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G.R. No.

L-26222 July 21, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte;
and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.


Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial
on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle,
caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house.
Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered
therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple
and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that
"said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed the
City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He
also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the
docket."
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that
"more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed."
The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the
acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by
different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one
crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for
multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came to
this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide
and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito
complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of
two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime defined
in the first part of Article 48 finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and
the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously;
the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of double murder.3 So where a
person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of
persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a
submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several
others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths
(eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder with the use of bolos, a
pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo of a man, his common-law wife, and their two
children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in
reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various
acts committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded
as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct
crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly
rang out" followed by a "series of shots" from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously
wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and
separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. 8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-
2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule who were asleep
were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of
the couple's children also asleep were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty
by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be
declared guilty of four murders."9

The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There, on
a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that there
was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the
killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge
conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all. 10 Not material here,
therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of
Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law.11

The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five cases
into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one.
To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to
try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be
remedied.12

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five
separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the
witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the
acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof.
If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats
as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed. 13 If the
Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal
properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are
not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For
one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense robbery. For another,
the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here
is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we
are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that,
on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office,
is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly
compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A
contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases.
Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be
transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the pronouncement
that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of
offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended
party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the
prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal
charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he
lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It
stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and
the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the
Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are
not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A
relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the
present case fits into any of the situations just recited.
1wph1.t

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to tag
the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and
frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that
matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should
not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void,
and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar
as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is
hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were
commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,


vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the
bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain
establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing
an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his
employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There
was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General
for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart
on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the
lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the
bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was
to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and
adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the
complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly
any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for
the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the
Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such
isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a
government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or
removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's
attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he
had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to
members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1

Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this
Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on
July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset
to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both
instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the
complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on
October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was
present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He
explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent
San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant
added that after reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly
good person." 2

The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession
notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney.
The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent
police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission
and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been
filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police
Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead
complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is
understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance
with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set
forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is
that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court
in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6

This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have
been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his
position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless,
while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of
the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make
use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could
assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that
labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien
interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a
member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his
fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy
of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains
unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for
not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.


A.C. No. 4984 April 1, 2003

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER


PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and
JOSE RABALO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent,
while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as


Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount
of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents


designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the
existence of a prior registration

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of


Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who
shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name. 3

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11)
baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
which were subsequently dismissed.4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 5 of


Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and
"Novas Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, 6 the complaint
sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent. 7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son,
Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot
the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave
threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a
libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven
(11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with
the end view of securing an appointment for herself. 9

In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges. 10 A
copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation
"Unclaimed."11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the
Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio
Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission
on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to
submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case
heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission
directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the
Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and
the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated
as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of
her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher
Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning
that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of
which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the


Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering
that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.13

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of


Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her
position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 14 However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella
G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the
respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is
further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.16 Respondents demands for
sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions
likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service.
This is clear from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts
or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend
to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 20 and Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well
as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the
penalty of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken
off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty
in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006

GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.

Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied
for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in
order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a
certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing
that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused
to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded
from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned.
When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which
complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the
money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9
March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand
letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the
alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks
postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because
respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant
dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave
complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored.
Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by
respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount,
complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The
demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to
submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint
claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not
have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services
rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant,
the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of
major age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since
they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary
visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related
polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10)
years after which they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as
Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said
visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also
inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same
amount of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while
her two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I
advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a
lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the
same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant
and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while
the other two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of
the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for
whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the
complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were
coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers
attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a
lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza
and inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not
really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious
violation of the Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was
confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned
affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same
amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa.
These acts of the complainant and her son could have been a ground for deportation
and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the Revised
Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made
to pay for quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no
longer around, he died sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the
amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of
having signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund
needed but up to the present my standby loan application has not been released and was
informed that the same would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should
have been released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to
be paid, according to the complainant has now become doubled plus attorneys fees
of P200,000.00.

Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondents evidence but the
scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly
out of the country to attend to his clients needs. Reception of respondents evidence was scheduled
for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice
and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her


report5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this
manner:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes
A to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however
claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a
certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed
to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody
really intended that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay
particularly the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the
needed papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January
this year, that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started
though some important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are
just going through the normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since January that I
do not make any follow ups on the progress of the same."

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good
self in connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take
some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are
being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved
your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all
the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash
Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his
personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his
personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty.
Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from
Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has
also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position
with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted
that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the Investigating Commissioners
report with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from
receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. 7

It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as
shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false
representation that that it was needed in complainants application for visa with the BID. Respondent
denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a
certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the
BID.11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While
he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally
silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell
short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the
charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence
despite due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is
inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-
culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of
which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you
out of my personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here
at the office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from
my own personal money.

2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself
in connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent
papers are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles,
who approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be
fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.

xxxx

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999
and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill
them up on their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the
peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to
raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but dont worry as the Lord had already provided
me the means.

3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the
early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still
papers lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that
everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to
personally return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I
must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the
releases of which are on the following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

May 11, 1999 -200,000

May 20, 1999-200,000

June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be
sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the
last time, if any of these checks, is returned, dont call me anymore. Just file the necessary action
against me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In
fact I stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give
preference to the check I issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a
very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to
withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring
the same to your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to
immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of
another. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have
issued his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an
admission of misconduct.

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters pending
application for visas is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office.19 Respondents conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing


another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,20 as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals."21

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22

Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover
up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A
lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and
disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground
for the revocation of such privilege.24

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical
significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of
Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants
owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified
in the public eye.26

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict
demands and high standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ;
(6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 27

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for
the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also
disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the
National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain
person.

Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. 30

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be
spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)

DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Complaint

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in
filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. 2 She gave
respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.3

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He
would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged
her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked
to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact
employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5

Respondent's Defense

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very
start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the
complainant's daughter.6

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent,
he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who
was a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was
unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal,
the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that
she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while
she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. 11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of
her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
1992.13

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in September 1994,
the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he
was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was
unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.15

Recommendation of the IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November
22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. 16

The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the
PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and
that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have
accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's
claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. 19 It found respondent guilty of
violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's
fees other than their salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered
him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the
receipt.21

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated
Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the
CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional
suspension of six months.22

The Court's Ruling

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.


Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers
in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject
to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.24

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.25

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15,
1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship.26Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant
and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the
complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was
still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for
the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. 28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this
was inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting
legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases
and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's
acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it
appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for
hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not
to do any falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. 32
1avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant
but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such
as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the
client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not
entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them. 35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal
rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

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