Demographic Dimensions of an Intervillage Land Dispute in Nubri, Nepal

Author(s): Geoff Childs

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1096-1113
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/684131
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GEOFF CHILDS
DemographyProgram
ResearchSchool of the Social Sciences
The AustralianNationalUniversity
Canberra,ACT 0200
Australia

Demographic Dimensions of an Intervillage Land Dispute

in Nubri, Nepal
The demographicbasis for a landdisputebetweentwo Tibetanvillages in Nubri,Nepal, is examinedin relationto family
systems.Despiteclose proximityandsocioculturalties, the villagesexperiencedivergentpopulationgrowthratesresulting
from differentfrequenciesof marriage.In one, old-agesecurityconcernsinduceparentsto retainfemalelaborwithinthe
householdby designatingdaughtersto be nuns,a practicethathas the unintendedconsequenceof limitingaggregatepopu-
lation growthby barringmany women from marriageand reproduction.In the othervillage the slightlydifferentfamily
system resultsin fewer nuns,fasterpopulationgrowth,and a need for more land. Comparisonswith family systems and
demographicoutcomesin Europeand Asia reveal this to be a case in which preventivechecks can exist in a context of
earlymarriageandhigh maritalfertilityanddemonstratehow concernsfor old-agesecuritycan act as a restrainton aggre-
gate fertility.[Tibetans,family systems,demography,religiouscelibacy]

H igh in a remotevalley of Nepal, ethnic Tibetans
from the neighboring villages of Sama and Lho
gathered on opposite sides of a turbulent Himala-
yan stream. Separated by the cascading barrier of water,
men from either side attempted to breach the others' de-
fenses by rushing the wooden bridge dividing them. A hail
of rocks kept the antagonists at bay. The battle raged for
hours, ending in a stalemate at nightfall when the partici-
pants in this grudge match reluctantly returnedto their re-
spective villages. In the final tally, there were no human
casualties. Yet the social consequences were far from neg-
ligible. The escalation of this intervillage dispute resulted
in contentious relations between the residents of Sama and
Lho, people who have been interdependent for centuries.
What had gone wrong?
The myth that Tibetan societies are devoid of internal
strife persists in the popular imagination (Lopez 1998;
Shakya 1999). Such a caricature ignores the simple fact
that Tibetans, like all humans, compete among themselves
and against others for economic resources such as land, bo-
vines, pastures, and even trade privileges (e.g., Ahmed
1999; Ekvall 1964; Ortner 1989). In the case of the
Sama-Lho conflict, the villagers were fighting over a
small stretch of land called Shala, a previously uninhabited
forest between the two villages.
The purpose of this article is to contrast demographic
processes in Sama and Lho, specifically with regardto fer-
tility, marriage, and population growth rates. It may seem
strange to start a discussion of village-level demographic
trends with a description of an intervillage melee. How-
ever, the logic will become clear, for the conflict is directly
related to a contrast in population processes, one that is not
intuitively obvious because of the fact that the villages
share a common linguistic and cultural heritage, are linked
via maritalexchanges and religious affiliation, and are eco-
nomically intertwined through shared resources and trade.
Despite their numerous similarities, a crucial difference in
the family systems of the two villages has resulted in dif-
ferent rates of nuptiality, fertility, and population growth-
a finding that would not be apparentin macrolevel demo-
graphic studies that tend to veil local-level heterogeneity
through aggregation. In this study, I use a microde-
mographic approach (e.g., Axinn et al. 1991; Caldwell et
al. 1988) to highlight the localized nuances of historical
processes, family systems, cultural attitudes, and their in-
fluences on demographic outcomes-akin to what Fricke
(1997) refers to as a "thickerdemography."
Family systems (the normative manner in which family
practices and household dynamics transpire, including
marriage forms, succession, inheritance, and so forth
[Skinner 1997:54]) influence demographic behavior and
outcomes. This proposition has an ongoing academic his-
tory (e.g., Das Gupta 1997; Davis 1955; Goody 1996; Ha-
jnal 1965, 1982; Levine 1987; Skinner 1997) and is one of
many key points of convergence between the disciplines of
anthropology and demography. Hajnal's (1965, 1982)
seminal hypothesis proposes that a cultural pattern in
northern Europe characterized by late marriage and high

AmericanAnthropologist103(4):1096-1113. Copyright? 2001, AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation

 CHILDS
ratesof celibacyresultedin relativelylow fertility,in con-
trastto elsewhere(primarilyin Asia) wherethejoint fam-
ily is assumedto inducehigh fertilitythroughpartiblein-
heritance,earlyanduniversalmarriage,andthe sharedcost
of child rearinginherentin multigenerational households.
Althoughthe detailsof Hajnal'sclassic formulationhave
not always held up to criticalscrutiny(e.g., Goody 1996;
Guinnane1991; Kertzerand Hogan 1991;Lee andWang
1999), the line of reasoningthatfamily systemsinfluence
demographicbehaviorremainsintact.In the case presented
here, a slight differencebetween family systems in Sama
and Lho accountsfor distinctpopulationgrowthratesin
these two villages, a disparitythat is at least partiallyre-
sponsiblefor the recentdispute.
Withinthe contextof family systems it is necessaryto
considerparentaldecisionsregardingeach offspring'srole
within the family throughoutthe course of the household
developmentcycle-in otherwords,a familymanagement
strategy.The decisions relateto many crucialsocial and
economic matters,includingmarriageoptions, the inter-
generationaltransferof assets, and provisionsfor old-age
security.To a certainextentthesedecisionsinfluencefam-
ily and householdcompositionsafterchildrenhave been
born and are influenced,but certainlynot determined,by
culturalnormsandhousehold-leveldemographicrealities.
As Greenhalgh(1988) and Skinner(1997) have pointed
out, in additionto controllingfertility(birthcontrol),off-
springsets can be manipulatedby influencingsurvivorship
(child control)and by sendingcertainchildrenout of the
family or bringingothersin (child transfer).Examplesof
child control through infanticide (Ball and Hill 1996;
Chagnonet al. 1979;Scrimshaw1978) anddifferentialpa-
rentalinvestmentleadingto higher mortalityamong less
desired infants (Levine 1987; Scheper-Hughes 1997;
Shorter1977) andexamplesof child transferthroughfos-
terage(Bledsoe 1990, 1994; Greenhalgh1988) and aban-
donment (Johnsonet al. 1998; Kertzer 1993) are well-
documentedmethodsby which parentsdeal with family
sizes and compositions after children have been born.
These are all partof the family managementstrategy,and
as Bledsoe notes it is importantto highlight"people'sac-
tive efforts to achieve demographicoutcomesby restruc-
turinghouseholdcompositionsand influencingchildren's
obligations,ratherthanactingstrictlywithinthe biological
bounds or culturalnormsthat seem to be imposedupon
them"(1990:97-98). A considerationof social roles that
childrencan occupy as membersof a household,whether
in situ or living elsewhere,is an importantstep towardun-
derstandingthe importanceof the family management
strategy.This articlefocuses not so muchon child control
and transferbut, rather,on how parentsinfluence their
children'sobligationsto them by keeping some offspring
withinthe householdwhile sendingothersout. In this case
the majordecisionsinvolvewho amongone's childrencan
/ DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS OF A LAND DISPUTE 1097
or cannotmarry,choices thatareconstrainedby normsof
inheritanceand postmaritalresidence,as well as the need
to assuresecurityin old age.
In the contextof Tibetancommunities,the formationof
polyandrousunionsandmale monasticism(in some sense
analogousto fosterage)arebothoptionswithinthe family
managementstrategythatcan help achievehouseholdsus-
tainabilityover time by removingsome sons from inheri-
tance potential(monks)and condensingthe othersinto a
single inheritingblock in orderto avoid excessive parti-
tioningof land and herds(Goldstein1976; Levine 1988).
Ratherthanfocusingon polyandry,as mostanalysesof Ti-
betan societies tend to do, in this study I consider the
demographicimplicationsof femalecelibacy.Specifically,
the focal pointis the practiceof convertingdaughtersinto
nonmarrying,celibatenunsin an effortto retainfemalela-
bor within the natal household-a family management
strategythatis commonin Samabutnot in Lho.At the ag-
gregatelevel this strategyactsas a restrainton fertilityand
populationgrowth,as the data will reveal. Because, ac-
cording to parents,a primarymotivationof converting
daughtersto nunsrelatesto old-agesecurityissues, the re-
sultantcurbingof fertilityis an unintendedconsequenceof
the family managementstrategy,which leads us to the is-
sue of populationregulation.
Wood asks the question,"Isthe growthof preindustrial
populations'regulated'in any meaningfulsense of the
word?"(1998:100).Malthus(see 1933)broachedthe issue
long ago in his discussionof "preventivechecks"on popu-
lationgrowth.He viewedsocioculturalmechanismsto bal-
ance a populationwith its resourcebase such as delayed
age at marriageas farpreferableto "positivechecks"such
as famineandplaguesinducedby rapidpopulationgrowth.
Preventivechecks on populationgrowthhave long been a
populartopic of inquiry.Studiesof marriagepatternsand
family systems in historicalpopulations(e.g., Lee and
Campbell1997;Netting1981)andanthropological studies
of small-scalepopulations(e.g.,Chagnon1975;Hem 1992;
Levine 1988; Wiley 1998) have revealedan arrayof eco-
logical variables,biologicalfactors,andhumanbehavioral
mechanismsthatact to inhibitfertilityand maintaina bal-
ance betweenpopulationsandresources.Yet the question
has seldombeenaskedwhethersuchpreventivechecksare
intendedto havetheeffectof limitingpopulationgrowthor
merely representan inadvertentresult of cumulativebe-
havior.
