Yarber File 1

Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 1 of 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16cv657-DPJ-FKB
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Counter-Defendant Kimberly V. Braceys Motion to
Dismiss [14]. Bracey asks the Court to dismiss Counter-Plaintiff Tony Yarbers Counterclaim
[9] against her. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and the Counterclaim is
dismissed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On August 25, 2016, Kimberly V. Bracey filed this lawsuit alleging sex-discrimination,
sexual-harassment, hostile-work-environment, and retaliation claims against the City of Jackson
and Mayor Tony Yarber, individually and in his official capacity. In general terms, Braceys
claims center on allegations of mistreatment by Yarber while she was employed by the City of
Jackson from April 2014, through April 2015.
On October 24, 2016, Yarber, in his individual capacity, filed his Answer and
Counterclaim [9]. He asserts claims against Bracey for abuse of process and defamation related
to her filing of the Complaint and Amended Complaint [3] in this action. Bracey moved to
dismiss those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Following the entry of a
show-cause order, Yarber responded in opposition, and Bracey filed a reply. The Court has
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.

II. Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-
pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). But the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To overcome a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). Id. at 555
(citations and footnote omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Abuse of Process
Yarber alleges that the filing of the Complaint and the filing and service of the Amended
Complaint containing false allegations . . . constitute abuse of process. Countercl. [9] at 9.
To maintain an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that
the defendant made an illegal and improper perverted use of the process, a use
neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the defendant had an
ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted, or improper use of
process; and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity.
Moon v. Condere Corp., 690 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Miss. 1997) (quoting State ex rel. Foster v.
Turner, 319 So. 2d 233, 236 (Miss. 1975)).
Typical of the cases where the action of abuse of process will lie is where through
the employment of process a man has been arrested or his property seized in order
to extort payment of money from him, even though the claim be a just one other
2
than in that suit, or to prevent a conveyance, or to compel him to give up

possession to some thing or value, when such were not the legal objects of the
suit.
Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 93 So. 2d 171, 175 (Miss. 1957). Where the only
process involved was a simple summon to defend the suit, a claim for abuse of process will not
lie. Id.; see also Gatheright v. Clark, No. 16-60364, 2017 WL 728698, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 23,
2017) (Where a claim is based solely on the filing of a suit, and not on any perversion of the
process once process issues, a claim for abuse of process will fail.); Austin Firefighters Relief &
Ret. Fund v. Brown, 760 F. Supp. 2d 662, 67677 (S.D. Miss. 2010) ([W]here an abuse of
process claim is based simply on the filing of a lawsuit, it cannot be said that process of the court
has been abused by accomplishing a result not commanded by it or not lawfully obtainable under
it.).
In this case, as in the cases cited above, Yarbers counterclaim is not based on any
perversion of any process[;] rather, it [is] based simply on the filing of the suit. Moon, 690 So.
2d at 1197 (citing Edwards, 93 So. 2d at 174); see also id. ([T]he only process involved in this
case was the summons. There were no arrests made, and there was no seizure of property. Thus,
there was no improper use of process after it had been issued.). Because Yarbers abuse-of-
process claim is based solely on Braceys filing of this lawsuit, the claim fails as a matter of law.
The motion to dismiss is granted as to the abuse-of-process claim, which is dismissed with
prejudice.
B. Defamation
In his defamation count, Yarber claims that Bracey made numerous false and
defamatory statements concerning him. Countercl. [9] at 10. All of the false statements
attributed to Bracey in the facts section of the Counterclaim are described as contained within
either the Complaint or the Amended Complaint in this matter. Id. at 89.
3
To establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove the following

elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; (2)
unprivileged publication to third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence
on part of publisher; (4) and either actionability of statement irrespective of
special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication.
Armistead v. Minor, 815 So. 2d 1189, 1193 (Miss. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Franklin v.
Thompson, 722 So. 2d 688, 692 (Miss. 1998)). Importantly, [s]tatements made in connection
with judicial proceedings, including pleadings, are, if in any way relevant to the subject matter of
the action, absolutely privileged and immune from attack as defamation, even if such statements
are made maliciously and with knowledge of their falsehood. McCorkle v. McCorkle, 811 So.
2d 258, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Gunter v. Reeves, 21 So. 2d 468, 470 (Miss. 1945));
see also Knotts by Knotts v. Hassell, 659 So. 2d 886, 890 (Miss. 1995) (This Court has long
recognized the absolute privilege that is attached to relevant statements made during the course
of judicial proceedings.).
For his part, Yarber does not seem to dispute the absolute privilege afforded to statements
made in judicial proceedings, instead characterizing the Counterclaim as including defamatory
statements [Bracey made] about [Yarber] to Anna Wolfe of the Clarion Ledger Newspaper that
were printed in an article, as well as statements made in a radio interview. Counter-Pl.s Resp.
[17] at 3. But the Counterclaim does not reference these alleged statements, so as of now, they
are not part of Yarbers defamation claim. As pleaded, the defamation claim fails to allege the
unprivileged publication of any false statement. The motion to dismiss is also granted as to the
defamation claim, which is dismissed without prejudice.
4
IV. Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not specifically addressed would not
have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Counter-Defendant Kimberly V. Braceys
Motion to Dismiss [14] is granted. Yarbers Counterclaim is dismissed. 1
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 20th day of March, 2017.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1
At this time, Yarber has not moved to amend the Counterclaim. Because the dismissal
of the defamation claim is without prejudice, Yarber may file a motion for leave to amend out of
time, attaching a proposed Amended Counterclaim, if he chooses. See Thomas v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 59091 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a party seeking leave to
amend must provide some specificity as to the substance of the proposed amendment); L.U.
Civ. R. 15 (If leave of court is required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, a proposed amended pleading
must be an exhibit to a motion for leave to file the pleading . . . .).
5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;

MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through counsel, and respectfully submits her
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. In support thereof, Plaintiff would show
unto the Court the following:
1. On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging sexual
harassment and retaliation by Defendants. [Doc. 1]. On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed
her First Amended Complaint. [Doc. 3].
2. On October 24, 2016, Defendant Tony Yarber filed his Answer, and
asserted counterclaims for abuse of process and defamation. [Doc. 9].
3. Both counterclaims assert claims that are based solely upon Plaintiff filing
a lawsuit against Defendant Yarber.
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a
complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court will "accept as true the well
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint." Culliver v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th
Cir. 2007). However, when the allegations in a complaint, even when taken as true,
"could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should be ...
exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
court." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007).
5. To maintain an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish:
(1) that the defendant made an illegal and improper perverted use of the process, a use
neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the defendant had an ulterior
motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of process; and
(3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity. Moon v. Condere Corp.,
690 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Miss. 1997). In the current case, Counter Plaintiff Yarber cannot
show that Counter Defendant Bracey made an illegal and improper perverted use of the
process merely by filing a complaint and having a summons issued to him. Id. (citing
Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 93 So. 2d 171, 230 Miss. 583 (1957)). As
such, this claim should be dismiss with prejudice.
6. The problem with Counter Plaintiff Yarbers defamation claim is that filing
a lawsuit is a privileged action that is immune to defamation claims.
Statements made in connection with judicial proceedings,

including pleadings, are, if in any way relevant to the subject
matter of the action, absolutely privileged and immune from
attack as defamation, even if such statements are made
maliciously and with knowledge of their falsehood.
McCorkle v. McCorkle, 811 So.2d 258, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Gunter
v. Reeves, 21 So. 2d 468, 470 (Miss. 1945); Hardtner v. Salloum, 114 So. 621, 623-4
(Miss. 1927). In the current case, Counter Plaintiff Yarber is solely relying upon
statements made in Mrs. Braceys Complaint and First Amended Complaint. As such,
Counter Plaintiff Yarbers defamation claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully requests that
the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
BY: /s Nick Norris

NICK NORRIS MB #101574
Attorney for Plaintiff
OF COUNSEL:
WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC

1880 Lakeland Drive
Suite G
Jackson, MS 39216
Phone: (601) 968-0000
Fax: (601) 968-0010
nick@watsonnorris.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nick Norris, attorney for Plaintiff do hereby certify that I have this day filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which sent notification of
such filing or mailed, via United States Mail, postage prepaid, on all counsel of record.
SO CERTIFIED, this the 14th day of November, 2016.
/s Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS

NORTHERN DIVISION

TONY YARBERS ANSWER, DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM
(JURY TRIAL REQUESTED)
COMES NOW, Answering Defendant, Tony Yarber, in his individual capacity, by and
through counsel, and files this his Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaim as follows:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
Answering Defendant. Accordingly, Answering Defendant moves this Court for a dismissal with
prejudice of the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Amended Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Some or all of the claims of the Plaintiff are barred by waiver.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Some or all of the claims of the Plaintiff are barred by her failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Affirmatively and alternatively, and without waiving any other defenses asserted herein,
Page 1 of 11
Answering Defendant hereby pleads any and all defenses available under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and United States and Mississippi law.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Amended Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of
action against this Answering Defendant.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff failed to mitigate any
injuries and damages she has allegedly suffered.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent Plaintiff claims any damages suffered by her are attributable to this
Answering Defendant, any such damages were the result of Plaintiffs own acts, omissions
and/or the acts or omissions of third parties for which Answering Defendant has no legal
responsibility.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, because this Answering Defendant did
not owe any legal duty to Plaintiff or, if Answering Defendant owed any such legal duty,
Answering Defendant did not breach that duty.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent that the Amended Complaint seeks any award or assessment of punitive
damages against this Answering Defendant, such award would be contrary to the laws of the state
of Mississippi and the laws of the United States of America, and would be violative of the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the
State of Mississippi.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Answering Defendant cannot be held liable for punitive damages, because at no time did
he act maliciously, fraudulently or with any intent to harm the Plaintiff or to deprive her of any
Page 2 of 11
legally protected rights.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Answering Defendant pleads any and all defenses and affirmative defenses available to
him which may become applicable through discovery and during the trial of this cause.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Affirmatively and alternatively, and without waiving any other defenses elsewhere
asserted herein, and the facts having not been fully developed, Answering Defendant would
affirmatively plead any and all affirmative defenses as may be applicable in this action: accord
and satisfaction, antenuptial knowledge, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, condonation,
constructive desertion, contributory negligence, discharge and bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, failure to mitigate damages, fraud, illegality, impossibility, insufficient
process, insufficient service of process, injury by fellow servant, laches, lack of capacity to
commit the offense, lack of standing, license, payment, preexisting injuries or damages,
reconciliation, recrimination, reformation, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND ANSWER

This Answering Defendant responds to the allegations of the Amended Complaint,
paragraph by paragraph and incorporates by reference all affirmative defenses heretofore
mentioned, as follows:
1. This Answering Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, and
insofar as the allegations pertain to this Answering Defendant, they are denied and Answering
Defendant demands specific proof thereof.
2. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 2 of the Amended Complaint are
Admitted.
3. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 3 of the Amended Complaint are
Page 3 of 11
Denied.
4. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 4 of the Amended Complaint
that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Admitted as to the fact that on April 24, 2014, Tony
Yarber did employ the Plaintiff as his Executive Assistant. However, that was changed shortly
thereafter and she was required to directly report to Beatrice Slaughter for the rest of her tenure
as an employee with the City of Jackson in the Mayors office.
thereof.
Page 4 of 11
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
Page 5 of 11
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
thereof.
are Denied.
are Denied.
are Denied.
are Denied.
COUNT I
27. Answering Defendant re-alleges each and every Affirmative Defense and response
set forth in paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully set forth herein.
thereof.
Page 6 of 11
thereof.
COUNT II
thereof.
thereof.
COUNT III
thereof.
thereof.

