PEOPLE v MUNAR

FACTS:
The court herein affirms the judgment of conviction for slight slander as rendered by
the La Union court of first instance. The Court reaffirms the principle that while the
jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at any time, sound public police bars a party
such as appellant from doing so belatedly and challenging the jurisdiction of the court
of first instances after having expressly procured that jurisdiction herself and
speculating on the fortunes of litigation.
Accused-appellant was originally charged with grave slander in the municipal court of
San Fernando, La Union for having uttered defamatory words by calling the offended
party the paramour of somebody.
Accused-appellant filed an appeal directly to the La Union court of first instance and
filed the 100-appeal bond fixed by the municipal court. She was duly re-arraigned and
entered a not-guilty plea.
Trial court rendered a decision rejecting the alibi of the accused, finding her guilty of
slight slander and imposing P50 fine and P500 indemnity to the offended party.
Accused filed an MR praying for acquittal and reduction of civil liability to P100 but
the trial court denied the MR and rejected the belated objection (balik ka here, sak)
The accused thereafter filed her notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court
Solely on the a question of law, that there was no legal basis for the judgment of
conviction because the proceedings were null and void as the private prosecutor had
no legal personality to represent, or present evidence for, the prosecution in view of
the reservation of the civil action, as borne out by the records.
Justice Antonio Barredo prayed that sinde the appeal as solely on questions of law
that the same be certified to this court(?)

ISSUE:
WON the private prosecutor for the offended party had no legal personality to conduct the
examination of some witnesses and that his participation rendered null and void the
proceedings is manifestly without merit.
WON the La Union court of first instance had jurisdiction to try the case of slander.
(RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC)

HELD:
The crime of grave slander comes within the are of the concurrent jurisdiction of
municipal courts of provincial capitals or city courts of first instance, and that the
judgment of the La Union courts of first instance to which she had expressly
appealed the municipal courts conviction should be deemed null and void for want of
jurisdiction as her appeal should have been directly to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court, but the question is foreclosed by the doctrine of estoppel enunciated
by the Court that after voluntary submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court.
While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy
bars the petitioners from so doing after their having procured that jurisdiction
themselves, speculation on the fortunes of litigation.
Bonifacio
v
RTC of Makati, Br. 149
Facts:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private
respondent Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed
a criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in
relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code .
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity,
character and reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for
exposing them to public hatred and contempt, and published in the said
website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory article persuading the public to
remove their investments and policies from the said company. This is after the
petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies they
obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to
indict the petitioners, filed separate information against them .
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the
grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in
 the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article
353 of the RPC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was
printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time
the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published, and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended
party accessed the internet-published article.
Issue:
Whether petitioners Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.
Held:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the
offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant
in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication. This is wrong. For the court to
hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open
the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. This goes
against the purpose as to why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended
party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-
of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.
Bonifacio,etal.vs.RegionalTrialCourtofMakati,Branch129,etal.G.R.No.184800;5May2010Facts:
UponthecomplaintfiledbyJessieJohnP.Gimenez(Gimenez)onbehalfoftheYuchengcoFamily
(particularly,formerAmbassadorAlfonsoYuchengcoandHelenY.Dee)andtheMalayanInsuranceCo.,
Inc.(Malayan),13InformationsforlibelwerefiledwiththeMakatiRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)against
officers,trusteesandamemberoftheParentsEnablingParentsCoalition,Inc.(PEPCI),andacertainJohn
Doe,theadministratorofthewebsitewww.pepcoalition.com,whichprovidesaforumforplanholdersof
PacificPlans,Inc.awhollyownedsubsidiaryofGreatPacificLifeAssuranceCorporation,alsoownedby
theYuchengcoGroupofCompaniestoseekredressforbeingunabletocollectundertheirpreneed
educationalplansafterPPI,duetoliquidityconcerns,filedforcorporaterehabilitationwithprayerfor
suspensionofpayments.TheInformationsallegedthattheaccused,holdinglegaltitletothesaidwebsite,
maliciouslypublishedthereinthefollowingdefamatoryarticleagainsttheYuchengcoFamilyandMalayan:
TalagangnaisahannanamantayongmgaYuchengcos.Nangyarinaangmgakinatatakutankong
pagbagsakngnegotiation.xxxxxxxxxForsuremaytacticspasilangnakabastasaatin.Letusbeready
foritbecausetheyhadsuccessfullylullusandthenexttimetheywilltrytokillusna.xxxHowever,on
appeal,theSecretaryofJusticedirectedthewithdrawaloftheInformationsforlackofprobablecause,
opiningthatthecrimeofinternetlibelwasnonexistent.Onmotionoftheaccused,theRTC,albeit
findingprobablecause,quashedtheInformationsforfailuretoallegethattheoffendedpartieswereactually
residinginMakatiatthetimetheoffensewascommittedasinfacttheylistedtheiraddressinManila,orto
allegethatthearticlewasprintedandfirstpublishedinMakati.Theprosecutionmovedforreconsideration,
arguingthatevenassumingtheInformationwasdeficientitmerelyneededaformalamendment.TheRTC
grantedthemotionandorderedtheprosecutiontoamendtheInformationtocurethedefectofimproper
venue.TheprosecutionamendedtheInformationtoshowthatthewebsitewasaccessibleinMakatiCity
andthedefamatoryarticlewasfirstpublishedandaccessedbytheprivatecomplainantinMakatiCity.
AftertheRTCadmittedtheAmendedInformation,severaloftheaccused(petitioners)filedapetitionfor
certiorariandprohibitionwiththeSupremeCourtfaultingtheRTC.Issues:(1)Whetherornotpetitioners,
infilingthepetitiondirectlytotheSupremeCourt,violatedtheruleonhierarchyofcourtstothusrender
thepetitiondismissible;and(2)whetherornottheRTCgravelyabuseitsdiscretionwhenitadmittedthe
AmendedInformation.Held:(1)Strictobservanceofthejudicialhierarchyofcourtsrequiresthatrecourse
mustfirstbemadetothelowerrankedcourtexercisingconcurrentjurisdictionwithahighercourt.Thus,
petitionsfortheissuanceofextraordinarywritsagainsttheRTCshouldbefiledintheCourtofAppeals.
Therule,however,admitsofcertainexceptionsaswhenthecaseinvolvespurelylegalquestions.Inthis
case,petitionersraisedapurequestionoflawinvolvingjurisdictionincriminalcomplaintsforlibelunder
Article360oftheRevisedPenalCode(RPC),asamendedbyRepublicAct(RA)No.4363.(2)The
AmendedInformationwasinsufficienttovestjurisdictioninMakati.Venueisjurisdictionalincriminal
actionssuchthattheplacewherethecrimewascommitteddeterminesnotonlythevenueoftheactionbut
constitutesanessentialelementofjurisdiction.Venueoflibelcaseswherethecomplainantisaprivate
individualislimitedtoonlyeitheroftwoplaces,namely:(a)wherethecomplainantactuallyresidesatthe
timeofthecommissionoftheoffense;or(b)wheretheallegeddefamatoryarticlewasprintedandfirst
published.Theprosecutionchosethesecond.BeforeArticle360oftheRPCwasamended,therulewas
thatacriminalactionforlibelmaybeinstitutedinanyjurisdictionwherethelibelousarticlewaspublished
orcirculated,irrespectiveofwhereitwaswrittenorprinted.Underthatrule,thecriminalactionis
transitoryandtheinjuredpartyhasachoiceofvenue.Article360wasamendedbyRA4363tostatethat
suchactionshouldbebroughtwherethearticlewasprintedandfirstpublished.Theevilsoughttobe
preventedbytheamendmentwastheindiscriminateorarbitrarylayingofthevenueinlibelcasesindistant,
isolatedorfarflungareas,meanttoaccomplishnothingmorethantoharassorintimidateanaccused,
especiallywhentheoffendedpartyisapersonofsufficientmeansorpossessesinfluence,andismotivated
byspiteortheneedforrevenge.Ifthecircumstancesastowherethelibelwasprintedandfirstpublished
areusedbytheoffendedpartyasbasisforthevenueinthecriminalaction,theInformationmustallege
withparticularitywherethedefamatoryarticlewasprintedandfirstpublished,asevidencedorsupported
by,forinstance,theaddressoftheireditorialorbusinessofficesinthecaseofnewspapers,magazinesor
serialpublications.Thispreconditionbecomesnecessaryinordertoforestallanyinclinationtoharass.The
samemeasurecannotbereasonablyexpectedwhenitpertainstodefamatorymaterialappearingona
websiteontheinternetastherewouldbenowayofdeterminingthesitusofitsprintingandfirst
publication.ToequatefirstaccesstothedefamatoryarticleonpetitionerswebsiteinMakatiwithprinting
andfirstpublicationwouldspawntheveryillsthattheamendmenttoArticle360oftheRPCsoughtto
discourageandprevent.FortheCourttoholdthattheAmendedInformationsufficientlyvestedjurisdiction
inthecourtsofMakatisimplybecausethedefamatoryarticlewasaccessedthereinwouldopenthe
floodgatestothelibelsuitbeingfiledinallotherlocationswherethepepcoalitionwebsiteislikewise
accessedorcapableofbeingaccessed.Contrarytopetitionersclaim,thevenuerequirements,underArticle
360oftheRPC,forlibelactionsfiledbyprivatepersonscannotbeconsideredundulyoppressiveasthey
stillallowsuchpersonstofilethecivilorcriminalcomplaintintheirrespectiveplacesofresidence,in
whichsituationthereisnoneedtoembarkonaquesttodeterminewithprecisionwherethelibelousmatter
wasprintedandfirstpublished.Disposition:TheRTCwasdirectedtoquashtheAmendedInformationand
todismissthecase.Ponente:J.ConchitaCarpioMoralesVote:50