G.R. No.

80390 March 27, 1998

CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and

ANGELICA M. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, & NESTOR FORTUNADO,
respondents.

MARTINEZ J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated
January 24, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch
V, in Civil Case No. 262, which reversed its earlier Decision2 dated July
31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filed by respondents.

The facts are not disputed:

Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Fortunado, are

the registered owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 7-3041 and T-1929, both registered with the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Said properties were mortgaged by
Arsenio Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the Traders Commercial Bank
(now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a loan obligation in the amount of
P370,000.00.

On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action before the then

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr.
and Traders Royal Bank, among others, for annulment of mortgage. In
said complaint, Traders Royal Bank interposed a counterclaim for
foreclosure of the mortgage.

On August 24, 1973, the trial court rendered a decision3, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

I. As Regards the Plaintiff's Complaint:

1. Ordering the defendant Mariano Pascual to pay to the plaintiffs

the amount of P24,550.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees in the amount of
P2,000.00 and to pay the costs.

2. Ordering the deed of real estate mortgage which is attached as

Annex "B" of the complaint to be declared null and void and, ordering
the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel the said mortgage at the
back of TCT No. T-1929, Book I, Page 8 and TCT No. T-3040, Book I,
Page 96 of said Register of Deeds.

II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party Complaint of

Defendant Traders Commercial Bank:

1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Ofelia Lopez to pay
the Traders Commercial Bank jointly and severally the amount of
P578,025.23, inclusive of interest and other bank charges as of April
30, 1971, and, thereafter, plus all interest and bank charges until full
payment is made and, to pay to the bank the amount of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs.

The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the plaintiffs is

also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, in

this manner:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by

eliminating paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision of the
lower court declaring the real estate mortgage in favor of the Traders
Commercial Bank null and void. The decision is affirmed in all other
respects.4

On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the
mortgage to petitioner Angel L. Bautista. By virtue of the said
assignment, petitioner on March 19, 1984 wrote the City Sheriff of
Iligan City requesting that the mortgaged properties be foreclosed for
non-payment of the loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte,
Branch V, a complaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary
injunction against petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
262.

After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a summary

judgment which was granted by the court. Consequently, on July 31,
1985, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. In its
decision, the trial court delved on the issue of prescription of a
mortgage action.
Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since the
principal loan has already been paid, the mortgage, which is an
accessory contract, should likewise be extinguished.

On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision
disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as amended, of the

summary judgment of July 31, 1985 is hereby reconsidered and
modified to read:

Premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have made out
a preponderating case against the defendants.

And as prayed for in the complaint, the temporary restraining order of

the Court in the case on April 23, 1984 is hereby converted into a
preliminary injunction and by these presents made permanent. The
City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L. Bautista and Mrs. Angelica M.
Bautista are hereby permanently restrained from conducting a public
auction sale of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-3041 (a.f.). The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is hereby further
ordered to cancel Entry No. 451 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
3041 (a.f.) on file with his office. No pronouncement as to damages or
attorney's fees.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a

Resolution6 on August 28,1987, forwarding the case to this Court for
resolution reading thus:

Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of Atty. Ramon

Gonzales' motion to the sound discretion of this Court and considering
the unrefuted allegation of the said motion that there were no
documentary or testimonial evidence which were the basis of the
questioned decision but mere admissions of the parties, the questions
raised on appeal become mere questions of law, over which the
Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction.

On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review
contending that the trial court erred in modifying its earlier decision; in
declaring that he has no right to foreclose the mortgaged property; in
declaring the temporary restraining order into a permanent preliminary
injunction and in ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel
entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.

We gave due course to the petition and required the contending

parties to submit their respective Memoranda on August 31, 1988.

On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A.

Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation informing the Court that the
subject real estate mortgage has already been released by the Traders
Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy
of the Release of Real Estate Mortgage,7 and that the petitioner was
killed in a robbery in his house.8 Respondents therefore pray for the
dismissal of the petition.

On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty.

Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said Manifestation. However, the
copy of the resolution of the Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was
returned unclaimed after three notices,9 with the postmaster's remark
"moved." In view of this development, the Court considered the
resolution as served. 10

Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we resolve to dismiss

the petition for having been rendered moot and academic.

The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has
the right to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage is no longer
necessary in view of the release of the mortgage as shown in the
certified true copy thereof. No useful purpose would be served by
passing on the merits of the petition. Any ruling in this case could
hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a well-
settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question or abstract
proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief
can be granted. 11

However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty.

Emilio Abrogena, to inform the trial court of the death of petitioner, a
duty mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides in part, to wit:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a

pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall
be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address
of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx

Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance with the

aforequoted provisions of Rule 3 could not be effected.

We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his

change of address which accounts for his failure to comment on the
manifestation of respondents relative to the death of petitioner and the
release of the subject real estate mortgage.

Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost,
an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more significant than
those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and

academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby
REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court of the death of
petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such
omission in the future will be dealt with severely.
G.R. No. L-27396 September 30, 1974

JESUS V. OCCEA and SAMUEL C. OCCEA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of
Bohol, Branch I, respondent. I.V. BINAMIRA, Co-Executor, Estate of W.C.
Ogan, Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol, Intervenor.

Jesus V. Occea and Samuel C. Occea in their own behalf.

Hon. Paulino S. Marquez for and in his own behalf.

I.V. Binamira for and in his own behalf as intervenor.

ANTONIO, J.:p

In this petition for certiorari with mandamus, petitioners seek (1) to

nullify the order of respondent Judge Paulino S. Marquez of the Court of
First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, in Sp. Proc. No. 423 entitled "In the
Matter of the Testate Estate of William C. Ogan," in relation to
petitioners' claim for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount
of P30,000.00, dated November 2, 1966, fixing at P20,000.00
petitioners' attorney's fees, "which would cover the period March 1963
to December 1965," and directing its immediate payment minus the
amount of P4,000.00 previously received by petitioners, and his second
order, dated January 12, 1967, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and modifying the November 2, 1966 order by deleting
therefrom the above-quoted phrase; (2) to direct the said court to
approve the release to them as attorney's fees the amount of
P30,000.00 minus the amount of P4,000.00 already advanced to them
by the executrix; and (3) to allow petitioners to submit evidence to
establish the total attorney's fees to which they are entitled, in case no
agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs.

The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject
matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2
million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea,
are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea,
and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963,
defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the
estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's
estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise
with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of
P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-
executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial
distribution of the corpus and income of the estate was made to the
heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the
estate and inheritance taxes were completely settled by the executrix
and the requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated

November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to them of
P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their services as counsel
for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to
withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay
petitioners. Three of the heirs, Lily Ogan Peralta, William Ogan, Jr. and
Ruth Ogan, moved to defer consideration of the motion until after the
total amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her
counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. In July, 1966, five
of the seven instituted heirs, namely, Lily Ogan Peralta, Necitas Ogan
Occena, Federico M. Ogan, Liboria Ogan Garcia and Nancy Ogan
Gibson, filed with the court a Manifestation stating that they had no
objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment
of attorney's fees and recommending approval of petitioners' motion.
Their first motion dated November 18, 1965 being still unresolved,
petitioners filed a second Motion for Payment of Partial Attorneys' Fees,
dated July 5, 1966, praying for the release to them of the amount of
P30,000.00 previously prayed for by them. Action on the matter was,
however, deferred in an order dated August 6, 1966, upon the request
of the Quijano and Arroyo Law Offices in behalf of heirs William Ogan,
Jr. and Ruth Ogan for deferment until after all the instituted heirs shall
have agreed in writing on the total attorney's fees. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 12, 1966, asking
the court to reconsider its deferment order and praying that payment
to them of P30,000.00 be approved on the understanding that
whatever amounts were paid to them would be chargeable against the
fees which they and the instituted heirs might agree to be petitioners'
total fees.