Poppernoted long ago that a primarytask of research
shouldbe to analyze"theunintendedsocial repercussions
of intentionalhumanactions"because "an action which
proceedspreciselyaccordingto intentiondoes not createa
problemfor social science"(1985:352). Numerouscases
have beendocumentedwherebystate-or community-level
administrativepolicies, usually having somethingto do
with taxation and common resource allocation, have a
1098 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * VOL. 103, NO. 4 * DECEMBER2001
directbearingon populationgrowthby influencinghouse-
hold formationprocesses, marriagetiming, and levels of
permanent celibacy (e.g., Goldstein 1971b; McNicoll
1975; Netting 1981; Vasey 1996; Wrigley and Schofield
1981). Yet rarelyis this issue addressedat the level of the
conjugalfamily, the locus of decision makingfor those
who areresponsiblefor andbeartheprimaryconsequences
of reproductivedecisions (for theoreticalviews on repro-
duction,see Carter1995;Greenhalgh1995).Nevertheless,
numerousscholars admit the possibility that population
regulationis an unintendedconsequenceof social prac-
tices. In an effortto constructa more"ecologicaldemogra-
phy," Low et al. argue that "population'regulation'is
likely to be almost universallythe incidentaloutcomeof
individuals responding to available resources, whether
consciouslyor not" (1992:20, emphasisadded).Further-
more,on historicalpopulationprocessesin Iceland,Vasey
writes,"Itreatregulationhereas a compensatoryresponse
of mortality,fertility,or bothto changingpopulationpres-
sure, whether or not the actors intend to exercise contro'l
(1996:366, emphasisadded). Finally, while commenting
on the decline of groupselection as an analyticaltool for
understandingpopulationregulationin human societies,
Wood states,"If groupselectionis unimportant, then it is
very unlikely that special behavioral and institutional
mechanismshave evolved in order to restrainpopulation
growthor regulatepopulationsize. But thatdoes not mean
thatfactorsdo notexist thathavethateffect,even if it is not
the reasonfor theirexistence"(1998:101).
In this articlethe unintendedconsequencesof human
actionswill be addresseddirectlyby lookingat contrasting
populationprocessesin two villages thatareclosely allied
throughsocial, cultural,linguistic,and economic connec-
tions.The case of SamaandLho illustrateshow individual
decisions made withinthe contextof family systemsmay
leadto inadvertent(butnot necessarilyunappreciated) out-
comes at the communitylevel, such as restrictingfertility
andconsequentlyhinderingpopulationgrowth.My analy-
sis centerson how long-termparentalstrategiesof family
managementcan result in demographicstability,despite
the fact thatthe primarymotivationshave littleif anything
to do withpopulationregulation.
Economic Insecurity and the Demise of
Trans-Himalayan Trade
The highlandvillages of Sama (elevation3,350 meters,
population460) andLho (elevation3,180 meters,popula-
tion 394) are the principalvillages of Nubri,a valley that
comprisesthe highestreachesof the BuriRiverin Gorkha
District, north-centralNepal. Positionedon the southern
slope of the Himalayas,the area is ecologically distinct
fromthe aridplateauon the northernside of the mountains
where the rain shadow effect makes vegetation sparse.
Adequate rainfall and careful managementpracticesin
Nubripermitthe maintenanceof some of Nepal'sbestpre-
servedforests(Hetts1996).
Politically,Nubriis dividedinto two Village Develop-
ment Committees:Sama (Sama and Samdo villages) and
Lho (Li, Sho, and Lho villages).1Tibetanhistoricaldocu-
mentsprovideevidencethatthe areamayhavebeensettled
as early as the thirteenthcenturywhen it was claimedby
Gungtang(Gung-thang),2 a small kingdomthatexistedin
southernTibetuntil 1620 (Tshe-dbangNor-bu 1990).An-
other early source suggests that the original inhabitants
were non-Tibetan,for a famouseleventh-centuryTibetan
yogi referredto Nubri as an "unculturedrealm of dark-
ness" (mtha'-'khob mun-pa'i smag-rum) and to its inhabi-
tants as "bovines"(dud-'gro)and "nonhumans"(mi-ma-
yin) (Mi-la Ras-pa 1985:67b-68a).By the late fourteenth
centuryTibetanwas spokenin the upperpartof the valley
(Rgod-ldem1983:2a).Tax documentscompiledin 1830
place Nubri within Tibet's Rdzong-dga'District(Lcags-
stag zhib-gzhung1989),yet the valley was definitelya part
of Nepalby 1861 (Montgomerie1868),suggestingthatpo-
litical affiliationtransferredfollowing the 1856 war be-
tween TibetandNepal.The currentpopulationis madeup
of Tibetans,who migratedacrossthe Himalayasin several
waves,andGhales,3who migratedfromareasof lowerele-
vationat undetermined dates.Basedon linguisticevidence
andthe historicalsources,it is reasonableto assumethatan
initialwave of Ghalesettlerswas culturallysubsumedby
the morenumerousTibetanmigrants.
The inhabitantsof Nubripursuethe typicalTibetaneco-
nomic triadthat combines subsistencefarming,herding,
andtrade,a subsistencestrategythathasbeenreferredto in
comparativestudies as Alpenwirtschaft("alpine econ-
omy") and involves the seasonalexploitationof vertical
zones, communalcontrolover pastures,individualcontrol
over farmlandandhayingfields, andthe regulationby so-
cial institutionsof movementsover spaceandtime (Guillet
1983; Orlove and Guillet 1985; Rhoadesand Thompson
1975). Nubriresidentsfit Netting's (1993) descriptionof
intensivefarmingsmallholders.They continuouslyculti-
vate each plot of land (no fallow period) and carefully
managethe soil throughthe creationof naturalfertilizers
(leaf base and bovine manure),annualcrop rotation,deep
tillage with the aid of animaltraction,and intercropping
(barleywith turnipsin Samaand Lho; corn with beansin
Lho). Householdsarethe primaryunitsof production,and
most have securerightsto arablelandandproductivepas-
tures.Both villageshave long been incorporatedinto state
structures(Tibet until the mid-nineteenthcentury,Nepal
since then) and maintaininternationalexchangerelations
(trans-Himalayan trade with Tibet, currentlyan autono-
mousregionof China).
Very few householdsproducesufficientgrainto sustain
themselves throughoutan entire year (McEacher et al.
1995:49).In the past,the food deficit was offset by trade.
BorderingTibet,Nubriresidentswere in a primeposition
 CHILDS /
to be middlemen in the lucrative trans-Himalayanex-
change networks.Grains such as rice and millet flowed
from the lower elevationGhalecommunitiesto Babuk,a
regulatedtradecenterabove Samaon the Nepaleseside of
the border,where they were exchangedfor Tibetansalt,
sheep, and wool. The situationwould not last, for in the
1960s the balanceof tradeshifteddramaticallybecauseof
a combinationof the Chineseoccupationof Tibet,with its
concomitantinfrastructural improvementsand restrictive
regulations on trade, and the increasein tradebetweenNe-
pal and India facilitated by new roadnetworks(cf. Fisher
1986; Fiirer-Haimendorf 1975; van Spengen 2000). To-
day, rice is trucked to the TibetanPlateaufrom mainland
China, and Indian iodized salt is readily available and
cheaper than Tibetan salt for Nepaleselowlanders.To fur-
thercomplicatematters,the currentlydiminishedvolume
of tradeis periodicallyimpededby borderclosures.One
such closure occurredin 1996 following an outbreakof
hoof-and-mouthdisease among Nubri's bovine popula-
tion. Nubridwellers still maintain,"If we don't trade,we
starve,"yet tradecan no longerbe countedon as a reliable
household-leveleconomicsupplement.4
In responseto chronicfood shortagesandtradeinsecu-
rity, Lho residentsdecided to clear the forest at Shala in
1985 and convert the land for agrarianpurposes.There
were, however, some obstacles.For one, GorkhaDistrict
governmentofficials refusedto grantpermissionto clear
the land,a decisionthatwas in line with the national-level
policy againstdeforestation.Furthermore, because of the
fact that there existed no formalline of demarcationbe-
tween Samaand Lho, andbecauseShalalies moreor less
equidistantfromthe two, the landin questionwas claimed
by both villages. Conflictshad not arisenin the past be-
cause forestresources(firewoodand constructiontimber)
at Shala were sufficientto satisfy the needs of both vil-
lages. Despite these obstacles,Lho residentsdivided the
land,allocatingaboutone-tenthof a hectareto eachhouse-
hold in the village.Householdscouldeithersell theirallot-
mentsto otherfamiliesor reducethe forestandcommence
plantingpotatoes.In all aboutten hectareswere cleared.
Repercussionssoon followed, including several violent
skirmisheswith Samaresidents.District-levelofficials in-
tervenedand devised a solutionthatemphasizesthe eco-
nomic interdependencethat has always existed between
thesevillages.Today,Samaresidentsmustpay a salttax to
Lho each year in exchangefor the rightto gatherwood at
Shala,and Lho residentsmust pay a cash tax on each bo-
vine thatis herdedaboveSamaeverysummer.Thedispute
is resolved,andShalais now recognizedas a partof Lho's
territory.
Lho residentsstatethatthe decisionto claim Shalawas
based on theirperceivedneed to increasefood production
in orderto feed a rapidlygrowingpopulation.Manypeople
expressed concern that their children would not have
DEMOGRAPHICDIMENSIONSOF A LAND DISPUTE 1099
enoughto eat in the future.To a certainextentthisfearcan
be attributedto the decliningrole of trans-Himalayantrade
in the local economy.However,placingsole responsibility
on exogenous economic factorscontributeslittle toward
determiningwhy it was Lho residents,andnot Samaresi-
dents,who claimedandclearedthe landat Shala.Afterall,
tradeinsecurityis a majorissue in bothvillages.
