BORDADOR V LUZ

FACTS:* Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry and respondent Brigida Luz, also
known as Aida Luz, was their regular customer.

* On several occasions, respondent Deganos, brother of Luz, received several pieces of gold and jewelry from
petitioners amounting to P382, 816. These items and their prices were indicated in seventeen receipts covering the
same. 11 of the receipts stated that they were received for a certain Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining 6
receipts indicated that they were received for Luz.

* Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the proceeds and return the unsold
items to Bordador. Deganos remitted only the sum of P53, 207. He neither paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor
did he return any unsold item to petitioners.

* The total of his unpaid account to Bordador, including interest, reached the sum of P725, 463.98. Petitioners
eventually filed a complaint in the barangay court against Deganos to recover said amount.

* In the barangay proceedings, Luz, who was not impleaded in the caes, appeared as a witness for Deganos and
ultimately, she and her husband, together with Deganos signed a compromise agreement with petitioners.

*In that compromise agreement, Deganos obligated himself to pay petitioners, on installment basis , the
balance of his account plus interest thereon. However, he failed to comply with his aforestated undertakings.

* Petitioners instituted a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages, with an application for
preliminary attachment against Deganos and Luz.

* Deganos and Luz was also charged with estafa

8 During the trial of the civil cae, petitioners claimed that Deganos acted as agent of Luz when received the
subject items of jewelry, and because he failed to pay for the same, Luz, as principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable
with him

* Trial court ruled that only Deganos was liable to Bordador for the amount and damages claimed. It held that
while Luz did have transactions with petitioners in the past, the items involved were already paid for and all that Luz
owed Bordador was the sum or P21, 483 representing interest on the principal account which she had previously paid
for.

* CA affirmed TCs decision

ISSUE: W/N Luz are liable to petitioners for the latters claim for money and damages in the sum of P725,463.98, plus
interests and attorneys fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not show that they signed any of the subject
receipts or authorized Deganos to receive the items of jewelry on their behalf

RULING: No

Evidence does not support the theory of Bordador that Deganos was an agent of Luz and that the latter should
consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in his obligation to petitioners.

The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Luz consented to the acts of Deganos or
authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular transactions involved.
 It was grossly and inexcusably negligent of petitioner to entrust to Deganos, not once or twice but on at least six
occasions as evidenced by 6 receipts, several pieces of jewelry of substantial value without requiring a written
authorization from his alleged principal.

A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.

Records show that neither an express nor an implied agency was proven to have existed between Deganos and
Luz. Evidently, Bordador who were negligent in their transactions with Deganos cannot seek relief from the effects of
their negligence by conjuring a supposed agency relation between the two respondents where no evidence supports
such claim

Uy vs CA

Uy vs. CA

GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo
to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is
physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated
expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC
ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon
are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother
was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in Fact
Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued
that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by
Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose,
without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a
parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was
incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers
of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate
required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity
of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

BUCTON v. RURAL BANK OF EL SALVADOR

G.R. No. 179625, February 24, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Cagayan de Oro. Concepcion borrowed the title of the land on the
pretext that she is going to show it to an interested buyer. Concepcion obtained a loan from respondent bank and as a
security for the loan, Concepcion mortgaged the property of petitioner using a SPA which was allegedly executed in
favor of Concepcion. When Concepcion failed to pay the loan, the house and lot of petitioner were foreclosed. Petitioner
insisted that she did not obtain any loan from the bank and that her signature was forged by Concepcion that the loan
was entered into by the latter in her own personal capacity. The bank on the other hand maintains that it was not
negligent in inspecting the properties and relied on the presumption of regularity of the notarized SPA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage was entered into by Concepcion in her personal capacity

HELD: Yes

CIVIL LAW: For the principal to be bound by a deed executed by an agent, the deed must be signed by the agent for and
in behalf of his principal.
As early as the case of Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. v. Poizat, we already ruled that in order to bind the
principal by a deed executed by an agent, the deed must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the
name of the principal. In other words, the mere fact that the agent was authorized to mortgage the property is not
sufficient to bind the principal, unless the deed was executed and signed by the agent for and on behalf of his principal.

In Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co., the wife authorized her husband to obtain a loan and to secure it with
mortgage on her property. Unfortunately, although the real estate mortgage stated that it was executed by the husband
in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of his wife, the husband signed the contract in his own name without indicating that
he also signed it as the attorney-in-fact of his wife.

In Rural Bank of Bombon, the agent contracted a loan from the bank and executed a real estate mortgage. However, he
did not indicate that he was acting on behalf of his principal.

Similarly, in this case, the authorized agent failed to indicate in the mortgage that she was acting for and on behalf of her
principal. The Real Estate Mortgage explicitly shows on its face that it was signed by Concepcion in her own name and in
her own personal capacity. In fact, there is nothing in the document to show that she was acting or signing as an agent
of petitioner. Thus, consistent with the law on agency and established jurisprudence, petitioner cannot be bound by the
acts of Concepcion.

In light of the foregoing, there is no need to delve on the issues of forgery of the SPA and the nullity of the foreclosure
sale. For even if the SPA was valid, the Real Estate Mortgage would still not bind petitioner as it was signed by
Concepcion in her personal capacity and not as an agent of petitioner. Simply put, the Real Estate Mortgage is void and
unenforceable against petitioner.

Respondent bank has no one to blame but itself. Not only did it act with undue haste when it granted and released the
loan in less than three days, it also acted negligently in preparing the Real Estate Mortgage as it failed to indicate that
Concepcion was signing it for and on behalf of petitioner. We need not belabor that the words as attorney-in-fact of, as
agent of, or for and on behalf of, are vital in order for the principal to be bound by the acts of his agent. Without these
words, any mortgage, although signed by the agent, cannot bind the principal as it is considered to have been signed by
the agent in his personal capacity.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES vs NLRC Case Digest

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.

480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International
Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made with the assistance of
Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with
her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese
employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for
three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the consent
and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations
Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made with the knowledge and
consent of Sunace

HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and separate employment
contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang,
not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace
continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the
execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy
to the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean that
Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had
taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing
about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten
Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a
mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance
of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending *Montehermozos+ employment contract necessarily
bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other
way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment
contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for
any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts
take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore, as Sunace
correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the
termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and
entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the
agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third
persons.

NAGUIAT V. CA

412 SCRA 591

Facts:

Queano applied with Naguiat for a loan in

the amount of 200,000, which Naguiat

granted.

Naguiat endorsed to Queano a check for the

amount 95,000. She also issued her own

check to the order of Queano.

The proceeds of the said checks were to

constitute the loan granted by Naguiat to

Queano.
To secure the loan, Queano executed a Deed

of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Naguiat.

The Deed was notarized, and Queano issued

to Naguiat a promissory note for the amount

of 200,000 with interest 12% per annum.

Queano also issued a check postdated for the

amount of 200,000 and payable to the order

of Naguiat.

Upon presentment on the maturity date, the

check was dishonored for insufficiency of

funds. Queano requested the bank to stop

payment of her postdated check, but the

bank rejected the request pursuant to its

policy not to honor such requests if the

check is drawn against insufficient funds.

Queano received a letter from Naguiats

lawyer, demanding settlement of the loan.

Queno told Naguiat that she did not receive

the proceeds of the loan, adding that the

checks were retained by Ruebenfeldt, who

purportedly was Naguiats agent.

Naguiat applied for the extrajudicial

foreclosure of the mortgage, the Sheriff then

scheduled the foreclosure sale.

Issue/s:

1. Does the NOTARIZED mortgage

deed enjoys the presumption of

truthfulness.
2. Was there an agency relationship

between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt?

Held:

1. The CA is correct in ruling that the

presumption of truthfulness of the

recitals in the public document was

defeated by the clear and convincing

evidence in this case that pointed to

the absence of consideration.

2. The CA recognized the existence of

an agency by estoppel citing Art.

1873 of the NCC. Apparently, it is

considered as a consequence of the

interaction between Naguiat and

Reubenfeldt, Queano got the

impression that the latter was the

agent of the former, but Naguiat did

nothing to correct the wrong

impression In that situation the rule

is clear.

We find no compelling reason to disturb the

ruling of the lower courts. That being the

case, it follows that the mortgage which is

supposed to secure the loan is null and void

G.R. No. L-25463 April 4, 1975

EMERITO M. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special First Division) and CESARIO P. CALANOC, respondents.

Tanada, Carreon and Taada for petitioner.

Francisco Gonzales III for private respondent.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:+.wph!1

Petitioner Emerita M. Ramos seeks a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in its case CA-G.R. No. 28032,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XII) in its Civil Case No. 24070 entitled "Cesario
Calanoc vs. Emerito M. Ramos and Farm Implement & Machinery Co."

The facts as found by the appellate court are as follows: About the latter part of 1953 Emerito M. Ramos, a businessman
engaged in the import-export trade and using the firm name FIMCO (Farm Implement & Machinery Co.), entered into a
contract with the Board of Liquidators of the Philippine Government for the purchase of 20,000 tons of rice from the
now defunct National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) at the rate of P404.00 per metric ton, F.O.B. Manila. The rice
was in turn to be sold by Emerito M. Ramos to the Nippon Trading Co., Ltd. in Japan, which firm made available to the
FIMCO through the Bank of Tokyo the sum of $136.00 for every ton of rice shipped to Japan. The arrangement was for
the Bank of Tokyo, in representation of the Nippon Trading Co., Ltd., to effect the transfer to Japanese
shippers/suppliers of sufficient dollars to cover the value of merchandise to be purchased by FIMCO's customers in the
Philippines. To make up for the difference between the purchase price of the NARIC rice in Philippine pesos and the
selling price in dollars at the rate of two-to-one, the Central Bank of the Philippines granted FIMCO an allocation of
$66.00 for every metric ton of rice shipped to Japan.

FIMCO entered into several contracts with local merchants for the resale to them of the imported goods which were
forthcoming as a result of the above-stated transactions. One such contract was concluded with Mrs. Salustiana Dee, or
Wellington & Co., in the amount of $1,333.000.00 or P2,666,000.00. 1 Cesario P. Calanoc, plaintiff in the lower court,
claiming that Emerito M. Ramos had engaged his services to procure purchasers for the imported goods and that he was
directly instrumental in bringing about the contracts in question, instituted an action to recover his alleged agreed
commissions of 2% on the contract with Wellington & Co. and 1% on those with the International Mercantile Co.

After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment ordering Emerito M. Ramos to pay plaintiff
commissions in the amount of P53,320.00 on the first transaction, and in the amounts of P10,000.00, P4,040.00 and
P180.00, respectively, on the other three, or a total of P67,540.00, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid. Defendant was also ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees, plus the costs. Emerito M. Ramos appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on May 20, 1965, a
judgment of affirmance on the following findings: t.hqw

Plaintiff declared that sometime in 1953, he went to Ramos' suite at the Manila Hotel upon the latter's invitation.
Appellant asked Calanoc to bond him in the amount of P400,000.00, and to look for importers of merchandise from
Japan. Appellant told Calanoc to sell the merchandise at a mark-up price of twenty-three percent of the invoice value of
the importation and that the overprice would constitute his commission.

Plaintiff was introduced to Mrs. Salustiana Dee, the owner of Wellington & Co., by Jose Ang Uco. He explained to the
prospective buyer the terms of the contract between FIMCO and the NARIC. In order to verify the existence of the barter
agreement, Mrs. Dee instructed the plaintiff to cable her supplier in Kobe, Japan, the Lam Tai Trading, Co., as well as the
Nippon Trading Co., FIMCO's representative in Tokyo. During this period of verification, Mrs. Dee was in frequent
communication with the plaintiff and Ang Uco either by telephone or by conferences in the broker's office. Plaintiff also
explained to Mrs. Dee that she was to open two letters of credit, one local and the other a dollar letter of credit; that
she was to pay the customs tax, the sales tax and the clearance duties at the Bureau of Customs: that the municipal
license tax was to be paid by Mr. Ramos, and that she was to pay a premium of 25% mark-up on the value of her
imported commodities. Calanoc, accordingly informed appellant that Mrs. Dee had agreed to pay a premium of 25% and
that, therefore, after deducting the 23% required mark-up, he (plaintiff) had a commission of 2% on said transaction.

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

Jose Ang Uco testified that he introduced Mrs. Salustiana Dee to Calanoc as a prospective buyer of imported
merchandise. Together, the three of them went to Mr. Recto of the Equitable Bank who explained to Mrs. Dee about the
banking procedure involved in the transaction. Thereafter, he and the plaintiff were in frequent communication with
Mrs. Dee until the latter went directly to Ramos and closed the contract in question without their presence. Mrs. Dee
had agreed to pay him a 2% commission on the transaction. ...

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

Plaintiff's testimony also finds corroboration in appellant's own admission that in engaging the broker's services he
specified that the latter's compensation would consist of the excess of the required 23% mark-up price.