thereof.
37. In that the unnumbered paragraph appearing after the term WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED of the Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations,
Answering Defendant asserts no belief as to the truth of said paragraph, but Answering
Defendant would deny that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought in said paragraph and any
Page 7 of 11
and all subsections of said unnumbered paragraph.
COUNTERCLAIM
Now having fully answered the Amended Complaint, Answering Defendant herein
assumes the role of counterclaimant and would show unto this Court the following:
PARTIES
1. Counter-Plaintiff, Tony Yarber, is an adult resident citizen of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County, Mississippi.
2. Counter-Defendant, Kimberly V. Bracey, upon information and belief, is an adult
resident citizen of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi who can be served with
process by and through her attorney of record in this matter.
FACTS
3. That on or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed a Complaint
in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff engaged in a
sexual relationship with her, among other false statements.
in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff engaged in
numerous sexual relationships with other women during this time, among other false
statements.
in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff sexually

harassed her, among other false statements.
in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff committed
retaliation against her, among other false statements.
7. That on or about August 29, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed an Amended
Complaint in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff
Page 8 of 11
engaged in a sexual relationship with her, among other false statements.
engaged in numerous sexual relationships with other women during this time, among other
false statements.
sexually harassed her, among other false statements.
committed retaliation against her, among other false statements.
11. That on or about September 7, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant caused
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff to be served with a Summons and copy of the Amended Complaint.
COUNT I - ABUSE OF PROCESS

12. Counter-Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, realleges and incorporates by reference each
and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered 1 through 11 of this Counterclaim with
the same force and effect as if more fully set forth at length herein.
13. That the filing of the Complaint and the filing and service of the Amended
Complaint containing false allegations against the Counter-Plaintiff by the Counter-Defendant is
a malicious perversion of a regularly issued civil process, for a purpose and to obtain a result not
lawfully warranted or properly attainable thereby.
14. That the actions of the Counter-Defendant were done with the intent to abuse the
privileges of the legal system.
15. The actions of the Counter-Defendant constitute abuse of process.
16. That as a direct and proximate result of said abuse of process, Counter-Plaintiff
has been caused to suffer damages of a personal and pecuniary nature, including but not limited
Page 9 of 11
to out of pocket expenses, damage to reputation, attorneys fees, and other damages to be proven
at trial.
COUNT II - DEFAMATION
18. At all times material and relevant, the Counter-Defendant made numerous false
and defamatory statements concerning Counter-Plaintiff.
19. That at all times material and relevant, said statements were unprivileged and
were published to third parties.
20. At all times material and relevant, said statements were made with malice,
recklessness and with knowledge that said statements were false.
21. The actions of the Counter-Defendant constitute defamation.
22. That as a direct and proximate result of said defamation, Counter-Plaintiff has
been caused to suffer damages of a personal and pecuniary nature, including but not limited to
out of pocket expenses, damage to reputation, attorneys fees, and other damages to be proven at
trial.
DAMAGES
24. As a direct and proximate result of the Counter-Defendants actions, inactions,
refusals and omissions, the Counter-Plaintiff has suffered injuries of a personal and pecuniary
nature, including, but not limited to, out of pocket expenses, damage to reputation, attorneys
fees, and other damages to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Counter-Plaintiff prays that the
Page 10 of 11
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that this Court award judgment
to the Counter-Plaintiff of, from, and against the Counter-Defendant, Kimberly V. Bracey, in a
sum that will fully and fairly compensate the Counter- Plaintiff for his loss, plus cost of court,
reasonable attorney fees and any other relief that this Court or a jury deems just and proper.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 24th day of October, 2016.
Tony Yarber, Individually
/s/ M. Judith Barnett

M. JUDITH BARNETT
M. JUDITH BARNETT (MSB #99766)

M. JUDITH BARNETT, P.A.
1911 Dunbarton Drive
Jackson, Mississippi 39216
Telephone: (601) 981-4450
Facsimile: (601) 981-4717
mjbarnettpa@yahoo.com
Attorney for Tony Yarber
This is to certify that I, M. Judith Barnett, attorney for Tony Yarber, have this date served,
via the CM/ECF filing system, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Answer,
Defenses, and Counterclaim to the following Counsel of Record:
Louis H. Watson, Jr., Esq.

