Are the limbs of Gods body free?

Yes, if He
wants so Free will in and before Vekaantha
Elisa Freschi, IKGA, Vienna
April 29, 2014

Contents
1 Methodological Foreword 2

2 Vekaantha 3

3 Vekaanthas philosophical and theological background 4

3.1 Vekaanthas Mms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 The Vaiava background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4 Rmnuja: Humans wish, God acts 6

4.1 God and evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 The root of good intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3 Vekaantha on karman and personal autonomy . . . . . . . . . 14

5 Ontology vs. ethics 15

5.1 Sudaranasri on Gods wishing free will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

6 A tentative solution 18

1 Methodological Foreword
As a scholar trained in Western Academia, one has at least three choices while
dealing with Sanskrit Philosophy:
1. One can treat it as if it were Western philosophy and discuss, e.g., of
monotonic or non-monotonic logic in Nyya.
2. One can deal with it in its own terms, e.g., by describing the inner-
Mms controversy about whether one has to study the Veda because
of the prescription to study it or because of the prescription to teach it
(since, in order for someone to teach, someone else must be learning from
him).

1
With the following as a possible variant:
2. One can deal with a problem in its own, Sanskrit terms, and only after-
wards look for parallels in Western philosophy.
3. One can attempt a compromise, looking at the form assumed by a certain
topic in Sanskrit philosophy.
In the case of the topic of this volume, and especially of free will, it is hard to
avoid the third approach. In fact, whereas the topic of free will is one of the
major Leitmotivs running throughout the whole history of Western Philosophy,
on a pair with ontology and epistemology, it is not formulated as a distinct topic
in Sanskrit philosophy (see Freschi 2013). Some authors have even went as far
as to declare that it may be only the relic of a very particular Hebrew myth
[the Fall from Eden, EF], a myth of little interest to Buddhists (and to Indians
in general, the author could have added) (Gareld 2014). However, as it will
be shown below, sections 4 and 5.1, the Fall from Eden is not the only possible
trigger of the problem of free will.
The reasons for the major presence/relative absence of the topic are dicult
to deterministically pinpoint, given that in India as in the West there have been
theistic and soteriological traditions for which the topic could have become rele-
vant (in the form of the debate about Gods omnipotence vs. human autonomy
(svtantrya) or in the form of what can people reasonably hope to achieve in
a soteriological path). However, one can notice in general that moral philoso-
phy has to be carefully looked for in Indian texts and is usually not a separate
topic of investigation (see Matilal 2002). Similarly, one can look for implicit
treatments of free will in theological contexts and in philosophy of action ones,
and this search for an implicit concept of free will will also animate the present
paper. Last, the label free will is as such the result of specic debates within
Christian philosophy. The authors I will examine rather speak of autonomy
(svtantrya). I decided to keep the denomination free will as the challenge to
think about a problem through dierent frames.
Last, I will discuss free will until Vekaantha. This means that I will
leave out all discussions concerning the later (see Raman 2007) split between
Vaakalai and Tekalai schools. Doctrinal dierences between the three au-
thors considered, i.e., Rmnuja, Sudarana Sri and Vekaantha, will be
highlighted whenever noticed.1

2 Vekaantha
Vekaantha (also known with the honoric title Vednta Deika, traditional
dates 12691370)2 is one of the most prolic and multi-faceted personalities
1A further, personal, premiss is here needed: The present author cannot help believing in
free will. She will try to be aware of her prejudices in favour of it and to balance them with
some deterministic skepticism.
2 See Neevel 1977, pp. 1416 for an explanation of these dates through the hypothesis that

the life-spans of the great masters of r Vaiavism have been prolonged in order to connect

2
of Indian philosophy. He attempted to create a philosophic system which was
meant to broaden Rmnujas Viidvaita Vednta and make it into a more
comprehensive philosophical system. Due to its ambition of comprehensiveness,
it is legitimate to expect from Vekaanthas system that it deals also with
questions relating to the nature of action and of our contribution to it, and,
thus, ultimately with the issue of free will. In order to inquire about it, one
can start by looking at Vekaanthas background. On the one hand, there
is Vekaanthas relation towards (Prva) Mms and Vednta (and other
Indian philosophical systems), on the other his relation with the Vaiava re-
ligious literature he considers authoritative (the Pcartra gamas and the
hymns of the vrs). Given the fact that most researches on Indian philosophy
focus on Sanskrit texts, one must be aware of the risk of neglecting the latter
component, which is predominant in Vekaanthas non-Sanskrit production.

3 Vekaanthas philosophical and theological

background
3.1 Vekaanthas Mms
Venkatanathas relation towards Mms has two aspects, since on the one
hand he wrote works dedicated to Prva Mms, and on the other he used it
as a crucial element in his enlarged Viidvaita Vednta system (see Freschi
forthcomingb). This makes a short excursus in the Mms theory of free will
necessary. Like many other schools of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy (see Dasti
and Bryant 2013), the Mms did not explicitly deal with the topic of free
will. Nonetheless, its theory of action presupposes that there are real agents and
that these can be held responsible for their actions. In this sense, its concept
of duty and of responsibility takes free will as self-assumed, as in the Kantian
principle that Ought entails Can (see Capozzi 1999 and cf. Mizrahi 2009).
A further problem arises in this connection, though. In fact, at rst sight
the world-order imagined by Mmsakas seems to be strictly deterministic:
according to the Veda, if one sacrices in the proper way, one will reach the
sacrices goal mechanically and with no space for unexpected outcomes. One
might reply to this objection by highlighting the fact that for Mmsakas the
Veda is only a deontic authority and that, therefore, it does not state that who-
ever sacrices will reach the sacrices result, but rather prescribes sacrices.
The connection with the result is then dierently interpreted by Prbhkara
and Bha Mmsakas, with the former claiming that the desire for the re-
sult is only mentioned in the Vedic prescriptions in order to identify the per-
son who should perform the sacrice (see Freschi 2012a, Freschi 2014). Even
Kumrila, who sees the arousal of the result as a necessary consequence of the
Vedas validity, is quite rm in maintaining that the Veda is valid only insofar
as it prescribes actions, and not as the describer of states of aairs. Thus, a de-
them directly to each other.

