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Above all, now, it no longer mattered how he behaved, what wayward impulses
he gave way to, or which perverse pathways he chose to follow. He was sorry
that Royal had died, as he owed the architect a debt of gratitude for having
helped to design the high-rise and make all this possible. It was strange that
Royal had felt any guilt before his death.
J. G. Ballard1
INTRODUCTION
I wrote this essay as a research assistant of the Fund for Scientific ResearchFlanders. Thanks to Ben
Kotze and Jeremy McKenna for valuable stylistic advice, and to Edward Winters for detailed written
comments on an earlier version.
1
James G. Ballard, High-rise (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975) 203.
2
Roger Scruton, The Classical Vernacular: Architectural Principles in an Age of Nihilism (New York:
St. Martins, 1994). Henceforth, all references will be to this work, unless indicated otherwise. The
subtitle of Scrutons book alludes to Rudolph Wittkower, Architectural Principles in the Age of
Humanism, 3rd ed. ([1949] London: Alec Turanti, 1967), a standard work on Renaissance
architecture. In addition, Scruton was probably aware of Robert Jan Van Pelt and Carroll William
Westfall, Architectural Principles in the Age of Historicism (New Haven: Yale UP, 1991).
3
See the passage on postmodernism in architecture on pp. 7576.
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RAFAEL DE CLERCQ
4
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture (London: Methuen, 1979).
5
I am deliberately ignoring one-off monuments of display (David Watkin, Morality and Architec-
ture Revisited [London: John Murray, 2001] ix) such as the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao.
6
In contrast with both musical composers and painters, the architect does not choose his audience.
For that reason, architecture cannot be modern (Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture). Scruton does
not object to modern art as such, however (see Roger Scruton, The Aesthetic Endeavour Today,
Philosophy 71 [1996]: 33150).
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THE LEGITIMACY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE
The Classical Vernacular is not a systematic work, but it does contain a rela-
tively clear line of thought that might be reconstructed as follows. First, starting
from what he takes to be an essential characteristic of architecture, Scruton sets
out three criteria defining what an architectural work ought to be (in order to be
acceptable). Subsequently, Scruton shows that modern architecture does not meet
these three criteria. The first part of his argument starts from the undeniable
premise that architecture isessentiallya public or social affair. From this
premise, the following three evaluative criteria are derived. (See Figure 1)
First, architecture should take notion of the communitys taste. Architecture is
part of the embellishment of everyday life and should therefore be acceptable
to everyone. Similarly, designing an acceptable building within a particular archi-
tectural style should be something that can be achieved by ordinary architects.
(Note that Mies van der Rohe once claimed something very similar: I have
wanted to keep everything reasonable and clearto have an architecture that
anybody can do.)9 As a consequence, architecture is more a question of (good)
manners than of real art. Architects should not aim for a unique and sublime mas-
terpiecewhich only a handful can realizebut for the adequate implementa-
tion of repeatable and recognizable forms (recognizable forms are supposed to
provide the background to the activities of our ordinary lives.)
Second, architectural works should be adjusted to the built environment. Rather
than trying to realize a highly personal project, architects should try to cope with
the limitations imposed by what is already there. In other words, architecture
should display the virtue of civility, that is, the willingness or capacity to nego-
tiate with others and to work out an arrangement that is acceptable to all
7
William C. Curtis, Modern Architecture since 1900, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1987) 377.
8
Still, attention is paid to the intellectual myths that guided the modern architects. For a similar
critique, see Peter Blake, Form Follows Fiasco: Why Modern Architecture Hasnt Worked (Boston/
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
9
See Affirming the Absolutes, Time 87 (11 Feb. 1966): 61. Cited by David Spaeth, Ludwig Mies
van der Rohe: A Biographical Essay, qtd. in J. Zukowsky, ed., Mies Reconsidered: His Career,
Legacy, and Disciples (Chicago: Art Institute of Chicago, 1986) 32.
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RAFAEL DE CLERCQ
Architecture is essentially
a public affair
Civility in architecture, as in all human life, is the art of the boundary: the art of defining the place
where public and private meet, and of ensuring that the line remains permeable to the commerce
between them. As with human morality, this virtue arises in architecture from the corporate attempt
to live by agreement. The uncivil building offers no clear boundary between inner and outer; it
turns it back on the world. (p. 18)
10
Civility is the virtue that fits man for society: it consists in the ability to adjust to ones neighbor,
to meet him on terms, even when terms are unequal, and to strive gently but firmly for peaceful
dealings in the midst of contest and conceit (17; see also 18, 25, 29, 30).
