Conservation of Resources
A New Attempt at Conceptualizing Stress
Stevan E. Hobfoll
ABSTRACT: Major perspectives concerning stress are
presented with the goal of clarifying the nature of what
has proved to be a heuristic but vague construct. Current
conceptualizations of stress are challenged as being too
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phenomenological and ambiguous, and consequently, not
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given to direct empirical testing. Indeed, it is argued that
researchers have tended to avoid the problem of defining
stress, choosing to study stress without reference to a clear
framework. A new stress model called the model of con-
servation of resources is presented as an alternative. This
resource-oriented model is based on the supposition that
people strive to retain, protect, and build resources and
that what is threatening to them is the potential or actual
loss of these valued resources. Implications of the model
of conservation of resources for new research directions
are discussed.
There are few areas of contemporary psychology that re-
ceive more attention than stress (Hobfoll, 1986, 1988;
Kaplan, 1983; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Milgram,
1986). This literature reflects researchers' belief that stress
is a major factor affecting people's lives, is intimately tied
with mental health, and is very possibly linked with many
problems of physical health. The interest in stress has
also caught the attention of the popular press, illustrating
that stress is of concern to the lay public as well as the
academic community ("Stress," 1983).
With all this great breadth of interest in stress, there
has been a surprising paucity of work on related theory
(Kaplan, 1983; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Although
initial stages of any research direction may be strictly
observational, this phase should give way to a more the-
ory- or model-based stage that provides a web of insights
and directions to guide research (Popper, 1959). Without
a clear theoretical backdrop, it is difficult to create a true
body of knowledge because there are no defined borders
of theory to be challenged (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Newton's theory was generally accepted for some 200
years because of such a lack of rival theories. As stated
by Kurt Lewin, "There is nothing as practical as a good
theory."
In this article, I will outline some of the stress models
that have guided research and thinking on stress histor-
ically. This will lead to a discussion of current models
that are relied on in framing the topic of stress for re-
search. However, it will be argued that only a weak link
exists between current stress models and the actual re-
March 1989 American Psychologist
Copyright 1989 by the American PsychologicalAssociation, Inc. 0003-066X/89/$00.75
VOl. 44, No. 3. 513-524
Kent State University
search that is conducted. In addition, it will be argued
that current models are tautological and so can do little
to move stress investigators toward new horizons of re-
search. Yet, because they are tautological, they can never
be rejected either. Finally, a new stress model will be pre-
sented called the model of conservation of resources. It
is proposed that this model is more directly testable,
comprehensive, and parsimonious than previous ap-
proaches and that it provides a dearer direction for future
research on stress and stress resistance.
The Cannon-Selye Tradition
The term stress is loosely borrowed from the field of
physics. Humans, it is thought, are in some ways analo-
gous to physical objects such as metals that resist mod-
erate outside forces but that lose their resiliency at some
point of greater pressure. The analogy to humans is ob-
vious, albeit inexact.
Walter Cannon (1932) was probably the first modern
researcher to apply the concept of stress to humans in
these kinds of terms. Cannon was principally concerned
with the effects of cold, lack of oxygen, and other envi-
ronmental stressors on organisms. He concluded that al-
though initial or low level stressors could be withstood,
prolonged or severe stressors lead to a breakdown of bio-
logical systems.
Cannon's emphasis on stress as response was carried
on by Hans Selye (1950, 1951-1956). Selye depicted stress
as an orchestrated defense operated by physiological sys-
tems designed to protect the body from environmental
challenge to bodily processes. He called this the General
Adaptation Syndrome. Specifically, he felt that there was
a common reaction to outside stressors following the se-
quence of alerting response, resistance response, and ex-
haustion.
Selye has been criticized on two levels. First, the
idea that the reactions of humans to stress is so uniform
can be challenged by a wealth of data (Appley & Trum-
bull, 1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). How people re-
spond to challenges from their environment can be seen
as a function of their personality, constitution, percep-
tions, and the context in which the stressor occurs (Mei-
chenbaum, 1977; Moos, 1984; Sarason, 1975; Spielberger,
1972; Zuckerman, 1976). Second, Selye has been criti-
cized for employing somewhat illogical deductive reason-
ing. He depicted stress in terms of outcome, such that an
organism could be seen as under stress only when a phase
of the general adaptation sequence was occurring. This
513
 viewpoint precludes the possibility of prospectively iden-
tifying the cause of stress, because we are forced to wait
until the outcome to know when stress will occur.
Stimulus Definitions of Stress
A less well-articulated view of stress may be identified in
terms of depicting stress from the nature of the stimulus,
as opposed to the response. Elliot and Eisdorfer (1982),
for instance, have focused on stressors, or that which is
likely to cause stress, as the object of interest. They out-
fined four kinds of stressors: (a) acute, time-limited
stressor& such as a visit to the dentist, a wasp entering
the car while one is driving, or a woman's awaiting breast
biopsy; (b) stressor sequences, such as divorce, bereave-
ment, or job loss; (c) chronic, intermittent stressors, such
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as examinations for students, meetings with business as-
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sociates one dislikes, or a regimen of visits to a physician
for painful treatments; and (d) chronic stressors, such as
debilitating illness, prolonged marital discord, or exposure
to occupation-related dangers.
Events in this case are considered stressful on the
basis of whether they normally lead to stress reactions.
That is, if the stimulus usually leads to emotional upset,
psychological distress, or physical impairment or dete-
rioration, then the stimulus is said to be a stressor. This
thinking loosely follows from the important work of Ger-
aid Caplan (1964) and Eric Lindemann (1944), who were
among the first to introduce a psychological view of stress,
as opposed to the physiological view advanced by Selye.
