2. ALIH V.

CASTRO 151 SCRA 279

FACTS:

On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the
home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street,
Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The initial reaction of
the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. The soldiers returned
fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties.

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the
articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge
their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-
incrimination.

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken
without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. The respondents, while admitting the absence
of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under
superior orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there as a valid search warrant.

HELD:

NO.

Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution.

The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse
the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. As mere
suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.

In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to
determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they
proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the
petitioner's guilt. The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant
before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited
away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure.

One cannot just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his
rank.

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms
and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. Pending determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall remain
in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts may decide.

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared
ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the
outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
5. METROPOLITAN BANK V. GONZALES G.R. NO. 180165, APRIL 7, 2009

Titan Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation (TICDC), private respondents, on behalf of
Visaland, applied with petitioner for 24 letters of credit, the aggregate amount of which reached the sum
of P68,749,487.96. Private respondents bound themselves to sell the goods covered by the letters of
credit and to remit the proceeds to petitioner, if sold, or to return the goods, if not sold, on or before their
agreed maturity dates. When the trust receipts matured, private respondents failed to return the goods
to petitioner, or to return their value amounting to P68,749,487.96 despite demand. Thus, petitioner
filed a criminal complaint5 for estafa6 against Visaland and private respondents with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila (City Prosecutor).

In their Counter-Affidavit,8 private respondents denied having entered into trust receipt transactions with
petitioner. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found that no probable cause
existed and dismissed Information Sheet (I.S.) No. 02G-30918 in a Resolution10 dated 23 January 2003.
The City Prosecutor underscored that for a charge of estafa with grave abuse of confidence to prosper,
previous demand is an indispensable requisite.

After the element of prior demand was satisfied, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution12 dated 11
October 2004 finding probable cause for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) 13 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 115.

In the interim, private respondents appealed the investigating prosecutors Resolution to the Secretary
of Justice. In a Resolution16 dated 31 March 2005, the Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no
probable cause to prosecute private respondents for estafa in relation to Presidential Decree No. 115.
From the adverse Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, petitioner elevated its case before the Court
of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari.

The Court of Appeals, however, in its Decision21 dated 30 March 2007, dismissed petitioners Petition
for Certiorari after finding that the Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling
against the existence of probable cause to prosecute private respondents.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA IN RELATION TO P.D. NO. 115.

HELD:

YES.

The present petition bears impressive merits.

Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged.

In the present case, the abuse of discretion is patent in the act of the Secretary of Justice holding that
the contractual relationship forged by the parties was a simple loan, for in so doing, the Secretary of
Justice assumed the function of the trial judge of calibrating the evidence on record, done only after a
full-blown trial on the merits. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice is not in a competent position to pass
judgment on substantive matters. The bases of a partys accusation and defenses are better ventilated
at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.

We need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties
evidence.32
Having said the foregoing, this Court now proceeds to determine whether probable cause exists for
holding private respondents liable for estafa in relation to Presidential Decree No. 115.

Under Presidential Decree No. 115, the entruster shall be entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the
good under a trust receipt to the entrustee to the extent of the amount owed to the entruster or to the
return of goods in case of non-sale. A violation of any of these undertaking constitutes estafa under the
Revised Penal Code. As found in the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner, private respondents were
charged with failing to account for or turn over to petitioner the merchandise or goods covered by the
trust receipts or the proceeds of the sale thereof in payment of their obligations thereunder.

Prescinding from the foregoing, we conclude that there is ample evidence on record to warrant a finding
that there is a probable cause to warrant the prosecution of private respondents for estafa. It must be
once again stressed that probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.

The offense punished under Presidential Decree No. 115 is in the nature of malum prohibitum. A mere
failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods, if not sold, constitutes a criminal offense that
causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest.

