51 Spouses Perea v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, The Pereas appealed.
The Pereas appealed. They argued that the award was improper as Aaron was
August 29, 2012
Torts and Damages Heirs of a high school student may be awarded damages for
loss income
In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate contracted Teodoro and Nanette Perea to
transport their (Zarates) son, Aaron Zarate, to and from school. The Pereas were
owners of a van being used for private school transport.
At about 6:45am of August 22, 1996, the driver of the said private van, Clemente
Alfaro, while the children were on board including Aaron, decided to take a short cut
in order to avoid traffic. The usual short cut was a railroad crossing of the Philippine
National Railway (PNR).
Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to block vehicles crossing the railway)
was up which means it was okay to cross. He then tried to overtake a bus. However,
there was in fact an oncoming train but Alfaro no longer saw the train as his view was
already blocked by the bus he was trying to overtake. The bus was able to cross
unscathed but the vans rear end was hit. During the collision, Aaron, was thrown off
the van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head was severed. He was only 15
years old.
It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the train honking from 50 meters away
before the collision because the vans stereo was playing loudly.
The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereas (Alfaro became at-large). Their cause of
action against PNR was based on quasi-delict. Their cause of action against the
Pereas was based on breach of contract of common carriage.
In their defense, the Pereas invoked that as private carriers they were not negligent
in selecting Alfaro as their driver as they made sure that he had a drivers license and
that he was not involved in any accident prior to his being hired. In short, they
observed the diligence of a good father in selecting their employee.
PNR also disclaimed liability as they insist that the railroad crossing they placed there
was not meant for railroad crossing (really, thats their defense!).
The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In the
decision of the RTC and the CA, they awarded damages in favor of the Zarates for
the loss of earning capacity of their dead son.
merely a high school student, hence, the award of such damages was merely
speculative. They cited the case of People vs Teehankee where the Supreme Court
did not award damages for the loss of earning capacity despite the fact that the victim
there was enrolled in a pilot school.
ISSUES: Whether or not the defense of due diligence of a good father by the Pereas
is untenable. Whether or not the award of damages for loss of income is proper.
HELD: Yes, in both issues.
Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father
This defense is not tenable in this case. The Pereas are common carriers. They are
not merely private carriers. (Prior to this case, the status of private transport for
school services or school buses is not well settled as to whether or not they are
private or common carriers but they were generally regarded as private carriers).
Private transport for schools are common carriers. The Pereas, as the operators of a
school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a
business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over
established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and (c)
transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientle, the Pereas
operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or
near where they operated the service and for a fee.
Being a common carrier, what is required of the Pereas is not mere diligence of a
good father. What is specifically required from them by law is extraordinary diligence
a fact which they failed to prove in court. Verily, their obligation as common carriers
did not cease upon their exercise of diligently choosing Alfaro as their employee.
(It is recommended that you read the full text, the Supreme Court made an elaborate
and extensive definition of common and private carriers as well as their distinctions.)
Award of Damages for Aarons loss of earning capacity despite he being a high
school student at the time of his death
The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a reputable school (Don Bosco). He was
of normal health and was an able-bodied person. Further, the basis of the
computation of his earning capacity was not on what he would have become. It was
based on the current minimum wage. The minimum wage was validly used because
with his circumstances at the time of his death, it is most certain that had he lived, he
would at least be a minimum wage earner by the time he starts working. This is not
being speculative at all.
The Teehankee case was different because in that case, the reason why no damages
were awarded for loss of earning capacity was that the defendants there were
already assuming that the victim would indeed become a pilot hence, that made the
assumption speculative. But in the case of Aaron, there was no speculation as to
what he might be but whatever hell become, it is certain that he will at the least be
earning minimum wage.
52 Victory Liner, Inc. v Rosalito Gammad, et al., November 25,
2004
Facts
Gammad showed that his wife Marie Grace was on board a Victory
Liner bus running at high speed when it fell on a ravine, which resulted
to her death and physical injuries to other passengers.
The heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for damages arising
from culpa contractual. the petitioner claimed that the incident was
purely accidental and that it has always exercised extraordinary
diligence.
The trial court ordered Victory Liner to pay actual damages, death
indemnity, exemplary and moral damages, compensatory damages,
attorneys fees and cost of the suit. The CA affirmed the trial courts
decision but reduced the actual and exemplary damages. The CA
denied the MR. Hence, the present petition wherein VL argues that the
award of damages were without basis and should be deleted.
Issue
Whether the award of damages was proper
Ruling
Petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract of
carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or
is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. There is no
evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate cause
of Marie Graces death was the negligence of petitioner.
Nevertheless, the award of damages should be modified. Article
1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, holds the common
carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a
passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2)
indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages.
In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled
to indemnity for the death of Marie Grace which under current
jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the
deceaseds earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a
rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. Rosalito did not present
evidence attesting to Marie Graces earning capacity as BIR Section
Chief.
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to
respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped
with exemplary damages because they are based on different jural
foundations. These damages are different in nature and require
separate determination. In culpa contractual or breach of contract,
moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad
faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
wanton disregard of contractual obligations and, as in this case, when
the act of breach of contract itself constitutes the tort that results in
physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764 in relation to Article
2206 of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case
the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. On the
other hand, exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of
example or correction for the public good may be recovered in
contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Respondents in the instant case should be awarded moral
damages to compensate for the grief caused by the death of the
deceased resulting from the petitioners breach of contract of carriage.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the
 extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, it is presumed to
have acted recklessly. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is
proper. Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award
respondents the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. These amounts are not
excessive.
Actual damages should be further reduced to P78,160.00, which
was the amount supported by official receipts.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may also
be recovered in the case at bar where exemplary damages are
awarded. The Court finds the award of attorneys fees equivalent to
10% of the total amount adjudged against petitioner reasonable.
In the instant case, petitioner should be held liable for payment of
interest as damages for breach of contract of carriage. Considering
that the amounts payable by petitioner has been determined with
certainty only in the instant petition, the interest due shall be
computed upon the finality of this decision at the rate of 12% per
annum until satisfaction
53 NPC v. CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns
near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and
their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and
imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior
warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners
denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it
exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written
warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was
no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged
negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living
near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of
the nature of damnum absque injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming
of the typhoon is a fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum
absque injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a
fortuitous event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results
in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between
themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law
on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
"whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God
or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the
act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause
of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect
or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar,
although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not
escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage.
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED",
would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to
set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake.
The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated
the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and
policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have
reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat
River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any such
warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent
the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they
do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice
has absolved them from liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error
that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature
of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was
physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous
events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and
obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat
Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble
their intention may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly
because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening
the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not
entitled to counterclaim.
