OCT-DEC 2010 Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

OCT-DEC
2010

PIPS Report
Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan:
Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace
and Security

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Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 3, Number 4
OCT-DEC 2010 Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

Report

Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic

Policy Options for Peace and Security

Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit

Acknowledgements

We owe our gratitude to a great many people whose help, insightful reviews, comments
and continuous support during the fieldwork and analysis helped us complete this
report successfully. Our deepest thanks go to Muhammad Amir Rana whose invaluable
inputs assisted us in articulating the arguments precisely and make necessary
corrections as and when needed. Special thanks to Najam U Din for editing and
reviewing the report.

We greatly appreciate the efforts of field researchers, Shahzada Zulfiqar and Mufti
Sanaullah in Balochistan, Ali Abbas in Islamabad, and Zahid Hassan in Lahore, who
conducted interviews with a range of people successfully despite the time constraints
and security risks, particularly in Balochistan.

We would also like to express our gratitude to PIPS researchers Khuram Iqbal, Nida
Naz and Shagufta Hayat for their continuous help and assistance in collection of related
research literature, provision of necessary data, documents, and searching the archives
with attention and care. Finally, the field and desk research for the study would not
have been possible without remarkable coordination by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore.

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OCT-DEC 2010 Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

Contents
1. Introduction and Methodology
2. Conflict Analysis
2.1 Structures: An Account of Factors
2.1.1 Geographical
2.1.2 Political
i. Relations with the Centre
ii. Governance
2.1.3 Economic
i. Development
ii. Control and Distribution of Resources
2.1.4 Social
i. Ethnicity and Culture
ii. Religion
iii. Security: Physical and Sociocultural

2.2 Actors: Agendas, Capacities and Locations

2.2.1 Nationalist Insurgents
2.2.2 Religious/Sectarian Extremists
2.2.3 Smugglers and Criminal Syndicates
2.2.4 Relations and Nexuses
2.2.5 Political Parties
2.2.6 The State and its Security Apparatus
2.2.7 Civil Society and Development Agencies

2.3 Dynamics of Conflict

2.3.1 Long-term Trends or Historical Context
2.3.2 Triggers of Violence
i. Nawab Akbar Bugtis Murder
ii. Enforced Disappearances
iii. Conflict Induced Internal Displacements
iv. Target Killings
v. Floods
2.3.3 Regional Context and External Factors
2.3.4 An Analysis of Future Scenarios

3. State Responses and Capacities

4. Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security

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OCT-DEC 2010 Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

Summary of Findings

Conflict Analysis

Structures

Insecurity in Balochistan stems from a combination of nationalist insurgency, sectarian-

related militancy, Taliban presence, target killings and criminal activities.

A weak and undemocratic political culture, lack of social development, and over-
centralisation have caused a strong sense of political deprivation. Although there have
been some problematic group histories in Balochistan based on ethnicities, the Baloch do
not have religious tensions with any other ethnic or sectarian community.

Two factors are critical with regard to religious structures of the Pakhtun community in
Balochistan: presence of a large number of Deobandi madrassas in Pakhtun-dominated
areas; and arrival and settlement of a large number of Afghan refugees in Balochistan
after the Soviet-Afghan war.

Actors
Two discourses prevail regarding the nature and level of the current insurgency and the
role of insurgent groups. According to one, the strife in Balochistan is crude guerrilla
warfare without a leadership that can appeal to the masses, while the other categorizes it
as a movement of disenchanted educated youth which is garnering support of the
masses.

Groups such as Taliban, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundullah have an active

presence in the province. Free movement across the Pak-Afghan border, presence of a
large Pakhtun community in Balochistan that shares the ethnicity and religion of a
substantial part of the population in Afghanistan, an extensive network of Deobandi
madrassas and the Afghan refugee camps in the province are some of the key support
and recruitment factors for Taliban.

Baloch insurgent groups and religious extremists have at least some links with crime
syndicates and gangs. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Baloch insurgents sometimes share
information and infrastructure. However, a nexus between Taliban and Baloch
insurgents is unlikely.

Different stakeholders believe that the political parties do not have the mandate or the
capacity to play a decisive role in resolving the conflict in Balochistan, and that the real
power lies with the security establishment.

Baloch nationalist political parties are either federalist or waver between federalism and
separatism. Mainstream and religio-political parties generally support Baloch demands
for provincial autonomy but renounce violence.

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OCT-DEC 2010 Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

There is considerable confusion about the mandate, jurisdiction and roles of different
security and law enforcement agencies in Balochistan. Although they have the required
human resource, their personnel are poorly trained, and lack the equipment and other
resources to carry out their duties adequately.

Civil society organizations operate on a non-political basis, and have no direct role in
conflict resolution. On account of widespread insecurity, absence of rule of law and
governance issues, many international development organizations have suspended or
wound up their projects in the province. However, some civil society and development
organizations continue to work on micro-level projects in the education and health
sectors. They employ the local people for these projects.

Dynamics
Some fundamental issues or sub-conflicts that have led to the present conflict in
Balochistan include the conflicting national identity perspectives of the state and Baloch
nationalists; underrepresentation of the Baloch at the national level; grievances over lack
of political and fiscal autonomy and over development issues; and hybrid manifestations
of Baloch nationalism, i.e., a nationalist political discourse and insurgent tendencies
existing alongside each other.

Baloch nationalism has several structural and dynamic factors ranging from
underrepresentation in the federation of Pakistan and its institutions to issues of political
and fiscal autonomy and development. Some events and developments in recent years
including the murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti, enforced disappearances of Baloch people,
conflict-induced internal displacements, and increasing incidents of target killinghave
triggered the current Baloch insurgency.

Regional and global dynamics of the conflict in Balochistan are associated with the
provinces unique geographical location and geo-strategic significance with special
reference to the development of a seaport in Gwadar, Balochistans significance as a
transit route for proposed gas pipelines and the US-led war on terror in the
neighbourhood.

State Responses and Capacities

A number of political measures by the incumbent government have a conscious focus on
Balochistan, including the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, the Aghaz-e-
Huqooq-e-Balochistan package and the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Implementation
of these measures would be of significance in the context of a sense of alienation and
disempowerment among the Baloch. Another state response has come recently in the
form of recruitment of Baloch youth in Pakistan Army.

These political developments have received two types of responses: outright dismissal,
and scepticism about implementation due to issues of law and order, governance, the
civil bureaucracys relations with democratic governments, Balochistan-centre rapport,
and economic recession, etc.

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OCT-DEC 2010 Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

There do not appear to be any signs of an imminent halt in the Baloch insurgency.
However, it is perhaps a bit too early to assess the impact of the governments political
overtures.

Options for Peace and Security

The federal government should ensure the implementation of the 7th NFC Award, the
Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package, and the 18th Constitutional Amendment, boost
the capacity and resources of law enforcement agencies, release or produce in courts all
illegally detained and missing persons, improve vigilance on Balochistans borders with
Afghanistan and Iran, and provide employment and livelihood opportunities to the
Baloch.

The Balochistan government should work out a comprehensive roadmap for

development projects in the province and prioritize sectors such as education, health,
fisheries, livestock and mining. It should prepare and share with local and international
development organizations detailed proposals for such projects. It should also address
the concerns of development agencies by ensuring security and transparency in financial
matters. The Balochistan government should establish polytechnic institutes with a view
to train the local people as skilled workers.

Political parties should engage Baloch nationalist parties and leaders in deliberations to
evolve a consensus on how violence and insecurity can be reduced in Balochistan. They
should also keep pressing the federal government to implement the political and
constitutional measures it has announced for Balochistan.

The security forces must ensure that their actions do not violate the law and that there
are no extrajudicial killings, illegal detentions or enforced disappearances.

International actors working for peace and development can initiate small and local-
level projects in collaboration with the provincial government, particularly in the health
and education sectors. They must make a conscious effort to avoid upsetting the political
and cultural sensitivities of the Baloch people.

(The report is published in PIPS Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies,
Volume 3, Number 4. To buy or subscribe contact publications@san-pips.com)

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