A comparisonof populationdensities(Sama,20.5 peo-
ple/hectare;Lho, 20.8 people/hectare)does not resolvethe
issue. Lho has a smallerpopulation,yet landholdingsper
householdare equal,seeminglytippingthe resourcescale
in favor of Lho because of the higher quality of their
fields.5One would expect that Sama residents,with their
higherpopulationand less productiveland, would be the
logical candidatesfor initiatingextensification.However,
bovines are a criticalaspect of the alpine economy, one
thatis closely rootedin culturalconceptionsof wealth.The
Tibetannounfor cattle (phyugs)is etymologicallyrelated
to the adjectivefor "wealthy"(phyug-po).Anotherterm
for cattle(nor)also bearsthe connotationof wealth("prop-
erty,""possessions").Thus, cattle are directlyassociated
withnotionsof prosperity.
To supportbovineherds,the criticalecologicalvariable
is not summerpastures,which are plentifulin Nubri,but
winterpasturesthatareclose to the village,have a reliable
watersource,andaresituatedon southern-facing slopes so
thatthe suncan quicklymelt snowfallandrevealthe grass
underneath.Lho residentsclaim that the people of Sama
are wealthierbecause of their comparativelyextensive
winterpasturesthatpermitthe maintenanceof largerbo-
vine herds.Thus, whereasthe land ratio favorsLho, the
bovine ratio (Sama, 2.5 bovines/person;Lho, 1.8 bo-
vines/person)favorsSama.
Onecannotconcludewhichvillagehada greaterneedto
convertShala from forest to farmlandbased on a simple
comparisonof resources.Because the people of Lho, and
not Sama, initiatedthe conflict by claimingthe disputed
land,otherfactorsmusthave been involved.Cohortfertil-
ity measures of women born between 1941 and 1950
(those who were completingor close to completingchild-
bearingin 1985) show higher aggregatefertilityin Lho
priorto the crisis.Althoughthe mereexistenceof a fertility
differentialis a good indicatorthat an elevated rate of
populationgrowthmayhave impelledthe residentsof Lho
to initiatethe landclaim, the morecompellingquestionis
why theseculturallysimilarvillagescouldexperiencesuch
distinctdemographicprocesses. To sort out the motiva-
tions behindthe land grabit is thereforenecessaryto ex-
aminethe demographicdata withinthe contextof family
systemsandfamilymanagementstrategies.
Marriage versus Celibacy
Contradictory attitudesexistin Tibetansocietiesregarding
the meritsof familylife versusreligiouscelibacy.Buddhist
1100 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, NO. 4 - DECEMBER
ANTHROPOLOGIST 2001
clergy consider marriage to be an obstacle to enlighten-
ment, for it entails a commitment to perpetuating worldly
suffering through procreation, an attitude evident in the
proverb "Whatis needed is the practice of the holy Dharma
[the teachings of the Buddha], what is not needed is a wife
for one's samsara [worldly suffering]" (Pemba 1996:40).
In contrast, another proverb proclaims: "A single wild ass
doesn't get water, a single man doesn't live life fully"
(Pemba 1996:7).
In Nubri there is a long-standing conflict between indi-
vidual desires to pursue the life of a recluse and family
pressures to remain economically active within the house-
hold. The religious aspirations of Tashi Dorje (Bkra-shis
Rdo-rje), an elderly marriedlama and the paternaluncle of
Sama's currenthead lama, illustrate this tension: "I wanted
to be a monk when I was young. Watching our father [for-
merly the head lama of the village] perform rituals, my
brothers, sisters, and our friends from the neighborhood
got the idea to act out our own religious ceremonies. Be-
hind our house was an overhanging rock. This was our
temple. When a group of children gathered there, we
would make offerings and recite prayers. All of the chil-
dren took part in our game." Eventually Tashi Dorje was
sent for religious trainingto a monastery in Tibet, where he
developed a desire to remain as a celibate monk. But his fa-
ther had another plan, namely, the perpetuationof the lama
lineage. Even though Tashi Dorje's elder brother would
become the village's head lama by virtue of primogeniture,
high mortality in the village necessitated that both brothers
marry in order to assure a successor. Tashi Dorje's desire
was subordinated to the need for the continuity of a bio-
logical descent lineage that can be traced back to the me-
dieval emperors of Tibet.
The tension between marriage and celibacy is not a new
phenomenon in Nubri, as illustrated by the following pas-
sages from the biography of Pema Dondub (Padma Don-
grub), a Nubri resident who was born in 1668. The ex-
cerpts record a conflict that arose several centuries ago
when Pema Dondub opted out of the householder's life in
favor of becoming a celibate cleric:
WhenI was 12 my father'sbrother,Uncle Tsetan,came to our
home and said to my father,"I need an adoptedson andhave
selected this middleboy of yours."I replied,"I will not go, I
want to practicereligion."Then fathersaid to me, "Youmust
go to Uncle Tsetan'shome. If you do not go, you will not re-
ceive any inheritanceof fields and animals."Becausemy un-
cle was an influentialmanwithmanypossessions,I was pow-
erlessto refuse.
One day I heardmy uncle say, 'That nephew of mine is
now 15 yearsold. He is becominga matureman,so it is nec-
essary to find him a wife." Hearingthis plan, I ran away, re-
solved not to engage in such worldly activities.I would not
live in the drearyworldof sufferinglike he does. I would not
take a wife. When Uncle Tsetan finally caught up with me
and heard my point of view, he demanded,"Whatare you
saying?"I repeatedmy vow, and he said, "Well then, if you
do not become a householder,who will receive my inheri-
tance?I have no son of my own to receivethe estate."
As a youthI worereligiousclothingbecausethe desirewas
strongwithin me to lead a life of religion.I recalledplaying
the lama as a child. All of my friends,both boys and girls,
came to receive offeringsfrom me while I sat on a throne.
Now, my parentswerean obstacleto my desireto practicere-
ligion. I returnedhome andstayedfor a few days. Fathercon-
frontedme and said it was time to returnto Uncle Tsetan.I
declared,"Iwon't go! Doing so would go againstmy inclina-
tion."... Fatherthenstated,"Becauseyou area son withouta
heart,you areno longera residentof this house. If you do not
acceptuncle's inheritance,you will receive nothingfrom the
hands of your own parents,not even cups to drinkfrom or
platesto eat from."Thenhe screamed,"Getout of here!"I de-
partedfeeling deep remorse.[PadmaDon-grub 1979:2b-6a,
my translation]
The intergenerationaltransfer of assets is a critical con-
cern. But why, given that Pema Dondub had two other
brothers, were his parents so concerned about his insis-
tence on pursuing a religious lifestyle? The reason be-
comes evident in the following passage, illustrating the
fact that children represent old-age security for parents in
Nubri. Pema Dondub succeeded in his quest to live the life
of an unmarriedrecluse, but in the meantime his two broth-
ers died, leaving his parents in a bind. On numerous occa-
sions they tried to convince their son to come back to the
village but to no avail. One of Pema D6ndub's last encoun-
ters with his old mother and father is related in the follow-
ing passage:
Whenmy two elderlyparentscame to visit [my meditationre-
treat],they stood outside of the cloth door and wept. "Son,
come and look at us two old folks with bad karma!"A single
tearfell frommy eye. I saidto my old parents,"Do not speak
like this.Listento me.... As for me, yourson, I have no wish
but to practicereligion.... My venerablemotherand father,
spin your prayerwheels. Thereis no truesubstanceto what-
ever you perceive.Nor is theresubstancein any thoughts.As
for me, I have no wish but to seek perfection.Do not suffer,
elderlyones,just spinyourprayerwheels.Even the walls that
makeup the houseandthe wealththataccumulateswithinare
impermanent.You may be emotionallyconnectedto the fam-
ily, but in witnessingtheirdeaths [i.e., their other two sons
who died as young adults]you see thatlife is naturallyimper-
manent.Do not suffer,elderlyones, spin your prayerwheels.
All sentientbeings aredestinedto die. Once born,thereis no
one who shall escape death. Suffering is the epitome of
worldlyexistence.In youryoungerdays it was acceptablenot
to practicemuch religion.But now, my parents,at this stage
of life you must continuouslyspin your prayerwheels....
My parents,set yourmindto the threejewels: the Buddha,his
teachings,and the communityof followers. Listen carefully
to whatI have said,andyou will no longersuffer."
My parentsgot up to leave. Fathersobbed,"So this is your
advice,my son? We can enduremorestoicallyif we can only
imaginethatwe arenot suffering?"Motheradded,"Whenthe
 CHILDS /
two of us old folks die, thereis nobody on whom our hopes
for the futurecan be placed.Your elder brotherand younger
brotherarebothdead,andthe house is abandoned.The court-
yardis abandoned.If we die, therewill undoubtedlybe suffer-
ing. My son, are your oaths so unwavering?"Motherand fa-
thercried while leaving. As for me, at this place of solitude,
becauseof the natureof everythingbeing impermanent, I con-
templatedlong and hardon the sufferingcaused by our ten-
dency to graspfor permanence.My parentscould not under-
stand the message I had imparted.[PadmaDon-grub 1979:
56b-57b, my translation]
At the present time most lay people in Nubri respect the
cloistered lifestyle of monks, yet they prefer to live as re-
productively active householders. Rarely do individuals
strike off on their own to become monks, for it is a decision
made for them when young by their parents. Marriages are
also arrangedby parents, the goals being to create or rein-
force social relationships with other families, to assure the
perpetuation of the family lineage, and to pass ownership
of family assets on to the next generation. The story of
Pema Dondub illustrates many of the concerns that still
arise today when individual desires and family aspirations
collide. In a society in which children are valued for the
support they give aging parents, the intergenerationaldis-
pute is bound to manifest when offspring strike off on their
own and leave the elderly to fend for themselves. The irony
is that one way to assure old-age security today in Sama is
precisely through religious celibacy. In this case it is not a
son who is made a monk but, rather, a daughter who be-
comes a nun-a practice that has discernible demographic
implications and will be dealt with below in the context of
household processes and family systems.
