Prosecution of Civil Action

Co v. Munoz, G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013

Elizalde Co v. Ludolfo Muoz
G.R. No. 181986 | December 4, 2013| Brion, J.
FACTS
Muoz was charged for perjury.
Suspecting that Co was responsible for said charge, Muoz stated in several radio station interviews that Co:
Influenced the City Prosecutor to expedite the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
Muoz;
Manipulated the results of the government bidding for the Masarawag-San Francisco
dredging project; and
Received P2M from Muoz on the condition that he will sub-contract Muoz for the project,
but did not fulfill said condition.
Co charged Muoz for 3 counts of libel. He did not waive/institute/reserve his right to file a separate civil action
arising from the libelous statements.
Muoz: Co is a public figure and the statements were of public interest; hence, these
statements are protected by the rules on privileged communication, which dispenses of the presumption of
malice and shifts the burden of proving the same to the plaintiff.
RTC: Guilty + ordered Muoz to pay:
P5M for each count of libel (moral damages);
P1.2M for legal services; and
P297,699.00 for litigation expenses.
CA: Acquitted Muoz + extinguished his civil liability ex delicto (meaning: arising from a crime).
Co appealed the civil aspect of the case.[1]
Co:
As for the possibility of Muoz to still be held civilly liable despite
acquittal: Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC) states that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
As for why Muoz should be held liable: The statements of Muoz are
not privileged communication because Co is not a public figure. Although he is known in his
community, this community only comprises of his business associates.
Muoz: The title of Section 2 is When separate civil action is suspended; thus, it only
applies when the civil action is instituted separately from the criminal action. The civil action for damages arising
from libel in this case, however, was instituted along with the criminal complaint for libel because Co did not
waive or reserve his right to file a separate civil action. Since Section 2 cannot apply if the civil action was
instituted along with the criminal action, the extinction of the penal action had already carried with it the
extinction of the civil action.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the civil action still subsists despite the acquittal of Muoz (i.e. W/N Muoz MAY STILL
BE HELD liable for damages)?
2. Whether or not Muoz IS ACTUALLY liable for damages?

HELD
1. YES. Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC states that a judgment of acquittal shall determine if the act/omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

If one were to follow the theory of Muoz:

- Suppose a civil action arising from a crime was filed along with the criminal action; Muoz says that the
acquittal of the accused automatically carries with it the extinguishment of his civil liability.
- This interpretation renders useless the mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 to determine the existence of
the act/omission which gave rise to the civil liability, because civil liability is deemed already extinguished. Thus,
this interpretation cannot be accepted.

2. NO. Although malice is generally presumed in a libelous statement, jurisprudence provides for exceptions, such
as:
- Remarks directed against a public figure (Guingguing v. CA)
- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest (Borjal v. CA)
 The statements of Muoz fall under both exceptions.
- Co is a public figure. To reverse this factual finding of the CA is beyond the jurisdiction of the SC.
- The subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of the statements of Muoz
were fair comments.

Thus, the statements of Muoz are exempt from the rule on presumption of malice. Since Co was not able to prove malice, he
cannot be entitled to moral damages.

[1] He admitted that he cannot appeal the criminal aspect of the case, since it would result to double jeopardy.

NOTES
Modes of enforcing a civil liability ex delicto:
1. Through a civil action deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action;
2. Through a civil action filed separately, either:
a. Before the criminal action; or
b. After, upon reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action.
The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action.

Rimando v. Sps. Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014

Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011
Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Elvin Chan and CA
G.R. No. 157547 | February 23, 2011 | J. Bersamin | AABPAYAD

FACTS:
On July 1997, an information against Eduardo Simon for the violation of BP22 was filed before the MeTC
Manila (criminal case docketed as People v. Simon)
Simon issued a Landbank check in favor of Chan payable to cash in the amount of 336,000PHP and was
dishonored due to Account Closed. He was unable to pay within 5 days upon receiving the Notice of
Dishonor.
Three years later, Chan filed a civil action for the collection of the principal amount and an application for
a writ of preliminary attachment before the MeTC Pasay.
MeTC Pasay issued writ of preliminary attachment to the Nissan vehicle of Simon
Simon filed an urgent MTD with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages averring
that:
o There is still a pending action between the same parties before the MeTC Manila (Pp v.
Simon)
o When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately.
Chan opposed the said motion and contended that:
o The civil action to recover civil liability is impliedly reserved when the information for the
violation of BP22 did not allege any damages suffered.
o Chan was not represented by a private prosecutor in the said criminal case.
o Since the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the NCC as it is based on fraud, this action
therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.
 o The plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an
obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the NIL.
MeTC Pasay granted Simons MTD due to litis pendentia.
RTC upheld the dismissal
CA reversed

ISSUE:
WON Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded was an independent civil action?

HELD:
NO. there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention
of BP 22. This is clear from Sec 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which
relevantly provides that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed. Such provision can be applied retroactively because it is in favor of the accused and it was
reflected in a SC Circular dated on 1997. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are
filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee
is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge
to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.
The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of
cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the
disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil,
only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate
civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is
filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount
of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.

A perusal of the civil case and the criminal case ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia
are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involve, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly,
the information and the complaint both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check worth
P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well
as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any
judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be
recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the
ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did
not err in affirming the MeTC.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside
the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on
October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008

Summary: A Civil Case for collection of sum of money was filed against Caroline Bun Tiong in the RTC
for the 3 post-dated checks which was issued by her. A separate criminal complaint was also instituted
and the question as to the validity of the separate civil action instituted by Balboa. SC held that in BP 22
the civil action is tried together with the criminal action. There is an exception to this rule which is when
the civil action was filed before the criminal action. In this case the civil action may continue separately
from the criminal action.

Facts:
On February 24, 1997 Balboa filed with the RTC a civil case for the collection of Sum of
Money against the spouses Bun Tiong. He seeks to recover the amounts covered by the 3 post-
dated checks issued by Carmen Bun Tiong.
On July 21, 1997, a separate criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against
Caroline in the MTC.
On August 11, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision in the Civil Case finding that Caroline
is liable for the amounts of the checks.
The MTC rendered a decision in the criminal case acquitted Caroline for the offense due
to the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC however
ruled that she is still civilly liable for the amounts of the checks.
The spouses Bun Tiong filed a partial reconsideration of the MTC decision (criminal
case) praying for the deletion of the civil indemnity but this was denied by the MTC.
The Civil Case was brought before the CA but the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the RTC Decision i toto.
Spouses are alleging that since there is already a civil case the award for civil indemnity
for the criminal action. They are alleging that there is forum shopping when Balboa filed the civil
case and the criminal case.

Issue: WON there was forum shopping

Held:
No, there were no forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a
favorable disposition. For forum shopping these elements must be present: 1. Identity of the parties or at
least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions, 2. Identity of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for 3. Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgement rendered in the
other will amount to res judicata or will constitute litis pendencia.
In Hyatt v Asia Dynamic the court held that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a
civil case for the recovery of sum of money and a criminal case for BP 22. This case applied Supreme
Court Circular No. 57-97 which provides that criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed
necessary to include the corresponding civil action, no reservation to file such action separately shall be
allowed. This was later on adopted to Rule 111 (b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
These rules however, are not applicable in this case because the cases were filed before the adoption of
the SC of these procedures in September 16, 1997.

The governing law for the case is Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court which provides that when a
criminal action is instituted the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The SC held that the only instance
wherein a civil case for BP 22 can proceed separately is if it was filed before the criminal action. In
addition the court held that the RTC in the Criminal Case already deleted the award for civil damages so
there is no double recovery for the amounts covered by the checks.

Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008

Sps. Jose v. Sps. Suarez

G.R. No. 176795 | June 30, 2008 | Tinga, J. | Prejudical Question | de Guia

Facts
Sps. Jose loaned Sps. Suarez money
At first, the interest rate was at 1% PER DAY, then, Sps. Jose increased the same to 5%
per day
Sps. Suarez had no choice but to accept as it was allegedly their only option
The parties sued each other:
Sps. Suarez sued to declare void the (clearly iniquitous) interest before
RTC Cebu
Later, Sps. Jose sued them in retaliation, for violations of BP 22 before
MTCC Cebu
Sps. Suarez filed before RTC Cebu a Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and a
TRO, alleging the presence of a prejudicial question
RTC Cebu granted the Suarezes motion and restrained MTCC from conducting further
proceedings
CA affirmed, saying
Sps Suarez had sought to annul the checks for being void pursuant to
Article 1422 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract which is the direct result of
a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent
Should the checks become void, they could not become the basis of a BP
22 violation
Thus, the outcome of the RTC Cebu case would determine the guilt or
innocence of Sps Suarez (more specifically, the wife, Purita)

Issue: WON the petition to nullify the 5% interest and the recovery of payments already made poses a
prejudicial question (NO)
 1. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
2. It has two essential elements:
(i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
3. The gravamen of the offense under [B.P. Blg.] 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively
declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum.
4. Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void
for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what
will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks.

Side Issue: Forum Shopping (Sps Suarez are guilty of the same)
1. There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court,
which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals.
2. Failing to get the relief they wanted, Sps Suarez sought before the RTC, the suspension of
the criminal proceedings which was granted.

Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision SET ASIDE. RTC injunction is LIFTED and RTC is ORDERED
to proceed with arraignment and trial in the BP 22 cases.

Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Pimentel v Pimentel| Sept 13, 2010| Alice| Prejudicial Question

Facts:

Maria Pimentel (private respondent) filed a complaint against Joselito Pimentel (Petitioner) for frustrated
parricide with the RTC of QC.
Subsequently, she filed a petition for declaration of Nullity of their marriage under art 36 of the FC.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC of QC on the existence of a
prejudicial question, since the relationship of petitioner and private respondent is a key element in
parricide.
RTC denied motion.
CA affirmed: The issues in nullity under art 36 and parricide are different. Even if the marriage would be
subsequently declared void, it is immaterial to the crime of parricide because prior to the institution of
declaration for nullity, the crime has already been consummated.
Issue: WON a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under art 36 constitutes a prejudicial question
in a criminal case for parricide?

Held: No.

(First point) The elements of prejudicial question under sec 7, rule 111 are:

(a) The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action and
(b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

To constitute prejudicial question, the civil action must be instituted before the criminal action. In this
case, the declaration for nullity was instituted after the complaint for frustrated homicide was instituted.

(Second point) There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or
homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide because the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, if granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime
that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.

The case cited by petitioner, Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, which ruled that "the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." is not applicable. First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro ruled that "there is a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences." In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned."
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 15, 2009

Jaime U. Gosiaco v. Leticia Ching

G.R. No. 173807 | April 16, 2009 | Tinga, J. |mjkdd
Summary
Gosiaco filed a case for violation of B.P. 22 against Ching for issuing 2 bouncing
corporate checks of ASB. Ching was acquitted criminally and civilly. Considering that ASB is
liable for the amount of the checks to Gosiaco, he sought to implead ASB in the B.P. 22 case
since the rule prohibits the institution of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases. The Supreme
Court ruled that a corporation cannot be impleaded as a defendant in B.P. 22 cases. Gosiaco,
however, may still recover the amount since the civil obligation of the corporation, arising out of
the civil code, is separate and distinct from the criminal and civil liability of the corporate officer
for violating B.P. 22.

Statement of Facts
Jaime Gosiaco invested 8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings, Inc. with an interest of 10.
5% amounting to 112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its Business Development Group
Manager, Leticia Ching, issued 2 checks for 8,000,000.00 and 112,000.00. Both checks were
signed by Ching and ASB recognized its obligation via a letter. Upon maturity, the checks were
deposited but were subsequently dishonored due to a stop payment order and due to insufficiency
of funds. This prompted Gosiaco to file a B.P. 22 case before the MTCC against Leticia Ching.

Gosiaco also moved that the ASB and its president, Luke Roxas, be impleaded as party
defendants. The MTCC denied the motion the motion and acquitted Ching from criminal liability
but held Ching to be liable civilly. The RTC, on the other hand, ruled that ASB and Roxas should
not be impleaded and that Ching is not criminally or civilly liable. The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. This prompted Gosiaco to file this present petition before the Supreme Court.

Gosiacos Problem: Ching was acquitted and is therefore no longer civilly liable. However, the
obligation of ASB to pay Gosiaco remains unfulfilled. Taking into consideration the fact that a
criminal prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 includes the corresponding civil action and that a
reservation to file a separate civil action in B.P. 22 is not allowed under the Rules of Court, how
could Gosiaco recover the sum of money?
By impleading the corporation and its President? Or by filing a separate civil action?

ISSUES

1. Whether or not Ching is civilly liable?

2. Whether or not ASB could be impleaded as party defendants?
3. Whether or not Gosiaco may file a separate civil action for the recovery of the sum of
money?

HELD

1. NO. Ching is not civilly liable. As a general rule, a corporate officer who issues a
bouncing corporate check could only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. The court cited
the case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders Inc. where it ruled that the civil liability in a B.P. 22
case is extinguished with criminal liability.
2. NO. ASB and its President could not be impleaded as party defendants. Section 1 of B.P.
22 provides that:

Where the check is drawn by a corporation company or entity, the person or persons, who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this act

Even if the Rules of criminal procedure require the joint trial of both the criminal and
civil aspects of B.P. 22 cases, ASB cannot be impleaded even if it recognized its obligation to
Gosiaco. Nowhere in B.P. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an
accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the
civil aspect thereof.

3. YES. Gosiaco may file a separate civil action for the recovery of the sum of money.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambanasa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

The substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against a
debtor- corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure. Technically, noting in
Section 1(b) of Rule 111 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical
person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rule prohibits is the reservation of a
separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. 22.

B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is
distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount represented from the check. The
civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check despite
the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is
itself the very obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these
civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the
amount of each.

In view of the legal confusion, should Gosiaco opt to file a separate civil aspect the Court
held that he should be exempt from paying the filing fees and he should not be barred by
prescription