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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

GR No. L-4433 May 29, 1953

PATENT HEALTH, plaintiff-respondent,

Vs.
ROMAN OMEGA, defendant-appellant.

Messrs. Roman Duterte, Cecilio Gillamac, Antolin Rubillos and Gaudioso Montecillo in representation of the appellant.
D. Victorino C. Teleron in representation of the appellee.

PAUL J.:

The payment of a payment is written as follows:

Villaba, Leyte, August 24, 1949.

This is to acknowledge receipt of the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600) from Health Patent,
Filipino citizen, of age, single, also a resident of Villaba, Leyte, like myself, as my indebtedness to her. I am
going to pay debt to her, her heirs, assigns and successors, in the said sum of P1,600 in Philippine currency,
as soon as possible or as soon as I have money.

This debt is not covered by any security because of the intimate relations of my family to her.

This sum covers my previous indebtedness to her which I received from her on May 4, 1947 and previous
thereto.

I hereby certify that I have indebtedness to her, before I exercise my right of repurchase of an agricultural
land, situated in Tag-alang, Villaba, Leyte, bearing Tax No. 2662, which I sold under her pact Of retro sale.

The Judge of Peace pronounces sentence ordering the payment of the debt within the term of four months counting from the
date of its promulgation, with costs.

At the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, before which this case was raised on appeal, both parties
filed a deed agreement with the following wording:

That, upon the face of the promissory note in question, it is apparent that no term is fixed therein and that its
performance is left to the will of the debtor-defendant. (Rec. On Appeal p.9)

That the questions Involved in the present action are purely questions of Law; viz.

(A) Whether or not the Justice of the Peace of Villaba, Leyte, Had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
present case and to fix a definite term for the payment of the indebtedness in question by the defendant by
Applying the Provisions of article 1128 of The Civil Code;

(B) Whether or not, the Court of First Instance has, consequently, an appellate jurisdiction in the present
action; (Rec. On Appeal, pp. 9-10)

And the Judge, declaring that the obligation is pure and unconditional, rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff ordering
the payment of the debt with interest and costs.

I appeal or appeal directly to this Court.

According to the agreement of facts submitted by the parties, the question to be resolved is as follows: if the payment period
has been left to the debtor's will, as in effect means the payment condition "as soon as possible or as soon as I Have money,
"" is the condition null?

Article 1115 of the Civil Code provides that "When the fulfillment of the condition depends on the exclusive will of the
debtor, the conditional obligation will be null." It must be null and void because, if the will of the debtor is fulfilled, it would
be impossible to recover the illusory the right of the creditor. Once the condition declared null, should the pure and
unconditional obligation be declared as well? We think not. If, by inadvertence or ignorance, the parties agreed on a
condition of payment contrary to the law, why should the condition be annulled, the principal obligation must be converted
into pure - demandable immediately - when its original intention was to grant the debtor Deadline for payment? To declare
the obligation pure is to impose a criterion completely different from the agreed one; Another period compatible with the
law and the will of the parties must be determined, and it is clear that the new condition should not depend solely on the
creditor: it is as unfair to leave it at the exclusive discretion of the debtor as to leave it at the sole discretion of the creditor. A
third party must determine that term, taking into account the circumstances under which the loan was granted. Therefore,
article 1128, inspired by a true sense of justice, provides that "if the obligation does not indicate a term, but of its nature and
circumstances, it is deduced that it was intended to be granted to the debtor, the courts shall determine the duration of the
debtor. Courts the duration of the term when it has been at the discretion of the debtor. "

Article 1115 is closely related to Article 1128 of the Civil Code, replacing this deficiency of the contract, caused by the
annulment of the condition of payment by express provision of Article 1115. Commenting on Article 1128, Manresa says:

The assumption of the first paragraph of this article, although similar, as already indicated, to the limitation,
which usually has in its effectiveness the immediate enforceability of pure obligations, is, however, different:
there was no obligation to grant In that case it would not be pure; Here, on the contrary, such a purpose
exists. That is why in the first case, the creditor's enforceability is not limited, but compliance by the debtor is
facilitated; And in the second, as there is a real term, that demandability appears limited.

The second paragraph of this article expresses, compared to 1115, the different importance of the term and
the condition. This can not be left to the will of the debtor, because it effects the existence of the obligation
itself; That if, because its influence does not reach so much, and to avoid that, in short, the obligation
contracted proved ineffective for never being fulfilled, the limitation is fixed to the judicial discretion.

In support of the theory of appeal that overturned the condition which depends exclusively on the will of the debtor,
immediate payment is required, the decision cited in Osmea against Rama, issued on September 9, 1909 under the
presentation of Judge Johnson, who says in part:

. . . It was said in the act of hearing of the matter in this Court, in recognition of the debt, quoted above, made
by the defendant, it had imposed the condition that the obligation would pay if consequia sell your home. If
this manifestation in its recognition of the debt could be considered as a condition, it would depend
exclusively on its will and was therefore void. (Art. 1115, Cod. Civ.) The recognition, therefore, was an
absolute recognition of the obligation, and sufficient to prevent the prescription of the action based on the
original contract "(14 Jur. Fil., 99)

But at Eleizegue against the Manila Lawn Tennis Club, President Arellano, as rapporteur, said:

Nor is it possible to conclude that the termination of the contract must be completely left at the mercy of the
tenant because the duration has been stipulated at his will.

The Civil Code has provided for this case in all kinds of obligations. In trying to term obligations generally it
has filled the vacuum of the previous legislation, regarding "the duration of the period, when it has been at
will of the debtor," and stipulates that the courts set in this case. (Art. 1128, para. 2.) In every contract, as the
writers feel, there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the benefit and a debtor who has the
obligation to fulfill the benefit. In bilateral contracts, the contracting parties are mutually creditor and debtor:
in this lease, the lessee is liable for the benefits listed in article 1554, and debtor in respect of those detailed in
1555 and 1561. Term to fulfill this last obligation is the one that has remained at the discretion of the debtor.
This period is the one that must be fixed by the courts.

The only possible action, according to the terms of the contract, is the one directed to the judge determining
this period, (2 Jur. Fil., 325.)

In Levy Brothers against Paterno, under the presentation of the Map Magistrate, this Court said:

Having forced the defendant to pay its debt to the plaintiffs gradually as stated in the voucher cars, it is seen
that such obligation is to run, since neither can be enforced compliance course, nor depends on the existence
of the same in the Realization of any eventual event. However, with such a time obligation, it does not
however have a certain date for compliance, resulting in an undetermined term, or the duration of which has
not been fixed by the partners when concluding the contract. It is also clear that the term is granted to the sole
benefit of the damandado and own comfort of the same, since given the terms of the voucher, the plaintiffs do
not win anything with the immediate enforceability of the obligation. There is not even any interest in the
debt agreed during the time that the defendant could take to pay the debt. For this reason, and in any way that
is considered the case, is undoubtedly falls under the provision of article 1128 of the Civil Code. . .:

Manifestly deficient in the obligation to file a notice regarding the duration of the term that is granted without
the slightest doubt in favor of the debtor, or the defendant, must be supplemented by a judicial decision that
determines that duration in Use of the faculty expressly granted to the Courts, for that purpose, by the legal
provision that has just been transcribed. I hereby exercise the right to exercise this power in the present case
by fixing the duration of the term on the basis of having to pay the debt at the rate of P200 monthly. And we
certainly do not see abuse of judicial discretion in the designation of such a fee, given the importance of the
obligation and the absence of any stipulation of interest in favor of the creditors. (18 Jur. Fil., 357.)

In Seoane v. Franco, as Judge Moreland was rapporteur, this Court said:

From these decisions it is evident that the document being tried in this case is one in which the payment
period is left at the discretion of the mortgage debtor. This being the case, action should have been taken in
order to indicate the date on which the obligation had to expire and be payable. Until such action had been
 taken, it was not necessary to initiate a lawsuit to recover the amount mentioned in the instrument. It is
therefore evident that the action was premature. The document should have been judged before its expiration.
Therefore, the action must be dismissed.

Ordinarily, when an action of this nature is exceeded, the plaintiff may, at once, bring suit to set the date on
which the deed must expire. . . . (24 Jur. Fil., 320)

Yu Chin Piao against Lim Tuaco under the presentation of Judge Moreland, was reiterated for the fourth time the doctrine
adopted in previous decisions that "When a lease does not stipulate any deadline but the nature of it and the circumstances
can It is inferred that the term of the lease is at the discretion of the lessee, or when the power to fix that term lies solely with
the lessee, the triubnals shall fix their duration. (33 Jur. Fil., 98)

And against Jose Gonzales, the two promissory notes disponian disputed that the debt was payable "as soon as possible".
Resolving the contest, this Court, through the Imperial Magistrate, said:

It is practically admitted by the parties that the consequences arising from the two promissory notes should be
governed by said article, (Art. 1128, Civ. Code) inasmuch as it was the intention of the plaintiff, evidenced
by the terms of the said notes , To grant the debtor a period within which to pay the debts. . . . The defendant
contends that art. 1113 of the Civil Code should be applied inasmuch as the obligations derived from the
promisory notes were demandable from the time of their execution,. . . .

We hold that the two promissory notes are governed by art. 1128 because under the terms thereof the plaintiff
intended to grant the defendant a period within which to pay his debts. As the promissory notes do not fix this
period, it is for the court to fix the same. (66 Phil., 369)

After considering with deternity the five decisions cited and that of Osmena against Rama, we conclude that when the term
of payment of an obligation is left to the exclusive will of the debtor, that condition must be annulled; But its annulment
does not make the obligation simple and unconditional; The recourse of the creditor in such case is to go to the court to
request the fixing of the term of the payment.

That the Judge of Peace of Villaba, Leyte, has jurisdiction over the present case there is no doubt, since the claim does not
claim more than the payment of the amount of P1,600: the Court of First Instance of Leyte, therefore, Also has jurisdiction
appealed.

As the plaintiff claims payment of the obligation without having previously obtained from the court the fixing of the
payment term, the filing of its claim is premature. (Seoane against Franco, supra)

The appealed decision is reversed with costs against the appellant-appellant.

Tuason, Montemayor, juice and Labrador, JJ., Concur.

Separate Opinions

FAIR, Bengzon and REYES, JJ, concurring..:

We concur in the result. However, we believe that article 1115 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. The case is governed by
article 1128.

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