They also saw it as important to emphasize that psycho-
logical distress was not necessarily the product of deep-
seated personological disturbance, as psychodynamic
theorists would have it, but rather that it could occur as
the product of confrontation with especially stressful
events. In particular, their work focused on normative life
crises and extreme challenges to people's self or social
world. The study of the process of bereavement is one
commonly cited offshoot of their approach (Parkes, 1970,
1972), and the early work on stress as change that requires
adaptation may also be seen as a product of this approach
(Holmes & Rahe, 1967).
A normative view of stressors as suggested by Elliott
and Eisdorfer is a good starting point because it outlines
those events that are likely to lead to stress responses.
This limits the world of events that one would otherwise
have to observe in each and every case in order to pro-
spectively study the stress process. Perceptions may be
important determinants of what is stressful, but these
perceptions are far from idiographic, that is, there is broad
agreement as to what is stressful (Dohrenwend, Krasnoff,
I wish to thank Leonard Jason, Benjamin Newberry,Angela Bridges,
and the anonymousreviewersfor their insightful comments on earlier
dralLsof this article. Thanksare also extendedto KennethHeller,Rudolf
Moos, and Irwin Sarason for their comments on the conceptualization
of some of the central ideas regardingthe stress model presented. I, of
course, assume all responsibilityfor the final product.
Correspondenceconcerningthis articleshouldbe addressedto Ste-
van E. Hobfoll,AppliedPsychologyCenter,Kent State University,Kent,
OH 44242.
514
Askenasy, & Dohrenwend, 1978; Holmes & Rabe, 1967).
Indeed, if this were not the case, how would it be possible
to construct finite fists of minor irritations and hassles
(Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981), the most
perception-bound kinds of stressors? Without a broad
sense of agreement about what is stressful in an objective
sense there would be little agreement between people on
which environmental occurrences were found to be
stressful.
Perhaps more important, if we do not begin with
an environmental view of stressors, then the division be-
tween stress responding and neurotic symptoms is lost
(Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, Dodson, & Shrout, 1984).
In other words, if stress is only that which is in the eye
of the beholder, then we return to a psychology of internal
processes. If, as Dohrenwend et al. (1984) pointed out,
stressors are indistinguishable from symptoms, then the
environmental component is removed from stress re-
search. It is not clear that this would push the study of
stress beyond where the study of psychopathology has
already taken us.
By creating a taxonomy of stressful events we set an
anchor point by which the differences in how people react
can be compared and through which the nature of the
events themselves can be further categorized (see Baum,
Singer, & Baum, 1981). Kessler (1983) suggested that this
may best be accomplished through longitudinal study of
such events. Unfortunately, this lead has seldom been
followed by stress researchers, as few studies have com-
pared reactions to different categories of events. Even if
this approach was adopted, however, it is clear that the
stimulus is only one facet of the stress phenomena.
Event-Perception Viewpoints
Another perspective that was influential to stress re-
searchers is a viewpoint that focuses both on the category
of stressor events and the individual differences in the
appraisal of those events. This approach should not be
confused with "stimulus only" perspectives or appraisal
perspectives because it emphasizes both the event and the
individual's reaction to the event.
The research of Spielberger (I 966, 1972) is illustra-
tive of this viewpoint. Spielberger suggested that certain
events are stressful if they are thought to be threats to the
physical self or the phenomenological self. He called these
physical threats and ego-threats, respectively. Although
individuals with different personalities responded some-
what uniformly to physical threats, people's responses to
ego-threats were related to personality traits. In particular,
Spielberger noted that people with high trait anxiety
tended to react with state elevations in anxiety to ego-
threat, whereas those who were low in trait anxiety tended
to be comparatively impervious to ego-threats. In this
way, it is neither the stimulus nor the appraisal that is
important, but rather their particular interaction.
Another line of research is also instructive in this
regard. Specifically, research on test anxiety has led to
one of the most complete understandings of responding
to one kind of stressful stimulus. The work of I. Sarason
March 1989 American Psychologist
 typifies this direction of investigation. Sarason (1972,
1975) has illustrated that examinations constitute a class
of environmental event that are very commonly found
to be stressful. However, he and other test anxiety re-
searchers also have suggested that relative sensitivity to
stress is a product of personality. This perspective is im-
portant because it illustrates both that certain events are
commonly viewed as stressful and that individuals differ
in their degree of reactivity to normatively stressful events.
It further indicates that such sensitivity is a fairly stable
personality trait and that although related to sensitivity
to other stressors, it may also exist independently of other
sensitivities. So, for example, a test-anxious person might
be resilient in the face of threatening interpersonal inter-
actions.
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Although both Sarason and Spielberger highlighted
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the role of perception in their theorizing and research,
their approach is more complex than this. Its complexity
derives from a three-part emphasis on appraisal, known
environmental threats, and personality traits. Broadly
speaking, it integrates appraisal- and stimulus-based
models, adding the vital third element of individual char-
acteristics. This three-part approach represented a con-
ceptual leap for stress researchers that has not often been
followed. Instead, many investigators have returned to
models that emphasize appraisal to such an extent as to
all but ignore actual environmental occurrences or per-
sonality traits, others have focused on personality to the
exclusion of more idiographic perceptions, and still others
have remained tied to stimulus-only models.
Homeostatic and Transactional Models
of Stress
Probably the most commonly adopted model of stress
employed by stress investigators today is a homeostatic
model of stress presented in detail by McGrath (1970),
but based in large part on the work of Lazarus (1966).