We are not prejudging this case on the merits. However, by merely glancing at the documents submitted
by petitioner entitled "Trust Receipts" and the arguments advanced by private respondents, we are
convinced that there is probable cause to file the case and to hold them for trial.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 30 March
2007 and the Resolution dated 16 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91892 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of Justice is hereby ORDERED to direct the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila to forthwith FILE Informations for estafa against private respondents Oliver
T. Yao and Diana T. Yao before the appropriate court.
8. TAN V. SY TIONG G.R. NO. 174570 DEC. 15, 2010

FACTS:

On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision, sustaining the validity of Search Warrant Nos.
03-3611 and 03-3612.

On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration2 wherein respondents informed this
Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of
the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision
be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot
and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.

Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for
Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information
for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants
will be used as evidence therein.

n granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and
the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable
cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information.

Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents motion to withdraw the information without prejudice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can still use the seize evidence by virtue of the search warrants issued in
connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft.

HELD:

NO.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject
search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause
warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts of robbery
has been rendered moot and academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety
of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident
subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of
the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence
in any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one
specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or
her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
11. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS V. VILLALUZ 71 SCRA 356

FACTS:

Petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter
complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of NIRC, Central Bank
Circular 265 and RA 1937 claiming that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the
government criminally, willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed
blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed",
without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage
Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles.

Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation, and
on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return
to private respondent the amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one
(1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue
seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).

Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so
stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure
proceedings thereon." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open
Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order
dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with
prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without
authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.

In these six cases, one common legal issue is whether a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power
to conduct preliminary investigations which is significant to determine whether items may be returned
or not.

ISSUE:

WON the items seized may be returned.

HELD:

NO.

The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary investigation does not bar
subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next
to impossible. For the enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of
Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the private
respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the customs official.

Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually
in the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the
Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of
enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review
by the Supreme Court.

Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court
from assuming cognizance of the subject matter and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin
properties subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code
because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they
do not result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty.
PETITION IS DISMISSED.

14. HO V. PEOPLE 280 SCRA 365

FACTS:

On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint 2 against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678,
respectively). The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 3 prohibiting
a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby.

That on or about April 4, 1989, ROLANDO NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO caused undue injury to
the National Steel Corporation (NSC), by entering without legal justification into a negotiated contract
of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT,
from Iligan City to Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much
higher than those previously offered other companies, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the
National Marine Corporation, in the total sum of One Million One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Fifty Two
Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P1,116,052.75).

Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned warrant of arrest
against Petitioners Ho and Narciso.

Thus, these petitions.

ISSUE:

May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the
resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman)
who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as
complainant's affidavit, respondent's counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted
at the preliminary investigation?

HELD:

YES.

We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
"personally." The word "personally" does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions.

In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer and the three-page memorandum
of the prosecution officer, when it issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. The latter two
documents/reports even had dissimilar recommendations the first indicting only Petitioner Narciso,
the second including Petitioner Ho. This alone should have prompted the public respondent to verify, in
the records and other documents submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation, whether
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the Ombudsman's action charging both petitioners with violation
of Sec. 3(e) of Anti-Graft law.

The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to
be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. Since their objectives
are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he
must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain
his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. It is not
required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge must
have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause.

What it should bear in mind, however, is that, aside from the 26-page report of the DOJ panel, the sworn
statements of three witnesses and counter-affidavits of the petitioners in Webb were also submitted to
the trial court, and the latter is presumed to have reviewed these documents as well, prior to its issuance
of the warrants of arrest.

In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft
investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed
before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation
without supporting evidence.

Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged
warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without
determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings
and recommendation.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET ASIDE. The warrant
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992 in Case No. 17674 for the arrest of
Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando Narciso is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
17. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS V. DE LA ROSA 197 SCRA 853

FACTS:

In 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year
old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed
Gatchalian and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens.

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on
review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the
Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant
was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the
exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was
issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now
become final and executory.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant
of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case
against them was assigned.

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled
the warrant of arrest issued against him.

27 years later, on August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) * issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William
Gatchalian.

Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among
others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation
proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against
William Gatchalian.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE MISSION ORDER COMMANDING THE ARREST OF GATCHALIAN

ISSUED BY COMMISSIONER DOMINGO OF CID IS VALID.

HELD:

NO.

Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with
the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit.

In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for
the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void
for being unconstitutional.

If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause,
surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).

A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition)
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for
purposes of investigation of the suspects

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962
warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no
mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition)
which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent
Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated
their Identification Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on
the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to
the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.

In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose
in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on
August 15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed
and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William
Gatchalian.

Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the date
of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship
of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec.
1, Article IV of the Constitution

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for
lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214
and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
20. PLDT V. HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION GR NO. 170694 DEC. 10 2012

FACTS:

The case is a consolidation of 2 petitions for review on certiorari each seeking to annul a ruling of the
CA setting aside an RTC ruling which directed the immediate return of seized items to HPS and another
CA ruling which affirmed an RTC order to release the seized equipment. The controversy originated
from 2 search warrants for violation of RPC308 for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of
PD401 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipment following the complaint of
PLDT accusing HPS of conducting ISR or unauthorized sale of international long distance calls. The
warrants were issued by the TC to seize instruments of the crime after being satisfied with the affidavits
and sworn testimony of the complainants witnesses that they saw telephone equipment inside the
respondents compound being used for the purpose of conducting ISR. After the implementation of the
warrants, the motions to quash the warrants and return the things seized were filed which were granted
by the RTC.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WARRANT IS VALID.

HELD:

YES.

There were 5 issues for the SCs resolution. Firstly, on whether PLDT possessed the legal personality
to file the petition in light of respondents claim that, in criminal appeals, it is the SolGen which has the
exclusive and sole power to file appeals in behalf of People, SC held that PLDT did because the petition
filed did not involve an ordinary criminal action, nor a civil action, but a special criminal process.

Secondly, on whether PLDTs petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright by the CA
since no MR was filed before the RTC order, SC held that despite the non-fulfilment of the requirement
of MR filing, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case offered exceptions to the rule, that is,
PLDTs deprivation of due process when the RTC expeditiously released the items seized by virtue of
the subject search warrants without waiting for PLDT to file its memorandum and despite the fact that
no motion for execution was filed by respondents which was required.

Thirdly, on whether PLDT was engaged in forum shopping when it filed a petition for certiorari despite
the fact that it had previously filed an appeal from the RTC order, SC held that no, PLDT did not because
the 2 motions posed different causes of action, i.e., the appeal that PLDT elevated to the CA was an
examination of the validity of the trial courts action of quashing the search warrants that it initially issued
while, on the other hand, the petition for certiorari was an inquiry on whether the TC judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the release of the seized items subject of the search
warrants despite the fact that the RTC order had not yet become final and executory.

Fourthly, on whether the 2 search warrants were improperly quashed, SC held that yes, they were
because: (1) evidence presented were sufficient to show probable cause to issue subject warrants; and
(2) subject warrants werent general warrants because the items to be seized were sufficiently identified
physically and their relation to the offenses charged were also specifically identified.

Lastly, on whether the release of the items seized was proper, SC held that no, it wasnt therefore
agreeing with one of the CA ruling that there was indeed grave abuse of discretion.

DOCTRINES

[1] An International Simple Resale (ISR) activity is an act of subtraction covered by the provisions on
Theft, and that the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is personal property,
which can be the object of Theft under Article 308 of the RPC.
[2] A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, much less a civil action, but a special criminal
process.

[3] Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken
in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.

[5] The quantum of evidence required to prove probable cause is not the same quantum of evidence
needed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be
subsequently filed.

[6] A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed
by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.
23. PEOPLE V. COLLADO

On October 14, 2004, appellants Marcelino Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra) were charged
with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den, dive or resort in violation of
Sections 5 and 6 of Article II, RA 9165.

Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the appellants and the other accused pleaded not
guilty.7 Pre-trial and joint trial on the merits subsequently ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and
Myra were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using
their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their drug sessions. After
confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who could introduce them to
Marcelino and Myra in the ensuing buy-bust operation.10

Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of
shabu.12 When asked how much shabu he needed, PO2 Noble replied, "dalawang piso," which
means P200.00 worth of drugs. But when PO2 Noble was handing over the marked money to
Marcelino, the latter motioned that the same be given to his wife, Myra, who accepted the money.
Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble
was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple
around which were seven persons.13 When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup
team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced himself as a policeman and
arrested Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to confiscate the metal container that contained
another sachet of white crystalline substance. PO2 Noble wrote the markings "MCC-RNN October 9,
2004" on both the plastic sachets of white substance sold to him by Marcelino and the one found
inside the metal container.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra,
where they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered
around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of
aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of
aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested
all these persons, advised them of their constitutional rights, and brought them to police headquarters
for investigation and drug testing.

A chemistry report14 on all the seized items yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Another chemistry report15 showed Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada positive for
drug use while Myra, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang, and Latario were found negative.

Version of the Defense

Marcelino and Myra owned an electronics and appliance repair shop annexed to their house. In the
evening of October 9, 2004, Marcelino was in the living room with his children and nieces fixing a
VCD player. Apelo, their househelp, was in the kitchen preparing food while Ranada, their repairman,
was outside the house fixing Sumulongs motorcycle. Cipriano and Madarang were also present at
the shop, the former to redeem his car stereo and the latter to borrow a play station CD. Latario, a
housemate of Marcelino and Myra, was also present at the time.

Marcelino suddenly heard someone say "Walang tatakbo!" Four armed men rushed inside the house
and pointed their guns at him and said "Wag ka nang pumalag." He was thereafter dragged outside
where he saw the other accused already in handcuffs. Marcelino was later informed that they were
being arrested for selling shabu. Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to a misunderstanding
he had with a former police officer named Rey who bought a VCD player from his shop. He
specifically instructed Rey not to let anyone repair the VCD player should it malfunction. However,
when the VCD player malfunctioned, Rey had it repaired by somebody else, hence Marcelino refused
to accept the VCD player and return Reys money. This earned the ire of Rey who threatened him
with the words "Humanda ka pagbalik ko."

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed trial courts Decision.
Not satisfied, the appellants are now before this Court arguing that irregularities attended their arrest
and detention as well as the procedure in handling the specimen allegedly seized from them.
Because of these, they assert that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST IS VALID.

HELD:

YES.

The appealed Decision should be affirmed, with modification.

Appellants question the validity of the buy-bust operation and point out the following irregularities
which they claim attended its conduct: (1) lack of warrant of arrest; (2) non-compliance with the
procedures laid down under Section 21 of RA 9165; and, (3) the alleged extortion of money from them
by PO2 Noble in exchange for dropping the charges against them. Due to these irregularities,
appellants argue that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to
police officers does not apply in this case.

The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act
of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal
drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police
officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually
committing the said crimes. Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of
appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected
to the same before their arraignment. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search
and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants claim of unreasonable
search and seizure must fail.1wph

Appellants aver that PO2 Noble tried to extort money from them in exchange for dropping the drug
charges against them. Here, aside from Marcelinos self-serving testimony, appellants claim of
extortion is not substantiated by other convincing evidence. In view of these, appellants allegation of
extortion and improper motive deserves no credence.

Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not followed. this Court
has consistently ruled that the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the
confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecutions cause,35 provided that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized substance were preserved, as in this case. Here, PO2 Noble, after apprehending
Marcelino and confiscating from him the sachets of shabu, immediately placed his markings on
them. To stress, the implementing rules are clear that non-compliance with the requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.

All told, this Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the
police officers involved in this case. The defense was not able to show by clear and convincing
evidence why the presumption should be overturned. The prosecution, on the other hand, was able to
establish that Marcelino, Myra and Ranada committed the crimes imputed against them, they having
been caught in flagrante delicto. This Court, being convinced that the guilt of Marcelino, Myra, and
Ranada have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, must uphold their conviction.