54. PADILLA MACHINE SHOP VS. JAVILGAS
FACTS: Javilgas was hired by Padilla Machine Shop. His work consisted of
reconditioning machines. In July 1998, his salary was increased and in
January 1999, his salary was again increased until his dismissal in April
2002. Petitioners made regular deductions for his SSS contributions, but
sometime in 2002, he found out that his employer was not remitting the
contributions to the SSS; as a result, he was not able to avail of the
benefits thereof when his wife gave birth. When he complained about the
failure of his employer to remit his SSS contributions, the latter transferred
him to the Novaliches branch office. Javilgas further alleged that in April
2002, Rodolfo Padilla called him by telephone and told him to stop working
but without giving any reason therefor. He stopped reporting for work and
sued petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the payment of
backwages, pro rated 13th month pay, separation pay, and moral and
exemplary damages. On the other hand, petitioner Rodolfo Padilla
(Rodolfo), proprietor of Padilla Machine Shop, alleged that in 1999, SSS and
Medicare contributions were deducted from Javilgass salary and remitted
to the SSS; that in 2000, they (petitioners) submitted a report to the SSS
that Javilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned his work, and transferred
to another shop, Raymond Machine Shop, located within the same vicinity
as Padilla Machine Shop; that some months after, Javilgas returned and
pleaded to be re-employed with them; that Rodolfo Padilla took Javilgas
back to work, but their customers were not satisfied with the quality of his
work; hence Javilgas was assigned to the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas
incurred numerous absences in the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas had
opened his own machine shop and even pirated the clients of
petitioners; and finally, Javilgas again voluntarily left Padilla Machine Shop
without prior notice. Decisions of Lower Tribunals 1. The Labor arbiter
found that he was illegally dismissed. 2. The NLRC reversed the LAs
decision as Javilgas was never dismissed stating that he was never notified
of his dismissal nor was he prevented from returning to work. Javilgasas
allegation as to the dates of his dismissal likewise was not appreciated. 3.
The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter. It held that the burden of proof is on the petitioners, to show
that Javilgas was dismissed for a valid and just cause. As to the
inconsistency in the dates of Javilgas termination, the appellate court
noted that it was a case of miscommunication. Javilgas was found to be
illiterate, as he did not even get to finish Grade School. Likewise, the delay
of eight months in the filing of the complaint should not work against
respondent because it took time for him to obtain the services of a
counsel. ISSUE: Was there abandonment so as to give a valid cause of
dismissal? HELD: No. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on
the employer to show that the employee was dismissed for a valid and just
cause.Petitioner did not elaborate or show proof of the claimed
abandonment. Instead, he concluded that Javilgas abandoned his
corresponding duties and responsibilities when he established and created
his own machine shop outfit. For abandonment to exist, it is essential: (a)
That the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been
absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (b) That there must have
been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt acts. The establishment of his own shop is not
enough proof that Javilgas intended to sever his relationship with his
employer. Petitioners consistently deny that Javilgas was dismissed from
service; that he abandoned his employment when he walked out after his
conversation with Rodolfo and never returned to work again. But denial, in
this case, does not suffice; it should be coupled with evidence to support it.
In the Machica case, the memorandum, among others, represented clear
and convincing proof that there was no intention to dismiss the employees;
it constituted evidence in support of the employers denial. In the instant
case, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to rebut Javilgas claim of
dismissal and satisfy the burden of proof required. As regards the eight-
month hiatus before Javilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case, we
sustain the Court of Appeals ruling that Javilgas filed the complaint
within a reasonable period during the three-year period provided under
Article 291 of the Labor Code. Machica Case: In Machica v. Roosevelt
Services Center, Inc.,[12] we sustained the employers denial as Reynaldo Rada (Engr. Rada), went to meet David in the latters office in
against the employees categorical assertion of illegal dismissal. In that Quezon City. David agreed to supply the power transformer provided that
case, several employees who allegedly refused to sign a memorandum[13]
from their employer, detailing the commission of alleged anomalies that
resulted in the overpricing and overcharging of customers, filed an illegal
dismissal case three days after receiving the said memorandum. They
claimed that they were illegally dismissed and were told not to report for
work anymore; the employer denied this and asserted that the workers
(who appeared to be the suspects in the anomalies) were merely given
three to five days off to decide whether or not to agree to share the loss
suffered by it as a result of the anomalies. The Court, in ruling that there
was no illegal dismissal, held that: The rule is that one who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their
allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It
must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear,
positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of
proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the
respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners. We have reviewed the
Memorandum of respondent Dizon and find nothing therein to indicate that
any of the employees of respondent corporation, including the petitioners,
would be considered terminated from employment if they refused to share
in the P23,997.58 loss. Petitioners and other employees of respondent
corporation were merely required to affix their signatures in the
Memorandum on the space opposite their respective names, to confirm
that they had read and understood the same. As elucidated by the NLRC in
the assailed Resolution: Read in its entirety, the Memorandum reflects the
GOOD FAITH of the employer in resolving a discovered anomaly. First, it is a
declaration of AMNESTY and FORGIVENESS; it did not name names; it did
not state that the guilty ones will be pursued and punished. Second, it
asked for SHARING among the employees for the loss due to the
discovered anomaly. Third, it indicated a POSITIVE BUSINESS DIRECTION as
it exhorted the employees from participating in similar anomalies
henceforward
65 David v. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative,
Inc.
The Facts:
Petitioner Virgilio S. David (David) was the owner or proprietor of VSD
Electric Sales, a company engaged in the business of supplying electrical
hardware including transformers for rural electric cooperatives like
respondent Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI),
with principal office located in Ozamis City.
To solve its problem of power shortage affecting some areas within its
coverage, MOELCI expressed its intention to purchase a 10 MVA power
transformer from David. For this reason, its General Manager, Engr.
MOELCI would secure a board resolution because the item would still
have to be imported.
On June 8, 1992, Engr. Rada and Director Jose Jimenez (Jimenez), who
was in-charge of procurement, returned to Manila and presented to David
the requested board resolution which authorized the purchase of one 10
MVA power transformer. In turn, David presented his proposal for the
acquisition of said transformer. This proposal was the same proposal that
he would usually give to his clients.
After the reading of the proposal and the discussion of terms, David
instructed his then secretary and bookkeeper, Ellen M. Wong, to type the
names of Engr. Rada and Jimenez at the end of the proposal. Both signed
the document under the word "conforme." The board resolution was
thereafter attached to the proposal.
As stated in the proposal, the subject transformer, together with the basic
accessories, was valued at P5,200,000.00. It was also stipulated therein
that 50% of the purchase price should be paid as downpayment and the
remaining balance to be paid upon delivery. Freight handling, insurance,
customs duties, and incidental expenses were for the account of the
buyer.
The Board Resolution, on the other hand, stated that the purchase of the
said transformer was to be financed through a loan from the National
Electrification Administration (NEA). As there was no immediate action on
the loan application, Engr. Rada returned to Manila in early December
1992 and requested David to deliver the transformer to them even
without the required downpayment. David granted the request provided
that MOELCI would pay interest at 24% per annum. Engr. Rada
acquiesced to the condition. On December 17, 1992, the goods were
shipped to Ozamiz City via William Lines. In the Bill of Lading, a sales
invoice was included which stated the agreed interest rate of 24% per
annum.
:
I.SSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THERE CAN BE VALID AWARD OF ATTY
FEES?