McGrath defined stress as a "substantial imbalance be-
tween environmental demand and the response capability
of the focal organism" (p. 17). More recently, Lazarus
and Folkman (1984) have defined stress as "a particular
relationship between the person and the environment that
is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his
or her resources and endangering his or her well-being"
(p. 19).
Implied in these definitions is that stress is not the
product of imbalance between objective demands and
response capacity, but of the perception of these factors.
Second, the consequences of failure to cope must be per-
ceived as important to the individual. Finally, McGrath
suggested that imbalance may take the course of under-
load rather than overload, that is, too little demand vis-
fi-vis coping capacity. Few researchers, however, have
adopted or followed up on the underload notion, and it
has garnered littlesupport.
Despite the widespread adoption of the balance
model by stressresearchers (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mer-
melstein, 1983; Gentry & Kobasa, 1984; Kendall, 1983;
Wilcox & Vernberg, 1985), I would argue that it is tau-
March 1989 American Psychologist
tological, overly complex, and not given to rejection. To
be scientific, the case for rejecting or accepting a model
must be clear. These points will now be reviewed in detail.
First, the balance model is tautological because it
does not separately define demand or coping capacity,
the two sides of the model. Demand is that which is offset
by coping capacity. Yet, coping capacity is that which
offsets threat or demand. Clearly, this reasoning is circular
and evolves from the sole emphasis on perceptions. The
balance perspective seems to lose in this way the basic
measuring stone that stimulus-based models could pro-
vide. So, for example, an understanding of how people
who possess varying coping resources respond to a known
threat, including the degree to which they find the stim-
ulus threatening, could help anchor the perceptive com-
ponent because the stimulus is a known entity. However,
if both the demand and the resources mobilized to combat
that demand exist only in the perceptual world, no such
anchor point exists.
An additional problem with balance perspectives is
that demand and coping capacity are conceptualized post
hoe. We only know that a resource aids coping capacity
after it is observed to counteract some demand. We do
not know if it will continue to be a resource in the future
because we must always wait to see if individuals perceive
it to be such. So, if optimism aids adjustment, it is ret-
rospectively said to be a resource, and if it impairs ad-
justment, it is retrospectively labeled a negative coping
style. Certainly, there is room for process in developing
a model of stress. However, if everything is process, there
is an absence of marker flags, standards of comparison,
and other points of reference that can aid in organizing
a taxonomy and a prediction of behavior that develops
from interactions of different factors.
By deemphasizing the objective environment, some
demands may even go unnoticed because individuals are
succeeding in coping with them in the natural course of
events. So, for example, persons with strong personality
hardiness (Kobasa, 1979) may fail to even notice demands
being placed on them because they see such demands as
exciting challenges. In fact, they may be so rich in coping
resources as to be unaware of these environmental oc-
currences. Other individuals may feel overwhelmed by
these same events. Has no demand been placed on the
hardy individuals because they failed to pay it heed, or
is it a demand that their strong resources quickly over-
came?
Even if coping resources and demands can be iden-
tified, the researcher is confronted with a methodological
problem of measuring them in meaningful units that may
be balanced. In other words, to test the model, the units
of coping resources must be compared to the units of
demands for balance or imbalance to be judged. No at-
tempt has been made to develop such a system of equiv-
alent units, no doubt because it would be an extremely
difficult task. Without such units, however, the model
remains a general conceptual framework, but one that
may never be directly tested.
Trumbull and Appley (1986) provided a variation
515
 on the balance theme that is more compatible with the
empirical study of stress. First, they suggested that im-
balance can occur when either the real or perceived de-
mands outstrip real or perceived coping capacity. This
seems to allow more equal emphasis for environmental
and personal factors than do the perception-focused stress
models. Second, Trumbull and Appley (1986) made an
effort to integrate the overlap of findings on physiological,
psychological, and social stress and suggested ways in
which biological, psychological, and environmental pro-
cesses could be studied side by side, rather than blurred
together. The problem of circularity in defining demand
and coping capacity, however, remains.
It could be argued that Lazarus and Folkman (1984)
have emphasized the interaction between the environment
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and the individual in their transactional model of coping
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(Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-
Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1985). However, even what
they termed the environment is really the individual's
appraisal thereof. This has led to criticisms of the cir-
cularity of their approach (Dohrenwend et al., 1984; Kasl,
1978). This circularity, it has been argued, follows from
their overemphasis on perception and their lack of em-
phasis on environmental contingencies. This may be seen
in their definition of stress, in which there is no stress
without perception, and may be contrasted to Trumbull
and Appley's (1986) definition, in which both objective
and subjective stress is acknowledged.
Kasl (1978) argued that when perceptions are used
to establish independent and dependent variables, as in
the transactional model, the two variables "are sometimes
so close operationally that they appear to be simply two
similar measures of a single concept" (p. 13). Lazarus
and Folkman (1984), in opposition to such criticisms,
went so far as to argue that the study of major stressors
that are not confounded with psychological outcome (e.g.,
loss of loved ones, severe illness, or combat) "must not
be allowed to seduce us into settling for a simplistic con-
cept of stress as environmentally produced" (p. 19). These
are exactly the kinds of events that Dohrenwend et al.
(1984) found to be the most likely to represent environ-
mental occurrences. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) instead
chose to study those "garden variety" stressors for which
one can "no longer pretend that there is an objective way
to define stress at the level of environmental conditions
without reference to the character of the person" (p. 19).
The jury is not yet in on the contrasting viewpoint
promoted by the more environmentally or the more cog-
nitively oriented camps. On one hand, there is actually
great overlap between the two positions. On the other
hand, the difference between the two positions was con-
sidered to be great enough for Lazarus and Folkman
(1984) to have stated that "at stake is the viability of all
cognitive, relational conceptualizations of stress" (p. 64).
The Conservation of Resources:
A New Stress Model
I would like to present a new stress model that I believe
more closely reflects current understanding of the ubiq-
516
uitous stress phenomena and perhaps bridges the gap be-
tween environmental and cognitive viewpoints. I will
argue that the proposed model is clearly testable, com-
prehensively explains behavior during stressful cir-
cumstances, and is more parsimonious than the balance
or transactional model, while still encompassing the rel-
ative importance and complexity of cognitions. The
model's basic tenet is that people strive to retain, protect,
and build resources and that what is threatening to them
is the potential or actual loss of these valued resources. I
have termed it the model of conservation of resources
(Hobfoll, 1988).
The view that individuals actively seek to create a
world that will provide them pleasure and success is a
long-standing one in psychology, but one that has been
relatively ignored in stress theory. Freud ( 1900/1913) in-
troduced the pleasure principle, the notion that humans
instinctually seek that which is pleasurable. Maslow
(1968) also proposed that people seek physical resources,
then social resources, then psychological resources, in a
hierarchical manner. Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan, and
MuUen ( 1981) have similarly proposed "that the protec-
tion and enhancement of self... . are fundamental goals
after which people strive" (p. 340, emphasis added). Most
germane to this article, social learning theory proposes
that people actively engage their environment in order to
increase the chances of obtaining positive reinforcement
(Bandura, 1977). There are two basic ways to achieve
these goals. First, people act to enhance the likelihood of
situational (i.e., here and now) reinforcement (Swarm &
Read, 1981). Success is more likely, however, if individuals
seek to create and maintain personal characteristics (e.g.,
mastery or self-esteem) and social circumstances (e.g.,
tenure or intimacy) that will increase the likelihood of
receipt of reinforcement and to avoid the loss of such
characteristics and circumstances (Wicklund & Goll-
witzer, 1982). The model of conservation of resources
rests on this second strategy.
The definition of stress is derived directly from the
model and the above mentioned basic tenet: Psychological
stress is defined as a reaction to the environment in which
there is (a) the threat of a net loss of resources, (b) the
net loss of resources, or (c) a lack of resource gain fol-
lowing the investment of resources. Both perceived and
actual loss or lack of gain are envisaged as sufficient for
producing stress.
Resources, then, are the single unit necessary for
understanding stress. Resources are defined as those ob-
jects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that
are valued by the individual or that serve as a means for
attainment of these objects, personal characteristics, con-
ditions, or energies. Examples of resources include mas-
tery (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978), self-esteem (Rosenberg,
1965), learned resourcefulness (Rosenbaum & Smira,
1986), socioeconomic status (Worden & Sobel, 1978),
and employment (Parry, 1986).
Environmental circumstances often threaten or
cause a depletion of people's resources. They may threaten
people's status, position, economic stability, loved ones,
March 1989 American Psychologist
 basic beliefs, or self-esteem. These losses are important
on two levels. First, resources have instrumental value to
people, and second, they have symbolic value in that they
help to define for people who they are (Brown & Andrews,
1986; Cooley, 1902; Erikson, 1968; James, 1890).
Behavior During Stressful and Everyday
Circumstances
The model of conservation of resources goes beyond pre-
vious models in that it inherently states what individuals
do when confronted with stress and when not confronted
with stress. Specifically, when confronted with stress, in-
dividuals are predicted by the model to strive to minimize
net loss of resources. This prediction is not inconsistent
with Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) coping model, but
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they did not specify the goal of coping other than as an
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attempt to limit stress.
Other stress theories do not predict psychological or
behavioral action when people are not confronted with
stressors. According to the conservation of resource
model, when not currently confronted with stressors,
people strive to develop resource surpluses in order to
offset the possibility of future loss. This phenomenon re-
ceived support when studied under the rubric of self-ac-
quisitive or self-assertive styles (Schlenker, 1987; Thibaut
& Kelley, 1959). When people develop resource surpluses,
they are likely to experience positive well-being (eustress),
as reviews of studies of personal and social resources attest
(Cohen & Edwards, in press; Cohen & Wills, 1985).
Where individuals are ill equipped to gain resources, in
contrast, they are likely to be particularly vulnerable
(Rappaport, 1981). Such individuals lean toward preven-
tion of resource loss, or what some have termed self-pro-
tective styles (Arkin, 198 l; Cheek & Buss, 198 l; Thibaut
& Kelley, 1959).
People may also enrich resources by investing other
resources, such as when people give aid to kith or kin.
Such resource investment is not necessarily tit for tat
(Clark, 1983), but rather, the model suggests that people
take a long-term outlook toward the conservation of re-
sources (see also Dodge & Martin, 1970).
This discussion begs the question of what people
employ to offset resource loss or to gain resources. The
answer to this question is that they employ resources that
they possess or they call on resources available to them
from their environment. Individuals, for instance, invest
their love and affection to receive a return of the same.
Often individuals invest their time and energy, two im-
portant resources, in attempts to translate them to other
more highly prized resources, for example, power and
money. Moulton (1980) argued that women are vulner-
able to stress because they are often challenged with new
expectations prior to the acquisition of relevant resources.
Kinds of Resources
As mentioned earlier, the model identifies four kinds of
resources whose loss and gain result in stress or eustress
(i.e., well-being), respectively. Object resources are valued
because of some aspect of theirphysical nature or because
March 1989 American Psychologist
of their acquiring secondary status value based on their
rarity and expense. A home has value because it provides
shelter, whereas a mansion has increased value because
it also indicates status. Objects have seldom been consid-
ered in stress research, but are linked to socioeconomic
status, which has been shown to be an important factor
in stress resistance (Dohrenwend, 1978).