As to Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong, the Court finds that they should be
acquitted of the offense of violation of Section 14, Article II, RA 9165, since the prosecution was not
able to clearly show specific overt acts that would prove that they were in possession of drug
paraphernalia.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The February 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02626 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Mark
Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael
Angelo Sumulong, and Jay Madarang are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 14,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. They are ordered released unless they are being lawfully held for
some other cause.
26. PEOPLE V. ZASPA

FACTS:

The case, docketed Criminal Case No. 2621 before the trial court, has charged Rolando Zaspa, a.k.a.
"Tata," and Julius Galvan with violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

At about two o'clock in the morning of 29 April 1994, Chief of Police Rosauro Francisco of Tarragona,
Davao Oriental, received a tip from a police informer that Rolando Zaspa and a companion were
bringing dried marijuana leaves bound for Mati, somewhere at Crossing Banhawan, Tarragona, Davao
Oriental. The group immediately proceeded to Crossing Banhawan, arriving thereat at about five o'clock
in the morning. Just as SPO2 Carasca and PO1 Rafael, who were both in uniform, proceeded to
approach the two men, Zaspa tried to flee. He was intercepted by the policemen. Zaspa claimed that
the contents of the bag did not belong to them. When the bag was opened, Zaspa told the policemen
that the dried marijuana leaves were owned by one Bito Mangandan.

Zaspa and Galvan stated that he was walking towards Barrio Sambarangay when an armed man in
civilian outfit pointed a gun at him and proceeded to examine the brown bag he was holding. The two
were brought to the police station where they were investigated and detained until they were brought
the following day to the P.C. Barracks at Mati.

Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty.

After trial, the court a quo found the two accused guilty of the crime with which they were charged.

Zaspa and Galvan appealed their conviction, albeit the penalty imposed, to the Court of Appeals for
review. The appellate court upheld the conviction

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A VALID ARREST.

HELD:

In the case at bench, the facts and circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused at dawn of April
29, 1994 would show that the arresting officers have proper and justifiable reasons to arrest the two (2)
suspects. First, they received a confidential information from a police informer that a certain Rolando
Zaspa with a companion were bringing dried marijuana leaves bound for Mati. Second, when the police
arrived at the crime scene, the two (2) suspects were suspiciously at the side of the road with a big
black bag in front of them. Third, there were no other people in sight and it is therefore safe to conclude
that the bag containing the contraband belonged to no one else but the suspects. Lastly, when the
police officers were approaching, the appellant Zaspa attempted to escape.

As to the seized marijuana, the same is admissible in evidence, for trite is the jurisprudence that the
search of the appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana in his possession were valid because
they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756).

In the instant case, the police informer has particularly mentioned the name of Rolando Zaspa as being
one of those who would be bringing the bag containing the marijuana, 7 thus paving the way for the
authorities to conduct their operation. When Zaspa, indeed, has made an attempt to run away upon
seeing the police officers, he inadvertently has also confirmed the information given to the police. It
bears to repeat that absent any convincing proof of an intent on the part of police authorities to falsely
impute a serious crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty will ordinarily have to prevail.8
On the validity of the warrantless arrest, along with the corresponding search and seizure, suffice it to
say that any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea;9 otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the accused to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellants.
29. PEOPLE V. FUNDALES

FACTS:

On December 8, 2003, appellant was charged with violations of Section 5 (illegal sale of dangerous
drugs), Section 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), and Section 12 in relation to Section 14
(illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) of Article II, RA No. 9165.

During arraignment, the appellant and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.6

Thereafter, the parties agreed to terminate the pre-trial7 and set the case for trial on the merits.

Version of the Prosecution

On the evening of December 2, 2003, the Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Task Force of Paraaque City Police, Police Superintendent Alfredo Valdez (P/Supt. Valdez),
received an information from a confidential informant about the illegal drug trade operations conducted
by the Fundales brothers. P/Supt. Valdez thus formed a buy-bust team.

PO1 Soquia, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, and the informant proceeded to the house of
the appellant.9 After PO1 Soquia handed the P 500.00 marked money to the appellant, 11 the latter
then went inside his house and when he reappeared, he handed to PO1 Soquia five plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance.12 PO1 Soquia then lit a cigarette which was the pre-arranged
signal to inform the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been consummated.13 Hence, the
team of back-up police officers proceeded to appellant's house to apprehend him.

Version of the Defense

On December 2, 2003, appellant was at home with Ricardo, Chulo, Joel, and Jerico repairing a washing
machine.18 At around 4:30 p.m., eight persons suddenly entered his house without warning and
permission.19Aside from their weapons and handcuffs, there was no indication that the men were police
officers since they were all in civilian clothing.20 Once inside, the men shouted, "Walang gagalaw,
sumama kayo sa amin".21 They were then brought to the Coastal Police Station and detained there for
two days.22

On March 18, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant in Criminal Case No. 03-1425
for illegal sale of shabu and dismissing Criminal Case No. 03-1426 for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs and Criminal Case No. 03-1427 for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, for insufficiency of
evidence. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Decision. Not satisfied with the Decision of the
CA, the appellant is now before this Court adopting the same issues he raised in the appellate court

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No.
9165.

HELD:

YES.
This Court is convinced that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the burden of establishing the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.

He argues that the prosecution's failure to present the forensic chemist during trial was fatal to its
cause. We have already ruled in a number of cases that non-presentation of the forensic chemist in
illegal drugs cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal.

Appellant next claims that the pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution were obtained in violation
of Sections 21 and 86(a) of RA No. 9165. The provisions of RA No. 9165 cited by the appellant are
meant to safeguard the accused in drugs cases against abuses of law enforcement officers.

Appellant further claims that the police officers failed to coordinate and report the buy-bust operation
with the PDEA. We have already ruled that nothing in RA No. 9165 suggests that it is the intention of
the legislature to make an arrest in drugs cases illegal if made without the participation of the PDEA.
We therefore see no reason why the non-participation of the PDEA would render the arrest illegal and
the evidence obtained therein inadmissible considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized prohibited substances and dangerous drugs have been properly preserved.

Appellant further asserts that no buy-bust operation took place contrary to the testimony of the arresting
officers. Appellant's contention does not deserve serious consideration. It is well-settled that the
testimonies of the police officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with it the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions. "Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary."3

Lastly, the claim of the accused that he was merely fixing a washing machine at the time of the arrest
and that the alleged buy-bust operation was fictitious. However, other than his own self-serving
testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence to support this claim.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The April 18, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02274 is AFFIRMED.
32. MALACAT V. CA

FACTS:

In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, petitioner was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for keeping, possessing and/or acquiring a hand
grenade, without first securing the necessary license and permit from the proper authorities. On
arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. After trial on the
merits, the court a quo found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under the
said law and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than seventeen years, four months and
one day of reclusion temporal as minimum and not more than thirty years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Unable to accept conviction, petitioner filed the instant
petition alleging that the respondent court erred in affirming the findings of the trial court that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and legal.

ISSUE:

WON THERE IS A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE.

HELD:

NO.

For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and
not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
appeal therefrom should have been to the Court and not the Court of Appeals. Hence, the challenged
decision immediately fall in jurisdictional grounds.

Additionally, the Court is convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral
certainty. First, serious doubts surrounds the story of police office Yu that a grenade was found in and
seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify in court the grenade he allegedly
seized. Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him and that two days earlier he was with the
group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, it was then unnatural and against common
experience that petitioner simply stood in Plaza Miranda in proximity to the police officers. Lastly, even
assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation police
officer Serapio, such admission is inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Verily, the search conducted on petitioner could
not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

In view thereof, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside for lack of jurisdiction and
on ground of reasonable doubt.
35. PEOPLE V. FIGUEROA

FACTS:

Arturo Figueroa was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. When arraigned, the
accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty," thereupon, trial ensued.

It would appear that on 10 November 1989, at around seven o'clock in the morning, Captain Lodivino
Rosario, the Executive Officer of the 215th PC Company, and his men arrived at the residence of
accused Arturo Figueroa at Barangay San Juan, San Francisco Subdivision, General Trias, Cavite, to
serve a warrant for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, in Criminal Case
No. 411 and Criminal Case No. 412 (for the crime of Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and for Violation
of Section 16, Art. III, Republic Act 6425). While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed,
strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence of
"shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to
acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live
ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa
denied ownership of the items.

The accused, besides assailing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, questioned the
admissibility in evidence of the firearm and rounds of ammunition which, he claims, were discovered
and taken during a warrantless search.

On 30 October 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused Arturo Figueroa guilty. CA
affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE FIREARMS AND ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION WHICH WERE

DISCOVERED AND TAKEN DURING THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AFTER SERVING THE
WARRANT OF ARREST IS ADMISSIBLE.

HELD:

YES

The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained and the search
and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A significant exception from the
necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful
arrest

Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony given by witnesses for the prosecution
despite what he claims to be inconsistencies in their declarations. We do not consider these
discrepancies to be so major as to warrant a complete rejection of their questioned testimony. We see
no cogent reason for not according due respect to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses.

Finally, it is claimed that appellant was just "framed-up." The conduct of the appellant following his
arrest would belie this allegation. Appellant himself admitted that he failed to complain about this matter
when he was apprehended. No plausible reason was given by appellant that would have prompted
police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime against him. Absent a strong showing to the contrary,
we must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. 8

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

38. PEOPLE V. TAN

FACTS:

The RTC found accused-appellant Sulpicio Sonny Boy Tan y Phua guilty of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On March
21, 2006, accused-appellant was initially arraigned, and he pleaded "not guilty" to the charge against
him. However, on March 22, 2006, his counsel de oficio, Atty. Clarence S. Dizon, filed a motion to allow
accused-appellant to withdraw his earlier plea and for reinvestigation of the case. Seeing as there was
no objection from the prosecution, the RTC granted the motion.

After finding that there exists probable cause against accused-appellant for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II
of RA 9165, the prosecution filed on July 11, 2006 a motion to set the case for arraignment and
trial.4 The motion was granted by the RTC.5 Thus, on July 18, 2006, accused-appellant, assisted by
counsel de oficio, Atty. Eliza B. Yu, re-entered his previous plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.6

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that on February 20, 2006, Makati City
Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted a manhunt operation against a suspect in a robbery case
involving Korean nationals along P. Burgos, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City. 10 While on board their
civilian vehicle, they chanced upon a male individual selling certain items to two foreigners. They heard
him say, "Hey Joe, want to buy Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra?"11 Curious, they inquired and the male
individual told them that he was selling Viagra and Cialis, while, at the same time, showing them the
contents of his bag which yielded 120 tablets of Valium 10. The male individual, who later turned out to
be Sonny Boy, was immediately searched and placed under arrest, after which they informed him of
the nature of his apprehension and of his constitutional rights.

In contrast, Sonny Boy interposed the defense of denial. He maintained that he was merely watching
cars as a parking boy along P. Burgos when two men suddenly held and invited him for
questioning.14 They asked him if he knew any drug pushers and, if he did, to identify them. When he
was unable to do so, they charged him for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, which is the subject
of the instant case.

After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime. On October 26, 2009, the CA affirmed
the judgment of the lower court finding that the prosecution succeeded in establishing, with moral
certainty, all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal from the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST IS ILLEGAL.

HELD:

NO.

The appeal has no merit.

Accused-appellant maintains in his Brief that the police officers failed to mark, inventory, and
photograph the prohibited items allegedly seized from him at the time of his apprehension.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs seized
was preserved. The testimony of SPO2 Geronimo categorically established the manner by which the
prohibited drugs were handled from the moment they were seized from accused-appellant up to the
time they were turned over to the duty officer and investigator at SAID-SOTF, who, in turn, turned them
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

Therefore, it is evidently clear that the chain of custody of the illicit drug found in accused-appellants
presence was unbroken.

He also argued that such was illegal, since none of the instances wherein a search and seizure may be
done validly without a warrant was present. Such argument is untenable. First of all, accused-appellant
never raised this issue before his arraignment. He could have questioned the validity of his warrantless
arrest at this time but he did not. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any question as to any defect in
his arrest and is likewise deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

Undoubtedly, the case at bar falls under Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113, that is, when the person to be arrested
is actually committing an offense, the peace officer may arrest him even without a warrant. However, a
warrantless arrest must still be preceded by the existence of probable cause.

Here, the arresting officers had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest in view of the fact that they
themselves heard accused-appellant say, "Hey Joe, want to buy Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra?"38 which, in
turn, prompted them to ask accused-appellant what he was selling. Therefore, it is without question that
the warrantless search and arrest of accused-appellant are legal and valid. The prosecution succeeded
in establishing, with moral certainty, all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03245 finding
accused-appellant Sulpicio Sonny Boy Tan y Phua guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED.
41. PEOPLE V. RACHO

FACTS:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for
the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in
Baler, Aurora. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person
he transacted with earlier. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and
invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the
accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom
which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous
drugs.

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11

Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECT THE WARANTLESS

ARREST OF THE APPELANT.

HELD:

NO.

In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to
mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first
time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the
admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the
validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not
squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find
that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him
during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.

The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to
have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest.

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not
the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. 16

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions,
namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18

Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable
cause to arrest appellant. Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a
warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu.
This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. 24

In the case at bar, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. Neither were the arresting
officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant.

Also, provided that from the period they receive the tip to the time they effect the arrest the appellant,
the police clearly had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.39

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item
is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding."

Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence.

44. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE

FACTS:

Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara
(respondent).

The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1)
proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling
petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing
to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-
departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be
rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2)
prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being
conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.

On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, before the Senate
based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate
to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent
activity in the future.

Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners,
through counsel, made an Opening Statement4 that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of
proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the
lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated
that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of
unregistered foreign securities.

However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces
tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT

Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because it would encroach
upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the subject and
nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee is in aid of
legislation.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of the persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial
body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Atty. Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering his investment.
On the contrary, and as confirmed during the initial hearing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint
humbly requested the Senate to conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of SCB-
Philippines, with the end view of preventing the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent activity by
the banks in general.9

Petitioners alleging that their being held in contempt was without legal basis, as the phrase "in aid of
collection" partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition.

We do not agree.

In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was "in aid of collection" is a direct challenge
against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find
the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that
the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses.

In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals
who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondents summons by leaving the country, it
was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose.

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state
that privacy is not an absolute right. The right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
There is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information
is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating
banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.

As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not being
indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource
persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as
accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of
their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they
may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. 19

Petitioners argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a recommendation for their
prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such as the Department of Justice or the Office
of the Ombudsman, does not persuade. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive
at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the
power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal
culpability.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation and Motion
dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.
47. POLLO V. CHAIRPERSON

FACTS:

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an

anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued
a memo directing the team to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files
copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five
days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing
expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal
search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the charge.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner
was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the
latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed
a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search
and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

HELD:

The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did
not violate his constitutional right.

[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn upheld the CSC
resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held that the search on petitioners
office computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his
constitutional right to privacy.]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures.

[The Supreme Court then discussed the American cases that served as jurisprudential bases for its
ruling]

Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now
address the following questions, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files and the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying
of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Moreover, even assuming arguendo,
in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at
least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence
of policy regulating the use of office computers [CSC Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer
Use Policy (CUP)], as in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government
employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception
and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions,
consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind
of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed
American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-
related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception
of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV
was lawyering for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the
Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a
CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with pending
cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the
Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its
mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or
limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be
a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Thus, petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. .
As already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable ground
for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint.