Dulay vs.

Torzuela

FACTS: On December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty
at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of
the firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security
Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.

Respondents Superguard defense:

1. Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.

Civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.

2. Private respondent further avers that Article 33 NCC applies only to injury intentionally committed
pursuant to the ruling in Marcia vs. CA and that actions for damages allowed therein are ex-delicto.

CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even
if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide.

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is granted. The case is remanded to RTC for trial on the merits

1. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Under Article 2180 NCC, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the
selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employees own liability for
fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 RPC. The action against
the employer may may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to RULE 111 Sec.
3.

2. the term physical injury in Art. 33 NCC has already been construed to include bodily injury causing
death ( Carandang vs. Santiago). It is not the crimes of Physical Injuries defined in the revised penal
code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide
(Madeja vs. Caro). Therefore the civil action based on article 33 NCC lies because Torzuela is charged
with homicide.

BUSTAMANTE, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 89880, 6 February 1991

FACTS: At about 6:30 AM if 20 April 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck and a
Mazada passenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion of
the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping of said wall from the
drivers seat to the last rear seat throwing out and killing the heirs of the petitioners. In the trial courts up
to the CA, it was maintained that the bus driver saw the front wheels of the cargo vehicle wiggling and
observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding such circumstance due to his belief
that the driver of the truck was merely joking, the bus driver shifted from 4 th to 3rd gear in order to give
more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake
a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.

Ruling of the trial court: The defendants Magtibay (operator of the bus), Serrado (operator of the bus),
Susulin (bus driver), Novelo (previous operator of the bus), del Pilar (owner of the cargo truck), and
Montesiano (truck driver) were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs damages.

Ruling of the CA: Reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the complaint with
respect to del Pilar and Montesiano.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has applied the correct law and doctrine in reversing the decision of the
trial court.

HELD: The doctrine of last clear chance adopted by the CA states that the negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. In other words, it means that even though a persons own acts
may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
However, as held in the landmark case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. IAC, et al., G.R. No.
66102-04, 30 August 1990, the principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and
drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
Furthermore, as between defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of
his discovery of the latters peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent.
As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed
to take action which could have avoided the injury.
 Since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and the drivers of the colliding vehicles but
a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and driver of the cargo truck,
the doctrine does not apply.

Vergara v. CA

Facts:

A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent Amadeo
Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private
respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety
Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The
insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party
liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

Held:

It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at
bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause
and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the
right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the
highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store
warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter
did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by
defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable
and the accident preventable.
 Custodio & Santos vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of the complainants, spouses Cristino
and Brigida Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos.
There was a 1-m wide passageway leading to Mabasas house that passes through the
properties of the complainants.
Sometime in 1981, the complainant spouses built a fence around their property. This effectively
deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the Santoses to compel
them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the blockade
done by the families in front.
The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the complainants to give Mabasa a permanent
easement and right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation.
The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of Mabasa with P65K of Actual
damages, P30K of Moral damages and P10K of Exemplary damages.
Issue: WON the grant of damages by the CA is proper.
Ruling:
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left
because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well within
his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement agreement, either by
contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was
only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which was even conditioned on
the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa
when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this
case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.