Family Systems and Family Management
Strategies in Nubri
Many have noted that family and household typologies
can be problematic (e.g., Fricke 1994; Hammel 1984;
Skinner 1997; Wilk 1991). By classifying families and
households according to a static typology, their inherent
processual natures are veiled (Wilk and Netting 1984), and
the roles of individuals within households are obscured
(Alter 1988:65). Furthermore, most demographic studies
fail to differentiate children within the household, assum-
ing that they somehow have the same utility to their par-
ents, a perspective that Bledsoe (1990, 1994) has criticized
by examining differential investments in children accord-
ing to gender, parity, and aptitude. These points are critical,
for without grasping how the household develops through
time, and without understandingthe potential roles that in-
dividuals can occupy within the household, it is difficult to
say anything meaningful about how the family system af-
fects demographic processes.
To remedy the situation Skinner's (1997) model of the
family system is adopted here. Using the conjugal unit
DEMOGRAPHICDIMENSIONSOF A LAND DISPUTE 1101
(CU), consisting of any two of husband/father, wife/
mother, and child(ren), as the point of departure, three
types of families are possible: the conjugal family consist-
ing of only a single CU, the stem family with two or more
CUs but no more than one per generation, and the joint
family containing two or more CUs with at least two being
in the same generation.6From a diachronic perspective the
conjugal system implies neolocal marriage, equal inheri-
tance among offspring (or among one gender) and the ab-
sence of succession per se, a usual sequence of coresiden-
tial arrangements whereby an extended period with
children is preceded and followed by the couple being
alone prior to children and as "empty nesters," that family
formation occurs with marriage,and that family extinction
occurs with the deaths of the marriedpartners.In the stem
system a spouse is brought in for only one offspring in
each generation, succession is to the child who has married
within the household, an unequal inheritance favors a sin-
gle heir, and an alternation occurs between conjugal and
stem phases. Finally, the joint system means that spouses
are brought in for each member of one gender, inheritance
is equal for the favored gender, succession is generally ab-
sent, the domestic cycle includes conjugal, stem, and joint
phases, and fissions into two or more families can occur
(Skinner 1997:54-63).
In Nubri the most basic terms for household and home
are drongba(grong-ba)andkyim(khyim).In the majority
of cases, all those who dwell under the same roof are mem-
bersof the same family(mizang[mi-bzang]),so the terms
drongba and mizang are nearly synonymous (see also Aziz
1978:29).Withinthehousehold,thekyimdak(khyim-bdag;
"master of the house" or "household head") is the person
who is responsible for each household's jural and eco-
nomic obligations in relation to the village.7
Ideally the household development cycle in Nubri is
characterized by oscillations between conjugal and stem
phases that inevitably result in the formation of multiple
conjugal households, each headed by a consanguineously
related kyimdak. The cycle can be summarized as the fol-
lowing sequence of events: First, spouses marry and begin
residing in the groom's natal home with his parents and
unmarried siblings (stem phase).8 Second, once their first
child is born (on averagethree years after marriage)the
young couple inheritsa portionof the groom's father's
land and bovines. The young couple is then expected to
build or renovateand move into a separatehome where
their own offspring set will develop (conjugal phase).
Third,alternationscommencebetweenstem and conjugal
phases as successive sons marryand bring home their
brides(conjugalto stem),who thenestablishseparateresi-
dences following the births of their own children (stem to
conjugal). Fourth, when the youngest son marrieshe inher-
its the parents' home. It is at this point that the family sys-
tems in Lho and Sama diverge. Parents in Sama commence
1102 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * VOL. 103, NO. 4 * DECEMBER2001
a final conjugalphaseby moving into a retirementhome,
usuallyat PemaCholinggompa (PadmaChos-glingdgon-
pa), the templecomplexjust outsideof the village.Parents
in Lho, on the otherhand,move into a smallhomeattached
to or in the immediatevicinity of theirformerhome now
occupiedby the youngestmarryingson.
Nubri's family system fits somewherebetween Skin-
ner's stem andjoint classifications,albeitthe end product
is severalconjugalfamilies.Even thoughall membersof a
single generation(males) can theoreticallymarryand in-
herit householdassets (characteristicof a joint system),
each son is expected to form an independenthousehold
priorto the subsequentson's marriage.Two conjugalunits
of the samegenerationareneversimultaneouslypresentin
the household.Therefore,Nubri representsa case of the
"hivingoff"variantof the stem system(Keyes 1975;Skin-
ner 1997).9
The process of partible inheritance and the estab-
lishmentof independenthouseholdsby sons raisetwo ma-
jor concernsfor parents.Firstof all, they must assurethe
orderlytransferof propertywithoutpartitioningan estate
to the pointof leavingchildrenwith insufficientresources
to maintaintheir own households.Furthermore,parents
mustbearin mindthattheirown physicalabilitiesarede-
clining and hence they will one day requireassistance.
Strategiesfor managingan offspringset throughlong-term
planningarecriticalwithrespectto bothof theseissues.
Polyandrycan reducethe excessive partitioningof es-
tates. Village regulationsin Nubri stipulatethat no more
than two brotherscan engage in such a union, unlike in
otherHimalayancommunitieswhereall brothersin a sin-
gle householdcan marrya common bride (see Goldstein
1976; Levine 1988; Schuler 1987). The logic behindthe
regulationin Nubrirelatesto the village tax system.Sim-
ply stated,the morehouseholdscreated,the largerthe tax
base to draw on for funding communal rituals (Childs
1998). Nevertheless, fraternalpolyandry is a common
practiceamongNubri'shouseholders,despitethe fact that
it occursat a low intensitycomparedwith thatin otherTi-
betansocieties.
Sendingsons outsidethe village to be monksis another
strategythatreducesestatepartitioning.The practiceeffec-
tively removes a potential claimant from his share of
householdresources.In the past many sons were sent to
study at monasteriesacrossthe borderin Tibet.Those no
longer exist, having been destroyedin the 1960s during
and priorto China'sCulturalRevolution.Since then, Ti-
betan refugees have reestablishednumerousmonasteries
in Kathmandu.At first these primarilydrew on the exile
community to fill their ranks. Recent demographic
changes involving sharplyreducedfertilityin the refugee
populationhaveresultedin a new trendwherebymostnew
recruitsnow come fromthe ethnicTibetancommunitiesof
the Himalayanborderlands.'? Incentivesto senda monkto
Kathmanduincludethe aforementionedreductionby one
of a household'sclaimantson heritableresourcesand,just
as importantly,the possibilitythathe will remitto the vil-
lage-dwellingparentscash obtainedfrom performingre-
ligious ceremoniesin the refugee communities.Once re-
moved from the village, monks rarely returnexcept to
visit.
Carefor the elderlyis the othermajorissue mentioned
above. Old age is consideredto be a stage of life that
shouldbe dedicatedto prayer,the purposebeing to posi-
tively influenceone's futurerebirththroughthe accumula-
tion of merit.We see this in PemaD6ndub'sexhortationto
his parentsto spin theirprayerwheels, a commonpractice
among elderlyTibetanswho are preparingfor deathand
transmigration to new lives. However,whereasage com-
mandsrespect,it also entailsa certaindegree of depend-
ency (Goldstein1980; Ortner1978). Elderlyfolks are es-
teemed for their experienceand religious devotion, yet
they areconsideredsomewhatof a burdenbecauseof their
infirmity.In the wordsof an agedinvalidfromSama,"Old
age is infernal,the young ones do not want us around.
They must feed theirown childrenbefore they feed us. I
amjust waitingto die."On the otherhand,neglectingeld-
erly parentsis frownedupon.Accordingto a householder
in Sama, "Childrenwho neglect theirparentswill be un-
able to receivetheirgratitude.It is a disgraceto the entire
community.We scold such individualsby saying, 'Your
parentshelpedyou when you were too young to go to the
toilet on your own. Now yourparentsneed help, and you
cannoteven give thema bit of food?Have you no shame?'
" Tensionsbetweeneconomicrealitiesand culturalideals
areevidentin the abovestatements.
Who do parentsin Sama consider to be best suited
among theirchildrento providesupportin old age? Not
marriedsons whose primaryobligationslie with theirown
developing families, and not unmarriedsons such as
monks who are usually sent to reside in monasterieslo-
catedin Kathmandu. Becausemarriageresultsin a transfer
of labor from a woman's natal householdto her marital
household,caringfor aging parentsby marrieddaughters
is in directcompetitionwiththeirdutiesto theirnew fami-
lies. Therefore,in Sama (but not Lho) people turnto un-
marrieddaughters,primarilynuns,to assureold-agesecu-
rity.Accordingto a Tibetanproverb,"If you wantto be a
servant,make your son a monk; if you want a servant,
make your daughtera nun"(Lopez 1998:211).This same
sentimentis often expressedby Sama laity and clerics
alike,who stateunequivocallythata majorreasonfor mak-
ing a daughtera nunis to assurea caretakerin old age. All
the nuns whom I interviewedin Sama concurredthatthe
life-coursedecisionwas madeby theirparents.
Cultural rationales behind this family management
strategyarecompelling.One sureway to gaina substantial
stock of religiousmeritis to donatea child to the religious
order.Doing so bringssodey (bsod-lde;"good fortune")
and jinlab (sbyin-rlabs;"blessing")to the daughter,the
 CHILDS / DEMOGRAPHICDIMENSIONSOF A LAND DISPUTE 1103

parents,and the entirecommunity.Strongsocial stigmas Table 1. Comparisonof monk and nun populations
associatedwith a nun's engagementin sexual activities in Sama and Lho.
help assurethat such women rarelyrevertto the house-
holderlifestyle. MonksandNuns MonksandNuns All Monks and
in Villageas %of Elsewhereas %of Nuns as % of
Female religiouspractitionersin Tibetansocieties gen-
Male/Female Male/Female Male/Female
erallyhave low statuscomparedwith male practitioners, a
Populations Populations Populations
bias that is to an extent rooted in Buddhistphilosophy
Sama 4.8% 14.4% 19.2%
(Campbell1996;Klein 1995).ManyTibetanmenconsider
Monks (n = 13) (n = 38) (n = 51)
nuns to be morally lax, emotionally unstable, and less
adeptat attainingspiritualprogressthantheirmale coun- Lho 1.7% 14.9% 16.6%
terparts(Havnevik1989:144-158). Samanunsoccupythe (n = 5) (n = 35) (n = 40)
lowest rankin the religioushierarchy.While marriedla- Sama 15.5% 3.4% 18.9%
mas and monksrecite from texts duringrituals(thereis a Nuns (n = 42) (n = 9) (n = 51)
directconnectionbetween literacyand religiousprestige) Lho 2.3% 4.6% 6.9%
and are seatedclose to the altar,nuns reciteprayersfrom (n = 4) (n = 11) (n = 15)
memoryandare relegatedto the backof the temple.They Source: Childs 1998.
are always served last, after all male participants,during
communalfestivalmeals.Furthermore, nunsneverpartake
in householdrites that are often dedicatedto the polha tions of thesetrendswill be detailedlater.Firstit is neces-
saryto explorethe reasonswhy sucha differencein family
(pho-lha),the protectivedeity of the patrilineage.
The life courseof a nunin Samagenerallyfollows a pat- managementstrategiesexists between villages that are
otherwiseso similar.
tern: she is consigned to her religious role while young
(generallyunderten yearsof age), resideswithinthe devel-
A Historical Basis for Demographic
opingnatalhouseholdduringwhichtime she helpscarefor
youngersiblings,relocatesto the templeretirementhome Heterogeneity
with the aging parentsafterher youngestbrothermarries
Religious practitionersin Nubri adhereto the Nying-
and takesover the natalhousehold,andfinallylives alone
mapa (Rnying-ma-pa;"AncientOnes") sect of Tibetan
in the templehome(whichshe owns) afterherparentspass Buddhism.One of the majordifferencesbetweenthe Ny-
away.The finalliving arrangement for theelderlyandtheir
ingmapa and the politically dominant Gelugpa school
nun daughtersmakessense accordingto local perceptions
(Dge-lugs-pa; "Virtuous Ones," headed by the Dalai
of physicalspace,for the templecomplexis conceivedof Lama)is thatthe formerpermitsclerics to marry,whereas
as a "religiousrealm"(chos-pa'iyul), whereasthe village the latterdoes not. Nubrihas long been a havenfor line-
is considereda "realmof worldlysuffering"(jig-rten-pa'i ages of married,householderlamas(sngags-pa)of theNy-
yul). Despite visible symbols of religious renunciation ingmapatradition,many of whom moved in from else-
(shavenheadsand red robes),the nunsof Samado not re- where.Such lamasnot only arepermittedto procreatebut
side in seclusionfrom the rest of the community.Rather, are expectedto do so in orderto perpetuatetheirlineages.
they remainvery active in the local economy, spending Successionworkson the basisof primogeniture, so thatthe
much of theirdays eithercaringfor elderlyparentsor as- eldestson inheritscontroloverthe lineage'stempleandas-
sisting brotherswith theirherdsand fields. Thus,restrict- sociated lands,usually situatedclose to if not withinthe
ing a daughterfrommarryingby convertingherinto a nun village.Thisprincipleof primogeniture (as opposedto par-
is an aspectof family managementdirectedat retainingla- tible inheritanceamongnonlamahouseholders)createsthe
bor withinthe householdand assuringthatparentsarenot potentialfor branchlineagesto form,as documentedelse-
neglectedin theirwaningyears. where in the Himalayas(Clarke1980a, 1980b).Younger
Similarto Samaparents,parentsin Lho sendmanysons sons in lamalineagesoftenmove on theirown initiativeor
to be monksin Kathmandu,yet rarelyaredaughtersdesig- areinvitedelsewhereto establishtempleswherenonecur-
natedto be nuns. In contrastto Sama children,sons and rently exists, a process that has happened repeatedly
daughters-in-laware the primarycaretakersof the elderly throughoutNubrihistory.
in Lho. Table 1 illustratesthe variationbetweenthe two Priorto the seventeenthcentury,Buddhistbeliefs,prac-
villages with respect to monk and nun populations.The tices, and social institutionswere not well entrenchedin
differenceis striking.Althoughthe proportionsof monks Nubri (Childs 1997). At the time there lived a lineage of
aresimilar,SamacreatesfarmorenunsthanLho.The data marriedlamaswho occupiedTradum(Spra-dun-rtse) and
show thatparentsin Samaexportmonksandretainnunsat Legtsey(Legs-rtse) monasteries on the northernside of the
home, indicatinga gendereddimensionto perceptionsof Himalayas and who held a landgrant thatincluded domin-
the utilityof religiouscelibacy.The demographicimplica- ion over Nubri.These lamas occupied a very significant
1104 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, NO. 4 * DECEMBER
ANTHROPOLOGIST 2001
position within the spiritual hierarchy of Tibet, for they
claimed a direct line of descent from Tibet's medieval em-
perors. Their claim was bolstered by a decree issued in
1661 by the fifth Dalai Lama (Aris 1975) and recognition
by an eminent eighteenth-century Tibetan historian (Tshe-
dbang Nor-bu 1974). Because of their connection with the
imperial family, the lama lineage is referred to as Ngadag
(Mnga'-bdag; "possessing power"), a term reserved for
those who have either a biological or a spiritual link (e.g.,
through reincarnation) with the medieval emperors of Ti-
bet.
According to senior members of Sama's lama lineage,
their ancestor who presided over Legtsey monastery dur-
ing the early seventeenth century had several sons, one of
whom migrated to Sama 13 generations ago. The reason
for his relocation across the Himalayas is unclear but may
be related to contemporaneous political events. At that
time Mongol armies were very active in Tibet in supportof
the politically ascendant Gelugpas. Members of the Nying-
mapa school believed that one of the Mongols' aims was to
destroy all vestiges of Tibet's old imperial lineage, for the
latter represented the leaders of an idealized Tibetan soci-
ety that formerly held sway over much of inner Asia.
Ngadag members therefore had ample reason to seek ref-
uge in "hidden valleys" (sbas-yul) situated in the relative
seclusion of the Himalayas (Childs 1999). One such hid-
den valley is found in Nubri.
Sama's lama lineage has perpetuated to this day. The
position of head lama of the community passes from father
to eldest son or from uncle to nephew in case no son is born
(as happened once in Sama). During the middle of the last
century the head lama had four sons. The eldest inherited
his father's throne, whereas the younger three were permit-
ted to establish collateral lineages in the village. Today
there are four lineages of marriedlamas in Sama, each rep-
resented by its senior male member.
For reasons that are not entirely clear Lho has no such
lineage of married lamas. Several abandoned villages
above Sama attest to the fact that the upper part of the val-
ley used to have a greater concentration of population than
lower down where Lho is situated, so perhaps the lamas
settled nearest to the economic focal point of the valley.
Another reason could be related to settlement patterns
found throughout the Himalayas whereby higher commu-
nities tend to be more Tibetan (or Tibetanized) in ethnicity,
religious affiliation, and socioeconomic practices. Three-
fourths of the current inhabitants of Sama belong to de-
scent lineages (rgyud-pa) that are Tibetan in origin, as op-
posed to one-half the residents of Lho. The balance
comprises members belonging to lineages of Ghale or
other origin. Regardless of the reasons, the presence of the
lineage in Sama and not in Lho helps account for the dif-
ference in the nun populations.
Lamas are a prerequisite for initiating females into their
social role as nuns. The economic incentive for lamas to do
so is rooted in the mandatory labor service ('u-lag) that
nuns incur through initiation. Every year until either the
lama dies or the nun becomes too infirm (usually the for-
mer, for lamas are older than their disciples) a nun is re-
quired to work for several days on tasks specified by her
lama. By training nuns a lama can significantly increase
his household's labor supply beyond the limits set by fertil-
ity and mortality within the family.
Lho must rely on Sama's lamas for the performance of
communal rituals and death ceremonies. Services are ren-
dered in exchange for cash or commodities. Technically
Sama's lamas could also initiate females from Lho, yet
such women are considered a bad risk because of their dis-
tant physical proximity. Calling on their labor at peak work
seasons is both impractical and unreliable, so there is little
economic incentive for the lamas of Sama to initiate nuns
from Lho.
Nuns also require a place to live. In the case of Sama,
nuns tend to reside at Pema Choling temple complex, only
a ten-minute walk from the village, from where they can
easily remain active in the local economy. Lho also has a
temple complex, Trong gompa (Krong dgon-pa), that was
founded about 50 years ago by a lama from Tibet. A few
elderly folks and one nun do live there, yet using Trong as
a retirementdestination is a recent phenomenon according
to current residents. The problem is that it is situated an
hour's walk away across difficult terrain, rendering it im-
practical to commute between temple and village on a
regularbasis. If nuns were expected to lead cloistered lives
of contemplation, the locale would be ideally suited to
their lifestyle. However, such is not the case with village-
based nuns who are valued primarily for their economic
contributions.
A third possibility for the differential is based on per-
ceived needs. It is possible that Lho residents are content
with their arrangementsfor elderly care and therefore see
no reason to create nuns. In a related vein, Lho has an im-
balanced sex ratio in the 0-19 age group (113 to 100) fa-
voring males. This is a possible indication of higher female
mortality, especially among infants and children, engen-
dered by "aggressive neglect" (see Levine 1987). Such dis-
crepancies are not uncommon in societies in which males
are valued more highly than females for their household
contributions (e.g., in India [Das Gupta 1987] and East
Asia [Goodkind 1996]). Therefore, it is likely that those fe-
males who do reach maturityin Lho are in higher demand
as spouses than as caretakersfor the elderly.
The above reasons help explain why Lho residents have
developed a system for elderly care whereby sons and their
wives (daughters-in-law) provide most of the support. In
contrast, the elderly in Sama rely on unmarrieddaughters
for support, a system made possible by the historical mi-
gration of a lama lineage from Tibet and the development
of a nearby temple complex that acts as a retirementdesti-
nation. Whether one system is more effective in catering to
 CHILDS /
the needs of the elderlyis beyondthe scope of this article,
for recentresearchshows how sucha comparisonrequires
detaileddata on old-age mortality(i.e., Alter et al. 1998).
Therefore,the next taskhereis to sortout the demographic
implicationsof these divergentfamily systems, specifi-
cally with regardto the side effect of populationgrowth.
Demographic Implications
SamaandLho bothexhibitthe characteristics of natural
fertilitypopulations,meaning that no stoppingmeasures
areemployedby couplesaftertheyhavereacheda targeted
numberof children(Wood 1990). This by no means im-
plies that women give birthto an unrestrictednumberof
children,for several interveningvariablesrelatingto the
proximate determinantsof fertility (Bongaarts 1978;
Wood 1990) such as birth seasonality and prolonged
breast-feedingact to limitbirths.Nevertheless,at thispoint
in time very few peopleexpressa need to limit theirfertil-
ity throughcontraception."A woman in Nubri typically
commenceschildbearinga couple of years aftermarriage
(first birth intervalis on averageabout three years) and
does notcease untilthe onsetof menopause,prematureste-
rility,or the deathof herspouse(s).
Table2 comparesbirthratesin SamaandLho.'2Fertility
in Lho is significantlyhigherthanthatin Sama,regardless
of whetherthe ratesareinfluencedby the populationstruc-
ture (i.e., the CrudeBirthRate), restrictedto the women
who are potentiallyfecund(i.e., the GeneralFertilityRate
and Total FertilityRate), or limitedto only those women
who are both marriedandin theirfecundyears and there-
fore most likely to be bearingchildren(i.e., the General
MaritalFertilityRate). Given the socioculturaland eco-
nomic similaritiesbetweenthese two villages, the differ-
ences are salient and somewhat unexpected.
The differencesin Table2 areprobablynot attributable
to ecological factorssuch as altitude(Beall 1983; Moore
1983), for Sama is only 170 metershigherthanLho. Nor
are nutritionalfactors likely responsible (Panter-Brick
1996), for the diets and consumptionpatternsin the two
villagesareso similar.Table3 indicatesthatthe difference
cannotbe accountedfor by socioculturalfactorssuch as a
significantly earlier age at marriageand the closely related
age at first birth or by demographic factors such as infant
mortality rates.'3 Instead, the fertility differential is most
Table 2. Comparisonof birthrates.
Sama Lho
FertilityMeasure
CrudeBirthRate 31 44
GeneralFertilityRate 148 180
Total FertilityRate 5.3 7.0
GeneralMaritalFertilityRate 264 332
Source: Childs 1998.
DEMOGRAPHICDIMENSIONSOF A LAND DISPUTE 1105
Table 3. Comparisonof marriageand infantmortality.
Measure Sama Lho
Female mean age at marriage 20.5 years 19.9 years
Mean age at first birth 23.7 years 22.8 years
Infantmortalityrate 229/1000 208/1000
(23%of live births)(21%of live births)
% of women aged 38% unmarried 25% unmarried
20-49 unmarried (n = 36) (n = 18)
Source: Childs 1998.
closely relatedto patternsof marriage.In Sama38 percent
of womenaged20-49 areunmarriedas opposedto 25 per-
centof theircounterparts in Lho.14
More women in Samathanin Lho are initiatedas nuns
and therebybarredfrom engagingin reproductiveactivi-
ties.15To begin estimatingthe consequenceof this trend,
Table 4 comparesTotal FertilityRates (TFRs) in Sama
and Lho. The first row shows the TFRs calculatedto in-
clude all females. The next row shows what the TFRs
wouldbe if celibatenunswere excludedfromthe popula-
tion. Excludingnuns has hardlyany effect on the ratefor
Lho (an increaseof 0.2 birthsper woman)but has a pro-
foundeffect on the ratefor Sama(an increaseof 1.2 births
perwoman).16
Intrinsicgrowthrates revealthat Sama's populationis
increasing(0.66 percentper year, doublingtime of 105
years)moreslowly thanLho's (1.48 percentperyear,dou-
bling time of 47 years).'7Table 5 comparesthe calculated
growth rates for each village and what the growth rates
would be if all nuns marriedand reproducedat the same
rateas theirhouseholdercounterparts. The intervillagedif-
ference in the intrinsicgrowth rates is 0.83 percentper
year.By excludingnunsfromthe sample,the differenceis
reducedto only 0.21 percentper year.Whereasthe figure
for Samajumpsby 0.70 percentwhen includingnuns,the
ratefor Lho increasesby only 0.09 percent.Simplystated,
a higherrate of nonmarriagein Sama resultsin a slower
pace of populationgrowth. In neithercase are the esti-
matedrates very high,'8 yet in a context of food scarcity
they certainlyhave the potentialto upset the balancebe-
tweenthe populationsandtheirresourcebases.
If all of Sama'snunshad marriedandreproducedat the
same rateas theirmarriedcounterparts, therewould have
been 27 additionalbirthsin Samafrom 1990to 1996.Tak-
ing infant mortalityinto account (229 per 1,000), this
would resultin an additional21 survivingchildrenin the
village, representinga 4.4 percentincreasein the de facto
population.If these numbersareextrapolatedover time, it
is clearthatSamaresidentswouldhavefarmoremouthsto
feed unless out-migrationor mortalityincreased.Clearly,
the family managementstrategyresultingin a high rateof
femalenonmarriageworksto restrainpopulationgrowthin
Sama.
1106 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, NO. 4 * DECEMBER
ANTHROPOLOGIST 2001
Table 4. Comparisonof Total FertilityRates (TFR).
Difference
Sama Lho betweenVillages
TFR 5.3 7.0 1.7
(includingnuns) births/womanbirths/woman births/woman
TFR 6.5 7.2 0.7
(excludingnuns) births/womanbirths/woman births/woman
Difference
within village 1.2 0.2
(effect of nuns) births/womanbirths/woman
Source: Childs 1998.
Comparisons and Conclusions
The disputebetweenSamaand Lho over Shalawas, in
part,drivenby demographicfactors.The argumentcan be
summarizedas follows: By the mid-1980ssome villagers
in Nubriperceiveda needto increasetheirfood production
in responseto the demiseof trans-Himalayan trade,a com-
ponentof the subsistencestrategythathadin the pastmore
thanoffset any shortfallsin the agropastoraleconomy.At
the time Lho's populationwas growingmorerapidlythan
Sama's, a trendthatwas (andstill is) in greatpartattribut-
able to differentialratesof femalenonmarriage.Therefore
the people of Lho seized on the opportunityof opening
new landfor agriculture,despitethe repercussionsthatfol-
lowed.
Demographicheterogeneityin a single settingis by no
means a unique revelation. For example, Kertzer and
Hogan (1989) uncovereddifferencesalong class lines in a
nineteenth-centuryItalian community, whereas Folmar
(1992) showshow castedistinctionscan accountfor demo-
graphic differentiationwithin a contemporaryNepalese
community.In the case of Nubri,class andcastearenotthe
issue. Rather,differencesin reproductiveoutcomesresult
from a variationin long-termparentalstrategiesaimedat
securingold-age care. Old-agesecurityconcernsmay in-
deed be linked with high individualfertility(see Nugent
1985), but at the aggregatelevel the provisionof elderly
care throughnuns keeps Sama's fertilityand population
growthin check.
For years anthropologistsand demographershave de-
bated the hypothesisthat the joint family system found
nearlyeverywherebuthistoricalEuropeis accountablefor
high fertility in preindustrialsocieties. Contrastingthe
Europeanfamily system,characterizedby late inheritance
that induces men and women to marryat advancedages
and preventsmany from marryingat all, with Asian sys-
tems that promoteearly and universalmarriagehas re-
sultedin the implicitassumptionthatpopulationgrowthis
restrainedby preventivechecksthatinducelow fertilityin
the formerand by positivechecks throughhigh mortality
in the latter (Das Gupta 1995). However, as more data
Table 5. Comparisonof intrinsicratesof naturalincrease(IRNI) and
doublingtimes.
Difference
Sama Lho betweenVillages
Actual IRNI 0.66% per year 1.48%per year 0.82% per year
Doubling time 105 years 47 years 58 years
IRNI if nuns marry 1.34 per year 1.57%per year 0.23% per year
Doubling time 52 years 44 years 8 years
Difference
within village 0.68% per year 0.09% per year
(effect of nuns) 53 years 3 years
Source: Childs 1998.
come to light,this perspectiveis failingto hold up to criti-
cal scrutinywith the revelationof fertilitycontrolwithin
marriagein some Asian societies (e.g., Das Gupta 1995;
Lee andWang 1999).Wheredoes Nubri,andin particular
Sama,fit intothisdebate?
Tibetansocietieshavelong beenviewed as an exception
to the "Asian"patternbecauseof polyandryandmale mo-
nasticism(Malthus1933;Turner1991), the resultof these
practicesbeing a deficitof marriageablemales and a con-
comitantsurplusof women who are unableto marry.As
for Nubri, marriageoccurs at relativelyyoung ages for
women (mean age of about 20), which is significantly
lower than in nineteenth-centuryEuropeanpopulations
such as Torbelin the Swiss Alps (Netting1981), Verviers
in Belgium(Alter 1988),andCasalecchioin Italy(Kertzer
andHogan1989)in whichwomendidnotmarryuntiltheir
mid-to late twenties.The meanage at marriagein Samais
similarto thatin partsof historicalChina(Lee andCamp-
bell 1997:84-90) but somewhathigherthanthatin Nepal
(16.4 years [Pradhamet al. 1997:81-83])andneighboring
parts of India (e.g., 18.0 years in Bihar [Ram et al.
1995:53]).Based on this level of comparison,Nubri re-
semblesthe Asian demographicexperiencemorethanthe
European.
The frequencyof nuptiality,however,revealsa picture
resemblingEurope far more than Asia.19The fact that
about20 percentof womenin Samanevermarryis anoma-
lous in South and East Asia. For example,more than 99
percentof womenin Biharmarryby the age of 30 (Ramet
al. 1995:54),andin moder Chinamarriageremainsnearly
universalfor women (Lee andWang 1999:68).Sama'sfe-
male marriagefrequencyis strikinglylow whencompared
with nationalfiguresfor Nepal showingthat98 percentof
women over age 30 have married(Pradhamet al. 1997:
79), yet it is more similarto the case in historicalEurope,
where female nonmarriagelevels rangedfrom around25
percentin nineteenth-century Iceland (Vasey 1996) and
postfamine Ireland (Guinnane1991)to about10 percentin
Germany at the turnof this century(Hajnal1965). Spin-
sterswerea commonfeatureof Europeansociety(Watkins
 CHILDS /
1984), yet they werenearlynonexistentin historicalAsian
societies such as China(Lee and Campbell1997) andJa-
pan (Corell 1984). Widespreadmarriageand the lack of
spinsters in China have historically been attributedto
skewed sex ratiosresultingfromhigherratesof femalein-
fant mortalityand outrightinfanticide(Lee andCampbell
1997; Lee and Wang 1999) and have been attributedin
moder timesto sex-selectiveabortions(CoaleandBanis-
ter 1994). In eithercase the resultis a shortageof brides
anda high demandfor marriageablewomen.No such sce-
narioexists in Sama,whereabortionis unknown(let alone
the meansfor prenatalsex determination)and infantmor-
tality for females is slightly less thanthatfor males.Lho,
on the otherhand,has a sex ratioimbalancestemmingin
partfroma higherlevel of femaleinfantmortalitythatmay
be directlyrelatedto the family system wherebythereare
fewer roles for womento occupy as celibatenuns.Hence,
womenarenot valuedas potentialprovidersof old-agese-
curityandmaybe subjectedto higherlevels of mortalityas
a result.
Like manypartsof historicalEurope,Samamaintainsa
low level of populationgrowthdue in partto the fact that
manywomennevermarry.Althoughthe demographicout-
comes are quite similar,the root causes embeddedwithin
the family systemare completelydifferent.In Europelate
marriageandnonmarriageareboth attributedto economic
necessity,for youngpeopledependedon the inheritanceof
landandotherresourcesin ruralsettings,andon prolonged
apprenticeshipsand years of toil in urbansettings,before
acquiringthe prerequisiteresourcesto startfamilies. Be-
queathalsto childrenwereoftendelayeduntilparentswere
too elderlyor infirmto managea farmon theirown, a situ-
ation that caused much intergenerational tension as evi-
dencedby the followingAustrianfolk song:
Father,whenya gonnagimmethe farm,
Father,whenya gonnasign it away?
My girl's beengrowingeveryday,
And single no longer wants to stay. [Berkner1972, cited in
Netting 1981:171]
Old-age securitywas often assuredthroughlegal con-
tracts that stipulatedeverythingfrom subsistenceallot-
mentsto whetheror not the retiredparentscould sit by the
fireplace(Gaunt1983). In the Swiss Alps, parentscould
retaina smallportionof landfor subsistenceandcouldalso
receive in exchangefor inheritancea set cash allowance
from their childrenand rights to reside within the house
(Netting 1981:172-174). Given the contractualnatureof
retirementand the potentialfor a lack of securityin old
age, it is no wonderthatparentsheld ontotheirassetsfor as
long as possible.
In contrast,inheritancein Nubrioccursat marriage,and
the partitioningof assets occursshortlythereafter.Parents
retaina portionof the landand animalsfor theirown sub-
sistenceuntilthe day they die. Thus,the natureandtiming
DEMOGRAPHICDIMENSIONSOF A LAND DISPUTE 1107
of intergenerationalwealthtransfersare no impedimentto
marriage, for the partitioningoccursin incrementsas each
successive son marries-a processthatcan take up to two
decades.To assureold-agesecurity,parentsin Samahave
a different strategy than in either historical Europe or Asia,
where sons and daughters-in-lawtend to be the primary
meansof support.Parentsin Samaretaina daughterwithin
the householdby makinghera nun.Herloyaltyto the natal
household is assured,on the one hand, throughcultural
prohibitionsagainstengagementin reproductiveactivities
and,on the otherhand,throughthe assurancethatshe will
inherita house at the templecomplexandthe landthather
parentsretainedfor theirown subsistence.
Althoughnot discusseddirectlyin much of the litera-
ture, the fact that many unmarriedchildrenin historical
Europeremainedwith theiraging parentsinsteadof emi-
gratingfromthe natalhouseholdis somewhatanalogousto
the situationof nuncaretakersin Nubri.Forexample,Net-
ting (1981:174)mentionsthatunmarriedadultsoftenlived
with theirparentsin T6rbel,while Guinnane's(1997:204)
dataon Irelandfrom 1911 show thatmorethanone-halfof
unmarried men and women aged 35-44 lived in their par-
ents' homes. Bourdieu'sstudy of the French village of
Bearn (see 1990) reveals an inheritancesystem that fa-
vored eldest sons, leaving few incentives for parents to
find matches for their younger sons. One option for
youngersons (i.e., those who did not inherit)was to forgo
marriage and remain as servants within their own families.
In essence, this meantthat "the younger son was, so to
speak, the structuralvictim-the socially designatedand
thereforeresignedvictimn-ofa systemthatplaceda whole
armouryof protectivedevicesaroundthe 'house,'a collec-
tive entityandan economicunit,or rather,a collectiveen-
tity definedby its economicunity"(Bourdieu1990:158).
Similarly,the nuns of Samacan be considered"structural
victims" of a family system that precludes girls with male
siblings from inheriting,that providesa role of religious
celibacyfor womenwithintheirnatalhouseholds,andthat
inducesparentsto rely on theirchildrenin old age follow-
ing the bequeathalof assetsto thosesons who marry.
Cain and McNicoll (1988) argue that maritalfertility
will not declineas long as the familyremainsa prominent
welfare institution.Indiais one setting where high birth
rateshave been closely associatedwith concernsover old-
age security(Cain 1981, 1991; Dharmalingam1994; but
see Vlassoff 1990,1991). Thethesismaybe validatthe in-
dividual level, but what about aggregatefertility?Sama
presentsus witha situationin whichconcernsoverold-age
securityactuallymoderatefertilityat the communitylevel.
The end resultis similarto the historicalEuropeanexperi-
ence (a high incidenceof nonmarriagecontributingto low
populationgrowth)butfor reasonsthatare entirelydiffer-
ent.The unintendedconsequenceatthe communitylevel is
a restrainton fertilityand populationgrowth in contrast
 1108 AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST
* VOL. 103, NO. 4 * DECEMBER
with those at Lho, where few nuns reside and where popu-
lation growth has led to a need to increase agriculturalpro-
duction-a need that resulted in the intervillage conflict
described at the beginning of this article.
Low population growth in Sama is a direct outcome of
conscious choices made by parents whose motivations
center on the need to assure that a caretaker will be avail-
able in their waning years. In this case preventive checks
have little if anything to do with a conscious strategy to
limit population growth.
Notes
Acknowledgments. Research carried out in Nubri during
1995 and 1997 was facilitatedthroughgrantsfrom Fulbright-
Hays and Wenner-Gren.I would like to thankGeorge Alter,
RobertAttenborough,Emilio Moran,RichardWilk, and three
anonymous reviewers for AmericanAnthropologistfor pro-
viding insightful critiques of earlier versions of this article.
My colleagues HeatherBooth, AdrianHayes, TerryHull, and
Zhongwei Zhao of the DemographyProgramat The Austra-
lian National University also contributedhelpful comments
and clarifications,especially regardingthe demographicas-
pects of the article. Finally, I would like to acknowledgethe
steadfastsupportof Tashi Dondub.None of the datacontained
hereincould have been obtainedwithouthis collaborationand
guidance.
1. Village Development Committees (VDCs) are subdis-
trict administrativeunits that are furtherdivided into wards
consisting of about20 householdseach. Thereare 69 VDCs in
the districtof Gorkha.Each has a representativein the district
government.