3
scriptive interpretation of Mms as upholding a theory of the Vedic validity
which requires a mechanistic vision of the world is inconsistent, since it would
be based on a descriptive approach to the Veda.
However, Viidvaita Vednta authors explicitly admit that the Veda can
also communicate descriptive contents, especially as regards the existence of
God Himself. Does this also mean that for Vekaantha, accordingly, sacrices
must deliver their fruits and that people who have sacriced will obtain the
sacrices results, with no possible exception? There is an interesting passage
in the rBhya in which Rmnuja explains that at a sacrice, God is not like
a guest:
By contrast, the Deity has been called by the person who has un-
dertaken the [ritual] action | He receives the object he wishes, but
it is not the case that through that He becomes the promoter of the
[ritual action] || 212 ||3
This might imply that God is not free not to deliver the result.4 Whereas a
guest might leave abruptly and without giving anything back, God is indeed
dierent. However, neither Rmnuja nor Vekaantha in his commentary
(called Tattvak) on the rBhya elaborate on this consequence and rather
focus on what promotes the sacrice (as evident already in v. 212d).
And even if God were bound to deliver results such as rain or sons, would
this also mean that a sacricer will also reach Gods presence, out of the sheer
performance of sacrices? This is a moot point, since moka liberation is not
mentioned in the Vedas, which instead prescribe sacrices for people who desire
svarga. This leaves one with the problem of the understanding of the term
svarga: temporary happiness or absolute happiness, as happens when one is at
the presence of God? Moreover, de facto, according to Viidvaita Vednta
authors the ritual way, though mandatory, is precluded as an independent way
of salvation (see below, section 4.2 for Rmnujas evaluation of the Vedic and
the r Vaiava ways to salvation and section 4.3 for Vekaantha on the same
topic). One sacrices, but one will never be able to accomplish sacrices in the
rigorous way prescribed. One will, thus, always be insucient and will always
stand ultimately in need of Gods intervention. And here the properly Vaiava
background steps in.

3.2 The Vaiava background

The pre-Rmnuja Vaiava religious texts follow a dierent path, since many
of them emphasise the worthlessness of the poet (the vr) or of his poetical
persona (often a woman) and his/her desperate need of Gods mercy, which is the
only thing which could save him/her (see Clooney 2014). Interestingly enough,
even in these texts, free will is not denied, but rather superseded by Gods
3 kriyprayuktapuruasamht hi devat | sanidhatte tadirtha na tatas tatprayuk-

tat || An. n.
angar
ac
arya 1941
4 On the interesting and related topic of Gods free will, see McCrea forthcoming, which is

the text of a lecture he delivered in Vienna, 14.6.2013.

4
intervention, who can save also a wicked sinner. The protagonist is desperate
because of her/his sins (see, e.g., Tiruvymoi 5.4.13, 5.9.1 and 5.9.6, and
10.3.4, translated and discussed in Clooney 2014) and states that s/he cannot
achieve anything on his/her own. The possibility to achieve salvation through
other ways (most notably, through the bhaktimrga, which is based on ones love
for God) is not ruled out. One could theoretically be able to love God and to be
saved through that. De facto, however, the protagonists of the vrs hymns
feel unable even to do that. Even their love is not perfect, and it is exactly
the awareness of ones unworthiness and imperfection that makes one desperate
enough to be able to completely surrender (prapatti) to God.5

4 Rmnuja: Humans wish, God acts

As discussed in the introduction, free will was not a main topic in Indian phi-
losophy, and discussions about it need rather to be looked for either at partly
unexpected places (e.g., within logical discussions about agency) or non philo-
sophical texts and their commentaries, most notably the Mahbhrata and espe-
cially the Bhagavadgt. Nonetheless, a precious exception is oered by a short
passage in Rmnujas Vedrthasagraha, which focuses on a constellation of
topics quite similar to the one Western readers are accustomed to:

[Obj.:] But you have said that the Supreme Self is the inner ruler
of each living being and that everything is under His control. Such
being the case, there appears to be no person eligible (adhikrin)
to be [addressed by] the injunctions and prohibitions found in the
Sacred Texts. [For,] one is t to [be addressed by] injunctions or
prescriptions if being able to undertake or refrain from an action
out of his own understanding (buddhi) only they perform or do not
perform [a prescribed or prohibited action], and such a [t person] is
not encountered in common experience. The fact that the Supreme
Self is the ruler of everything has been substantiated insofar as He is
the one who causes [others] to do, He is the promoter of everyone in
regard to every sort of undertaking. And one also nds in the Sacred
Texts: He alone causes the person whom He wishes to lead out of
these worlds, to perform a good deed. He alone causes the person
whom He wishes to fall down to perform an evil deed.6 Thus, since
He is the one who causes [people] to perform good or evil deeds, He
is cruel.
[R:] To this, we answer: The Supreme Self, abiding as the Entire to
which all parts belong, arranged for all conscious beings in a general
way the whole multitude of undertakings and ceasings consisting of
the the connection (yoga) with the power to think,7 the connection
5 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the concept of prapatti, see Raman 2007.
6 Kauitaki Upaniad 3.8. The same passage is quoted also in the rBhya ad 2.3.6.40.
7 For an explanation of what this entails, see below, section 5.1.

