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PART II
I. OCA vs Sardillo
II. Lomondot vs Balidong
III. Rules 6-9
IV. RULES 10-14

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARDILLO

401 SCRA 583
TOPIC: Jurisdiction
FACTS: Judge Sardido decided a case involving Falsification of Documents. Since one of the defendants in a case is an RTC judge, he
removed the name of the RTC judge from the roster of the defendants. Judge Sardido's basis for removing the name of the RTC judge is
Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89. The Circular says that "the IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, all cases
involving judges of lower courts and justices xxx"
In the case, Judge Sardido referred the criminal aspect together with the administrative aspect to the SC.

ISSUE: whether the criminal aspect of the case is cognizable by the SC.

RULING: No. Only the administrative aspect of the case is what must be forwarded to the Supreme Court. The trial courts retain jurisdiction
to try the criminal aspect of a case involving judges. SC Circular 3-89 refers to administrative cases not to criminal cases.

LOMONDOT VS. BALINDONG

762 SCRA 494

FACTS: In 1991, Omaira and Lomondot filed with SDC Marawi City a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for
mandatory injunction and TRO against respondents Pangandamun and Diaca, claiming they are the owners by succession of parcel of
land on which Pangandamun and Diaca illegally entered and encroached 100 sqm and 200 sqm respectively. The SDC in 2005 rendered a
decision declaring plaintiffs owner of the subject land and ordering defendants to vacate portions illegally encroached. Respondents
appealed with SC but the latter dismissed the petition. The SDC Decision became final and executory on October 31, 2007 and an entry of
judgment was subsequently made. Petitioners filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of demolition which the
SDC granted. However, after hearing, the SDC issued a resolution that the motion for issuance of a Writ of Demolition should be held in
abeyance and provided that while the decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are
instances when a Writ of Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of
Execution. The fact that the defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution and
their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs is, according to SDC, a supervening event. After attempts for settlement
failed, plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special order to destroy, demolish or
remove defendants' houses, considering their claim that they no longer encroach any portion of plaintiffs land. Motion for issuance of a writ
of demolition was denied. Petitioners filed with the CA-CDO petition for certiorari assailing the Orders issued by the SDC. The CA
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction saying that, under RA 9054, it is the Sharia Appellate Court (SAC) which shall exercise
jurisdiction over petition for certiorari; that, however, since SAC has not yet been organized, it cannot take cognizance of the case as it
emanates from the Sharia Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, over which it can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under Republic Act No. 9054, the Shari'a Appellate
Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over decisions of SDC.
2. Whether or not the fact that the defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of
Execution and their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs is a supervening event that can hold the writ of
execution in abeyance.

HELD:
1. YES. In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, we stated that: x x x [t]he Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the
appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Sharia Appellate Court shall have been
organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special
Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices. Notably, Tomawis case was
decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on April 27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition,
i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow the Tomawis ruling.

NO. The SDC Decision dated January31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached had
become final and executory after we affirmed the same and an entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or
amended. In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr., Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. This is the doctrine of
finality of judgment. In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said: x x x a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final
and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or
relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. The party who alleges a supervening event to
stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the
conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is
the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered
a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and immutable judgment.

V. RULES 6-9
ALMA JOSE VS. JAVELLANA
664 SCRA 1
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APPEALS; FORUM SHOPPING; FRESH PERIOD RULE

On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon
Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00
upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable
period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her
daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders
of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the
properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of
converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.
Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance,
injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC). Javellana prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that
Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not
state a cause of action, which was initially denied. However, upon her MR RTC reversed its decision and granted the motion to dismiss,
opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional
sale for not being party thereto.

Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order of
the RTC was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It appears that
pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing
his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
remanded the records to the RTC.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the order of the RTC on June 21, 2000 was not appealable?
2. Whether or not the notice of appeal was belatedly filed?
3. Whether or not Javellana was guilty of forum shopping?

HELD:
1. Yes. The denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and appealable. First of all, the denial of
Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-
97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.

The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise: The distinction between
a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and
the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.

2. Yes.
The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
The Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous of
appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC
reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Under the rule, Javellanas notice of
appeal filed on July 19, 2000 was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

3. No.
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and
identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts;
and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must
raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct
causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.
In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to
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clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for
certiorari had the ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment
case until his appeal is finally resolved," as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant.
The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was
a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping
for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had
not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

MEDADO VS. HEIRS OF ANTONIO CONSUING

665 SCRA 534
TOPIC: Verification and Certification
FACTS: (Spouses Medado) and Estate of Consing executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the property identified as
Hacienda.

As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with (PNB). Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of
Consing offered the subject lots to the government. Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC, an action for rescission and damages
against Spouses Medado due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement.

In the meantime while the case for rescission was pending, Land Bank issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of
cash as compensation for the lots. Spouses Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds thereof to the Estate of Consing, they
institute an action for injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the proceeds of the lots to Estate of Consing, and
restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds

RTC granter the injunction (Medado) and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. The writ was implemented 1 day before the hearing
for the motion for reconsideration filed by Heirs of Consing. Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned
the RTC's order via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction
for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping.

On the matter of the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to a petition for certiorari, the heirs
explained that the implementation of the questioned writs rendered their motion for reconsideration moot and academic. The heirs argued
that their case was within the exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is
first filed.

CA NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE the ruling of RTC.

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case for injunction during the pendency of
Civil Case for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against forum shopping.

ISSUES: Whether or not the requirement for verification and certification against forum shopping complied with by the heris of consing
when the same is solely signed by Soledad- administratix?

RULING: The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA petition were substantially complied with,
following settled jurisprudence. Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the
action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from
proceeding with the action.

The Court has consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance
that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on
them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct. It was based on this principle that this Court had also allowed herein petitioner, via our Resolution dated
April 22, 2009, a chance to submit a verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of the
Court dismissing the petition outright.

COA VS. PALER

614 SCRA

Topic: Authority to file petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping / appeal despite having been filed beyond
the reglementary period

Facts: Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II with the Technical Support Service of the COA. Mr. Paner submitted a
request for vacation leave for 74 working days then left for the U.S. without verifying whether the application for leave was approved.
Comm. Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees due to his continuous 30-day absence without
leave and in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999. Mr. Paner moved for MR with the Comm. Chairman, was
denied; on appeal, CSC reversed and set aside the Comm. Chairman's decision. (Rule 43) CA affirmed CSC resolution; hence Rule 45.

Issue/s:

1 WON Commission Secretary may file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the
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Commission Chairman;
2 WON appeal may prosper despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Ruling/s:

1 Representatives, lawyers or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign
the verification. However, as to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. Lack of authority, (certification of non-forum shopping) dismissible.

2 Procedural rules need not be strictly observed if appeal is meritorious. it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in
favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts
should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are
intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of
substantive rights of the parties.

BENGUET EXPLORATION INC. VS. CA

351 SCRA
DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things: (1) that the document was signed; (2) that the document complied
with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when the document was signed, it was in the original form without any alteration; and (4) that
the document was delivered.

FACTS: Petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against SeawoodShipping and Switzerland General
Insurance, Co., Ltd.

Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet, was in charge of exportation. His responsibilities included the documentation of export
products, presentations with banks, and other duties connected with the export of products. He explained that private respondent Seawood
Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates. The bill of lading stated that the cargo, consisting of
2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union. It was
insured by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked. When the cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio
Lumibao received a report dated August 19, 1985, from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount
stated in the bill of lading. For this reason, petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In
its letter, dated August 21, 1985, petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the alleged shortage. As both Seawood
Shipping and Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these cases against Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance.
Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of his testimony, he was secretary of Nil Alejandre, manager of
Benguet. According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the warehouse at La Union to assist in the loading of the copper concentrates. These
copper concentrates were to be loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present when the cargo was loaded on the
ship, as evidenced by the Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28, 1985. According to
Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to determine how much was loaded on the ship. Cayabyab
stated that he saw petitioner Benguet's representative and his immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr.
Cardenas, sign the Certificate of Weight. Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of Weight, which stated therein that
2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship. Cayabyab likewise confirmed the authenticity of the Mate's
Receipt, saying that he witnessed the Chief Mate sign the document.

Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading,
Certificate of Weight, Mates Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result,
there is a prima facie presumption that their contents are true.

ISSUE: Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented were properly established by the testimony of the
plaintiffs witness, resulting to prima facie presumption that their contents are true.

RULING: This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Genuineness
and due execution of the instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its
face from the one executed.

It is equally true, however, that execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without
enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case,
and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument
introduced in evidence.
Respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these documents. Switzerland Insurance presented Export
Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioners own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared, in which it was stated that the copper concentrates to
be transported to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent more or less. On the other
hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioners claim, prepared a report which showed that a total
of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point. As the report stated: It is to be pointed out that there
were no actual weighing made at Benguet Explorations site. The procedure done was that after weighing the trucks before and after
unloading at Poro Point, the weight of the load was determined and entered on Philex Trip Ticket which was later on copied and entered
by the truck driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc.s Transfer Slip.

Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point and
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loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper concentrates shipped.
Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Lading,
Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mates Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by Switzerland
Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is
compounded by the admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual amount of copper
concentrates loaded on the vessel.

In the face of these admissions, appellants claim of loss or shortage is placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the
accuracy of the figures indicated in appellants documentary evidence that could confirm the alleged loss of 355.736 MT. Notwithstanding
the figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1 that 2,243.496 WMT of copper concentrates was loaded by appellant at the port of origin, it
should be stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of lading.
Thus, it has been held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were
delivered for shipment and as between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital. Resultingly, the
admissions elicited from appellants witnesses that they could not confirm the accuracy of the figures indicated in their documentary
evidence with regard to the actual weight of the cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the port of destination, in effect
rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.

ASIAN CONST. & DEV. CORP. VS. CA

458 SCRA
DOCTRINE: There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or
other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.

FACTS: The original plaintiff in this case, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC), filed a collection suit with damages against Asian
Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) for non-payment of rentals of the several leased equipment amounting to
P5,071,335,86. ACDC, on the other hand, filed a motion to file and admit answer with third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas
Corporation (BOC) alleging by way of special and affirmative defense that while it is true ACDC is indebted to MEC in the amount of
P5,071,335,86, the same cannot be complied with because BOC is yet to pay ACDC the contracted services it rendered which includes the
use of the subject equipment at its project site and therefore, as a result, BOC should be impleaded as a third-party defendant in this case.
MEC opposed it by filing a motion for summary judgment alleging that since there was no genuine issue as to the monetary obligation of
ACDC to MEC, the only issue left for the trial court to resolve is the amount of attorneys fees and cost of litigation. Furthermore, MEC also
added that the demand set forth by ACDC in its special and affirmative defense partook the nature of a negative pregnant and that there
was a need for a hearing in its claim for damages.
Both the RTC and CA ruled denying the motion filed by ACDC and in favor of MEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in denying the third-party complaint filed by ACDC

RULING: No. There is no showing in the proposed third-party complaint that the respondent knew or approved the use of the leased
equipment by the petitioner for the said project in Quezon. BOC cannot invoke any defense the petitioner had or may have against the
claims of the respondent in its complaint, because the petitioner admitted its liabilities to the respondent for the amount of P5,075,335.86.
The barefaced fact that the petitioner used the equipment it leased from the respondent in connection with its project with BOC does not
provide a substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against the latter. There is no causal connection between the claim of the
respondent for the rental and the balance of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold and leased to the petitioner, and the failure
of BOC to pay the balance of its account to the petitioner after the completion of the project in Quezon.
The controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and BOC, on the other, are thus
entirely distinct from each other. Hence, the denial of the third-party complaint by the courts were proper.

BANCO DE ORO VS. TANSIPEK

593 SCRA 456
TOPIC: Motion to lift order of default

FACTS: The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction, Inc (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. as actual
construction went on, progress billings were made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein respondent John Tansipek,
its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were initially remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check
in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI but instead, Tansipek deposited the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB
allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for the deposit to payees account only, and despite the alleged lack
of authority of Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the check despite demands made by the latter.
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIBs Motion to Dismiss.
PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the
Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied.
Upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Respondent
Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the correct remedy

HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek
should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court.

A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of
meritorious defenses must concur.
It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent Tansipek in this case is not barred from appealing from the judgment
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on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the latter
and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decisions being contrary to law or the evidence already
presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

406 SCRA 190
DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things: (1) that the document was signed; (2) that the document complied
with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when the document was signed, it was in the original form without any alteration; and (4) that
the document was delivered.
DENIALS; NEGATIVE PREGNANT; SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FACTS: On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, represented by the OSG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos. In
said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten
wealth. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos
couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property.

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their
answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos
children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently,
respondent Marcos children filed a motion for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. Hearings were conducted
by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.

On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her
opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment." Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998
claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the
remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order
dated, the case was set for trial.

After several resettings, petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million. The
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 arguing that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON Summary Judgment is proper; WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate
summary judgment.

RULING: YES. Summary Judgment is proper.

The SC finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the
petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents'
defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs.
Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a
sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.

Moreover, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by
the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall because it happened a long
time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.

If an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in
fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against
them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations.
Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue.
Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial
pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect
an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not
having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure: Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

Further, when matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial. An unexplained
denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective
denial. Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means of
 7

knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture
"for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions"
cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are
therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.

Furthermore, their opposition to the motion for Summary Judgment was not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as
required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure: x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or
admissions at least three (3) days before hearing.
After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file,
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republic's motion only
demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief. In sum, mere denials, if
unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment.

A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is
ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse
party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily
hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them.

Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory of summary judgment
is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or
admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION VS. ALON

533 SCRA 28
TOPIC: Negative Pregnant

FACTS: On July 15, 1999, Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Silay City, Branch 40, a
complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de
Vera, praying for the following reliefs: issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with
the auction sale of petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of nullity of the mortgage
constituted over petitioners property in favor of respondent; and award of damages.

On July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale set on July 23, 1999, as agreed upon by the parties.
Notwithstanding said directive, another foreclosure sale was scheduled on October 15, 1999. Per RTC Order dated October 14, 1999, the
October 15 scheduled sale was held in abeyance; but re-scheduled the sale on November 15, 1999 for the following reasons:

However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial institution to foreclose collaterals and/or securities for any
loan, credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and
other charges amount to at least 20% of the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the books of the financial institution. Moreover, no
restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action
taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided by said law. x x x The defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines and Eric B. De Vera, Sheriff of this Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on November
15, 1999.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals
(CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction which it denied due course and dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the Decision, which was eventually denied by the CA. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the properties subject of this case.

HELD: Without first resolving the foregoing issue, the Court finds that the petition should be denied for the sole reason that the act sought
to be enjoined by petitioner is already fait accompli. In Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, the Court held that
[I]njunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.
In Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that where the period within which the former employees were prohibited from
engaging in or working for an enterprise that competed with their former employer the very purpose of the preliminary injunction has
expired, any declaration upholding the propriety of the writ would be entirely useless as there would be no actual case or controversy
between the parties insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned.
 8

Records show that the foreclosure sale which petitioner sought to be enjoined by the RTC has already been carried out by the Sheriff, and
in fact, a Certificate of Sale dated June 26, 2000 was issued to respondent. There is, therefore, no more actual case or controversy
between the parties insofar as the RTCs refusal to enjoin the sale is concerned, and any resolution by the Court of the impropriety or
propriety of the RTCs refusal to issue any restraining or injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale will serve no purpose but merely lend
further addle to Civil Case pending before the RTC.

Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioners bone of contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes
are silent as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property. It does not
categorically deny that these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact, negative
pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. As
defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

I. RULES 10-14
LISAM ENTERPRISES VS. BANCO DE ORO
670 SCRA 310
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Resolution[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City (RTC), dated November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners complaint, and its Order[2] dated May 15, 2000, denying
herein petitioners Motion for reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, be reversed and set aside.

FACTS:
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) acquired a residential lot in Legaspi City. Lolita was a stockholder of LEI and a member of its Board
of Directors. She is also designated as its Corporate Secretary. Leandro A. Soriano and Lilian S. Soriano were married to each other and
also functioned as its president and treasurer respectively.
LEI acquired a residential lot in Legaspi City. Sometime later, spouses Soriano obtained a loan from PCIB ( now BDO) and
mortgaged the residential lot to secure the loan. Lolita claimed that the mortgaged agreement was executed without authority of the board
of plaintiff LEI. To cure the defects of the mortgaged, spouses signed a Deed of Assumption of Loans and Mortgage Obligations and
Amendment of Mortgage; wherein in said document, LEI was made to assume the P20 Million personal indebtedness of the Spouses
Soriano with BDO. Lolita claimed that there was no board resolution that authorized the Spouses Soriano to create the deed. Furthermore,
Spouses Soriano falsified the signature of Lolita to make it appear that it was consented by LEI.
The inability of the Spouses Soriano to pay their debt, the property was set for auction/foreclosure sale.LEI filed a complaint
against respondents for Annulment of Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages with
the RTC. The lower court issued a TRO and later issued a Writ of preliminary injunction enjoining BDO from proceeding with the auction
sale. BDO filed a motion to dismiss. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Consequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and a
motion to admit an amended complaint. The RTC denied both motions.
Plaintiff filed petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC should have allowed the motion to admit an amended complaint.

HELD:
Yes, plaintiff may amend their court with leave of court. It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of
Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties.
A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a
matter of right.
Amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners
by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is
quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing
so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be
thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial courts denial of the motion to
admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same.

The Court shall first delve into the matter of the propriety of the denial of the motion to admit amended complaint.Pertinent provisions of
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive
pleading is served x x x.

Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. x x x

It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners'
complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading
having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by
leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. However, in Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications, [4] the Court discussed this rule at
length, to wit:

x x x [A]fter petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court.
The said Section states:
 9

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made
only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of
thecourt upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus:

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the
cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment
in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense."

This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments
sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of
the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that
discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the
theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated inValenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving
the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every
case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action
and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.[5]

TIU VS. PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

596 SCRA 432
TOPIC: Amendment of pleadings

FACTS:

1. PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against herein petitioners-representatives of Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI) due to
the latters failure to pay loans after several demands made by PBCOM.

2. Pursuant to said loans, a duly notarized Surety Agreement was executed by AWRIs Directors, before the controversy arose.

3. In their Answer, petitioners-representatives of AWRI alleged, among other things, that they were not personally liable on the
promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the
Surety Agreement attached to the complaint as Annexes A to A2were falsified, considering that when they signed
the same, the words In his personal capacity did not yet appear in the document and were merely intercalated thereon
without their knowledge and consent.

4. PBCOM admitted its mistake in making the insertion and explained that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the
notary public. PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to speak the truth of the parties
intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners were already primarily liable on the Surety Agreement whether or not the
insertion was made, having admitted in their pleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement in the
original form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules, emphasized that the motion incorporated in the
pleading can be treated as a motion for leave of court to amend and admit the amended complaint pursuant to Section
3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

RTC- RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the altered document with the original Surety Agreement.
- Denied subsequent MR

CA (on Petition for Certiorari) Dismissed Petition!

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of
the original.

RULING: NO. Petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Order of the RTC allowing the substitution of the
document by relying on Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the Rules do not allow the withdrawal and
substitution of a "falsified document" once discovered by the opposing party. PBCOM argues that since the complaint is based on an
actionable document, i.e., the surety agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall
be deemed part of the pleading. Considering that the surety agreement is annexed to the complaint, it is an integral part thereof and its
substitution with another copy is in the nature of a substantial amendment, which is allowed by the Rules, but with prior leave of court.
Moreover, PBCOM alleges that since the Rules provides that substantial amendments may be made upon leave of court, the authority of
the RTC to allow the amendment is discretionary. Thus, the CA correctly held that the act of granting the said substitution was within the
 10

clear and proper discretion of the RTC. As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the
original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution. The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in
Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, its substance must be
set forth, and the original or a copy thereof "shall" be attached to the pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof, to wit: Section 7.
Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of
such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

With respect to PBCOMs right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer,
Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.
Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be
refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,26 thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the
cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment
in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to
be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules
which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that
discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the
theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. The courts should be
liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early
stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all
the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every
case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action
and unnecessary expense. In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety
agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first place instead of the original
agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words "IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" were inserted to conform to the banks standard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of
the notary public. PBCOMs counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of
the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved. Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence,
not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. The original surety
agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties respective rights and obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the
amendment of the complaint, which consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the original.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, they could not be prejudiced by the substitution since they can still present the substituted
documents, Annexes "A" to A-2," as part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay
the action. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides, the petitioners are not precluded from filing
the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of
the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The case before the RTC is civil in nature, while the
alleged falsification is criminal, which is separate and distinct from another. The present case failed to comply with the above-stated
requisites. In the instant case, the soundness of the RTCs Order allowing the substitution of the document involves a matter of judgment
and discretion, which cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This rule is only intended to correct defects of
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. VS. CA

382 SCRA 499
TOPIC: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for
its dismissal before the higher court? Sec 2, rule 10 pleadings may only be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is
served.

FACTS: Petitioner (Remington Industrial Sales Corp) filed complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract
against Industrial Steels with Ferro Trading GMBH as principal defendant, and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and
BS separately moved for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions and the MR. ISL filed answer.
British Steel separately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA claiming that complainant failed to show that it had commited
any act or ommission violating Remingtons rights. Complaint only stated that BS and Ferro were just mere suppliers of goods for ISL.
Remington then sought to amend the complaint by incorporating additional facts to have a cause of action against BS by using Sec 2, Rule
10, stating that it can amend its complaint as a matter of right because respondent (BS) has not yet filed a responsive pleading.

RTC RULING: Amended Complaint is noted and other proceedings were held in abeyance until CA decides on the petition for certiorari
and prohibition of BS.
CA RULING: Granted BS writ of certiorari, ordered judge to dismiss without prejudice the Complaint against BS. MR was also dienied.

ISSUE:
 11

1. WON CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint agasint BS for lack of cause of action under the original complaint even
if it was already amended as a matter of right, and sufficient causes of action are averred in the amended complaint.
2. WON CA erred in holding if Remington wants to pursue its case against BS, it has to refile complaint, pre-empting the right of the
lower court to rule on amended complaint.

HELD: YES. CA erred in dismissing the complaint because it the amendment made by Remington was done in a timely manner and as a
matter of right, which was before BS gave its answer in accordance to Sec 2, Rule 10 of the ROC. The decision of the CA will result into
multiple suits. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF IT BEING DISMISSED.
Sec 2, rule 10 - Before the answer, a complaint may be amended as a matter of right. It can amend to introduce a new cause of action or
change in theory. During this time, rights of defendant have not yet been violated because he hasnt filed an answer yet. Considerable
leeway is given the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PRIOR the filing of answer.
Sec 3, rule 10 - After the answer, subtantial amendment of complaint is not allowed without leave of court. RATIONALE: any material
change in the allegations already contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of defendant who has alerady set up his defense in
the answer.

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS VS. CITY OF URDANETA

566 SCRA

Re: Amendments to pleadings

DOCTRINE
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the
merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.

Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts
are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity
of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be
made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

FACTS
Respondent Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed a complaint for annulment of contract with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction and temporary restraining order against respondents City of Urdaneta, Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA
Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation
(APPCDG).

1. Del Castillo alleged that the Urdaneta City mayor entered into 5 contracts for the construction and management of a 4-storey twin
cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250Million, funded by a loan
from PNB. For a minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95Million.

2. According to Del Castillo, all 5 contracts are void because the object of the contract is a piece of land belonging to public domain
and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, the contracts are void because they
were all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid.
1. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer, joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were
properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
2. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action.
3. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer5 with compulsory counterclaim and motion to
dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
4. Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed,
also in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to:
1. withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer;
2. drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff;
3. admit Urdaneta City's complaint; and
4. conduct a new pre-trial.

Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its inability to file the
necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.

RTC: In an order dated 11 September 2002, RTC admitted entry of appearance of Lazaro Law firm and granted the withdrawal of
appearance of the city prosecutor. It granted the prayer to drop the city as defendants and admitted its complaint for consolidation
with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the citys complaint.

In another order dated 14 February 2004, RTC dropped Capalad as defendant, and his complaint was admitted and
consolidated with the complaints of del Castillo and Urdaneta City. RTC directed APP and APPCDC to answer Capalads
complaint.

CA: APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before CA. CA dismissed the petition because:
1. defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
2. failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and
 12

3. lack of written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.

ISSUE
Whether Trial court erred in allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their
respective answers and admitting their complaints.

HELD
The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
Petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief,
that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.

We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the
merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-
trial Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the
parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also
that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for
said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open court may
also override admissions in the Answer.

As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists that
Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents
petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly,
Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of
Capalad.

VALMONTE VS. CA
252 SCRA
Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of
90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however,
practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where
he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband.
She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A.,
while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A.
Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and where
he can be found.He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for
her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his
summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file
her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special
appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondents motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner
Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.
NO.
There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.
1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants
interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not
found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
2. In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes.
This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court
as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to
be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
3. Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14,
17. As provided in 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his
behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
4. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her
Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.

Digest2
 13

Facts: Petitioners Spouses Valmontes and Respondent Dimalanta are all residents of the U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a
member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in an office in Manila, Philippines. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
sister of Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals against the spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The subject of the action is a three-door apartment located in Paco, Manila. In her Complaint, private
respondent alleged that the complaint may be served with summons at Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found. The foregoing averments were made on the basis of a letter sent by
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte to private respondents counsel in which, in regard to the partition of the property in question, she referred
private respondents counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of
summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo, who was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons,
insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the
process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not
file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special
appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondents motion. The trial court, denied private respondents motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes in default. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.

Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

Held: There was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte. The Court of Appeals holding that she had been validly served stated
that she clearly and unequivocally directed that all communications be addressed to her lawyer who happens also to be her husband. Such
directive was made without any qualification. This view is bolstered by Atty. Valmontes subsequent alleged special appearance made on
behalf of his wife. The CA cannot allow Mrs. Valmontes assertion that representation by her lawyer and husband as far as the Paco
property controversy is concerned, should only be made by him when such representation would be favorable to her but not otherwise.
Further, the summons was served not upon just an ordinary lawyer but upon her lawyer husband. The same lawyer/husband happens to be
also her co-defendant in the instant case which involves real property which, belongs to the conjugal partnership. It is highly inconceivable
and certainly it would be contrary to human nature for the lawyer/husband/co-defendant to keep to himself the fact that they had been sued
with regard to a property which he claims to be conjugal. Petitioners alleges that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in refusing to apply the
provisions of Rule 14, 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and applying instead Rule 14, 8 when the fact is that petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte is a nonresident defendant; and (2) because even if Rule 14, 8 is the applicable provision, there was no valid substituted
service as there was no strict compliance with the requirement by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts that petitioners are invoking a technicality and that strict adherence to the rules
would only result in a useless ceremony. Determination should first be made on whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem. This is because the rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the other of
these actions. In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14,
7-8[2] is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to
the authority of the court.[3] If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a
Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule.[5] In
all of these cases, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction
over his person is essential to make a binding decision. If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and
he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17, which provides:
17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable
time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. In such cases, what gives the court
jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled
in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. Service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of the action and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take
steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.[6] Private respondents action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property and
not to render a judgment against him. As explained in the leading case of Banco Espal Filipino v. Palanca :[7] The action quasi in
rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the
sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident
who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective
outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. In the case at bar, the service of
summons was not done by means of any of the first two modes, and the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, cannot as
well be justified under the third mode. The third mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through
the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.[8] Moreover, there are several reasons for the invalidity of the
service. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by
Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on
 14

that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer. In the second place, service in the attempted
manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such leave
must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for
the application. Finally, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file
her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an
Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not
found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60)
days from notice. Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondents
attorney that all communications intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer, no power of attorney to
receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it
appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, concerning the partition of the property in
question. The authority given to petitioners husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including an authority to
represent her in any litigation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in this
case. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL & COMM. CORP VS. TAN

326 SCRA

FACTS: Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[1] over its real property in favor of
respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of petitioners indebtedness to respondent.

Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the RTC. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served
upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriffs return, as a Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and
(discretion) working therein, he is the highest ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendants Corporation, to receive processes of the
Court.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service of summons upon it, as a result of which
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that service on
Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriffs return, was invalid as he is not one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be
served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons upon a mere draftsman was valid

HELD: NO. Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that service of summons upon one who is not
enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons
other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. this Court enumerated the requisites for the application of the doctrine of
substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession
of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriffs
return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was
actually served.The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is
attained. There is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third, there is, however, no direct proof of
this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown.

E.B. VILLAROSA VS. BENITO

312 SCRA
FACTS: E.B. Benito is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao City and with branch offices at Paraaque City and Cagayan De
Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent, Imperial Development Corporation, executed a Deed of Sale with development agreement
wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land belonging to Imperial. On April 3, 1998, Imperial filed a complaint for breach of
contract against E.B. Benito before the RTC Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
BRANCH MANAGER Engy. Sabulbero at Cagayan De Oro City Branch. E.B. Benito moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of
summons thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner. On the other hand, Imperial contended that
the service is valid alleging that there was a substantial compliance with the rule as it was served through its branch manager.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and held that there was a valid service of summons. Hence, this petition was filed by EB Villarosa
contending that the trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
RULING: No. Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
This provision revised the former Sec 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:
If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be
made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
The rule now states general manager instead of only manager. As held by Justice Regalado, the aforesaid terms were obviously
ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word agent. Service of summons upon
persons other than those mentioned in Sec 13 of Rule (old rule) has been held improper. The purpose of which is to render it reasonably
certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. Accordingly,
the service of summons upon the branch manager at its branch in CDO, instead to the general manager at its principal office in Davao City
is improper.
 15

RAMOS VS. RAMOS

399 SCRA
Topic: Estate as Parties

Facts: Petitioners are children of the late Chanliongco, Jr., the latter being the co-owner of a parcel of land together with sister Narcisa and
brothers Mario and Antonio. The co-owners executed a special power of attorney in favor of Narcisa by virtue of which her daughter sold
the lot to respondents. Due to the conflicting stand of the co-owners concerning the validity of the sale, respondents filed an action for
interpleader.
The Regional Trial Court upheld the validity of the sale insofar as Narcisa is concerned but the other portions as void for lack of authority.
The Court of Appeals, however, declared the sale as valid stating that Narcisas daughter was authorized as a sub-agent. Not appealed
from, the decision became final and executory. The petitioners questioned this decision contending that it is violative of due process since it
disposes of the property to which they are entitled to as heirs of the deceased co-owner without them being served summons and
impleaded in the case.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners should have been impleaded in the case as heirs of one of the co-owners.

Ruling: No. The petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of one
of the co-owners. They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by
an executor or administrator. Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the
deceased co-owners had already been made parties. As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants. Not being parties,
they were not entitled to be served summons.

BPI VS. SPS. SANTIAGO

519 SCRA 389
TOPIC: Service of Summons

FACTS: Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel of land by Irene Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged
with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its loans,
BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served
with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and
Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon has been fully paid. Such
payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-
Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original
loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed
and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.

On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day, summons was served on the Branch
Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz,
Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the
corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation. Also alleged lack of authorityof the
person who signed. RTC denied the MD and issued new summons.

The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition with BPI alleging that the court a
quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale,
was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the original summons was served upon the branch manager of its
Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch.

RULING: YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the issuance of
the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.

Sec. 11, Rule 14. Service upon domestic private juridical entity When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.

Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The
officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render
it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the
corporation for the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be
validly made in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual.
However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003, before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
issued on 20 March 2003, whatever defect attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly cured.
 16

Inarguably, before the Order granting the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of BPI by virtue of the new summons validly served on the Corporate Secretary. The fact that the original summons
was invalidly served is of no moment since jurisdiction over BPI was subsequently acquired by the service of a new summons.

SANTOS VS. PNOC EXPLORATION

566 SCRA 272
TOPIC: Service of summons by publication, service of summons by registered mail, voluntary appearance
FACTS: On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complained for a sum of money against petitioner
Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the RTC of Pasig City. The complaint sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing petitioners unpaid
balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines on May 20,
20003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of
respondents employee to the effect that the sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period so respondent moved that the case be set for the reception of its
evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 11, 2003.
Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section
19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was
not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his answer
be admitted.
Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by publication and pursuant to the
September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.
In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order.
It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court, and that
due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also
denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial
court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its
orders and processes, particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.
During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision. It ordered petitioner to
pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.
Meanwhile the Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial
court and dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of court on service of summons by publication applies only to actions in rem and not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money.

(2) Whether or not the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court.

(3) Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

RULING:
(1) NO. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought
and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner
was properly served with summons by publication.

Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted service may be
availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in
rem actions only.
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies
to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

(2) Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the
following:

an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business
or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by
service of summons by registered mail to the defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial
 17

court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is
imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
(3) Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons . The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. This was
equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

TEH VS. CA
401 SCRA 762

Topic: Erroneous address in the complaint-Motion to Dismiss- Alias Summons

The Case: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner Richard Teh assails the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated March 14, 2000 which dismissed his petition for certiorari for failure to attach the original or certified true
copies of the annexes thereto, as well as the appellate courts Resolution dated February 9, 2001 dismissing petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Facts: On August 20, 1998, respondent EIM International Sales, Inc. filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Complaint
for collection of sum of money with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment against Wood Based Panels, Inc., Sinrimco. Inc.,
Manfred Luig and petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 66974 and raffled to Branch 167 of the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioner was impleaded in the case because he was the President of both Wood Based Panels, Inc. and Sinrimco, Inc.
Subsequently, summons were served upon the two corporations and Luig (defendants). The sheriff failed to serve the summons
intended for the petitioner because the former could not locate the petitioners address as indicated in the complaint. Said address
was obtained by the respondent from the General Information Sheets filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by the two
corporations.1
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, but the same was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, they filed their respective answers
to the complaint. The respondent then filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial, and the court granted the same and set the pre-trial on
October 19, 1999. A notice of pre-trial was sent by the RTC to the defendants, including the petitioner. The notice to the latter was again
sent to the address indicated in the complaint.
On October 19, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had not acquired
jurisdiction over his person because he had not been served with summons. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the pre-trial and
the resetting thereof on November 19, 1999. It, likewise, ordered the respondent to submit a reply or opposition to petitioners motion to
dismiss within five days from October 19, 1999.
The next day, October 20, 1999, the respondent filed a Comment explaining that summons had not been served on the petitioner
because, according to the sheriff, the petitioners address indicated in the complaint, "138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,"could not
be located.
The trial court issued an Omnibus Order dated November 17, 1999 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and directing that an alias
summons be issued against the petitioner to be served upon him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The respondent thereafter
filed a manifestation and motion, informing the court that the address of the petitioner as indicated in the complaint was erroneous, and
that summons should instead be served upon him at "138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City," which was his correct
address.
On December 14, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts omnibus order. He contended therein that the
case should be dismissed in view of the trial courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over his person and the respondents failure to
prosecute the case, considering that more than a year had passed since the complaint was instituted and yet summons had not yet been
served on him. The respondent opposed the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The trial court issued an Order dated January 25, 2000 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, which order the petitioner
received on February 3, 2000.
On February 28, 2000, the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition questioning the trial courts
November 17, 1999 Omnibus Order and the January 25, 2000 Order denying his motion for reconsideration.
On March 14, 2000, the appellate court issued its Resolution dismissing the petition for failure to attach certified true copies of relevant
documents referred to in the petition.2
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution, but said motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated February 9, 2001.

Issues:
1. Whether or not, the denial of the motion to dismiss is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not, there is proper service of summons.

Ruling: No grave abuse of discretion and there is proper service of alias summons.
The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter denied
the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias summons to be served upon him. Although the
respondent should have resorted to other means to determine the correct address of the petitioner when it was informed by the sheriff that
he failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure because the petitioners address
as indicated by Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco, Inc. on their respective General Information Sheets, was incorrect.
Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under Rule 16, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied
the petitioners motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss
or order the amendment of the pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its finding that the issues alleged by the
respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully in the absence of the petitioner. In its desire to resolve completely the issues brought
before it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by ordering the issuance
of alias summons on the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within its discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in
 18

dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it.

MASON VS. CA
413 SCRA
TOPIC: Summons, Default

FACTS: Spouses Mason owned two parcels along EDSA in Pasay City. Petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus
Corporation entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000)
at the end of the third year of the lease. Private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation, petitioners filed a complaint for rescission
of contract with damages against private respondent before the RTC of Pasay City. Summons was served upon private respondent through
a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return
described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading. The private respondent was declared in default and the petitioners
were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. That decision became final on May
12, 1999. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default
since according to the court, the incidents can be resolved based on the records.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to
lift the writ of execution which was also denied for being dilatory.
Private respondent appealed to the CA, which ruled in its favor.
The CA held that private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer.
Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution, were also invalid because
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, and
2. Whether private respondents motion to lift order of default was in order.

RULING:
1. None. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons authorized to
receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance
rule. Petitioners stress that even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in private respondents corporation, there was
substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached private respondent.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and
more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only
"manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, there should be strict compliance
with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke the ruling in Millenium. Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and
effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where the Court upheld the doctrine of
substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process.
2. Moot and Academic. Petitioners claim that private respondents motion to lift order of default was not in order for it was filed late, contrary
to the provision in sub-paragraph (b), Section 3,17 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires filing of the motion after
notice but before judgment. Also, the motion was (a) not under oath; (b) did not show the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect that
caused private respondents failure to answer; and (c) did not show private respondents meritorious defense.
Since service of summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings
held before it, including the order of default, are null and void.

JOSE VS. BOYON

414 SCRA

TOPIC: Summons, Kinds of Summons

FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint before the RTC for specific performance against respondents to compel them to facilitate the
transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court issued
summons to the [respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because
efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed. Petitioners filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of
Court to Effect Summons by Publication, which was granted. The respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring
herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were
allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA held that the trial court had no
authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them.

ISSUE: WON there was valid service of summons?

 19

HELD: NO. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in
personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures
laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned from the rules, personal service of summons is
preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof
of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts
proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with
all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. In the instant case, it appears that the
process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
respondents. Summons by publication in this case was also improper. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or
summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.

MANOTOC VS. CA
499 SCRA 21
TOPIC: Substituted service of summon.
FACTS: Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the US District Court of Hawaii against Ma. Imelda
Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence in the Philippines allegedly working
for Manotoc. RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was served on a Macky dela Cruz described as
a caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared in default.

Manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, stating that she is not a resident of the said condo
and that she does not hold office there, and dela Cruz is not her representative or employee. Thus no valid service was made. Further, she
states that she is a resident of Singapore.

RTC denied the motion and the subsequent MR. Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, that was denied. MR was
also denied.

ISSUE: Whether there was valid substituted service.

RULING: No. In actions strictly in perosnam jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory and can be complied with valid
service of summons. If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a reasonable time, substituted service can be resorted to.
It is extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual method of service thus rules for such must be faithfully complied with.

The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt personal service which is 15-30 days for the sheriff are:

1) By leaving copies of summons at defendants residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or by leaving copies
at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge.

2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became impossible.

3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least 3 times. The person of suitable age and discretion must be at least 18 years old, able to
read the summons written in English, and must be with confidential relation to defendant. A competent person in charge can be the
president or manager.

The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply with the requirements. Dela Cruz was not a representative of
Manotoc. Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was no jurisdiction acquired.

ONG VS. CO
FEBRUARY 25, 2015

G.R. No. 206653 February 25, 2015

TOPIC: SERVICE OF SUMMONS
In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be given an opportunity to be heard. This right
begins at the very moment that summons is served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance in ensuring that the
defendant personally grasps the weight of responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only in exceptional circumstances that constructive
notification, or substituted service of summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of the rigorous requirements for substituted service of
summons, then the Court has no other option but to strike down a void judgment, regardless of the consequences.
FACTS:
Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, were married.
Co filed two petitions for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity on two different occasions. Co stated in the first
petition that Ongs address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. Co indicated in the second petition that Ongs address was 23 Sta. Rosa
Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued summons. In the Servers Return, process server stated that, on
August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally on Ong. The said documents were received by a security officer.
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding Cos marriage with Ong as void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on Ong but she failed to file her responsive pleading
within the reglementary period.
Sometime in November 2008, Ong, received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear
before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings.
When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of
 20

marriage; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (3) Decision dated December 11, 2002 declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as void ab initio; and (4) their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

RULING:
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law
defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves
the service of summons or other processes on the petitioner.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the
defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14.
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of summons, to
wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The
date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Pascual v. Pascual, the return of summons did not show or indicate the actual exertion or positive steps taken by the officer or process
server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. Similarly, in Spouses Afdal v. Carlos, the process servers indorsements therein
failed to state that the personal service on the defendants was rendered impossible and that efforts were made to find them personally. In
both those cases, the Court ruled that the meticulous requirements for substituted service of summons were not met.

In the case at bench, the summons was issued on July 29, 2002. In his servers return, the process server resorted to substituted service of
summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days
from the issuance of the summons. The servers return stated the following:
SERVERS RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with copy of petition, were effected to
respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City,
after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient
age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.
Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons, Duly Served, this 2nd day of August, 2002.
The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on
petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the
corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there
were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner,
though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the
summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the
competence of the security officer to receive the summons.

Also, aside from the servers return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records which would describe the specific attempts to
personally serve the summons. Co did not even claim that Ong made any voluntary appearance and actively participated.

The presumption of regularity was never intended to be applied even in cases where there are no showings of substantial compliance with
the requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is
defective. As earlier explained, the server's return did not comply with the stringent requirements of substituted service of summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the decision must be declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
260, Paraaque City is hereby declared VOID.

DOMAGAS VS. JENSEN

 21

448 SCRA 663

CALLEJO, SR., J
FACTS: Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Vivian Jensen before the MTC. The summons and the complaint were not
served on Jensen because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother,
Oscar Layno, who was then in Jensens house. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Layno, who received the same. The court
rendered judgment in favor of Domagas. Jansen failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued. Jensen filed a
complaint against Domagas before the RTC for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that the Sheriffs failure to serve
the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Jansen
alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother,Oscar Layno, was improper. RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Jensen and against Domagas. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint. The
CA rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint of Domagas was one for
ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem
. The summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent is an action in personam or quasi in rem.
HELD: The ruling of the CA that the petitioners complaint for forcible entry against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous.
The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam.
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.
Ruling: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of
summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following
modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Decision: The respondent was
not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.

DOLE PHIL. VS. QUILALA

557 SCRA 433
TOPIC: Service of Summons on Corporations Sec. 11, Rule 14; Voluntary Appearance Sec. 20, Rule 14
FACTS: Private respondent All Season Farm Corporation (ASFC) filed a complaint with the Makati City RTC presided by Hon. Judge
Quilala which sought the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines Inc. (Dole) and several of
its officers.
Dole stated that an alias summons was served upon it through Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific General
Services, Ltd., separate from Dole. Subsequently, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over Dole due to improper service of summons; (b) the complaint filed failed to state a cause of action; (c ) ASFC was
not the real party in interest and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in their
official capacities as Dole corporate officers.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by Dole. Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the alias
summons was not properly served. The CA ruled that Doles president had known of the service of the alias and summons although he did
not personally receive and sign it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dole was validly served with summons.
RULING: The Court held that summons was validly served. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is
restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Service must
therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant, received the alias summons. There was no evidence that
she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the president. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal
assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. As
held previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to
question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the
receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading. Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the
receipt of the summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time,
petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.
The RTC therefore properly took cognizance of the case against Dole Philippines, Inc., and we agree that the trial and the appellate courts
committed no error of law when Doles contentions were overruled.

CHU VS. MACH ASIA TRADING CORP.

694 SCRA 302
TOPIC: How jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired.
FACTS: Petitioner purchased from respondent on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator worth P900,000.00. Petitioner initially paid
P180,000.00 with the balance of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly installments through Prime Bank postdated checks. Petitioner then
purchased again 2 equipment from respondent on installment basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00. Respondent deposited the 12 checks
issued by petitioner. However, the same were DISHONORED by the bank either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient
funds," or "payment stopped."
Petitioner failed to pay despite demand, saying that his business was hit by the crisis and he would be returning the equipment if he cannot
 22

pay. Respondent, filed a complaint against petitioner before RTC Cebu for sum of money, replevin, attorney's fees and damages.
RTC issued writ of replevin. Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioner's given address for the purpose of serving the summons,
together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner,
since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by a
certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner.
Petitioner, failed to file responsive pleading. Respondent, moved that petitioner be declared in default. RTC, declared petitioner in default;
ordered presentation of evidence ex parte. RTC, decided in favor of respondent; ordered petitioner to pay. Petitioner, appealed to CA,
argued that the RTC erred in concluding that the substituted service of summons was valid, and that, consequently, there was error on the
part of the RTC when it declared him in default, in proceeding with the trial of the case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against
him. CA, affirmed RTC, opined, among others, that the requirement of due process was complied with, considering that petitioner actually
received the summons through his security guard. It held that where the summons was in fact received by the defendant, his argument that
the Sheriff should have first tried to serve summons on him personally before resorting to substituted service of summons deserves scant
consideration. Thus, in the interest of fairness, the CA said that the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the service of summons
should not unduly prejudice the respondent's right to speedy justice.

ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon petitioner.

HELD: NO.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil
case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to
its authority.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a
reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.15 Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the
defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summons.

Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and
that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method
extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by
statute is considered ineffective
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, the Summons and writ issued in the above-entitled case
with the following information, to wit:
1. That the Summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond was received on December 7, 1999, by Rolando Bonayon, a
security guard on defendant Sixto Chu at his given address who received and signed receipt thereof.
After the issuance of the Sheriff's inventory receipt, the units were turned over to Al Caballero and companion, representatives of plaintiff,
who shipped the same to Cebu to be deposited with MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, Block 26 MacArthur Highway, Reclamation
Area, Cebu City, for safekeeping, subject to the provision of Sec. 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a
relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus,
service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
Moreover, the reasoning advanced by the CA in ruling against the petitioner was based merely on conjectures and surmises. The CA even
went as far as to conclude that the process server's neglect should not have unduly prejudiced the respondent, thus:
Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard, the requirement of due process would have nevertheless
been complied with. x x x. Based on the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, the security guard would not have
allowed the sheriff to take possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he would be accountable to Chu for
the said units. Chu, for his part, would not have given his permission without being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of
replevin issued by the lower court, which permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ of replevin.
Thus, where summons was in fact received by defendant, his argument that the sheriff should have tried first to serve summons on him
personally before resorting to substituted service of summons is not meritorious.
Evidently, plaintiff-appellee cannot be penalized, through no fault of its own, for an irregular or defective return on service of summons.
In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the service of summons should not, thus, unduly prejudice
plaintiff-appellee's right to speedy justice.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned,
the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null
and void.

MACASAET VS. CO, JR.

697 SCRA 187
TOPIC: Service of Summons
Doctrine: To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the
same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time
may the officer resort to substituted service.

FACTS: Respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite and herein petitioners,
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. Subsequently,
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summonses were issued and RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on
the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the
office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed
that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons and explained in his return that
Macasaet and Quijano were always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos and Reyes were always out roving to gather
news; and that he had then resorted to substituted service upon realizing the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a
reasonable time. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid
and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons
personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the MTD stating that considering that summonses cannot be served within a reasonable time to the persons of all the
defendants, hence substituted service of summonses was validly applied. The MR was also denied. The CA affirmed the said decision of
RTC. The MR was also denied. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons to the petitioners

HELD: Yes. There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their
office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed
because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and gathering
news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of
petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person
within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving
officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service
should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on
the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should
the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter,that governs.
YU VS. TATAD
642 SCRA 421 Brion

Doctrine: There is no distinction between the periods to appeal between criminal and civil cases, thus the Fresh Period rule enunciated in
Neypes applies also to criminal cases.

FACTS:
1. The RTC convicted Yu of Estafa in a May 26, 2005 decision.
2. 14 days later or on Jun 9, Yu filed with the RTC a MNT alleging she discovered new and material evidence but was denied on Oct
17.
3. On Nov 16, Yu filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC alleging she has a fresh period of 15days pursuant to the Neypes Rule from
Nov 3 (the receipt of the denial of her MNT) or up to Nov 18 within which to file her NOA.
4. On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance.
5. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is
inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
6. The prosecution filed a Motion for Execution of the decision which was considered by the RTC.
7. Yu then filed a petition for prohibition and TRO against the RTC.\
8. Yu argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

ISSUE: WON the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases? YES

RATIO:
1. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. -- An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or
his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
2. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally
apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
following reasons:
a. BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in criminal and civil cases when it categorically stated for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from
b. The provisions of R41S3 and R122S6 although differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned - the appeal period stops running upon the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
c. While the SC did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal in criminal cases, it did include R42 on petitions for review
from the RTC to the CA and R45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC, both of which also applies to appeals in
criminal cases.
3. Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to the SC in civil and
criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 and Section 6 of Rule 122 should be treated
differently.
4. If the SC were to interpret strictly the fresh period rule, a double standard of treatment would exist.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh
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period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005,the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

PALILEO VS. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

738 SCRA
TOPIC: Effect of failure to timely file an appeal
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs of
preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction against Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Planters Development Bank (defendant Bank),
Arturo R. Delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad, and Emmanuel Tesalonia on 22 December 1998.
After summons together with the verified Complaint and its annexes were duly served upon defendants, the latter answered. In the last pre-
trial hearing dated 17 November 2000, only plaintiffs and their counsel appeared, thus, the latter moved for the presentation of evidence
ex-parte, which was granted by the Court with the reservation of verifying the return card to determine whether the order for the pre-trial
was indeed received by defendants. Finally, at the 21 November 2001 hearing, defendants again failed to appear and their failure to file
pre-trial brief was noted; thus plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, defendants were ordered to jointly and severally pay: Actual Damages; George Philip Palileo -
P2,605,972.92, Jose R. Dela Cruz - P1,529,508.80; Moral Damages P500,000.00 each; Exemplary Damages P500,000.00 each;
Attorneys P500,000.00 each and to pay the costs.
On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service specifically LBC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial.
Petitioners copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service
through LBC, but in their address of record Tupi, South Cotabato there was no LBC service at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with
the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was
simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.
Petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal. In an August 30, 2006 Order, the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial, while it granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, which it treated as a motion for the
execution of a final and executory judgment.
Records show that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial dated 28 July 2006 was initially filed via an LBC courier on
28 July 2006 and was actually received by the Court on 31 July 2006, which was followed by filing of the same motion thru registered mail
on 2 August 2006. Said motion was set for hearing by the movant on 18 August 2006 or 16 days after its filing.
Section 5, Rule 159 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended is pertinent thus:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. The aforesaid provision requires [that] every motion shall
be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing NOT later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. Being a litigated motion, the aforesaid rule should have been complied with. Its noncompliance renders it defective.
CA initially upheld RTCs ruling but later reversed itself, hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents motion should be heard despite having been filed beyond the period prescribed by the rules.

RULING: No. Since PDBs Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15-day period within which to
appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer
question the trial courts Decision in any other manner. "Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a
judgment not appealed from by him." The "presumption that a party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made
by the lower court" applies to it. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision has become
final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. "Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter
which the parties might have litigated and have x x x decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation,
and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of defense."

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA VS. MIRANDA

700 SCRA
TOPIC: The Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed.
FACTS: In 1994, petitioners Cirila, Cornelio, Numeriano, Jr., Erlinda, Lolita, Rufina, Danilo, Alejandro, Felimon, Teresita, Elizabeth, and
Analiza, all surnamed Miranda, representing themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Muntinlupa City, a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-612, against the heirs of
Pedro Miranda, namely: Pacita and Oscar Miranda; the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, Rogelio Miranda; and the spouses respondent Pablo
Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the Decision became final and executor.
On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, which was not implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte
Motion praying that the RTC issue a Break-Open and Demolition Order in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since
more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order
dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 05-131. Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment assailing, among others, the jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of
the Petition for Revival of Judgment.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the Decision dated
August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to
the CA, insisting that respondents opposition is without merit.
Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order.Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for
Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course.On June 14, 2007, the CA denied the Petition for
Mandamus on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was perfected on time.

RULING: NO. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from.
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Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the
date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules.
Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established
jurisprudence that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof
in court; instead, the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. Records show that the Notice of
Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the
CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
Neither can petitioners use typhoon Florita as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal because work in government offices
in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day petitioners Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC.
And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal
would still be denied for lack of merit.