In the appellate court's thinking, there was "a clear preponderance of evidence that in compliance with his undertaking
to procure purchasers for appellant's merchandise, he produced the importers, Wellington & Co. .. and as a result of his
efforts said companies entered into the contracts in question with the defendant-appellant (thereby entitling plaintiff)
to recover the commissions claimed by him as compensation for his successful efforts."

Only two errors are attributed by the petitioner to the appellate court, there being no issue raised regarding the
affirmance of the awards made by the trial court in favor of Cesario Calanoc in connection with the transaction
concluded by the petitioner with the International Mercantile Company. Petitioner contends: (1) that the Court of
Appeals "erred in holding petitioner Emerito M. Ramos liable to respondent Cesario P. Calanoc for the sum of
P53,320.00, representing a commission of 2% of the contract price of P2,666,000.00 in the sale made by petitioner
Ramos to Wellington & Company, instead of only P13,330.00, representing the 1/2% overprice actually paid by the
buyer to the petitioner Ramos in excess of the 23% mark-up price of the invoice value of the importation
notwithstanding the express finding made by the respondent Court itself, ... that the contract existing between
petitioner Ramos and respondent Calanoc was to sell the merchandise to any buyer, at a mark-up price of 23% of the
invoice value of the importation, and that any overprice actually received by petitioner Ramos, above the stated 23%
premium, would accrue to respondent Calanoc as his commission;" and (2) that the Court of Appeals "erred in holding
petitioner Emerito M. Ramos liable to respondent Cesario P. Calanoc for the sum of P10,000.00, by way of attorney's
fees, in the absence of any specific finding by the Honorable respondent Court that petitioner Ramos had acted in gross
and evident bad faith in refusing to accede to respondent Calanoc's demand and defending himself from the complaint
filed against him."

The preliminary question which poses itself in connection with the first assigned error is whether this Court may make
its own findings of fact independently of those made by the Court of Appeals. The general rule is that the appellate
court's findings are conclusive, but this rule is not without some recognized exceptions, such as: (1) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257); (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15); (3) where there is a grave
abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2929); (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz vs. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26); and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista vs. Alto, 103 Phil. 401). See
also Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 33 SCRA 622; Roque vs. Buan, 21 SCRA 642.

Several circumstances compel Us to go into the record of this case in order to find out whether or not it falls within any
of the exceptions above-stated. First, the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in the nature of
conclusions, without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and second, the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main brief, with the corresponding references to the record, are not materially
denied or disputed by the private respondent. These facts are necessary for a clear understanding and proper resolution
of the issue of how much private respondent Calanoc is entitled to as commission in the Wellington & Company
transaction.

According to the trial court it was convinced that "plaintiff actually was engaged by defendant to look for buyers on
commission basis; that plaintiff was directly instrumental in bringing about the contract with Wellington & Company in
the amount of $1,333,000.00 or P2,666,000.00, ... ; that defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 2% on the Wellington &
Company transaction ... " The Court of Appeals proceeded on the same theory and even adopted as its own the
following observation of the trial court: t.hqw

The court deplores the actuations of defendant and Mrs. Dee in completely bypassing plaintiff when they were ready to
finalize their contract to avoid having to pay to plaintiff his due, after the latter had exerted a lot of effort and spent a lot
of time in bringing them together. Defendant was able to make an additional 1/2% profit and Mrs. Dee saved 3-1/2% but
the ruse did not add to the business stature of the parties concerned.

In our view, the position adopted by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of their own findings of
fact, is not justified. The contract between Ramos and Calanoc is quite explicit: the arrangement was for Calanoc to sell
the merchandise to any buyer at a mark-up price of 23% over the invoice value of the importation and any overprice
successfully collected above the stated 23% would accrue to Calanoc as his commission. The amount of such commission
was therefore fluid, depending upon the overprice obtained above the 23% mark-up price of the invoice value set by
Ramos.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is evidently based on the assumption that since Calanoc was the efficient agent
who brought about the Wellington & Co. contract, it follows that he was entitled to the 2% commission which he claims
was the overprice he secured for Ramos' merchandise. The assumption is not borne out by the record. As already
observed, and this was confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the arrangement was for Calanoc "to sell the merchandise at
a mark-up price of twenty-three percent of the invoice value of the importation and the overprice would constitute his
commission." Nothing in the agreement guaranteed Calanoc a fixed commission, which depended upon the overprice
the buyer would pay. And it is a fact, undisputed by Calanoc that what Ramos received in the Wellington & Co.
transaction in excess of his original 23% mark-up price was only P13,330.00 and not P53,320.00, the amount claimed
and awarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

The one feature of this case which militates most strongly against the conclusions arrived at by the courts below is that
they did not necessarily follow from the facts established. Calanoc never brought the buyer, Mrs. Salustiana Dee, to
Ramos. The agreement, if any, regarding the 25% buying price was made solely between Calanoc and Mrs. Dee. Ramos
did not intervene nor participate in any manner in that supposed agreement. While it is true, as Calanoc claims, that he
informed petitioner that Mrs. Dee had already agreed to pay the 25% premium, there is absent in the records of this
case any evidence to show that Mrs. Dee confirmed such agreement with petitioner and that the latter could have
bound her to it. Petitioner had fixed for himself a 23% mark-up, allowing anything over that amount as commission. If
Mrs. Dee changed her mind and refused to pay the 25% premium, and paid only 23-1/2%, that was her prerogative;
petitioner had neither the duty nor the right to compel her to contract for more than what she was willing to pay, when
she was ready to meet his price. t.hqw

.... a broker is never entitled to commissions for unsuccessful efforts. The risk of failure is wholly his. The reward comes
only with his success. That is the plain contract and contemplation of the parties. The broker may devote his time and
labor, and expend his money with ever so much of devotion to the interest of his employer, and yet if he fails, if without
effecting an agreement or accomplishing a bargain, he abandons the effort, or his authority is fairly and in good faith
terminated, he gains no right to commissions. .. He may have introduced to each other parties who otherwise would
have never met; he may have created impressions, which under later and more favorable circumstances naturally lead
to and materially assist in the consummation of a sale; he may have planted the very seed from which others reap the
harvest; but all that gives him no claim. It was part of his risk that failing himself, not successful in fulfilling his obligation,
others might be left to some extent to avail themselves of the fruit of his labors. .. in such a case the principal violates no
right of the broker by selling to the first party who offers the price asked, and it matters not that sale is to the very party
with whom the broker had been negotiating. He failed to find or produce a purchaser upon the terms prescribed in his
employment, and the principal was under no obligation to wait longer that he might make further efforts. The failure
therefore and its consequences were the risk of the broker only however must be taken with one important and
necessary limitation If the efforts of the broker are rendered a failure by the fault of the employer; if capriciously he
changes his mind after the purchaser, ready and willing, and consenting to the prescribed terms, is produced; or if the
latter declines to complete the contract because of some defect of title in the ownership of the seller, some unremoved
encumbrance, some defect which is the fault of the latter, then the broker does not lose his commissions. And that upon
the familiar principle that no one can avail himself of non-performance of a condition precedent who has himself
occasioned its non-performance. But this limitation is not even an exception to the general rule affecting the broker's
right for it goes on the ground that the broker has done his duty, that he has brought buyer and seller to an agreement,
but that the contract is not consummated and fails through the after-fault of the seller." (Danon vs. Brimo & Co., 42 Phil.
133,139-141).

It is significant that in his complaint Calanoc does not attribute bad faith, fraud or fault to Ramos. All that he claims is
that since he had informed Ramos of Mrs. Dee's alleged commitment to pay a 25% mark-up, the latter had consequently
lost the right to reduce it. But as already observed, there is no showing that such a commitment to Calanoc was a
contract which Ramos himself could enforce against Mrs. Dee, or that she was ready and willing to pay him the 25%
mark-up, despite which he accepted only 23-1/2%, And certainly, if she was, vis-a-vis Ramos, willing to pay only 23-
1/2%, he was not precluded from accepting it without being liable to Calanoc for the difference.

In the absence of independent proof that the non-payment by Mrs. Dee of the 25% premium over the mark-up price
was due to the fault, fraud or bad faith of Ramos, we are not prepared to share the Court of Appeals' view in this regard.
He gained nothing by the reduction, and it cannot be presumed that he accepted it in order to cause prejudice to
Calanoc.

The trial court awarded in favor of Calanoc attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. This was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in view of its findings, established here to be not really indubitable, that Ramos acted in evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy Calanoc's claim. Considering the nature and extent of the services rendered by respondent Calanoc's
counsel both in the trial and appellate courts, coupled with the admitted refusal of Ramos to satisfy Calanoc's initial
claim for the commissions he earned to which Calanoc was later on found to be entitled although the amount
involved in the Wellington & Co. transaction was considerably lessened the attorney's fees both in the lower court
and appellate courts should be fixed at P6,000.00. This may be done motu proprio by this Court under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, which provides that attorney's fees may be recovered in the instances therein enumerated and in "any other
case where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees... should be recovered," provided the amount
thereof be reasonable in all cases. (See: Bank of America vs. Araneta, 40 SCRA 144; Balmes vs. Suson, 28 SCRA 304).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court of Appeals' decision under review is hereby modified by reducing the amount for
which petitioner Ramos is liable to pay to respondent Calanoc on the Wellington & Co. transaction from P53,320.00 (2%)
to P13,330.00 (1/2%) which latter figure represents the amount actually received by petitioner in excess of his original
23% mark-up; the attorney's fees awarded in favor of Calanoc is likewise reduced from P10,000.00 to P6,000.00. In all
other respects the decision is affirmed, with no special pronouncement as to costs.

Makasiar, Barredo, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fabay vs resuena case is separate

G.R. No. 191128 Guizano v. Veneracion

Brion, J.

Action for reconveyance filed against petitioner by respondent. SC rules that the case must be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action because respondent impleaded petitioner, and not the registered owner of the subject property
who was the real party-in-interest.

DOCTRINE

Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party-in-interest in the case cannot be executed. Hence, a
complaint filed against such a person should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE

Carmencita Guizano petitioner

Reynaldo Veneracion respondent

FACTS

1. This case involves two parcels of land in Brgy. Kapihan, San Bernardino, Bulacan, inherited by
siblings Lucia and Nicasio Bernardino.

Nicasio: sold his entire share (6,445 sqm) to the Guizano spouses (petitioner)

Lucia: sold a 645 sqm portion of her share to Reynaldo Veneracion (respondent)

2. Nicasios share sold to petitioner was then registered under a TCT in the name of Emmanuel
Guizano (petitioners son).

3. Lucia didnt have any documentary proof of ownership over her share, so respondents father hired
a geodetic engineer to segregate the land sold to respondent from the land sold to petitioner.

Petitioner was there during the survey and pointed out the boundaries of the property sold
to her. She also affixed her signature to the sketch plan drew up by the geodetic engineer.

As an additional precaution, Lucia and the respondent had petitioner affix her signature on
the deed of sale over Lucias share to signify that she had no objections.

4. Petitioner later discovered that Lucias share sold to respondent was actually part of the property
sold to her by Nicasio. She placed the word HOLD on the subdivision plan signed by the geodetic
engineer.

5. Respondent then filed a complaint against petitioner and Lucia, praying that petitioner reconvey
the parcel of land in his favor.

6. In her Answer, petitioner claimed that the complaint was without merit since the property subject
of the sale between respondent and Lucia was part of the property sold to her, which is registered
in the name of her son Emmanuel. Thus, respondent had no cause of action against her.

7. RTC Malolos dismissed the complaint, observing that Lucia had no evidence to support her
ownership of her share she never had the property surveyed, never paid real estate taxes, and
never declared it for tax purposes.
 It also found respondent guilty of laches for filing the action 14 years after Emmanuel
Guizanos title over it was issued, which already attained the status of indefeasibility.

8. The CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered petitioner to convey the property to respondent. It
found that petitioner believed the property sold to respondent belonged to Lucia (see bullet points
under Fact #2) and is thus estopped from claiming ownership over the same.

9. Petitioner died during the pendency of the case, so her heirs filed a Rule 45 petition before the SC,
averring that:

Emmanuels title had already attained indefeasibility, thus it is no longer open for review by
the CA;

Reconveyance is not available to respondents because of laches;

The action should be dismissed because it was directed against petitioner, who is not the
real party in interest as she was not the registered owner of the property (it was
Emmanuel, who was not even impleaded).

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. W/N respondents complaint should be dismissed for not being filed against the real party-in-
interest Yes.

Both the RTC and the CA grievously erred when they overlooked a basic but fundamental
issue that petitioner timely raised in her Answer that the complaint states no cause of
action against her.

An action for reconveyance is an action available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. While it is a real action,
it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only, although it concerns the
right to an intangible thing.

o Being an action in personam, any judgment in this action is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded. This is in keeping with the principle that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, as embodied in Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:

Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
 o Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party-in-interest in the
case cannot be executed. Hence, a complaint filed against such a person should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Respondent filed the complaint to compel petitioner to execute a Deed of Reconveyance

over the subject property in his favor, even though he knew that the property was
registered in Emmanuels name and not petitioners.

o Respondent alleged that he filed the complaint against petitioner and not
Emmanuel because Emmanuel was only a nominal owner of the property, and
petitioner was the actual owner.

o The SC rules that the Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership over
registered land, and absent any evidence to the contrary, Emmanuel is the real
party-in-interest and respondent should have filed the action against him.

What makes respondents error even more inexcusable is the fact that petitioner repeatedly
raised this issue (of not being the real party-in-interest) before the lower court in her
Answer and Pre-Trial Brief. Respondent was already made aware of this defect in his
complaint and had opportunities to correct it, so his failure to implead Emmanuel is
untenable.

Respondent filed the complaint against petitioner either as owner or as attorney-in-fact of

Emmanuel. However, Emmanuel never authorized petitioner to be his attorney-in-fact.

o Even if she was authorized in a power of attorney executed by Emmanuel, an

attorney-in-fact is still not a party-in-interest and Emmanuel must still be
impleaded, according to Sec. 3, Rule 3, ROC:

Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a

representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petition granted. CA decision reversed.

TRUST

ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION, vs NICASIO I. ALCANTARA and EDITHA I. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 183050, January 25, 2012

This case is about the validity of a rehabilitation courts order that compelled a third party, in possession
of money allegedly belonging to the debtor of a company under rehabilitation, to deliver such money to
its court-appointed receiver over the debtors objection.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the
Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may,
upon motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.

Decision:

Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned
and, with the trial courts authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever
it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in
the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an
ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the
rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third
party.

Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate
adjudication of claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings
similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation
case. The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its
creditors and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules incorporate the concept of prohibited
pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the traditional
approach of receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any
incident, on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.
IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs HEIRS of BERNARDINO TAEZA

FACTS: Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) was the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 3653) subdivided into
four. From 1973-1976, Suprme Bishop Rev. Macario Ga, sold one lot to Bienvenido de Guzman and two
lots to Bernardino Taeza.

Taeza registered the subject parcels of land and transfer certificates were issued in his name. He then
occupied a portion of the land.

In January 1990, IFI filed for annulment of sale annulment of the subject parcels of land against Rev. Ga
and the defendant Bernardino Taeza on the ground that Rev. Ga was not authorized to sell. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of IFI. The CA reversed such decision. It ruled that IFI being a corporation
sole, validly transferred ownership over the land in question through its Supreme Bishop, who was at
the time the administrator of all properties and the official representative of the church. It further held
that [t]he authority of the then Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga to enter into a contract and represent the
plaintiff-appellee cannot be assailed, as there are no provisions in its constitution and canons giving the
said authority to any other person or entity.

ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale with mortgage is null and void or unenforceable?

HELD: The issue boils down to the question of whether then Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga is authorized to
enter into a contract of sale in behalf of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that there was no consent to the contract of sale as Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga had
no authority to give such consent. It emphasized that Article IV (a) of their Canons provides that "All real
properties of the Church located or situated in such parish can be disposed of only with the approval
and conformity of the laymen's committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop, with sanction of the
Supreme Council, and finally with the approval of the Supreme Bishop, as administrator of all the
temporalities of the Church." It is alleged that the sale was done without the required approval
mentioned in the Canons;

The Trial court also found that the laymen's committee indeed made its objection to the sale known to
the Supreme Bishop but the latter still executed the contract of sale despite such opposition. He clearly
acted beyond his powers: This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable contracts
mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, which provides, thus:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

Petition Granted. IFI is the rightful owner of subject lots.

G.R. No. 140528 December 7, 2011

MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and children: CLARO,
MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all surnamed TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE
RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE and
DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA; EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs,
namely: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO, ROMULO T. ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIO-
HADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO
T. TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T. ZULUETA, CANDIDO T. TORBELA, FLORENTINA T.
TORBELA and PANTALEON T. TORBELA; DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN,
represented by her heirs, namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN;
and SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 140553

LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, Petitioner,

vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Presently before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, both assailing the Decision1 dated June 29, 1999 and Resolution2 dated October 22, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 140528 are siblings Maria Torbela,3 Pedro Torbela,4 Eufrosina Torbela
Rosario,5Leonila Torbela Tamin, Fernando Torbela,6 Dolores Torbela Tablada, Leonora Torbela
Agustin,7 and Severina Torbela Ildefonso (Torbela siblings).

The petitioner in G.R. No. 140553 is Lena Duque-Rosario (Duque-Rosario), who was married to, but now
legally separated from, Dr. Andres T. Rosario (Dr. Rosario). Dr. Rosario is the son of Eufrosina Torbela
Rosario and the nephew of the other Torbela siblings.

The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374 square meters, located in Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan (Lot No. 356-A). It was originally part of a larger parcel of land, known as Lot No. 356 of
the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, measuring 749 square meters, and covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 16676,8 in the name of Valeriano Semilla (Valeriano), married to Potenciana Acosta.
Under unexplained circumstances, Valeriano gave Lot No. 356-A to his sister Marta Semilla, married to
Eugenio Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon the deaths of the spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was
adjudicated in equal shares among their children, the Torbela siblings, by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition9 dated December 3, 1962.

On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim10 over Lot No. 356-A
in favor of Dr. Rosario. According to the said Deed, the Torbela siblings "for and in consideration of the
sum of NINE PESOS (P9.00) x x x transfer[red] and convey[ed] x x x unto the said Andres T. Rosario, that
undivided portion of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR square meters of that parcel of land embraced in
Original Certificate of Title No. 16676 of the land records of Pangasinan x x x."11 Four days later, on
December 16, 1964, OCT No. 16676 in Valerianos name was partially cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and
TCT No. 5275112 was issued in Dr. Rosarios name covering the said property.

Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim13 was subsequently executed on December 28, 1964, this time by
Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings and was
already returning the same to the latter for P1.00. The Deed stated:

That for and in consideration of the sum of one peso (P1.00), Philippine Currency and the fact that I only
borrowed the above described parcel of land from MARIA TORBELA, married to Eulogio Tosino,
EUFROSINA TORBELA, married to Pedro Rosario, PEDRO TORBELA, married to Petra Pagador, LEONILA
TORBELA, married to Fortunato Tamen, FERNANDO TORBELA, married to Victoriana Tablada, DOLORES
TORBELA, widow, LEONORA TORBELA, married to Matias Agustin and SEVERINA TORBELA, married to
Jorge Ildefonso, x x x by these presents do hereby cede, transfer and convey by way of this ABSOLUTE
QUITCLAIM unto the said Maria, Eufrosina, Pedro, Leonila, Fernando, Dolores, Leonora and Severina, all
surnamed Torbela the parcel of land described above.14 (Emphasis ours.)

The aforequoted Deed was notarized, but was not immediately annotated on TCT No. 52751.

Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) on February 21, 1965 in the sum of P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 356-A. The mortgage was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on September 21, 1965 as Entry No.
243537.15 Dr. Rosario used the proceeds of the loan for the construction of improvements on Lot No.
356-A.

On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio) executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim,16 on behalf of the
Torbela siblings. Cornelio deposed in said Affidavit:

3. That ANDRES T. ROSARIO later quitclaimed his rights in favor of the former owners by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim which he executed before Notary Public Banaga, and entered in his Notarial
Registry as Dec. No. 43; Page No. 9; Book No. I; Series of 1964;

4. That it is the desire of the parties, my aforestated kins, to register ownership over the above-
described property or to perfect their title over the same but their Deed could not be registered because
the registered owner now, ANDRES T. ROSARIO mortgaged the property with the DEVELOPMENT BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, on September 21, 1965, and for which reason, the Title is still impounded and held
by the said bank;

5. That pending payment of the obligation with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES or
redemption of the Title from said bank, I, CORNELIO T. TOSINO, in behalf of my mother MARIA
TORBELA-TOSINO, and my Aunts EUFROSINA TORBELA, LEONILA TORBELA-TAMEN, DOLORES TORBELA,
LEONORA TORBELA-AGUSTIN, SEVERINA TORBELA-ILDEFONSO, and my Uncles PEDRO TORBELA and
FERNANDO, also surnamed TORBELA, I request the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to annotate their
adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52751, based on the annexed document,
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim by ANDRES T. ROSARIO, dated December 28, 1964, marked as Annex "A"
and made a part of this Affidavit, and it is also requested that the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES be informed accordingly.17

The very next day, on May 17, 1967, the Torbela siblings had Cornelios Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated
May 16, 1967 and Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 annotated on TCT
No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 27447118 and 274472,19 respectively.

The construction of a four-storey building on Lot No. 356-A was eventually completed. The building was
initially used as a hospital, but was later converted to a commercial building. Part of the building was
leased to PT&T; and the rest to Mrs. Andrea Rosario-Haduca, Dr. Rosarios sister, who operated the Rose
Inn Hotel and Restaurant.

Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP. Under Entry No. 520197 on TCT No. 5275120 dated
March 6, 1981, the mortgage appearing under Entry No. 243537 was cancelled per the Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage executed by DBP in favor of Dr. Rosario and ratified before a notary public on
July 11, 1980.

In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime
in 1979-1981. Records do not reveal though the original amount of the loan from PNB, but the loan
agreement was amended on March 5, 1981 and the loan amount was increased to P450,000.00. The
loan was secured by mortgages constituted on the following properties: (1) Lot No. 356-A, covered by
TCT No. 52751 in Dr. Rosarios name; (2) Lot No. 4489, with an area of 1,862 square meters, located in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, covered by TCT No. 24832; and (3) Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, with an area of
1,001 square meters, located in Nancayasan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, covered by TCT No. 104189.21 The
amended loan agreement and mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on March 6,
1981 as Entry No. 520099.22

Five days later, on March 11, 1981, another annotation, Entry No. 520469,23 was made on TCT No.
52751, canceling the adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A under Entry Nos. 274471-274472, on the basis of
the Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage executed by Dr. Rosario on March 5, 1981. Entry No.
520469 consisted of both stamped and handwritten portions, and exactly reads:

Entry No. 520469. Cancellation of Adverse Claim executed by Andres Rosario in favor of same. The
incumbrance/mortgage appearing under Entry No. 274471-72 is now cancelled as per Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage Ratified before Notary Public Mauro G. Meris on March 5, 1981: Doc. No. 215;
Page No. 44; Book No. 1; Series Of 1981.

Lingayen, Pangasinan, 3-11, 19981

[Signed: Pedro dela Cruz]

Register of Deeds 24

On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario (spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan
in the amount of P1,200,000.00 from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To
secure said loan, the spouses Rosario again constituted mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. The mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry No.
53328325 on December 18, 1981. Since the construction of a two-storey commercial building on Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was still incomplete, the loan value thereof as collateral was deducted from the
approved loan amount. Thus, the spouses Rosario could only avail of the maximum loan amount
of P830,064.00 from Banco Filipino.

Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr. Rosarios loan from PNB, the mortgage on Lot No. 356-A
in favor of PNB was cancelled per Entry No. 53347826 on TCT No. 52751 dated December 23, 1981.

On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, a Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages,
against the spouses Rosario, which was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4359. On the same day, Entry Nos.
593493 and 593494 were made on TCT No. 52751 that read as follows:

Entry No. 593494 Complaint Civil Case No. U-4359 (For: Recovery of Ownership and Possession and
Damages. (Sup. Paper).

Entry No. 593493 Notice of Lis Pendens The parcel of land described in this title is subject to Lis
Pendens executed by Liliosa B. Rosario, CLAO, Trial Attorney dated February 13, 1986. Filed to TCT No.
52751

February 13, 1986-1986 February 13 3:30 p.m.

(SGD.) PACIFICO M. BRAGANZA

Register of Deeds27

The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan from Banco Filipino. As of April 2, 1987, the
spouses Rosarios outstanding principal obligation and penalty charges amounted to P743,296.82
and P151,524.00, respectively.28

Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-
8-C-2-B-2-A. During the public auction on April 2, 1987, Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the three
foreclosed properties for the price of P1,372,387.04. The Certificate of Sale29 dated April 2, 1987, in
favor of Banco Filipino, was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on April 14, 1987 as Entry No. 610623.30
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their Amended Complaint,31 impleading
Banco Filipino as additional defendant in Civil Case No. U-4359 and praying that the spouses Rosario be
ordered to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino.

The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on March 4, 1988 a case for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure and damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, against Banco Filipino, the Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff and his Deputy, and the Register of Deeds
of Pangasinan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4667. Another notice of lis pendens was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 on March 10, 1988 as Entry No. 627059, viz:

Entry No. 627059 Lis Pendens Dr. Andres T. Rosario and Lena Duque Rosario, Plaintiff versus Banco
Filipino, et. al. Civil Case No. U-4667 or Annulment of ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
The parcel of land described in this title is subject to Notice of Lis Pendens subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Mauro G. Meris, as Doc. No. 21; Page No. 5; Book 111; S-1988. March 7, 1988-1988
March 10, 1:00 p.m.

(SGD.) RUFINO M. MORENO, SR.

Register of Deeds32

The Torbela siblings intervened in Civil Case No. U-4667. Eventually, on October 17, 1990, the RTC issued
an Order33 dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. U-4667 due to the spouses Rosarios failure to
prosecute.

Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino, but their efforts
were unsuccessful. Upon the expiration of the one-year redemption period in April 1988, the Certificate
of Final Sale34and Affidavit of Consolidation35 covering all three foreclosed properties were executed on
May 24, 1988 and May 25, 1988, respectively.

On June 7, 1988, new certificates of title were issued in the name of Banco Filipino, particularly, TCT No.
165812 for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and TCT No. 165813 for Lot No. 356-A .36

The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on August 29, 1988 a Complaint37 for annulment of
the Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988, judicial cancelation of TCT No. 165813, and damages,
against Banco Filipino, the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4733.

On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC of Urdaneta City a Petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession. In said Petition, docketed as Pet. Case No. U-822, Banco Filipino prayed that a writ of
possession be issued in its favor over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A, plus the improvements
thereon, and the spouses Rosario and other persons presently in possession of said properties be
directed to abide by said writ.

The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822. The Decision38 on
these three cases was promulgated on January 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

1. Declaring the real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 executed by Spouses Andres
Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino, legal and valid;

2. Declaring the sheriffs sale dated April 2, 1987 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 and subsequent
final Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1988 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751 legal and valid;

3. Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751 (now TCT 165813);

4. Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot 356-A together with the improvements
thereon (Rose Inn Building). The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue a writ of possession in
favor of Banco Filipino;

5. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to render accounting to Banco Filipino the rental they
received from tenants of Rose Inn Building from May 14, 1988;

6. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to pay Banco Filipino the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys
fees;

7. Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give [the Torbela siblings] the right of first refusal over Lot 356-A.
The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to annotate the right of [the Torbela siblings] at the back of TCT
No. 165813 after payment of the required fees;

8. Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby ordered to reimburse [the Torbela siblings] the market value
of Lot 356-A as of December, 1964 minus payments made by the former;

9. Dismissing the complaint of [the Torbela siblings] against Banco Filipino, Pedro Habon and Rufino
Moreno in Civil Case No. U-4733; and against Banco Filipino in Civil Case No. U-4359.39

The RTC released an Amended Decision40 dated January 29, 1992, adding the following paragraph to the
dispositive:

Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-[B]-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-122471, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 104189 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan[.]41

The Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario appealed the foregoing RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Their appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.

In its Decision42 dated June 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Items
No. 6 and 7 of the appealed decision are DELETED. Item No. 8 is modified requiring [Dr. Rosario] to pay
[the Torbela siblings] actual damages, in the amount of P1,200,000.00 with 6% per annum interest from
finality of this decision until fully paid. [Dr. Rosario] is further ORDERED to pay [the Torbela siblings] the
amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P100,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
Costs against [Dr. Rosario].43

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution44 dated October 22, 1999, denied the separate Motions for
Reconsideration of the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.

The Torbela siblings come before this Court via the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 140528, with the
following assignment of errors:

First Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY [DR. ANDRES T. ROSARIO] IN FAVOR OF THE
[TORBELA SIBLINGS] DATED DECEMBER 28, 1964 AND THE REGISTRATION OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE
CLAIM EXECUTED BY THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS], SERVE AS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO CONVEY OR AFFECT
THE LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS THEREOF IN SO FAR AS THIRD PERSONS ARE CONCERNED.

Second Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 52751 IS CLEAN AND FREE, DESPITE OF THE ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCES
OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM AND THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM APPEARING AT THE BACK
THEREOF AS ENTRY NOS. 274471 AND 274472, RESPECTIVELY.

Third Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE
CLAIM OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] UNDER ENTRY NO. 274471 WAS VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PETITION DULY FILED IN COURT FOR ITS CANCELLATION.

Fourth Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK IS A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.

Fifth Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE FILING OF A CIVIL
CASE NO. U-4359 ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, IMPLEADING RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO AS ADDITIONAL
PARTY DEFENDANT, TOLL OR SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE ONE YEAR PERIOD OF REDEMPTION.

Sixth Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE OWNERSHIP OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PREMATURELY CONSOLIDATED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.

Seventh Issue and Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AT
LEAST WORTH P1,200,000.00.45

The Torbela siblings ask of this Court:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the [Torbela siblings] most respectfully pray
that the questioned DECISION promulgated on June 29, 1999 (Annex "A", Petition) and the RESOLUTION
dated October 22, 1999 (Annex "B", Petition) be REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and/or further MODIFIED in
favor of the [Torbela siblings], and another DECISION issue ordering, among other reliefs, the
respondent Banco Filipino to reconvey back Lot No. 356-A, covered by T.C.T. No. 52751, in favor of the
[Torbela siblings] who are the actual owners of the same.

The [Torbela siblings] likewise pray for such other reliefs and further remedies as may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises.46

Duque-Rosario, now legally separated from Dr. Rosario, avers in her Petition for Review in G.R. No.
140553 that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A were registered in her name, and she was
unlawfully deprived of ownership of said properties because of the following errors of the Court of
Appeals:

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PERIOD TO REDEEM THE
PROPERTY HAS NOT COMMENCED, HENCE, THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE, THE CONSOLIDATION OF
OWNERSHIP BY [BANCO FILIPINO], ARE NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO RULE THAT THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO BY THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] HAD ALREADY BEEN PRESCRIBED.47

Duque-Rosario prays that the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and
that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A be freed from all obligations and encumbrances and
returned to her.

Review of findings of fact by the RTC and the Court of Appeals warranted.

A disquisition of the issues raised and/or errors assigned in the Petitions at bar unavoidably requires a
re-evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by the parties in the court a quo.

In Republic v. Heirs of Julia Ramos,48 the Court summed up the rules governing the power of review of
the Court:

Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
especially where such findings coincide with those of the trial
court.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/169481.htm - _ftn The findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, conclusive and binding upon this Court, since this
Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.

The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.49

As the succeeding discussion will bear out, the first, fourth, and ninth exceptions are extant in these
case.

Barangay conciliation was not a pre-requisite to the institution of Civil Case No. U-4359.

Dr. Rosario contends that Civil Case No. U-4359, the Complaint of the Torbela siblings for recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, should have been dismissed by the RTC
because of the failure of the Torbela siblings to comply with the prior requirement of submitting the
dispute to barangay conciliation.

The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 on February 13, 1986, when Presidential Decree No.
1508, Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level, was still in
effect.50 Pertinent provisions of said issuance read:

Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:

1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;

5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Section 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all
disputes which involved real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated.

The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

1. involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangays adjoin each other; and

2. involving real property located in different municipalities.

xxxx

Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall
be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. x x x. (Emphases
supplied.)

The Court gave the following elucidation on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa in Tavora v. Hon.
Veloso51:

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a
barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their
dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time,
Section 3 while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in
"different barangays" within the same city or municipality unequivocably declares that the Lupon
shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.

Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes
where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays
in which they actually reside adjoin each other.

It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a given
dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:

"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such.

The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary
the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to
the contrary.

"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except something from the enacting clause; to
limit, restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or in part; or to exclude from the scope of the statute that
which otherwise would be within its terms." (73 Am Jur 2d 467.)

Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed
in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although venue is generally determined
by the residence of the parties, disputes involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or any part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere
within the same city/municipality.52 (Emphases supplied.)

The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the Torbela siblings and the spouses Rosario) do not reside
in the same barangay, or in different barangays within the same city or municipality, or in different
barangays of different cities or municipalities but are adjoining each other. Some of them reside outside
Pangasinan and even outside of the country altogether. The Torbela siblings reside separately in
Barangay Macalong, Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Barangay Consolacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Pangil,
Laguna; Chicago, United States of America; and Canada. The spouses Rosario are residents of Calle
Garcia, Poblacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Resultantly, the Lupon had no jurisdiction over the dispute and
barangay conciliation was not a pre-condition for the filing of Civil Case No. U-4359.

The Court now looks into the merits of Civil Case No. U-4359.

There was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.

There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to Lot No. 356-A from their parents, the
Torbela spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same from the first registered owner of Lot No. 356-A,
Valeriano.

Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which they
transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of P9.00. However, the
Torbela siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario
could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name and use said property to secure a loan from DBP, the
proceeds of which would be used for building a hospital on Lot No. 356-A a claim supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence, and borne out by the sequence of events immediately following
the execution by the Torbela siblings of said Deed. On December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot
No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr. Rosarios name. On December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario executed his
own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which he expressly acknowledged that he "only borrowed" Lot No.
356-A and was transferring and conveying the same back to the Torbela siblings for the consideration
of P1.00. On February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosarios loan in the amount of P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage
on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a hospital building started on
Lot No. 356-A.

Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela siblings is the testimony of Atty. Lorenza
Alcantara (Atty. Alcantara), who had no apparent personal interest in the present case. Atty. Alcantara,
when she was still a boarder at the house of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr. Rosarios mother), was
consulted by the Torbela siblings as regards the extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 356-A. She also
witnessed the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.

In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in his name, to prove his purported title to Lot
No. 356-A. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,53 the Court made a clear distinction between title and
the certificate of title:

The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different
from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership
although both are interchangeably used. x x x.54 (Emphases supplied.)

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give
the holder any better title than what he actually has.55 Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein
his acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name.

Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A after paying the Torbela siblings P25,000.00,
pursuant to a verbal agreement with the latter. The Court though observes that Dr. Rosarios testimony
on the execution and existence of the verbal agreement with the Torbela siblings lacks significant details
(such as the names of the parties present, dates, places, etc.) and is not corroborated by independent
evidence.

In addition, Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 12, 1964 and December 28, 1964, even affirming his own signature on the latter Deed. The
Parol Evidence Rule provides that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced into writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.56 Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of
Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the Deeds; (2) failure of the Deeds to express the true intent and the agreement of the
parties thereto; (3) the validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence of other terms agreed to by the
Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario after the execution of the Deeds.57

Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosarios testimony on his alleged verbal agreement with the Torbela
siblings, the Court finds the same unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario averred that the two Deeds were executed
only because he was "planning to secure loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines and
Philippine National Bank and the bank needed absolute quitclaim[.]"58 While Dr. Rosarios explanation
makes sense for the first Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964 executed by the Torbela
siblings (which transferred Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for P9.00.00), the same could not be said for the
second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 executed by Dr. Rosario. In fact, Dr.
Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim (in which he admitted that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A and
was transferring the same to the Torbela siblings for P1.00.00) would actually work against the approval
of Dr. Rosarios loan by the banks. Since Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28,
1964 is a declaration against his self-interest, it must be taken as favoring the truthfulness of the
contents of said Deed.59

It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A
based on his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the said
Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of the
Civil Code, "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon."60 That admission
cannot now be denied by Dr. Rosario as against the Torbela siblings, the latter having relied upon his
representation.

Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only
holds Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings.

Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It
is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the
beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created
by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of
law.61

Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the
Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that
a trust is clearly intended."62 It is possible to create a trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee."
Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create
a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of
relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the
relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.63
In Tamayo v. Callejo,64 the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in the
beginning, but the registered owners subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a
previous sale of the property to another party, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust
the nature of an express trust. The same situation exists in this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to
register Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964, an implied trust was
initially established between him and the Torbela siblings under Article 1451 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the
name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.

Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing his express
admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the
nature of the trust to an express one. The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-
A remained registered in Dr. Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of
said property, together with the improvements thereon.

The right of the Torbela siblings to recover Lot No. 356-A has not yet prescribed.

The Court extensively discussed the prescriptive period for express trusts in the Heirs of Maximo
Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio Labanon,65 to wit:

On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to rule in Bueno v. Reyes that unrepudiated written
express trusts are imprescriptible:

"While there are some decisions which hold that an action upon a trust is imprescriptible, without
distinguishing between express and implied trusts, the better rule, as laid down by this Court in other
decisions, is that prescription does supervene where the trust is merely an implied one. The reason has
been expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88, as
follows:

Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all actions for recovery of real property prescribed
in 10 years, excepting only actions based on continuing or subsisting trusts that were considered by
section 38 as imprescriptible. As held in the case of Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958, however,
the continuing or subsisting trusts contemplated in section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred
only to express unrepudiated trusts, and did not include constructive trusts (that are imposed by law)
where no fiduciary relation exists and the trustee does not recognize the trust at all."

This principle was amplified in Escay v. Court of Appeals this way: "Express trusts prescribe 10 years
from the repudiation of the trust (Manuel Diaz, et al. vs. Carmen Gorricho et al., 54 O.G. p. 8429, Sec.
40, Code of Civil Procedure)."
In the more recent case of Secuya v. De Selma, we again ruled that the prescriptive period for the
enforcement of an express trust of ten (10) years starts upon the repudiation of the trust by the
trustee.66

To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would bar a beneficiarys action to recover in an express
trust, the repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and made known to
the beneficiary.67The express trust disables the trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the property
committed to his management or custody, at least while he does not openly repudiate the trust, and
makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this reason, the old Code of
Civil Procedure (Act 190) declared that the rules on adverse possession do not apply to "continuing and
subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts. In an express trust, the delay of the beneficiary is directly
attributable to the trustee who undertakes to hold the property for the former, or who is linked to the
beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The trustee's possession is, therefore, not adverse to
the beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made aware that the trust has been repudiated.68

Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated the trust on December 16, 1964, when he
registered Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751, so when on February 13, 1986, the Torbela
siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359, for the recovery of ownership and possession of
Lot No. 356-A from the spouses Rosario, over 21 years had passed. Civil Case No. U-4359 was already
barred by prescription, as well as laches.

The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor v. Ringor69 for the following reasons:

A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate
the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not vest
ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and
records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens
system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful claim to the property, the
Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration
of the lands in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they
seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs.
The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title.
The intended trust must be sustained.70 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the more recent case of Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose Labiste,71 the Court refused to
apply prescription and laches and reiterated that:

[P]rescription and laches will run only from the time the express trust is repudiated. The Court has held
that for acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express
trust for the recovery of the property held in trust it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive. Respondents cannot rely on the fact that the Torrens title was issued in the name of Epifanio
and the other heirs of Jose. It has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held
in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. The rule requires a
clear repudiation of the trust duly communicated to the beneficiary. The only act that can be construed
as repudiation was when respondents filed the petition for reconstitution in October 1993. And since
petitioners filed their complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has not yet prescribed, laches
cannot be attributed to them.72 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that under the foregoing jurisprudence, the registration of Lot No. 356-A by Dr. Rosario in his
name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964 is not the repudiation that would have caused the
10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express trust to run.

The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Rosario repudiated the express trust when he acquired another loan
from PNB and constituted a second mortgage on Lot No. 356-A sometime in 1979, which, unlike the first
mortgage to DBP in 1965, was without the knowledge and/or consent of the Torbela siblings.

The Court only concurs in part with the Court of Appeals on this matter.

For repudiation of an express trust to be effective, the unequivocal act of repudiation had to be made
known to the Torbela siblings as the cestuis que trust and must be proven by clear and conclusive
evidence. A scrutiny of TCT No. 52751 reveals the following inscription:

Entry No. 520099

Amendment of the mortgage in favor of PNB inscribed under Entry No. 490658 in the sense that the
consideration thereof has been increased to PHILIPPINE PESOS Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
only (P450,000.00) and to secure any and all negotiations with PNB, whether contracted before, during
or after the date of this instrument, acknowledged before Notary Public of Pangasinan Alejo M. Dato as
Doc. No. 198, Page No. 41, Book No. 11, Series of 1985.

Date of Instrument March 5, 1981

Date of Inscription March 6, 198173

Although according to Entry No. 520099, the original loan and mortgage agreement of Lot No. 356-A
between Dr. Rosario and PNB was previously inscribed as Entry No. 490658, Entry No. 490658 does not
actually appear on TCT No. 52751 and, thus, it cannot be used as the reckoning date for the start of the
prescriptive period.

The Torbela siblings can only be charged with knowledge of the mortgage of Lot No. 356-A to PNB on
March 6, 1981 when the amended loan and mortgage agreement was registered on TCT No. 52751 as
Entry No. 520099. Entry No. 520099 is constructive notice to the whole world74 that Lot No. 356-A was
mortgaged by Dr. Rosario to PNB as security for a loan, the amount of which was increased
to P450,000.00. Hence, Dr. Rosario is deemed to have effectively repudiated the express trust between
him and the Torbela siblings on March 6, 1981, on which day, the prescriptive period for the
enforcement of the express trust by the Torbela siblings began to run.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and mortgage agreement was registered on TCT No.
52751, to February 13, 1986, when the Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359
against the spouses Rosario, only about five years had passed. The Torbela siblings were able to institute
Civil Case No. U-4359 well before the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement of
their express trust with Dr. Rosario.

Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches. Laches means the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. As the Court explained in the preceding paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case
No. U-4359 five years after Dr. Rosarios repudiation of the express trust, still within the 10-year
prescriptive period for enforcement of such trusts. This does not constitute an unreasonable delay in
asserting one's right. A delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to
be a delay that would bar relief. Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.75

Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.

Having determined that the Torbela siblings are the true owners and Dr. Rosario merely the trustee of
Lot No. 356-A, the Court is next faced with the issue of whether or not the Torbela siblings may still
recover Lot No. 356-A considering that Dr. Rosario had already mortgaged Lot No. 356-A to Banco
Filipino, and upon Dr. Rosarios default on his loan obligations, Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage,
acquired Lot No. 356-A as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and consolidated title in its name
under TCT No. 165813. The resolution of this issue depends on the answer to the question of whether or
not Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith.

Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is that
the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage
is considered null and void. However, an exception to this rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good
faith." Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the
mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy.
This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate
of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.
This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for value." The prevailing
jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the
mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion,
has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful
owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is,
nonetheless, entitled to protection.76

On one hand, the Torbela siblings aver that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith because as
early as May 17, 1967, they had already annotated Cornelios Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and Dr.
Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471-
274472, respectively.

On the other hand, Banco Filipino asseverates that it is a mortgagee in good faith because per Section 70
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the notice of
adverse claim, registered on May 17, 1967 by the Torbela siblings under Entry Nos. 274471-274472 on
TCT No. 52751, already lapsed after 30 days or on June 16, 1967. Additionally, there was an express
cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 dated March 11, 1981. So when Banco
Filipino approved Dr. Rosarios loan for P1,200,000.00 and constituted a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A
(together with two other properties) on December 8, 1981, the only other encumbrance on TCT No.
52751 was Entry No. 520099 dated March 6, 1981, i.e., the amended loan and mortgage agreement
between Dr. Rosario and PNB (which was eventually cancelled after it was paid off with part of the
proceeds from Dr. Rosarios loan from Banco Filipino). Hence, Banco Filipino was not aware that the
Torbela siblings adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A still subsisted.

The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith. Entry Nos. 274471-274472 were not
validly cancelled, and the improper cancellation should have been apparent to Banco Filipino and
aroused suspicion in said bank of some defect in Dr. Rosarios title.

The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons
that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.77

Adverse claims were previously governed by Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, quoted in full below:

ADVERSE CLAIM

SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and
designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree
therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was
frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its discretion.
Construing the aforequoted provision, the Court stressed in Ty Sin Tei v. Lee Dy Piao78 that "[t]he validity
or efficaciousness of the [adverse] claim x x x may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the
proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found
unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be cancelled." The Court likewise pointed out in the
same case that while a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in a number of ways, "the same is not
true in a registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one instance, i.e., after the claim is
adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court x x x;" and "if any of the registrations should be
considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens and not the annotation of
the adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing and
proper disposition of the claim."

With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree on June 11, 1978, Section 70 thereof now
applies to adverse claims:

SEC. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registrations, may, if no other provision
is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right, or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days
from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same
claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as
may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be
ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim
thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos
nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
(Emphases supplied.)

In Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,79 the Court squarely interpreted Section 70 of the Property Registration
Decree, particularly, the new 30-day period not previously found in Section 110 of the Land Registration
Act, thus:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a
construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when
a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of
effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three,
paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:

"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration."

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to
thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in
relation to the sentence following, which reads:

"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest."

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of
thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated
by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the statute's totality.
Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless
clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its
history, origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts in their construction. x x x.

xxxx

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of
the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to
qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the
cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already
ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the
process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.

It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be cancelled," which obviously indicates, as
inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an
adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days
from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with
the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in
determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the
court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine
whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to
thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of
adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed
out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety
of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the
existence of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the
provision immediately following:

"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be registered by the same
claimant."

Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse claimant will be
precluded from registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground.

It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon
petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and
make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found
unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the
interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties."80 (Emphases supplied.)

Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act or Section 70 of the Property Registration
Decree, notice of adverse claim can only be cancelled after a party in interest files a petition for
cancellation before the RTC wherein the property is located, and the RTC conducts a hearing and
determines the said claim to be invalid or unmeritorious.

No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has been conducted herein to determine the
validity or merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings. Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse
claim of the Torbela siblings, annotated as Entry Nos. 274471-774472, upon the presentation by Dr.
Rosario of a mere Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.

Regardless of whether or not the Register of Deeds should have inscribed Entry No. 520469 on TCT No.
52751, Banco Filipino could not invoke said inscription in support of its claim of good faith. There were
several things amiss in Entry No. 520469 which should have already aroused suspicions in Banco Filipino,
and compelled the bank to look beyond TCT No. 52751 and inquire into Dr. Rosarios title. First, Entry
No. 520469 does not mention any court order as basis for the cancellation of the adverse claim. Second,
the adverse claim was not a mortgage which could be cancelled with Dr. Rosarios Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage. And third, the adverse claim was against Dr. Rosario, yet it was cancelled based
on a document also executed by Dr. Rosario.

It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists,
or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or
mortgagor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it afterwards
develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defects as
would have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required of a
prudent man in a like situation.81

While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 might not be evident
to a private individual, the same should have been apparent to Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an
ordinary mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose business is impressed with public interest. In fact,
in one case, 82 the Court explicitly declared that the rule that persons dealing with registered lands can
rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks. In another case,83 the Court adjudged that
unlike private individuals, a bank is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings,
including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence
before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.

Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less a purchaser in good faith at the
foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the Torbela siblings over Lot No. 356-A is superior
over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No. 356-A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a
reconveyance of said property even from Banco Filipino.

Nonetheless, the failure of Banco Filipino to comply with the due diligence requirement was not the
result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill
will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.84

Given the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings, there is no more need to address issues
concerning redemption, annulment of the foreclosure sale and certificate of sale (subject matter of Civil
Case No. U-4733), or issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino (subject matter of Pet.
Case No. U-822) insofar as Lot No. 356-A is concerned. Such would only be superfluous. Banco Filipino,
however, is not left without any recourse should the foreclosure and sale of the two other mortgaged
properties be insufficient to cover Dr. Rosarios loan, for the bank may still bring a proper suit against Dr.
Rosario to collect the unpaid balance.

The rules on accession shall govern the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and the rents thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of accession is recognized under Article 440 of the Civil
Code which states that "[t]he ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially."

There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A. The Torbela
siblings themselves alleged that they allowed Dr. Rosario to register Lot No. 356-A in his name so he
could obtain a loan from DBP, using said parcel of land as security; and with the proceeds of the loan,
Dr. Rosario had a building constructed on Lot No. 356-A, initially used as a hospital, and then later for
other commercial purposes. Dr. Rosario supervised the construction of the building, which began in
1965; fully liquidated the loan from DBP; and maintained and administered the building, as well as
collected the rental income therefrom, until the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 before
the RTC on February 13, 1986.

When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, both the Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr.
Rosario (as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware of the construction of a
building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr. Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite
his knowledge that Lot No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela siblings. This is the case contemplated under
Article 453 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the
land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be
the same as though both had acted in good faith.

It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his
knowledge and without opposition on his part. (Emphasis supplied.)

When both the landowner and the builder are in good faith, the following rules govern:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good
faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers
no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount
expended.

Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in
good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner
of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability
of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the law has provided a just and
equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to
pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is
older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.85

The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity
or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. But even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the
owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is
only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is
not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the
land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.86

This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the determination of matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of the Civil Code. Such matters include the option
that the Torbela siblings will choose; the amount of indemnity that they will pay if they decide to
appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A; the value of Lot No. 356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr.
Rosario; or the reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario but the value of the land is
considerably more than the improvements. The determination made by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated June 29, 1999 that the current value of Lot No. 356-A is P1,200,000.00 is not supported
by any evidence on record.

Should the Torbela siblings choose to appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, the following
ruling of the Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals87 is relevant in the determination of the amount of
indemnity under Article 546 of the Civil Code:

Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined.
The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of
the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for
necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in
consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this Court
pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin
made of strong material based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana,
despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of
between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), the landowner was
ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the
house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value"
of the house, a useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this
regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said
provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a
piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other
may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the
current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to
acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount.
Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value
of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of
reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.88 (Emphases supplied.)

Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such as rents, belong to the owner of the
building.89 Thus, Dr. Rosario has a right to the rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and is under
no obligation to render an accounting of the same to anyone. In fact, it is the Torbela siblings who are
required to account for the rents they had collected from the lessees of the commercial building and
turn over any balance to Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosarios right to the rents of the improvements on Lot No.
356-A shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen their option under Article 448 of the Civil
Code. And in case the Torbela siblings decide to appropriate the improvements, Dr. Rosario shall have
the right to retain said improvements, as well as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has
been paid.90

Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to the Torbela siblings.

The Court of Appeals ordered Dr. Rosario to pay the Torbela siblings P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Indeed, Dr. Rosarios deceit and bad faith is evident when, being fully aware that he only held Lot No.
356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings, he mortgaged said property to PNB and Banco Filipino absent the
consent of the Torbela siblings, and caused the irregular cancellation of the Torbela siblings adverse
claim on TCT No. 52751. Irrefragably, Dr. Rosarios betrayal had caused the Torbela siblings (which
included Dr. Rosarios own mother, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario) mental anguish, serious anxiety, and
wounded feelings. Resultantly, the award of moral damages is justified, but the amount thereof is
reduced to P200,000.00.

In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages may also be imposed given that Dr. Rosarios
wrongful acts were accompanied by bad faith. However, judicial discretion granted to the courts in the
assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. The
circumstances of the case call for a reduction of the award of exemplary damages to P100,000.00.

As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Because of Dr.
Rosarios acts, the Torbela siblings were constrained to institute several cases against Dr. Rosario and his
spouse, Duque-Rosario, as well as Banco Filipino, which had lasted for more than 25 years.
Consequently, the Torbela siblings are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and the amount
of P100,000.00 may be considered rational, fair, and reasonable.

Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.

The Court emphasizes that Pet. Case No. U-822, instituted by Banco Filipino for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the RTC of Urdaneta, included only Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A (Lot No.
4489, the third property mortgaged to secure Dr. Rosarios loan from Banco Filipino, is located in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, and the petition for issuance of a writ of possession for the same should be
separately filed with the RTC of Dagupan City). Since the Court has already granted herein the
reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino to the Torbela siblings, the writ of possession now
pertains only to Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.

To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of Banco
Filipino. Dr. Rosario no longer appealed from said judgment of the appellate court. Already legally
separated from Dr. Rosario, Duque-Rosario alone challenges the writ of possession before this Court
through her Petition in G.R. No. 140553.

Duque-Rosario alleges in her Petition that Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A had been registered in her name
under TCT No. 104189. Yet, without a copy of TCT No. 104189 on record, the Court cannot give much
credence to Duque-Rosarios claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Also, the question of
whether Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was the paraphernal property of Duque-Rosario or the conjugal
property of the spouses Rosario would not alter the outcome of Duque-Rosarios Petition.

The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and the two other properties after Dr. Rosario defaulted on the payment of his
loan; Banco Filipino was the highest bidder for all three properties at the foreclosure sale on April 2,
1987; the Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987 was registered in April 1987; and based on the
Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation dated May 25, 1988, the
Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 104189 and issued TCT No. 165812 in the name of Banco Filipino for
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A on June 7, 1988.

The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year redemption period should be counted not from the
date of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the Registry of
Deeds.91 No copy of TCT No. 104189 can be found in the records of this case, but the fact of annotation
of the Certificate of Sale thereon was admitted by the parties, only differing on the date it was made:
April 14, 1987 according to Banco Filipino and April 15, 1987 as maintained by Duque-Rosario. Even if
the Court concedes that the Certificate of Sale was annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later date, April
15, 1987, the one-year redemption period already expired on April 14, 1988.92 The Certificate of Final
Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation were executed more than a month thereafter, on May 24, 1988 and
May 25, 1988, respectively, and were clearly not premature.

It is true that the rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property.
The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of
redemption.93 However, the liberal interpretation of the rule on redemption is inapplicable herein as
neither Duque-Rosario nor Dr. Rosario had made any attempt to redeem Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
Duque-Rosario could only rely on the efforts of the Torbela siblings at redemption, which were
unsuccessful. While the Torbela siblings made several offers to redeem Lot No. 356-A, as well as the two
other properties mortgaged by Dr. Rosario, they did not make any valid tender of the redemption price
to effect a valid redemption. The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption price should either be fully offered in legal
tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the
offer to redeem is being made in good faith.94 In case of disagreement over the redemption price, the
redemptioner may preserve his right of redemption through judicial action, which in every case, must be
filed within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce redemption,
being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, would have the effect of preserving his redemptive rights
and "freezing" the expiration of the one-year period.95 But no such action was instituted by the Torbela
siblings or either of the spouses Rosario.

Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A in
favor of Banco Filipino by invoking the pendency of Civil Case No. U-4359, the Torbela siblings action for
recovery of ownership and possession and damages, which supposedly tolled the period for redemption
of the foreclosed properties. Without belaboring the issue of Civil Case No. U-4359 suspending the
redemption period, the Court simply points out to Duque-Rosario that Civil Case No. U-4359 involved
Lot No. 356-A only, and the legal consequences of the institution, pendency, and resolution of Civil Case
No. U-4359 apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.

Equally unpersuasive is Duque-Rosarios argument that the writ of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-
2-A should not be issued given the defects in the conduct of the foreclosure sale (i.e., lack of personal
notice to Duque-Rosario) and consolidation of title (i.e., failure to provide Duque-Rosario with copies of
the Certificate of Final Sale).

The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute upon the
expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser's ownership of
the property. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem,
the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.961avvphi1
The judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the
mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for the refusal to issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether
or not there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser
is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending
annulment case. The issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is a
ministerial act and does not entail the exercise of discretion.97

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition of the Torbela siblings in G.R. No. 140528 is
GRANTED, while the Petition of Lena Duque-Rosario in G.R. No. 140553 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated June 29, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770, which affirmed with
modification the Amended Decision dated January 29, 1992 of the RTC in Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-
4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, to now read as follows:

(1) Banco Filipino is ORDERED to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings;

(2) The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is ORDERED to cancel TCT No. 165813 in the name of Banco
Filipino and to issue a new certificate of title in the name of the Torbela siblings for Lot No. 356-A;

(3) The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the
proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, particularly: (a) the present fair market
value of Lot No. 356-A; (b) the present fair market value of the improvements thereon; (c) the option of
the Torbela siblings to appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A or require Dr. Rosario to
purchase Lot No. 356-A; and (d) in the event that the Torbela siblings choose to require Dr. Rosario to
purchase Lot No. 356-A but the value thereof is considerably more than the improvements, then the
reasonable rent of Lot No. 356-A to be paid by Dr. Rosario to the Torbela siblings;

(4) The Torbela siblings are DIRECTED to submit an accounting of the rents of the improvements on Lot
No. 356-A which they had received and to turn over any balance thereof to Dr. Rosario;

(5) Dr. Rosario is ORDERED to pay the Torbela siblings P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

(6) Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, covered by TCT No.
165812. The RTC Branch Clerk of Court is ORDERED to issue a writ of possession for the said property in
favor of Banco Filipino.

SO ORDERED.

LOPEZ v. CA

LOPEZ v. CA G.R. No. 157784 December 16, 2008 Ponente: TINGA

FACTS:

On 23 March 1968, Juliana executed a notarial will,whereby she expressed that she wished to constitute
a trust fund for her paraphernal properties, denominated as Fideicomiso de Juliana Lopez Manzano
(Fideicomiso), to be administered by her husband. If her husband were to die or renounce the
obligation, her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to become administrator and executor of the Fideicomiso.
Two-thirds (2/3) of the income from rentals over these properties were to answer for the education of
deserving but needy honor students, while one-third 1/3 was to shoulder the expenses and fees of the
administrator. As to her conjugal properties, Juliana bequeathed the portion that she could legally
dispose to her husband, and after his death, said properties were to pass to her biznietos or great
grandchildren. Juliana initiated the probate of her will five (5) days after its execution, but she died on
12 August 1968, before the petition for probate could be heard. The petition was pursued instead in
Special Proceedings (S.P.) No. 706 by her husband, Jose, who was the designated executor in the will. On
7 October 1968, the Court of First Instance, Branch 3, Balayan,Batangas, acting as probate court,
admitted the will to probate and issued the letters testamentary to Jose. Jose then submitted an
inventory of Julianas real and personal properties with their appraised values, which was approved by
the probate court. Thereafter, Jose filed a Report dated 16 August 1969, which included a proposed
project of partition. Jose proceeded to offer a project of partition.Then, Jose listed those properties
which he alleged were registered in both his and Julianas names, totaling 13 parcels in all. The disputed
properties consisting of six (6) parcels, all located in Balayan, Batangas, were included in said list. On 25
August 1969, the probate court issued an order approving the project of partition. As to the properties
to be constituted into the Fideicomiso, the probate court ordered that the certificates of title thereto be
cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, new certificates be issued in favor of Jose as trustee of the Fideicomiso
covering one-half (1/2) of the properties listed under paragraph 14 of the project of partition; and
regarding the other half, to be registered in the name of Jose as heir of Juliana. The properties which
Jose had alleged as registered in his and Julianas names, including the disputed lots, were adjudicated
to Jose as heir, subject to the condition that Jose would settle the obligations charged on these
properties. The probate court, thus, directed that new certificates of title be issued in favor of Jose as
the registered owner thereof in its Order dated 15 September 1969. On even date, the certificates of
title of the disputed properties were issued in the name of Jose. The Fideicomiso was constituted in S.P
No. 706 encompassing one-half (1/2) of the Abra de Ilog lot on Mindoro, the 1/6 portion of the lot in
Antorcha St. in Balayan, Batangas and all other properties inherited ab intestato by Juliana from her
sister, Clemencia, in accordance with the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 706. The disputed lands
were excluded from the trust. Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a holographic will disposing of the
disputed properties to respondents. The will was allowed probate on 20 December 1983 in S.P. No. 2675
before the RTC of Pasay City. Pursuant to Joses will, the RTC ordered on 20 December 1983 the transfer
of the disputed properties to the respondents as the heirs of Jose. Consequently, the certificates of title
of the disputed properties were cancelled and new ones issued in the names of respondents.
Petitioners father, Enrique Lopez, also assumed the trusteeship of Julianas estate. On 30 August 1984,
the RTC of Batangas, Branch 9 appointed petitioner as trustee of Julianas estate in S.P. No. 706. On 11
December 1984, petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of parcels of land with sum of money
before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas against respondents. The complaint essentially alleged that Jose
was able to register in his name the disputed properties, which were the paraphernal properties of
Juliana, either during their conjugal union or in the course of the performance of his duties as executor
of the testate estate of Juliana and that upon the death of Jose, the disputed properties were included
in the inventory as if they formed part of Joses estate when in fact Jose was holding them only in trust
for the trust estate of Juliana. The RCT dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription. The CA
denied the appeals filed by both parties. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether an implied trust was constituted over the disputed properties when Jose, the trustee,
registered them in his name.

HELD:

The disputed properties were excluded from the Fideicomiso at the outset. Jose registered the disputed
properties in his name partly as his conjugal share and partly as his inheritance from his wife Juliana,
which is the complete reverse of the claim of the petitioner, as the new trustee, that the properties are
intended for the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso. Furthermore, the exclusion of the disputed properties
from the Fideicomiso was approved by the probate court and, subsequently, by the trial court having
jurisdiction over the Fideicomiso. The registration of the disputed properties in the name of Jose was
actually pursuant to a court order. The apparent mistake in the adjudication of the disputed properties
to Jose created a mere implied trust of the constructive variety in favor of the beneficiaries of the
Fideicomiso.

G.R. No. 154486 : December 1, 2010

FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. ANTONIETA JARANTILLA, BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE,

substituted by CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE, DOROTEO JARANTILLA and TOMAS JARANTILLA,Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

The spouses Andres Jarantilla and FelisaJaleco were survived by eight children: Federico Sr., Delfin,
Benjamin, Conchita, Rosita, Pacita, Rafael and Antonieta. Petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr. is the
grandchild of the late Jarantilla spouses by their son Federico Jarantilla, Sr. and his wife Leda Jamili.
Petitioner also has two other brothers: Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla.

The Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves the real properties of their deceased
parents. With the exception of the real property adjudicated to PacitaJarantilla, the heirs also agreed to
allot the produce of the said real properties for the years 1947-1949 for the studies of Rafael and
AntonietaJarantilla.

Sps. Rosita Jarantilla and Vivencio Deocampo entered into an agreement with the spouses Buenaventura
Remotigue and ConchitaJarantilla to provide mutual assistance to each other by way of financial support
to any commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement. This proved to be successful
as they were able to establish a manufacturing and trading business, acquire real properties, and
construct buildings, among other things. The same ended in 1973 upon their voluntary dissolution.

The spouses Buenaventura and ConchitaRemotigue executed a document Acknowledgement of

Participating Capital stating the participating capital of of their co-owners as of the year 1952, with
AntonietaJarantillas stated as eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) and Federico Jarantilla, Jr.s as five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

The controversy started when Antonieta filed a complaint against Buenaventura, Cynthia, Doroteo and
Tomas, for the accounting of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its partition and the
delivery of her share corresponding to eight percent (8%), and for damages. She alleged that the initial
contribution of property and money came from the heirs inheritance, and her subsequent annual
investment of seven thousand five hundred pesos (P7,500.00) as additional capital came from the
proceeds of her farm.

Respondents denied having formed a partnership. They did not deny the existence and validity of the
"Acknowledgement of Participating Capital" and in fact used this as evidence to support their claim that
Antonietas 8% share was limited to the businesses enumerated therein. Petitioner Federico Jr joined his
aunt Antonieta and likewise asserted his share in the supposed partnership.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonieta and Federico. On appeal, the CA set the RTC Decision.
Petitioner filed a petition for review to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to profits over the
businesses not listed in the Acknowledgement

HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed

CIVIL LAW- There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. It is
a partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry
to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.

CIVIL LAW- The common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the
owners, though they may use it for the purpose of making gains; and they may, without becoming
partners, agree among themselves as to the management, and use of such property and the
application of the proceeds therefrom.

Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a contract of partnership: (a) an
agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the
profits among the contracting parties.

It is not denied that all the parties in this case have agreed to contribute capital to a common fund to be
able to later on share its profits. They have admitted this fact, agreed to its veracity, and even submitted
one common documentary evidence to prove such partnership - the Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital.

The Acknowledgement of Participating Capital is a duly notarized document voluntarily executed by

Conchita Jarantilla-Remotigue and Buenaventura Remotigue in 1957. Petitioner does not dispute its
contents and is actually relying on it to prove his participation in the partnership. Article 1797 of the Civil
Code provides:

Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with the agreement. If only the share
of each partner in the profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the same
proportion.

In the absence of stipulation, the share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to
what he may have contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses.

The petitioner himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital. However, petitioner fails to realize that this document specifically enumerated the businesses
covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue
Trading in Cotabato City. Since there was a clear agreement that the capital the partners contributed
went to the three businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go beyond
the stipulations in the document. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in limiting petitioners share
to the assets of the businesses enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.

In Villareal v. Ramirez, the Court held that since a partnership is a separate juridical entity, the shares to
be paid out to the partners is necessarily limited only to its total resources.

CIVIL LAW- express and implied trust

The petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to respondents properties based on the concept of
trust. He claims that since the subject real properties were purchased using funds of the partnership,
wherein he has a 6% share, then "law and equity mandates that he should be considered as a co-owner
of those properties in such proportion."

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such
proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. While implied
trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts
with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.

The petitioner has failed to prove that there exists a trust over the subject real properties. Aside from
his bare allegations, he has failed to show that the respondents used the partnerships money to
purchase the said properties. Even assuming arguendo that some partnership income was used to
acquire these properties, the petitioner should have successfully shown that these funds came from his
share in the partnership profits. After all, by his own admission, and as stated in the Acknowledgement
of Participating Capital, he owned a mere 6% equity in the partnership.

DENIED.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY VS. LAURENCIO AYING

G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005

Facts:

The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-
Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said
parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a
decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano,
Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was,
however, lost during the war. The siblings extra-judicially sold the lot however, three siblings, namely,
Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon Aying did not participate in the extra-judicial partition. After the partition
the lot was sold. 29 years after, the Roberta, Emiliano and Simen filed a case for the ejectment of the
present occupants.

Issue: Whether or not respondents cause of action is imprescriptible

Held:

The facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that
all the heirs have executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of
law applicable to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states: ART. 1456. If property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The rule that a trustee
cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates
the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts,
prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily,
repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. An action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. With regard to
petitioners argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a partition made
with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say
that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact,
its validity had been upheld but only as to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As
discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who
executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the
obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon
Aying who, having brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the
reconveyance of their share in the land in dispute.

G.R. No. 175073 August 15, 2011

ESTATE OF MARGARITA D. CABACUNGAN, represented by LUZ LAIGO-ALI, Petitioner,

vs.
MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO ROY LAIGO, STELLA BALAGOT and SPOUSES MARIO B. CAMPOS AND JULIA S.
CAMPOS, Respondents.

CARPIO,* J.,

BRION,**

SERENO,***JJ.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 13, 2006 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72371. The assailed decision affirmed the July 2, 2001
judgment2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of La Union, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 1031-BG a
complaint for annulment of sale of real property, recovery of ownership and possession, cancellation of
tax declarations and damages filed by Margarita Cabacungan,3 represented by her daughter, Luz Laigo-
Ali against Marilou Laigo and Pedro Roy Laigo, respondents herein, and against Estella Balagot,4 and the
spouses Mario and Julia Campos.

The facts follow.

Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land in Paringao and in Baccuit,
Bauang, La Union, each measuring 4,512 square meters, 1,986 square meters and 3,454 square meters.
The properties were individually covered by tax declaration all in her name.5 Sometime in 1968,
Margaritas son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. (Roberto), applied for a non-immigrant visa to the United States, and
to support his application, he allegedly asked Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties
in his name.6 For said purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property whereby the subject properties were transferred by donation to Roberto.7 Not
long after, Robertos visa was issued and he was able to travel to the U.S. as a tourist and returned in
due time. In 1979, he adopted respondents Pedro Laigo (Pedro) and Marilou Laigo (Marilou),8 and then
he married respondent Estella Balagot.

In July 1990, Roberto sold the 4,512 sq m property in Baccuit to the spouses Mario and Julia Campos
for P23,000.00.9 Then in August 1992, he sold the 1,986 sq m and 3,454 sq m lots in Paringao,
respectively, to Marilou for P100,000.00 and to Pedro for P40,000.00.10 Allegedly, these sales were not
known to Margarita and her other children.11

It was only in August 1995, at Robertos wake, that Margarita came to know of the sales as told by Pedro
himself.12 In February 1996, Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted the instant
complaint for the annulment of said sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
subject properties as well as for the cancellation of Ricardos tax declarations. Margarita admitted
having accommodated Robertos request for the transfer of the properties to his name, but pointed out
that the arrangement was only for the specific purpose of supporting his U.S. visa application. She
emphasized that she never intended to divest herself of ownership over the subject lands and, hence,
Roberto had no right to sell them to respondents and the Spouses Campos. She likewise alleged that the
sales, which were fictitious and simulated considering the gross inadequacy of the stipulated price, were
fraudulently entered into by Roberto. She imputed bad faith to Pedro, Marilou and the Spouses Campos
as buyers of the lots, as they supposedly knew all along that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the
properties.13 Hence, she principally prayed that the sales be annulled; that Robertos tax declarations be
cancelled; and that the subject properties be reconveyed to her.14

The Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, and had
merely relied on Robertos representation that he had the right to sell the property; and that, hence,
they were not bound by whatever agreement entered by Margarita with her son. They posited that the
alleged gross inadequacy of the price would not invalidate the sale absent a vitiation of consent or proof
of any other agreement. Further, they noted that Margaritas claim was already barred by prescription
and laches owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject properties. Finally, they believed that
inasmuch as Roberto had already passed away, Margarita must have, instead, directed her claim against
his estate.15

In much the same way, Marilou and Pedro,16 who likewise professed themselves to be buyers in good
faith and for value, believed that Margaritas cause of action had already been barred by laches, and
that even assuming the contrary, the cause of action was nevertheless barred by prescription as the
same had accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an
implied trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a period of ten
(10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to enforce an implied trust
thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.17

On February 3, 1999, prior to pre-trial, Margarita and the Spouses Campos amicably entered into a
settlement whereby they waived their respective claims against each other.18 Margarita died two days
later and was forthwith substituted by her estate.19 On February 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a
Partial Decision20 approving the compromise agreement and dismissing the complaint against the
Spouses Campos. Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued with respect to Pedro and Marilou.

On July 2, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the complaint is DISMISSED.21

The trial court ruled that the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer operated as a simple transfer of the subject
properties from Margarita to Roberto. It found no express trust created between Roberto and Margarita
by virtue merely of the said document as there was no evidence of another document showing
Robertos undertaking to return the subject properties. Interestingly, it concluded that, instead, an
"implied or constructive trust" was created between the parties, as if affirming that there was indeed an
agreement albeit unwritten to have the properties returned to Margarita in due time. 22

Moreover, the trial court surmised how Margarita could have failed to recover the subject properties
from Roberto at any time between 1968, following the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer, and
Robertos return from the United States shortly thereafter. Finding Margarita guilty of laches by such
inaction, the trial court barred recovery from respondents who were found to have acquired the
properties supposedly in good faith and for value.23 It also pointed out that recovery could no longer be
pursued in this case because Margarita had likewise exhausted the ten-year prescriptive period for
reconveyance based on an implied trust which had commenced to run in 1968 upon the execution of
the Affidavit of Transfer.24 Finally, it emphasized that mere inadequacy of the price as alleged would not
be a sufficient ground to annul the sales in favor of Pedro and Marilou absent any defect in consent.25

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October 13, 2006, affirmed the trial
courts disposition. The appellate court dismissed petitioners claim that Roberto was merely a trustee
of the subject properties as there was no evidence on record supportive of the allegation that Roberto
merely borrowed the properties from Margarita upon his promise to return the same on his arrival from
the United States. Further, it hypothesized that granting the existence of an implied trust, still
Margaritas action thereunder had already been circumscribed by laches. 26

Curiously, while the appellate court had found no implied trust relation in the transaction between
Margarita and Roberto, nevertheless, it held that the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, in relation to an implied trust created under Article 1456, had already been exhausted by
Margarita because her cause of action had accrued way back in 1968; and that while laches and
prescription as defenses could have availed against Roberto, the same would be unavailing against
Pedro and Marilou because the latter were supposedly buyers in good faith and for value.27 It disposed
of the appeal, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 2 July 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.28

Hence, the instant recourse imputing error to the Court of Appeals in holding: (a) that the complaint is
barred by laches and prescription; (b) that the rule on innocent purchaser for value applies in this case
of sale of unregistered land; and (c) that there is no evidence to support the finding that there is an
implied trust created between Margarita and her son Roberto.29

Petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals should not have haphazardly applied the doctrine of laches
and failed to see that the parties in this case are bound by familial ties. They assert that laches must not
be applied when an injustice would result from it. Petitioner believes that the existence of such
confidential relationship precludes a finding of unreasonable delay on Margaritas part in enforcing her
claim, especially in the face of Luzs testimony that she and Margarita had placed trust and confidence in
Roberto. Petitioner also refutes the Court of Appeals finding that there was a donation of the properties
to Roberto when the truth is that the subject properties were all that Margarita possessed and that she
could not have failed to provide for her other children nor for means by which to support herself. It
reiterates that the transfer to Roberto was only an accommodation so that he could submit proof to
support his U.S. visa application.

On the issue of prescription, petitioner advances that it runs from the time Roberto, as trustee, has
repudiated the trust by selling the properties to respondents in August 15, 1992; that hence, the filing of
the instant complaint in 1996 was well within the prescriptive period. Finally, petitioner states that
whether a buyer is in good or bad faith is a matter that attains relevance in sales of registered land, as
corollary to the rule that a purchaser of unregistered land uninformed of the sellers defective title
acquires no better right than such seller.

Respondents stand by the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In their Comment, they theorize that if indeed
Margarita and Roberto had agreed to have the subject properties returned following the execution of
the Affidavit of Transfer, then there should have been a written agreement evincing such intention of
the parties. They note that petitioners reliance on the Affidavit of Transfer as well as on the alleged
unwritten agreement for the return of the properties must fail, simply because they are not even parties
to it. Be that as it may, the said document had effectively transferred the properties to Roberto who, in
turn, had acquired the full capacity to sell them, especially since these properties could well be
considered as Robertos inheritance from Margarita who, on the contrary, did have other existing
properties in her name. Moreover, they believe that the liberal application of the rule on laches
between family members does not apply in the instant case because there is no fiduciary relationship
and privity between them and Margarita.

There is merit in the petition.

To begin with, the rule is that the latitude of judicial review under Rule 45 generally excludes factual and
evidentiary reevaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform conclusions of the trial court
and the appellate court. Yet, in the case at bar, while the courts below have both arrived at the dismissal
of petitioners complaint, there still remains unsettled the ostensible incongruence in their respective
factual findings. It thus behooves us to be thorough both in reviewing the records and in appraising the
evidence, especially since an opposite conclusion is warranted and, as will be shown, justified.

A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership of property and
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling
him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.30 Trusts are
either express or implied.31 Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words evincing an intention to create a
trust.32 Implied trusts also called "trusts by operation of law," "indirect trusts" and "involuntary trusts"
arise by legal implication based on the presumed intention of the parties or on equitable principles
independent of the particular intention of the parties.33 They are those which, without being expressed,
are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently of the particular
intention of the parties, as being inferred from the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of
equity.34

Implied trusts are further classified into constructive trusts and resulting trusts. Constructive trusts, on
the one hand, come about in the main by operation of law and not by agreement or intention. They
arise not by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a
trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice.35 Also known as trusts ex maleficio,
trusts ex delicto and trusts de son tort, they are construed against one who by actual or constructive
fraud, duress, abuse of confidence, commission of a wrong or any form of unconscionable conduct,
artifice, concealment of questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience has
obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold
and enjoy.36 They are aptly characterized as "fraud-rectifying trust,"37 imposed by equity to satisfy the
demands of justice38 and to defeat or prevent the wrongful act of one of the parties.39Constructive trusts
are illustrated in Articles 1450, 1454, 1455 and 1456.40

On the other hand, resulting trusts arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved
in a transaction whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold
his title for the benefit of another. This is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration
and not legal title is determinative of equitable title or interest and is always presumed to have been
contemplated by the parties.41Such intent is presumed as it is not expressed in the instrument or deed
of conveyance and is to be found in the nature of their transaction.42 Implied trusts of this nature are
hence describable as "intention-enforcing trusts."43Specific examples of resulting trusts may be found in
the Civil Code, particularly Articles 1448, 1449, 1451, 1452 and 1453.44

Articles 1448 to 1456 of the Civil Code enumerate cases of implied trust, but the list according to Article
1447 is not exclusive of others which may be established by the general law on trusts so long as the
limitations laid down in Article 1442 are observed,45 that is, that they be not in conflict with the New
Civil Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.46

While resulting trusts generally arise on failure of an express trust or of the purpose thereof, or on a
conveyance to one person upon a consideration from another (sometimes referred to as a "purchase-
money resulting trust"), they may also be imposed in other circumstances such that the court, shaping
judgment in its most efficient form and preventing a failure of justice, must decree the existence of such
a trust.47 A resulting trust, for instance, arises where, there being no fraud or violation of the trust, the
circumstances indicate intent of the parties that legal title in one be held for the benefit of another.48 It
also arises in some instances where the underlying transaction is without consideration, such as that
contemplated in Article 144949 of the Civil Code. Where property, for example, is gratuitously conveyed
for a particular purpose and that purpose is either fulfilled or frustrated, the court may affirm the
resulting trust in favor of the grantor or transferor,50 where the beneficial interest in property was not
intended to vest in the grantee.51

Intention although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the transaction or
from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction, particularly the source of the
consideration is always an element of a resulting trust52 and may be inferred from the acts or conduct
of the parties rather than from direct expression of conduct.53 Certainly, intent as an indispensable
element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of
statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes.54 Because an implied trust is neither
dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced by writing,55 Article 145756 of our
Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is
required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot
rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.57

Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals finding that there was no evidence on record showing that an
implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto, we find that petitioner before the trial
court, had actually adduced evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the
legal title to the properties in question, with attendant expectation that Roberto would return the same
to her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was entered into. The
evidence of course is not documentary, but rather testimonial.
We recall that the complaint before the trial court alleged that the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer was
executed merely to accommodate Robertos request to have the properties in his name and thereby
produce proof of ownership of certain real properties in the Philippines to support his U.S. visa
application. The agreement, the complaint further stated, was for Margarita to transfer the tax
declarations of the subject properties to Roberto for the said purpose and without the intention to
divest her of the rights of ownership and dominion.58 Margarita, however, died before trial on the merits
ensued;59 yet the allegation was substantiated by the open-court statements of her daughter, Luz, and
of her niece, Hilaria Costales (Hilaria), a disinterested witness.

In her testimony, Luz, who affirmed under oath her own presence at the execution of the Affidavit of
Transfer, described the circumstances under which Margarita and Roberto entered into the agreement.
She narrated that Roberto had wanted to travel to the U.S and to show the embassy proof of his
financial capacity, he asked to "borrow" from Margarita the properties involved but upon the condition
that he would give them back to her upon his arrival from the United States. She admitted that
Robertos commitment to return the properties was not put in writing because they placed trust and
confidence in him, and that while she had spent most of her time in Mindanao since she married in
1956, she would sometimes come to La Union to see her mother but she never really knew whether at
one point or another her mother had demanded the return of the properties from Roberto.60 She
further asserted that even after Robertos arrival from the United States, it was Margarita who paid off
the taxes on the subject properties and that it was only when her health started to deteriorate that
Roberto had taken up those obligations.61 Hilarias testimony ran along the same line. Like Luz, she was
admittedly present at the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer which took place at the house she
shared with Jacinto Costales, the notarizing officer who was her own brother. She told that Roberto at
the time had wanted to travel to the U.S. but did not have properties in the Philippines which he could
use to back up his visa application; as accommodation, Margarita "lent" him the tax declarations
covering the properties but with the understanding that upon his return he would give them back to
Margarita. She professed familiarity with the properties involved because one of them was actually
sitting close to her own property.62

While indeed at one point at the stand both of Luzs and Hilarias presence at the execution of the
affidavit had been put to test in subtle interjections by respondents counsel to the effect that their
names and signatures did not appear in the Affidavit of Transfer as witnesses, this, to our mind, is of no
moment inasmuch as they had not been called to testify on the fact of, or on the contents of, the
Affidavit of Transfer or its due execution. Rather, their testimony was offered to prove the
circumstances surrounding its execution the circumstances from which could be derived the unwritten
understanding between Roberto and Margarita that by their act, no absolute transfer of ownership
would be effected. Besides, it would be highly unlikely for Margarita to institute the instant complaint if
it were indeed her intention to vest in Roberto, by virtue of the Affidavit of Transfer, absolute ownership
over the covered properties.

It is deducible from the foregoing that the inscription of Robertos name in the Affidavit of Transfer as
Margaritas transferee is not for the purpose of transferring ownership to him but only to enable him to
hold the property in trust for Margarita. Indeed, in the face of the credible and straightforward
testimony of the two witnesses, Luz and Hilaria, the probative value of the ownership record forms in
the names of respondents, together with the testimony of their witness from the municipal assessors
office who authenticated said forms, are utterly minimal to show Robertos ownership. It suffices to say
that respondents did not bother to offer evidence that would directly refute the statements made by
Luz and Hilaria in open court on the circumstances underlying the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer.

As a trustee of a resulting trust, therefore, Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive trust, is merely
a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management, control or disposition of the property
except to make a conveyance when called upon by the cestui que trust.63 Hence, the sales he entered
into with respondents are a wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust. The
question is: May respondents now be compelled to reconvey the subject properties to petitioner? We
rule in the affirmative.

Respondents posit that petitioners claim may never be enforced against them as they had purchased
the properties from Roberto for value and in good faith. They also claim that, at any rate, petitioners
cause of action has accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer and, hence,
with the 28 long years that since passed, petitioners claim had long become stale not only on account
of laches, but also under the rules on extinctive prescription governing a resulting trust. We do not
agree.

First, fundamental is the rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer of realty is in
good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was
made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in which case the purchaser who relies
on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith and for
value.64 Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, respondents purchased the same at
their own peril. Their claim of having bought the properties in good faith, i.e., without notice that there
is some other person with a right to or interest therein, would not protect them should it turn out, as it
in fact did in this case, that their seller, Roberto, had no right to sell them.

Second, the invocation of the rules on limitation of actions relative to a resulting trust is not on point
because the resulting trust relation between Margarita and Roberto had been extinguished by the
latters death. A trust, it is said, terminates upon the death of the trustee, particularly where the trust is
personal to him.65 Besides, prescription and laches, in respect of this resulting trust relation, hardly can
impair petitioners cause of action. On the one hand, in accordance with Article 114466 of the Civil Code,
an action for reconveyance to enforce an implied trust in ones favor prescribes in ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues, as it is based upon an obligation created by law.67 It sets in from the
time the trustee performs unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust which are made known to the latter.68 In this case, it was the 1992 sale of the properties to
respondents that comprised the act of repudiation which, however, was made known to Margarita only
in 1995 but nevertheless impelled her to institute the action in 1996 still well within the prescriptive
period. Hardly can be considered as act of repudiation Robertos open court declaration which he made
in the 1979 adoption proceedings involving respondents to the effect that he owned the subject
properties,69 nor even the fact that he in 1977 had entered into a lease contract on one of the disputed
properties which contract had been subject of a 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals.70 These do not
suffice to constitute unequivocal acts in repudiation of the trust.

On the other hand, laches, being rooted in equity, is not always to be applied strictly in a way that would
obliterate an otherwise valid claim especially between blood relatives. The existence of a confidential
relationship based upon consanguinity is an important circumstance for consideration; hence, the
doctrine is not to be applied mechanically as between near relatives.71 Adaza v. Court of Appeals72 held
that the relationship between the parties therein, who were siblings, was sufficient to explain and
excuse what would otherwise have been a long delay in enforcing the claim and the delay in such
situation should not be as strictly construed as where the parties are complete strangers vis-a-vis each
other; thus, reliance by one party upon his blood relationship with the other and the trust and
confidence normally connoted in our culture by that relationship should not be taken against him. Too,
Sotto v. Teves73 ruled that the doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the
fact that the parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise
unreasonable delay.

Third, there is a fundamental principle in agency that where certain property entrusted to an agent and
impressed by law with a trust in favor of the principal is wrongfully diverted, such trust follows the
property in the hands of a third person and the principal is ordinarily entitled to pursue and recover it so
long as the property can be traced and identified, and no superior equities have intervened. This
principle is actually one of trusts, since the wrongful conversion gives rise to a constructive trust which
pursues the property, its product or proceeds, and permits the beneficiary to recover the property or
obtain damages for the wrongful conversion of the property. Aptly called the "trust pursuit rule," it
applies when a constructive or resulting trust has once affixed itself to property in a certain state or
form.74

Hence, a trust will follow the property through all changes in its state and form as long as such
property, its products or its proceeds, are capable of identification, even into the hands of a transferee
other than a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution will be enforced at the election of the
beneficiary through recourse against the trustee or the transferee personally. This is grounded on the
principle in property law that ownership continues and can be asserted by the true owner against any
withholding of the object to which the ownership pertains, whether such object of the ownership is
found in the hands of an original owner or a transferee, or in a different form, as long as it can be
identified.75 Accordingly, the person to whom is made a transfer of trust property constituting a
wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust, when not protected as a bona
fide purchaser for value, is himself liable and accountable as a constructive trustee. The liability attaches
at the moment of the transfer of trust property and continues until there is full restoration to the
beneficiary. Thus, the transferee is charged with, and can be held to the performance of the trust,
equally with the original trustee, and he can be compelled to execute a reconveyance.76

This scenario is characteristic of a constructive trust imposed by Article 145677 of the Civil Code, which
impresses upon a person obtaining property through mistake or fraud the status of an implied trustee
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Petitioner, in laying claim against
respondents who are concededly transferees who professed having validly derived their ownership from
Roberto, is in effect enforcing against respondents a constructive trust relation that arose by virtue of
the wrongful and fraudulent transfer to them of the subject properties by Roberto.

Aznar Brother Realty Co. v. Aying,78 citing Buan Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals,79 explained this
form of implied trust as follows:

A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust,
confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called
the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui
que trust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary
relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary
relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the
so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.

xxxx

x x x [C]onstructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud,
duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity
and good conscience, to hold.80

It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on a constructive implied trust prescribes in 10 years
likewise in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Yet not like in the case of a resulting implied
trust and an express trust, prescription supervenes in a constructive implied trust even if the trustee
does not repudiate the relationship. In other words, repudiation of said trust is not a condition
precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.81

As to when the prescriptive period commences to run, Crisostomo v. Garcia82 elucidated as follows:

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in
favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes in 10
years from the issuance of the title. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property.1avvphi1

It is now well settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake,
giving rise to an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Art. 1144. This
ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust,
which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land.83

From the foregoing, it is clear that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the instrument
affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the land and
operates constructive notice to the world.84 In the present case, however, the lands involved are
concededly unregistered lands; hence, there is no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be
notified of the furtive and fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by
actual notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to
toll. The filing of the complaint in February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period. Finally, such delay
of only six (6) months in instituting the present action hardly suffices to justify a finding of inexcusable
delay or to create an inference that Margarita has allowed her claim to stale by laches.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 72371, affirming the July 2, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Union, Branch
33 in Civil Case No. 1031-BG, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered (a) directing the
cancellation of the tax declarations covering the subject properties in the name of Roberto D. Laigo and
his transferees; (b) nullifying the deeds of sale executed by Roberto D. Laigo in favor of respondents
Pedro Roy Laigo and Marilou Laigo; and (c) directing said respondents to execute reconveyance in favor
of petitioner.

SO ORDERED.