel, under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of
Court, to inform the Court of these deaths within 30 days thereof. Petitioners
counsel failed to so inform this Court, which should be a ground for
disciplinary action. Hence, respondents prayed that the Court order the heirs
of the two deceased to appear and be substituted in these cases within 30
days from notice.
In a Resolution79 dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for
substitution and noted the Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to
include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as
Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
Respondents then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the
Supreme Courts Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25,
2005, December 12, 2005, and February 15, 2006.80 They prayed that
petitioners be given a last period of five days within which to deposit with the
Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued widows allowances as of June 2006.
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents
manifestation and motion.81 They argued that the resolutions sought to be
implemented were all issued prior to the DOJ Resolution finding probable
cause to file the falsification charges against respondents. They contended
that the criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law
wife and not a "widow"; hence, there is no legal justification to give her the
widows allowance. They also reiterated their earlier arguments against the
grant of widows allowance.
Meanwhile, Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with
Motion for Reconsideration.82 She argued that since the trial court had
already appointed a judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which
includes Julian Sys estate, the proper party to be substituted should be the
administrator and not Julians heirs who never exercised ownership rights
over the properties thereof.
The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting
substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.
The Courts Ruling
G.R. No. 114217
Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.
The Third Partial Decision of the RTC
To review, the CA held, to wit:
The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer the
resolution on the question concerning the properties in the name of
Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not
necessarily affect the decision he rendered concerning the properties in the
names of Jose Sy Bang and wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria
Sy, considering that the properties mentioned were separable and distinct
from each other, such that the claim that said properties were not their own,
but properties of the late Sy Bang, could have been the subject of separate
suits.83
We agree with the CA.
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 4. Several judgments. In an action against several defendants, the
court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one
or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.
The trial courts Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment
as contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the status
of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while
deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents pending
the presentation of evidence.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims
against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and
judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.84
Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable
interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not
affect the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties
in the names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did
not preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the
properties in the names of the other heirs.
The trial courts June 2, 1982 Order reads:
IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties
in the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy
and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of the other
parties litigants in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of the
Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences
(sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said question was
agreed to be submitted for resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby
sets for the reception or for the resolution of said issue in this case on June
8 and 9, 1982, both at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon; notify all parties litigants
in this case of these settings.85
It is obvious from the trial courts order86 that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for
the purpose of determining whether properties in the names of Enrique Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives
are also part of the Sy Bang estate.
Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said:
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the
parties in this case in the matter of whatever sums of money, property or
asset belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that came into their possession in
order that the Court may be properly guided in the partition and adjudication
of the rightful share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latters
estate; this becomes imperative in view of new matters shown in the
Submission and Formal Offer of Reserve Exhibits and the Offer of Additional
Documentary Evidence filed respectively by Oscar Sy and Jose Sy Bang, et
al., thru their respective counsels after the question of whether or not the
properties in the names of Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all
surnamed Sy, should form part or be included as part of the estate of Sy
Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of May 26, 1982; the Court
deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the part of any of the
parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent of the estate
belonging to Sy Bang.87
The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated
the details, then carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision.
The evidence that formed the basis for the trial courts conclusion is
embodied in the Decision itself evidence presented by the parties
themselves, including petitioners.
However, notwithstanding the trial courts pronouncement, the Sy Bang
estate cannot be partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the
extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule
90, Section 1,88 have been settled.89
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or
any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.90
Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition.91 As
this Court has ruled:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in
the action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of
Appeals:
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first
stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will
not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In
fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his
complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and
unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of the properties x x x."92
Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating
the proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial Decision is
but a determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There
remained issues to be resolved by the court. There would be no final
determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the courts
examination of the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando,
and Enrique. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court will have to
make a pronouncement whether the properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only
after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the trial
court finally order the partition of each of the heirs share.
Appointment of Receiver
As to the issue of the judges appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say that
the CA conclusively found thus:
The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in
court. Upon Order of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners
submitted their opposition to [the] petition for appointment of a receiver filed
by private respondents. x x x.
Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the
receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third
Partial Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon
verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are
mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing
the same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted,
dissipated, misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly
in granting the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to
preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his
discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was
the petitioners who violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the
Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and unwarranted
seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are
admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of private
respondent, Rosauro Sy.93
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens
Next, petitioners question the trial courts Order canceling the notice of lis
pendens.94
Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition
of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the
land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or
notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding
section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the
registration of certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of
the final judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated
by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.95
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens,
such power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As
provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.96
This Court has interpreted the notice as:
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with
it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in
any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may
well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined
and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or
removal-like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment of
injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action,
and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.97
The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were
able to prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the
owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was
also proven that the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be
annotated, was only 1/14 of the assessed value of the property. Moreover,
Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond
to protect whatever rights or interest Oscar Sy may have in the properties
under litis pendentia.98
G.R. No. 150797
In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CAs
February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its
jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had
no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance ordered by this
Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widows allowance
was made before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the
guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition
(Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the
estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the
surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried
property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is
the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the
provision of the law that the widows allowance is to be taken from the
common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widows allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts.99
In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court
has pronounced that:
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court,
only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where
his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its
delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the
embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or
title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any
property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x
the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to
have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in
a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings.100
Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate
of the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are
at liberty to initiate.101
Other Unresolved Incidents
Payment of Widows Allowance
It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita
Ferrera-Sy her monthly widows allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said
allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then,
they again argued against the grant of widows allowance after the DOJ
issued its Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges
against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification
proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a "widow" and,
therefore, not entitled to widows allowance.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of
falsification against respondents.
In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been defined as "the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause needs to rest
only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.102
Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is
presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widows allowance to be
taken from the estate of Sy Bang.
We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with
whatever the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.
Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of
Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as
Heirs of Sy Bang
On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for
the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
A Final Note
We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought about by
petitioners propensity to challenge the Courts every directive. That the
petitioners would go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties
under the law and the orders of this Court is truly deplorable. Not even a
citation for contempt and the threat of imprisonment seemed to deter them.
Their contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far too
long with practically no end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court
processes is shameful, and they must not be allowed to continue with their
atrocious behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay
the Court treble costs.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No.
150797 is GRANTED, while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED. The
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City is directed to hear and decide Civil Case
No. 8578 with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of
Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED. Treble costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

The Motion is denied.

The widows allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bangs

estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the
names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy form part of Sy
Bangs estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial
courts Third Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there
has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding
properties belonging to Sy Bangs estate.

That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no
excuse from complying with this Courts order. Properties of the estate have
been identified i.e., those in the names of petitioners thus, these
properties should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita. In
any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits
or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate.103
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1 ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,3 dated 19
December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece
of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set
aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2
December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different
parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale
siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri,
as Naves successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition,
determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty
Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P.
de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly
S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba,
Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged
that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa
Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between
him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave]
reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the
partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed
because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore.
[Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered
to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be
[Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully
apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to
her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed
that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered
by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to
[Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time
repudiating the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered by the
fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to
her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the
property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20,
1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she
received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has
no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged
Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in
interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the
corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly
authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene
alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property.
Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the Pabale siblings]
as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court
denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a
Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the
allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos]
amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and
including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of
the fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she
was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue.
Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the
trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and
Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this
time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being
mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report
conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M.
A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the
same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that
in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave"
she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a
decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract
entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null
and void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and
Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the
proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view
of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as
SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner.
On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said
guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave
who now resides with the Brosas spouses has
categorically refused to be examined again at the National
Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the
Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986
submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the
supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr.
Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital
and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the
purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and
deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid
take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said
condition having become severe since the year 1980. She
and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty.
Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular
guardian without need of bond, until further orders from
this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as regular
guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in
the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of
protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her
real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure
made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her
lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom,
while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina
Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required
docketing fees within the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September
20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an
orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the
instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for
guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February
14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their
Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a
party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by
the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never
raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9,
1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts
permission for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the
instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective
pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R.
Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property
was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In
refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating
that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already
revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution
should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it
cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits,
the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated
January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and
Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and
effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20,
1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale
siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the
property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records
of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of
title over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in
the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their
favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession
over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its
income from the time they took over possession to the
time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and
thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly
and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133,
solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the
amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in
their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found incompetent
since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It
ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M.
Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President,
 Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale,
are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding
the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20,
1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in
the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which
found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and
thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision
already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an
incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into
should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20
February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings
of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose
Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October
1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus
filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to
establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by
the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as
owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must
be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed
transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a
quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for
lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988
CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED
OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED
JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY
EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF
JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES. 9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22
June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule
that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies,
in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
47, Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former
judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph
(c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the
following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a
fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause
of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the
issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination
of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs.
Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between
bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and
 conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material
facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in
former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied
in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and although such
matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were
not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could
not have been rendered without deciding the particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter
as to all future actions between the parties and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they
are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation,
further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise
put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of
a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no
application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of
his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment
of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for
resident. Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a
resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful
guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may
petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a
general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or
incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United
States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward
thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person
who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a
general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the
appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of
the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him
in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in
the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14
years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other
general or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by
filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of
majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged
incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are
prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters
of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in
the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of
the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to
attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been
given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in
support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question
is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his
person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter
specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this
rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city
where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his
property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the
usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of
Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner,
with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that
those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be
notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person
is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself
and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as
his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could
help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and
most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives
living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the
minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that
they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said
contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply
therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and
actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives,
nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to
direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the
petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC
actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November
1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning
the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale
siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said
Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the
father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to
appear in the said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit
and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the
Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings
and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment.17 It
must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule
Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus
sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not
only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment,
but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said
case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court
before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties
may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri
failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence
earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served
if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify
deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the
requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair
results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.19 Procedural rules
are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we
stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the
rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny
her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for
being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals
also denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein
respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship
proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is
their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein
documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted
in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as
verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no
allegation to the effect that he represented them before the
Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to
submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30
October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the
father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to
represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact
that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20
February 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in
favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales
presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his
children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject
property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of
judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed
the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said
sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be
established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that
she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the
fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only
nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that
she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the
two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in
1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long
as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he
was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of proving
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who
alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.24
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated
only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and
she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a
Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment
of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as
the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of
the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise
falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on
the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become
severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a
declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision,
prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and (2)
by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their
examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to
cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her
judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which
may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All
they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and
again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which
made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of
being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987
to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves incompetency from
1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render
the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the
former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the
Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the
validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is

hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.

SO ORDERED.
 There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition,
determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,3 dated 19
December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece
of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set
aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2
December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different
parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale
siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri,
as Naves successor-in-interest.
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty
Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P.
de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly
S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba,
Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged
that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa
Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between
him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave]
reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the
partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed
because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore.
[Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered
to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of
[Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully
apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to
her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed
that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered
by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to
[Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time
repudiating the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered by the
fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to
her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the
property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20,
1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she
received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has
no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged
Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in
interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the
corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly
authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene
alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property.
Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the Pabale siblings]
as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court
denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a
Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the
allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos]
amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and
including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of
the fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she
was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue.
Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the
trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and
Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this
time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being
mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report
conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M.
A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the
same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that
in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave"
she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a
decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract
entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null
and void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and
Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the
proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view
of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as
SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner.
On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said
guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave
who now resides with the Brosas spouses has
categorically refused to be examined again at the National
Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the
Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986
submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the
supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr.
Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital
and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the
purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and
deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid
take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said
condition having become severe since the year 1980. She
and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty.
Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular
guardian without need of bond, until further orders from
this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as regular
guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in
the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of
protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her
real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure
made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her
lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom,
while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina
Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required
docketing fees within the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September
20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an
orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the
instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for
guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February
14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their
Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a
party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by
the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never
raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9,
1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts
permission for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the
instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective
pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R.
Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property
was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In
refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating
that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already
revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution
should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it
cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits,
the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated
January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and
Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and
effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20,
1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale
siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the
property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records
of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of
title over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in
the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their
favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession
over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its
income from the time they took over possession to the
time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and
thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly
and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133,
solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the
amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in
their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found incompetent
since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It
ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M.
Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President,
Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale,
are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding
 the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20,
1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in
the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which
found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and
thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision
already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an
incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into
should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20
February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings
of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose
Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October
1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus
filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to
establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by
the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as
owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must
be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed
transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a
quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for
lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988
CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED
OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED
JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY
EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF
JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES. 9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22
June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule
that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies,
in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
47, Rule 39, which read:
 SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former
judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph
(c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the
following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a
fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause
of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the
issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination
of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs.
Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between
bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material
facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in
former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied
in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and although such
matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were
not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could
not have been rendered without deciding the particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter
as to all future actions between the parties and if a
 judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they
are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation,
further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise
put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of
a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no
application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of
his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment
of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for
resident. Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a
resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful
guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may
petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a
general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or
incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United
States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward
thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person
who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a
general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the
appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of
the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him
in their care;
 (d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in
the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14
years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other
general or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by
filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of
majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged
incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are
prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters
of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in
the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of
the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to
attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been
given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in
support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question
is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his
person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter
specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this
rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city
where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his
property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the
usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of
Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner,
with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that
those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be
notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person
is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself
and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as
his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could
help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and
most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives
living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the
minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that
they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said
contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply
therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and
actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives,
nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to
direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the
petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC
actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November
1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning
the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale
siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said
Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the
father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to
appear in the said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit
and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the
Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings
and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment.17 It
must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule
Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus
sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not
only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment,
but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said
case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court
before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties
may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri
failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence
earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served
if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify
deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the
requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair
results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.19 Procedural rules
are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we
stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the
rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny
her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for
being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals
also denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein
respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship
proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is
their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein
documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted
in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as
verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no
allegation to the effect that he represented them before the
Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to
submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30
October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the
father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to
represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact
that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20
February 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in
favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales
presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his
children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject
property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of
judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed
the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said
sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be
established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that
she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the
fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only
nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that
she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the
two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in
1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long
as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he
was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of proving
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who
alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.24
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated
only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and
she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a
Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment
of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as
the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of
the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise
falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on
the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become
severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a
declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision,
prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and (2)
by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their
examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to
cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her
judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which
may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All
they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and
again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which
made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of
being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987
to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves incompetency from
1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render
the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the
former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the
Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the
validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5,
2002 resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP
No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas
corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient
in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August
28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue,
Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named
Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer"
in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she
continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the
family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She
told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find
them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija,
Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for
habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995),
an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds
its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
 In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children,
habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA
7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas
corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer
is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word
"exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court
which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also
possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former
is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a
petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a
respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus
on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the
Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That
may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence
of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise
it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority
of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. The
enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of
the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the
remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the
legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the
issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus
may be filed in the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and
BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue
writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently
cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek
redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the
Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the
State is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of children."
The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing
three major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as
expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law.
The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and
original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of
regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization
in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child.
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the
situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of
the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas
corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy
and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the
legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the
Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of
miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular
courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens
Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at
bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word "exclusive" in
the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus
cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in
the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The
Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only
within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where
the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same
writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2,
Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at
any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member
thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court
or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance,
or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance,
or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his
judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose
resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule
that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The
spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the
words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth
life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice
guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of
the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law
and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used
in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in
mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must
prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are
not favored:
 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute
must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that
the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws
on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws
on the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus
relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA
7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for
a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be
made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the
region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas
corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over
the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the
country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable
obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than
the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since
the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas
corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in
society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire
for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to
others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, otherwise known as
1
the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27,
2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in
2
SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both
minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at
St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.
3
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer
teacher at STCs high school department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the
waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if
they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their
black brassieres. What is more, Escuderos students claimed that there were
times when access to or the availability of the identified students photos was
not confined to the girls Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any
4
Facebook user. 5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
students Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol),
STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the schools Student Handbook, to
wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity;
contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample
body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the
pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma.
Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school principal and ICM Directress.
6
They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally
abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant
Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is
more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of
their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises
scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr.
Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the
RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
38594. In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from
7
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of
Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil
Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of
the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date
of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on
the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB on the basis of
8 Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same
the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra)
were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on
the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set
at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or
ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were
called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however,
violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying
of information, data, and digital images happened at STCs
Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted
to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of
their childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas
databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata
before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be
rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained inviolation of the childrens right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an
Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their verified
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the
petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b)
petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of
their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld
that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as
to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC
noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the schools policies and rules on
discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court
pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data. 10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of
habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving
the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was
indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
11
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. 12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." The writ,
13
however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a persons
14
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may
be extended. 15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to
informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the
perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the
nature of an online social network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial
barriers, bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
16
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the providers
databases, which are outside the control of the end-usersis there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this
point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not
enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
 (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only
to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its
17
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact,
the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent
remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of
18
Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against
STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly
conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need
not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." It does not
19
necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her
family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for
any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not
prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly limiting the
reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities
whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect
a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the
information and communications technologya right which a great majority
of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the
core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common
Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to
20
privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy;
21
and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
22
the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals
to control information about themselves. 23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individuals right to
control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual
should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking." 24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for
judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of
data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to
privacy. In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
25
the landmark case, H v. W, promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized
26
that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of
the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the
Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ
of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an
expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with
engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected
in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal
information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing
sharing a myriad of information, some of which would have otherwise
27
remained personal.
b. Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social
media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of
which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin
board, a user/owner can post anythingfrom text, to pictures, to music and
videosaccess to which would depend on whether he or she allows one,
some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining
popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of
various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people
use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on in
the world, and to share and express what matters to them." 28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending"
another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to
connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and
"Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is
established and both users are permitted to view the other users "Public" or
"Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user
to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the
user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and
shares certain information to the latter. 29
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
30
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a users profile as well as information uploaded by the user.
31
In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
32
to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a users
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of
digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall,"
except for the usersprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired
privacy setting:
 (a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to
set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile
content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another users point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to
what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences." Ideally, the selected setting will be
34
based on ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of
his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that users particular
post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct.
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy
tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto. 35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a
protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is
first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest
the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention
36
can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in
cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant
or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise,
38
such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information
to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a
custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo
would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit
the photos visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only
strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very
intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of
his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible
to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in
nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such
that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination
is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone
of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images
will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their childrens Facebook
accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to
Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting
safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they posit that their childrens
39
disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public
viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without
their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioners children testified, it was
Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five
of them, although who these five are do not appear on the records.
40
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students
41
showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of
mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who
are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the
computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic],
and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me
that there had been times when these photos were public i.e., not confined
to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors testimonies for one
key reason: failure to question the students act of showing the photos to
Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five
of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escuderos claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn
account that her students, who are the minors Facebook "friends," showed
her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show
that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were
ever resorted to by Escuderos students, and that it is reasonable to
43
assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
44
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method of
46
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent
to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster
the petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that
the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of
the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way;" 47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who
are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
(4) A users Facebook friend can "share" the formers post, or
49
"tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite
50
its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details
privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter
is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of
which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B
are not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As post, which
is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (As own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends or the
public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a result, the audience who
can view the post is effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebooks
proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or
privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that OSNs have facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby
resulting into the "democratization of fame." Thus, it is suggested, that a
51
profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more
so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners
argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken
to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients
of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering
the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor
their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than
the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594. These are not tantamount to a violation of the minors
52
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the users
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances,
the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being
broadcasted to the public at large or all the users friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your childrens
ears." This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
53
consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations. As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in
54
protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN users,
55
especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the
"netiquettes" on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to
56
the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they
generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves
sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good
cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online
conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools
and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy
and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view
of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in
online activities. Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world
58
and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly
or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in
cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating
their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these
institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks,
theres no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the
students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to
whenever they engage incyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be
1wphi1
cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any
kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably
making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside
the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information,
otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or
copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their
online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their
rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here,
requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We
cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place
the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to
keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook
is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors'
privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned
errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON.
MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F.
CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY
B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES,
GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P.
ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO
FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS,
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO,
REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO
GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY
CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected
members of the Kuratong Bale/eng Gang, is once again before this Court
this time questioning, among other things, the trial qmrt's determination of
the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions.1
The Facts and the Case
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine
National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP
ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC]
led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal
Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M.
Acop ), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief
Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out
between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved,
including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop,
Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28
others (collectively, the respondents).3 On review, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the
police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047
to 57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their
liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson
pleaded not guilty.
Upon respondents motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their
cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that
none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutors
motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic
Act (R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction by deleting
the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all
pending cases where trial had not begun. As a result of this new law, the
Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R.
1280964 but this Court upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the
transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the
amended informations contained no allegations that respondents committed
the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official
functions as required by R.A. 8249.
Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal
Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other
prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims heirs
also executed affidavits of desistance. These prompted the respondents to
file separate motions for the determination of probable cause before the
issuance of warrants of arrests.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional
dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial
following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants.
Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza
sought to revive the cases against respondents by requesting the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation in
their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S
Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez
constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation.
Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his
co-accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila
in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court denied
the plea for temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of
prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused liable
as principals for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the filing of separate
informations against them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by respondent Judge
Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC of Manilas order which allowed the
renewed preliminary investigation of the murder charges against him and his
co-accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon City a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought
the suspension of the proceedings in that court.
In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
RTC of Quezon City from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any
proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before it. On August 24, 2001
the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of
double jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679
to 89 was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years after
when they were not revived.
Upon the prosecutions appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5 the Court ruled
that, based on the record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing provisional dismissals. The
records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion for provisional
dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the heirs of
the victims had no notice of any motion for such provisional dismissal.
The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed
the RTC of Quezon City to try the cases with dispatch. On motion for
reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raffle of the
criminal cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the cases
still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided over by
Judge Yadao.
On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth
certificates showing that they were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the
prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and asked
respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the
assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court.
The request for recall was denied.
On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch
81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the family
courts in view of the changes in the two informations. On October 24, 2003
the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti cautela on
the motions to determine probable cause.
On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecutions motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground that Section
5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She also granted the motions for
determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases against the
respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were
inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary investigations
before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.
On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or
disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of her order. It also filed an
administrative complaint against her for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to
the best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment.7On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent
supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification with motion for
cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.
On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to
recuse her, prompting the prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on
January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued another order, denying the
prosecutions motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12,
2003 that dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on January 26,
2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration of its January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but
also for having become moot and academic.
On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the
notices of appeal that it filed in the cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it
filed the present special civil action of certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The prosecution presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her
discretion in allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-
raffled to other than among the RTC of Quezon Citys family courts.
2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she took cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to
the prosecutions view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of
family courts.
3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she did not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of
the cases.
4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of
probable cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence
in support of the prosecutions motion for reconsideration.
5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in
her court.
The Courts Rulings
Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents
contention that the prosecutions resort to special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial court dismissed the criminal
actions against respondents, the prosecutions remedy was to appeal to the
CA from that order of dismissal.
Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an
appeal.8 Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an
order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered its action and withdrew
that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy, and adequate
remedy.9 In other words, the prosecutions move was not a case of forgotten
remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent
Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and
that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy
for the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is
altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.
Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action
directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the
People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.10 In any case, the
immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that
has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases
have come before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural
lapse.
1. Raffle of the Cases
The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge
gravely abused her discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102
to 12 under a separate category which did not restrict their raffle to the citys
special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC Administrative
Order 36-96. Further, the prosecution points out that she violated
Administrative Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the
raffle. The presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes
courts eligible to receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.
The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle
of the subject cases. The raffle maintained a separate list for criminal and
civil cases. Criminal cases cognizable by special criminal courts were
separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate
heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this since it merely
indicated that the cases were not being raffled for the first time.
The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from
raffle since these branches remained without regularly appointed judges.
Although the pairing judges of these branches had authority to act on
incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean that such
branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did
not then object to the manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution
raised the question only when it filed this petition, a clear afterthought.
2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts
The prosecution points out that, although this Courts October 7, 2003
Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the
prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact
that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive
Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5
of R.A. 8369.
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that
vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn
covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18)
years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of
the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and
ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred.
(Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare
and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not
compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,11 for
instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with
the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the
murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point
out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special
attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as
party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by
their parents who had become the real private offended parties.
3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the
respondents.
The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:
Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among
others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
xxxx
(e) the judge knows the judges spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal
reason for inhibition.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide
for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.
The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to
determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards
the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and
prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence
that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his duties
according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge
based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judges
rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12
Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited
herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following
her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court
finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadaos
dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and
stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply
accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the
basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false information.
To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public
disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing
such cases.
The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadaos statement
that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant
of arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows that she
cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this
constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she
referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for
disqualification.
Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for
reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative
complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecutions
stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the
respondents. The comment could of course not be regarded as a
prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order
holding that the complainants evidence failed to establish probable cause
against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a
motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who
filed it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at
the time she filed her comment.
4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing,
deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark
its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under Section
6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadaos duty was to determine
probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the
basis of the investigating prosecutors resolution as well as the informations
and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the
existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating
prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of probable
cause within five days from notice.
Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up
and adopted the Ombudsmans findings when the latter conducted its
preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave
weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation
when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the
cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo
Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior
inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.
The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when
determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to
conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.13
But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain
in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted
to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for
Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those
affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and
related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part
of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the
respondents.14
The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents
along with the criminal informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the
presence of probable cause against the respondents:
1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yus affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he
said that on May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command
Head, ordered him to form two teams that would go after suspected
Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the Superville
Subdivision in Paraaque City. Yu headed the assault team while
Marlon Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the police team
apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it turned them over
to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned that the
men and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which
he said that he was part of the perimeter defense during the
Superville operation. After the assault team apprehended eight
male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos
then went to the office of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he
saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other
police officers.
According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be
brought to Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-
out and that this action had been cleared with higher authorities, to
which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval. Before Ramos
left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay
pa diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four
male suspects. In the early morning of May 18, 1995, they
executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few minutes
later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed
responsibility for the incident.
3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he
corroborated Ramos statements. Medes said that he belonged to
the same team that arrested the eight male suspects. He drove the
L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects
were killed.
4. Mario C. Enads affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed
having served as TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17,
1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together with respondents
Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car
and observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later
that night, other police officers arrived and apprehended the men in
the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying on the floor while
the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left Sucat in
the early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but
was awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers
fire their guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended
suspects.
5. SPO2 Noel P. Senos affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he
corroborated what Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of
the advance party in Superville Subdivision and was also in
 Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed.
6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31,
199520 which narrated the events that took place on May 17 and 18,
1995. This report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and
Canson.
7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates.
The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports,
taken together with the other documents of record, fail to establish probable
cause against the respondents.
First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of
Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly
heard the commanders of the various units plan the killing of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City and actually execute such plan. Yus testimony is limited to the capture
of the gang members and goes no further. He did not see them killed.
Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the
prosecutions own evidencethe PNP ABRITGs After Operations Report of
May 31, 1995shows that these men took no part in the operations against
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a
comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson),
Traffic Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command
(Acop), and National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were
involved. The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that
list. Notably, only Yus name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that
list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for commendations
and promotions, any omitted name would hardly have gone unchallenged.
Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence
against the respondents, submitted in the course of the preliminary
investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted in a related
robbery charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He
claimed in that counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision
nor Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since
he was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18.22 Notably,
Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was on duty at the TMC
headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23
Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and
giving credence to Ramos and Medes statements, dismissed the robbery
case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of officers that it charged with
the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge
Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of testimony of
these witnesses.
Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he
narrated, his role was limited to cornering and arresting the suspected
Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in Superville
Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit,
he no longer knew what happened to them.
Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this
finding cannot have any legal significance for the purpose of the preliminary
investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent sufficient
proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang members down.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action
outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to
present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options
upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as
to the existence of probable cause.24
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory. The courts first option under the above is for it to "immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice. But that is not the case here. Discounting the affidavits of
Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents
some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged.
PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six
years after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief
that the police could produce new witnesses in the five days required of the
prosecution by the rules.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of
multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial.25
5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one
public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but
allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to be
heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the
prosecutions use of tape recorders.
But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample
inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its
proceedings. Thus:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons
empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
xxxx
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in
every manner appertaining thereto;
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;
xxxx
There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadaos policy of allowing only one
public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during the
hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels
representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.26 The burden of
establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon
the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients damages
claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common
position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the
accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.
As for the prohibition against the prosecutions private recording of the
proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create
an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party,
witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being
given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the
official recording of the proceedings by the courts stenographer has been
insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadaos
policy against such extraneous recordings.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the

following assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:

1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for
re-raffle, granted the motions for determination of probable cause,
THIRD DIVISION
and dismissed the criminal cases;

March 18, 2015

2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of
the respondents for the immediate resolution of the three pending
incidents before the court; G.R. No. 200620

3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to
recuse and the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory
disqualification;
4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and
ROBERTO L. ABAD, MANUEL D. ANDAL, BENITO V. ARANETA, PHILIP
G. BRODETT, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN and ROBERTO V. SAN
JOSE, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
represented by VICTOR AFRICA, Respondent.

DECISION
5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
SO ORDERED.
This case is a remnant of the multiple suits generated by the two factions
battling for control of two sequestered corporations since 2004, a
controversy we already resolved with finality in 2013.

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the Decision dated
1

October 21, 2011 and Resolution dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of
2

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99789. The CA reversed the Order dated 3

June 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149
in Civil Case No. 06-095.

Respondent Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

(PHILCOMSAT), along with Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC) were among those private companies sequestered by
the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) after the EDSA
People Power Revolution in 1986. PHILCOMSAT owns 81% of the
outstanding capital stock of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation (PHC). The
majority shareholders of PHILCOMSAT are also the seven families who
have owned and controlled POTC (Ilusorio, Nieto, Poblador, Africa,
Benedicto, Ponce Enrile and Elizalde).
During the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Enrique L.
Locsin and Manuel D. Andal, along with Julio Jalandoni, were appointed
nominee-directors representing the Republic of the Philippines through the
PCGG in the board of directors of POTC and the board of directors of
PHILCOMSAT. These PCGG nominees have aligned with the Nieto family
against the group of Africa and Ilusorio (Africa-Bildner), in the ensuing battle
for control over the respective boards of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC.
Benito Araneta was also a nominee of PCGG during the term of President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
On August 31, 2004, the following were elected during the annual
stockholders meeting of PHC conducted by the Nieto-PCGG group: Locsin
(Director and Acting Chairman); Oliverio Laperal (Director and Vice-
Chairman); Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. (Director, President and Chief Executive
Officer); Philip G. Brodett (Director and Vice-President); Andal (Director,
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer); Roberto V. San Jose (Director and
Corporate Secretary); Jalandoni, Lokin, Jr., Prudencio Somera, Roberto
Abad and Benito Araneta as Directors. Said election at PHC was the
offshoot of separate elections conducted by the two factions in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT, the Africa-Bildner group and the Nieto-PCGG group.
In the July 28, 2004 stockholders meetings of POTC and PHILCOMSAT,
Victor Africa was among those in the Africa-Bildner group who were elected
as Directors. He was designated as the POTC proxy to the PHILCOMSAT
stockholders meeting. While Locsin, Andal and Nieto, Jr. were also elected
as Directors, they did not accept their election as POTC and PHILCOMSAT
Directors. Instead, the Nieto-PCGG group held the stockholders meeting for
PHILCOMSAT on August 9, 2004 at the Manila Golf Club. Immediately after
the stockholders meeting, an organizational meeting was held, and Nieto, Jr.
and Locsin were respectively elected as Chairman and President of
PHILCOMSAT. At the same meeting, they issued a proxy in favor of Nieto,
Jr. and/or Locsin authorizing them to represent PHILCOMSAT and vote the
PHILCOMSAT shares in the stockholders meeting of PHC scheduled on
August 31, 2004.
Thereafter, the two factions took various legal steps including the filing of
suits and countersuits to gain legitimacy for their respective election as
directors and officers of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. The Africa group had
sought the invalidation of the proxy issued in favor of Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin
and consequent nullification of the elections held during the annual
stockholders meeting of PHC on August 31, 2004 (Civil Case No. 04-1049
of RTC, Makati City, Branch 138). Prior to this, there was the pending case
involving the compromise agreement dated June 28, 1996 entered into by
Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio with the Republic of the Philippines and the PCGG
relative to the Ilusorio familys shareholdings in POTC, including those
shares forcibly taken from him by former President Ferdinand Marcos which
were placed in the name of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-
Pasig Land Development (Mid-Pasig). By Decision dated June 15, 2005, this
Court affirmed the validity of the said compromise agreement in G.R. Nos.
141796 and 141804. As a result of the compromise agreement, the Ilusorio,
Africa, Poblador, Benedicto and Ponce Enrile families gained majority control
(51.37%) and the Nieto family and PCGG became the minority.
On November 17, 2005, Africa in his capacity as President and CEO of
PHILCOMSAT, and as stockholder in his own right, wrote the board and
management of PHC that PHILCOMSAT will exercise its right of inspection
over the books, records, papers, etc. pertinent to the business transactions
of PHC for the 3rd quarter of 2005, specifically the companys financial
documents. 4
In his letter dated November 22, 2005, Nieto, Jr. said that Africas request
will be referred to the PHC Board of Directors or Executive Committee in
view of the several pending cases involving the Africa and Nieto-PCGG
groups on one hand, and the PHC and its board of directors on the other. He
further advised Africa to inform them in writing of his reasons and purposes
for such inspection. In reply, Africa reiterated his request for inspection
5
asserting that the PHILCOMSAT board of directors was elected on
September 22, 2005 under circumstances in consonance with the final
decision of this Court and that there is no case against its legitimacy.
6
On the day of the scheduled inspection, PHILCOMSAT sent its
representatives, Atty. Samuel Divina and Enrico Songco. However, Brodett
disallowed the conduct of the inspection which prompted PHILCOMSAT
through its counsel to make a written query whether the refusal of Brodett to
permit the conduct of PHCs inspection of corporate books and financial
documents was with the knowledge and authority of PHCs board of
directors. But no reply or communication was received by Africa from the
PHC. 7
On February 2, 2006, PHILCOMSAT filed in the RTC a Complaint for 8
Inspection of Books against the incumbent PHC directors and/or officers, to
enforce its right under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code of the
PHILCOMSAT were both under sequestration by the PCGG, and hence all
issues and controversies arising therefrom or related or incidental thereto fall
under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners also contended that the petition should be dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia as the CA may take judicial notice of the fact that
many cases involving Africas purported authority to represent PHILCOMSAT
are pending before several courts, which issue must necessarily be resolved
to determine who possesses the right of inspection of PHCs books and
records.
Finding merit in petitioners arguments, the CA granted the petition, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of dismissal
dated 21 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149,
in Civil Case No. 06-095, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. The court
a quo is reminded to hear and decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED. 11

Philippines. The original defendants were Julio J. Jalandoni, Luis K. Lokin,

Jr., Oliverio G. Laperal, Nieto, Jr., Prudencio C. Somera, and herein
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners are now before
petitioners Andal, Locsin, Brodett, San Jose and Araneta.
this Court.

In its Order dated June 21, 2007, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack
The issues submitted for our resolution are: (1) whether it is the
of jurisdiction. Citing Del Moral v. Republic of the Philippines and Olaguer v.
9

Sandiganbayan or RTC which has jurisdiction over a stockholders suit to

RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, Br. 48, Manila, said court ruled that it
10

enforce its right of inspection under Section 74 of the Corporation Code; and
is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction considering that plaintiff is a
(2) whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action considering that
sequestered corporation of the Republic through the PCGG alleging a right
PHILCOMSAT never authorized Africa or any other person to file the said
of inspection over PHC but which right or authority was being raised as a
complaint.
defense by the defendants.

The petition has no merit.