2. Tibetanhas been writtenfor over 1,300 years. To facili-
tate both readabilityand accuracyI use approximatetranscrip-
tions of Tibetanpersonalnames and place-names,followed at
theirfirst occurrencesby propertransliterations.
3. Ghales are a branchof the Gurungethnic group that is
concentratedin the middle hills of centralNepal. Ghalesspeak
a Tibeto-Burmanlanguage,considerthemselvesto have origi-
natedin Tibet (Pignede 1993), and have maintainedsocial and
economic contactswith Tibetansfor severalcenturies.It is not
unprecedentedfor Ghales who inhabithighlandvalleys of Ne-
pal to become culturallyaffiliated with Tibetansthroughen-
during contacts (e.g., the residents of Nyishang; see van
Spengen 2000).
4. Nubri residentsinterpretthe recent demise of tradenet-
works as an indicationthatthe world system is in an advanced
stage of decay. Accordingto Buddhisttheology, the earthand
its inhabitantsprogress through continual cycles of creation
anddestruction.A golden age characterizedby humanlongev-
ity and social cohesion graduallydegeneratesas life expectan-
cies ebb and society disintegrates.The end result is total de-
structionfollowed by regenerationas a new cycle commences
(Nattier 1991). In termsof currency,the fact thatgold and sil-
ver cash has given way to iron coins and then papermoney in
recent decades is interpretedby Nubri residents as a visible
manifestationof the cyclical decline andthe onslaughtof a de-
generateera.
2001
5. Microclimaticconditions mean that Sama's fields yield
a single crop per year, compared with two in Lho. Further-
more, Lho's ratio of measuresof grain harvestedper measure
sown is 10-12 to 1, comparedwith 6-10 to 1 in Sama.Sama's
slightly higher altitudeis also enough to preventthe growing
of corn and beans, which thrivein Lho. The differencein land
quality is reflected in land prices-six times higher in Lho
thanin Sama.
6. The termfamily has become problematicwithin anthro-
pology because it is so difficult to define in a cross-cultural
perspective.In this model, it is clear that Skinneruses family
in the limited sense of people who are biologically relatedand
coresident.
7. The kyimdakis almost always a male, with the follow-
ing exceptions:(1) the householdis headedby a widow or di-
vorcee whose children are still young, (2) the household is
headed by an unmarriedwoman (i.e., nun or spinster) who
may or may not have children,or (3) the householdis headed
by a womanwho has a matrilocallyresidenthusband(referred
to as a magpa [mag-pa] in the local vernacular).
8. Althoughpatrilocalresidenceis the norm,all threetypes
of postmarital residence (patrilocality, matrilocality, and
neolocality) are options in Sama. Most marriagesresultin the
bridemoving in with the groom, whetherin his parent'shouse
(patrilocality)or in a new home of their own (neolocality).In
the cases in which parentslack sons, they bequeaththeirpos-
sessions to a daughter,and the daughter'shusbandwill be a
magpa(matrilocallyresidentson-in-law).
9. Stem family systems are very common in the Himalayan
region. For example, althoughthe majorityof households in
the Tamang village of Timling are conjugal, Fricke (1994:
152) argues that the system actually operates accordingto a
stem principlebecause elderly parentsreside until death with
a marriedson. Similarly,among the Nyinba of westernNepal
the family system is consideredstem because brotherstake a
single bride and live in the same home with their parents
(Levine 1988). Goldstein(e.g., 1971a:71) has emphasizedthe
stem family as a culturalnormamongTibetans.
10. Data from the 1998 survey of Tibetanrefugees living
in India and Nepal reveal below-replacementfertility levels
for 1997-98 (Planning Council 2000:24-28). Furthermore,
several lamas and monks in Kathmanduhave informed me
that,in recentyears, therehas been a large increasein the per-
centageof monksin refugeemonasterieswho come fromrural
areas of Nepal. No firm data are availableto confirmthis an-
ecdotalevidence.
11. I was unable to uncover data on indigenous forms of
birth control in Nubri similar to those that have been docu-
mented in other Tibetan communities (Norberg-Hodgewith
Russell 1994). People in Nubri claim no awarenessof such
measures,yet it is possible that women guardedtheir knowl-
edge from a male interviewer.No health facilities exist in the
entire valley for disseminatingmodern contraceptives.Only
one man in the lower partof the valley had a vasectomy per-
formedin Kathmandurecently,and only one woman in Sama
and Lho is known to have used an injectable contraceptive
while she and her husbandwere living in Kathmandu.
12. In orderto minimize the effects of stochasticvariation
(a criticalissue when workingwith small populations)the fer-
tility data for Sama and Lho representannualaveragesover a
 CHILDS /
seven-yearperiod (1990-96). The CrudeBirth Rate (CBR) is
a simple ratio of birthsin a given year per 1,000 people. As it
includes the entire population regardless of sex or age, the
CBR has limited use because it is not a measure of fertility
among those who are at risk of giving birth.The GeneralFer-
tility Rate (GFR) is a ratioof birthsper 1,000 women of repro-
ductive age (15-49), so it controls for the age and sex struc-
ture of the population. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
representshow many children a woman can expect to bear
throughouther reproductivecareergiven currentage-specific
fertility rates. In other words, Sama's TFR of 5.3 means that,
given today's fertility rates, women now reaching their fif-
teenth birthdayscan expect to give birthto five or more chil-
dren on average. Because all women are includedin this cal-
culation, a high rate of nonmarriagemoderates the overall
measure.Finally, the GeneralMaritalFertilityRate is similar
to the GFR except that births are divided by the numberof
marriedwomen, therebyprovidinga good indicatorof fertility
within marriageby controlling for nonmarriage.To set the
datain a nationalcontext, Nepal's 1996 rateswere as follows:
CBR = 37, GFR = 167, and TFR = 4.6 (Pradhamet al. 1997).
13. If infant mortality rates were higher in Lho than in
Sama, this could theoreticallyaccount for the fertility differ-
ences. Prolongedbreast-feedingis one of the primarymeans
for achieving long birthintervalsin Nubri.More infantdeaths
could result in higher fertility by shorteningthe durationof
lactationalamenorrhea(in Sama birthintervalsare 34 months
following a child that survives but only 21 months following
an infant death). However, the question is moot because the
ratesare nearlyidentical.
14. The differenceis not accountedfor by differentratesof
divorce and widowhood: 30 percent of the cohort in Sama
have never married,compared with only 19 percent in Lho.
Nuns accountfor 19 percentof the cohortin Sama(n = 18) but
only 4 percentin Lho (n = 3).
15. Nuns who do become pregnantare expelled from the
order,as they are consideredto be highly immoralfor break-
ing theirreligious vows and too impuredue to intercourseand
childbirthto carryon as religious practitioners.In some cases,
they move out of the communityto avoid social reprobation.
16. When nuns are removedfrom the samplethereis still a
differentialof 0.7 births/woman,meaningthatmaritalfertility
is higher in Lho. Therefore, religious celibacy does not ac-
count for the entire fertility gap. One possible explanationfor
this phenomenon is that Lho has experienced a recent baby
boom since opening the land at Shala. Shala is situateda two-
hour walk away from Lho, so families have built temporary
residencestherefor the peak work season. Duringthe summer
most households now exploit three differentecological zones
(as opposed to two in the past): the high summerpasturesfor
grazing, the village fields, and the new fields at Shala. Lho's
householdershave therebycreateda greaterdemandfor labor,
a requirementthat may be reflected in their reproductivebe-
havior(cf. Netting 1993).
Anotherpossible explanationconcerns the relationshipbe-
tween old-age security concerns and fertility (Nugent 1985).
Perhapssons in Lho are not consideredto be a reliablesource
of support,therebyproviding an incentive for parentsto have
many sons who can sharethe burdenof supportingthemin old
DEMOGRAPHICDIMENSIONSOF A LAND DISPUTE 1109
age. In Sama old-age security is assuredonce a daughterhas
survivedpast infancy and has been convertedinto a nun. Par-
ents in Lho may thereforeperceive a greaterneed for children
and act accordingly.
17. One can derive an estimate for the rate of naturalin-
crease (the intrinsicgrowthrate) with the aid of model life ta-
bles (Shryockand Siegel 1976:313-318). Using mortalitypat-
terns as guidelines (high rates in infancy, childhood, and old
age), Coale and Demeny's South Level 6 model life table
(1983:386) was found to best representthe demographicsitu-
ationin Nubri.
18. China has resortedto coercive measuresto achieve a
growth rate similar to Lho's (1.53 percent per year in
1985-90, doublingtime of 45.3 years [UnitedNations 1995]),
whereas Sama's rate is only slightly higher than those found
in low-fertility countries such as France (0.55 percent per
year, doubling time of 126 years), Japan (0.44 percent per
year, doubling time of 158 years), and Norway (0.42 percent
per year, doubling time of 165 years) (United Nations 1995).
Both villages are experiencing rates well under Nepal's na-
tional average(2.50 percentper year in 1995-2000, doubling
time of 27.7 years [United Nations 1995]), yet they compare
favorablywith otherHimalayanTibetancommunitiesin west-
ern Nepal (1.0-1.5 percentper year for the Nyinba, doubling
time of between 46 and 69 years [Levine 1988:241]; and 2.1
percentper year in Limi, doublingtime of 31 years [Goldstein
1981]).
19. According to Coale's index of marriage(a weighted
average of the proportionsof marriedwomen), nuptialityin
SamaandLho is still somewhathigherthanlevels in historical
Europeanpopulations. The levels in Sama (.603) and Lho
(.695) are above those found in northernEurope during the
1870s and 1880s, for example, in Englandand Wales (.504),
Germany (.467), and Switzerland (.411) (see Coale and
Treadway1986:48-54).
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