Hgdvhsvcjsvcj Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was
Mbcnksncjls
Mnxmslkxsck
Lncmslckskc,s.c,s
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All
the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who
had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the
vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated
October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the
resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which.
reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be
submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required
the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976,
reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the
IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was
set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court
raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration
of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in
its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous
conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore
legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed
by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by
persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would
be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be obliviousxmslcms. to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal
knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously
sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and
sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The
tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He
likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he
had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It
made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to
regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two
years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be
said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle.11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So
it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant
such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the
part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October
23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional
Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. Whether
directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the
court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate
language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more
deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial
proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more
circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe
proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.
R E SO LU TI O N
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language
in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the
parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for
forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case
on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When
complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in
the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be
suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay,
que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the
record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent
was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda
Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino
Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife
immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed
the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics
likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was
offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was
addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of
intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which
all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be
more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of
Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by complainants own manifest hostility and
provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the
use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and
warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39258 November 15, 1982
RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, ROBERTO L. BAUTISTA, OSCAR S. ATENCIO, and POLICARPIO MAPUA,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, Presiding Judge, Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, ADEZ
REALTY, INC., PILAR I. VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.,
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, and VICTORINO GASKELL, respondents.
Raymundo Armovit, Roberto L. Bautista and Oscar S. Atencio for petitioners.
Senen S. Ceneza for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression 1 in a motion to dismiss an action for damages flied by
petitioners as defendants failed to obtain an affirmative response from respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima. Hence this certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus proceeding, assailing on jurisdictional grounds the order denying such motion. The alleged grievance
of private respondents 2 as plaintiffs in a case then pending before respondent Judge 3 arose from the first two paragraphs of the
answer of petitioners 4 as defendants, worded as follows: "[Defendant], through counsel, by way of answer to the complaint,
respectfully, represents: 1. The averments of plaintiff's alleged due organization and existence (par. 1, Complaint) is denied it
falsifies the fact of its creation and operation as an instrument and front for illegal and oppressive usurious loan transactions; the
averments on defendant's personal circumstances (supra) are admitted, with the qualification that his dealings with plaintiff were
based on good faith and reliance on his part, but taken advantage of by scheming plaintiff. 2. That averments on the alleged loan
secured on 3 December 1971 in the sum of P7,270.00 and accessory sums thereon, the supposed demands for payment and
requests for extensions, the alleged failure of defendant to pay (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, supra) are specifically denied as fraudulent
distortions of the facts and apparent disguises to confuse and conceal the true agreements between the parties," 5 after which came
the affirmative defenses. The privileged character of such words employed in a pleading on a matter impressed with relevance,
usury being the defense, is not difficult to discern, if, as should be the case, there be recognition of the basic constitutional right of
free expression. So it would be in accordance with an unbroken line of decisions of this Tribunal. It does appear, therefore, that
petitioners are entitled to the remedies prayed for.
The facts are undisputed. This litigation had its origin in a suit for collection filed by plaintiff Adez Realty, Inc., now one of the
private respondents, seeking the payment of P7,270.00 with 12% interest and 25% of such amount as liquidated damages. 6 The
principal allegation was that plaintiff, now respondent, Adez Realty, Inc. agreed to extend to the defendant, now petitioner,
Policarpio Mapua and did deliver to him a loam in the amount of P7,270.00 on the condition that failure to liquidate such loan on
the date due would result in paying not only the principal with interest but the equivalent to 25% as liquidated damages. 7 It was
then stated that defendant Mapua had not paid such overdue debt, hence the filing of this case for collection. 8 The answer was
filed with the alleged offending paragraphs thereof as duly noted at the outset of this opinion. 9 Moreover, the affirmative defenses
contained the following allegations: "3. The transactions between plaintiff and defendant are in reality a loan of P5,000.00 secured
way back in 1969 earning usurious interest at the rate of 5% monthly, or 60% per annum to the extent that defendant was unable to
pay said usurious interest and at the same time liquidate the principal amount of P5,000.00 by December 3, 1971, such that 4. On
3 October 1971, plaintiff's jargon and double-talk caused defendant to sign the alleged promissory note Annex A, Complaint,
which plaintiff managed to facelift and veneer as a lawful deed and agreement, but stripped of its gloss, it is null and void, for
being contrary to the laws policy against usury. 5. Considering the payments by defendant of 5% interest monthly on the principal
since 1969, or P250.00 monthly, until 3 December 1971, defendant had fully paid the principal indebtedness. 10 The language
employed in such answer resulted, as had been stated, in a complaint for damages filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
before respondent Judge. 11 Then came the motion to dismiss, which as set forth, was predicated on the matter complained of being
absolutely privileged. 12 When after an opposition to such motion 13 and a reply to such opposition 14 were submitted, the lower
court issued the order denying the motion to dismiss, 15 this petition was filed with this Court, a motion for reconsideration having
proved futile. 16
To repeat, the petition is impressed with merit.
having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. In
exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:
1. "The prevailing rule," according to Justice Malcolm in the leading case of Santiago v. Calvo," 17 is that parties, counsel and
witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case." 18 Such doctrine was foreshadowed in the earlier case
of Zurbito v. Bayot, 19 decided in 1911. In the language of Justice Johnson: "If the persons presenting the claim are, in the opinion
of those opposing it, attempting to have a claim allowed which should not be snowed, they have a right to state their reasons
therefor, even though such opposition may incidentally reflect upon the honor and credit of the person presenting the claim." 20 A
year after the Santiago ruling, a similar pronouncement came from the pen of another eminent jurist, Justice Street in Baron v.
David. 21 Thus: "It is clear that with respect to these damages the cross-action cannot be maintained, for the reason that the
affidavit in question was used in course of a legal proceeding for the purpose of obtaining a legal remedy, and it is, therefore,
privileged." 22 The then Justice, now retired Chief Justice Concepcion in the leading case of Sison v. David 23 restated the principle:
"It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions,
belong to the class of communications that are already absolutely privileged." 24 As so emphatically stressed by the late Chief
Justice Castro in Deles v. Aragona:" 25 The doctrine of privileged communication is not an Idle and empty principle. It has been
distilled from wisdom and experience." 26
2. It is undoubted likewise, as held in Tolentino v. Baylosis, Justice J.B.L. Reyes being the ponente, 27 that as to the degree of
relevancy or pertinency necessary for the invocation of this absolute privilege, "the courts favor a liberal rule."28 He added: "The
matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that
no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need
not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial." 29 He likewise
quoted from the aforesaid Santiago v. Calvo decision: "For, as aptly observed in one case, 'while the doctrine of privileged
communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the
present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships.'"30 The language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon
in Dorado v. Pilar 31 is apropos: "Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance
of causes they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase." 32 It bears mentioning that
in Deles, 33 such sentiment was pharaphrased by Chief Justice Castro in this wise: "Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a
great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients, they may be
pardoned some infelicities of language." 34
3. The language of this Court on the question of what pleadings enjoy absolute immunity is not swathed in obscurity. Nor has there
been only change of mind - far from it. This Court has consistently adhered to what it had stated with clarity as far as 1911. If at
all, the later decisions had been even more emphatic to dissipate any lurking doubt that the rule of liberality so unequivocally set
forth must be upheld. The principle that calls for application is crystal-clear. The immunity parties and counsel enjoy is absolute
as long as the test of relevance is met. There is need, it would seem, to keep in mind that as Hokfeld pointed out, the correlative
of immunity is disability. Respondent Judge failed to heed such an imperative. It ought to have granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners, to repeat, are entitled to the remedies sought. So this Court has ruled in the aforecited cases of Zurbito and Baylosis as
wen as People v. Andres. 35
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the assailed order denying the motion to dismiss is annulled. Respondent Judge or
whoever may be acting in his stead is prohibited from taking any further action in Civil Case No. 94551 except to dismiss the
same. To that extent, mandamus lies. No costs.
A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En
Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar
Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his
Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his
Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official
Receipt No. 83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court,
included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a
Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath
as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable
Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to
his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which
reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable
Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my
Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual
General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's
(Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the
Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I
paid my membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City
Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise
respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official
Receipt No. 4601685, ... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the
name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-
1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion
with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that
herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due
and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and
Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .
10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No.
3195776, ... .
 11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)
as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, ....
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from
notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar
and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. SO ORDERED.
17 and 19, Rules of Court.)