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THE LEGITIMACY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE
Finally, architecture should respect the nature of those who populate the public
space: human beings. Their biological nature includes that they orient themselves
visually, that they walk upright, that they are vulnerable, and that they have certain
proportions. This already precludes a lot: architecture that reduces the passer-by
to a dwarf, that is, sharp and angular, horizontal, and so forth. Mans rational
nature implies a desire to justify and criticize judgments according to publicly
accepted starting points or criteria. As a result, it is desirable to have a shared
normality and a public space that is able to reflect this commonality, or at least
our collective hopes for one. Thus, architecture should comply with claims made
by the environment, and give priority to meanings that are accessible to every-
one. Only then can it help to delineate a domain that is really public, that is, more
than the sum of individual preferences and goals.
According to Scruton, these three criteria impose two more specific
constraints on any architectural practice. Firstly, buildings have to be designed
within a common style according towhat Scruton callsaesthetic constants:
patterns and standard solutions handed down by tradition (in other words, the
common style should be a vernacular one.)11 A common style is necessary if
the co-ordination problem is to be solved that arises inevitably when different
tastes and preferences meet.12 Moreoverand this is the second constraint
within this common style facades are to be erected. Facades are characterized
by a vertical order or organization of elements (plinth, cornice, column, capital,
etc.), which makes them better suited to mans natural posture. Also, facades
create a human face (that looks, greets, and so on) and facilitate the fitting in of
a building within an existing environment (for instance, a street). To be suc-
cessful, however, facades require special attention for transitions and shadow
play, as well as a skilful application of molding and ornaments on the basis of
preexisting rules of composition. In this vernacular aspect resides the facades
civility and its capacity to mark out a public space together with the adjoining
facades.
11
Briefly, I mean a tradition of patterns, adapted to the uses of the ordinary builder, and capable of
creating accord and harmony in all the many circumstances of potential conflict (p. 25).
12
See also Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture 250.
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RAFAEL DE CLERCQ
aesthetically pleasing.13 (Sometimes, it even seems to aim for such a break.) This
objection is humorously accepted by Philip Johnson in an interview:
What about the people? Dont you care about people at all? The answer is no, of course. I
mean I respect the scale of a human being, but the people themselves? What have they got to do
with architecture?14
13
In The Aesthetics of Architecture Scruton even speaks of an injured moral feeling (p. 250).
14
Qtd. in Hilary Lewis and John OConnor, eds., Philip Johnson: The Architect in His Own Words
(New York: Rizzoli, 1994) 174.
15
See also Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture 211, 213.
16
We have lost all sense of the street as a public thoroughfare; we regard squares and avenues as
mere empty spaces among concrete piles. . . Lacking any sense of the public realm, we lack also
a sense of the private. The very distinction between public and private is lost, in building styles
which reflect the atomized nature of secular society (p. xiii). See also p. 32, and Scruton, The Aes-
thetics of Architecture, 24950.
17
The relation between consequentialism and horizontalism is discussed on pp. 5556.
140
THE LEGITIMACY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE
Consequentialism
Horizontalism
No (common) style
No vertical order
= no facades
which blurs the distinction between private and public.18 This way, it is impossi-
ble to have a facade: there is no vertical ordering of elements and the building
does not have a particular orientation. As a consequence, there is no dialogical
relation with the adjacent buildings and difficulties arise as to how the building
ought to fit within the existing environment. Finally, Scruton claims that the lack
of a vertical order clashes with mans nature: The horizontal style would be a
[natural?] part of the human world only if all our public activities took place on
stretchers (p. 14). By the way, Scruton insists that the horizontal style should
not be explained by reference to economical motivations.
18
The horizontal style in fact makes no place for doors, so that the juncture between inner and outer
remains always vaguely definedsometimes an invisible slit in a screen of glass, sometimes
squeezed helplessly into corners, opening on to some arbitrarily defined space, presenting neither
an invitation to enter nor a promise of security. Worse is still the habit of concealing the door alto-
gether, so that each house, even when joined in a terrace, turns its back completely on its neigh-
bor (p. 17; see also p. 22).
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RAFAEL DE CLERCQ
Consequentialism
It is a platitude that the form of a construction is always underdetermined by
the functions it is supposed to serve, and by any other collection of nonaesthetic
requirements. (True, the degree of underdetermination differs depending on
whether houses and office buildings are concerned, or power stations and rocket
launchers.)22 The underdetermination of form by nonaesthetic function has an
important consequence, however. As William Curtis writes, [A] priori images
concerning the eventual appearance of the building will enter the design process
19
For a nice illustration of how contemporary architecture can be context-sensitive, see Maurice
Lagueux, Nelson Goodman and Architecture, Assemblage 35 (1998): 23.
20
Curtis 388; admittedly, the quoted text leaves open whether the chain of discoveries includes dis-
coveries of what works; for all Curtis says, the discoveries may just be discoveries of what does
not work, and thus may not provide contemporary architects with much to rely upon.
21
The reason why I focus on these characteristics is that Scruton cannot explain why there is some-
thing irredeemably wrong about modern architecture unless he is right about its essential features.
22
See Alan Holgate, Aesthetics of Built Form (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992) 22627.
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THE LEGITIMACY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE
at some point. . . functions c[an] only be translated into the forms and spaces of
architecture through the screen of a style.23
In other words, elements of style are unavoidable because functional and other
nonaesthetic requirements do not themselves suffice to determine the form of a
building.
Of course, the conclusion does not follow immediately. If architects were
capable of surveying all possible solutions to a given (nonaesthetically specified)
design problem, then they would be able to select one of those solutions on a
purely arbitrary basisthus avoiding reliance on a priori images concerning the
eventual appearance of the building. However, architects have no such capabil-
ity. Nor should they. For what interests them in a particular case is the relevant
or acceptable alternatives. What counts as relevant or acceptable depends on the
particular case at hand but also on the architectural ideals that guide the practice
in which the architect participates. Such ideals provide what Curtis refers to as
a priori images and the screen of a style. (They may of course exist in the
absence of explicit rules or maxims.)
Taking these considerations into account, it is not surprising that the outspo-
ken consequentialist attitude of some (early) modern architects did not prevent
the development of a common style. Around the 1930s, it became possible to
discern a so-called international style in spite of the ideological differences
between the architects involved, and in spite of the disparate functions that their
buildings were supposed to serve. Later, elements that were part of the interna-
tional style kept recurring, although the ideological programs were surely differ-
ent, or even absent.24 Again, this suggests that the typically modern shapes and
materials were not just derived from all kinds of nonaesthetic concerns. Appar-
ently, they have, or are experienced as having, a value of their own. Finally, there
are many indications that the concern for all kinds of nonaesthetic values such as
function and structure was aesthetically laden from the very beginning. For
instance, the slender I beams on the outside of some of van der Rohes build-
ings have no practical function. Their purpose is to create a certain visual effect,
and in particular, to remind one of to the presence of a steel frame (made invis-
ible by concrete fireproofing).25
In sum, the modern movement is not devoid of style or aesthetic motives. This
is also evident from the influence of painting on some modern architects. As a
23
Curtis 182.
24
See Edward Winters, Review of The Classical Vernacular: Architectural Principles in an Age of
Nihilism, Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1996): 53557.
25
Of his Farnsworth House, Schulze remarked: Certainly the house is more nearly a temple than a
dwelling, and it rewards aesthetic contemplation before it fulfills domestic necessity. Franz
Schulze, Mies van der Rohe: A Critical Biography (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985) 256.
143
RAFAEL DE CLERCQ
Horizontalism
Scrutons argument against the horizontal style rests on the assumption that (i)
we are spontaneously inclined to see a human figure in a building, and in partic-
ular, a human face in a facade, and that (ii) the horizontal style frustrates this incli-
nation of ours. However, even if this (double) assumption were to be correct, it
would still be questionable whether the consequence of (ii) is as dramatic as
Scruton thinks it is: an intelligible form (pp. 12, 18, 55, 82), coherence (p. 22), a
clear orientation within the environment (p. 81), expressive qualities (pp. 10, 14),
attention for all kinds of details such as the play of light and shadow, and the like,
surely have not disappeared with the disappearance of the traditional facade.27
More important, however, is the question of what caused this more or less
sudden breach in the history of architecture: Why did architecture come to look
so different? Why did architects start to design buildings according to the hori-
zontal style? Scruton seems to impugn architectural education (pp. 1213, 77),
which, in his opinion, is barely to be called education since valuable knowl-
edge, for example, concerning facades, is no longer conveyed and because stu-
dents are no longer trained to acquire important skills such as drawing. The most
important change in architectural education is, however, according to Scruton,
that the ground-plan has come to occupy a central place. The horizontal style is
supposed to be a logical consequence of that change. However, this does not
explain why modern architecture came into existenceat best, it explains why
modern architecture persists. For one thing, the first modern architects were
trained in a completely different tradition. Mies van der Rohe, for instance, even
started as a designer of ornamental details. Furthermore, the question now
becomes: What caused the change in architectural education? It is no doubt tempt-
26
To think so is to take the consequentialist rhetoric of the moderns for a truthful representation of
their practice. However, Scruton does not commit this mistake. See, for example, Scruton, The Aes-
thetics of Architecture 38: It will not have escaped the readers attention that the straw philoso-
phy which I labelled constructivism corresponds to little that has been practised by modern
architects, and that many of the changes in form and style that our century has witnessed have been
motivated by just that desire for an apt or appropriate appearance which I attributed to the theo-
rists of the Renaissance.
27
In modern architecture there is also a playing with colors and (more or less) reflecting surfaces.
144
THE LEGITIMACY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE
ing to explain the change in terms of the new demands emanating from the emer-
ging industrial society: The design of factories, train stations, hospitals, power
stations, schools, office buildings, and so on, certainly required a function-
oriented approach, as well as knowledge of suitable building materials and con-
struction techniques. However, as a matter of fact, aesthetic considerations seem
to have played an at least equally important role. This is not surprising, given
what was said earlier in response to the allegation of consequentialism. In any
case, it is clear that in seeking to explain changes in architectural history, includ-
ing changes in architectural education, one has to acknowledge the part played
by changing architectural ideals.
If realizing the ideal associated with a particular style turns out to be of little
valueeither because the ideal is itself defective or because its realization might
hamper the realization of other, more cherished valuesthen it would be wise to
switch styles. However, it is unclear to what extent styles can be switched at will.
At any given time only a limited number of styles are available to the artist. More-
over, it seems that styles do not remain available once they have come into
existence.
This brings up the issue of historicismroughly, the view that the develop-
ment of art is beyond our conscious controlwhich is addressed by Scruton in
his review of David Watkins book Morality and Architecture (also included in
The Classical Vernacular). Watkin had been criticized (by Richard Wollheim) for
being insufficiently aware of the fact that a style can be exhausted at a certain
moment, and so be in need of replacement. Scruton might be criticized for the
same reason, but he has an answer ready, The problem with such a [historicist]
view is not that it is false [!], but rather, as Watkin points out, that there is no way
in which an artist can be seriously influenced by it (p. 126).
However, the problem with this reply is that, if the doctrine of historicism is
trueScruton does not say it is notartists do not have to be influenced by the
idea of a necessary succession of styles and movements: they are anyway swept
along with the development.28 Second, Scrutons reply is therefore all the more
applicable to his own views: How can architects be influenced by a theoretically
or morally motivated plea for a vernacular architecture if this does not fit within
the logic of architectural history? And finally, suppose that architects were to be
convinced by Scrutons arguments, and that they resumed working in the ver-
nacular tradition. Then wouldnt that reintroduce the kind of intellectualism that
Scruton despises in modern architecture?
Be that as it may, it is unlikely that Scruton really intended to contribute to the
rehabilitation of a past style. In the introduction to his book, he is more explicit
28
On a historicist conception, architectural styles can be necessitated by their predecessors but also
by the larger context in which architects live and work.
145
RAFAEL DE CLERCQ
about his aims, Perhaps the practices I recommend in what follows will never
be revived without the faith that gave rise to them. But they are worth discussing,
since they contain knowledge and wisdom that can be understood even in an age
which is unable or unwilling to act on them (p. xii).
In other words, Scrutons aim is probably not to change the course of history,
but to remind one of what has disappeared with the classical vernacular, and so
(I suppose) to explain why many people still feel uncomfortable when they are
faced with plain modernist architecture. However, because the context in which
the vernacular style originated disappeared as well, this feeling of discomfort may
be irremediable, even if the vernacular style were to be reanimated in the future.
In other words, if such reanimation were to take place, for whatever reason,
without a recurrence of the original context, I think we would have to say with
Nietzsche, What is the beauty of a building to us now? The same thing as the
beautiful face of a woman without spirit: something mask-like (Human, All too
Human, 218).
146