Conditions are resources to the extent that they are
valued and sought after. Marriage, tenure, and seniority
are examples of these. Conditions have been studied in-
frequently vis-a-vis their stress mediating effect, but Pear-
lin (1983) has suggested that roles inherent in being sub-
ject to certain conditions (e.g., wife, employee, or partner)
are critical to an understanding of people's stress resis-
tance capacity. Vachon (1986) provided evidence that just
living with someone (a condition) resulted in decreased
mortality rates for women with cancer, and Henderson,
Byrne, and Duncan-Jones (1981) found that being mar-
ried is a resistance resource. Others, however, argue that
conditions may need to be qualified; a bad marriage or
poor social relationship is unlikely to have salutary effects
(Rook, 1984; Thoits, 1987). Clearly, this area of resources
holds much promise for future work. The conservation
of resource model suggests that measuring the extent to
which conditions are valued by individuals or groups may
provide insight into their stress-resistance potential.
Personal characteristics are resources to the extent
that they generally aid stress resistance. Antonovsky
(1979) coined the term general resistance resources and
suggested that one's personal orientation toward the world
is the key; specifically, this means seeing events as pre-
dictable and generally occurring in one's best interest.
Investigations of various personal resources suggest that
many personal traits and skills aid stress resistance (Cohen
& Edwards, in press; HobfoU, 1985b). In addition, social
support's effect seems to hinge on its value in promoting
or supporting a positive sense of self and a view that one
can master or at least see through stressful circumstances
(Cohen & Wills, 1985; Pearlin et al., 1981).
Energies are the last resource category and include
such resources as time, money, and knowledge. These
resources are typified not by their intrinsic value so much
as their value in aiding the acquisition of other kinds of
resources. Energy resources have not been studied in
North America to my knowledge, but have received some
attention within the German action orientation model of
stress research (Schtnpflug, 1985). Indirect evidence for
the importance of energy resources may be found in net-
work research by Wellman (1981), who illustrated that a
large social network becomes valuable when information
(an energy resource) that requires numerous sources (e.g.,
contacts for employment) is required.
Finally, the reader might note that social support
does not fit in any one category above. Rather, social
relations are seen as a resource to the extent that they
provide or facilitate the preservation of valued resources,
but they also can detract from individuals' resources. This
notion is consistent with research that finds social support
beneficial when it provides for situational needs (Cohen
517
 & Wills, 1985; Hobfoll, 1985b) and harmful or benign
when it does not (Hobfoll & London, 1986; Riley & Eck-
enrode, 1986; Rook, 1984).
The Concepts of Loss
To assert that stress only concerns a loss or the potential
loss of resources may seem on first blush to be an over-
statement, but this is what the data on stress seem to
support. Early discussion of the idea that loss is central
to threat may be attributed to such authors as Lindemann
(1944) and Parkes (1970). In studying bereavement, they
found that loss of a loved one constituted social loss, po-
tential loss of status and economic stability, loss of a way
of life, as well as loss of the loved individual.
For loss to be central to a comprehensive theory of
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stress, however, loss would have to be central to all psy-
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chological stressors, not just bereavement. In reviewing
any of a number of stressful event surveys (Dohrenwend
et al., 1978; Holmes & Rahe, 1967; Sarason, Johnson, &
Siegel, 1978), it becomes clear that most items are ob-
viously loss events. These include death of a spouse, di-
vorce, marital separation, being fired at work, retirement,
foreclosure of a mortgage or loan, and so on. These events
are given the strongest severity weighting when weights
are assigned to items (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). This sup-
ports the notion that items that clearly reflect loss are the
most psychologically threatening. Furthermore, if the loss
does not directly affect the individual, it is less salient
(Hobfoll, London, & Orr, 1988; Swindle, Heller, & Lakey,
1988). Brown and Andrews (1986) reported that other
than in cases of depression where the disorder is likely to
be dispositional, loss events are responsible for approxi-
mately 90% of the cases of depression they studied.
Other events are more ambiguous in terms of why
they might cause stress. These include such events as
business readjustment, change in health of a family
member, receiving a large mortgage, or graduation from
college. Researchers have consistently found that if the
dimension of"undesirability" is partialed out of the cor-
relation between the endorsement of the event and out-
come, the relationship between the experience of these
events and strain (i.e., the outcome of stress) approaches
zero (Mueller, Edwards, & Yarvis, 1977; Thoits, 1983;
Vinokur & Selzer, 1975). The question is what is meant
by the vague concept "undesirable." In reviewing event
items, it is readily noted that the positive interpretation
of an item, such as business readjustment, indicates some
increase in acquisition of something the individual values.
Obversely, the negative possibility would suggest a loss of
something the individual values (e.g., money, status, or
flexibility). Consequently, when individuals are endorsing
the item, "business readjustment," they are either indi-
cating adjustment that denotes a gain in power, finances,
or positive challenge, or they are indicating adjustment
that denotes their loss. Only the loss alternative seems to
be stressful and then only when it threatens cherished
role involvements (Swindle et al., 1988).
Others have suggested that positive events also are
stressful because change itself is stressful. Again, there is
518
little evidence supporting this supposition and a good
deal of evidence challenging it (Thoits, 1983). According
to the model of conservation of resources, many changes
signify a gain of resources, and these should aid stress
resistance, not hinder it. Indeed, as already mentioned,
studies that have separated positive and negative events
have found that positive events have a stress-limiting effect
(see Thoits, 1983, for a review).
Transitions have also been seen as potentially stress-
ful. Felner, Farber, and Primavera (1983) made a strong
case, however, for seeing transitions as periods requiring
adaptation--a process that is challenging but not nec-
essarily stressful (Kobasa, Maddi, & Courington, 1981).
