2/7/00 4:43 PM

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS,

respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates
"IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated

A December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC,
.......- Br. 224, QC

Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November

B 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
.......- Paraaque, MM

Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to

C File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January
.......- 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA
6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
 Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc
Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC
Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January
17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above
his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of
Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues
was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice,
after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the
same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good
standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in
good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as
above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14,
1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of
Makati, Br. 150.

1
Rollo, pp. 4-9.
2
Id., p. 11.
3
Id., p. 13.
4
Records, pp. 35-42.
5
Id., pp. 39-40.
 Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to
the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was
never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment
from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights
as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show
that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such
dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and
surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondents suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more
particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President
Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4

6
Records, p. 57.
7
Rollo, p. 38.
 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992
have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a
limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing
in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore
liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP
dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in
good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a
Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and
it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the
courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
 CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character,
in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and
the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The
marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began
in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them.Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6
January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared
that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by
instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus,

8
Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-41.
was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after
Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation"
carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant
on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with
his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also
admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I
have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation,"
for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of
Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that
she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to
take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that
our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application
to take the bar exam.

c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme
Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit
ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to
dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our
marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is
he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to
Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while
he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and
considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the
marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not
to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-
pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any
court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-
hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was
void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties
shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said
parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not
have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the
1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that
Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the
various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the
status of his marriage is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good
moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a
gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him
outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his
pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was
void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his
marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an
exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in
connection therewith has been regularly performed.

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter
No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of
which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General,
he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the
second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which
were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case,
he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case,
however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his
signature in the marriage contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow
him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret
was because it was "not in order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its
very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the
beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant
and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which
otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer,"
he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before
this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his
purpose.In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through
his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer
of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr.
JusticeGeorge A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted
with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

December 3, 1948

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar
Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers'
Association) as amici curiae.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a
duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of
the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN
LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed;
One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference
we quote the news item in full:

Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates
who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.

These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the
tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.

Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully
one week before the tests.

The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar
in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city.

The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute
an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the
students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations.

The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the
revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines,
on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates
of some private technical schools.

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla,
who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the
Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite
Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the
Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has
been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission
to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which
rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by
one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to
the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath
and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news
item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew
the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal
their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their
identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the
public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted
said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging
him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the
necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties
responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the
revelation.

In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter
part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a
copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the
Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:
 In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14,
1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in
August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized
by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation
thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author
of said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken
of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the
committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court.

From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined
and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on
which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his
cooperations, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar
examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain
to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources
of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded
will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the
Court of the result.

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He
appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court
requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a very serious
matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in
the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar
examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and
correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the
whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him
that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination
questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the
identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and
evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not
even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he
refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and
if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper,
the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was postponed to
October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of
this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court
Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under
oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take
action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public
hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably
argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of
general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in
said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state.

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and
important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of
the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state,
that is to say that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to
reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal
question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not
unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it
originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6
was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that
the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no
circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee,
however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of
section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the
original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee "unless the court finds
that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purposed of the bill.
This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already
referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc.,
many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto
amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting
in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the
Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest
of the public or the interest of the state required that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave
as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or
fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto
amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was
disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the
end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state,"
claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was
approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.

In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the
"security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by
Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without much
discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the
phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For
instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public
interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase
"interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and
discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the
phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion,
about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account
for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to
accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."

In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of
fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;"
it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase
"interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and limited to the
"security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public
safety," are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The
phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the
privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or
when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that
the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when
the public safety requires it.

The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I,
Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, Crimes against National Security. Then, more
recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security" was equally used in
section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as
contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the
immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it
could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "National
Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to
believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state,"
it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal
the sources of his information.

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than
"security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most
anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and
maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate"
even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in which
the whole state and nations, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of
the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of
justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine,
impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of
the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional
provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission
of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the
Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme
Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are
found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now
thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or occupying important
Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes
several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the
law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual
manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or
the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in
these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared
to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary,
from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting
attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions.
Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with
wide and general interest and national importance.

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of
Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in
illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when
otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be
alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The
public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to
go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is
entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and
training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar
Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this
act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have
honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because
they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those
who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the
hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar
Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no need of much
law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the
examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a
spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and
designation of this Court. They would be suspected, one or two or more of them that through negligence, or
connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not themselves actually
released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge
of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to
overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the
confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and
believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can
and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the
state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of
the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee
of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said
examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and
independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court, we have the
inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to
adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of
their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their
officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil.,
350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of
his informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already
mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants, law graduates
and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar
Examination questions to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really meant and intended to
make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was
the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward
and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead
of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at least
one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the
examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that
examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination
questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination
questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the
day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or
bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the
university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not
disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to
have seen all these things.

In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine
hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight
subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight
sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a
total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners.
The examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and
identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance
based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, evidence on the
identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained
and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court
does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every
one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers
of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task
and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any serious
and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of
basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the
respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable
evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained
in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it
was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation
because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to
protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with the members
thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination
questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people
in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it
can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty,
even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the
investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he
reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It
merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity
allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the
charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties
who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by
the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the
passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that
only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or
hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions
were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer,
and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the
answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before
examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds
that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions
were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below
passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo
reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the September
14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in refusing to make the
revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated
during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In
other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform.
(Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he
complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common or frequent, in this
jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in
other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming
number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent,
the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and
confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court
the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
Perfecto, J., concurring and dissenting:

The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify conclusively the finding
of the majority that respondent is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of this Court.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It would protect him
only if we could agree with his theory that the words "interest of the state" used in the law should be read to mean
security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the whole text of Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the
intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can be gleaned in the Senate journal, or in the grammatical,
rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the words in question, that can justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of
the ideas that they embrace within the small circle of public security or safety of the state.

The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts within the ideas of
security or safety occupy a place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is no legal basis for us to
reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a minimum that, if given effect, would virtually
amend the law without the benefit of congressional enactment. Such would be violative of the Constitution.

In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the Senate committee
that would limit the privilege up to the point where it runs in conflict with the wide area of public interest, the
opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation was pushed up to the place where the
privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No one is authorized to push that line of limitation still
farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We have to stop at the line of limitation set by Congress. To
hurdle it is to transgress the law.

No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any limitation to an
imaginable minimum, or how much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in Congress, we are
powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject in the statute a law of our own creation,
or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat the legislative intent. There is no alternative for the losing
legislative side except to bide for time and wait for a more respective mood of Congress.

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the disobedience of a
judicial order. The orders of a court demand obedience for their effectiveness. Administration of justice is impossible
with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial orders is the elan vital of the administration of
justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing because it means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos.
The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will never allow such a thing to obtain.

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive department or without a
legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress functions only one third of the year. During the
remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation does not suffer any impairment. It can even be said that during
those two thirds of the year there is more normalcy than during the Congressional session when legislative reforms
and the enactment of new laws cannot but produce some public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis
in the way of life of the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human society without some
effective system of administration of justice, functioning without long interruptions.

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and this Supreme
Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should mete out to all affected
parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without fear or favor, the guilty parties, regardless of who
they may be, in the present case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty imposed upon respondent.

Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared invalid in our
opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil., 741. The provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in section 6 of
Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum not exceeding P1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than six months, or both. Considering that there are mitigating circumstances that attenuate respondent's
responsibility, youthfulness, honest but wrong belief in the existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm,
we should not impose upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we imposed in the case of Benito M.
Sakdalan, L-2781, the very one which, as can be gleaned from the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of
Republic Act No. 53.
We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to reduce the
imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the revelation exacted from him. The penalty should be
measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the discretion of the guilty one. His future
revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his responsibility for the offense he has already perpetrated. His past
disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future action. The past cannot be remade. What has been done cannot be
undone. These are verities no one can eloign.

We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent
Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either
denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy
and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and
civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of
the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170
SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed
separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the
Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in
SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take
his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition
of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988,
respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No.
59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no
position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a
testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that
respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the
IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of
Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer
of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board
of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good
moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP testimonial
referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December
1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of
the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a
testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath,
and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently
reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any
acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
 Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of
Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title
to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of
acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc.
The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its
Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of CourtMunicipal
Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the
Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is
there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board
does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine
Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge
Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and
Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending
case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the
oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case
entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant
Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his
actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22
May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the
Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has
been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated
that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and
reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this
development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this
Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2
October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the
question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On
our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's
resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or amend
said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and
executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as anything which
is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any
permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his
case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of
Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional
retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12
December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation
of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the
principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name
and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the
aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership
over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the
loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January
1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of
the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no
cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In
our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the
complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M.
Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August
1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his
repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose
his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from
the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and
willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character
and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's
taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the
Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent
over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan.
At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it
default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise
with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy
peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747).
The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and
prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a
confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was
instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was
then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however,
mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains second
thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated
his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but have known was public land. This was
manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him
where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as
the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is
more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a
bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land
at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually
compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the
pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions
for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of
the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not,
therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not
submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their
objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can
neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the
legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . .
. (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least
common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness
or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution,
dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* In Bar Matter No. 44 (Eufrosina Yap Tan and Nicolas El. Sabandal) Bar Matter No. 59 (Benjamin Cabigon v.
Nicolas El Sabandal) & SBC 624 (Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes Agnis v. Nicolas El. Sabandal) [126 SCRA 60].
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio
I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among
others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his
knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that
respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without
their authority.

In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.

By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct
the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal
Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor
General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the
Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.

Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case
followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the
Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the
investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days
from notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as
Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following:

FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4,000.00.
This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16,
records). In the said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that the
lwph1.t

amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent

assured complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such assurance,
complainants signed the same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent.
Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for
what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the
obviously usurious interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they
stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest,
respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D,
Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage
dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P
10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special
power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property
at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976.
Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent insisted that
complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality.
Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants
Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the
document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.

Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage
was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay
their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's
Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage
were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on
June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.

When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn
Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the
legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed,
complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and
that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.

Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00 and
went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem
their property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.

Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of
paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had
soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants
went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for
disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.

Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears on the two
documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on
August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in
truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to
the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00
loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan had been
indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said
document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from
complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular
Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property,
at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance,
since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that
complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the
property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he
denies that he has violated any right of the complainants.

After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against respondent.

While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00,
they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real
Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only
P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly
due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30,
1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up
to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6)
months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00
complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00.
Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in
P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes wills.

There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the
supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily
signed by the complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement
to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
abandoned.

However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the
exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this
case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the
Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that
each of the successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should
have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate
mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event
of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that
in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of
common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. Respondent at
least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their
obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This
respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their
best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by
complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that complainants,
per advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on
April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and
not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of
respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to
April, 1976).

Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and that this was
the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance.
This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was
simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the
actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p.
14, rec.).

Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of
the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since he sold
the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos.
Respondent's denial is spacious.

Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that
the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31,
1976. With its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated
substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a
sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2). lwph1.t

In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting:

In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is
whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the
respondent.

In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present
complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning
there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that
respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when
respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. However,
in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great
disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a
better position financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants
were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt
that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore
that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the
respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction
between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample
evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a
limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money
lenders during the time of the transactions in question'

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their counsel
(private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda,
compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.00
as advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id
amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.

Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the
consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].

We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail
but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between
complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants
in this case, knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this,
respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00.
He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount carried by the
accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34,
record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps
because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the
whole amount to complainants.

At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but
they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about.

On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had already lost their
trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and,
more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the
same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the
P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the
 receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed
settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.

Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion before the
court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.

The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying,
had this to say:

With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda
is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was
given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the
private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private
prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent
received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable
settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said
amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as
alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance
payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants?
Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come
that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent, the former
filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith
and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to
this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact
is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private
prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent.'

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-
professional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. The
doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S.
Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.

Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did not bother
to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not
understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another
lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they
did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their
complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their
property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits
mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)

and made the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3

The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings
out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under
Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their
direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and
was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and
having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of
procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers. The complainants
immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was
in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also
filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28
October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the
complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated
17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had become final and
executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not having passed
through any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-
examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated,
Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants
had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that respondent
had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were
attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for
numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings.
Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had
eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent
asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he
nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his
(respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17
December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the
complainants and their witnesses.

After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties, we
agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.

The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to
complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;

2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;

3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to
complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;

4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to
sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";

5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and

6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had
already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within
a certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are
punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which merely
avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one
penal statute the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time when
he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two
(2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil
liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants; the second is that,
having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform
complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts
show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of
complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance
payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did
turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot
"without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but
the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as
partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-
professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so
gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the
lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the
Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member
of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private
transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of
professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that
good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the
Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Gr;no-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313

Complainant,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M.
RONGCAL,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 7, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry,
from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for.Disbarment and suspension
of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[1]
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P.
Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of he said,
she said, the parties conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter
presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she
was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the biological father
of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary
referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand
letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their
daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment.

At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started having
a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started
calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly
started courting her, giving her financial aid.Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances
towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job,
financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances,
assured by respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had
already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of

Disclaimer[3] (Affidavit) categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in
the birth certificate[4] of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed
to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the
document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her
daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that
despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the
Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed
the document without even taking a glance at it.[5]

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave

him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical
expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance
of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed
her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he
was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to
give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to
Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the
civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.[7] It was only
when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her
disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by
his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her
into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him
as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time,
respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her
daughter. She argues that respondents aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a
lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.[8] Hence, she filed the instant complaint[9] dated 2
February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant

needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support.Complainants former
high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official,
referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask
support for the child.[10] Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He
learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in
order to settle things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she
would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset.He also explained to
her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate
for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount,
negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to
issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant
disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that
respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to
sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit
was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual
payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank
employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies
pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the
Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told
respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the
complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorneys fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According
to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults, [11] complainant then
being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already
annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant
very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital
liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and
former high school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence
where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence
several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he
had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to
2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was
an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position
of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible
for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than
three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
 Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being
worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo Citybecause a suitor had
promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never
came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga.As the money she received from Aquino
was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and
urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her
pleas, he also advised her to look for the right man [12] and to stop depending on him for
financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he
was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty.
Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he
agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they
have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In
2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from
the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for
financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped
communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She
told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she
wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed
him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should
the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored
her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[13] After the parties submitted their respective
position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report
and Recommendation[14] dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties conflicting
factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is

wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a
member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the
law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time
have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
 Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice
complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent
kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid
while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals
the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage
of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x[15]

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two
months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and
emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission,[17] respondent was
meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of
similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to
complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning[18] (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand
Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates
his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired
between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and
manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing
to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainants bare
allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should
be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the
truth.

In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it
has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme
Court.
 While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP
has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair
with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [20] in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.[21] As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.[22] The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. [23] A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[24] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.[25]

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. [27] Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.[28]

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule

1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged
deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in
order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we
find otherwise.

Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to his
promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case
against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having
sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and
discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by
promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or
helplessness on her part.[29] Respondents numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do
not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite
being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover,
the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial
support.

Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status
inspire belief. We find credence in respondents assertion that it was impossible for her not to
have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her
friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of
respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him
there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial
Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondents allegations that she had met
and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped
him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital
status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man,
it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent
whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that
she preferred to change [her] life for the better,[30] as alleged in her complaint. We believe that
her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and
wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any
misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral
control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her
read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged
that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support
from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom
how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months
and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew
was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short
sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed
it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents
of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her
to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandras medical and
educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer. [32] If her own allegation
is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the
settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes
to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny
being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in
short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion
is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of
respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a
document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with
Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable
settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in
court.[33] Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of
complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and
intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she
experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent
also acted as Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainants
bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.[34] Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.[35]

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by

Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his
personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in
violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
 We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainants claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant
received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have
received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent
never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more
than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he
assumed it was for his attorneys fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed
two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand,
respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of
an agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously,
there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly
proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes
that complainant requested for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with
a huge sum of money.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding
in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The
IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the
veracity of the assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state
of the evidence, a more
in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the

substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for
further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for the
cost of her childs DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked
for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys
fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is
distinct from a civil or a criminal action.[36] It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of
a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary
objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration
of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[37] As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.[38] The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyers
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[39]

Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the

Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or
was found to be a womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated from the
foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v.
Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was
married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of
men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his
reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However,
in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife,
but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for
his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We
take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken
as mitigating circumstances in his favor.[48]Considering further that this is his first offense, we
believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of
immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Decision.