J.

Soundarya Political Theory

1657349 CIA III - Article Review

MAIS I Submitted on 1/3/2017

Article Reviewed

The Emergence of Ex-Jihadi Political Parties in Post-Mubarak Egypt by Jrme Drevon

The Middle East Journal, Vol. 29(4), Autumn 2015, pp.511-526

Published by Middle East Institut
Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/595951

In todays war on terror, the world regularly debates on the counter-terrorism mechanisms in
the context of military action. Discussions on drone strikes, use of torture, surveillance and
intelligence often dominate the debate. However, it is hardly noticed that most of the terrorist
group end their violence as they join the political process. Evidence since 1986 prove that the
almost 43 % of the terrorist groups end joining political process or when their prominent leaders
are killed or arrested by local police or intelligence agencies. Military hardly plays a role of
significant importance to be the primary reason behind any terrorist organisation ending (Jones,
Libicki, 2010). There are well-known instances when terrorist organisations have involved
themselves in political process and participated in elections. For instance Hamas in Palestine
in1992, Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1996 and 2006 gained strong standing in the legislature of the
country too. In addition, there have been numerous instances where terrorist organisations have
been engaged directly by the government themselves to end the violence and bring them to
mainstream politics. For instance, the negotiations with FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Columbia by the government to end five decade long violence resulting in more than 6000
members of the armed group giving up their arms and entering mainstream lives, the on-going
negotiation between the Afghanistan Government and other stakeholder countries government
with Taliban to end violence in the region etc. It is in light of these situations and events that
studying the political participation of formerly violent insurgent jihadi groups in Egypt through
formation of a political party of their own becomes significant. The study of political inclusion of
mainstream and armed Islamist movement have been widely cover in many literature but
transformation of a armed jihadi organisation into a political party after their comprehensive
rejection of violence has been rare.

It is on this premise that the study The Emergence of Ex-Jihadi Political Parties in Post-
Mubarak Egypt by Jrme Drevon is set. The paper attempts to uncover the rationale behind
their transformation of two formerly Islamist armed movements, al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya the
Islamic Group) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into a political party after the 2011 Arab Spring
Uprising in Egypt. In doing so, the paper argues that these violent jihadi groups embraced
political participation after reassessment of the political opportunities provided to them by
Egypts brief political opening under Morsis rule. Major argument of the paper is that this
political participation of the Islamist terror groups has been made possible and facilitated
because of the groups own internal assessment, dialogues and reorientation of their ideologies
understanding the new political opportunities available to them and not because of their
acceptance of democracy or party politics in Islam. The article analyses how the group
rationalized and legitimized their action to start a new political party against their own past
commitments and original ideologies in an attempt to understand why the terrorist organisation
did so. The major question the author puts forward is why an Islamist organisation will
participate in political process in a regime considering their participation legitimizes the very
regimes it is theoretically opposing. The paper does not study the long term implication of
entrance of formerly armed jiahdi groups into political process.

The paper has used qualitative research methodology, which is based on extensive field study in
Egypt between 2011 and 2013 and has used interviews with the leaders and volunteers of both
the Islamic movements and their respective political parties as well as comprehensive analysis of
groups own political literature and their organisational dynamics to explore the internal
dynamics and debates which from part of the major argument of the paper.

Background

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya emrged during the 1970s, one as a
loosely related network to infiltrate army and stage a coup and other as a students movement in
South Egypt. The commonalities of both the groups arise from their commitment to armed
violent in response to Sadat governments crackdown on Islamic movement in Egypt. The two
groups joined together for a brief period of time to overthrow Sadats government which they
were successful of but were caught and put in jail subsequently. Eventually the union
disintegrated and both the groups since then have been involved in armed violence in the country
in the form of assassinations, bombing, etc while maintain low-profile. After the Arab Spring, the
al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya formed a new political party named Building and Development party in
June 2011 and The Egyptian Islamic Jihad formed Safety and Development Party at the end of
2012.

On debating and legitimizing the creation of Ex-Jihadi political party

The author, while analyzing the reason for the violent armed organisation to renounce violence
and enter into political process, argues that most of the previous literature on the issue has been
attributing the major reason for this to the role of states non-violent approach, the incentives,
and other factors. At the same time, they have underplayed the groups internal dynamics and the
fundamental changes the groups undergo for renouncing violence and transform to a political
party. The author, through this article attempts to fill this research gap. By highlighting the
internal dynamics of the organisation, their structure, the interaction among leaders and followers
of the groups, and the revision of their ideology they do, the author brings to light the major
influence the internal factors of an armed jihadi group has on their renunciation of violence and
transition to participating in political process.

Critically analyzing the events that led to formation of political parties by both the groups, the
author argues that the major reason for the transformation was the political opportunity the
situation in the country offered them and the author also observes that the groups have still not
articulated their vision for Egypt in future and are silent on their political participation in future.
The danger it poses has not been emphasized by the author in the article. While the author does
mention that the article does not look into long term implication of this new development in
political process in Egypt, it is nave of author not to mention the possible danger the previously
armed group now participating in political process without any vision for the future poses for the
country. The argument that their political experience has been short-lived to pass a judgment on
the repercussions theyll have in the countrys political arena is not convincing.

In addition, the author argues that while Islamic movements like Muslim brotherhood entered
political process to benefit from the legal protection associated with the political participation, it
is not the case with these two Islamic movements. Given the groups involvement in terrorist
attacks in the past, their vision for political participation in future being questionable, the
argument of the author that the groups does not have substantial constituency or a military wing
to legitimize and hence these Islamic movement did not enter politics to benefit from leagal
protection is fragile. It is not clear how the author makes this case on such a flimsy line of
reasoning. To me, it only seems like the groups have formed political parties to reap the benefit
of the political opportunity presented to them and replace the existing authoritative autocratic
regime by a new one of their own if possible.

On whole the author is right to point out the most important factor for any armed jihadi group to
renounce violence and accept legitimacy of political process by participating in it is their internal
dynamics, and how the group interprets its foundational ideologies to suit its needs. However,
refraining from commenting on the repercussions of this new development and the long-term
implication makes the study inconclusive.

Relevance & Impact

The study is significant given the countries and international organisations are trying hard to
combat terrorism in any way possible. The recent negotiations with Taliban by Afghanistan and
the stake holder countries, even in India, the negotiations with National Socialist Council of
Nagaland(Kaplang) shows how governments around the world are persisting to make the armed
forces renounce violence and enter mainstream. If the two parties, in any way become successful
in political participation and make their voices heard (not considering their policies and
ideologies) this will encourage other terrorist organisations to also follow lead. However, it
should be acknowledged that the legitimacy of this is highly doubtful and questionable.

Impact: Cited - 2

Reference

Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al
Qa'ida. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008. Retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.html.