Wilcox (1986) also argued that transitions are series of
linked events. When these chains of events entail multiple
loss events (e.g., divorce leading to income loss, break-
up of other relationships, and childcare difficulties), they
are likely to prove stressful. However, when they are made
up of positive events or challenges that are successfully
met, they are more likely to produce stress inoculations
(Meichenbaum & Jaremko, 1983). Again, the evidence
suggests that stress is likely to ensue only when loss is
evidenced: Change, transitions, and challenge are not of
themselves stressful.
Resource Replacement
The model of conservation of resources also suggests that
although loss of resources is stressful, individuals may em-
ploy other resources to offset net loss (cf. Pearlin et al.,
1981). Replacement is the most direct way this is accom-
plished. Following divorce, for instance, the most common
course is remarriage (Burgess, 1981). Following miscar-
riage, women are told by supporters to quickly get pregnant
again (Hobfoll & Leiberman, 1987). Kessler, Turner, and
House (1987) also found that reemployment following
prolonged unemployment largely counteracts loss-related
depression, anxiety, and somatization. When direct re-
placement is not possible, symbolic replacement or re-
placement through indirect means may be possible. Nu-
merous studies illustrate, for instance, that following loss
of self-esteem people attempt to directly alter potentially
harmful conditions in order to facilitate positive feedback
(relatively direct), compensate by regaining esteem in other
related areas (relatively indirect), or artificially acquire
support for their desired identity through superficial in-
terpersonal manipulations (more indirect; see Schlenker,
1987, for detailed discussion of these points).
Employing resources for coping is also stressful in
itself. In some elegant experiments, Schtnpflug (1985)
illustrated that individuals employ resources in the coping
process and that such employment often depletes these
resources. Energy is expended, favors are used up, and
self-esteem is risked, all in the service of offsetting loss of
other potential loss. If the resources expended in coping
outstrip the resultant benefits, the outcome of coping is
likely to be negative. Illustrating this point, studies have
found that people who were placed in a position in which
they were required to give support, at a time when they
themselves needed support, experienced increased psy-
March 1989 American Psychologist
 chological distress (Hobfoll & London, 1986; Riley &
Eckenrode, 1986).
I think it would yield important insights about stress
if the cognitive and behavioral strategies people employed
in coping were tested following this process of replace-
ment, substitution, or investment. Work on energization
following failure (Ford & Brehm, 1987) suggests that
people roughly judge their potential losses, determine
what they stand to lose by expending other resources, and
analyze the likelihood of succeeding or offsetting losses
if they choose to employ a given coping strategy. The
extent to which they make rational, efficient, and suc-
cessful decisions about how to cope would be of great
interest. No doubt such strategies are clouded by emotions
and the inherent complexity of real human problems,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
but research should nonetheless be capable of uncovering
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
important insights.
There is a hint here of blaming the victims, that is,
"If they were only to employ their resources well, they
could overcome stress." However, resources are not dis-
tributed equally, and those people who lack resources are
most vulnerable to additional losses (Dohrenwend, 1978).
Loss spirals develop because they lack the resources to
offset loss. If resources are used to prevent loss of other
resources, such loss would be predicted to lead to further
decreases in the likelihood of possessing necessary re-
source reserves (see Billings & Moos, 1981; Eron & Pe-
terson, 1982; Menaghan, 1983). So, for example, following
their spouse's death, many women are too economically
disadvantaged to upgrade their education, and so they
are also likely to be subjected to economic stressors.
The model also predicts that those lacking the op-
tions made possible by possessing many resources will
attempt loss-control strategies that have a high cost and
poor chance of success. When the stakes are high, indi-
viduals have little choice but to attempt gain strategies
that are likely to fail, but have some short-term payoff
(Ford & Brehm, 1987). If they do not, they risk lapsing
into a sense of helplessness and despair (Alloy, Peterson,
Abramson, & Seligman, 1984) and further exposing
themselves to loss. Mitchell and Hodson (1986), for ex-
ample, found that battered women who lack personal re-
sources such as education, self-earned income, and oc-
cupational status use passive coping. Such inappropriate
forms of coping can best be explained by the fact that
passive coping strategies are the most potent ones in the
women's repertoire. In the past, instead, it has often been
interpreted as support for these women's masochistic
tendencies. Another study noted that Black women in a
traditional Black community will seek counterproductive
types of support from elders because more appropriate
support is unavailable (Dressier, 1985). These studies
support the hypothesis that those who lack resources at-
tempt to employ what resources they have, often pro-
ducing self-defeating consequences.
Appraisal of Resources
Until this point, emphasis has been placed on objective
loss and shared social standards of what constitutes loss.
March 1989 American Psychologist
The model also proposes an important role, however, for
appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). It should be un-
derscored, however, that even when perception is impor-
tant, normative tendencies regarding how resources are
evaluated and what constitutes loss guide individuals' as-
sessments of their environments and their selves. In this
regard, Rokeach (1973) provided ample evidence for
common (i.e., normative) values within like cultures or
groups, and scaling of life events provides evidence that
an agreed-on set of weights can be applied to events rang-
ing from the most benign to the most extreme (Holmes
& Rahe, 1967).
Shifting thefocus of attention. One way individuals
may conserve resources is by reinterpreting threat as
challenge (Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa et al., 198 I). Thus,
people may focus on what they might gain, instead of
what they might lose, in light of a particular situation. I
have argued previously, however, that this type of trans-
formation should not be romanticized as occurring for
all stressors (Hobfoll, 1985a). Many tragic stressors have
little redeeming value (Lehman, Wortman, & Williams,
1987). Still, many everyday stressors are neither clearly
positive nor negative and so are most likely to be open
to personal appraisal. The takeover of one's employer by
a larger corporation may, for instance, be appraised as an
opportunity for a quick rise in the executive ranks, or it
may be perceived as spelling a rash of job lay-offs. The
death of a spouse or child, in contrast, has much more
straightforward meaning in terms of its consequences.
Reevaluating resources. In addition to refocusing
attention as to whether and which resources are likely to
be lost or gained, people may combat their sense of loss
by reevaluating the value of resources that are threatened
or that have been lost. So, for example, the stress of school
failure can be mitigated by lowering the value placed on
education. Similarly, a social rejection can be lightened
by lowering the value placed on the lost relationship.
This appears to be the most simple course for people,
because rather than combating the stressor or enduring
the stress, people could merely alter their interpretation
of events and their consequences. Indeed, many stress
theories have suggested that appraisal is the key to stress
resistance (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Goodhart, 1985;
Johnson & Sarason, 1978; Kobasa, 1979; Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984; Spielberger, 1972). However, this suggests
that appraisal of the values placed on internal and external
resources are more pliable than they may, in fact, be.
Devaluation of resources in order to counteract the
impact of their loss challenges basic notions concerning
the self and the world. Following examination failure,
students may devalue the worth of education. However,
if their self-esteem was based, in part, on their past aca-
demic excellence and if they were raised in a society that
highly esteems education, there will be impediments to
making such reassessments. Because those things that
people value and the ways in which they perceive the
world are basic to their sense of self (Erikson, 1963; May,
1950; Rokeach, 1973), perceptions may not be so pliable.
This may be one reason why so few interventions aimed
519
 at changing how people make transformations of this kind
have even been attempted.
Phrasing this as an empirical question, I would sug-
gest that people's resource assessments are derived, in
part, from their basic values (Rokeach, 1973) and devel-
opmental history, that is, what they have learned through
experience to be valuable to them. Hence, it would be
hypothesized that although minor reappraisals may allow
individuals to buffer the brunt of stressors, reappraisal of
more basic aspects of the self and the environment are
more likely to backfire against the individual--resulting
in a sense of insecurity and despair--than they are to
have stress-moderating effects.
Kaplan (1983) made a similar argument, as follows:
To the extent that individuals are born with or acquire attributes
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. . and are circumstantially required to perform behaviors
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
that threaten their basic values or reflect the inability to achieve
these values, individuals will experience a degree of subjective
distress. Insofar as the basic value in question is positive self-
evaluation, a history of circumstances in which individuals come
to experience themselves as possessing highly disvalued attri-
butes and performing disvalued behaviors will evoke highly dis-
tressful self-rejecting feelings. (p. 211)
So, what Kaplan was suggesting is that when people must
behave or experience themselves in a way dissonant with
their basic view of the self or the world, they are likely to
experience psychological distress.
Rollo May (1980) also suggested that such threats
to underlying or basic values are counterproductive.
The distinctive qualit~ of human anxiety arises from the fact
that man is a valuing animal, who interprets life and world in
terms of symbols and meanings. It is the threat to these values--
specifically,to some value that the individual holds essential to
his existence as a self--that causes anxiety. (p. 241)
Additional research is required concerning norma-
tive evaluation of resources and individuals' more stable
resource appraisals. Certainly, situational changes in per-
ceptions are important, but they seem to have been stud-
ied to the exclusion of more basic, stable self and world
views. More attention should be drawn to how stress is
influenced by socialization (Kaplan, 1983), roles (Merton,
1957; Pearlin, 1983), and social development (Bandura,
1977) than models that overwhelmingly emphasize ap-
praisal have done.
The Expectation of Net Gain of Resources
The model of conservation of resources also suggests what,
in part, motivates people's behavior when they are not
currently experiencing taxing stressors. Specifically, in-
dividuals are motivated to gain resources. This motivation
drives people to invest resources in order to enrich their
resource pool. This serves both to shelter them from fu-
ture losses and contributes to enhanced status, love, pos-
sessions, or self-esteem, depending on individuals' goals
and the direction of their investment.
Investment of resources may be observed in good
marriages. In such marriages, both partners are constantly
contributing from what they have to each other and to
520
the relationship. There is a long-term expectation, how-
ever, that their investment will produce a payoff in terms
of returned love, esteem, affection, and security (Clark,
1983). Clearly, people's financial investments also follow
this principle. People are willing, in this regard, to invest
greater resources for greater payoff or for increased odds
of payoff(i.e., low risk). A small gain is poor compensation
for a large risk.
The model of conservation of resources predicts that
when such investment does not provide a good return,
people will experience this as loss. The loss is the loss of
the expected or envisioned gain. Schfnpflng (1985) also
suggested that the cost of expended internal and external
resources must be added to negative outcome or sub-
tracted from positive outcome, in order to predict people's
stress reactions, and he provided some laboratory evi-
dence for this phenomenon. Other research has also in-
dicated that depression is most likely to follow when in-
vestment of resources fails to resolve a conflict (Brown
& Andrews, 1986). Obviously, more research is required
to explore this proposed aspect of the stress phenomenon.
F u t u r e R e s e a r c h on S t r e s s
The model of conservation of resources helps structure
the sphere in which research on stress may advance. First,
the model emphasizes that resources have both objective
and subjective components. Current reliance on self-re-
port increases the potential for confounding with self-
reported measures of outcome. Future research should
attempt to study objectively observable resources as well.
