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Fred Gale
To cite this article: Fred Gale (1998) Cave 'Cave! Hic dragones' : a neo-Gramscian
deconstruction and reconstruction of international regime theory, Review of International
Political Economy, 5:2, 252-283, DOI: 10.1080/096922998347561
A BS T R A C T
The author reviews the theoretical history of the international regime
concept and its deployment within neorealist, neoliberal and institution-
alist IR conceptual frameworks. He argues that the ve criticisms or
dragons levelled by Susan Strange at the concept in her 1982 article Cave!
Hic dragones simultaneously underestimated the concepts theoretical
originality and exaggerated the degree to which it committed theorists to
a static, ordered and statist conception of the global political economy.
The author shows how the concept, stripped of its neorealist and neolib-
eral heritage, can be deployed within a critical, neo-Gramscian theoretical
framework to analyse meso-level structures and the role that global civil
society actors are playing in contesting the normative structures (rights
and rules), procedures and compliance mechanisms of existing and
prospective international regimes.
K E Y WO R D S
International organization; regime; relations; theory; environment.
IN T R O DU C T IO N
In spite of close to twenty years of theoretical elaboration and empir-
ical research, the international regime concept still lacks a critical edge.
The concept, introduced into the international relations literature in the
1975 special edition of International Organization, was initially dened as
a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational
energies and nancial commitments, which have been accepted by a
group of states (Ruggie, 1975). This denition contained many of the
elements of Krasners widely accepted denition agreed to by a group
1998 Routledge 09692290
CAVE CAVE! HIC DRAGON ES
I NT E R NA T IO NA L R EG IM E TH E OR Y
Accounts of international regime analysis link its emergence to theoretical
and practical problems that developed within the realist and liberal tra-
ditions of IR theory in the 1970s (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Porter,
1992). According to Kratochwil and Ruggie, by the early 1970s, liberals
had been forced to reject their central theoretical notion that international
governance was coterminous with the activities of international organi-
zations (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 758). Liberals had reluctantly
reached the conclusion, based on an analysis of the post-war period, that
international governance was something other than what international
organizations did. Changes in the structure of the international system
had placed a great strain on the major post-war international organiza-
tions set up at Bretton Woods in 1944. If international governance was
synonymous with what international organizations did, then the loom-
ing crisis in international organizations should have been reected in a
decline in international governance, and possibly a return to 1930s-style
beggar-thy-neighbour international economic policies. Yet the anomaly
was that although international organizations were under immense pres-
sure and perceived to be performing badly, international cooperation
was on the rise. In casting around for a concept to clarify the nature of
international governance, therefore, liberals hit upon the concept of inter-
national regimes. The new concept enabled them to study not only the
process and structure of international cooperation, but also the role
played within it by international organizations.
The major theoretical difculty realists encountered in the post-war
period derived from their notion of state power. Measured in terms of
military might, the concept of state power proved too crude to account
for bargaining outcomes in international relations. Particularly after the
OPEC oil price hikes of 1974, realists broadened their concept of power
to include economic resources. A broader concept of power and a greater
willingness to investigate international political economic issues drew
realists attention to some of the limits of their crude billiard-ball image
of the international system. While realists continued to focus on the
conict between states in an interstate system, they also required
concepts to explain the existence of signicant levels of international
cooperation. The international regime concept enabled realists to recon-
cile their billiard-ball image of the international system with the
existence of relatively widespread levels of international cooperation.
254
CAVE CAVE! HIC DRAGON ES
CA VE ! H IC D R A G ON ES
Strange launches her critique of the regime concept on the basis of her
own structuralist perspective of the operation of the international politi-
cal economy. For Strange, the underlying structure of the international
political economy is formed by the logic of state action on the one hand
and the logic of market forces on the other. Her criticism of the regime
concept arises from a perception that a focus on international institutions
as intervening variables or mediating structures distorts theorists under-
standing of the nature of the international political economy and of the
way in which power is exercised by state and non-state actors. Strange is
on strong ground when she cautions theorists against treating the rules
and arrangements agreed between governments as a prime determinant
of what actually happens and when she exhorts us to examine the
complex and interlocking network of bargains that underlie such rules
and arrangements (Strange, 1982). On the other hand, I argue here that
Strange goes too far in her dismissal of the regime concept. A critical
examination of existing rulebooks international regimes is useful pre-
cisely because it helps to elucidate the nature of the underlying bargains
that have been negotiated among international actors. The regime concept
is useful also because it identies and names a terrain of contestation in
the international sphere that is analogous to struggles at the national level
between different social forces over the content of government legislation
and policy. Once we accept, therefore, that the purpose of examining
international regimes is precisely to reveal the underlying bargains upon
which they have been constructed, Stranges ve dragons or objections
to the concept become less serious, individually and collectively, than rst
suggested.
The rst of Stranges dragons is that the regime concept is a fad, one
of those shifts of fashion not too difcult to explain as a temporary
reaction to events in the real world but in itself making little in the way
of a long-term contribution to knowledge (Strange, 1982: 479). This crit-
icism has not stood the test of time. The regime concept, introduced in
the 1970s, continues to be important in the IR literature of the 1990s
(P. Haas et al., 1993; Levy et al., 1995; Humphreys, 1996). The concepts
continuing vitality can be attributed to the fact that it enables theorists
to examine, in a systematic way, in designated issue areas, the processes
that foster and prevent the emergence of institutionalized international
behaviour. The rapid process of international institutionalization in the
post-war period has its origins in the massive structural changes taking
place in the global political economy. New international institutions are
being created to cope with the problems and opportunities presented
by the emergence of a signicantly modied post-war system of global
production and consumption.
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regimes are good things, that the more of them there are, the better,
and that the negotiation of an international agreement or convention
represents a triumph of order over anarchy, regardless of the content
of the agreements themselves. The question arises, however, as to
whether this conservative value bias is an inherent feature of the inter-
national regime concept per se, rather than a reection of the values of
the dominant theoretical frameworks that have employed the interna-
tional regime concept to date.
Notwithstanding the empirical evidence, there are several reasons for
doubting Stranges conclusion that the deployment of the regime concept
necessarily and irrevocably commits us to valuing order for orders sake.
Thus, although the deployment of the regime concept presupposes that
institutionalized behaviour is possible at the international level, it does
not in itself require that such instances be prevalent, effective or positive.
For hegemonic stability theorists, for example, operating within a realist
theoretical framework, the existence and strength of an international
regime is necessarily a historical phenomenon. Regimes wax and wane
depending on whether a hegemonic power exists and on the hegemons
position in the hegemonic cycle. When a hegemonic power declines to
the point at which it is no longer capable of providing international
public goods and no ascending hegemonic power exists to take over
that role, hegemonic stability theorists would argue that the international
system would be characterized by complete anarchy and the absence
of institutionalization. The deployment of the concept is, therefore,
perfectly compatible, theoretically, with the conclusion that little insti-
tutionalized behaviour exists in fact.
There is, moreover, considerable debate among IPE theorists about
the degree to which the international system is characterized by order
and anarchy. Strange prefers Hedley Bulls conception of an anarchical
society and observes that Bull well describes the general state of the
international system in which more order, regularity of behaviour, and
general observance of custom and convention than the pure realist
expecting unremitting violence of the jungle might suppose (Strange,
1982: 486; Bull, 1977). Strange thus agrees that the international system
can be generally characterized as containing at least some minimal forms
of institutionalized behaviour. However, she does not explore whether
this behaviour varies across issue areas or across time, and goes to great
pains to deny that such institutionalized behaviour is either signicant
or worth studying. Strange goes to such lengths because, in the trade
issue area, for example, she is concerned that focusing on instances of
institutionalized behaviour gives the false impression that it is the trade
regime the rules and arrangements agreed between governments
that is a prime determinant of what actually happens and not the
bargaining power of the most powerful states (Strange, 1982: 162).
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C R IT IC A L T H E OR Y A N D TH E IN T ER N A TI ON A L
R E GI ME C O N C EP T
In the words of Robert Cox,
critical theory stands apart from the prevailing order of the world
and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike
problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social
power-relations for granted but calls them into question by
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they
might be in the process of changing.
(Cox, 1986)
Despite this general unity of purpose, however, there is a wide range of
theoretical frameworks within critical theory to choose from. Within the
discipline of international relations we can identify Marxist, dependency,
world systems, neo-Gramscian, feminist and postmodern approaches
(Brewer, 1980; Frank, 1967; Wallerstein, 1979; Cox, 1987; Whitworth, 1994;
Weber, 1995). While each of these theoretical frameworks shares the
general purpose of critical theory, substantial differences exist among
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and unproblematic process; and that western ways were generally best
and should be imitated by all other states. While the intersubjective ideas
of statehood and the logic of raison dtat were accepted throughout the
post-war interstate system, the collective images were contested, both
theoretically, by scholars in all countries, and practically, by the Soviet
Union in the military sphere and by Europe, Japan and the Third World
in the economic sphere.
Despite its preponderance of military capabilities and its collective
image of liberal internationalism, the role of US-dominated international
institutions in the construction of Pax Americana was crucial. These inter-
national institutions and their presiding organizations (the United
Nations Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank and GATT being the
most critical) legitimized Pax Americana and consolidated US hegemony
by minimizing the resort to force. International institutions played a
crucial role in the consolidation of US hegemony, similar to the role played
by national institutions in the construction of bourgeois hegemony. Insti-
tutions, whether national or international, facilitated hegemonic projects
because they mediated and legitimized existing power relations. Through
judicious negotiation and the making of concessions, powerful sectional
interests could be presented as the general interest of all under a universal
policy.
It follows from the above analysis that the neo-Gramscian approach
to international relations places considerable importance on the autono-
mous inuence of ideas and institutions in the development of world
orders. Furthermore, ideas and institutions are not to be derived from
material capabilities, and
no one-way determinism need be assumed among these three: the
relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal. The question of
which way the lines of force run is always a historical question to
be answered by a study of the particular case.
(Cox, 1986: 219)
Unlike some other critical IR approaches, therefore, which treat inter-
national institutions as derivative of the capitalist mode of production
and which function in the interest of capital, the neo-Gramscian
approach gives considerable weight to the possibility of autonomous
institutional effects. As the earlier quotation from Cox makes clear, insti-
tutions may reect the power relations at their point of origin, but can
take on a life of their own and become battlegrounds for competing
collective images.
My contention is that there is also a homology between Coxs concep-
tualization of international institutions and the international regime
concept outlined earlier. Cox himself draws attention to this in the
following comment:
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C O NC L U S IO N
This article has reviewed the historical emergence of the international
regime concept and argued that the concept is not inherently tied to a
structuralist ontology or a positivist epistemology as is often claimed. The
realization that the concept has been deployed within non-structuralist,
interpretative frameworks paves the way for its deployment within a
critical IR theoretical framework. Prior to doing so, a critique of Susan
Stranges ve objections to its faddish, woolly, conservative, static and
state-centred nature is undertaken, which reveals that her objections are
either no longer valid, overstated, or generally true of the discipline of
social science as a whole. Finally, I have outlined how the concept,
stripped of its neorealist and neoliberal clothes, can be regarded as theor-
etically consistent with a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework, enabling
theorists to examine critically meso-level international institutions that
are increasingly being formed in response to the globalization of social
relations.
Space does not permit me to illustrate the utility of this approach in
practice and readers are referred elsewhere for a detailed account of the
struggles between state, industry and environmental representatives
over the normative structure, procedures and compliance mechanisms
of the tropical timber trade regime that took place through the
International Tropical Timber Organization between 1983 and 1994
(Gale, 1998). This study makes explicit other authors implicit recogni-
tion that beneath the formal structure of international regimes lies a
struggle between global social forces representing the interests of state
elites, business representatives and progressive social movements over
the legitimacy of the parties, the normative structure to be validated,
the procedures to be followed, and the compliance mechanisms to be
instituted. Parson, for example, recognizes the existence of blocking
coalitions in his basically statist study of the negotiation of the Montreal
Protocol on ozone-depleting substances. In that study, Parson notes:
The more serious reservation, though, is that the Protocol probably
represents the right measures enacted too late. . . . It is not likely
that the 1987 Protocol could have been negotiated any faster than
it was; its negotiation, ratication, implementation, and amend-
ment all took place with remarkable speed. . . . But the 1985
Convention, whose only innovations beyond the 1977 declaration
were a dispute resolution process and the status of the EC, took
eight years to negotiate. Roughly speaking, opponents of interna-
tional controls blocked the authorization of a negotiating body for
four years, then advocates and opponents of controls deadlocked
for four years.
(Parson, 1993: 72)
278
CAVE CAVE! HIC DRAGON ES
N OT E S
1 The terms neorealism and neoliberalism are used here to refer to the new
realism and liberalism that emerged in the 1970s under the inuence of
Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1979). Waltz systematized the study of international
relations by arguing that state behaviour was conditioned by the structure
of the international state system based on the principles of sovereignty and
279
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