That being said, the Court now comes to Davids prayer that MOELCI be
made to pay the total sum of P5,472,722.27 plus the stipulated interest at
24% per annum from the filing of the complaint. Although the Court
agrees that MOELCI should pay interest, the stipulated rate is, however,
unconscionable and should be equitably reduced. While there is no
question that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate
on any interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 iii the professional standing of the lawyer.
which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 3 In all cases, AF must be addressed in a full-blown trial
1983, it is also worth stressing that interest rates whenever and not on the bare word of the parties. And always,
unconscionable may still be reduced to a reasonable and fair level. There they are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.
is nothing in the said circular which grants lenders carte blanche
authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.16 Accordingly, the
FACTS:
excessive interest of 24% per annum stipulated in the sales invoice should
be reduced to 12% per annum.
Atty. Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the
Indeed, David was compelled to file an action against MOELCI but this
reason alone will not warrant an award of attorneys fees. It is settled that probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita
the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule. Farlin. He also petitioned the court in his capacity as
Counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
executor under the will. The will was unopposed and
litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated
to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense,
the court issued a certificate of allowance.
attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter; while in its
extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for
damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's Later on, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for
fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in attorney's fees" against the petitioners, alleging that
Article 2208 of the Civil Code 17 which demands factual, legal, and the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal
equitable justification. Its basis cannot be left to speculation or services rendered, the sum of P68,000.00. Thereafter
conjecture. In this regard, none was proven.
Moreover, in the absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded
summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were
attorney's fees only in case plaintiffs action or defendant's stand is so a complaint against said heirs" directing them to
untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith.18 is MOELCI's answer the motion.
case cannot be similarly classified.
Also, David's claim for the balance of P73,059.76 plus the stipulated
interest is denied for being unsubstantiated.
Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the
56 Lacson v. Reyes, 182 SCRA 729 claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed
DOCTRINES: upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly
already paid.
1 A lawyer who is both the executor and administrator of
the estate may not charge the estate, but the HEIRS
who are his clients.
2 Attorneys fees are in the nature of actual damages, RTC Judge Reyes ordered the heirs to pay Atty.
which must be duly proved: Serquina. The heirs appealed but the court denied
i they must be reasonable, that is to say, they their notice of appeal for failure of the heirs to file a
must have a bearing on the importance of the
subject matter in controversy; record on appeal. Atty. Serquina then moved for
ii the extent of the services rendered; and execution, which was granted by Judge Reyes.

ISSUES & HELD:
1 Whether or not Atty. Serquina should have paid
docket fees before filing the "motion for attorney's
fees."
Payment of docket fees is mandatory. It may be true
that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in
the main case, still, it is not an escape valve from the
payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether
separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the
payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty.
Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of
P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid
the fees in question before the respondent court could
validly try his "motion".
2 The respondent court gravely abused its discretion
in denying the heirs' notice of appeal for their
failure to file a record on appeal; and
The court says this is a dead issue since they are
annulling the decision anyway.
3 The respondent court also gravely abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to
the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules
of Court.
GR: Under Rule 85, Sec. 7 an attorney who is
concurrently an executor of a will is barred from
recovering attorney's fees from the estate.
E: An administrator or executor may be allowed fees for
the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but
he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate.
His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a
compensation is in the nature of executor's or
administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's
fees.
Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a
lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge
the estate for his fees, but rather, his CLIENT.
Attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages,
which must be duly proved. They are also subject to
certain standards, to wit:
1 they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must
have a bearing on the importance of the subject
matter in controversy;
2 the extent of the services rendered; and
3 the professional standing of the lawyer.
In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial
and not on the bare word of the parties. And always, they
are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.
The court held that Atty. Serquina is entitled to P15,000.00
for his efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the
heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.
57 Petron Corporation v. National College of Business
and Arts
The sole question raised in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is
whether petitioner Petron Corporation (Petron) should be held liable to pay
attorneys fees and exemplary damages to respondent National College of
Business and Arts (NCBA).
This case, however, is but part of a larger controversy over the lawful
ownership of seven parcels of land[2] in the V. Mapa area of Sta. Mesa,
Manila (the V. Mapa properties) that arose out of a series of events that
began in 1969.[3]
Sometime in 1969, the V. Mapa properties, then owned by Felipe and
Enrique Monserrat, Jr., were mortgaged to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) as part of the security for the P5.2 million loan of Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. (MYTC) and Monserrat Enterprises Co. MYTC, for its
part, mortgaged four parcels of land located in Quiapo, Manila.
On March 31, 1975, however, Felipes undivided interest in the V. Mapa
properties was levied upon in execution of a money judgment rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Filoil Marketing Corporation v.
MYTC, Felipe Monserrat, and Rosario Vda. De Monserrat (the Manila case).
[4] DBP challenged the levy through a third-party claim asserting that the
V. Mapa properties were mortgaged to it and were, for that reason, exempt
from levy or attachment.
Issue: is Petrons liability for exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Held: Article 2208 lays down the rule that in the absence of stipulation,
attorneys fees cannot be recovered except in the following instances:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expense to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and employers
liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.[10]
Article 2208(5) contemplates a situation where one refuses unjustifiably
and in evident bad faith to satisfy anothers plainly valid, just and
demandable claim, compelling the latter needlessly to seek redress from
the courts.[12] In such a case, the law allows recovery of money the
plaintiff had to spend for a lawyers assistance in suing the defendant
expenses the plaintiff would not have incurred if not for the defendants
refusal to comply with the most basic rules of fair dealing. It does not
mean, however, that the losing party should be made to pay attorneys fees
merely because the court finds his legal position to be erroneous and
upholds that of the other party, for that would be an intolerable
transgression of the policy that no one should be penalized for exercising
the right to have contending claims settled by a court of law.[13] In fact,
even a clearly untenable defense does not justify an award of attorneys
fees unless it amounts to gross and evident bad faith.[14]
58 Estate of the Deceased MR. AND MRS. FLORENCIO P. BUAN,
represented by BIENVENIDO P. BUAN and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS, co-
administrators, doing business under the name and style of
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLO CAMAGANACAN, respondent.
In the night of December 14, 1954, Priscillo Camaganacan, a pay
passenger bound for Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal, took at San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 79 belonging to the Estate of Mr. and
Mrs. Florencio P. Buan, of which defendants are the administrators. In
Malolos, Bulacan, the bus tried to overtake a La Mallorca bus. The two
buses ran a race. As it overtook the La Mallorca bus in Guiguinto, Bulacan,
and while driven at a fast clip, the Philippine Rabbit bus ran smack into a
Delbros trailer travelling in the opposite direction.

In consequence, Priscillo Camaganacan suffered a fracture of the right
wrist, a crushing injury on the second finger of the left hand, a lacerated
wound on the right leg. Brought to the Malolos Provincial Hospital, he was
on the next day December 15, 1954 transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital in Mandaluyong. Discharged on January 22, 1955, he
received further treatment until April 15, 1955. His hospital expenses were
paid by defendants.1wph1.t
The text of the decision should state the reason why attorneys' fees are
being awarded, otherwise, the award is disallowed (Fed. of United Namarco
Distributors, Inc., et al. vs. National Marketing Corp., L-17819, and National
Marketing Corp. vs. Tan, etc., et al., L-17768, 31 March 1962; Jimenez vs.
