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SEPthinkerapresRodin MetaphysicsResearchLab,CSLI,StanfordUniversity
StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy
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Peirce'sTheoryofSigns
FirstpublishedFriOct13,2006substantiverevisionMonNov15,2010

Peirce'sSignTheory,orSemiotic,isanaccountofsignification,representation,referenceandmeaning.
Althoughsigntheorieshavealonghistory,Peirce'saccountsaredistinctiveandinnovativefortheirbreadth
andcomplexity,andforcapturingtheimportanceofinterpretationtosignification.ForPeirce,developinga
thoroughgoingtheoryofsignswasacentralphilosophicalandintellectualpreoccupation.Theimportanceof
semioticforPeirceiswideranging.Ashehimselfsaid,[]ithasneverbeeninmypowertostudy
anything,mathematics,ethics,metaphysics,gravitation,thermodynamics,optics,chemistry,comparative
anatomy,astronomy,psychology,phonetics,economics,thehistoryofscience,whist,menandwomen,wine,
metrology,exceptasastudyofsemiotic(SS1977,856).Peircealsotreatedsigntheoryascentraltohis
workonlogic,asthemediumforinquiryandtheprocessofscientificdiscovery,andevenasonepossible
meansfor'proving'hispragmatism.ItsimportanceinPeirce'sphilosophy,then,cannotbeoverestimated.

Acrossthecourseofhisintellectuallife,Peircecontinuallyreturnedtoanddevelopedhisideasaboutsigns
andsemioticandtherearethreebroadlydelineableaccounts:aconciseEarlyAccountfromthe1860sa
completeandrelativelyneatInterimAccountdevelopedthroughthe1880sand1890sandpresentedin1903
andhisspeculative,rambling,andincompleteFinalAccountdevelopedbetween1906and1910.The
followingentryexaminesthesethreeaccounts,andtracesthechangesthatledPeircetodevelopearlier
accountsandgeneratenew,morecomplex,signtheories.However,despitethesechanges,Peirce'sideason
thebasicstructureofsignsandsignificationremainlargelyuniformthroughouthisdevelopments.
Consequently,itisusefultobeginwithanaccountofthebasicstructureofsignsaccordingtoPeirce.

1.BasicSignStructure
1.1TheSignifyingElementofSigns
1.2TheObject
1.3TheInterpretant
2.Peirce'sEarlyAccount:18678.
2.1ThoughtSigns
2.2InfiniteSemiosis
3.TheInterimAccount:1903
3.1SignVehicles
3.2Objects
3.3Interpretants
 3.4TheTenClassesofSigns
4.TheFinalAccount:190610
4.1DividingTheObject
4.2DividingtheInterpretant
4.3IssueswiththeFinalAccount
Bibliography
PrimaryLiterature
SecondaryLiterature
OtherInternetResources
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1.BasicSignStructure
Inoneofhismanydefinitionsofasign,Peircewrites:

Idefineasignasanythingwhichissodeterminedbysomethingelse,calleditsObject,andso
determinesaneffectuponaperson,whicheffectIcallitsinterpretant,thatthelateristhereby
mediatelydeterminedbytheformer.(EP2,478)

WhatweseehereisPeirce'sbasicclaimthatsignsconsistofthreeinterrelatedparts:asign,anobject,and
aninterpretant.Forthesakeofsimplicity,wecanthinkofthesignasthesignifier,forexample,awritten
word,anutterance,smokeasasignforfireetc.Theobject,ontheotherhand,isbestthoughtofaswhatever
issignified,forexample,theobjecttowhichthewrittenorutteredwordattaches,orthefiresignifiedbythe
smoke.Theinterpretant,themostinnovativeanddistinctivefeatureofPeirce'saccount,isbestthoughtofas
theunderstandingthatwehaveofthesign/objectrelation.TheimportanceoftheinterpretantforPeirceis
thatsignificationisnotasimpledyadicrelationshipbetweensignandobject:asignsignifiesonlyinbeing
interpreted.Thismakestheinterpretantcentraltothecontentofthesign,inthat,themeaningofasignis
manifestintheinterpretationthatitgeneratesinsignusers.Thingsare,however,slightlymorecomplexthan
thisandweshalllookatthesethreeelementsinmoredetail.

1.1TheSignifyingElementofSigns
Theveryfirstthingtonoteisthattherearesomepotentialterminologicaldifficultieshere.Weappeartobe
sayingthattherearethreeelementsofasign,oneofwhichisthesign.Thisisconfusinganddoesnotfully
capturePeirce'sidea.Strictlyspeaking,forPeirce,weareinterestedinthesignifyingelement,anditisnot
thesignasawholethatsignifies.Inspeakingofthesignasthesignifyingelement,then,heismoreproperly
speakingofthesignrefinedtothoseelementsmostcrucialtoitsfunctioningasasignifier.Peirceuses
numeroustermsforthesignifyingelementincludingsign,representamen,representation,and
ground.Hereweshallrefertothatelementofthesignresponsibleforsignificationasthesignvehicle.

Peirce'sideathatasigndoesnotsignifyinallrespectsandhassomeparticularsignifyingelementisperhaps
bestmadeclearwithanexample.Consider,forinstance,amolehillinmylawntakenasasignofmoles.Not
everycharacteristicofthemolehillplaysapartinsignifyingthepresenceofmoles.Thecolorofthemolehill
playsasecondaryrolesinceitwillvaryaccordingtothesoilfromwhichitiscomposed.Similarly,thesizes
ofmolehillsvaryaccordingtothesizeofthemolethatmakesthem,soagain,thisfeatureisnotprimaryin
themolehill'sabilitytosignify.Whatiscentralhereisthecausalconnectionthatexistsbetweenthetypeof
moundinmylawnandmoles:sincemolesmakemolehills,molehillssignifymoles.Consequently,primary
tothemolehill'sabilitytosignifythemoleisthebrutephysicalconnectionbetweenitandamole.Thisisthe
signvehicleofthesign.ForPeirce,then,itisonlysomeelementofasignthatenablesittosignifyitsobject,
andwhenspeakingofthesignifyingelementofthesign,orrather,thesignvehicle,itisthisqualifiedsign
thathemeans.

1.2TheObject

Justaswiththesign,noteverycharacteristicoftheobjectisrelevanttosignification:onlycertainfeaturesof
anobjectenableasigntosignifyit.ForPeirce,therelationshipbetweentheobjectofasignandthesignthat
representsitisoneofdetermination:theobjectdeterminesthesign.Peirce'snotionofdeterminationisbyno
meansclearanditisopentointerpretation,butforourpurposes,itisperhapsbestunderstoodastheplacing
ofconstraintsorconditionsonsuccesfulsignificationbytheobject,ratherthantheobjectcausingor
generatingthesign.Theideaisthattheobjectimposescertainparametersthatasignmustfallwithinifitis
torepresentthatobject.However,onlycertaincharacteristicsofanobjectarerelevanttothisprocessof
determination.Toseethisintermsofanexample,consideragainthecaseofthemolehill.

Thesignisthemolehill,andtheobjectofthissignisthemole.Themoledeterminesthesign,inasmuchas,
ifthemolehillistosucceedasasignforthemoleitmustshowthephysicalpresenceofthemole.Ifitfailsto
dothis,itfailstobeasignofthatobject.Othersignsforthisobject,apartfromthemolehill,mightinclude
thepresenceofmoledroppings,oraparticularpatternofgroundsubsidenceonmylawns,butallsuchsigns
areconstrainedbytheneedtoshowthephysicalpresenceofthemole.Clearly,noteverythingaboutthemole
isrelevanttothisconstrainingprocess:themolemightbeaconventionalblackcolororanalbino,itmightbe
maleorfemale,itmightbeyoungorold.Noneofthesefeatures,however,areessentialtotheconstraints
placeduponthesign.Rather,thecausalconnectionbetweenitandthemoleisthecharacteristicthatit
imposesuponitssign,anditisthisconnectionthatthesignmustrepresentifitistosucceedinsignifyingthe
mole.

1.3TheInterpretant
Althoughtherearemanyfeaturesoftheinterpretantthatbearfurthercomment,hereweshallmentionjust
two.First,althoughwehavecharacterizedtheinterpretantastheunderstandingwereachofsomesign/object
relation,itisperhapsmoreproperlythoughtofasthetranslationordevelopmentoftheoriginalsign.The
ideaisthattheinterpretantprovidesatranslationofthesign,allowingusamorecomplexunderstandingof
thesign'sobject.Indeed,Liszka(1996)andSavan(1988)bothemphasizetheneedtotreatinterpretantsas
translations,withSavanevensuggestingPeirceshouldhavecalleditthetranslatant(Savan1988,41).
Second,justaswiththesign/objectrelation,Peircebelievesthesign/interpretantrelationtobeoneof
determination:thesigndeterminesaninterpretant.Further,thisdeterminationisnotdeterminationinany
causalsense,rather,thesigndeterminesaninterpretantbyusingcertainfeaturesofthewaythesignsignifies
itsobjecttogenerateandshapeourunderstanding.So,thewaythatsmokegeneratesordeterminesan
interpretantsignofitsobject,fire,isbyfocusingourattentionuponthephysicalconnectionbetweensmoke
andfire.

ForPeirce,then,anyinstanceofsignificationcontainsasignvehicle,anobjectandinterpretant.Moreover,
theobjectdeterminesthesignbyplacingconstraintswhichanysignmustmeetifitistosignifytheobject.
Consequently,thesignsignifiesitsobjectonlyinvirtueofsomeofitsfeatures.Additionally,thesign
determinesaninterpretantbyfocusingourunderstandingoncertainfeaturesofthesignifyingrelation
betweensignandobject.Thisenablesustounderstandtheobjectofthesignmorefully.

AlthoughthisisageneralpictureofPeirce'sideasaboutsignstructure,andcertainfeaturesaremoreorless
present,orgivengreaterorlesseremphasisatvariouspointsinPeirce'sdevelopmentofhistheoryofsigns,
thistriadicstructureandtherelationbetweentheelementsispresentinallofPeirce'saccounts.Inwhat
follows,weshallseethreeofPeirce'sattemptsatgivingafullaccountofsignsandsignification,the
correspondingsigntypologies,lookatthetransitionsbetweentheseaccounts,andexaminesomeofthe
issuesthatarisefromthem.

2.Peirce'sEarlyAccount:18678.
Peirce'searliestsignificantattemptatanaccountofsignscomesinhis1867paperOnANewListof
Categories(W2.4958).Inthataccount,wefindthesamebasicsignstructureoutlinedabove:anysign,or
representationasPeircecallsitatthisearlystage,willhaveasignvehicle,anobject,andaninterpretant.An
importantdifferenceherethoughishowhethinksoftherelationbetweensignsandinterpretants.In
particular,Peircethoughtthatwhilstourinterpretingthesignifyingrelationbetweensignandobjectrelied
uponunderstandingthebasisofsignificationinanygivencase,healsothoughtthatthegenerated
interpretantitselffunctionedasafurther,moredevelopedsignoftheobjectinquestion.Andofcourse,asa
furthersign,itwillalsosignifythatobjectthroughsomefeatures,whichagain,wemustinterpret,and
generateafurtherinterpretant.Aswillbeobvious,thisleadstoaninfinitechainofsigns.Ifanysignmust
generateaninterpretantinordertobeasign,andanysignisitselftheinterpretantofsomefurthersign,then
clearly,theremustbeaninfinityofsignsbothproceedingandprecedingfromanygiveninstanceof
signification.Somescholars(forexample,(Short2004)and(Short2007))thinkthatinfinitesemiosisisa
characteristiconlyofPeirce'searlyaccount.Others,(Liszka1996,Savan1988)treatinfinitesemiosisas
presentinallofPeirce'saccounts.Weshallreturntotheissueofinfinitesemiosisintheearlyaccountbelow.
First,weshalllookatthetypesofsigntowhichPeirce'searlyaccountgivesrise.

Peircethoughtthatrepresentationsgeneratefurtherinterpretantsinoneofthreepossibleways.First,viaa
merecommunityinsomequality(W2.56).Thesehecallslikenesses,buttheyaremorefamiliarlyknownas
icons.Second,thosewhoserelationtotheirobjectsconsistsinacorrespondenceinfact(W2.56)are
termedindices.Andfinally,thosewhoserelationtotheirobjectsisanimputedcharacter(W2.56)are
calledsymbols.Putsimply,ifwecometointerpretasignasstandingforitsobjectinvirtueofsomeshared
quality,thenthesignisanicon.Peirce'searlyexamplesoficonsareportraitsandnotedsimilaritiesbetween
theletterspandb(W2.534).Ifontheotherhand,ourinterpretationcomesinvirtueofsomebrute,
existentialfact,causalconnectionssay,thenthesignisanindex.Earlyexamplesincludetheweathercock,
andtherelationshipbetweenthemurdererandhisvictim(W2.534).Andfinally,ifwegeneratean
interpretantinvirtueofsomeobservedgeneralorconventionalconnectionbetweensignandobject,thenthe
signisasymbol.Earlyexamplesincludethewordshommeandmansharingareference.(W2.534).

This,then,istheveryfirstoutingforPeirce'sfamousdivisionofsignsintoIcons,Indexes,andSymbols.
AlthoughPeirce'sprecisethoughtsaboutthenatureofthisdivisionweretochangeatvariouspointsinhis
developmentofsigntheory,thedivisionnonethelessremainsthroughouthiswork.Thereare,however,some
importantfeaturestothisearlyaccountthatmarkitoutfromthelaterdevelopments.Weshalllookattwoof
thesefeatureshere:theimportanceofthoughtsignsandinfinitesemiosis.

2.1ThoughtSigns
AninterestingfeatureofPeirce'searlyaccountisthatheiskeentoassociatesignswithcognition.In
particular,Peirceclaimsthatallthoughtisinsigns(W2.213).WecanseethisfromPeirce'searlyideathat
everyinterpretantisitselfafurthersignofthesignifiedobject.Sinceinterpretantsaretheinterpreting
thoughtswehaveofsignifyingrelations,andtheseinterpretingthoughtsarethemselvessigns,itseemstobe
astraightforwardconsequencethatallthoughtsaresigns,orasPeircecallsthemthoughtsigns.One
interestingconsequenceofthisisthatintheearlyaccount,Peirceisquicktodismisstheimportanceand
relevanceoficonsandindices.

Theobjectsoftheunderstanding,consideredasrepresentations,aresymbols,thatis,signswhich
areatleastpotentiallygeneral.Buttherulesoflogicholdgoodofanysymbols,ofthosewhich
arewrittenorspokenaswellasthosewhicharethought.Theyhavenoimmediateapplicationto
likeness[icons]orindices,becausenoargumentscanbeconstructedofthesealone,butdoapply
toallsymbols.(W2.56)

ThisgivesPeirce'searlyaccountofsignsarathernarrowscopeitisconcernedprimarilywiththegeneral
andconventionalsignsofwhichourlanguageandcognitionconsist.Thereasonforthisnarrowfocusis
simple:forPeirce,sincesymbolsarepotentiallygeneralandfallundertheremitofgeneralrules,theyare
afitsubjectofstudyforhisprimaryfocus,logic.Thisearlyaccount,then,focusesmainlyongeneraland
conventionalsigns,thosesignsidentifiedbyPeirceassymbols.Iconsandindices,althoughnotedatthis
earlystage,areconsideredofsecondaryphilosophicalimportance.Asweshallseelater,thisnarrowfocusis
somethingthatPeircewaslatertorevise.

2.2InfiniteSemiosis

Aspreviouslynoted,partandparcelofPeirce'searlyaccountofsignsisthataninfinityoffurthersignsboth
proceedandprecedefromanygivensign.ThisisaconsequenceofthewayPeircethinksoftheelementsof
signsatthisearlystageandseemstostemfromhisideathatinterpretantsaretocountasfurthersigns,and
signsareinterpretantsofearliersigns.Sinceanysignmustdetermineaninterpretantinordertocountasa
sign,andinterpretantsarethemselvessigns,infinitechainsofsignsseemtobecomeconceptuallynecessary.
Toseethis,imagineachainofsignswitheitherafirstoralastsign.Thefinalsignthatterminatesthe
semioticprocesswillhavenointerpretantifitdid,thatinterpretantwouldfunctionasafurthersignand
generateafurtherinterpretant,andthefinalsignwould,infact,notterminatetheprocess.However,since
anysignmustdetermineaninterpretanttocountasasign,thefinalsignwouldnotbeasignunlessithadan
interpretant.Similarly,afirstsigncouldnotbetheinterpretantofaprecedingsign.Ifitwere,thatprevious
signwouldbethefirstsign.However,sinceanysignmustbeaninterpretantofaprevioussign,afirstsign
wouldnotbeasignunlessitwasalsoaninterpretantofaprevioussign.Theproblemisthatifweallowa
finalsignwithnointerpretant,orafirstsignwhichisnottheinterpretantorsomeearliersign,thenwehave
failedsignsinthesemioticprocess.Thisaffectstherestofthesemioticchaincausingsomethinglikea
collapseofdominoes.Forexample,ifthefinalsignfailstobeasigninvirtueofgeneratingnointerpretant,
thensincethatfailedsignissupposedtoactastheinterpretantoftheprevioussignandfunctionasafurther
signinitsownright,ithasalsofailedtobeaninterpretant.Theconsequenceofthisisthattheprevioussign
hasfailedtogenerateaproperinterpretantandsofailedtobeasign.Theconsequenceofthisisthatandso
on.Thealternativeisnottocountenanceterminatingsigns.Andobviously,ifwecannotendthesemiotic
processthensignscontinuegeneratingsignsadinfinitum.

Peircewasbothawareanduntroubledbyinfinitesemiosis.Inpart,thisisduetotheantiCartesianproject
carriedoutinPeirce'sworkinthe1860s.AsignificantpartofthisprojectforPeirceisthedenialof
intuitions,somethingthatPeircetookasakeyassumptionofCartesianphilosophicalmethod.Giventhat
Peircedefinesintuitionasacognitionnotdeterminedbyapreviouscognitionofthesameobject(W2.
193),itseemsclearthattheinfiniteprocessionofthoughtsignsgeneratedbyearlierthoughtsignsandin
turngeneratingfurtherthoughtsignsispartandparcelofthedenialofintuitions.However,inlater
developmentstohissigntheory,despiteneverexplicitlyrelinquishinginfinitesemiosis,manyofthe
conceptsthatleadtoitarereplacedorrevised,andtheconceptbecomeslessprominentinPeirce'swork.

3.TheInterimAccount:1903
In1903,PeircegaveaseriesoflecturesatHarvard,andatTheLowellInstitute.Partoftheselectureswasan
accountofsigns.However,the1903accountofsignsshowedconsiderabledevelopmentstotheearly
accountofthe1860s.First,wheretheearlyaccountsuggestedthreeclassesofsign,the1903account
suggeststenclassesofsign.Second,wheretheaccountthe1860streatsthegeneralsign,orsymbol,asthe
mainfocusofsigntheory,the1903accountcountsmanymoresigntypesaswithinthefocusofphilosophy
andlogic.Third,Peircedroppedtheclaimthataninfinitechainofsignsprecedesanygivensign(seeShort
2004,2212).

ThesechangesseemtobeaconsequenceofdevelopmentsinsymboliclogicmadebyPeirceandhisJohns
Hopkinsstudent,OscarMitchell,intheearly1880s.Asiswellknown,duringthistime,andindependently
ofFrege,PeirceandMitchelldevelopedquantificationtheory(seePeirce(1883),and(W5.162191)).An
essentialpartofthisdevelopmentwastheinclusionofsingularpropositionsandindividualvariablesfor
objectsthatcannotbepickedoutbedefinitedescriptions.Peircetreatedthesenongeneralsignsasindices,
whichinturnledhimtoidentifytheindexasanessentialpartoflogic.Thismadehisearlieraccountofsigns
seemunderdeveloped.(See,forinstance,Short(2004,219222),Hookway(2000,127131),andMurphey
(1961,299300)).ThisappearstohaveledPeircetotakesignsotherthanthesymbolmoreseriously.In
particular,itledPeircetorealizethatsomesymbolicsignshaddistinctlyindexical(thatisnongeneral)
features.Similarly,symbolswithheavilyiconicfeatures,especiallyinmathematics(seeHookway1985Ch
6),weremoreimportantthanhethought.Whatthismeant,ofcourse,wasthattheaccountofthe1860swas
nowwoefullyinadequatetothetaskofcapturingtherangeofsignsandsignificationthatPeircethought
importantforphilosophyandlogic.

Peirce's1903accountofsigns,then,isnotableforitsbroaderscope,relativeneatness,andcompleteness.In
itPeircereturnstothebasicsignstructurewegaveaboveandbypayingcloseattentiontothoseelementsof
signsandthevariousinteractionsbetweenthemgiveswhatseemstobeanextensiveaccountofsignification,
andanexhaustivetypologyofsignsfarbeyondtherangeofhisearlyaccountofthe1860s.Tounderstand
Peirce's1903account,wemustreturntothethreeelementsofsignification,namely,thesignvehicle,the
object,andtheinterpretantandseehowPeircethinkstheirfunctioninsignificationleadstoanexhaustive
classificationofsigntypes.
3.1SignVehicles

RecallthatPeircethoughtsignssignifytheirobjectsnotthroughalltheirfeatures,butinvirtueofsome
particularfeature.By1903,forreasonsrelatedtohisworkonphenomenology,Peircethoughtthecentral
featuresofsignvehiclescouldbedividedintothreebroadareas,andconsequently,thatsignscouldbe
classifiedaccordingly.Thisdivisiondependsuponwhethersignvehiclessignifyinvirtueofqualities,
existentialfacts,orconventionsandlaws.Further,signswiththesesignvehiclesareclassifiedasqualisigns,
sinsigns,andlegisignsrespectively.

Examplesofsignswhosesignvehiclereliesuponaqualityaredifficulttoimagine,butaparticularlyclear
example,usedbyDavidSavan,isthis:

[]IuseacolorchiptoidentifythecolorofsomepaintIwanttobuy.Thecolorchipisperhaps
madeofcardboard,rectangular,restingonawoodentableetc.,etc.Butitisonlythecolorofthe
chipthatisessentialtoitasasignofthecolorofthepaint.(Savan1988,20)

Therearemanyelementstothecoloredchipasasign,butitisonlyitscolorthatmatterstoitsabilityto
signify.Anysignwhosesignvehiclerelies,aswiththisexample,onsimpleabstractedqualitiesiscalleda
qualisign.

Anexampleofasignwhosesignvehicleusesexistentialfactsissmokeasasignforfirethecausalrelation
betweenthefireandsmokeallowsthesmoketoactasasignifier.Othercasesarethemolehillexampleused
earlier,andtemperatureasasignforafever.Anysignwhosesignvehiclereliesuponexistentialconnections
withitsobjectisnamed,byPeirce,asinsign.

Andfinally,thethirdkindofsignisonewhosecrucialsignifyingelementisprimarilyduetoconvention,
habitorlaw.Typicalexampleswouldbetrafficlightsassignofpriority,andthesignifyingcapabilityof
wordsthesesignvehiclessignifyinvirtueoftheconventionssurroundingtheiruse.Peircecallssignswhose
signvehiclesfunctioninthiswaylegisigns.

3.2Objects

JustasPeircethoughtsignscouldbeclassifiedaccordingtowhethertheirsignvehiclesfunctioninvirtueof
qualities,existentialfacts,orconventionsandlaws,hethoughtsignsweresimilarlyclassifiableaccordingto
howtheirobjectfunctionedinsignification.Recallthat,forPeirce,objectsdeterminetheirsigns.Thatisto
say,thenatureoftheobjectconstrainsthenatureofthesignintermsofwhatsuccessfulsignification
requires.Again,Peircethoughtthenatureoftheseconstraintsfellintothreebroadclasses:qualitative,
existentialorphysical,andconventionalandlawlike.Further,iftheconstraintsofsuccessfulsignification
requirethatthesignreflectqualitativefeaturesoftheobject,thenthesignisanicon.Iftheconstraintsof
successfulsignificationrequirethatthesignutilizesomeexistentialorphysicalconnectionbetweenitandits
object,thenthesignisanindex.Andfinally,ifsuccessfulsignificationoftheobjectrequiresthatthesign
utilizesomeconvention,habit,orsocialruleorlawthatconnectsitwithitsobject,thenthesignisasymbol.

Thisisatrichotomywithwhichwearealreadyfamiliarfromtheearlyaccount,andindeed,theexamplesof
icons,indices,andsymbolsarelargelythesameasbefore:iconsareportraitsandpaintings,indicesare
naturalandcausalsigns,symbolsarewordsandsoon.Thereare,however,additionalinstances,forexample,
iconsincludediagramsusedingeometricalreasoning,indicesincludepointingfingersandpropernames,
andsymbolsincludingbroadspeechactslikeassertionandjudgment,allofwhichsuggestsaconsiderable
broadeningofthistrichotomy.Itiswellworthnoting,though,thatby1903Peircewasawarethatitwouldbe
hard,ifnotimpossible,tofindanypureinstancesoficonsandindices.Rather,hebegantosuspectthaticons
andindiceswerealwayspartlysymbolicorconventional.Totrytocapturethis,Peirceexperimentedwith
someadditionalterminologyandtypesoficonandindex.Thesehecalledthehypoicon(seeCP2.2761903)
andthesubindex(seeCP2.3301903)respectively.Weshallnotexplorethesesignsfurtherhere(see
(Goudge1965)and(Atkin2005)formoreonPeirce'sviewofindices,and(Legg2008)formoreonicons),
butitisworthnotingthatby1903,thesimpleicon/index/symboltrichotomywassomethingofan
abstraction,andPeircewasawarethatanysinglesignmaydisplaysomecombinationoficonic,indexical
andsymboliccharacteristics.
3.3Interpretants

Aswiththesignvehicleandtheobject,Peircethoughtwecouldclassifysignsintermsoftheirrelationwith
theirinterpretant.Again,heidentifiesthreecategoriesaccordingtowhichfeatureoftherelationshipwithits
objectasignusesingeneratinganinterpretant.Further,aswiththeclassificationofthesignintermsofthe
signvehicleandtheobject,Peirceidentifiesqualities,existentialfacts,orconventionalfeaturesasthebasis
forclassifyingthesignintermsofitsinterpretant.

Ifthesigndeterminesaninterpretantbyfocusingourunderstandingofthesignuponthequalitativefeatures
itemploysinsignifyingitsobject,thenthesignisclassifiedasarheme.Examplesarenotstraightforward,
butonewayofunderstandingrhemes,istothinkofthemasunsaturatedpredicateslike,isadog,is
happy,lovesorgivesto,andsoon.Wheneverweunderstandasignintermsofqualities
itsuggestsitsobjectmayhave,wegenerateaninterpretantthatqualifiesitssignasarheme.If,ontheother
hand,asigndeterminesaninterpretantbyfocusingourunderstandingofthesignupontheexistential
featuresitemploysinsignifyinganobject,thenthesignisadicent.Wecanthinkofdicentsisassaturated
predicates,orpropositions,likeFidoisadog,Larryishappy,FidolovesLarry,Larrygivesfoodto
Fido,andsoon.Andfinally,ifasigndeterminesaninterpretantbyfocusingourunderstandingonsome
conventionalorlawlikefeaturesemployedinsignifyingtheobject,thenthesignisadelome,orasPeirce
mostfrequently,butconfusingly,callsthem,arguments.Further,justaswecanthinkofarhemeasan
unsaturatedpredicate,andadicentasaproposition,wecanthinkofthedelomeasanargumentorruleof
inference.Ourabilitytounderstandasignintermsofitsplaceinsomepatternofreasoningandsystemof
signsenablesustoderiveinformationfromit(bydeductivereasoning)ormakeconjecturesaboutit(by
inductiveandabductivereasoning).So,wheneverwecometounderstandasignasfocusingourattention
uponsomeconventionalfeatureofitsrelationshipwithobject,thatis,enablingustounderstandthesignas
partofarulegovernedsystemofknowledgeandsignsetc.,wehaveaninterpretantthatqualifiesasignasa
delome(orargument).

3.4TheTenClassesofSigns

Peircebelievedthatthethreeelements,andtherespectiveclassificationstheyimposeduponsigns,couldbe
combinedtogiveacompletelistofsigntypes.Thatis,sinceasignhasasignvehicleitcanbeclassifiedas
eitheraqualisign,asinsign,orlegisign.Additionally,sincethatsignhasanobjectitcanbeclassifiedas
eitheranicon,anindex,orasymbol.Andfinally,sincethatsignwillalsodetermineaninterpretantitcanbe
classifiedaseitherarheme,adicent,oradelome.Eachsignisthenclassifiableassomecombinationofeach
ofitsthreeelements,thatis,aseitheroneofthethreetypesofsignvehicle,plusoneofthethreetypesof
object,plusoneofthethreetypesofinterpretant.Initially,thisseemstoyieldtwentysevenpossible
classificatorycombinations,but,becauseofcertainofPeirce'sphenomenologicaltheories,thereare
restrictionsonhowwecancombinethedifferentelementsthatmeanthereare,infact,onlytentypesofsign.
(FormoreontherelationbetweenPeirce'sphenomenologicalcategories,andhissigntypology,see(Lizska
1996)and(Savan1988))

Therulesforthepermissiblecombinationsareactuallyquitesimplesolongaswebeartwothingsinmind.
First,typesofeachelementareclassifiableaseitheraquality,anexistentialfact,oraconvention.Thatis,
acrossthethreeelementsofasign,therearethreetypesderivingfromqualities(thequalisign,theicon,and
therheme),threederivingfromexistentialfacts,(thesinsign,theindex,andthedicent),andthreederiving
fromconventions(thelegisign,thesymbol,andthedelome).Second,theclassificationoftheinterpretant
dependsupontheclassificationoftheobject,whichinturndependsupontheclassificationofthesign
vehicle.Therulesthatdeterminepermissibleclassifications,then,arethatifanelementisclassifiedasa
quality,thenitsdependentelementmayonlybeaclassifiedasaquality.Ifanelementisclassifiedasan
existentialfact,thenitsdependentelementmaybeclassifiedaseitheranexistentialfact,oraquality.Andif
anelementisclassifiedasaconvention,thenitsdependentelementmaybeclassifiedaseitheraconvention,
anexistentialfact,oraquality.Thisleavesuswithtenpermissiblecombinationsbetweenasignvehicle,
objectandinterpretant,andsotenpossiblekindsofsigns.Theylooksomethinglikethis:

INTERPRETANT OBJECT SIGNVEHICLE EXAMPLES(fromCP2.2542631903)

Rheme Icon Qualisign Afeelingofred
 Rheme Icon Sinsign AnIndividualDiagram
Rheme Index Sinsign Aspontaneouscry
Dicent Index Sinsign AWeatherCock
Rheme Icon Legisign Adiagram[type]
Rheme Index Legisign Ademonstrativepronoun
Dicent Index Legisign Astreetcry
Rheme Symbol Legisign Acommonnoun
Dicent Symbol Legisign Ordinaryproposition
Delome Symbol Legisign Anargument

Thesetentypesofsignaresimplycalledafterthecombinationoftheirelements:anordinarypropositionisa
dicenticsymboliclegisign,aspontaneouscryarhematicindexicalsinsign,andsoon.

Despiteitsapparentcompletenessandcomplexity,however,Peircewassoontobeginrethinkinghis1903
accountofsignsandoverthefinalyearsofhislife,heintroducedfurthercomplexitiesandnuances.

4.TheFinalAccount:190610
DuringthelastpartofhislifethemajorityofPeirce'sphilosophicaloutputconcernedsemiotic,andhe
developedhisaccountofsignsfarbeyondthe1903theory.Thereseemtobetworeasonsforthis.First,
Peircewasgeographicallyandintellectuallyisolatedandhismainoutletwascorrespondencewiththe
Englishwoman,LadyVictoriaWelby.WelbywroteonvariousphilosophicaltopicsandsharedPeirce's
interestsinsignsandmeaning.ThisseemstohavegivenPeirceawillingandsympatheticaudienceforhis
developingideasonsigns.Thesecondreasonseemstohavebeenhisgrowingappreciationofthe
connectionsbetweenthesemioticprocessandtheprocessofinquiry.Peircealwaysthoughtofhisphilosophy
inasystematicandarchitectonicway.However,around1902,anapplicationforfundingtotheCarnegie
Institutesawhimexpressmoreclearlytheconnectionsbetweendifferentaspectsofhisphilosophy.The
applicationfailed,butPeircehadreturnedtothinkingabouttheplaceofsigntheoryinhisbroader
philosophy.Inparticular,hecametoseesigntheorymoreclearlyaspartofthelogicofscientificdiscovery,
thatis,ascentraltohisaccountofinquiry.WeshallnotreviewPeirce'saccountofinquiryhere,butasanend
directedprocessleadingfromdoubtpronetodoubtproofbeliefs,Peircebegantoseeasimilarend
directednessrunningthroughthesemioticprocess.ThiskindofthinkingleadPeircetoreassesshisaccount
ofsignsandsignstructure:theconnectionbetweentheprocessofinquiryandsignchainsledPeircetonotice
subtletiesandnuancesthathadpreviouslybeentransparenttohim.Inparticular,itledhimtoseechainsof
signsastendingtowardsadefinitebutidealizedendratherthanprogressingadinfinitum.Sinceatthe
idealizedendofinquirywehaveacompleteunderstandingofsomeobject,thereneedbenofurther
interpretantofthatobjectourunderstandingcannotbedevelopedanyfurther.(SeeRansdell(1977)and
Short(2004)and(2007)formoreontheconnectionsbetweenPeirce'slateraccountandtheenddirected
processofinquiry.Indeed,Short(2007)representsthefullestandbestdevelopedaccountof'telic'
interpretationsofPeirce'ssemiotictodate).

4.1DividingTheObject
ThefirsteffectofPeirce'sgreaterappreciationoftheparallelsbetweeninquiryandhissigntheoryisa
distinctionbetweentheobjectofthesignasitweunderstandatsomegivenpointinthesemioticprocess,
andtheobjectofthesignasitstandsattheendofthatprocess.Theformerhecallstheimmediateobject,and
thelaterhecallsthedynamicobject.Aneatwayofcapturingthisdistinctionisasthedifferentobjects
arisingfromthetwoanswerstothequestion:whatobjectdoesthissignreferto?Oneistheanswerthat
couldbegivenwhenthesignwasusedandtheotheristheonewecouldgivewhenourscientific
knowledgeiscomplete.(Hookway1985,139).

4.1.1TheDynamicObject
Thedynamicobjectis,insomesenses,theobjectthatgeneratesachainofsigns.Theaimofasignchainis
toarriveatafullunderstandingofanobjectandsoassimilatethatobjectintothesystemofsigns.Using
slightlymoresimplisticterms,Ransdell(1977,169)describesthedynamicobjectastheobjectasitreally
is,andHookway(1985,139)describesitastheobjectasitisknowntobe[attheendofinquiry].Indeed,
Hookway'sdescriptionshowsanacuteawarenessoftheconnectionbetweenthedynamicobjectandthe
processofinquiryinPeirce'slatersigntheory.Anexample,fromLiszka(1996,23),capturesPeirce'sidea
quiteclearly:takingapetroleumtankhalffullwithfuel,avarietyofsignsforthishalffullstateare
available.Perhapsthereisafuelgaugeattachedtothetank,orperhapsthetankmakesadistinctivesound
whenwestrikeitandsoon.But,despitethesevarioussigns,theobjectunderlyingthemallistheactuallevel
offuelinthepetroleumtankthisisthedynamicobject.

4.1.2TheImmediateObject

Ransdell(1977,169)describestheimmediateobjectaswhatwe,atanytime,supposetheobjecttobe,and
Hookway(1985,139)describesitastheobjectatthetimeitisfirstusedandinterpreted.Theimmediate
object,then,isnotsomeadditionalobjectdistinctfromthedynamicobjectbutismerelysome
informationallyincompletefacsimileofthedynamicobjectgeneratedatsomeinterimstageinachainof
signs.Returningtothepetroleumtankexample,whenwestrikethetank,thetonethatitemits(which
functionsasthesignvehicle)representstousthatthetankisnotfull(butitdoesnottellusthepreciselevel
offuel).Theimmediateobject,then,isalessthanfulltank.

Clearly,theimmediateanddynamicobjectsofasignareintimatelylinkedandPeirceconsistentlydescribes
andintroducesthetwotogether.(See,(CP4.536(1896)).However,theconnectionbetweenthetwoismost
clearwhenweconsidertheconnectionsbetweensignchainsandinquiry.Thedynamicobjectis,aswehave
suggested,thegoalandendpointthatdrivesthesemioticprocess,andtheimmediateobjectisourgraspof
thatobjectatanypointinthatprocess.Ransdell,forinstance,says:

[T]heimmediateobjectistheobjectasitappearsatanypointintheinquiryorsemioticprocess.
The[dynamic]object,however,istheobjectasitreallyis.Thesemustbedistinguished,first,
becausetheimmediateobjectmayinvolvesomeerroneousinterpretationandthusbetothat
extentfalselyrepresentativeoftheobjectasitreallyis,and,second,becauseitmayfailto
includesomethingthatistrueoftherealobject.Inotherwords,theimmediateobjectissimply
whatweatanytimesupposetherealobjecttobe.(Ransdell1977,169)

Putthisway,itisclearhowPeirce'sgrowingconcerntocapturetheparallelsbetweensemiosisandthe
processofinquiryleadshimtoidentifytwoobjectsforthesign.

4.2DividingtheInterpretant

Justaswiththeobject(s)ofthesign,theparallelsbetweensemioticandinquiryresultinasimilardivisionof
interpretants.Asachainofsignsmovestowardsafinalendtherearedifferentinterpretantsplayingdifferent
butimportantroles.Peirceidentifiesthreedifferentwaysinwhichwegraspthewayasignstandsforan
object.Hecallsthesethreetypesofinterpretant,theimmediateinterpretant,thedynamicinterpretantandthe
finalinterpretantanddescribesthemlikethis.

The[Dynamic]Interpretantiswhateverinterpretationanymindactuallymakesofasign.
[]TheFinalInterpretantdoesnotconsistinthewayinwhichanyminddoesactbutintheway
inwhicheverymindwouldact.Thatis,itconsistsinatruthwhichmightbeexpressedina
conditionalpropositionofthistype:Ifsoandsoweretohappentoanymindthissignwould
determinethatmindtosuchandsuchconduct.[]TheImmediateInterpretantconsistsinthe
QualityoftheImpressionthatasignisfittoproduce,nottoanyactualreaction.[][I]fthere
beanyfourthkindofInterpretantonthesamefootingasthosethree,theremustbeadreadful
ruptureofmymentalretina,forIcan'tseeitatall.(CP8.3151909).

Weshallexamineeachoftheseinturn,buttogetaclearerunderstandingofthethreeinterpretantsitis
helpfultolook,verybriefly,atPeirce'sthreegradesofclarity,orunderstandingsincePeircetooktheseto
informhisdivisionofinterpretants.
Inhis1878paper,HowToMakeOurIdeasClear(W3,257275)Peirceintroducesthreegradesofclarity,
orlevelsofunderstanding.Inthispaper,heintroduceshisfamouspragmaticmaximasadevelopmentof
rationalistnotionsofclearanddistinctideas.Combininghispragmaticmaximwithnotionsofclarityfrom
DescartesandLeibniz,Peirceidentifiesthreegradesofunderstanding.Thefirstgradeofclarityistohavean
unreflectivegraspofsomeconceptineverydayexperience.Thesecondgradeofclarityistohave,orbe
capableofproviding,ageneraldefinitionofthatconcept.Thethirdgradeofclarity,though,comesfrom
Peirce'sfamousstatementofthepragmaticmaxim:

Considerwhateffects,whichmightconceivablyhavepracticalbearings,weconceivetheobject
ofourconceptiontohave.Then,ourconceptionoftheseeffectsisthewholeofourconception
oftheobject.(W3,266)

Afullunderstandingofsomeconcept,then,involvesfamiliaritywithitindaytodayencounters,theability
tooffersomegeneraldefinitionofit,andknowingwhateffectstoexpectfromholdingthatconcepttobe
true.

AlthoughthesegradesofclarityarepartofPeirce'spragmatism,hisgreaterunderstandingofthe
interconnectednessofhisthoughtledhimtorealizethattheywerealsocrucialtohisworkonsemiotic.In
particular,hesawthethreegradesofclarityorunderstandingasreflectedinhisnotionoftheinterpretantand
ofcoursefeltthattheinterpretantalsohadthreegradesordivisions.Peircehimselfsays:

IntheSecondPartofmy[HowToMakeOurIdeasClear],Imadethreegradesofclearnessof
Interpretation.ThefirstwassuchFamiliarityasgaveapersonfamiliaritywithasignand
readinessinusingitorinterpretingit.Inhisconsciousnessheseemedtohimselftobequiteat
homewiththeSign.[]ThesecondwasLogicalAnalysis[andisequivalentto]LadyWelby's
Sense.ThethirdwasPragmatisticAnalysis[andis]identifiedwiththeFinalInterpretant.(CP8
.185(1909)).

Here,then,Peirceidentifiesthefirstgradeofclaritywiththedynamicinterpretant,thesecondgradewiththe
immediateinterpretant,andthethirdgradewiththefinalinterpretant.

4.2.1TheImmediateInterpretant

Asitsidentificationwiththesecondgradeofclaritysuggests,theimmediateinterpretantisageneral
definitionalunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenthesignanddynamicobject.Inanextendedexample,
wherethedynamicobjectistheweatheronastormyday,Peircedescribestheimmediateinterpretantasthe
schemain[our]imagination,i.e.thevagueImageofwhatthereisincommontothedifferentimagesofa
stormyday(CP8.314(1907)).Theimmediateinterpretant,then,issomethinglikerecognitionofthesyntax
ofthesignandthemoregeneralfeaturesofitsmeaning.Indeed,Peirceseemstotaketheimmediate
interpretanttobeallthatisexplicitinthesignapartfromitscontextandcircumstancesofutterance(CP5
.473(1907)).AlsoinstructiveisDavidSavan'sdescriptionoftheimmediateinterpretantasthe:

explicitcontentofthesignwhichwouldenableapersontosaywhetherornotthesignwas
applicabletoanythingconcerningwhichthatpersonhadsufficientacquaintance.Itisthetotal
unanalyzedimpressionwhichthesignmightbeexpectedtoproduce,priortoanycritical
reflectionuponit.(Savan1988,53).

Intermsofanexamplewhereordinarysentencesarethesigns,theimmediateinterpretantwillinvolve
somethinglikeourrecognitionofgrammaticalcategories,syntacticstructuresandconventionalrulesofuse.
Forinstance,withoutknowinganythingaboutitscontextofutterance,wecansurmisecertainthingsabout
thesentence,wedon'twanttohurthim,dowe?.Weknowitisaquestion,weknowitconcernsdoing
harmtosomeperson,amale,andsoon.Thesethingsarepartoftheimmediateinterpretantofthesign.

4.2.2TheDynamicInterpretant

Thesecondtypeofinterpretantthatanysignmusthaveisthedynamicinterpretant.Thisisour
understandingofthesign/dynamicobjectrelationshipatsomeactualinstanceinthechainofsigns.Peirce
describesthedynamicinterpretantastheeffectactuallyproducedonthemind(CP8.343(1908)),orasthe
actualeffectwhichthesign,asasign,reallydetermines(CP4.536(1906)).Thedynamicinterpretant,
then,istheunderstandingwereach,orwhichthesigndetermines,atanyparticularsemioticstage.

Tocontinuewithlinguisticexamples,weknowthatthedynamicinterpretantistheactualinterpretationwe
make,orunderstandingwereach,inthefirstinstanceofinterpretation.Forinstance,whenyousaytome
whilstpointingatsomecowardlywomanweknow,Isawherduckunderthetable,thedynamic
interpretantismyunderstandingthatyouaretheutterer,thatIamtheaddressee,andthatyousawour
cowardlyacquaintancehidebeneathatable.

Thereisalsoaninterestingconnectionbetweenthedynamicinterpretantandtheimmediateobject.Asthe
understandingweactuallyreachatanyparticularpointinthesignchain,thedynamicinterpretantrepresents
anincompleteunderstanding,orinterpretation,ofthedynamicobject.Moreimportant,though,isthatthe
immediateobjectofsomesigninasignchainconsistsoftheactualinterpretationsmadepreviously,thatis,it
consistsofthedynamicinterpretantsfromearlierstagesinthesignchain.AsRansdell(1977,169)putsit,
theimmediateobjectis,inotherwords,thefundedresultofallinterpretationpriortotheinterpretationof
thegivensign.Thedynamicinterpretantthen,istheactualinterpretationorunderstandingwemakeatsome
pointinthesemioticprocess,andalsoconstitutes,alongwithpreviousdynamicinterpretants,theimmediate
object,orpartialunderstandingwehaveofthedynamicobjectatanyparticularpointinthesemioticprocess.

4.2.3TheFinalInterpretant

Peircedescribesthefinalinterpretantas,thatwhichwouldfinallybedecidedtobethetrueinterpretationif
considerationofthematterwerecarriedsofarthatanultimateopinionwerereached(CP8.184(1909)).
Elsewherehedescribesitastheeffectthatwouldbeproducedonthemindbythesignaftersufficient
developmentofthought(CP8.343(1908)).Thefinalinterpretant,then,seemstobewhatourunderstanding
ofthedynamicobjectwouldbeattheendofinquiry,thatis,ifwehadareachedatrueunderstandingofthe
dynamicobject.Peirce'snotionofinquiryisclearlycentralhere.AsHookwaypointsout,wemightbest
definethefinalinterpretantastheunderstanding:

whichwouldbereachedifaprocessofenrichingtheinterpretantthroughscientificenquirywere
toproceedindefinitely.Itincorporatesacompleteandtrueconceptionoftheobjectsofthesign
itistheinterpretantweshouldallagreeoninthelongrun.(Hookway1985,139).

Asanexample,consideragainthekindsofutterancethatwehavealreadylookedat.Insuchacaseasyour
uttering,Isawherduckunderthetable,thefinalinterpretantwouldbetheunderstandingwherethereis
nolatitudeofinterpretationatall(CP5.447(1905)),thatis,wherethemeaningsofthewords,theidentity
oftheagentsinvolvedandsoon,areabsolutelydeterminate.So,thefinalinterpretantofyourutteranceofI
sawherduckunderthetableismycomingtoadeterminateunderstandingofwhatyoumean.Wecan
envisagehowthiswouldcomeabout,bymyaskingavarietyofquestions,likeareyouusingduckasa
verboranoun?,orevenareyoutalkingtome?anddevelopingaseriesofdynamicinterpretantsthatget
uscloserandclosertothefinalinterpretant.

JustasthedynamicinterpretanthasclearconnectionswithotherelementsofPeirce'ssemiotic,sotoodoes
thefinalinterpretant.Asshouldbeclear,fromtheconnectionsthatemergefromthenotionofinquiry,the
finalinterpretantinteractsstronglywiththedynamicobject.Thefinalinterpretant,then,isimportanttoour
understandingofthedynamicobjectinacoupleofways.First,itisthepointwhereourgraspofthedynamic
objectwouldbecompleteand,accordingtoRansdell(1977,169170),iswheretheimmediateobjectandthe
dynamicobjectcoincide.Thisrepresentsthefullassimilationorintegrationofthedynamicobjectintoour
systemofsigns.Second,thefinalinterpretantfunctionsasanexemplarornormativestandardbywhichwe
canjudgeouractualinterpretativeresponsestothesign.AsDavidSavanputsit,Peirce'sintentionwasto
identifythethirdtypeofinterpretantasprovidinganormorstandardbywhichparticularstages(Dynamical
Interpretants)ofanhistoricalprocessmaybejudged.(Savan1988,62).

4.3IssueswiththeFinalAccount

ThisidentificationofthesixelementsofasignistheclearestandleastcontroversialpartofPeirce'sfinal
signtheories.MostofwhatweknowaboutPeirce'sfinalaccountisgleanedfromletters,partiallyworkedout
manuscriptsandothermiscellaneousitems.Consequently,thereismuchtothefinalaccountthatisstill
unclear,unsatisfactory,incomplete,andcontroversial.Inthisfinalsection,weshalllookattwoofthemost
interestingissuessurroundingthefinalaccount:Peirce'sprojectedFinalClassificationofsixtysixsignsand
whatappearstobehisidentificationofadditionalinterpretants.

4.3.1TheFinalClassification

JustastheEarlyandInterimAccountsincludeacorrespondingclassificationofsigntypes,Peirce'sfinal
accountholdssimilartypologicalambitions.Peircestatesexplicitlythattherearesixtysixclassesofsignin
hisfinaltypology.(SeeEP2.481).Strictlyspeaking,thesixelementsthatwehavedetailedyieldonlytwenty
eightsigntypes,butweareinterestedinPeirce'sveryfinaltypology.Hebelievesthatwecanobtainthese
sixtysixclasses,ratherinthemannerofthe1903typology,byidentifyingtenelementsofsignsand
signification,eachofwhichhasthreequalifyingclasses,andthenworkingouttheirpermissible
combinations.Thesetenelementsincludethesixsignelementsidentifiedabove,plusfourotherelements
thatfocusontherelationbetweensigns,objectsandinterpretants.Thetenelementsandtheirrespectivesign
types,takenfromPeirce's1908letterstoLadyWelby(EP2483491),then,areasfollows:

1.InrespectoftheSignitself(whatwehavebeencallingtheSignVehicle),asignmaybeeithera(i)
Potisign(ii)Actisignor(iii)aFamisign.

(Bythetimeofthefinalaccounts,Peircewasexperimentingwithterminologysothese
typesareperhapsmorefamiliarasQualisigns,SinsignsandLegisigns).

2.InrespectoftheImmediateObject,asignmaybeeitheri)Descriptive(ii)Designativeor(iii)a
Copulant.
3.InrespectoftheDynamicObject,asignmaybeeither(i)Abstractive(ii)Concretiveor(iii)
Collective.
4.InrespectofrelationbetweentheSignandtheDynamicObject,asignmaybeeither,(i)anIcon(ii)an
Indexor(iii)aSymbol.
5.InrespectoftheImmediateInterpretant,asignmaybeeither(i)Ejaculative,(ii)Imperativeor(iii)
Significative.
6.InrespectoftheDynamicInterpretant,asignmaybeeither(i)Sympathetic(ii)Shockingor(iii)
Usual.
7.InrespectoftherelationshipbetweentheSignandDynamicInterpretant,asignmaybeeither(i)
Suggestive(ii)Imperativeor(iii)Indicative.
8.InrespectoftheFinalInterpretant,asignmaybeeither,(i)Gratiffic(ii)ActionProducingoriii)Self
ControlProducing.
9.InrespectoftherelationbetweentheSignandtheFinalInterpretant,asignmaybeeithera(i)Seme
(ii)Phemeor(iii)aDelome.
10.InrespectoftherelationbetweentheSign,DynamicObjectandFinalInterpretant,asignmaybe
either(i)anAssuranceofInstinct(ii)anAssuranceofExperienceor(iii)anAssuranceofForm.

ThereasonthatPeircebelievesthesetenelementswillyieldsixtysixclassesisclearenough,thesame
combinatorialconsiderationsgivenfortheinterimtypology(outlinedabovein3.4)applyhere.However,the
precisemannerandorderinwhichtheseelementsinteractwilldeterminewhatthesixtysixclassesofsigns
willlooklikeinthefinaltypology.Unfortunately,thesetendivisionsandtheirclassesrepresentabaffling
arrayofunderexplainedterminology,andthereislittletoindicatepreciselyhowweshouldsetaboutthe
taskofcombiningthem.Eventhoughwemaybeconfidentonthenumberofsignsinthefinaltypology,
otherdetailsaresketchyandunderdeveloped,andtherestillexistsnofullysatisfactoryaccountofthesixty
sixclasses.AsNathanHouserpointsout,asoundanddetailedextensionofPeirce'sanalysisofsignstohis
fullsetoftendivisionsandsixtysixclassesisperhapsthemostpressingproblemforPeirciansemiotics.
(Houser1992,502).

Thereis,ofcourse,goodworkonthefinaltypology(see(BurksandWeiss1949),(Sanders1970),(Savan
1988),(Jappy1989),(Muller1994),and(FariasandQueiroz2003)forthebestofthiswork),butultimately,
itisnotclearthatanyaccountwillovercometheproblemsposedbytheincompleteandcursorynatureofthe
finalaccount.Indeed,itisnotclearthatPeircehimselfwasfullyateasewithhisfinaltypologyandhowits
elementsshouldhangtogether.Ashehimselfsaid:
 ThetendivisionsappeartometobeallTrichotomiesbutitispossiblethatnoneofthemare
properlyso.OfthesetenTrichotomies,Ihaveaclearapprehensionofsome,anunsatisfactory
anddoubtfulnotionofothers,andatolerablebutnotthoroughlytriedconceptionofothers.
(EP2.483)

4.3.2AdditionalInterpretants

AsiscommonwithallofPeirce'sworkinphilosophy,variouschangesinterminologyandsubtletieswith
accompanyingneologismsoccurfromonepieceofworktothenext.Hisworkoninterpretantsisno
different.Atvariouspointsinhisfinalaccountsofsigns,Peircedescribesthedivisionofinterpretantsas
being:immediate,dynamicandfinalorasemotional,energetic,andlogicalorasnave,rogateandnormal
orasintentional,effectiveandcommunicationalorevendestinate,effectiveandexplicit.AsLiszka(1990,
20)notes,thereceivedviewinPeircescholarshipsuggeststhatthedivisionsofinterpretantintoimmediate,
dynamic,andfinalarearchetypal,allotherdivisionsbeingrelativelysynonymouswiththesecategories.
Thereare,however,somedissentersfromthisview.

Indiscussingtheinterpretant,Peircedescribesoneofthetrichotomiesaboveasfollows:

Inallcases[theInterpretant]includesfeelingsfortheremust,atleast,beasenseof
comprehendingthemeaningofthesign.Ifitincludesmorethanmerefeeling,itmustevoke
somekindofeffort.Itmayincludesomethingbesides,which,forthepresent,maybevaguely
calledthought.Itermthesethreekindsofinterpretanttheemotional,theenergetic,and
thelogicalinterpretants.(EP2.409)

Forsomescholars,thisdescribesadivisiondistinctfromtheimmediate/dynamic/finaltrichotomy.Fitzgerald
(1966,78)claimsthatsinceemotional,energeticandlogicalinterpretantsareactualeffects,theymustbe
seenasthreesubtypesofthedynamicinterpretant.Thisisbecausedynamicinterpretantsaredescribedby
Peirceastheeffectactuallyproducedonthemind.Short(1981,1996,and2004)thinksthateachofthe
immediate,dynamicandfinalinterpretantsmaybefurthersubdividedintoemotional,energeticandlogical.
Inparticular,Shortthinksthattheimmediate/dynamic/finaltrichotomydescribestheinterpretantatsome
stageofanenddirectedsemioticprocess,whereastheemotional/energetic/logicaltrichotomydescribesthe
typesofinterpretantpossibleatanygivenstage.

TherearesimpletextualreasonsthatcountagainstFitzgerald'sclaims.Forinstance,Peircedescribesthe
dynamicinterpretantasderivingitscharacterfromaction(CP8.315(1904)),butlatersays,actioncannotbe
alogicalinterpretant(CP5.491(1906)).Thisseemstomakethetwoinconsistent.(SeeLiszka(1990,21)
formoreontheproblemswithFitzgerald'sclaim).Moreover,thisinconsistencyseemstosuggestaproblem
forShort'sviewsincehisaccountalsosuggeststhatthedynamicinterpretantshouldincludethelogical
interpretantasasubdivision(Short1981,213).Short,however,claimstextualsupportforhisownviewfrom
instanceswherePeircementionstheemotional/energetic/logicaltrichotomyalongsidetheapparently
separateclaimthatsignshavethreeinterpretants.(Shortsites(CP8.333(1904))and(CP4.536(1906)).
Shorttakesthisassuggestingthatthetwoshouldbetreatedasdifferentanddistincttrichotomies.(Short
2004,235).

Howfarthetextualevidenceonthematterwillprovedecisiveisunclear,especiallygiventhefragmentary
natureofPeirce'sfinalworkonsigns.However,oneortwothingsmilitateinfavorofthereceivedview.
First,Peirceisnotoriousforexperimentingwithterminology,especiallywhentryingtopindownhisown
ideas,ordescribethesamephenomenonfromdifferentangles.Second,itisunclearwhytrichotomieslike
theintentional/effectual/communicationalshouldcountasterminologicalexperimentswhilstthe
emotional/energetic/logicalcountsasadistinctdivision.Andfinally,thereislittleprovisioninPeirce's
projectedsixtysixclassesofsignsforthekindofadditionalclassificationsimposedbyfurthersubdivisions
oftheinterpretant.(Formoreonthisdiscussionsee,(Liszka1990and1996),(Fitzgerald1966),(Lalor
1997),(Short1981,1996,and2004)).

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OtherInternetResources
 ThePeirceEditionProject
Arisbe:ThePeirceGateway
DictionaryofPeirce'sTerminology

RelatedEntries
Peirce,CharlesSanders|Peirce,CharlesSanders:logic|pragmatism|semiotics:medieval|typesandtokens

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