5
 with the power to undertake and [the connection with the power
to cease]. He then entered [into each conscious being?] being their
support in order to realise these [powers] and He rules as one who
permits [that each conscious being undertakes the action s/he wants
to undertake]. Therefore, [each conscious being], having received the
power [to think, undertake or cease an action], undertakes, ceases
to act or [thinks] from himself/herself alone. The Supreme Self ob-
serves the one who acts so without interfering (udsin). Therefore,
everything is logical. In contrast [to what the opponent claimed],
the fact of causing to do good or evil acts is the content of a specic
arrangement (vyavasth), it is not common to all [actions without
distinction].8

This last sentence implies that God does indeed inuence the actions performed
by human beings, but that this happens in a ruled way, on the basis of their
intentions and not in all cases indiscriminately. As a matter of fact, there is
space for Gods intervention on human actions, although He only strengthens
ones intention. The following lines explain that God is well-inclined towards
those who are themselves prone to good actions:
A dierent case (tu) is that of a person who rst undertook actions
out of himself/herself alone, which were beyond measure in agree-
ment [with Gods will]. God, pleased, gives her the connection to a
benevolent (kalya) mind and by so doing He puts her in motion
towards virtue (kalya). A person who, by contrast, undertakes ac-
tions which are beyond measure hostile [to Gods will], receives from
God a cruel mind. By so doing, God Himself puts her in motion
towards cruel deeds. As it has been said by God: To those who are
devout and are constantly concentrated I, pleased, give the connec-
tion with an intention through which they can reach me. In order to
have compassion of them alone I, residing in the nature of the Self,
destroy the obscurity produced by ignorance through the brilliant
ame of knowledge. For ever and ever I send these evil, vicious
and vile people in sasric Asuric births only (BhG 10.1011 and
16.19).9
8 nanu ca sarvasya janto paramtm antarym tanniymya ca sarvam ity uktam; eva

ca sati vidhiniedhastr adhikr na dyate; ya svabuddhyaiva pravttinivttiakta,

sa eva kuryt na kuryd iti vidhiniedhayogya; na caia dyate; sarvasmin pravttijte sar-
vasya preraka paramtm krayit iti tasya sarvaniyamana pratipditam. ryate ca ea
eva sdhukarma krayati ta yam ebhyo lokebhya unninati, ea eva asdhukarma kray-
ati tam yam adho ninati iti sdhvasdhukarmakrayittvt nairghya ca. atrocyate
sarvem eva cetann cicchaktiyoga pravttiaktiyoga itydisarva pravttinivtti-
parikara smnyena savidhya, tannirvahaya taddhro bhtv anta praviya, anu-
manttay ca niyamana kurvan eitvena avasthita paramtm. etad hitaaktis san
pravttinivttydi svayam eva kurute; eva kurvam kama paramtm udsna ste
ata sarvam upapannam.
sdhvasdhukarmakrayittva tu vyavasthitaviaya, na sarvasdhraam (S astr 1894,
pp. 138141).
9 yas tu prva svayam eva atimtram nuklye pravtta ta prati prta svayam eva bha-

6
 A discussion similar to the Vedrthasagraha one can be found also in
Rmnujas rbhya, where the triggers are again on the one hand the prob-
lem of the signicance of prescriptions (favouring free will), and on the other
hand some passages from the BS and from the Sacred Texts, which seem to
suggest that there is no independent will on the side of conscious beings:
This agency of the individual soul, is it independent, or does it rely
on the supreme soul?
What is the prima facie view?
That it is independent, for if it were dependent on the supreme
soul, there would be the undesired consequence that prescriptions
and prohibitions would be meaningless. In fact, only one who is able
to initiate an action or cease it out of its own idea can be enjoined.
Therefore, he must be an independent agent. This is the prima facie
view. To this, [BS 2.3.40 says:] By contrast, this [agency] is due
to someone else (the supreme soul), because of the Sacred
Texts [stating it].10

After this objection, it is again the problem of the signicance of prescriptions

and prohibitions which makes the ball keep rolling. In the commentary to the
next stra, the siddhntin answers to this problem as follows:
The meaning of [BS 2.3.41] is that in all actions, an eort is done by
the person. After having seen the exertion, the supreme soul who
is the inner ruler causes [the person] to act by means of giving him
his permission.11 Without the permission of the supreme soul, the
[persons] could not act.
Why is it so?
Because [otherwise] what has been prescribed or prohib-
ited would become meaningless and because of other rea-
sons. Because of other reasons (di) includes [Gods] favouring
gavn kalyabuddhiyogadna kurvan kalye pravartayati. ya puna atimtra prtik-
lye pravtta tasya tu krr buddhi dadan svayam eva krrev eva karmasu prerayati
bhagavn. yathokta bhagavat tem satatayuktn bhajat prtiprvakam | dadmi
buddhiyoga ta tena mm upaynti te || tem evnukamprtham aham ajnaja tama
| naymy tmabhvastho jnadpena bhsvat || tn aha dviata krrn sasreu
nardhamn | kipmy ajasram aubhn surv eva yoniu || iti || [BhG 10.1011 and 16.19]
astr 1894, pp. 141142).
(S
10 ida jvasya karttva ki svtantryea? uta paramtmyattam iti. ki prptam. sv-

tantryeeti. paramtmyattatve hi vidhiniedhastrnarthakya prasajyeta. yo hi svabud-

dhy pravttinivttyrambhaakta, sa eva niyojyo bhavati. ata svtantryesya karttvam
iti prpte bhidhyate part tu tac chrute iti (rBh ad BS 2.3.40). My interpretation of
BS 2.3.40 is supported by Rmnujas gloss: tuabda paka vyvartayati. tat karttvam
asya jvasya part paramtmana eva hetor bhavati. kuta. rute.
11 anumati, also called mantraa or abhyanujna in comparable discussions, indicates the

act of inciting of a superior person in regard to his inferior. For this technical term, found
already in Prva Mms, see Freschi 2012b, section 2.2.10. For its use in the context of
free will, see below, section 5.1.

7
 or restraining [people]. For instance, if two people have a common
wealth, this cannot become the property of the one or the other
unless the other one agrees.12

4.1 God and evil

The fact that God causes people to act, once they have conceived the wish to
undertake an activity leads to a problem which is current in many theodicies,
that is, why does not God prevent evil, although He is omnipotent? Rmnuja
oers the following answer:
Moreover, [if] the permission of one of the two is performed au-
tonomously, the result belongs to that person alone. It has been
explained in the explanation about the Skhya doctrine13 that the
fact that the one who is able to make [people] desist from evil acts
permits [them] does not procure that He is cruel.14
The reference is to rBh ad 2.2.3, where again BhG 16.19 is quoted and it is
said that God observes people conceive intentions without interfering. Next:
He, the revered supreme person, whose desires are achieved [with-
out any possible obstruction],15 omniscient, who can realise by [His
own] intention (satyasakalpa),16 who undertakes His play in accor-
dance with His own greatness, arranges into two the acts, insofar as
some are suitable and some are not. Next He assigns to all souls
in a common way their power to rule, which regards [their] bod-
ies, sense-faculties, etc., which are t as the material cause of the
[power to act]. Then, He shows [them] a Sacred Text which com-
municates His own command (sana) and, after having entered [in
each person] as [their] inner soul in order to subduing them, He
keeps on controlling by means of permissions. These people, who
have obtained the power [to act] from Him, whose [power to act]
has been assigned by Him to sense-faculties, bodies and [mind], and
who have Him as substrate, undertake good and evil acts accord-
ing to their own wishes by themselves alone. And therefore, [God],
who knows who has been performing good deeds in accord with His
12 sarvsu kriysu puruea kta prayatnam udyogam apekyntarym paramtm

tadanumatidnena pravartayati ; paramtmnumatim antaresya pravttir nopapadyate

ity artha. kuta etat. vihitapratiiddhvaiyarthydibhya. diabdennugrahanigrahdayo
ghyante. yath dvayo sdhrae dhane parasvatvpdanam anyatarnumatim antarea
nopapadyate (rBh ad BS 2.3.41).
13 This refers to the commentary on BS 2.2.19, where Skhya is discussed. The relevant

portion occurs in rBh ad 2.2.3, see immediately below.

14 athptarnumatiti svenaiva kteti tatphala tasyaiva bhavati. ppakarmasu nivar-

tanaaktasypy anumanttva na nirdayatvam vahatti skhyasamayanirpae pratipdi-

tam (rBh ad BS 2.3.41).
15 This is a standard attribute of God in Viidvaita Vednta, found, e.g., also in

Vekaanthas Tattvamuktkalpa.
16 For this attribute, see ChUp 3.14.2 and rBh ad 3.2.11 and ad 4.4.89.

8
 command, gladdens [them] through [the four human aims, namely]
dharma, success, pleasure and liberation. By contrast (ca), He con-
nects those who transgress His command to the opposite of the [four
human aims].
Therefore, there is no room for the objections about the fact that
the [human] autonomy would be diminished. In fact, compassion
independent of ones own purpose consists in the fact that one cannot
bear someone elses suerance. And this [compassion], when it is
present also towards the ones who seek to transgress His command,
does not amount to a virtue (gua). On the contrary, it procures
only that one is no longer a full person (apustva17 ). In this case (of
a person transgressing Gods command) only holding him back is a
virtue, because otherwise there would be the undesired consequence
that stopping a hostile person is not a virtue.18
The next objection in rBh ad 2.3.41 resembles the one discussed in the
Vedrthasagraha, above, with the same quote from Kauitaki Upaniad 3.8.19
The answer by the siddhntin is the following one:

It must be said [in reply]: This (intervention of God) is not common

to all [without distinction]. The revered one Himself favours the
person who undertakes an action while being determined to be in
harmony with the highest person, who lies beyond each measure,
and He produces interest for the most benevolent acts, which are
the tools to reach [Him], in such a person. He [also] holds back
the person who undertakes an action while being determined to be
against the One beyond measure and produces interest for acts which
lead down [to hell] and which are contrary to [His] reach in such a
17 Literally:the state of a eunuch.
18 sa bhagavn puruottamo vptasamastakma sarvaja sarvevara satyasakalpa
svamhtmynuguallpravtta etni karmi samcnni, etny asamcnnti karmad-
vaividhya savidhya, tadupdnocitadehendriydika tanniyamaakti ca sarve
ketrajn smnyena pradiya, svasanvabodhi stra ca pradarya, tadu-
pasahrrtha cntartmataynupraviya, anumanttay ca niyacchs tihati. [te]
ketrajs tu tadhitaaktaya tatpradiakaraakalevardik taddhr ca svayam eva
svecchnuguyena puypuyarpe karma updadate. tata ca puyarpakarmakria
svasannuvartina jtv dharmrthakmamokair vardhayate; santivartana ca tad-
viparyayair yojayati.
ata svtantrydivaikalyacodyni nvaka[, EF] labhante. day hi nma svrthani-
rapek paradukhsahiut. s ca svasantivttivyavasyiny api vartamn na guy-
vakalpate; pratyutpustvam evvahati. tannigraha eva tatra gua; anyath atruni-
grahdnm aguatvaprasagt.
yathoktam, te satatayuktn bhajat prtiprvakam | dadmi buddhiyoga ta
yena mm upaynti te || tem evnukamprtham aham ajnaja tama | naymytmab-
hvastho jnadpena bhsvat iti (rBh ad BS 2.2.3). The passage ends (again) with a
quote from the BhG, namely BhG 10.1011.
19 nanv evam, ea hy eva sdhu karma krayati ta yam ebhyo lokebhya unninati | ea

evsdhu karma krayati ta yam adho ninati ity unniay dhoninay ca svayam eva
sdhvasdhun karma krayatty etan nopapadyate (rBh ad BS 2.3.41).

9
 person.20
Next follow the same quotes from the BhG (10.1011 and 16.19), but within
longer passages (BhG 10.811 and BhG 16.819), again understood as meaning
that God leads people towards the direction they have wished for themselves.

4.2 The root of good intentions

A possible further question would be: Who inclines people towards God or
against Him? What, if not God Himself? The rBh does not raise the problem
in the adhikaraa quoted above. However, one might suggest that Rmnuja, as
sharing the pan-Indian belief in the system of karman, would have if asked
answered that one conceives good intentions because of previous virtuous births.
But the objector in the Vedrthasagraha just keeps quiet and karman is only
hinted at:
This highest person who is the supreme Brahman can only be
reached through devotion (bhakti) which has no other purpose,21 is
uninterrupted, is fond of the Excellent one,and has the form of med-
itation (anudhyna) which has reached the level of making [Him]
clearly perceptible.22 This devotion is by one whose multitude of
sins ( ppa) gathered through endless births have been destroyed by
the unsurpassed accumulation of good deeds ( puya), who is turned
towards Him because he has taken refuge at the lotus-feet of the
highest person, and who is endowed with the virtues of equanimity,
self-control, ascetic power (tapas), purity, patience, sincerity, dis-
cernment between situations in which fear is needed and situations
in which no fear is appropriate, generosity, non-violence and other
[similar virtues] which he has been gathering day by day through the
awareness of the real essence of the truth which he has learnt through
the Sacred Texts and which has been nourished by the teaching of a
good teacher. [The devotee, furthermore,] is rm in bringing to their
end (upasah-)23 the xed and occasional ritual which have the ap-
pearance (vea) of pleasing the highest person and are adequate for
[his] caste and stage of life, and in shunning the prohibited [acts]. He
has laid down (nyas-) his self at the lotus-feet of the highest person,
20 ucyate. etan na sarvasdhraam. yas tv atimtraparamapurunuklye vyavasita pra-
vartate, tam anugan bhagavn svayam eva svaprpty upyev atikalyeu karmasv eva
ruci janayati. ya ctimtraprtiklye vyavasita pravartate, ta nighan svaprptivirod-
hiv adhogatisdhaneu karmasu ruci janayati (rBh ad BS 2.3.41).
21 That is, nothing is aimed at through devotion, which is an end in itself.
22 On the possibility of attaining perception of God through intense meditation see the

opposite opinions by Vekaantha (SM ad 1.1.4) and Ymuna (tmasiddhi), also discussed
in Freschi forthcominga.
23 In this context, I would have rather expected the mention of the performance (anuhna)

of the rituals. Perhaps the mention of their upasahti is meant to indirectly stress the fact
that one has to continue performing them, even after having undertaken the bhakti-path.
Raghavachar (1978, p. 98) does not stress this term and translates: He is devoted to the
performance of the nitya and naimittika duties.

10
 and he has had the darkness of his own death dispersed (vidhvasta)
through the gratuitous deeds (prasda) of the supremely compas-
sionate highest person, who is pleased by incessant praise, recol-
lection, eorts (yatana), repetition [of His name] (krtana), hearing
of [His] virtues, telling [about them], meditation (dhyna), bowing,
obeisance (prama), and similar [acts of devotion], caused to be by
devotion to Him.24
The passage stresses the importance of ones commitment to God. But how
does this commitment get started? Rmnuja suggests the need to get rid
presumably: to rst get rid of ones accumulated sins (see above, the rst
emphasised passage), through the accumulation of an unsurpassed amount
of good deeds. This presumably means that these need to be accumulated
through a large number of previous births a fact which would ipso facto
devoid one present lifes actions of their presumed autonomy. In fact, if one
had to rst accumulate endless good deeds, in the present life one could only
struggle to accumulate good deeds in order to erase the evil ones, with no
hope of achieving the possibility to venerate God. However, the mention of
the accumulation of good deeds is closely followed by that of aragati taking
refuge, a juxtaposition which is present also elsewhere in Rmnuja. Consider
for instance this passage (whose rst part has been quoted above, section 4.1).

By means of refuting endless intolerable oences accumulated in be-

ginningless and endless eras, [which amounts to] just desisting from
the determination to transgress His own command [a person] un-
dertakes action by herself alone, for the sake of augmenting beyond
measure [her] pleasure.25
More explicit is the following passage of Rmnujas commentary on the BhG,
where the problem of who is able to start bhaktiyoga is dealt with:

Arjuna was dejected, seeing that bhaktiyoga can be practised suc-

cessfully [only] by a person who is free from all sins and to whom
the Blessed One is inexpressibly dear, seeing further that the sins
which are inimical to starting bhaktiyoga are innite and the dharmas
which are in the form of expiation [for them], to be done in a limited
24 so yam parabrahmabhta puruottama niratiayapuyasacayakeajan-
mopacitappare paramapuruacararavindaaragatijanitatadbhimukhyasya
sadcryopadeopabhitastrdhigatatattvaythtmyvabodhaprvakharaharupacyamna-
amadamatapaaucakamrjavabhaybhayasthnavivekadayhisdytmaguopetasya
varramocitaparamapururdhanaveanityanaimittikakarmopa-
sahtiniiddhaparihranihasya parapuruacararavindayugalanyastt-
mtmyasya tadbhaktikritnavaratastutismtinamasktiyatanakrtanagua-
ravaavacanadhynrcanapramdiprtaparamakruikapuruottamaprasdavidhvastasvntadhvntasya
ananyaprayojannavarataniratiayapriyaviadatamapratyakatpannnudhynarpabhaktyekalabhya
astr 1894, pp. 142144). Emphasis added.
S
25 svasantivttivyavasyanivttimtrendyanantakalpopacitadurviahnantpardhnagkrea

niratiayasukhasavddaye svayam eva prayatate (rBh ad BS 2.2.3).

11
 time,26 do not help in overcoming them [and] that he was therefore
unworthy of starting bhaktiyoga. Then, the Blessed One said, Aban-
doning all dharmas, take refuge in me alone, thus driving away his
sorrow. There are sins, hoarded up from beginningless time, of
various types, endless, [which are] obstacles to [your] undertaking
bhaktiyoga. There are expiatory rites for each of these [actions] such
as kcchra, cndryaa, [and others, including] agnioma etc. var-
ious, eternal, which are dicult to do for one such as you who has
little time. [Therefore], renouncing all [these] dharmas, in order to
succeed in beginning bhaktiyoga, take refuge in me alone. I, who am
supremely compassionate, the Refuge of the entire would impervious
to distinctions, the Ocean of Compassion for those who seek me, I
will free you from all those sins which have been spoken of, which
are obstacles to beginning that bhakti towards the essential nature.
Do not grieve.27

This seems28 to mean that taking refuge in God or performing the appropriate
expiation rites constitutes a shortcut for having all ones sins deleted and being
thus able to start venerating God. Together with the passages mentioned above,
this would mean that one should take refuge in God before being able to conceive
good intentions, since the accumulated sins would otherwise hinder one. As a
consequence to that, there seems to be no possibility of autonomous decisions
for one who has not taken refuge nor performed expiations. S/he will be pray
of his or her previous sins and not be able to start into the path of veneration
to God. This also means that atheists could only regain their possibility of
autonomous decisions through the hard path of the Vedic expiation rites. What
seems to be self-evident, by contrast, is that one can autonomously decide to
undertake expiation rites, to turn to God as ones refuge or to refrain from both.
Although accumulated sins may hinder ones actions, they seem not to be able
to hinder ones intentions.
26 I think that the reading aparimitaklaktai, found in BhGBhasya3 suits better the

context. Accordingly, I would translate as follows: which can only be done in an unlimited
time. Vekaanthas commentary shows that already at his time both readings were current,
since he discusses both, see below, section 4.3.
27 Translation by Srilata Raman (Raman 2007, pp. 3839). athav, sarvappavinirmuk-

ttyarthabhagavatpriyapuruanirvartyatvd bhaktiyogasya tadrambhavirodhippnm

nantyc ca tatpryacittarpair dharmai aparimitaklaktais te dustaratayt-
mano bhaktiyogrambhnarhatm locya ocato rjunasya okam apanudan rbhagavn
uvca sarvadharmn parityajya mm eka araa vraja iti. bhaktiyogrambhavi-
rodhyandiklasacitannvidhnantappnugun tattatpryacittarpn kcchracn-
dryaakmavaivnaraprjpatyavrtapatipavitreitrivdagniomdikn nnvidhn
anants tvay parimitaklavartin duranuhnn sarvn dharmn parityajya bhak-
tiyogrambhasiddhaye mm eka paramakruikam anlocitavieealokaarayam
ritavtsalyajaladhi araa prapadyasva. aha tv sarvappebhyo yathoditasvar-
pabhaktyrambhavirodhibhya sarvebhya ppebhyo mokayiymi m uca (Gtbhya
ad 18.66, BhGBhasya3). Emphasised letters are absent in Raman 2007, p. 190.
28 Caution is needed, since the BhG addresses a specic devout, namely Arjuna, and it is

not self-evident that its teaching can apply to all human beings.

12
 Summing up, it seems that Rmnuja upheld at least phenomenologically,
a form of compatibilism. Intentions need the support of God to be turned into
actions, but one can conceive independently the desire to take refuge in God
and this is the root of ones future attitudes and deeds.

4.3 Vekaantha on karman and personal autonomy

Some further elements can be gathered from Vekaanthas commentary (called
Ttparyacandrik) on Rmnujas Gtabhya ad 18.66. There, Vekaantha
quotes several passages (possibly from the Bhgu Sahit) to the eect that
evil deeds need to be overcome before undertaking bhakti. But then he also
states that this path is impossible:
Out of being free from sins [arises ones] extreme fondness for the
Lord. In fact, it is said For people whose sins are destroyed, the
devotion for Ka is produced (Bhgu Sahit 30.128). Having
in view Through a heap of obstacles the devotion of people is held
back.29 [Ka] said: Since the sins which are inimical to
starting bhaktiyoga are innite. According to in thousands of
rebirths the impossibility to delay in the reading to be done in a
limited time is better suited. [. . . ] Through that, it is suggested
that the tool (expiatory rites) cannot be accomplished.30
The same concept is repeated slightly thereafter:

[There are expiatory rites for each of these [actions], [. . . ],

which are dicult to do] for one such as you who has little
time means that one has only one body. Arjunas grief derives ex-
actly from the assessment that the very dicult performances which
he should realise could only be realised in several births.

At the same time, as hinted at before (end of section 3.1), this does not mean
for Vekaantha that one should give up all sacrices and just ask for Gods
compassion. By contrast, the idea seems to be that one should try hard in order
to be honest while begging for his compassion because one actually failed to do
better:
Nor is the case that there is through that the undesired consequence
of dropping xed and occasional rituals, because it has been said that
they are the object of expiation rites dicult to be accomplished.
Out of the same rule, however, this applies also in the case of the
29 The same verse is quoted also by Jva Gosvmin, Satsandarbha, Bhaktisandarbha ad 152.
30 ppanirmokd atyarthabhgavatpriyatvam. nar kappn ke bhak-
ti prajyate iti hy ucyate. vighnyutena govinde na bhaktir nivryate ity
dyanusandhnenha tadrambhavirodhippnm nantyd iti. janmntarasa-
hasreu itydyanusrea parimitaklaktair iti phe vilambkamatva scitam.
[. . . ] tenopyasya dussampdatvavyajanam (Ttparyacndrik ad BhGBhya ad 18.66,
BhGBhasya3).

13
 xed and occasional rituals which are dicult to be accomplished,
since the Sacred Texts act only on the one who is able [to perform
what is asked for], since there is no aw if one does not do what
one cannot do, since if one can only perform a substitute of what
is enjoined, then one must perform that only, and since in our case
(that of the way to liberation as described in BhG 18.66) the sur-
render (prapadana) to the only Lord is prescribed in every respect
as a substitute of the main [thing to be done, i.e., the karmamrga]
to one who is not able [to perform] the main [thing to be done]. It
is so also because there is a distinction between eligible people who
are able or not to perform [the main thing to be done], because it is
in all cases congruous that there is no distinction in the result of the
principal [thing to be done] or of its substitute (i.e., through both
one obtains the same result, if they have done what they could).31

Thus, ones inability to undertake the bhakti- or the karmamrga, which may
be due to ones karmic past, does not completely eliminate the possibility to
choose ones destiny, since one can still decide to surrender to God and this will
open to one a completely fresh slope, in which ones past karmic traces cannot
interfere.

5 Ontology vs. ethics

Ontological and ethical concerns come often to clash when it comes to the issue
of free will and Vekaanthas case is no exception. In contemporary philosophy
this often means that ones ontology is strictly deterministic. Such determinism
is explained appealing to dierent reasons, ranging from (in the last century)
ones being completely determined by ones rst years to (today) the claim that
the neurosciences seem to prove that we elaborate reasons for doing X only
after having started doing it (for instance, the neurons with the information to
move ones arm start delivering the information before the cerebral elaboration
of the rationale of this action, so that the elaboration of motives seems to be an
epiphenomenon not really needed for the sake of acting, but only for rationalising
it32 ). However, the denial of any free will entails the lack of meaning for any
ethical theory since there is nothing which can be chosen, why should one
wonder about what the better course of action would have been? Moreover, no
matter how strong the arguments for determinism are, it is hard to deny that
one does psychologically feel free to move ones arm or not. In short, ontological
arguments seem to clash with ethical and psychological ones.
By the time of Vekaantha, a similar problem regarded the opposition
between the Prva Mmsaka deontic perspective, which entails the necessity
of free will, and the Vedntin theological perspective, which is quite clear in
31 p. 412.
32 See Wegner 2002 and Libet 2004, and, for a dierent perspective, cf. Mele 2009.

14
maintaining that the brahman is not only the ecient cause (nimittakraa) of
the world, but also its material cause (upadnakraa).
If one takes a theistic perspective and says that the brahmnan is God, it is
easy to foresee the next step, namely the equation of the relationship God-world
to the one between a person and her body. If the world is literally the body of
God, which He can move at will, what space can be left to free will? Moreover,
even for Gods free will no much space is left, given that the Mmsaka back-
ground enforces upon Him the sacricial causality, so that He does not seem to
be free not to deliver the fruit of a well-performed sacrice. In short, several con-
trasting trajectories (deontic, theological-ontological and theological-mystical)
intersect in Vekaanthas concept of free will. This is no surprise, given that
Vekaantha himself tried to bring to synthesis so many dierent trends. The
question which remains to be answered is whether he perceived that of free will
as a problem to be addressed and solved or whether he just implicitly applied
the background and more or less pan-Indian assumption of a compatibilism in
order to focus on the one or the other perspective according to the text he was
writing, but without believing that they were incompatible.

5.1 Sudaranasri on Gods wishing free will

Sudarana Sri (also called Sudarancrya or Vedavysa Bharya, . 1290
acc. to Potter) wrote commentaries on several works of Rmnuja. He is tra-
ditionally regarded as a much senior contemporary of Vekaantha. His com-
mentary on the passage of Rmnujas Vedrthasagraha quoted above, section
4, seems to oer a solution to the ethical-ontological argument hinted at in the
previous section. After having shown that omnipotence would entail cruelty on
the part of God, Sudarana Sri counters the objection in this way:

In this case there is no contradiction [between omnipotence and mer-

cifulness] because the connection [of human beings] with the power
to think (cit-akti) is grounded in the xed will of the Lord and this
is xed.33

In other words, God will not change His opinion concerning human freedom.
Next, Sudarana Sri explains the compounds power to think and power to
undertake actions, found also in the root text by Rmnuja (see above, section
4):

The meaning is that He confers, in general to all conscious beings,

the power to undertake or cease external [acts] and the power to
know, to desire to act and to endeavour. [He does so] for the sake
of their autonomy (svtantrya). In this way, once knowledge, desire
to act or eort have been undertaken, as for the inception of [their]
undertaking,34 there is no dependence on the highest person (i.e., on
33 cicchaktiyogasya bhagavannityecchdhnatvt tannityatvvirodha (p. 140).
34 I am emending prakttyrambhe into pravttyrambhe.

15
 God). Rather, [the conscious being] undertakes an action on his own,
disregarding the highest person. Nor is it the case that through that
the controlling power [of God] is diminished, because also the fact
that others can disregard [Him] depends on His own autonomy [out
of which He decided to confer them the powers mentioned above].35
Gods controlling power and the fact that it does not conict with free will,
since it rather supports it, is further elaborated upon in a following passage:
Thus, the highest person, disregards ones rst undertaking, while
later he permits (anuman-) [it]. For this very reason it has been said
that he controls in so far as he permits. The fact of permitting is the
activity which is the cause of the fact that the [human undertaking]
can extend until its result, and it consists of avoiding the weakness
of the undertaking [by means of supporting it]. By contrast, it is
not the case that [God] causes to act someone who had not already
undertaken an action, thus, since knowledge, desire to act and [eort]
are autonomous, prescriptions and prohibitions are adequate.36 [. . . ]
Although [God] is able to control in all possible ways, He controls
only insofar as He permits, due to right volition.37 Also permission
is nothing but control, since without it a [human] undertaking could
never extend until its result.38
Next, Sudarana Sri briey hints at the ontological problem on the background,
i.e., the relation between God and the world (with the latter including conscious
beings):
In this way, although there is no specic way to control, it remains
well established that [God] is the sustainer (dhraka) and the one to
whom everything relates (ein), thus there is no diminishment to
the fact that the relation between [God and everything else] is like
the one between self and body.39
As for the rBh passage mentioned above (section 4), it is again Sudarana
Sri who wrote a commentary thereon. This time, the commentary is concise,
but at least two sentences are worth being mentioned:
35 bhyapravttinivttiakti jnacikrprayatnaakti ca sarvacetann smnyena

tatsvtantryrha pradyety artha. eva jnacikrprayatneu pravtteu pravt-

tyrambhe na paramtmpeksti api tu svayam eva pravarttate tadn paramt-
mopekaka, na caitvat niyanttvavaikalya parasyopeky api *svasvtantrydhnatvt
astr 1894, p. 140). *So in a footnote reporting a variant reading, whereas the main text
(S
has svasvtantrydhikatvt.
36 This clause is directed against the initial objection in Rmnujas text, see section 4.
37 satsakalpa could refer to both God and His controlled ones.
38 evan upekakasan prathamapravttau saty pacd anumant paramtm, at a eva

hy anumanttay ca niyamana kurvann ity ukta bhavati.* anumanttvam nma pravt-

tiaithilyaparihrtmakas tatphalaparyantatvahetur vypra, na tv apravttasya pravar-
takatvam, eva jnacikrdau svtantryd vidhiniedhayogyatva [. . . ] sarvaprakraniya-
manaakto pi san satsakalpd evnumanttay niyacchati, anumanttvam api niyamanam
eva tena vin pravtte phalaparyantatvyogt (S astr 1894, p. 141). *Full stop added.
39 eva niyamanaprakraviebhve pi dhrakatva eitva ca susthitam ity t-

maarrabhvasya ca na hni (S astr 1894, p. 141).

16
 The Lord is the cause common [to both good and evil acts], through
the fact that he delivers the undertaking of actions in the sense-
organs, the body and the mind. As for the specic agency, however,
at rst He is indierent and then He permits [it]. The permission is
tantamount to the deliverance of the result, so that [in this sense],
one depends on Him. [However], one is connected to the [suitable]
result insofar as one is autonomous as regards the initial undertaking
of the action.40

Vekaantha did not write a commentary on the Vedrthasagraha himself,

and it would be strange to imagine that he did not know Sudaranas treatment
of this problem. The present author is still looking for references or traces of it
in Vekaanthas many works.

6 A tentative solution
Thus, free will seems to remain a pre-condition. Vekaantha does not cease
to prescribe that one must try hard to comply to the requirements of Vedic and
Pcartra prescriptions (for an example of the latter, see Rastelli forthcoming).
However, the Vaiava-vr background suggests that one would nonetheless
most probably fail, if it were not for Gods supporting our actions. This free-
dom of the will and neediness of the acts leads to the conclusion that, left to
oneself, one will be unworthy of being saved. But the contrast between rigorous
prescriptions and the impossibility to realise them will make one despair and,
ultimately surrender.
Given that human beings need Gods assistance to perform actions, but
not to conceive them, one is free to surrender. At this point, as explained by
Rmnuja and Sudarana Sri, God can step in and lead ones actions according
to ones good intentions.
From an ontological point of view, our being parts of Gods body entails
that we can act only according to His will, but this metaphysical background
does not block the possibility to direct ones mind towards God. God controls
our actions, not our wishes. And He does not control them, because He does
not want it (see section 5.1).
It remains open to question why this is so, but one might speculate that
God wants to be freely loved and thus endowed human beings with enough free
will to decide to turn towards Him, although they still need His assistance to
actually move towards Him.

Abbreviations
BhG Bhagavadgt
40 sdharaakranam vara karaakalevaracipravttidndin. vieakarttve tu prg
upekaka. pact tv anumant. anumati ca phaladnatuly. ata paryattatvam.
prathamapravttau svtantryt phalnvaya.

17
 BS Brahmastra
rBh rBhya

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