This can be done by measuring behavioral (e.g., sup-
portive behavior) or structural (e.g., belonging to a co-
hesive group) operationalizations of resources (Hobfoll &
Lerman, 1988; Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1987)
or by seeking assessments by clinicians (e.g., evaluation
of self-esteem; Brown & Harris, 1978). This will not be
possible for all resources, but where it is possible it would
help dispel arguments that resources are themselves
symptoms (Depue & Monroe, 1986; Dohrenwend et al.,
1984).
It also follows that the field of stress would benefit
from investigations of resources that people find helpful
in light of differing kinds of losses. Individual traits, such
as hardiness (Kobasa, 1979), locus of control (Lefcourt,
Martin, & Selah, 1984), personal self-consciousness (Suls
& Fletcher, 1985), optimism (Carver & Scheirer, 1983),
absence of chronic psychopathological disorder (Depue
& Monroe, 1986), and low negative affectivity (Watson
& Tellegen, 1985) have been studied, but only as general
stress mediators. Similarly, social support has been studied
regarding its effect on stress in general, not some specific
kind or category of stressors (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Sar-
ason & Sarason, 1985). By studying the specificity of re-
sources for counteracting the effects of different kinds of
losses, the potency (i.e., effect size) and robustness (i.e.,
degree of potency for varied kinds of losses) may be iden-
tified. In our own research, for example, we have found
self-esteem to be a generally robust resource (Hobfoll &
Leiberman, 1987; Hobfoll & London, 1986), whereas the
March 1989 American Psychologist
 benefit of social support was found to be limited to sit-
uations in which social interaction is possible and in
which social interaction does not add to already experi-
enced stress (e.g,, stress contagion; Riley & Eckenrode,
1986). Furthermore, social support was found to have a
time-limited effect, whereas the influence of self-esteem
was not time limited.
If resources are only beneficial when they help
counteract loss or aid net increase of resources, it also
follows that a resource may, indeed, be detrimental in
certain instances (Hobfoll, 1985b). We have adopted the
term "resources" in our own work, despite this problem,
because so many other authors have used this term. How-
ever, there is a scientific concern when research concen-
trates on the case in which investigators search for in-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
stances that prove their point or support the robustness
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of the resource that most interests them. We are all guilty
of this tendency, and it is important that we test the notion
of fit of resources with situational demands by illustrating
both when a given resource aids adjustment and when it
interferes with adjustment or is neutral. Only by this
multimethod, multitrait approach (i.e., indicating when
different resources do and do not contribute to stress re-
sistance; Campbell & Fiske, 1959) may we differentiate
between the actual active ingredients of coping and such
problems as shared method variance and self-fulfilling
prophesy.
The model o f conservation of resources also de-
mands that the popular concept of "fit" (Caplan, 1983;
French, Rodgers, & Cobb, 1974) be spelled out such that
we may learn what aspects of the resource "fit" the de-
mands resulting from the loss. Fit has typically been mea-
sured in terms of self-report as to whether individuals
globally judge their resources as fitting demands (i.e.,
"how good is the fit of your resources with job demands?).
More recent applications of the concept have attempted,
in contrast, to predict a priori what properties of certain
resources offset the effect of specific demands (Hobfoll &
Leiberman, 1987; Hobfoll & Lerman, 1988; Hobfoll &
London, 1986; Keinan & Hobfoll, in press; Mitchell &
Hodson, 1986; Parry, 1986). Moos (1984) has been in-
strumental in this regard in urging researchers to consider
the ecology of stressful events, although he has not pro-
posed a specific theory about the properties of events that
are stressful. Future research will need to more carefully
delineate how certain demands are met by specific re-
sources, and the concepts of substitution, replacement,
and investment of resources may provide one avenue for
such refinement.
Because loss spirals and investment of resources are
predicted to occur and because events themselves are
likely to evolve over time, it is also important to focus on
how the interplay between resources and situational needs
changes over time as stressor sequences unfold. In addi-
tion, because both of these processes result in potential
resource depletion, it will be important to illustrate not
only the effect of resources on outcome, but also of out-
come on resources (Hobfoll & Lerman, 1988; Pearlin et
al., 1981; SchSnpflug, 1985). The transactional model of
March 1989 American Psychologist
stress also makes this point regarding the recursive nature
of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), but does not ex-
plicitly state that coping itself potentially depletes re-
sources.
In outlining the process by which resources operate,
the model of conservation of resources suggests a specific
set of behaviors and cognitions that may be observed in
order to support, clarify, or disconfirm the model. So, for
example, rather than merely showing that social support
or a particular style of coping results in a stress-buffering
effect, to confirm the present model it would have to be
shown that cognitions or events caused real or perceived
losses and that social support or coping style limited these
losses or enabled gain of other resources. Prior research
has focused on outcome (e.g., direct versus stress-buffering
effects) and not process, but outcomes alone can neither
disqualify nor buttress any particular stress model.
Overall, research on stress must move from its pres-
ent acceptance of studying stress as a vague, general con-
cept and move toward direct testing of stress models.
Lacking precise measurement instruments and physical
laws that allow absolute standards, the social sciences
must proceed through the cumbersome process of hy-
pothesis testing of comparative models. However, the
stress literature may be criticized as having many hy-
potheses but lacking overarching models that create
competing viewpoints.
The conservation of resources model provides a per-
spective that may better reflect the current state of knowl-
edge concerning stress. In addition, it leads to many test-
able directions that lend the model both to potential con-
firmation or rejection. Comparison to alternative models
will be useful and may encourage researchers to adopt a
more theory-based approach to their investigations. Only
in this way can we possibly avoid a science that merely
reflects how we wish to see things. Nowhere is this point
more clear than in the study of stress.
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