PHILCOMSAT appealed to the CA thru a petition for review under Rule
43 arguing that it is the RTC and not Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction
over the case involving a stockholders right to inspect corporate books and
records. Petitioners countered that the main controversy is rooted upon the
issue of who are the rightful representative and board of directors of
PHILCOMSAT. Accordingly, PHILCOMSATs right of inspection hinges on the
resolution of the ongoing power struggle within PHILCOMSAT, specifically
on the issue of who between the Africa and Nieto-Locsin groups is the
legitimate board of directors. It was further pointed out that POTC and
Both issues presented in this case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the RTC in
intra-corporate disputes within the sequestered corporations of PCGG, and
who between the contending groups held the controlling interest in POTC,
and consequently in PHILCOMSAT and PHC, have already been resolved in
the consolidated petitions docketed as G.R. No. 184622 (Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corp. [POTC] and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation [PHILCOMSAT] v. Victor Africa, et
al.), G.R. Nos. 184712-14 (POTC and PHILCOMSAT v. Hon. Jenny Lin
Aldecoa-Delorino, Pairing Judge of RTC Makati City, Br. 138, et al.), G.R.
No. 186066 (Philcomsat Holdings Corp., represented by Concepcion
Poblador v. PHILCOMSAT, represented by Victor Africa), and G.R. No.
186590 (Philcomsat Holdings Corp., represented by Erlinda I. Bildner v.
Philcomsat Holdings Corp., represented by Enrique L. Locsin). 12
On the first issue, we ruled that it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan
which has jurisdiction over cases which do not involve a sequestration-
related incident but an intra-corporate controversy.
Originally, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A vested the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the following in the
SEC, to wit:
xxxx
(a)Devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of the board of
directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members
of associations or organization registered with the Commission;
(b)Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members
or associates, respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right as such entity;
(c)Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnership or
associations;
(d)Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be
declared in the state of suspension of payment in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient
property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respective fall due or in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to
cover its liabilities but is under the management of a Rehabilitation
Receiver or Management Committee created pursuant to this
Decree.
Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation
Code), effective on August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-
corporate controversies and the other cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D.
No. 902-A was transferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
5.2 of the law, which provides:
5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court; Provided, That the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-
corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved
within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall
retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases
filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
To implement Republic Act No. 8799, the Court promulgated its resolution of
November 21, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC designating certain branches
of the RTC to try and decide the cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No.
902-A. Among the RTCs designated as special commercial courts was the
RTC (Branch 138) in Makati City, the trial court for Civil Case No. 04-1049.
On March 13, 2001, the Court adopted and approved the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 in
A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC, effective on April 1, 2001, whose Section 1 and
Section 2, Rule 6 state:
Section 1. Cases covered. The provisions of this rule shall apply to
election contests in stock and non-stock corporations.
Section 2. Definition. An election contest refers to any controversy or
dispute involving title or claim to any elective office in a stock or non-stock
corporation, the validation of proxies, the manner and validity of elections,
and the qualifications of candidates, including the proclamation of winners,
to the office of director, trustee or other officer directly elected by the
stockholders in a close corporation or by members of a non-stock
corporation where the articles of incorporation or by-laws so provide. (bold
underscoring supplied)
Conformably with Republic Act No. 8799, and with the ensuing
resolutions of the Court on the implementation of the transfer of
jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court, the RTC (Branch 138) in Makati
had the authority to hear and decide the election contest between the
parties herein. There should be no disagreement that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of an action, being conferred by law, could neither be altered
nor conveniently set aside by the courts and the parties.
To buttress its position, however, the Nieto-Locsin Group relied on Section 2
of Executive Order No. 14, which expressly mandated that the PCGG "shall
file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."
The reliance was unwarranted.
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14 had no application herein simply
because the subject matter involved was an intra-corporate controversy, not
any incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to any case involving
assets whose nature as ill-gotten wealth was yet to be determined. In San
Miguel Corporation v. Kahn, the Court held that:
The subject matter of his complaint in the SEC does not therefore fall within
the ambit of this Courts Resolution of August 10, 1988 on the cases just
mentioned, to the effect that, citing PCGG v. Pena, et al., all cases of the
Commission regarding the funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally
acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, Subordinates, Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees, whether civil or criminal, are
lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme
Court." His complaint does not involve any property illegally acquired or
misappropriated by Marcos, et al., or "any incidents arising from, incidental
to, or related to" any case involving such property, but assets indisputably
belonging to San Miguel Corporation which were, in his (de los Angeles')
view, being illicitly committed by a majority of its board of directors to answer
for loans assumed by a sister corporation, Neptunia Co., Ltd.
De los Angeles complaint, in fine, is confined to the issue of the validity of
the assumption by the corporation of the indebtedness of Neptunia Co., Ltd.,
allegedly for the benefit of certain of its officers and stockholders, an issue
evidently distinct from, and not even remotely requiring inquiry into the
matter of whether or not the 33,133,266 SMC shares sequestered by the
PCGG belong to Marcos and his cronies or dummies (on which, issue, as
already pointed out, de los Angeles, in common with the PCGG, had in fact
espoused the affirmative). De los Angeles dispute, as stockholder and
director of SMC, with other SMC directors, an intra-corporate one, to be
sure, is of no concern to the Sandiganbayan, having no relevance whatever
to the ownership of the sequestered stock. The contention, therefore, that in
view of this Court's ruling as regards the sequestered SMC stock above
adverted to, the SEC has no jurisdiction over the de los Angeles complaint,
cannot be sustained and must be rejected. The dispute concerns acts of
the board of directors claimed to amount to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the
stockholders, or is one arising out of intra-corporate relations between
and among stockholders, or between any or all of them and the
corporation of which they are stockholders.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been held not to
extend even to a case involving a sequestered company
notwithstanding that the majority of the members of the board of
directors were PCGG nominees. The Court marked this distinction clearly
in Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, holding thusly:
The subject-matter of petitioners proposed complaint-in-intervention
involves basically, an interpretation of contract, i.e., whether or not the right
of first refusal could and/or should have been observed, based on the
Addendum/Agreement of July 14, 1988, which extended the terms and
conditions of the original agreement of January 1, 1976. The question of
whether or not the sequestered property was lawfully acquired by Roberto S.
Benedicto has no bearing on the legality of the termination of the
management contract by NRHDCs Board of Directors. The two are
independent and unrelated issues and resolution of either may proceed
independently of each other. Upholding the legality of Benedictos acquisition
of the sequestered property is not a guarantee that HIPs management
contract would be upheld, for only the Board of Directors of NRHDC is
qualified to make such a determination.
Likewise, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed
complaint-in-intervention. The original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the
Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to (a) cases filed by the PCGG,
pursuant to the exercise of its powers under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and
14, as amended by the Office of the President, and Article XVIII, Section 26
of the Constitution, i.e., where the principal cause of action is the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, as well as all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related
to such cases and (b) cases filed by those who wish to question or
challenge the commissions acts or orders in such cases.
Evidently, petitioners proposed complaint-in- intervention is an ordinary civil
case that does not pertain to the Sandiganbayan. As the Solicitor General
stated, the complaint is not directed against PCGG as an entity, but against
a private corporation, in which case it is not per se, a PCGG case.
In the cases now before the Court, what are sought to be determined are
the propriety of the election of a party as a Director, and his authority to
act in that capacity. Such issues should be exclusively determined only
by the RTC pursuant to the pertinent law on jurisdiction because they
did not concern the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
13
In the case at bar, the complaint concerns PHILCOMSATs demand to
exercise its right of inspection as stockholder of PHC but which petitioners
refused on the ground of the ongoing power struggle within POTC and
PHILCOMSAT that supposedly prevents PHC from recognizing
PHILCOMSATs representative (Africa) as possessing such right or authority
from the legitimate directors and officers. Clearly, the controversy is intra-
corporate in nature as they arose out of intra-corporate relations between
and among stockholders, and between stockholders and the corporation.
As to the issue of whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action since PHILCOMSAT never authorized Africa to file it,
we rule in the negative.
A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it
appears clearly from the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Conversely, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause
of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is
not entitled to any relief. Here, attached to the complaint is the Board
14
Secretarys Certificate stating, among others, that PHILCOMSAT board of
15
directors had authorized its President to exercise the right of inspection in its
subsidiary PHC, and to file a case in court in case of refusal by PHC.
Petitioners insist that the board meeting held on September 22, 2005 where
the aforesaid resolution was approved, is void for want of a quorum "as the
majority of the legitimate directors of PHILCOMSAT were not present at and
notified of the meeting." This clearly alludes to the Nieto- PCGG groups
non-recognition of the election of the board of directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT conducted by the Africa-Bildner group.
The issue thus boils down to the legitimacy of the Africa-Bildner group as the
controlling interest in PHILCOMSAT.
In the same cited case of Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp.
(POTC) v. Africa, we have further settled with finality, under the doctrine
16
of stare decisis, the question of who between the contending factions
(Africa-Bildner) and (Nieto-PCGG) held the controlling interest in POTC, and
consequently PHILCOMSAT and PHC. Thus:
The question of who held the majority shareholdings in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT was definitively laid to rest in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R.
No. 141804, whereby the Court upheld the validity of the compromise
agreement the Government had concluded with Atty. Ilusorio. Said the
Court:
With the imprimatur of no less than the former President Fidel V. Ramos and
the approval of the Sandiganbayan, the Compromise Agreement must be
accorded utmost respect. Such amicable settlement is not only allowed but
1avvphi1
even encouraged. Thus, in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, we held:
xxxx
The authority of the PCGG to enter into Compromise Agreements in civil
cases and to grant immunity, under certain circumstances, in criminal cases
is now settled and established. In Republic of the Philippines and Jose O.
Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. (173 SCRA 72 [1989]), this Court
categorically stated that amicable settlements and compromises are not only
allowed but actually encouraged in civil cases. A specific grant of immunity
from criminal prosecutions was also sustained. In Benedicto vs. Board of
Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC, and IBC (207 SCRA 659
[1992]), the Court ruled that the authority of the PCGG to validly enter into
Compromise Agreement for the purpose of avoiding litigation or putting an
end to one already commenced was indisputable. x x x (italics supplied)
Having been sealed with court approval, the Compromise Agreement has
the force of res judicata between the parties and should be complied with in
accordance with its terms. Pursuant thereto, Victoria C. de los Reyes,
Corporate Secretary of the POTC, transmitted to Mr. Magdangal B. Elma,
then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and Chairman of PCGG, Stock
Certificate No. 131 dated January 10, 2000, issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, for 4,727 POTC shares. Thus, the Compromise
Agreement was partly implemented.
As a result of the Government having expressly recognized that 673
legal doctrine or change the interpretation of the law as to prejudice the
parties and undo their situations established under an old doctrine or prior
interpretation. Indeed, the ruling only affirmed the compromise agreement
consummated on June 28, 1996 and approved by the Sandiganbayan on
June 8, 1998, and accordingly implemented through the cancellation of the
shares in the names of IRC and MLDC and their registration in the names of
Atty. Ilusorio to the extent of 673 shares, and of the Republic to the extent of
4,727 shares. In a manner of speaking, the decision of the Court in G.R. No.
141796 and G.R. No. 141804 promulgated on June 15, 2005 declared the
compromise agreement valid, and such validation properly retroacted to the
date of the judicial approval of the compromise agreement on June 8, 1998.
Consequently, although the assailed elections were conducted by the Nieto-
PCGG group on August 31 , 2004 but the ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and
G.R. No. 141804 was promulgated only on June 15, 2005 , the ruling was
the legal standard by which the issues raised in Civil Case No. 04-1049
should be resolved . (Emphasis supplied)
17

POTC shares belonged to Atty. Ilusorio, Atty. Ilusorio and his group
gained the majority control of POTC. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
October 21, 2011 and Resolution dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of
Applying the ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R. No. 141804 to Civil Case Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99789 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No. 04-1049, the RTC (Branch 138) correctly concluded that the Nieto-
PCGG Group, because it did not have the majority control of POTC, No pronouncement as to costs.
could not have validly convened and held the stockholders meeting
and election of POTC officers on August 5, 2004 during which Nieto, Jr. SO ORDERED.
and PCGG representative Guy De Leon were respectively elected as
President and Chairman; and that there could not be a valid authority
for Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin to vote the proxies of the group in the
PHILCOMSAT meeting.

For the same reason, the POTC proxies used by Nieto, Jr. and Locsin
to elect themselves respectively as Chairman and President of
PHILCOMSAT; and the PHILCOMSAT proxies used by Nieto, Jr. and
Locsin in the August 31, 2004 PHC elections to elect themselves
respectively as President and Acting Chairman of PHC, were all invalid
for not having the support of the majority shareholders of said
corporations.

While it is true that judicial decisions should be given a prospective effect,

such prospectivity did not apply to the June 15, 2005 ruling in G.R. No.
141796 and G.R. No. 141804 because the ruling did not enunciate a new
 Republic of the Philippines 4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be
changed to conform to the name she has always carried and used.
SECOND DIVISION
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered
G.R. No. 160597 July 20, 2006 respondent, as petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 2001.
vs.
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an
BOLANTE, respondent. Order giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal
offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of
DECISION evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20,
respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification
Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts."
GARCIA, J.:

On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic
express March 26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July
of the Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of
18, 2001 hearing. Following another resetting, what actually would be the
Appeals (CA) dated October 21, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74398 affirming
initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra in Special
actually held. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence
Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat
several documents without any objection on the part of herein petitioner
commenced by herein respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru the
known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. Among the documents thus
submitted and marked in evidence were the following:
In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the
following:
Exh. "A" - The Petition

1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses

Exh. "B" - The Notice of Initial Hearing
Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth
of Bangued, Abra;
Exh. "C" - The Certificate of Posting
2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Exh. "D" - The Appearance of the Solicitor General
Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use
but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; Exh. "E" - The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor
3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as
in her other public and private records; and Exh. "F" - The Affidavit of Publication
 Exh. "F-I" -The Newspaper Clippings
Exh. "G" - The Norluzonian Courier
Exh. "H" - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier
Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the
case, respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her
petition was to have her registered name changed to that which she had
actually been using thru the years. She also categorically stated she had not
been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present
correct name.
An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republic's
petition which cited the decision of the trial court:
At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante]
testified, among others, that she is now married to Jorge Marbella,
Jr. and presently residing at Bliss Angad, Bangued, Abra since
1995 but before she resided in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth.
She presented her birth certificate and was marked as Exhibit J to
establish such fact of birth and to effect that the name Roselie
Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and correct name
but instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during
her school days, while being a government employee, and in all her
public and private records.
She presented her professional license issued by the Professional
Regulation Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine
Institute of Certified Public Accountant and a 'Quick Count'
document all issued in her name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which
documents were marked as Exhibit K and Exhibit L and Exhibit M
respectively. She likewise marked her marriage license as Exhibit N
to prove her marriage xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that,
she wanted to secure a passport and wanted that the same be
issued in her correct name and that she would not have filed the
petition was (sic) it not for the passport.
On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in
filing the petition is her realization that there will be a complication
upon her retirement.2 (Words in bracket added.)
On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic
petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby
approved and is granted by this Court for being meritorious.
The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:
a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth
from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas
Bolante; and,
b) To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with
Registry Regulations.
Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Bangued, Abra for recording and compliance.
SO ORDERED.3 (Underscoring added)
In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed
Decision of October 21, 2003,4 the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the
trial court.
Hence, the Republic's present petition on the following issues:
I
 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3, RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF
COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A
QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY,
UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED
FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural
and jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. As we articulated
in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,5 citing pertinent
jurisprudence,6 non-compliance with these requirements would be fatal to
the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change
of name. The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall
be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form
and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at
least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, . The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to
an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice. (Underscoring added.)
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name
cannot be set within four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of
such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication.
We are not persuaded.
As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed
on October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order
issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was published in the
November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of
the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of
publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001
is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3,
Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA,7 must emphasize, however,
that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting
the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling,
with due notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally
settling for September 25, 2001.
It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on
September 25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure
the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went
unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state and correctly so that
the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover.8
The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as
notice to the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to
bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any and
against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.9
In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the
following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order
indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the
publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and,
(3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating
ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30
days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice of the hearing.
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any
interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition.
Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the
Government.10 The government, as an agency of the people, represents the
public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the
government, effectively represents the public.11 In this case, the Solicitor
General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of
appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of
Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly,
there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the
hearing.
Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial
hearing which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation
prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no
objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the
exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the
Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and
knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing
demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided
by decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that
changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can
be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth
or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has
recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among
these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c)
when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice
public interest.13
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the
corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on
the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available.14 What is
involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow
from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts."
With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of
name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she
started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria
Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her
scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of
her driver's license, professional license as a certified public accountant
issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count"
document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her
life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is
granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person
shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social
standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.16
The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show
that the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in
avoidance of any entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration.
Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification, while
perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of
one's good moral character or compelling evidence to prove that the change
of name is not sought for any evil motive or fraudulent intent. Respondent's
open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which she was
cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime under her
registered name or under her present name (name that she is using) had
convinced the trial court of the bona fides of her request for change of name.
As the CA correctly ratiocinated:

In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her

registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a different
name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned
enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the
less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records
straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to

prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to
her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect
that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the
requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a
quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no
derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the
declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the
petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled
by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no
jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of
name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said
petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we
see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-
appellant. (Word in bracket added).

At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of

the basic petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than to
avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its discretion
judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to
disturb the action thus taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to
be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar
OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry
in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop
his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married
to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs
name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a
long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named
Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons
name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated
against because of his current registered name which carries a middle
name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother
and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if
there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2 The
trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the
petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is
merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in
the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of
the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering
that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained that
the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to
study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving
due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not
prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not
reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule
45)6 arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code.
Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a
need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name
for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony
among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the child."8 It is
argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name
as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that
the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also
alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change
of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name
to use, contrary to previous cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a
minor to petition for change of name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
the petition. The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court correctly
denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article
174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the
mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also
no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best
interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a
petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.12The OSG also adds
that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change
of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners
allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion
and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its
argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle
name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage
of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei
Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father,
Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle
name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is
actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either
in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied.14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper
and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.15 To justify a request
for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper
and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the
best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance
or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does
not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt
another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided
cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal
with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases
involving requests for change of the given name18 and none on requests for
changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the
negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this
point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of
indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently
been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family
to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is
fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed
only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle
names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well
as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother,21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
fathers surname.22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus
contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle
name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself
into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother,
Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to
change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court
granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings
who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers
surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still
being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there
was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent
purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her
behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the
surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The
Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted
where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate
the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the
surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates
that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the
Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the
father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only
one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner
therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon,
sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
(her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the
name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her
voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court
overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states
that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her
father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of
herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there
was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could
not warrant favorable action on his petition.
Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the
petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her
registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school
records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would
only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by
a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to
buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to
petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the
Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would
make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches
the age of majority.26 As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
SO ORDERED.
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners
were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being
of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment,
fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can
also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions
for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible
animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a
result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of
 Republic of the Philippines (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
SUPREME COURT Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
Manila Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of
entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
SECOND DIVISION Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender
from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petitioner, Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the
RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
- versus -
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Respondent.
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries.
At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -x
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
DECISION conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
QUISUMBING, J.:
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that
this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she
has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents
condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to
her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated
January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown
that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing
proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his
body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He
has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in
the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of
the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES
OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE
HER A "MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male,
on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her
name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party
in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondents petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed
for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local
Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party
in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless
the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition,
the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings,
orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence
his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province
in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in
form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose
of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof,
and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the
province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election
nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on
the date fixed in the order that such order has been published
as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the
court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of
the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings.
Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry.
He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition should
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We
agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision
was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change
of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries
in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article
407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the
early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen
clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older,
some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1
in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex
anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the
term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of
both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.
[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an
intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold
the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either
male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither
truly male nor truly female."[25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female,
then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry
for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
and scientific development showing the respondent to be other
than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself
as a male and considering that his body produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has
not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life
to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment
and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate
on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency
due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become
or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent
to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has
to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action
to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity
of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make
his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this
case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court
has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial
courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of
name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with
the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the
reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit
open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition
for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case
No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
 The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will
be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On
the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of
the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There
is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth
on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of
Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
 SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed
in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change
of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss,
or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children
and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation
and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality
of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast,
sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the
sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
 emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents;
(e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30is
immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
"female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition
were to be granted.
and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
G.R. No. 140305 December 9, 2005
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not PLATON AND LIBRADA CERUILA, Petitioners,
to make or amend it. vs.
ROSILYN DELANTAR, represented by her guardian, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects
of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes DECISION
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change
his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.
Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an
action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 97-818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the
rape case involving Romeo Jaloslos.1The RTC granted the Ceruilas petition
in its decision dated April 11, 19972 which was nullified, however, by the
Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999.3 The CA denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.4 Hence the present petition.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a The antecedents are as follows:
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of

happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument
about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences
Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar
(Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was
incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which prompted
the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the
whereabouts of the mother, Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was
granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119 on November 9, 1996 and
Simplicios motion to vacate said judgment was denied by said court on
January 20, 1997.5
On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila,
entitled "IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR," praying
that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for
the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of
simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all
material entries therein, as follows:
a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin;
b. The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar being a
forgery;
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that,
as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and co-guardian in fact
of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;
d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected
in said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister and
therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is
actually not legitimate;
f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father
merely made it appear that she was born at the time the informations for the
birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper
recording;
g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of
Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos.6
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing
on March 19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week
for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The
Order also stated that any person who is interested in the petition may
interpose his/her comment or opposition thereto on or before the scheduled
hearing.7
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila.8 However, no
representative appeared during the scheduled hearing.9
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the
Ceruilas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria Rosilyn Telin
Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the
office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics
Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage registers the entry
of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto, if
any.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil Registrar
of Manila and the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC explained in its Decision thus:
During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find out if
there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioners counsel,
Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional
requirements (Exhibits "A" to "E").11 Thereafter, petitioner husband Platon
Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and
after he completed his testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his
evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following:
On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital
in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth
certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit "I"). In the said birth
certificate the name of the childs mother appear as Librada A. Telin (Entry
No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The
birth certificate likewise shows that the parents of the child, Simplicio R.
Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married on February 14, 1977 in Manila
(Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the same document, it is made to
appear that the mother of the child was 27 years old when the child was
born and that she was attended in her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry
No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos Santos as
the informant and mother of the child with her given address as 2165 P.
Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very certificate of live birth
that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal
certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit "J") and Librada Delantar (Exhibit
"K") to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have
been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal
certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio and Librada are similarly
entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen (Exhibit "J-1" and "K-1"). The
Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the petitioner that it is
highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would commit an
incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the parents of
the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal
certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered therein that she was born on
January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit "K-2"). Such being the
case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of
Rosilyn in stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the
birth certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at the
time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada
Delantar as secondary evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification
to the effect that the records of birth on file with the office for the period
January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit
"L"). And going for the jugular, so to speak, the signature of the person
named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth certificate (Exhibit "I") purporting
to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature of the latter appearing in
the verification of the petitioner (sic) (Exhibit "A-6") are so strikingly dissimilar
that they could not have but proceeded from two different hands. For it does
not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such
discrepancy in the writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioners
claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified document, the Court is left
with no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the petition. To
let the birth certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights
and interests of the herein petitioners.12
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD,
filed, with the CA, a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for
cancellation of entry of her birth certificate.13 She claimed that she and her
guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and
learned about the same only from the news on May 16, 1997.14 She argued
that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her
right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to
be illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the
entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy.15
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her
mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate;
Librada is not an interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio
is the father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who
attended to the birth;16Libradas allegations are also contradicted by (a) the
"Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book dated April 13-May 29,
1985," issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section
and Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the petition
for annulment as Annex "E" and which states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar
was born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital and that her parents are
Librada Telin and Simplicio Delantar;17 and (b) the admission of Simplicio in
his Motion to Vacate Judgment18 in Sp. Proc. No. 96-41919 regarding the
custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul as Annex "F,"
where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be
deprived of his parental authority.20
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of
the respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in Special
Proceedings No. 97-81893.
With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.21
The CA reasoned that:
As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893
entitled "In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate
of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar", herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar
represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-
respondent therein,contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon
Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or correction
of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect sought
to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth
certificate. With more reasons, therefore, that all parties, particularly Rosilyn
Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian, the DSWD, whose birth certificate
was sought to be annulled or cancelled from the Civil Register must not only
be notified but must be made a party in the said petition.
present petition raising the following issues:
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest
which would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is the
entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and cancelled.
JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial
entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors, should be passed
upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons interested
are made parties therein Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469;
470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is
indeed wanting of the required notice to all the parties having claim or
interest which would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings,
as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1997
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11,
1997 null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner
Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected by the said decision.
Also, the said decision dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void for
lack of due process there being no adversarial proceedings (was) conducted
by the public respondent Regional Trial Court.
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory,
and had in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still the execution
thereof produces no legal effects. 22
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners.23 Hence, the
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38
DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED:
IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
 II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD
HAVE EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE THE
SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.24
As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the
entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the
case should be liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration
of nullity of falsified documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code25 and
Section 15, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court26and not as a special proceeding;
petitioners were only constrained to utilize the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry since Article 5 of the Civil Code provides no procedure for the
nullification of void documents which happens to be a birth certificate in this
case; since the present case involves an ordinary civil action, the cases
relied upon by the CA which are applicable only to special proceedings
should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an indispensable
party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile, is not an
indispensable party and granting that she is, she was deemed duly
impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the case;
respondents location could not be determined as she was reported to have
ran away from the custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition
and the order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation should be
considered substantial notice and the requirements of due process deemed
substantially complied with; there was no adversarial proceeding in court
because the parties were declared in general default thus, just like an
ordinary civil case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.27
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised
its peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and
void ab initio following the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab
initio for being contrary to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its
inherent nullity; otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties
will have to file cases anew to annul respondents birth certificate.28
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and
that the RTC judgment dated April 11, 1997 be reinstated.29
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that:
since the petitioners chose to file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in
the present action turn around and claim that their case is not a special
proceeding; in any case, due process was not complied with rendering the
proceedings a quo annullable; petitioners sought to establish Librada
Ceruilas status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother of respondent, thus,
the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court;30 petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or
protect their right or to prevent or redress a wrong, for their case to be
categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being
invoked by petitioners is a general provision, while entries of record of birth
in the civil register are governed by Republic Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry
Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides
for a remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil registry is erroneous
or falsified, petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport their case
from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the correction of entry
to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document;
in Republic vs. Valencia,31 it was held that the parties who must be made
parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register are the civil registrar and all persons who have or who are
claiming interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a
person whose interests would be adversely affected by the petition, is an
indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice;
respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly
notified.32
Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority
to rule on the merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on
whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the CA
were to rule on the merits of the case, it would have deprived respondent of
due process; and that in any case, respondents record of birth is not void as
Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of respondent.33
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for
review on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a
ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of
the issues raised herein, we shall treat the present petition, as it claims, to
be a petition for review on certiorari.34
Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of
Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a special proceeding? Considering that the
petition, based on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth of
Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth
certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in
the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a special
proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in
the negative.
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made
parties thereto.35 As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito,36 unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of
the rules.37
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of
Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and
date of birth are at stake.
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the
proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in the caption of the
petition. Such reasoning is without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic38 where the mother sought
changes in the entries of her two childrens birth certificates:
since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines
as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature,
is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are
sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They
include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well,
together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights
would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be
affected by the change should be notified or
represented . . ..39 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons,
who, however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly
not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by
the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of
vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of
fair play and due process.40 This is but proper, to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested
party was not impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by
compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however,
earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties.41
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the
proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did
petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General.
It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the
cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian,
the DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, parties to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case
against Romeo Jalosjos, where her father, as appearing in the birth
certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal
case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not
have been considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyns age and thus find
basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this
petition. Their efforts in this regard, however, were thwarted when the CA
overturned Branch 38s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos. 132875-
7642 considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to
resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the
birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the

false entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio,
hence should be nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified
by the CA in exercise of its peremptory power to declare null and void the
said certificate.

The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the

Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be
annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:

Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court
of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.

Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null
and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court
to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164255 September 7, 2011
SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN and ERLINDA LEBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
VILMA S. MIRASOL, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO,
BRANCH XXVII, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by
law is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The Case
In Special Proceedings No. 1307 involving the settlement of the estate of the
late L.J. Hodges, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, in Iloilo City,
issued an order dated May 3, 1995 (ruling that a property of the estate sold
to the petitioners be divided in two equal portions between the petitioners
and the respondent).1 On March 2, 1998, the RTC affirmed the order dated
May 3, 1995.2 The petitioners filed a notice of appeal and, later on, a record
on appeal, but the respondents moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15,
2000 on the ground of tardiness of the record on appeal. The RTC granted
the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 13, 2002, the
petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal,3 but the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.4 Thus, on June 23, 2004,
the petitioners directly appealed to the Court, assailing the orders of
February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.
Antecedents
In January 1985, the petitioners relayed their offer to the administrator of the
Estate of L.J. Hodges to purchase for P22,560.00 Lot 18, Block 7 of 971 (Lot
18), an asset of the Estate situated on D.B. Ledesma Interior, Jaro, Iloilo
City. They made a deposit of P4,512.00, the equivalent of 20% of the
offer.5 On August 1, 1985, the administrator sought judicial approval of the
offer,6 stating to the RTC that petitioner Erlinda Lebin was the actual
occupant of Lot 18.7 The RTC commissioned one Atty. Tabares to conduct an
ocular inspection of Lot 18 to ascertain if Erlinda Lebin was really the
occupant. In his report, Atty. Tabares confirmed that Erlinda Lebin was the
only occupant of Lot 18.8 Accordingly, on August 28, 1985, the RTC granted
the administrators motion for approval of the offer.9
In the meanwhile, respondent Vilma S. Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to
purchase the lot containing an area of 188 square meters where her house
stood. The lot was initially identified as Lot No. 4, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 4), but
a later survey revealed that her house was actually standing on Lot 18, not
Lot 4.10 Learning on November 11, 1985 of the approval of the petitioners
offer to purchase Lot 18, therefore, Mirasol filed on December 6, 1985 a
petition for relief from the order dated August 28, 1985.11
On December 17, 1987, pending resolution of the petition for relief, the
petitioners paid the last installment for Lot 18, and moved for the execution
of the deed of sale.12 Apparently, the motion was not acted upon by the RTC.
At last, on May 3, 1995, the RTC resolved the petition for relief, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court, under the auspices of equity and justice tempered
with humanitarian reasons, hereby declare each of the offeror-claimants
after complying with their respective obligation with the estate, should there
be any, to be the owner where their respective houses stand, and therefore,
DIRECTS and ENJOINS for the following matters to be undertaken:
For the Administrator of the L.J. Hodges Estate:
1) To assist both offeror-claimants in effecting a Relocation Survey
Plan and cause the equal partition of the subject lot herein between
the said offeror-claimant;
2) To execute the corresponding deed of sale over the aforecited
subject lot in favor of the herein offeror-claimants --- Erlinda Lebin
 and Vilma S. Mirasol purposely to expedite the issuance of
respective title; and ---
3) To exact payment from either or both offeror-claimants should
there be any deficiency, and/or to refund payment should there be
any excess payment from either or both offeror-claimants.
SO ORDERED.13
On May 23, 1995, the petitioners moved for reconsideration and/or new
trial.14 On March 2, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial of the petitioners.15 Thus, on March 27, 1998, the petitioners
filed a notice of appeal in the RTC.16 Allegedly, on May 5, 1998, they also
filed a record on appeal.17On January 25, 1999, they presented an ex parte
motion to approve the record on appeal.18 On June 15, 2000, Mirasol filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal, insisting that the record on appeal had been
filed late.19 The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on February 1,
2002.20 The petitioners moved for reconsideration on March 13, 2002,21 but
the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.22
Hence, the petitioners appealed via petition for review on certiorari filed on
June 23, 2004, to seek the review and reversal of the orders of the RTC
dated February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.
Issues
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners
appeal for their failure to timely file a record on appeal; and
2. Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging
that Lot 18 be sold to both the petitioners and Mirasol in equal
portions.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
I Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are
RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners appeal
for their failure to timely file a record on appeal
Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 12923 is the
elimination of the record on appeal in most cases, retaining the record on
appeal only for appeals in special proceedings and in other cases in which
the Rules of Court allows multiple appeals. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 has incorporated this innovation, to wit:
Section 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases,
the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the
entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered
consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court. (emphasis supplied)
In early 1990, the Supreme Court issued its resolution in Murillo v.
Consul24 to clarify and fortify a judicial policy against misdirected or
erroneous appeals, stating:
At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, there is no way by which judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court except by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended. The
proposition is clearly stated in the Interim Rules: "Appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the
perfected in two (2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:
a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise
of original jurisdiction; and
b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days
from notice of the judgment, and as already stated, shall point out the error
of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing
a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in
special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which
event the period of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary.
There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil cases to
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The present procedures for
appealing to either court and, it may be added, the process of ventilation of
the appeal are distinct from each other. To repeat, appeals to this court
cannot now be made by petition for review or by notice of appeals (and, in
certain instances, by record on appeal), but only by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. As was stressed by this Court as early as 1980, in
Buenbrazo v. Marave, 101 SCRA 848, all "the members of the bench and
bar" are charged with knowledge, not only that "since the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8031 in 1969," the review of the decision of the Court of
First Instance in a case exclusively cognizable by the inferior court xxx
cannot be made in an ordinary appeal or by record on appeal," but also that
appeal by record on appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court was abolished by Republic Act No. 5440 which, as already
stated, took effect on September 9, 1968. Similarly, in Santos, Jr., v. C.A.,
152 SCRA 378, this Court declared that "Republic Act No. 5440 had long
superseded Rule 41 and Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court on direct
appeals from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court in civil and
criminal cases, x x and that "direct appeals to this Court from the trial court
on questions of law had to be through the filing of a petition for review on
certiorari, wherein this Court could either give due course to the proposed
appeal or deny it outright to prevent the clogging of its docket with
unmeritorious and dilatory appeals."
In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the
only course of action open is to dismiss the appeal. In other words, if an
appeal is attempted from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of
appeal, that appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of any
statement in the notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; and
more than once has this Court admonished a Trial Judge and/or his Clerk of
Court, as well as the attorney taking the appeal, for causing the records to
be sent up to this Court in such a case. Again, if an appeal by notice of
appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in
the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of law, the appeal
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may be stressed
once more, it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may properly be invoked.
There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
appeals from one court to the other, much less for tolerating continued
ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus behooves every attorney seeking
review and reversal of a judgment or order promulgated against his client, to
determine clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to the judgment or
order, whether of fact or of law; then to ascertain which court properly has
appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to observe scrupulously the requisites for
appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness that any error or imprecision
in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause.25 (emphasis
supplied)
An offshoot of Murillo v. Consul is the inclusion in the 1997 revision of the
rules of civil procedure, effective July 1, 1997, of a provision that forthrightly
delineated the modes of appealing an adverse judgment or final order. The
provision is Section 2 of Rule 41, viz:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
 (b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance
with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law
are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)
(emphasis supplied)
The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor
a constitutional right, but merely statutory, and the implication of its statutory
character is that the party who intends to appeal must always comply with
the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right of appeal may
be lost or squandered.
As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special
proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or final order
determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because
it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless
otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.26The ostensible reason for
requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multi-
part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of
being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An
appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the
original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in
its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the
record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case
because the original records remain with the trial court even as it affords to
the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the appealed
matter.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court underscores the multi-part nature
of special proceedings by enumerating the particular judgments and final
orders already subject of appeal by any interested party despite other parts
of the proceedings being still untried or unresolved, to wit:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or
the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the
estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of
the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or
guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the
party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects
the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order
granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
The petitioners appeal comes under item (e) of Section 1, supra, due to the
final order of May 3, 1995 issued in the settlement of the estate of L.J.
Hodges being "a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the
party appealing." In order to elevate a part of the records sufficient for
appellate review without the RTC being deprived of the original records, the
remedy was to file a record on appeal to be approved by the RTC.
The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
made feasible the shortening of the period of appeal from the original 30
days to only 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order. Section
3,27Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period
for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the
need for the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day
period a party aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in special
proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and
a record on appeal upon the adverse party within the period;28 in addition, the
appealing party shall pay within the period for taking an appeal to the clerk of
the court that rendered the appealed judgment or final order the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.29 A violation of these
requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by record on appeal,30 or
the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court31 may be a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal.
Did the petitioners comply with the requirements for perfecting their appeal?
The petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995 order of the RTC on May
15, 1995. They filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on May 24,
1995. On March 23, 1998, they were served with the order dated March 2,
1998 (denying their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial). Although
they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the record
on appeal only on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal
43 days from March 23, 1998, the date they received the denial of their
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They should have filed the
record on appeal within 30 days from their notice of the judgment. Their
appeal was not perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record on
appeal happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection of their
appeal.
The petitioners filing of the motion for reconsideration vis--vis the order of
May 3, 1995 interrupted the running of the period of 30 days; hence, their
period to appeal started to run from May 15, 1995, the date they received
the order of May 3, 1995. They filed their motion for reconsideration on May
24, 1995. By then, nine days out of their 30-day period to appeal already
elapsed. They received a copy of the order dated March 2, 1998 on March
23, 1998. Thus, the period to appeal resumed from March 23, 1998 and
ended 21 days later, or on April 13, 1998. Yet, they filed their record on
appeal only on May 5, 1998, or 22 days beyond the end of their
reglementary period. Although, by that time, the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure had meanwhile taken effect (July 1, 1997), their period of appeal
remained 30 days. It is stressed that under the 1997 revisions, the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period of
appeal, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
viz:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) (emphasis supplied)
Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court empowers the RTC as the trial
court, motu proprio or on motion, to dismiss the appeal for having been
taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period.32 For that reason, the RTC rightly granted
Mirasols motion to dismiss the record on appeal.
Nonetheless, the petitioners propose to be excused from the requirement of
filing a record on appeal, arguing that "(t)o require a (r)ecord on (a)ppeal
here is to reproduce the more than eighteen (18) volumes of records here
which is quite impossible to do" and that "most of these records, (sic) have
nothing to do with the present controversy."33 Also, they state that their
counsel was "of the honest belief and impression" that "the same was not
really necessary because the nature of the controversy xxx is civil and not
an intestate one."34
The petitioners submissions are frail and facetious.
In order to come up with the record on appeal, the petitioners were not
expected to reproduce over 18 volumes of the records, for their record on
appeal would have included only the records of the trial court which the
appellate court would be asked to pass upon.35 Section 6, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which meanwhile became applicable to them,
specified what the record on appeal should contain, thusly:
Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. - The full names of
all the parties to the proceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record
on appeal and it shall include the judgment or final order from which the
appeal is taken and, in chronological order, copies of only such pleadings,
petitions, motions and all interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed
judgment or final order for the proper understanding of the issue involved,
together with such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.
If an issue of fact is to be raised on appeal, the record on appeal shall
include by reference all the evidence, testimonial and documentary, taken
upon the issue involved. The reference shall specify the documentary
evidence by the exhibit numbers or letters by which it was identified when
admitted or offered at the hearing, and the testimonial evidence by the
names of the corresponding witnesses. If the whole testimonial and
documentary evidence in the case is to be included, a statement to that
effect will be sufficient without mentioning the names of the witnesses or the
numbers or letters of exhibits. Every record on appeal exceeding twenty (20)
pages must contain a subject index. (6a)
The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, and should be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by law.36The statutory nature of the right to
appeal requires the one who avails himself of it to strictly comply with the
statutes or rules that are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. In the
absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, like
when the loftier demands of substantial justice and equity require the
relaxation,37 or when there are other special and meritorious circumstances
and issues,38 such statutes or rules should remain inviolable.39
In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law
is mandatory and jurisdictional, because the failure to perfect the appeal
within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court causes the judgment or final
order to become final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order.40 The failure of the
petitioners and their counsel to file their record on appeal on time rendered
the orders of the RTC final and unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court
lost the jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and the petitioners were
precluded from assailing the orders.
II
RTC committed no reversible error in allocating
Lot 18 in equal portions to both petitioners and respondent
The non-perfection of the appeal by the petitioners notwithstanding, the
Court declares that the RTC did not err in allocating the parcel of land
equally to the parties if only to serve and enforce a standing policy in the
settlement of the large estate of the late L.J. Hodges to prefer actual
occupants in the disposition of estate assets. The policy was entirely within
the power of the RTC to adopt and enforce as the probate court.
As stated in the administrators motion for approval of the offer, the approval
of the offer to purchase would be conditioned upon whether the petitioners
were the only actual occupants. The condition was designed to avoid the
dislocation of actual occupants, and was the reason why the RTC
dispatched Atty. Tabares to determine who actually occupied the property
before approving the motion. It turned out that the report of Atty. Tabares
about the petitioners being the only occupants was mistaken, because the
house of Mirasol, who had meanwhile also offered to purchase the portion
where her house stood, happened to be within the same lot subject of the
petitioners offer to purchase. The confusion arose from the misdescription of
Mirasols portion as Lot 4, instead of Lot 18.41
1wphi1
Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale,
mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate. The approval of the sale
1avvphi1
in question, and the modification of the disposition of property of the Estate
of L.J. Hodges were made pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 89, to wit:
Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to
interested persons; Disposal of proceeds. - When it appears that the sale of
the whole or a part of the real or personal estate will be beneficial to the
heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon
application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the
heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold,
authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said
estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of
administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the
provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to
the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions. [emphasis
supplied]
Without doubt, the disposal of estate property required judicial approval
before it could be executed.42 Implicit in the requirement for judicial approval
was that the probate court could rescind or nullify the disposition of a
property under administration that was effected without its authority.43 This
power included the authority to nullify or modify its approval of the sale of the
property of the estate to conform to the law or to the standing policies set
and fixed for the purpose, where the invalidation or modification derived from
the falsity of the factual basis of the disposition, or from any other factual
mistake, or from the concealment of a material fact by a party. Consequently,
the probate courts modification of its approval of the petitioners offer to
purchase was well within the power of the RTC to nullify or modify after it
was found to be contrary to the condition for the approval. Thereby, the
RTCs ruling, being sound and judicious, constituted neither abuse of
discretion nor excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review, and AFFIRM the final
orders dated May 3, 1995 and March 2, 1998.

The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.