Nick Norris, Esq.
Watson & Norris, PLLC
1880 Lakeland Drive, Suite G
Jackson, MS 39216-4972
LaToya C. Merritt, Esq.

Jason T. Marsh, Esq.
Phelps Dunbar, LLP
P.O. Box 16114
Jackson, MS 39236-6114
SO CERTIFIED, this the 24th day of October, 2016.
/s/ M. Judith Barnett

M. JUDITH BARNETT
Page 11 of 11

NORTHERN DIVISION

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Kimberly V. Bracey, by and through her counsel,
Watson & Norris, PLLC, and files this action against Defendants, City of Jackson,
Mississippi, Mayor Tony Yarber and John Does 1-3. As more specifically set forth
below, Plaintiff has been subjected to sex discrimination, sexual harassment, a sexually
hostile work place in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, has been unlawfully retaliated against in the terms and conditions of her
employment with Defendant, City of Jackson, Mississippi, has been subjected to
violations of the 14th Amendment, Equal Protection, by Defendant Mayor Tony Yarber
and has suffered violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by
Defendants. In support of this cause, the Plaintiff would show unto the Court the
following facts to-wit:
PARTIES
1. The Plaintiff, Kimberly V. Bracey, is an adult female resident of Hinds
County, Mississippi, residing at 6331 Lyndon B. Johnson Drive, Jackson, MS 39213.

2, Defendant, City of Jackson, Mississippi, is a municipality in the state of
Mississippi and may be served through the City Clerk, Kristi Moore, 219 South
President Street, Jackson, MS 39205.
3. Defendant, Mayor Tony Yarber, may be served with process by serving
the Office of the Mayor, 219 S. President Street, Jackson, MS 39205.
4. In addition to the Defendants identified above, there are Defendants
whose identities are presently unknown to Plaintiff. These unknown Defendants are
identified as John Doe Defendants 1-3 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Every allegation in the Complaint is an allegation and a filing as of this date against
each John Doe Defendant. These Defendants are persons whose identities are
unknown at this time; however, they are believed to be employees of Defendant, City of
Jackson, Mississippi.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court has federal question jurisdiction.
6. This Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
Defendants and venue is proper in this Court. A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs
Charge of Discrimination is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and a true and correct copy
of the EEOCs Dismissal and Notice of Rights is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
7. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant on April 24, 2014 as an Executive
Assistant to the Mayor, Tony Yarber. As such, Defendant Tony Yarber was in a position
of direct authority over Plaintiff.

8. In May 2014, Plaintiff separated from her husband and moved in with
Monica Joiner, who is the City Attorney for Defendant City of Jackson, Mississippi.
9. During this time Defendant, Tony Yarber, engaged in a sexual relationship
with Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not make Ms. Joiner aware of this relationship as Ms. Joiner
was also actively pursuing a sexual relationship Defendant Yarber. Plaintiff was also
aware that Defendant Yarber engaged in numerous sexual relationships with other
women during this time.
10. In July 2014, Plaintiff reconciled her relationship with her husband and
moved back into their family home.
11. At this point, Plaintiff ended her consensual relationship with Defendant
Yarber.
12. In response, Defendant Yarber transferred Plaintiff to be supervised by
other staff members.
13. Around this same time, Defendant Yarber began forcing Plaintiff to
continue the sexual relationship by making it clear that she could be terminated if she
did not have sex with him. Plaintiff was the sole source of income for her family at this
time, and could not easily find comparable work.
14. Defendant Yarber has requested Plaintiff to encourage another female to
give Defendant Yarber oral sex in exchange for guaranteed employment.
15. Defendant Yarber subjected Plaintiff to inappropriate sexual comments
about other women on several occasions.
16. In May or June 2014, Plaintiff was required to attend a fundraiser arranged
by Marshand Crisler in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mitzi Bickers, who is a campaign