Bucoy, L-10221, 28 Feb. 1959; Castillo vs. Samonte, L-13146, 30 January
1960).
Issue:Is the award of attys fees proper:
Held: no, The very opening paragraph of Article 2208 reveals that the
award of attorneys' fees remains exceptional in our law, and it is up to the
court to make an express finding of the facts that bring the case within the
execution and justify the grant of counsel fees:
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys' fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs can not be recovered, except:
the general rule being still that it is not sound public policy to place a
penalty on the right to litigate (Tan Ti vs. Alvear, 26 Phil. 568); nor should
counsel fees be awarded every time a party wins a lawsuit (Jimenez vs.
Bucoy, supra.).
It is true that, in No. 11 of Article 2208, recovery of counsel fees is allowed
"where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys' fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered", but even in such cases the
conclusion must be borne out by findings of facts and law. What is just and
equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of
demonstration. This is specially true since the last part of Article 2208
expressly adds that the "attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable". In the present case, for the award of P2,680.00 in actual
damages the appealed decisions awards no less than P2,000.00 in counsel
fees, which is hardly reasonable. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion
in the award of attorneys' fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
demands a factual, legal, or equitable justification upon the basis of which
the court exercises its discretion. Without such justification, the award is a
conclusion without a premise, as basis being improperly left to speculation
and conjecture.
59 Eastern Shipping vs CA
GR No. 97412, 12 July 1994
234 SCRA 78
FACTS
Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping from
Japan. The shipment as insured with a marine policy. Upon arrival in Manila
unto the custody of metro Port Service, which excepted to one drum, said
to be in bad order and which damage was unknown the Mercantile
Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment
from Metro, one drum opened and without seal. Allied delivered the
shipment to the consignees warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum
which contained spillages while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake. As consequence of the loss, the insurance company paid
the consignee, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of
consignee against the defendants Eastern Shipping, Metro Port and Allied
Brokerage. The insurance company filed before the trial court. The trial
court ruled in favor of plaintiff an ordered defendants to pay the former
with present legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of
the complaint. On appeal by defendants, the appellate court denied the
same and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.
(2) Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or
damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed from the
date the decision appealed from is rendered.
HELD
(1) The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from the
decision of the court a quo. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damaes
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of money.
The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.
(2) From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shll begin to run only from the date of judgment of the court is made.
(3) The Court held that it should be computed from the decision rendered
by the court a quo.
60 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August
13, 2013
G.R. No. 189871 : August 13, 2013
703 SCRA 439 Civil Law Torts and Damages Actual and
Compensatory Damages Legal Rate of Interest is now 6%
Labor Law Labor Relations Illegal Dismissal Computation of
Monetary Benefits
Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe
Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by Gallery
Frames on January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
found Gallery Frames guilty of illegal dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded
Nacar P158,919.92 in damages consisting of backwages and separation
pay.
Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the decision
became final on May 27, 2002.
After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA for
recomputation as he alleged that his backwages should be computed from
the time of his illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until the finality of the
SC decision (May 27, 2002) with interest. The LA denied the motion as he
ruled that the reckoning point of the computation should only be from the
time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January 24, 1997) until the decision of
the LA (October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that the said date should be
the reckoning point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that
decision became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.
HELD: No. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal
dismissal cases (referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins, or
loses but wins on appeal). The first part is the ruling that the employee was
illegally dismissed. This is immediately final even if the employer appeals
but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal. The second part is the
ruling on the award of backwages and/or separation pay. For backwages, it
will be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. But if the employer appeals, then the end
date shall be extended until the day when the appellate courts decision
shall become final. Hence, as a consequence, the liability of the employer,
if he loses on appeal, will increase this is just but a risk that the employer
cannot avoid when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor
Arbiters decision. This is also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
Code.
Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory
damages, the Supreme Court ruled that the old case of Eastern Shipping
Lines vs CA is already modified by the promulgation of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796 which lowered the legal
rate of interest from 12% to 6%. Specifically, the rules on interest are now
as follows:
1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans:
a. If stipulated in writing:
a.1. shall run from date of judicial demand (filing of the case)
a.2. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated
b. If not stipulated in writing
b.1. shall run from date of default (either failure to pay upon extra-judicial
demand or upon judicial demand whichever is appropriate and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code)
b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
2. Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)
a. If already liquidated, rate of interest shall be 6% per annum,
demandable from date of judicial or extra-judicial demand (Art. 1169,
Civil Code)
b. If unliquidated, no interest
Except: When later on established with certainty. Interest shall still be 6%
per annum demandable from the date of judgment because such on such
date, it is already deemed that the amount of damages is already
ascertained.
3. Compounded Interest
This is applicable to both monetary and non-monetary obligations
6% per annum computed against award of damages (interest) granted by
the court. To be computed from the date when the courts decision
becomes final and executory until the award is fully satisfied by the losing
party.
4. The 6% per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively:
Final and executory judgments awarding damages prior to July 1, 2013
shall apply the 12% rate;
Final and executory judgments awarding damages on or after July 1, 2013
shall apply the 12% rate for unpaid obligations until June 30, 2013; unpaid
obligations with respect to said judgments on or after July 1, 2013 shall still
incur the 6% rate.
61 cCASE TITLE: Eustaquio Mayo Y Agpaoa v. People of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 91201 December 5, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
PRINCIPLE: MORAL DAMAGES
FACTS: Petitioner Mayo was charged with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Multiple Serious,
Less Serious, and Slight Physical Injuries. This charge arose from
an Information which states that sometime in August of 1982 at
4pm, Mayo was driving a Philippine Rabbit bus along the McArthur
Hway in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Private respondent (PR) Linda
Navarette, on the other hand, was aboard a Mitsubishi Lancer along
with several others including two children. The Lancer was driven
by June Navarette and was cruising steadily at the right lane of the
road while the Rabbit bus was trailing closely behind the Lancer.
Behind the bus is a Tamaraw jeep. At first, the Tamaraw jeep was
ahead, followed by the Lancer, and behind it is the Rabbit bus, all
travelling towards Manila. The Lancer as well as the Rabbit bus
following one after the other overtook the Tamaraw jeep. As the
vehicles approached the Mabalacat Institute, the Rabbit bus, picked
up speed and swerved to the left lane to overtake the Lancer
however an oncoming vehicle from the opposite lane appeared and
flashed its headlights to warn the Rabbit bus to give way. The
Rabbit bus then suddenly swerved to the right in an effort to return
to the correct lane and avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle. In
the process however, it hit and bumped the left rear side of the
Lancer causing its driver to lose control of the wheel and it swerved
across the left lane and hit a bystander then crashed against a
concrete fence of another person. The Lancer was heavily damaged
and the passengers including the driver sustained physical injuries
in varying degrees.
RTC RULING: Mayo was convicted and charged and the civil
aspect of the case was heard in the criminal case. The
complainants therein including PR Navarette were awarded
damages wherein the amount of moral damages awarded to her
was Php700,000.00 (while to others ranged from 5k to 60k).
CA RULING: Mayo appealed with the CA which affirmed the RTC
Decision with the modification only with respect to the
imprisonment aspect. Mayos MR denied, hence, the Petition.
Mayos contention was that the CA did not discuss the specific
factual circumstances which would justify the award of arbitrary
and exorbitant amount of moral damages and instead stated only
general terms.
The CA, on the other hand, cited the provisions of the NCC,
specifically Arts. 2217 and 2219 to justify the legal basis of moral
damages and based thereon concluded that the amount is not
excessive and is in accord with the law and the facts of the case.
ISSUE/s: The sole issue in this case is whether or not the findings
of the lower court justify the award of Php700k as moral damages
in favor of PR Navarette.
SC RULING: To arrive at its Decision, the SC examined the records
of the case and established that prior to the accident, PR Navarette
was an Economist by profession and a graduate of BS Home
Economics at UP. She was an Asst VP and Resident Manager of Club
Solviento in QC as well as a Food consultant receiving a gross
income of Php17k. As a result of the accident, she suffered from a
permanent partial facial disfigurement and total loss of vision of her
right eye which was replaced by a false eye.
According to the doctor, PR Navarettes right eye could not be
saved since the right eyeball needed to be removed as it was
heavily lacerated and there was a necessity of an artificial eye
placement in the socket. Upon advice of her doctor in Makati Med,
she had to go to San Francisco, USA for further treatment. She went
twice to San Francisco and incurred expenses around Php60k to
80k.
Furthermore, PR Navarette declared that she had a boyfriend whom
she lost after the accident. She broke down over the misfortune
and placed a value of her mental, psychological, and moral
sufferings in the amount of Php500k as moral damages and asked
the lower court to double the amount making it Php1M stating as
reason that her boyfriend would have been her lifetime partner and
her guide of her eye forever had she not lost him.
The foregoing findings form the only basis for the award of moral
damages in favor of PR Navarette by the RTC and the CA.
RATIO PART: According to the SC, there is no question that moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, Art. 2219 of the NCC provides that:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
1. A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.
2. Quasi-delicto causing physical injuries.
3. Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
4. Adultery or concubinage.
5. Illegal search.
6. Libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
7. Malicious prosecution.
8. Acts mentioned in article 309.
9. Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
SC agrees that PR Navarette is entitled to moral damages. She
suffered injuries as a result of the criminal offense by Mayo.
Moreover, her injuries resulting in a permanent scar at her forehead
and the loss of her right eye undoubtedly gave her mental anguish,
wounded feelings and shock. The psychological effect on her as
regards the scar and her false eye must have devastated her
considering that women in general are fastidious on how they look.
More importantly, the loss of her eyesight resulted to her giving up
her job not only because of her prolonged absences but because of
the physical handicap she suffered.
Nevertheless, the SC finds no justification to award moral damages
to PR Navarette for the loss of her boyfriend. No doubt, the loss of
her boyfriend after the accident added to her mental and emotional
sufferings and psychologically affected and disturbed her. However,
there is no clear evidence on record to show that her boyfriend left
her after the accident due to her physical injuries. He may have left
her even if she did not suffer the slightest injury. The reasons for
the break-up of a courtship are too many and too complicated such
that they should not form the basis of damages arising from a
vehicular accident. Moreover, granting that her boyfriend left her
due to her physical injuries, we still find no legal basis for the award
of moral damages in her favor because of the loss of a boyfriend.
Art. 2219 quoted above enumerates cases wherein moral damages
may be granted. Loss of a boyfriend as a result of physical injuries
after an accident is not one of them. Neither can it be categorized
as an analogous case.
Heading on to the propriety of the amount of Php700k as moral
damages, the SC ruled that the well-entrenched principle is that
moral damages depend upon the discretion of the trial courts
based on the facts and circumstances of each case. This discretion
is, however, conditioned in that the amount awarded should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive so as to indicate that it
was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial
court. In determining the amount of moral damages, the actual
losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the gravity of the
injuries must be considered. Finally, moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense
of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
defendants culpable action.
Applying these principles in the instant case, the SC finds that the
award of Php700k as moral damages in favor of PR Navarette is
unconscionable and excessive. SC further rejects Navarettes claim
for Php1M for the loss of her boyfriend. The SC notes that she
asked for the amount of Php500k as moral damages for her
physical injuries and therefore, the award for moral damages
should not exceed such amount. The SC rules that under the
circumstances of the instant case, the amount of Php200k as moral
damages in favor of PR Navarette is reasonable, just and fair.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly
GRANTED. The questioned decision of the CA is MODIFIED in that
the amount of Php700k as moral damages granted to complainant
Navarette is reduced to Php200k.
62 Samson Jr. vs. BPI; Moral Damages
09/10/2013
0 Comments
G.R. No. 150487. July 10, 2003
Facts: Gerardo Samson deposited to his BPI account a Prudential Bank
Check in the amount of P3,500.00. When he asked his daughter to
withdraw 2, 000 pesos inorder to pay his creditor who came to his house,
he came to know that his previous deposit was not credited to his account.
Because of this he was embarrassed infront creditor. Moreover, when
petitioner informed respondent of his concern respondent's manager
displayed arrogance, indifference and discourtesy. Petitioner then filed a
case for damages against respondent.
The RTC awarded 200, 000 as moral damages. The CA reduced the same to
50, 000.
Issue: whether or not the award of moral damages is correct.
Held: Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were
never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its
award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no
hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount.
The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination
of the proper amount of the award. Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status quo
ante would not be achieved.
We believe that the award should be increased to P100,000, considering
(1) that petitioner was a businessman and was the highest lay person in
the United Methodist Church; (2) that he was regarded by respondent and
its officers with arrogance and a condescending manner; and (3) that
respondent successfully postponed compensating him for more than a
decade. This amount is more than the P50,000 granted by the CA, but not
as much as the P200,000 granted by the RTC.
That petitioner reported the missing check deposit to respondent only after
three weeks did not constitute contributory negligence. The injury resulted
from the denial of his withdrawal due to insufficient funds, an injury he
suffered before learning that his check deposit had been lost. Respondent,
not he, immediately knew that a deposit envelop was missing, yet it did
nothing to solve the problem. His alleged delay in reporting the matter did
not at all contribute to his injury.
63 Villanueva v. Salvador
GR No. 139436
25 January 2006
Facts:
Spouses Salvador secured two loans from Ever
Pawnshop, owned and managed by Villanueva. They
pledged their jewelry items for the loans that they
contracted. The first and second loan indicate 10 April
1992 and 22 May 1992, respectively, as the last day to
redeem the jewelry.
The redemption periods came and went, but the
spouses failed to redeem the jewelry.
Their son partially paid the first loan on June 1 while
the second loans maturity date was extended to June
30.
o Due to the partial payment of the first loan, the
loan was renewed with regard to the remaining
balance.
o As for the second loan, Ever Pawnshop provided
that the spouses must pay 20% of their second
loan obligation on or before June 4, else, the
jewelry will be auctioned as scheduled.
Spouses Salvador failed to pay 20% of the second loan
on June 4 and so, Ever Pawnshop issued a notice
regarding the public auction sale of the jewelry. The
notice appeared in Manila Bulletin on June 4, the
very day of the auction itself.
On July 1, the spouses tendered the 20% payment for
the second loan, but the pawnshop refused to accept
it. The pawnshop informed the spouses that the
pledged jewelry had already been auctioned last June
4.
o However, it was later on found out that pieces of
the pledged jewelry items were still in the shop,
indicating that the pawnshop either bought
some of the unredeemed pledgers or did not sell
them.
As for the pledged jewelry for the first loan, Mrs.
Salvador tried to redeem them as well but all she got
in response were unclear information as to their
whereabouts. Mr. Salvador also tried to tender
payment of the amounts due on both loans and
demanded return of the pledged jewelry. However,
Ever Pawnshop refused to accept the tender.
Thus, a complaint was filed against Villanueva and
Ever Pawnshop. The spouses alleged that the public
auction sale of the 2 sets of jewelry pledged was not
valid because it was done without notice.
o After summons were served to Villanueva, his
counsel informed the Salvadors that his client is
now willing to accept the payment and have the
jewelry items for the first loan redeemed.
However, the Salvadors turned down this
belated offer.
(Since the spouses turned down his offer...) Villanueva
averred that he reminded the spouses regarding the
maturity dates and redemption period of the loans. He
also said he provided sufficient notice to the spouses
as there was a publication on June 4 in Manila Bulletin
regarding the public auction of the jewelry items.
o Villanueva said that there was a caveat printed
on the dorsal side of the pawnshop tickets
issued to the spouses which state that the
pledged items shall be auctioned off if they are
not redeemed before the expiry date of the
redemption period.
RTC ruled in favor of Salvadors and awarded them
moral damages. Naturally, Villanueva appealed. CA
upheld RTCs decision.
Issue:
W/N there was valid notice of the sale - NO
W/N the award of moral damages was proper - NO

Held:
No valid notice of sale
The Pawnshop Regulation Act accord the pawner a 90-
day grace period from the date of maturity of the
loan obligation within which to redeem the pawn. Also,
even before the lapse of the 90-day period, it also
mandates that the pawner be notified of the
proposed auction sale through a publication in at
least 2 daily newspapers during the week
preceding the date of the auction sale.
o Petitioner failed in both aspects. Ever Pawnshop
only caused publication of the auction in one
newspaper AND on the very day of the
scheduled auction sale itself. Verily, a notice of
the auction sale on the very day of the auction
defeats the purpose of the notice which is to
inform the pawner beforehand that a sale is to
occur.
Award of Moral Damages is Not Proper (the case
discussed concepts first then the ruling)
Proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify award
of moral damages.
However, it is essential that the claimant satisfactorily
proves the existence of the factual basis of the
damages and its causal connection to the defendants
wrongful act or omission.
o This is so because moral damages, although
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose penalty on the
wrongdoer
Conditions required in awarding moral damages:
o There must be an injury, whether physical,
mental, or psychological, clearly sustained by
the claimant
o There must be a culpable act or omission
factually established
o The wrongful act or omission of the defendant
must be the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant
o The award of damages is predicated on any of
the case stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
There need not be a showing that the defendant acted
in a wanton or malevolent manner, BUT there must
still be proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for
a claim for moral damages to succeed.
Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa
contractual, except when bad faith supervenes
and is proven
o Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty
through some motive or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of the fraud
o The person claiming moral damages must
provide convincing evidence of the existence of
bad faith (since good faith is presumed)
In this case, the cause of action arose from negligence
of the petitioners. While gross negligence may
sometimes amount to bad faith, the negligence in this
case is just simple negligence. The RTCs categorical
finding that the case came about owing to the
petitioners mistake in renewing the loan when the
sale of the article to secure the loan had already been
effected
o RTCs factual finding was that the jewelry
pawned for the first loan were already
auctioned in May. Due to an oversight, the
pawnshop committed a mistake when it allowed
the renewal of the loan in June despite the sale
of jewelry in May.
Since there was no bad faith on the part of the
pawnshop, awarding of moral damages is not proper.
64 IGLECERIO MAHINAY, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. GABINO A. VELASQUEZ, JR., respondent.

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated December 20,
2001 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the "order and
resolution" dated October 31, 1977 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Naval, Biliran in Civil Case No. B-0923, for damages.
The instant case arose from the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioner
Iglecerio Mahinay against respondent Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr.
According to Olipio Machete, overseer of respondent, petitioner uttered the
following malicious and insulting statement against respondent: "Your
master, a candidate for Congressman, Ben Velasquez, is a land grabber."
Machete informed respondent of what petitioner said about him. This
impelled respondent to file a complaint for damages against petitioner,
claiming that his utterances besmirched his and his familys reputation and
caused him anxiety, mental anguish and sleepless nights.
As no amicable settlement could be reached by the parties, trial on the
merits ensued. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of respondent on
the basis of the sole testimony of Machete and awarded to respondent
moral damages in the amount of P100,000 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.2 No other evidence was adduced by either party.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
order lacked factual basis. The Court of Appeals, however, modified the
award, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that the award for moral and
exemplary damages is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this
appeal DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."3
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner comes to this
Court arguing that the appellate court gravely erred in: (a) affirming the
trial court order despite the lack of sufficient factual basis and (b) awarding
moral and exemplary damages to respondent despite his failure to take the
witness stand.4
We agree.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.5 While
respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove
them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness
stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly
suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not
suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.6 No
other person could have proven such damages except the respondent
himself as they were extremely personal to him.
In Keirulf vs. Court of Appeals,7 we held:
"While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of
the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal
connection to defendants acts. This is so because moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held
that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of
mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and
testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral
damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation vs.
National labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "additional facts
must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under
the Civil Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings,
grave anxiety, etc. that resulted therefrom."
The testimony of Machete was not enough evidence of the moral damages
that the respondent supposedly suffered. Machete may have clearly
testified on the specific words uttered by petitioner against respondent but
he could not have testified on the wounded feelings respondent allegedly
went through by reason of petitioners slanderous remark. The award of
moral damages must be anchored to a clear showing that respondent
actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings or similar injury. There was no better witness to
this experience than respondent himself. Since respondent failed to testify
on the witness stand, the trial court did not have any factual basis to award
moral damages to him.
Neither is respondent entitled to exemplary damages. "If the court has no
proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based,
such indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with
respect to the award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that
the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."8
Furthermore, this specie of damages is allowed only in addition to moral
damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the
claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.
The affirmance of the Court of Appeals of the ruling of the trial court is
therefore not in order as it lacked sufficient factual basis.
65 Mercury Drug v. Huang
Fast Facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner
of a six-wheeler truck with. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del
Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the
parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla
GLI Sedan.
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at
around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Both
were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City.
The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane
to its right. When the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into
the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island
where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic
Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers license had been confiscated because
he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen
Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung.
Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for
life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation
treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence
and reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for
failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of
the accident was respondent Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to
petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the
car bumped the trucks front right tire.
The trial court found for petitioners and held PLDT and Del Rosario jointly
and severally liable for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
Tortious Act: Collision of a 16 wheeler truck and a Sedan causing
paralysis to the driver.
What is it? Quasi-Delict
Legal Basis: Art. 2205
Issue:
Whether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by
Mercury Drug
Held: NO
We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del
Rosario. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also
joint and solidary with the employee.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of
the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the
employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial
evidence on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the
Recruitment and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants
are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination
when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied
for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del
Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the
driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye
and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and
police clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario
attended only three driving seminars on June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000
and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the
accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up
driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has
been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate.
Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any company policy
requiring back-up drivers for long trips.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due
diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on
the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a
license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he
reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He
was not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever
was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding
that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
66 Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433
FACTS:
February 28, 1987 7:45 pm: Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost
control and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the
east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu
pickup driven by Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting physical injury to
Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were treated at the Quezon
City General Hospital
The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA
Despite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front
portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building
and gasoline dispensing equipment
RTC: proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's driver.
Pantranco North Express, Incorporated to pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf
for the damages of the Isuzu pick-up and Porfirio Legaspi
CA: Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to
pay costs
ISSUE: W/N both Lucila should be awarded moral damages
HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages to
Lucila and Legaspi is hereby INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00
respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to P200,000.00.
Legaspi is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00
Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that
he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual
relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real
personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote
and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct
from that of the injured person. Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to
consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by
the evidence on record.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in
awarding moral damages.
no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious
manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given
her
awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite
the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing
proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings
She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her
teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments.
Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt
that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to
undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She
suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
accident.
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior
that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required
by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender
discretion of the court
(1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,
among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temporate, yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably
liquidated or compensatory damages; and and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner." plaintiffs.
exemplary damages awarded increased to P200,000
The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe that Legaspi, being 67 G.R. No. 188979 September 5, 2012
also a victim of gross negligence, should also receive exemplary damages
Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of
vs.
defendant CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
Porfirio that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and that during said
period he did not have any income
P16,500 as compensation for loss of earning capacity for the period is
amply supported by the records and is demandable under Article 2205 of FACTS:
the Civil Code
Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven
A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-
Mere proof of Lucila's earnings consisting of her 1983 and 1984 income tax year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sisters room, when the
returns would not suffice to prove earnings for the years 1985 and 1986.
appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.5 AAA cried, but the
The incident happened on February 28, 1987.
An estimate, as it is categorized, is not an actual expense incurred or to be appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket.6 The appellant removed
incurred in the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short
reasonable considering that in this instance such estimate was secured by pants and briefs.7 The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands.
the complainants themselves AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and
in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina.8 The appellant stopped when
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof
AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellants upper thigh as the latter
of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court
was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and
it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone.
existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to Immediately after, the appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself with a
defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of blanket and cried.10
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of
penalty on the wrongdoer.
rape
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape
status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances,
there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration
of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape.
ISSUE:
WON the rape was consummated.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. We find that the prosecution
failed to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the
evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellants penis did not
penetrate, but merely touched (i.e.,"naidikit"), AAAs private part. In fact,
the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not
succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs
Sinumpaang Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was holding the
victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This
circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she was
resisting the appellants attempt to insert his penis into her vagina
makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly,
nothing in the records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants
penis penetrated, however slightly, the victims female organ.
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of
the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ."27 Without any
showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness.
, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish the required penile penetration. AAAs testimony did not
establish that the appellants penis touched the labias or slid into her
private part. Aside from AAAs testimony, no other evidence on record,
such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had
been penetration, however slight, of the victims labias. In the absence of
testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the
appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an
attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when the "touching" of
the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate,
attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely
acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by
the following overt acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing her;
removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands
and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The
appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his
own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance.
The totality of the appellants acts demonstrated the unmistakable
objective to insert his penis into the victims private parts.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case
with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only
logical and inevitable conclusion."42 We emphasize that a conviction
cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
68 G.R. No. 188603 January 16, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA," Accused-Appellant.
Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413,2 which affirmed with
modification the May 29, 2006 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 86, Quezon City in Crim. Case No. -Q-99-82409, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal that found appellant Ramil Rarugal alias
"Amay Bisaya" guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.
On December 8, 1998, the following information for the crime of murder
was filed against appellant:
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippine,
the above-named appellant, with intent to kill, qualified by evident
premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person
of one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed
weapon, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said Arnel M. Florendo.4
Appellant was only arrested sometime in August 2001. During his
arraignment on August 27, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the
merits ensued.
Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the
RTC found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m., while
victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita Street,
Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use of a long
double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving him of
his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This
incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified
appellant in court.
Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his
siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events
of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other
relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took
Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City
General Hospital, due to the unavailability of blood. It was there that
Florendo died6 on October 26, 1998 with the family spending about
P2,896.007 for his hospitalization and P25,000.008 for his funeral.
Autopsy Report signed by Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dominic L. Aguda,
showed the following Postmortem Findings9:
Cyanosis, lips and fingernailbeds
Brain- pale
Heart-chambers, contain small amount of dark clotted blood
STAB WOUND-
sutured, healing, 3.0 cms, located on left chest, 15.0 cms. from the
anterior median line directed backwards and medially involving the skin
and underlying tissues passing between the 6th and 7th left ribs, entering
the thoracic cavity and severed the lower lobe of the left lung with a depth
of 7-8 cms.
THORACOSTOMY INCISIONS-
sutured, 3.5 cms., located on the left chest, 19.0 cms. from the anterior
median line; sutured, 3.2 cms. located on the right chest 20 cms. from the
anterior median line
Hemothorax- left, 500 cc
Visceral organs- pale
Stomach- empty
CAUSE OF DEATH:
STAB WOUND, LEFT CHEST
In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at
that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in
Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan on October 19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997.
He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at
any point. On cross-examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in
front of his house in Novaliches, Quezon City.10
On May 29, 2006, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. It stated:
After evaluation, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as
the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive identification made by Sit-
Jar, the denial and alibi made by [appellant] has no leg to stand on. Under
prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of positive
identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify.
Moreover, Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
appellant. Florendo, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound,
identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
statements made by a person under the consciousness of an impending
death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The
positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the
liability of herein appellant.
xxxx
As shown by the evidence, the killing of Arnel Florendo was sudden
indicating treachery and the appellant being then armed with a knife, the
killing was done with abuse of superior strength. These circumstances
qualify the crime to murder, all of the elements of the offense being
present.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the
appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
amount of P28,124.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.11 (Citations omitted.)
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 21, 2006.12 He questioned the
RTCs finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the commission of the
crime and its appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He
argued that witness Sit-Jar lacked credibility for giving inconsistent
testimony. Moreover, he averred that there was no basis for the finding
that treachery qualified the crime to murder since its elements were not
established.13
On June 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the May
29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness Sit-Jars positive
identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes
precedence over appellants defense of denial and alibi. Moreover,
appellant failed to adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper
motive to falsely testify against him. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of
the appeal in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant RAMIL RARUGAL is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P27,896.00 as
actual damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The said Decision in all other respect STANDS.14
Hence, this appeal.15 Petitioners confinement was confirmed by the
Bureau of Corrections on September 30, 2009.16
Both the appellee17 and the appellant18 waived the filing of supplemental
briefs and adopted the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.
We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with
modification respecting the award of damages.
This Court has consistently stated that the trial court is in a better position
to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.19 We have been reminded in People v. Clores20
that:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the
guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case x x x;
(2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern
if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in
a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
testifying under grueling examination.21
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. After a careful review
of the records, we find that appellant failed to negate the findings of the
trial court with concrete evidence that the latter had overlooked,
misconstrued, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that the prosecution witness recounted the details of
that fateful night in a "clear, straightforward and convincing manner,
devoid of any signs of falsehood or fabrication."22
First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the
victims assailant in contrast to the appellants defense of denial and alibi.
We have stated in Malana v. People23 that:
It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is
incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when
the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x.
(Citations omitted.)
The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible
for appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Appellants bare alibi that he was working as a farm
administrator in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was allegedly staying there at
the time of the commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the
alleged physical impossibility that he committed the crime charged,
moreso in the face of positive identification by the witness, who was not
motivated by any improper motive to falsely testify against him.
Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time
to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was
appellant who had stabbed him.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death.
The Court has stated in People v. Maglian24:
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence
if the following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and
the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants
death." x x x. (Citation omitted.)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to
his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration.
It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice
on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it
was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an
expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death,
and under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in
the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been
competent to testify had he survived.25 It is enough to state that the
deceased was at the time competent as a witness.26 Lastly, the dying
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
We reproduce the statement of the RTC:
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
appellant. The victim, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound,
identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending
death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The
positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the
liability of herein appellant.27
It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing
incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the
apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a
consequence of appellants stabbing him in the chest.
Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellants act of
suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along
Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.28 Here, appellant
surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed him
in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect
himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own
person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime
of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code.29
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence, the Court must modify the
amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded by the
courts a quo.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases.30
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim were able
to prove before the trial court actual damages in the amount of P27,896.00
based on the receipts31 they submitted. Moreover, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the award of exemplary damages is proper in this
case. We have stated that:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.32
(Emphasis omitted.)
We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.0033
and the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.0034 to conform
to recent jurisprudence.
We sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering
of the victims heirs.35 As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family.36
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.37
69PazFores,Petitioner
v.
IreneoMiranda,Respondent
GRno.L12163March4,1959
Reyes,J.B.L.,J.
MirandawasoneofhtepassengersonajeepneydrivenbyEugenioLuga.Whilethejeepwas
descendingSta.Mesabridgeatanexcesisvespeed,thedriverlostcontrolcausingittoswerveand
hitthebridgewall.
Fiveofthepassengerswereinjured,includingMirandawhosufferedafractureoftheupperright
humerus.Hewasubjecttoaseriesofoperationsyetatthetimeofthetrial,hehasnotyet
recoveredtheuseofhisrightarm.
Lugawaschargedwithseriousphysicialinjuriesthroughrecklessimprudence,anduponinterposing
apleaofguilty,wassentencedaccordingly.
Itwasallegedthattheevidencefailedtoidentifythevehiclebutthiswasrejectedbytheappellate
courtwhichfoundthatthejeepcarriedtheplateno.TPU1163,seriesof1952andregisteredinthe
nameofPazForezandthatthevehiclehadthenameofDonaPazpaintedbelowthewindshield.
Therewasnoevidencepresentedtoprovethecontrary.
ForesalsosaidthatsheallegedlysoldthejeepinvolvedtoaCarmenSackerman.
ISSUE/s:
1.IstheapprovalofthePublicServiceCommissionnecessaryforthesaleofapublicservicevehicle
evenwithoutconveyingtherewiththeauthoritytooperatethesame?YES
2.WONmoraldamagesmaybeawarded.NO.
1.TheCAansweredYEStothisquestion.UnderSec.20ofthePublicServiceActitwasunlawful
fortheowner,lesseeoroperatortosell,alienate,mortgage,encumberorleaseitspropertyamong
otherswithoutthepreviousapprovalandauthorityoftheCommission.Thetransferwithoutthe
authorityofthePSCisnoteffectiveandbindinginsofarastherespnsibilityofthegranteeunder
thefranchiseinrelationtothepublicisconcerned.
Foresassailsthisarguingthattheintherulingsbeingapplied,theoperatordidnotconveybylease
orbysale,thevehicleindependentlyofhisrightsunderthefranchise.SCnobasis.Theprohibition
isclear,itwasmeanttoprotectthepublicinterest.Untiltheapprovalisobtained,incontemplation
oflaw,thevehicleisstillundertheserviceoftheownerofoperatorstandingintherecordsofthe
Commissionwhichthepublichastorelyon
thesalebetweenthepartiesisstillvalid.
2.theP2,000(reducedfromP10,000)andtheP3,000asatty'sfeeswerevalidawardsofactual
damages.Asforthemoraldamages,itmustdiscarded.Moraldamagesarenotrecoverablein
damageactionsredicctedonabreachofthecontractoftransportation(art.2219and2220ofthe
NCC).
Thus,incaseofbreachofcontractproofofbadfaithorfraudisessentialtojustifyanaward
ofmoraldamagesandthatabrechofcontractcannotbeconsideredincludedinthedescriptiveterm
analogouscasesinArt.2219.Art.2176excludescaseswherethereisapreexistingcontractual
relationbetweentheparties.
Theonlyexceptioniswheredeathresultsfromtheaccident.Inthiscase,Art.2206providesthat
thedeceasedmaydemandmoraldamagesformentalanguisbyreasonofthedeathofthedeceased
70 Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center
GRN 141994 January 17, 2005
Carpio, J.:
FACTS:
Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program Expose. Respondent Ago was the owner
of the Medical & Educational center, subject of the radio program Expose. AMEC claimed
that the broadcasts were defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC claimed for
damages. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With
the supposed expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations and as
such, destroyed plaintiffs reputation. FBNI was included as defendant for allegedly failing
to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The trial court
found Rimas statements to be within the bounds of freedom of speech and ruled that the
broadcast was libelous. It ordered the defendants Alegre and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for
moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
RULING:
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMECs claim, or moral
damages fall under item 7 of Art 2219 of the NCC.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff
is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can
validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implied damages. In such a
case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party
libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se.
thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, we find the award P500,000 moral
damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous,
per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages to P150k.
JOIN TORT FEASORS are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advice countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
tort, as who approve of it after it is done, for its benefit.