San Ildefenso lines v CA
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24,
1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its
owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein
petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI)
figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of
Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue
in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota
van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18,
1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein
petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13,
1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the
van and subrogee, filed a case for damages
against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the
assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as
well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00
(P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an
independent civil action based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no
reservation was made in the said criminal case?
an independent civil action during the pendency
of a criminal action when no reservation of the
right to file an independent civil action was made
in the criminal action and despite the fact that the
private complainant is actively participating
through a private prosecutor in the
aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April
3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior
reservation is the standing rule that shall govern
the institution of the independent civil actions
referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past
pronouncements that view the reservation
requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to
substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no
longer be controlling. There must be a renewed
adherence to the time-honored dictum that
procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but
to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And
for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution
itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules
concerning the enforcement of rights with the end
in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
which should not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Far from altering substantive
rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is,
to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v.
Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as
subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is
not exempt from the reservation requirement with
respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict
arising from the same act or omission of petitioner
Javier complained of in the criminal case. As
private respondent PISC merely stepped into the
shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota
van), then it is bound to observe the procedural
requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had
she herself instituted the civil case.
2) Rafael Reyes vs. People, 329 SCRA 600
By
Facts:
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White
Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan
bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with
2,000 cases of empty beer Grande bottles.
Seated at the front right seat beside him was
Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. At around
4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck
was descending at a slight downgrade along the
national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road
covering the full width of the trucks right lane
going south and about six meters in length. These
made the surface of the road uneven because the
potholes were about five to six inches deep. The
left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo,
before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca
saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from
the opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lance but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming
vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the
truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading
the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle
rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the
left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge
above said shoulder where it finally stopped. The
Nissan was severely damaged and its two
passengers, namely, Feliciano Balcita and
Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. On October 10,
1989, Provincial Prosecutor Durian filed with the
RTC an amended information charging Dunca with
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide
and damage to property. On November 29, 1989,
the offended parties filed with the RTC a complaint
against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of driver Dunca, based
on quasi delict. Respondents opted to pursue the
criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case
quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On
December 15, 1989, respondents withdrew the
reservation to file a separate civil action against
the accused and manifested that they would
prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the
criminal action. However, they did not withdraw
the separate civil action based on quasi delict
against petitioner as employer arising from the
same act or omission of the accused driver. The
RTC held that the driver was guilty. Respondents
moved for amendment of the dispositive portion
of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the
private respondents in the event of insolvency of
the accused, which the lower court granted.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck
involved in the accident may be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck
driver despite the filing of a separate civil action
by the offended parties against the employer of
the truck driver; and
(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages
to the offended parties in the criminal case
despite the filing of a civil action against the
employer of the truck driver.
Held:
(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party
has the choice between (1) an action to enforce
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate
action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is
made, the injured party can not avail himself of
any other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission of the accused. This is the rule against
double recovery.In other words, the same act or
omission can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto either of
which may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
damages under both types of liability. In the
instant case, the offended parties elected to file a
separate civil action for damages against
petitioner as employer of the accused, based on
quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the
accused who has been adjudged guilty in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be
held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against
it. In view of the reservation to file, and the
subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of
civil liability, the same was not instituted with the
criminal action. Such separate civil action was for
recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case
was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the
criminal action by the filing of a separate civil
action against the employer. The only issue
brought before the trial court in the criminal
action is whether accused Dunca is guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property. The action for recovery of
civil liability is not included therein, but is covered
by the separate civil action filed against the
petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.
The policy against double recovery requires that
only one action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against
the employee or against his employer. The injured
party must choose which of the available causes
of action for damages he will bring.
3) LRT vs. NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding
platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation with
the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad
fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train
came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization
and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial
court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and
severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and
the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable
as well as removing the award for compensatory
damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of
carriage already existed between Navidad and
LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train
tickets and the liability was caused by the mere
fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train
being managed by the LRTA and operated by
Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having
presented expert evidence showing that the
emergency brakes could not have stopped the
train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for
the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are
liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist
with compensatory damages.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arising from the breach of that contract
by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be
based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and
1763 of the New Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above
statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all
circumstances. This obligation exists not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises where they
ought to be in pursuance to then contract of
carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for
death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or
(b) on account of willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers if the common
carriers employees through theexercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission. In case of such death or injury, a
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier
to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be
held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176
in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the
employee Escartin is established, the employer,
Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption
that it did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-
contractual breach How then must the liability of
the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be
described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other
in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code
can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an
act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on
tort to apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal
damages in addition to actual damages
is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. It is an established rule that
nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award was
deleted/\.
4) LIGA vs. ALLEGRO
1) LIGA vs. ALLEGRO RESOURCES575 SCRA 310
(Art. 1159)Facts: Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership entered into a
leaseagreement with La Paz Investment & Realty
Corporationwherein the former leased to the latter
its parcel of land
locatedin San Juan. La Paz constructed the Greenh
ills ShoppingArcade and divided it into several
stalls and subleased them toother people. One of
the sub-lessees was Edsel Liga (Liga),who
obtained the leasehold right to Unit No. 26, Level
A of theGSA. As the lease expired, the
stallholders made several attemptsto have their
leasehold rights extended. Allegro Resources
became the new lessee. As the newlessee, Allegro
offered to sublease Unit No. 26, Level A
toLiga. They entered into a lease agreement
dubbed RentalInformation in which Liga agreed to
pay rental of P40Kmonthly. She also agreed to pay
the back rentals due Ortigas.Liga also gave P40K
as one month advance rental
and another P40K as one month security deposit a
s provided in theagreement. Liga failed to pay the
subsequent due rent. Despite repeateddemands
from Allegro, Liga had failed to pay her rentals for
thesubleased property, as well as the back rentals
from Januaryto August 2001 due Ortigas.Issues:1.
WON Liga should pay to Ortigas back rentals
covering theperiod 1 January 2001 to 31 August
2001? NO2. WON Liga should pay to Allegro back
rentals in the amountof P40K a month starting
from 1 September 2001 until suchtime as she
vacates the leased property? YES3. WON Liga
should pay to Allegro the amount of P20K
asattorney's fees and the costs of suit? YESHeld:1.
(1) Ortigas is not a party to this case, whether as
plaintiff or otherwise. It is basic that no relief can
be extended in a judgment to a stranger or one
who is not a party to a case. (2)Allegro cannot
justify the award as a legal representative
byvirtue of a provision in its lease agreement with
Ortigas. Allegrodid not aver in its complaint that it
was acting as Ortigas's legalrepresentative and
seeking the back rentals due Ortigas. (3)There is
no allegation or prayer in the complaint that
Allegrowas seeking the collection of the
back rentals due Ortigas.2. The Court cannot
countenance the obstinate refusal of
Ligato pay P40K a month to Allegro since she had
alreadyacquiesced to pay such rental rate
when she signed the
RentalInformation. It is fundamental that a contrac
t is the lawbetween the parties. Obligations
arising from contracts havethe force of law
between the contracting parties and should
becomplied with in good faith.It is a general
principle of law that no one may be permitted
tochange his mind or disavow and go back upon
his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to
the prejudice of the other party.Likewise, it is
settled that if the terms of the contract
clearlyexpress the intention of the contracting par
ties, the literalmeaning of the stipulations would
be controlling.3. Law and jurisprudence support
the award of attorney's feesand costs of suit in
favor of Allegro. Attorney's fees and costsof
litigation are awarded in instances where "the
defendantacted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy theplaintiff's plainly valid, just
and demandable claim." Havingdelivered
possession over the leased property to Liga,
Allegrohad already performed its obligation under
the leaseagreement. Liga should have exercised
fairness and
good judgment in dealing with Allegro by religiousl
y paying theagreed monthly rental of P40,000.00
5) MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., vs. MIGUEL V.
CAMPOS,
G.R. No. 138814 , April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Miguel V. Campos filed a
petition with the Securities, Investigation and
Clearing Department (SICD) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) against the
petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE)
The petition sought: (1) to nullify the Resolution
dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors,
which allegedly deprived him of his right to
participate equally in the allocation of Initial Public
Offerings (IPO) of corporations registered with
MKSE; (2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was
allegedly deprived of, for which he would pay IPO
prices;.
SICD granted the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from
implementing or enforcing the resolution of the
MKSE. they also issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for the implementation or enforcement
of the MKSE Board Resolution in question.
On March 11,1994, petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Petition
became moot due to the cancellation of the
license of the MKSE (2) The SICD had no
jurisdiction over the petition and (3) the petition
failed to state a cause of action. However, the
SICD denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition failed to state a
cause of action.
HELD:
The petition filed by respondent Miguel
Campos should be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another.
 It contains three essential elements: 1) the
legal right of the plaintiff 2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant and 3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. If these elements are absent, the complaint
will be dismissed on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action. Furthermore, the petition filed
by respondent failed to lay down the source or
basis of respondents right and/or petitioners
obligation.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code, provides that
Obligations arise from: law, Contracts, Quasi
Contracts, Acts or omissions punished by law and
quasi delicts. Therefore an obligation imposed on
a person and the corresponding right granted to
another, must be rooted in at least one of these
five sources.
The mere assertion of a right and claim of
an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a
Complaint or Petition, without identifying the basis
or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact
and law. A pleading should state the ultimate facts
essential to the rights of action or defense
asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions
of fact or conclusions of law.
The Respondent merely quoted in his
Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed
sometime in 1989, granting him the position of
Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life. However,
there is nothing in the said Petition from which the
Court can deduce that respondent, by virtue of his
position as Chairman Emeritus of MKSE, was
granted by law, contract, or any other legal
source, the right to subscribe to the IPOs of
corporations listed in the stock market at their
offering prices.
6)
Diesel Construction Co., Inc V. UPSI Property
Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No. 154885, March 24, 2008
UPSI Property Holdings, Inc., V. Diesel Construction
Co., Inc. and FGU Insurance Corp.,
G.R. No. 154937, March 24, 2008
Facts:
On August 26, 1995, Diesel, as contractor,
and UPSI, as Owner, entered into a
Construction Agreement for the interior
architectural construction works for the 14
th
to the 16
th
floors of the UPSI Building 3 Meditel/Condotel
Project located on Gen. Luna St., Ermita,
Manila. Under the Agreement, as amended,
Diesel, for PHP 12,739,099, agreed to undertake
the
Project, payable by progress billing. As stipulated,
Diesel posted, through FGU Insurance corp.
(FGU), a performance bond in favor of UPSI.
The Agreement contained provisions and contract
provisions on contract works and
Project completing, extensions of contract period,
change/extra work orders, delays and damages
for negative slippage. Under the Agreement, the
Project Prosecution proper was to run for a
period of 90 days from August 2, 1999 to
November 8, 1999. They later agreed to move the
commencement date to August 21, 1999 and the
completion was moved to November 20, 1999.
Also this includes the section obliging the
contractor, in case of unjustifiable delay, to pay
the
owner liquidated damages in the amount
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of one (1) percent of
the
total Project cost for each calendar day of delay.
During the course of Project implantation, change
orders were effective and extensive
sought. Diesel requested for extension owing to
the following causes or delaying factors: (1)
manual hauling of materials from the 14
th
to 16
th
floors; (2) delayed supply of marble; (3) various
change orders; and (4) delayed in the installation
of shower assembly. UPSI disapproved the
desired extensions on the basis of the foregoing
causes, thus putting Diesel in default for a given
contract of work. Furthermore, for every default
situation, UPSI assessed Diesel for liquidated
damages in the form of deductions from
Diesels progress payments, as stipulated in
the
Agreement. On March 16, 2000, Diesel sent a
letter notice to UPSI stating that the Project has
been completed as of the date. UPSI, however,
disregarded the notice, and refused to accept
delivery of the contracted premises, claiming that
Diesel abandoned the Project unfinished
Diesel then filed a complaint compelling to pay
the unpaid balance of UPSI of the contract price,
plus damages and attorneys fees. UPSI denied
liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diesel can be entitled to full
payment of the contract amount.
HELD:
As evidenced, by UPSIs Progress Report No. 19 for
the period ending March 22, 2000,
Diesels scope of work , as of that date, was
already 97.56% complete. Such level of work
accomplishment would, by any natural norm,
be considered as substantial to warrant full
payment of the contract amount, less actual
damages suffered by UPSI. Article 1234 of the
Civil
Code says as much, If the obligation had
substantially performed in good faith, the obligor
may
recover as though there had been and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
7) Chaves vs. Gonzales, 32 SCRA 547, No. 27454,
April 30, 1970
Chavez vs. Gonzales
March 25, 2016
Case Digest
G.R. No. L-27454 April 30, 1970
Rosendo O. Chavez, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
Fructuoso Gonzales, defendant-appellee
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts: On July 1963, Rosendo Chavez brought his
typewriter to Fructuoso Gonzales a typewriter
repairman for the cleaning and servicing of the
said typewriter but the latter was not able to finish
the job. During October 1963, the plaintiff gave
the amount of P6.00 to the defendant which the
latter asked from the plaintiff for the purchase of
spare parts, because of the delay of the repair the
plaintiff decided to recover the typewriter to the
defendant which he wrapped it like a package.
When the plaintiff reached their home he opened
it and examined that some parts and screws was
lost. That on October 29, 1963 the plaintiff sent a
letter to the defendant for the return of the
missing parts, the interior cover and the sum of
P6.00 (Exhibit D). The following day, the
defendant returned to the plaintiff some of the
missing parts, the interior cover and the P6.00.
The plaintiff brought his typewriter to Freixas
Business Machines and the repair cost the amount
of P89.85. He commenced this action on August
23, 1965 in the City Court of Manila, demanding
from the defendant the payment of P90.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, P100.00 for
temperate damages, P500.00 for moral damages,
and P500.00 as attorneys fees. The defendant
made no denials of the facts narrated above,
except the claim of the plaintiff that the cost of
the repair made by Freixas Business Machines be
fully chargeable against him.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable for
the total cost of the repair made by Freixas
Business Machines with the plaintiff typewriter?
Ruling: No, he is not liable for the total cost of the
repair made by Freixas Business Machines instead
he is only liable for the cost of the missing parts
and screws. The defendant contravened the tenor
of his obligation in repairing the typewriter of the
plaintiff that he fails to repair it and returned it
with the missing parts, he is liable under ART.
1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to
do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in
contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
Furthermore it may be decreed that what has
been poorly done he undone.
8) Pantaleon vs American Express International
Polo Pantaleon vs American Express International
Inc. G.R. No. 174269 May 8, 2009 Tinga, J.: Facts:
Polo Pantaleon went on a tour with his family in
Europe. While they were in Amsterdam, Mrs.
Pantaleon decided to purchase some diamond
pieces. Mr. Pantaleon used his AMEX credit card to
pay for the said diamonds. It took AMEX a total of
78 minutes to approve the purchase and to
transmit the approval to the jewelry store. The
travel companions of the Pantaleon family got
irritated because they had to cancel the city tour
due to the delay in the purchase of the diamonds.
The same thing also happened when the family
was in the US. Issue: Whether or not AMEX has
committed a breach of its obligation to Pantaleon.
Ruling: Yes, AMEX committed a breach of its
obligation. It is the obligation of the respondent,
as a debtor/obligor, to act on the purchase of the
petitioner with timely dispatch. The culpable
failure of the respondent herein is not the failure
to timely act on the same but the failure to
promptly informed petitioner the reason for the
delay, and duly advised him that resolving the
same could take some time. Fallo: Wherefore, the
petition is granted. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Branch 145 is hereby reinstated. Costs against the
respondent.