contributor for Defendant Yarber, hosted a dinner at a restaurant in New Orleans where
numerous city staff members were in attendance. Later that evening, Plaintiff,
Defendant Yarber, Jason Goree, Torrence Mayfield and Jackie Anderson Woods met
Ms. Bickers at a strip club where Ms. Bickers paid for everything. Plaintiff and Mr.
Mayfield were required to watch the door where Mayor Yarber and one of the strippers
went into to be alone.
17. In August 2014, Plaintiff was required to attend another fundraiser for
Defendant Yarber in Atlanta, Georgia, that was hosted by Mitzi Bickers. After the
fundraiser, Defendant Yarber, Plaintiff, Jackie Woods, Artie Stuckey and Jason Goree
rode by boat with Ms. Bickers to one of her friends house. Prior to arriving at the home
Plaintiff had been informed they were going for a dinner. Instead, Plaintiff and others
were greeted by strippers wearing only body paint.
18. In August or September 2014, Plaintiff was required to attend another
fundraiser for Defendant Yarber and Tyrone Lewis in Atlanta that was hosted by Mitzi
Bickers. Ms. Bickers had arranged for a woman to have a sexual relationship with
Defendant Yarber while Plaintiff was attending this fundraiser in Atlanta, Georgia. The
next day after the fundraiser, Plaintiff was required to go with Defendant Yarber for
another gathering at Ms. Bickers home. Again strippers wearing only body paint
greeted them at the door. While Tyrone Lewis and his staff were present at the
fundraiser, they were not present the next day when strippers were present at Ms.
Bickers home.
19. In early April 2015, Plaintiff could not take the harassment any longer, and
chose to refuse any further advances even if it meant her employment would be
terminated.
20. On April 26, 2015, Plaintiff was falsely accused by Mayor Yarber of
unauthorized use of city equipment for personal use. Plaintiff was threatened with
termination by Jackie Woods, her supervisor. Plaintiff was then placed under the
supervision of Beatrice Slaughter and told by email from Mayor Yarber, who copied the
City Attorney on the email, that Plaintiff would no longer be under the supervision of
Jackie Woods.
21. On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff was abruptly terminated by Mayor Yarber.
Around this same time, Plaintiff learned that City of Jackson, MS employees unlawfully
accessed her private Google e-mail account to assert Plaintiff was using city equipment
for personal use. Defendant John Does 1-3 unlawfully accessed Plaintiffs private
Google e-mail account to pull a flyer for the campaign of Plaintiffs husband to falsely
claim Plaintiff had printed or copied the flyer hundreds of times to be used for the
campaign.
22. Plaintiff had verbal authorization from her director, Beatrice Slaughter, to
use the citys equipment to make copies for her husbands campaign and to keep a log
of the copies, which she did. While Plaintiff did use the citys equipment with
authorization from her supervisor, the particular flyer pulled from her private e-mail
account was never copied using city equipment.

23. During her tenure as Executive Assistant to Mayor Yarber and her job with
the City of Jackson, Mississippi, Plaintiff always performed her job duties above
satisfactory and had a good work record.
24. In truth, Plaintiff was terminated for refusing the sexual advances of Tony
Yarber, Mayor of the City of Jackson, Mississippi.
25. To Plaintiffs knowledge, there were two other female city employees who
were terminated because they refused sexual advances from Tony Yarber while he was
acting as the Mayor of the City of Jackson, Mississippi.
26. Further, to Plaintiffs knowledge, there were two other co-workers who
violated the same work rule (unauthorized use of city equipment), but were not
disciplined or discharged.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I - VIOLATION OF TITLE VII - SEXUAL HARASSMENT

AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT THROUGH 1983 EQUAL PROTECTION
27. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs 1 through 26 as though
specifically set forth herein and alleges as follows:
28. The actions of Tony Yarber, acting in his individual and official capacity as
Mayor of the Defendant, the City of Jackson, constitute unlawful sexual harassment.
29. The acts of the Defendants constitute a willful and intentional violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the 14th Amendment through
1983, and entitle Plaintiff to the recovery of damages.
COUNT II VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VII AND THE

14TH AMENDMENT THROUGH 1983 RETALIATION
30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all averments set forth through
Paragraphs 1 through 29 above as though specifically set forth herein.
31. Defendant City of Jackson, Mississippi has violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Defendants have violated the 14th Amendment through 42
U.S.C. 1983 by retaliating against Plaintiff for refusing the sexual advances of the Mayor
of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, Tony Yarber.
32. As a result of Defendants said retaliation, Plaintiff suffered damages,
including, but not limited to, compensatory damages, loss of reputation, humiliation,
embarrassment, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish.
COUNT III VIOLATION OF THE ELECTRONIC

COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT and the STORAGE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
33. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs 1 through 32 as though
specifically set forth herein and alleges as follows:
34. By unlawfully accessing Plaintiffs personal email account as an
employee, agent and/or representative of the City of Jackson, Defendant City of
Jackson, Mississippi, along with John Does 1-3 violated the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 as well as the Storage Communication Act.
35. Plaintiff has been harmed as a result of Defendants actions, and the
Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for the same.
36. The acts of the Defendants and their employees, agents and
representatives constitute a willful intentional violation of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq., and other state and federal laws, and
entitle Plaintiff to recovery of damages, both compensatory and punitive in nature.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully prays that upon
hearing of this matter by a jury, the Plaintiff be granted the following relief in an amount
to be determined by the jury:
1. Reinstatement or future wages in lieu of reinstatement;

2. Back pay;
3. Compensatory damages;
4. Punitive damages;
5. Attorneys fees;
6. Costs and expenses; and
7. Any other relief to which she may be properly entitled.
THIS, the 29th day of August 2016.
Respectfully submitted,
KIMBERLY V. BRACEY, PLAINTIFF
By: /s Nick Norris

Louis H. Watson, Jr. (MB# 9053)
Nick Norris (MB#101574)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
OF COUNSEL:
WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC

1880 Lakeland Drive, Suite G
Jackson, Mississippi 39216-4972
Telephone: (601) 968-0000
Facsimile: (601) 968-0010
Email: louis@watsonnorris.com
I, NICK NORRIS, attorney for the Plaintiff, do hereby certify that I have this day
served via ECF filing or by United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following counsel of record:
City of Jackson, Mississippi

City Clerk - Kristi Moore
219 South President Street
Jackson, MS 39205
Mayor Tony Yarber,

Office of the Mayor
219 S. President Street
Jackson, MS 39205
SO CERTIFIED, this the 29th day of August 2016.
s/Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS

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Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16cv657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

This case is before the Court on Counter-Defendant Kimberly V. Braceys Motion to

I. Facts and Procedural History

sexual-harassment, hostile-work-environment, and retaliation claims against the City of Jackson

Jackson from April 2014, through April 2015.

personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

(citations and footnote omitted).

Complaint containing false allegations . . . constitute abuse of process. Countercl. [9] at 9.

Turner, 319 So. 2d 233, 236 (Miss. 1975)).

than in that suit, or to prevent a conveyance, or to compel him to give up

To establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove the following

made in judicial proceedings, instead characterizing the Counterclaim as including defamatory

defamation claim, which is dismissed without prejudice.

Motion to Dismiss [14] is granted. Yarbers Counterclaim is dismissed. 1

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 20th day of March, 2017.

s/ Daniel P. Jordan III

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;

PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. In support thereof, Plaintiff would show

unto the Court the following:

1. On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging sexual

her First Amended Complaint. [Doc. 3].

asserted counterclaims for abuse of process and defamation. [Doc. 9].

a lawsuit against Defendant Yarber.

4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a

5. To maintain an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish:

such, this claim should be dismiss with prejudice.

a lawsuit is a privileged action that is immune to defamation claims.

Statements made in connection with judicial proceedings,

Counter Plaintiff Yarbers defamation claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully requests that

the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss be granted.

BY: /s Nick Norris

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC

SO CERTIFIED, this the 14th day of November, 2016.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;

TONY YARBERS ANSWER, DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM

(JURY TRIAL REQUESTED)

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Civil Procedure and United States and Mississippi law.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

action against this Answering Defendant.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

injuries and damages she has allegedly suffered.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Answering Defendant did not breach that duty.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE