Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ETH Zurich
N0. 156, June 2014, Editor: Matthias Bieri
By Prem Mahadevan
raises the question of how China really in- There have been reports that China is al- readiness in the Western Pacific might be.
tends to protect its oil imports from inter- ready creating a fourth fleet that would Support for a greater Chinese naval profile
diction, and whether it is preparing for a eventually consist of two Carrier Battle is widespread across most sections of edu-
larger naval push into the Indian Ocean. In Groups based at Hainan Island. This fleet cated society, with some citizens feeling
such a scenario, the Chinese argument might be placed directly under the Central strongly enough to offer their own savings
about protecting oil supplies might be a Military Commission, the highest military towards the cost of an aircraft carrier.
balancer against Beijings oft-quoted com- decision-making body, making it a power-
mitment to a peaceful rise devoid of any ful instrument of geopolitical signaling. Securing the Peaceful Rise
shows of military power. The aircraft carriers that would form the The IOR plays an integral role in Chinas
core of the fleet would have little role in the narrative of a peaceful rise. Indeed, Bei-
Naval Nationalism and the IOR event of a war in the Western Pacific. This jings interest in the IOR surged concur-
The PLANs three fleets the North Sea is because they would be vulnerable to at- rently with the narratives own appearance
Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet tack by air and subsurface components of in the early 2000s. This might be due to
are respectively concerned with protect- US and allied naval forces. Instead, it ap- Chinese recognition of the need to win al-
ing the countrys political and economic pears that the carriers primary value would lies against strategic containment by the
heartland, preventing Taiwanese secession, be in waters where open combat is unlikely US by courting Middle Eastern and Arab
and asserting Chinese claims over disputed and their psychological impact outweighs states. Beijing might have used the argu-
waters. At present, the navy is thought ca- their military contribution. The IOR is a ment about protecting its commodity ship-
pable of deploying only ten warships plus logical theater for their deployment. ping lanes to cloak its entry into the IOR
one attack submarine and one replenish- as an economic imperative, thereby circum-
ment ship in the Indian Ocean on a con- The PLAN has long chafed at the effec- venting the military passivity that was inte-
tinuous basis. It lacks the capability to pro-tiveness with which it can be contained in gral to its peaceful rise commitment. The
East Asia, locked within the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-6 demon-
confines of the first island strated that the US would stand by its se-
This raises the question of how chain that extends from Japan curity guarantees in East Asia a posture
China really intends to protect its through Taiwan to Malaysia.
Exit points in this chain are
that blocked the PLANs vision of gaining
maritime supremacy in Chinas immediate
oil imports from interdiction. controlled by potentially hostile neighborhood.
navies, forcing the PLAN to
develop an operational focus on Present indications are that the PLAN is
ject a greater force beyond Chinas controlling near seas during wartime. Since aiming to gain advanced competence in
near-seas, and also seems more focused on the Western Pacific is dominated by the carrier operations after 2020, with an even-
preparing for conflict in the Western Pa- US Navy, the PLAN has found an outlet in tual strength of up to four Carrier Battle
cific. the IOR, where it has both short-term rea- Groups. Its large submarine fleet the
sons for deployment (counter-piracy) and striking arm of its Anti-Access/Area De-
Since at least 2008, however, China has long-term ones (guarding Sea Lines of nial doctrine (together with anti-ship bal-
been expanding its South Sea Fleet by al- Communications). listic missiles) is projected to become
locating the latest warships to it and shift- even more sophisticated. This has led to
ing nuclear submarines from the North Sea Nationalistic passion among netizens ad- worries that China might move some of its
Fleet. This would make sense, given that vocating a more assertive Chinese foreign- subsurface assets to the IOR, where it
the disintegration of the Soviet Union policy stance is providing the service with a would be in a position to threaten other
greatly reduced any threat that China faces case for engaging in far-seas operations, countries merchant shipping in the event
from its northern borders. The East Sea however limited their contribution to war- of war. Despite having articulated a need to
Fleet, lying in between, would be too vul-
nerable to a concentrated strike if it were
strengthened to deal with a Taiwan-related
contingency. By focusing on the South Sea
Fleet, China keeps all its options open in
The PLAN and the Communist Partys Geoeconomic Agenda
the event of a war with Japan or Taiwan
(either scenario would probably feature US The ruling Chinese Communist Party is concerned with maintaining domestic stability. To this end,
intervention), the PLAN could use the it aims to ensure economic progress by securing a steady supply of raw materials and fuel for
East and South Sea Fleets to impose an industry. As a self-marketing strategy, the PLAN has portrayed its own budgetary expansion as vital
to ensuring a continuous flow of these supplies, since most arrive by sea. By doing so, it aspires to
economic blockade of the targeted territory gain competence in long-distance operations. Since late 2008, it has been dispatching vessels to
while not being cornered in a confined the Gulf of Aden on counter-piracy missions. In the process, it is estimated to have trained more
space by the stronger US Navy. Should no than 10,000 officers and sailors in the intricacies of far-seas deployment and in coping with the
such war occur in the Western Pacific, ves- psychological effects of prolonged operations.
sels from the South Sea Fleet could be sent What the PLAN is not doing is equally telling: It is not investing in replenishment ships on a large
further afield into the IOR in a force pro- scale. Since such a step would have been essential for developing a true blue-water capability, the
jection role. There is a general consensus question must be asked if the PLANs primary objectives are at sea, or on the shores of countries
that ring the Indian Ocean. Naval logistics can be of an onshore or offshore nature, and China
among both Chinese and US experts that appears to be more inclined towards the former, since this allows it to find willing partners for its
this is likely to happen anyway, once Bei- push into the IOR. Maritime diplomacy driven by both economic and military agendas seems to be
jing has settled its immediate maritime at the core of Chinese engagement in the region.
disputes.
protect its own maritime trade routes, Chi- across the world has been met by concerns serving the strategic ambiguity of Chinas
na might gain an offensive advantage in the that the Chinese navy is entering Western earlier approach to the IOR, but couching
relatively uncharted waters of the Indian harbors under the guise of trade and infra- it in more commerce-minded terms.
Ocean, where the US Navys geographical structure development.
and logistical advantage is smaller than in In the medium-term, it is unlikely that
the Western Pacific. Uncertain Future many IOR states would acquiesce to a
By investing in sea power, China has found creeping militarization of their territorial
Most interestingly of all, the PLAN is im- a sustainable means for combining eco- waters by permitting a permanent Chinese
plementing an impressive program of ex- naval presence. This is because
pansion that might make it one-third larg- they would prefer to play off
er than the US Navy by 2020. At the end of The PLAN is implementing an China against the West rather
this decade therefore, the service is expect- impressive program of expansion than leaning towards Beijing
ed to have many vessels to spare for opera- and risk losing Western inter-
tions other than war. Such operations could that might make it one-third est, thereby becoming wholly
include counter-piracy and disaster relief, larger than the US Navy by 2020. dependent on Chinese good-
as well as intelligence-gathering close to will. The most obvious excep-
other countries territorial waters and com- tion here is Pakistan, which is
mercial exploitation of their exclusive eco- nomic and military power to reshape the keen to go well beyond economic engage-
nomic zones. international system. The fact that the In- ment and get China militarily involved in
dian Ocean is a vital transit corridor for the its tensions with India by enticing the
The recent tensions between China and country provides it with strong grounds to PLAN to build a base at Gwadar. Al-
Vietnam, although occurring in the South establish a permanent presence there. though this is an outlier, in the long term, it
China Sea, are illustrative in this regard Many IOR states see Chinese investment might only be an exaggeration of the privi-
and of potential relevance to the IOR as in infrastructure as a matter of pride, show- leged position China could come to enjoy
well. They demonstrate that points of mari- casing domestically bright economic pros- in the IOR. Host governments tied to Bei-
time friction are increasing as a resource- pects. They also see it as an opportunity to jing by trade deals would be hard pressed to
hungry and increasingly nationalistic Chi- make a point to the West that deficiencies withstand its requests for increased naval
na bumps up against smaller powers in in governance need not be hyped to a de- access to their ports, particularly if the
waters closer to their homeland than to its gree where they become a hindrance to West and India remain aloof from their
own. As impressive as Chinas naval build- business. This weakens the prospect of an economic development. The decades after
up is, it is being matched by an expansion international consensus forming against 2020 might thus see a sharp change in the
in the Chinese commercial fleet. In terms Beijing, if and when a requirement arises to power balance in the Asia-Pacific in Chi-
of vessel numbers, China already has the use military force. To sidestep Western nas favor.
worlds largest such fleet, demonstrating concerns about a String of Pearls threat-
the scale of its maritime ambitions. The ening shipping lanes, China has recently
government-owned China Overseas Ship- floated the idea of a Maritime Silk Road Dr. Prem Mahadevan is a Senior Researcher with
ping Company has been described by some connecting the Western Pacific and Indian the Global Security team at the Center for
experts as being merely a civilian arm of the Oceans. US analysts perceive this as merely Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. He is the
PLAN. Its growing investment portfolio an exercise in rebranding effectively pre- author of Maritime Insecurity in East Asia (2013).
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