On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order fixing the

total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965
at P20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On January
12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by
fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at
P20,000.00.

Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of

discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in fixing the entire attorney's fees
to which they are entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing the
said fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The reasons given by
petitioners in support of their contention are: (1) the motion submitted
by petitioners for the court's resolution was only for partied payment of
their attorney's fees, without prejudice to any agreement that might
later be reached between them and the instituted heirs on the
question of total attorney's fees, yet respondent Judge resolved the
question of total attorney's fees; (2) considering that the only question
raised by petitioners for the court's determination was that of partial
attorney's fees, they never expected the court to make a ruling on the
question of total attorney's fees; consequently, petitioners did not have
the opportunity to prove to total fees to which they were entitled, and,
hence, they were denied due process of law; (3) of the seven heirs to
the estate, five had agreed to petitioners' motion for partial payment
to them of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, while the
remaining two did not oppose the motion; (4) in his order, respondent
Judge stated that he based the amount of P20,000.00 on the records of
the case, but the amount of attorney's fees to which a lawyer is
entitled cannot be determined on the sole basis of the records for there
are other circumstances that should be taken into consideration; and
(5) contrary to respondent Judge's opinion, the mere fact that one of
the attorneys for the executrix is the husband of said executrix, is not a
ground for denying the said attorneys the right to the fees to which
they are otherwise entitled.

Only Judge Paulino S. Marquez is named respondent in the present

petition, for, according to petitioners, "no proper party is interested in
sustaining the questioned proceedings in the Lower Court."

In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a)

petitioners' proper remedy is appeal and not a special civil action,
considering that there is already a final order on the motion for
payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occea is the husband of
executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, hence, Samuel Occea's pecuniary
interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is
representing in the special proceeding; (c) one reason why respondent
Judge ordered the deletion of the phrase containing the period March,
1963 to December, 1965 from his November 2, 1966 order is that
there are miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromise
agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses
incurred by petitioners for the estate; (d) co-executor I. V. Binamira
should be included as party respondent to comply with Section 5, Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (e) it is the duty of respondent
Judge not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix,
who is at the same time the wife of said counsel and is herself an heir
to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see
to it that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as
possible," and to avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is
absorbed in the process of such division," in order that there may be a
worthy residue for the heirs. As special defenses, respondent Judge
alleged that the seven instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this
case; that mandamus cannot control the actuations of the trial court
because they involved matters of discretion; and that no abuse of
discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to
administer the estate frugally.

On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners'

motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of
P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C. Occea and Jesus V.
Occea are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix
Necitas Ogan Occea, the latter cannot be expected to oppose
petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as
the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty.
I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed
with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which
was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of Resolution of August 9, 1967 and an Opposition
to "Motion for Leave to Intervene," contending that Atty. Binamira
ceased to be a co-executor upon his resignation effective October 29,
1965. On August 15, 1967, Atty. Binamira filed Intervenor's Opposition
to Petition (answer in intervention) traversing the material averments
of the petition.

On August 25, 1967, intervenor filed a Reply to Executrix's Opposition

and Opposition to Exicutrix's Motion for Reconsideration. On
September 18, 1967, intervenor filed Intervenor's Comments on
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August
9, 1961. On September 21, 1967, petitioners filed against intervenor a
Petition for Contempt asking this Court to hold intervenor in contempt
of court. We required intervenor to comment thereon. On October 9,
1967, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition for Contempt.
Invervenor filed on October 20, 1967, Intervenor's Comments and
Counter Petition, asking this Court to dismiss petitioners' motion for
indirect contempt and instead to hold petitioners guilty of indirect
contempt for gross breach of legal ethics. We deferred action on the
contempt motion until the case is considered on the merits. On January
15, 1968. Intervenor I. V. Binamira filed an Answer to Supplemental
Petition. This was followed on February 12, 1968, by another Petition
for Contempt, this time against one Generoso L. Pacquiao for allegedly
executing a perjured affidavit dated December 20, 1967, to aid
intervenor I. V. Binamira to escape liability for his deliberate
falsehoods, which affidavit intervenor attached to his Answer to
Supplemental Petition. On the same date, February 12, 1968,
petitioners filed against intervenor a Second Supplemental Petition for
Contempt. On February 19, 1968, petitioners filed Petitioners'
Manifestation Re Documentary Evidence Supporting Charges.

We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions
for contempt.

The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the
executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his
attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The
estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for
payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the
administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by
counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to
make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an
action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator, 1
or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the
court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the
payment of his fees as expenses of administration. 2 Whichever course
is adopted, the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will
have the right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer
and on the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner
filed his petition directly with the probate court.

There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the

estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate under
administration and see to it that it is wisely and economically
administered and not dissipated. 3 This rule, however, does not
authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the
estate, to act in a whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the
amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to without according to the
latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services.
Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of
procedural due process.

What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion for partial
payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers for
the executrix for the period February, 1963, up to the date of filing of
the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs had
manifested conformity to petitioners' motion, while the remaining two
merely requested deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the
total amount for Executrix's fees and attorney's fees of her counsel is
agreed upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of such
conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to
establish how much attorney's fees they are entitled to for their entire
legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at P20,000.00 the
entire attorney's fees of petitioners.

In his Order of January 12, 1967, respondent Judge explained:

The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by
Atty. Samuel Occea, within each given period, is easily visible from
them; his work as revealed by those records is the factual basis for this
Court's orders as to attorney's fees.

Whatever attorney's fees may have been approved by the Court on

October 28, 1965 were as a result of compromise and were with the
written consent of all the heirs and of all the signatories of the
compromise agreement of October 27, 1965. That is not so with
respect to Atty. Occea's thirty-thousand peso claim for fees; and so,
this Court, after a view of the record, had to fix it at P20,000.00. The
record can reflect what an attorney of record has done.
In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of
the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove
what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled
for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent Judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.
Evidently, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis of the
record alone considering that there are other factors necessary in
assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and character of
the service rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount
of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in
the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and
social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a
recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger
fee when it is contingent than when it is not. 4

It should be noted that some of the reasons submitted by petitioners in

support of their fees do not appear in the records of the case. For
instance, they claim that in connection with their legal services to the
executrix and to the estate, petitioner Samuel C. Occea had been
travelling from Davao to Tagbilaran from 1965 to March, 1967, and
from Davao to Cebu and Manila from 1963 to March, 1967, and that in
fact he and his family had to stay for almost a year in Dumaguete City.
These claims apparently bear strongly on the labor, time and trouble
involved in petitioners' legal undertaking, and, consequently, should
have been subject to a formal judicial inquiry. Considering,
furthermore, that two of the heirs have not given their conformity to
petitioners' motion, the need for a hearing becomes doubly necessary.
This is also the reason why at this stage it would be premature to grant
petitioners' prayer for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00
as partial payment of their fees.

II

As stated above, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt

of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having
made false averments in this Court.

We have carefully considered these charges and the answers of

intervenor, and, on the basis of the evidence, We conclude that
intervenor I. V. Binamira has deliberately made false allegations before
this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of
justice, to wit:
1. To bolster his claim that the executrix, without approval of the
court, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company,
Inc., intervenor submitted as Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental
Petition a so-called "Real Estate Mortgage" which he made to appear
was signed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna and the executrix. The
certification of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex A-Contempt) shows
that what intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage is in
reality only a proposed mortgage not even signed by the parties.

2. Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition, also stated

that in December, 1965, the executrix, without the court's approval or
of the co-executor's consent, but with petitioners' consent, loaned
P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. out of the
estate's funds. The record shows that only P50,000.00 was loaned to
the company to protect the investment of the estate therein, and that
the same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed among others,
by intervenor, and approved by the court.

3. To discredit petitioner Samuel C. Occea and his wife, the

executrix, intervenor stated in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition
that less than a month after the loan of P100,000.00 had been granted
to the transportation company, petitioner Samuel C. Occea was
elected president by directors of his own choosing in the Bohol Land
Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the executrix
loaned to her husband the said sum of money. The certification of the
corporate secretary of the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc.
(Annex D-Contempt) states that petitioner Samuel C. Occea was not
the president of the company at the time, nor did he act as president
or treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de la
Serna. This last fact is also shown in intervenor's own Annex 5 of his
Answer to Supplemental Petition.

4. In intervenor's Opposition to this petition for certiorari, he stated

that contrary to the executrix's statement in the 1965 income tax
return of the estate that an estate "income of P90,770.05 was
distributed among the heirs in 1965, there was in fact no such
distribution of income. The executrix's project of partition (Annex E-
Contempt) shows that there was a distribution of the 1965 income of
the estate.

5. To discredit petitioner and the executrix, intervenor alleged in his

Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that petitioners caused to be filed
with the court the executrix's verified inventory which failed to include
as assets of the estate certain loans granted to petitioner Samuel C.
Occea in the sum of P4,000.00 and to the executrix various sums
totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C. Ogan to his
daughter, the executrix (Annexes F, G. and H-Contempt), show that the
said sums totalling P10,000.00 were in reality partly given to her as a
gift and partly for the payment of certain furniture and equipment.

6. Intervenor, in Order to further discredit petitioners and the

executrix, stated in his Reply to Executrix's and Opposition to
Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration that the executrix and
petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him all that he was entitled to
under the compromise agreement. The receipt dated October 29,
1965, signed by intervenor himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he
acknowledged receipt from petitioner Samuel C. Occea, lawyer for the
executrix, the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all claims and
fees against the Estate, pursuant to the Agreement dated October 27,
1965."

7. In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to

Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor alleged that he
signed Atty. Occea's prepared receipt without receiving payment,
trusting that Atty. Occea would pay the amount in full, but later Atty.
Occea withheld Chartered Bank Check No. 55384 for P8,000.00 drawn
in favor of intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt signed by
intervenor I. V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he
acknowledged receipt of the check in question in the amount of
P8,000-00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo ... ." Anent the sum of
P15,000.00 in cash, Annex J-Contempt (Reply to the Opposition for
Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by intervenor with the probate
court) shows that intervenor, as movant, himself had alleged that "no
check was issued to movant, but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was
included in purchasing Manager's check No. 55398 for the Clerk of
Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was voluntarily
extended by intervenor as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part
of the total cash bond of P75,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court,
as shown by a receipt signed by Atty. Samuel C. Occea (Annex K-11-
Contempt) which forms part of the record in the court below.

8. In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition, intervenor

denied the truth of petitioners' claim that intervenor had voluntarily
and willingly extended the sum of P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of
goodwill to form part of the P75,000.00-deposit. In the Opposition to
Motion of Executrix for Reconsideration of Order of February 19, 1966,
dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt), intervenor had, however,
admitted that "out of the goodness of his heart ... in the nature of
help," he had "willingly extended as a favor and gesture of goodwill"
the said sum of P15,000.00.
9. To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C. Occea that he
stayed in Dumaguete City for almost one year to attend to the affairs
of the estate, intervenor, in his intervenor's Opposition to Petition,
alleged that said petitioner's stay in Dumaguete City was not to attend
to the affairs of the estate, but to enable him to teach in Silliman
University. The certification of the Director of the personnel office of
Silliman University, dated December 4, 1967 (Annex V-Contempt) is,
however, to the effect that their "records do not show that Atty. Samuel
C. Occea was teaching at Silliman University or employed in any other
capacity in 1963, or at any time before or after 1963."

The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by

petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately made
false allegations in his pleadings.

We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a

lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by
dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to
the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court
and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness.
It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false
allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a
document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing
counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the
practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his
clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these
false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.

The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of

intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not been
substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be dismissed.

We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt
filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the
affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the
contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The
said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to
defend himself against the contempt charge, the charge must be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a
quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total
attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V.
Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared
guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00). Costs against intervenor.

In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990 1 addressed to this Court,

complainant Teodoro I. Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other
appropriate penalty upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola, a member of
the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice.

The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by

Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their
counsel in connection with Civil Case No. 3330-M 2 filed sometime in
1966 with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Bulacan against
Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz
and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the complaint, 3 respondent alleged, on
behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad Alvendia and
Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease Applications Nos. V-
1284 and 2807 covering portions of public land situated in Barrio
Baluarte, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, and that lease
contracts 4 had been executed in their favor by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent prayed in the
complaint that his clients (the Alvendias) be declared "bona fide
lessees of the land in controversy . . . ." 5 In an Order dated 2 October
1969, 6 the CFI dismissed the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M
for non-appearance of the Alvendias.

On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which

provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of

the foreshore fronting the Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan . . .
is hereby withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for
communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be called the
Bulacan Fishing Reservation." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was
part of the communal fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470.
On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias,
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title 8 in Land
Registration Case ("LRC") No. 3711-M with the then CFI of Bulacan
praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2 9 be registered
in the name of the spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the
Amended Application that the applicant Alvendias were the owners of
the land, they having acquired the same from one Teresita Vistan by
sale sometime in 1929.

It is petitioners contention that respondent, in filing the Amended

Application for Original Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M stating
that his clients were the owners of the property applied for despite his
full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere lessees of the land
in controversy as so described in the complaint respondent had filed in
Civil Case No. 3330-M, had willingly aided in and consented to the
pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawful application
for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of
the Bar.

In his Answer, 10 respondent alleged that the Application for Original

Registration of Title was originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro,
and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance therein, respondent
filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title; that he
believed his clients had the right to apply for the registration of the
land; and that assuming his clients did not in fact have any such right,
the court where the Application for Original Registration of Title was
filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this complaint for disbarment
was filed prematurely.cralawnad

Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer. 11

In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer the

case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the

complaint for disbarment. In said Motion, he alleged for the second
time that he was not the original lawyer who filed the application in
the land registration case, but a certain Atty. Montesclaro. Respondent
further alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty.
Montesclaro when he took over, even went to the extent of verifying
from the Bureau of Lands if the application was proper. The Legal
Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent that it
was. He was informed that judicial application for registration is one of
the methods of acquiring such lands, said lands being alienable and
disposable. There are, however, other means of obtaining the said
lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro) chose the present
action for land registration.

Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the
original lawyer when said counsel withdrew his appearance. Your
respondent, hence, was in good faith when he took over the land
registration case, subject matter of this present administrative
investigation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion to

Dismiss to the Solicitor General.

In a Report 13 dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated

that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his
clients, i.e., the Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of
the land in question. However, respondent does not deny that he
prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original Registration
of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the
Alvendias are the owners of the land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2.
Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to why his
submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his
allegations in the complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-M that
the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the same
property.

It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false

statement to the court in the land registration case. As proven by
complaint, respondent has willingly aided and consented in the filing
and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land
registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the bar.
14

It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would
gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that
lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their
clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court
sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and
only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their
clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. 16

In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that

his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later
pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the
same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it
matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a
member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to
do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent
upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in
pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other
than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration
proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he really
believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their
rights. Respondents excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the
Solicitor General and the complainant that those excuses do not
exculpate the Respondent.chanrobles law library

It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyers oath
and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated
that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that" [a]
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He has
been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of
the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the
title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his
overriding duty to the court and to the law itself.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of

committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the
Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of Professional
Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in
the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall
be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
G.R. No. L-28131 February 28, 1972

CHAN KIAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ARSENIO ANGSIN [A. A. Industrial Chemical Supply], defendant-
appellee.

Ramon Encarnacion, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.

Galang and Garcia for defendant-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of

Manila, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving a
pure question of law.

The appellate court's resolution of certification of September 19, 1967

gives the following backgrounder on the facts of the case: .

Plaintiff's complaint before the CFI of Manila alleges, among other

things, that on July 23, 1962, he entered into an agreement with
defendant whereby, for and in consideration of the purchase price of
P300.00 per drum, or a total of P120,000.00 which he received from
defendant on the same date, he sold to defendant, for delivery on
August 23, 1962, 400 drums of monosodium glutamate and that on
August 23, 1962, he was ready to deliver the 400 drums of
monosodium glutamate but defendant refused to accept delivery and
insisted on the return of the P120,000.00 because the price of the said
merchandise had already fallen in the local market, hence said
complaint prays that defendant be ordered to receive from plaintiff 400
drums of monosodium glutamate, with damages.

Arising from the same transaction is Criminal Case No. 67752, People
vs. Chan Kian (herein plaintiff) before the same court, wherein herein
defendant is the complainant, who accuses herein plaintiff with estafa
involving the same 400 drums of monosodium glutamate and the sum
of P120,000.00.
On defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, which was
opposed by plaintiff, and in view of the pendency of both criminal and
civil cases between the same parties and over the same subject
matter, the lower court ruled that the trial of the criminal case should
take precedence over the civil case, "not only because the procedure
provided for the prosecution of offenses is more adequate than civil
procedure, but because the judgment which may be rendered in the
criminal action may dispose of the civil action." The lower court also
opined that giving preference to the criminal case would avoid
multiplicity of suits and the possibility of a conflict of decision on the
same issues, for it would be anomalous if the civil case is decided in
favor of plaintiff and thereafter he gets convicted in the criminal case.
Concluding that "only if the criminal case is tried first and the accused
is acquitted would it be proper for him to continue with this civil case,"
the lower court finally said that this ruling is in accordance with
Paragraph (c)of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court providing that "after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted."

The appellate court then recited plaintiff-appellant's grounds of appeal:

Appealing the order of dismissal to this Court, plaintiff contends "That

the lower court erred in giving due course to the motion to dismiss filed
by defendants-appellee" on the following grounds: .

(1) That the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 107,
Section 1, have no application in the case at bar; .

(2) That civil case No. 52247 is a prejudicial question to the

resolution of Criminal Case No. 67752; .

(3) That assuming arguendo that the provisions of Rule 107 is

applicable, the proper remedy is not Motion to Dismiss.

After the submittal in September and October, 1963, of the parties'

briefs, the appellate court found no question of fact and that "the only
issue is the correctness of the order of dismissal which is one of law," 1
and ordered the elevation of the record to this Court.

Since the present case involved only plaintiff-appellant's appeal from

the lower court's dismissal order of his civil case No. 52247 for specific
performance, and the parties made no reference to what had
transpired meanwhile to the criminal case for estafa, No. 67752
against plaintiff as accused pending before another branch, Branch
XVIII of the same lower court presided by Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., 2
the Court resolved to send for the records of the criminal case.
The Court's examination, motu proprio, of the record of said Criminal
Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has shown that the
principal issue raised on appeal by herein plaintiff-appellant that the
lower court erred in issuing the order dismissing his civil complaint
against the complainant in the criminal case on its ruling that the trial
of the criminal case should take precedence over the civil case, has
become moot and academic. This is so because in the meantime long
before this case was certified to this Court by the appellate court on
September 19, 1967, the trial of the criminal case had proceeded and
terminated with a judgment of conviction rendered on July 9, 1964 by
Judge Kapunan of Branch XVIII, which in turn was reversed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals as per its decision of June 18, 1965.

The record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 thus shows the following
sequence of events:

1. Judge Kapunan had denied a similar motion on the part of the

accused (herein plaintiff) to suspend the criminal proceedings, ruling in
his order on February 2, 1963 that the civil case did not present a
prejudicial question, besides citing Judge Arca's prior order of January
28, 1963 dismissing the civil case. 3

2. The accused (herein plaintiff) questioned Judge Kapunan's order

by seeking an injunction from the Court of Appeals in a case docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 31915-R, entitled "Chan Kian, petitioner vs. Ruperto
Kapunan, Jr. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Arsenio
Angsin, respondents." The appellate court, through its special fifth
division, promulgated on July 13, 1963 its decision ruling that
"respondent judge correctly denied petitioner's motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 67752 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila" 4 and final judgment was entered on September 10, 1963. 5

3. The criminal case thus proceeded to trial and on July 10, 1964,
Judge Kapunan promulgated his decision dated July 9, 1964 finding the
accused (therein plaintiff) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and sentencing him to serve an indeterminate penalty ranging
from not less than ten (10) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor as minimum, to not more than fourteen (14)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P120,000.00 and to pay the
costs. 6

4. On appeal, the appellate court, through its special first division

approved the Solicitor-General's recommendation for acquittal and
reversed Judge Kapunan's judgment of conviction and instead
acquitted the accused (plaintiff herein of the charge against him, per
its decision of June 18, 1965 7 and final entry of the said judgments
was made on June 29, 1965. 8

The majority of the division held "that the transaction between

complainant Arsenio Ang Sin and appellant Chan Kian that led to the
execution of Exhibit A was one of purchase and sale with advance
payment of the purchase price of P120,000.00 for 400 drums of
"Vetsin". There was, therefore, no obligation on the part of appellant to
return the said amount to the complainant. Furthermore, we find that
appellant was ready and willing to deliver the 400 drums of "Vetsin" as
agreed upon and hence he did not, under the circumstances of this
case, incur any criminal liability." Enriquez, J. as a minority disagreed
with the majority's holding on the nature of the transaction but
nevertheless held that "(U)nder the facts therefore neither
misappropriation nor conversion has been shown. The absence of such
essential element precludes the existence of criminal liability" and
likewise voted for the acquittal of the accused. And they were also
unanimous that the drop in the price of the monosodium glutamate
was the reason for complainant's failure to take delivery thereof on the
agreed deadline and for the precipitate filing of the criminal complaint
on the day immediately following thereafter.

None of the above developments of record in the criminal case has

been brought to the attention of the appellate court or of this Court in
the present appeal by the attorneys for the parties, except for the
mention in appellee's brief of the appellate court's decision denying
plaintiff's petition for a writ enjoining Judge Kapunan from proceeding
with the criminal case, supra. 9

The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as officers of the
courts, but faithfully complied with their duty to deal with the courts in
truth and candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate court the
above developments, all by June, 1965, which have made the principal
issue at bar moot and academic, 11 this case would then have been
disposed of and need not have been certified to this Court, and the
time needed by it to devote to the prompt disposition of meritorious
cases need not have been thus
dissipated. 12

At any rate, it is clear that the civil case filed by plaintiff-appellant

should merely have been suspended, not dismissed although without
prejudice, by the lower court under the Rule invoked by it. 13 Appellee
concedes as much, stating that the dismissal without prejudice is in
effect a suspension pending the outcome of the criminal case.
Now that the criminal case has already been resolved, the lower
court's dismissal of the civil case should be set aside and the case
accordingly remanded to it.

On March 12, 1969, the Court, upon motion of plaintiff-appellant,

issued its Resolution authorizing plaintiff "to sell at the best price
obtainable, under the supervision of the Clerk of this Court or his
representative, the 400 drums of monosodium glutamate subject of
this case, now stored in the bodega of the General Packing
Corporation, and to deposit with this Court the proceeds of such sale,
after deducting the storage fees and other necessary expenses." As
per report of the Clerk of Court, this Resolution has not been
implemented to date, due according to plaintiff's explanation of
December 9, 1971, to the very low price being offered for the article.
With the present disposition of this case, this matter has become moot,
without prejudice to plaintiff's refiling his motion anew with the lower
court.

ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the appealed order

of dismissal is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the lower
court for proper trial and disposition on the merits. With costs against
defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973

LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners,

vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC.,
respondents.

Ortile Law Office for petitioners.

Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law

upon counsel of respondents for improper conduct and abuse of the
Court's good faith by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross
disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his
solemn duty to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the Court and
tending to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due
course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon
within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the
hearing of the case 1 pending before it below.

Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel

for respondents, stating that while he had received on November 15,
1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no
accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence
the undersigned counsel would not be able to prepare the comments
of the respondents as directed in said resolution without said copy."
filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of
such petition within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court
granted such first extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972.

Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of

Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed a
verified second motion for extension of ten days from December 15,
1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2.
That Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got sick on December 6,
1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per verified medical
certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just
recovered from his ailment, and has requested the undersigned to
specially make this motion for another extension of TEN (10) days in
order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents."

Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third
motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to
submit the required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel
has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due
to pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the
Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out in a
clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972.

The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said
extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents'
failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions
sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12,
1973, the Court as per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to
require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to explain and show
cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required
comment.

Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973,
wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his) pressing
professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the
answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents)
took delivery of the records of the said case from his office and
contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."

Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the
Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he
learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an
answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty.
Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical certificate which certified
however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors' Hospital
only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan.
15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his
services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December
12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and
subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972)
and that Gregorio Caeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc.
"saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him
that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer because of
the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R.
No. L-35766 from me."

Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5,

1973 of Gregorio Caeda, president and general manager of
respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that their
corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the
answer to meet the deadline" and delivered the records of the case to
the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not sworn to before any
official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the statement
"(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually
transpired" under the signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-
Treasurer)."

Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any
undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat
this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an
opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within
the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this
Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this similar
incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and
without blinking an eye notwithstanding that the required comment
has long been overdue for almost four months at the time that he
"be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the
respondents."

Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11,
1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's
explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents'
comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying
that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court.

In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the

petition and dismissed the same for insufficient showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course
from any adverse decision on the merits being the merits being the
proper and adequate remedy.

The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the

Court finds to be unsatisfactory.

Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents'

comment is due to the failure of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez,
contracted by his clients at his instance because of his pressing
professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation,"
is unworthy of credence because it is contrary to the facts of record:

In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his

belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained to file
the required comment, and no other lawyer, much less Atty. Fernandez,
ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents;

In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office
cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972
and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in
order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;"
 In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the
Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the desired
comments" and cited "pressure of work in his office" and the Christmas
Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a
clean copy" which comments never came to be submitted to this
Court;

His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez'

medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital for
sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had sufficient
time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended
deadline on January 12, 1973;

Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies

the latter's claim that the records of the case had been given to the
former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Caeda of
respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between
December 23-26, 1972) he advised Caeda of his inability to prepare
the "answer" and Caeda got back the records of the case from him;

He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the

desired comments" was "already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and
only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit the
same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months and worse, in his
"explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare
the anser [which] he will try his best to do it within the period granted
by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored and
disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on
January 12, 1973; and

He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not

seeing to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required
comment, that the required comment was filed within the last
extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the
Court on his assurance that the final draft was ready and did nothing
for three months until after he received the Court's resolution of April
12, 1973 requiring his explanation.

The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his
having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the
required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any
explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly
prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt
disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court
required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and
unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous
representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents
submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let

pass without submitting the required comment which according to his
motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was
only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly
asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment
which supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months
ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the
Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of
justice.

In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There
must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes
that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action."

It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn

oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no
falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their
clients.

The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the

pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his
solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false
statement of fact or law." 3

The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his
oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the
administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and
representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by
the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been
admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that
while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the
utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar
as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4
Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the
practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases
despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file
the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on
counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with
the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their
part."

Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous

infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959,
the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante

from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from
his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of
court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of
Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank.

Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and

furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132365 July 9, 1998

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,

vs.

HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL
CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with
mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested Regional Trial
Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for
violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private
respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua
and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged
in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional
Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the

Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court
of Alien, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private

respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel

Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.

c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private

respondent Esbel Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private

respondent Diosdada Amor only.

In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B.

Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the
records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law
Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court
on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended
by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the
cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does
not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order
read as follows:

[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for
[sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under
Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1)
year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject
to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of
the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129
as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec.
32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an

imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other
penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and
amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including
damages to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over

the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did
not exceed six (6) years.

The two motions 4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC

Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its
Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the
Order of 17 October 1997, 5 the petitioner filed this special civil action.
It contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court
has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses"
because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and
this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election
offenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of

the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General

informs us that it is "adopting" the instant petition on the ground that
the challenged orders of public respondent "are clearly not in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence."
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it
is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining
the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has
divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where
the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment;
moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and
orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified
accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in
question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it
is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to
the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as follows:

Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. The regional trial court shall have
the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the
decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those
enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed
by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section,
thus:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an

election offense:

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or

employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any
officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or
any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which
may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in
any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense
under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is
"imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years"
and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage.

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691,

provides as follows:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals 7 that by virtue

of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32,
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those
criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor.
Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional,
arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the
Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception

provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1)
Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; 8 and (4) the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 9 as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code,
election offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or

by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article
VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress
may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a
special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law
on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691
can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is
merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does nut
have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or
the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No.
7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from
the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening
sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an
opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his
duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, 11 to be
faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. 12

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioner's

Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness
in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion
for Reconsideration 13 he filed, with the court below, Atty. Balbuena
stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in
the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-
94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to

Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by
way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to
failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand
together with the provisions that any election offense under the code
shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years
and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election
Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest
upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception
to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found
under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over
criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Emphasis
ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge
Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction
between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses,
has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of

Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus
Election Code the Comelec has the power to conduct preliminary
investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the
Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the
same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise
jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote.
Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that
any election offense under the code shall be punishable with
imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject
to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is
the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court
jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg.
129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by
Republic Act. No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over
criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the
correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither
Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor
Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA.
Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the
paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty.
Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were
findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth
is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14

mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the text of a decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25
August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and
A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try
and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further,
ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the

discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974

JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and
RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In
Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine
Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as
respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and
in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to
insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance
the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the
entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Taada, et al" which
was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973,
for lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes

imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case
even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive
for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar
that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a
member of the Bar.

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on

Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a
"fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against
Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City
Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil
Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075,
the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid".
Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court
rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred
pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory
damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in
Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided
by Hon. Santiago O. Taada but the Court of First Instance upheld the
decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it
was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.

The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the

Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose
N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972),
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in
favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of
evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that
positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some
words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to
Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of
Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.

It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del
Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of
the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust
judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the
innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When
the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the
motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust
judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be
deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and
abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second
motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another
threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the
jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171,
204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the
AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that
will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines."

The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that
notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for
Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he
reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert
its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days
(and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for
contempt of court.

On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation

wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and
he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of
the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent
sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals
informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines,
furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into
consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case
scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on
December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices
of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he
instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the
amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law
and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do
so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar
seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in
accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his
own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not
accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role
of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and
construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of
what is in accordance with law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's

Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very
manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the
Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which
happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar,
instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his
plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth
Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos
and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices
concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be
criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or
doing it through ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution

(March 5, 1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any
man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb,
if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the
threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference
to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining
against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the
Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the
constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was
arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities,
including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this
anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly

concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and
condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the
practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies
of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We
upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order
of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated
Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to
circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals
suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against
Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon
Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in
Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to
hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the
case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement
after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and
agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-
justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did
not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he
actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making
them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with
the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his
motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension
from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored
because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages
filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.

Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of
frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court,
G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for
reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court
requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the
resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices
favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration
We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He,
then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating
brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that,
had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the
last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same,
civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals
who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica,
reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment
therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding
evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and
work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in
a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to
Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution
aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R.
No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse
of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of
this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require
by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the
contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court

in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine
what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful
wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his
contemptuous statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M.

Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really
uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question "binuang man gud
na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud
na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the
former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be
liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the
preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive
evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was
really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na
siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral
defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for
review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the
Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone
question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G.
R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals
was so informed.

To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to

show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements
contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an
explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is
attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the
Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B")
against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G.
Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as
extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed
suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human
efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore,
decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to
God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification

of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July
1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the
Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No.
46504-R.

Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico

del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on
November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an
additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other
things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of
the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all
human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless
and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the
filling-up of human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a

toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1,
1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of
apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as
state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside
of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In
other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances
that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft,
and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No.
L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent
del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding
condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother
in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of
proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating
from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and
those of others are all wrong.

When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed
the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order
of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration
on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In
Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he
had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to
submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of
respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further
investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of
Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for
decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973,

respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high
blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and
physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily
forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all
mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he
reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in
its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same
in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view
that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified
his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the
Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and
scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion
prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of
sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and
expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could
have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his
clients as regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although

pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the
contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's
previous statements. We quote:

The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of
the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in
the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a
justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held
liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the
Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American
laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the
Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and
fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the
Supreme Court thereon

While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at

the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be
considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly
stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of
sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical
anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and
thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and
in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this
case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court
facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily
retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent
power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to
deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making
arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that
second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful

attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is
his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he
owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which,
without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In
re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).

As We stated before:

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual

endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should
give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps
much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues
involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions,
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-
22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)

Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed

against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a

judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the
prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction
of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to
extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the
latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve
nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to
secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in
a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a
serious disrespect. We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the
court so essential to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis
supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs.
C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No.

46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one
specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for
review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for
disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial
discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats
to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision
and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be
anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts
by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of

respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his
concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the
people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for
law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements
without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is
merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems
not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be
so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may
appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the
viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves
into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is
with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing
lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in
the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with
keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events
and circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and
mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and
honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have
nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the
book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with
honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those
who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose
to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for
them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for
the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.

46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from
the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19,
1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the
Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice
of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect
immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p.
562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re:
Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito
M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.

RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:

After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent
MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to
our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.
Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be
taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-
cause order.

The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth
in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made

these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could
be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for
Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the
bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).

b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the

immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum
Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).

c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims

and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in
the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17,
sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).

MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L.

Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points
out, contain the following statements:

d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law
due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a
gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used
by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the
light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to
create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).

The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment

herein was rendered and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself
and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and
Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January
11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable
Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated
January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in
the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment
referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial
ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about
respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been
caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of
"petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly
benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:

(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been
declared unconstitutional.

(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-
entitled case.

(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the
right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of
this nature.

(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first
place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is
neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome
development of the law but only served to delay respondent for the
benefit of the favored party.

(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the
status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that
it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.

(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said

decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.

(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise
in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all
bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable
Supreme Court.

(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme
Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said
decision manifests.

(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred
million dollars by said decision without an effort by the Honorable
Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the
trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and
Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing
pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor
General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were
comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the
fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if
MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would
be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change
the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7,
paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial

authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty
unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for
a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala
daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of
court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the
violation of moral principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez who
refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused
who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the
explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that
many of our government officials are just amoral?

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and

(h) of paragraph 7 thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his

compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He
there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for
reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should
be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations
made on November 21, 1968.

On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying

that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore
quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through
inadvertence.

On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur,

registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer
that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit
themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to
inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the
comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.

On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early
as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this
case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did
not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices.
According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against
counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."

In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains
to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of
context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He
made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of
context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f),
Rule 138, had been violated.

On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose

Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original
jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil
contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the
Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an
"offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor
General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended
Party or witness."

We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of

December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of
December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his
law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or
any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in
MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted;
that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case;
that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional
competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on
likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and
he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had
not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any
pleading or any other document in connection with this case.

On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In

brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our
November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of
absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the
attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his
name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case
(L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.

A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969,

respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling
who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion
reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following
paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the

Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the
Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which condition is
prohibited by the New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part
in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially
significant in the present instance because the member who penned
the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately
four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company

abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao
nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice
and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government,
either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of
confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar
price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually,
until restitution or compensation is made.

This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969,
requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days
from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for
contempt of court."

On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there
alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already
finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and
requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that
he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know
anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated
in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently
explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of
the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was
misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not
revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the
case.

Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on

August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and
Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty.
Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of
court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three,
Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads,
personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at
9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them
will be heard by this Court."

On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He

disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago)
convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago,
is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he
knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for
reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there
upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and
left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the
motion and that he never even read it.

On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as

follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the
fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago
started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in
Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that
MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads
asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling
whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to
Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While
Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the
motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name
was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads,
from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion
was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a
half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was
with Caling for about fifteen minutes.

In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the
quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said
quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings
to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the
announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In
fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.

On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and
Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the
second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second
contempt incidents seriatim.

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third

motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be
expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
"vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized,
democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of

July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous
manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we
issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before
the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of
this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds
to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by
the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth
the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a
belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice
for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must
be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed
to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."

It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained

language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it
has been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his
rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this
Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not
make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only
because it was belatedly made but also because his signature
appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this
paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities"
who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty
unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of
unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or
an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to
ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just
amoral?"

Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of

"unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of
"unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a
lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about
loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement
that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly
or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-
petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should
also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis
in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court.
For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at
once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed
by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up?
Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence
thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in
fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government
operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why
the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on
the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is
easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a
court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are
thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a
lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon
of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the
courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an

instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."4

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that
it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not
permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society,
their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice
Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and
no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary
and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice
Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to
the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of
the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the
court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges
may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-
restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not
unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty.
Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the
statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore
quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He
describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying
bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling
of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is
made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of
context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They
do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the
pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is
charged." 10

Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702,
708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of
the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has
never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a
chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life.
A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would
transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a
palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of
wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed."
We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront
to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his
assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This
Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should
be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt
under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it,
in every manner appertaining thereto." 11

We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved,
under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the
court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct
tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty
of contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It

was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm
of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly
did Regala insist and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of
respondents that he had not participated in any way in the
pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his
name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.

4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident

is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that
Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the
pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt
from contempt.

5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The

fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.

First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has

been made why this has been done.

Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said
Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. ...
only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus

SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the
court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be
submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the
Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether
such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission;
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted
for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if
the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing
filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12

Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to
explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted
quotation came about the portion left out was anyway marked by
"XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct
with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid
nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate
deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a
qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally
omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the
World Court and/or the United States government. It must be
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion
announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting
to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to

decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has
even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency
between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An
appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would
appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat
to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that
he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has
been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to
have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.

7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the

fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt
charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of
contempt.

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he

had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that
he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair
appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents
before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion,
who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the
background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with
Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand,
Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for
reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil.
We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on
July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to
Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth
motion for reconsideration during all that time.

Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur

in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He
has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should
be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer
should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from
doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected

where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with
the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of
disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
justice.

9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only
for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the
main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of
July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and
conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly
warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And
We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had
been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the
adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond.,
contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any
consideration.

It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by

a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the
result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the
same have failed.

For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago
in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano
C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of
court; and

2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago,

Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court,
and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F.
Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the

Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in
the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.

Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the

Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to
the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.

G.R. No. L-42032 January 9, 1976

IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY OF MANUEL DE

GRACIA ON A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. MANUEL DE GRACIA,
petitioner,
vs.
THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL, Makati, Rizal; THE PROVINCIAL
WARDEN, PROVINCIAL JAIL, Pasig, Rizal; HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXV, Pasig, Rizal;
and MARCIANO P. STA. ANA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Pasig, Rizal,
respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is settled law-that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for

release from confinement of a person who has served his sentence. 1 It
i s on such a doctrine that reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de
Gracia in this application for the issuance of such a writ. It is
undisputed that while the information against petitioner charged him
with the commission of frustrated homicide to which he pleaded not
guilty, it was later amended to one of serious physical injuries. It is to
such lesser offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea of
guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado
imposed upon him the penalty of four months and one day of arrests
mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That
period of confinement he had duly served by November 10, 1975,
considering that he had been under detention since July 18, 1975. 2
This notwithstanding, the petition alleged that he was not set free, the
reason being that on November 19, 1975, the last day of the prison
term imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the very same
case where your petitioner was convicted and for which he served
sentence, Criminal Case No. 15289, a 'Motion to Order the Warden to
Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner)' alleging as a
ground that the 'father of the victim, Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the
movant (respondent Asst. Fiscal, not the People of the Philippines), that
the victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason the
undersigned will file an amended information. 3 Then came this
paragraph in the petition: "That on the following day, November 20,
1975, the respondent Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact
that he had no jurisdiction to act on said motion because the case had
long been terminated and his decision therein had already been
executed, and, further, even assuming that the respondent Judge could
still act in the case, he could not and should not act on the Fiscal's
motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof
was furnished to your petitioner whose very liberty was being sought
to be deprived, still [he] persisted in acting upon the Fiscal's motion
and granted the same 'in the interest of justice,' not at all minding that
your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent
Judge, is still entitled to due process of law and to some justice; ...." 4
There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was fruitless. 5 Hence
this petition.

On December 8, 1975, this Court issued the following resolution: "The

Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on
Friday, December 12, 1975 and required the respondents to make a
[return] of the writ not later than the aforesaid date. The Court further
Resolved: (a) to set this case for hearing on Monday, December 15,
1975 at 10:30 a.m.; and (b) to [grant] the motion of petitioner to
litigate as pauper in this case." 6 On the date set for hearing,
respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado filed his return, worded as
follows: "1. That the petitioner Manuel de Gracia has already been
ordered released by this court per order dated December 11, 1975, in
view of the fact that Trial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. has not as of
this time filed the amended information for Homicide after the death of
Florante Valenzuela, the offended party in this case, notwithstanding
his motion entitled 'Motion to Order the Warden to hold the Release of
Manuel de Gracia dated November 19, 1975, ...; 2. That in view of the
release from custody of Manuel de Gracia, the present petition for
habeas corpus has become moot and academic. ..." 7 Fiscal of Rizal,
did likewise. The return stated: "1. That the Respondent Marciano P.
Sta. Ana, Jr., the Assistant Provincial petitioner is not in his custody or
power although, as alleged in the petition, it was upon his motion that
the respondent Judge issued the Order ... ordering the warden to hold
the release of the accused (herein petitioner). 2. That the reason for his
said motion ... is, as stated therein, that he was informed of the death
of the victim and he was going to file an amended information. 3. That
because of the necessity for immediate action so as to avoid the
accused being released so that he could be held to answer for a crime
of homicide, and in the honest belief at that time that the proper
remedy was the filing of an amended information for homicide, the
undersigned filed the motion on said ground. The information
concerning the death of the victim was given to the undersigned by
the victim's father only on November 19, 1975, the last day of
confinement of the accused. However, after being able to study the
applicable rule and jurisprudence, the undersigned concluded that the
proper remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment
had already been rendered on the first information, but the filing of a
new information for homicide upon the authority of this Honorable
Court's ruling in People v. Manolong, and It is similar cases. 8

As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for hearing by
respondent wardens, a resolution of the following tenor was adopted
by this Court: "When this case was called for hearing this morning,
Atty. Salvador N. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant
Provincial 'Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and Major o Maristela
appeared for the respondents. Thereafter, the Court Resolved (a) to
require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. to file a
[return] of the writ for the respondent wardens not later than 10:30
a.m. of Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to [reset] the hearing
of this case on the aforesaid date and time. 9 It should be stated
likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela assured the Court that petitioner
had been release What was declared orally by him was thereafter set
forth in writing in accordance with his return dated December 16,
1975: II That on Sept. 18, 1975, the Office of the Provincial Warden
received a commitment order issued by Judge Reynaldo Honrado,
dated 16 September 1975, ...; IV. That by virtue 6f that commitment
order which the petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from
four (4) months and one (1) day, he was transferred to Makati
Municipal Jail, on Sept. 18, 1975, to service his prison term thereat
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 29 as said prisoner is classified as
Municipal prisoner; V That the petitioner was brought back and
confined again to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec. 3, 1975, by virtue of
Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla, Executive Judge CFI
Rizal dated Dec. 3, 1975, ...; VI. That on December 12, 1975, the Office
of the Provincial Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of
First Instance of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge Reynaldo Honrado,
directing him to release Manuel de Gracia, the petitioner in this case;
VII. That by virtue of odd order ... and the Order of Release, ... the
undersigned respondent released on said date the petitioner as
evidenced by certificate of discharge from prison and that is the reason
why he cannot produce the body of said person before this Honorable
Court; VIII That he was not able to make the return of the writ
immediately on the ground that he was at that time confined in the
hospital, and he was d only on December 13, 1975." 10 There was
likewise a return of the writ on such a date on behalf of respondent
Cresencio T. Pimentel, Municipal Warden of Makati, Rizal. It was therein
declared: "1. That the petitioner was not in his custody when he
received copy of the petition as the petitioner was transferred to 'the
Rizal Provincial Jail on December 3, 1975, as he was going to be
charged with the crime of homicide and 'therefore, his confinement has
to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of said transfer,
respondent Municipal Warden could not produce the body of the
'petitioner before this- Honorable Court." 11

On the morning Deeember 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial

Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared.
Neither petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present.
There was this manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru counsel,
respectfully manifests that he has already been released from
confinement, for which reason the present petition has been rendered
moot and academic .... 12 It would appear, therefore, that with the
release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and
academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note.
There was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran
who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very
day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may
be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice
before this Tribunal. it suffices to call his attention to such failing by
way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar.

G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR.
CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ,
petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and
NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN,
respondents.

Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.

Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer

for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman

dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension of
petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr.,
Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to
the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez,
Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The
petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify
Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office
of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation
of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition,
Rollo, pp. 19-21).

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative

complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the
private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the
recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-
Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the
charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify
Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and
bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on
the petition.

On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a

"Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to Supplemental
Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp.
173-176), respectively, averring developments that transpired after the
filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.

On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the

respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending
filing of comments by said respondents on the original supplemental
manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).

On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent

Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated
October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to
comment on the said motion.

On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission,"

respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the
Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the
lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-
267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the
orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-
1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients
petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey
or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by
Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order
(Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation
of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of
unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies,
malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing
subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings
(Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and
Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to
Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached
to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).

On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment

dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of
the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain
the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear
intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold
in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension,
the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c)
respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating
and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace
petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with
the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring
the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution"
(Comment attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).

In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required

respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order,
stating inter alia, that:

It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present controversy
was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at
bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually
occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that
petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective
positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be
lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons
acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act
in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992
until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615
thereof).

On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the

Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated
that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government
official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in
the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).

In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the

position of the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman can only suspend
government officials or employees connected with his office.
Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar
petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo
without pagination).

The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power
to suspend government officials and employees working in offices
other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of
the administrative complaints filed against said officials and
employees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend

petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated
January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy

may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated

by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office
of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the

Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by
Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law."

On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that
under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to
the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative
investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the
preventive suspension himself.

They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function,
and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public

official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.

The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the

Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers, namely: (1)
direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public
officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal,
suspension, demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel
compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3,
1992, pp. 9-10).

The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can
easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the Ombudsman
imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive
suspension.

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to

recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13
[3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension"
should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it
is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945];
Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power
to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.
The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the
requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to
recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of
erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent
determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman
has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct
such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need
to suspend the respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes,
among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the
possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The
Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the
persons facing administrative charges should be preventively
suspended.

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are

liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of
Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in
determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to
an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory
Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in
criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally
(People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers
as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by
the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its
provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should
be avoided.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution

should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and
objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940];
Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).

In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a
preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:

Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If

after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively

suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his
office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any
officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.

The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension and
which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any
subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending
an investigation . . . ."

Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which
superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also
authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate
officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."

However, when the power to discipline government officials and

employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the Civil
Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the
Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the
phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted,
appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority." Therefore,
Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper

disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate officer
or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).

The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and

"in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The
conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word
"subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or
employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman
to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation
by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office"
or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or
administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent
therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to
determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive
suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he
issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the
opportunity to confront the charges against them during the
preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the
disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-
13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that assuming
arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend
erring public officials and employees who are working in other
departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and void
for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of

the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing
and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra,
petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not
preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be
dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was
merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).

There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the

Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a respondent
unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge
would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively

suspend officials or employees under investigation were found in
Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is

given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This
fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left
such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on
the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the
Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only after: (a)
petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and
the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which
incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them
(Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of
petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the
members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission,
Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the
complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to
submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.

Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits

(Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private
respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).

Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw
and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and
bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be
said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acting favorably on their recommendation.

The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with
unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy
and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman
and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The
Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the
Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute
indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to
question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of
their clients.

On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language

used by counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and
their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent"
"Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's
Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).

A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause.

The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and
restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with
his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v.
Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by
counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a
disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of
impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more
heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant
special civil action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or
abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the
arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart
from the present special civil action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to

be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED
and SET ASIDE.