G.R. No.

163604 May 6, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and
APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc
City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report 2 and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal. 3

By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.

The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a
Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.

By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:

At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the
assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of
Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively
dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found
in the records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court.

However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed
order.

The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial
court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or
decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No.
124320, March 2, 1999).

Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente

1
 Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand
of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding involving
multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is
required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the
enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.

By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution9requiring respondent to file her comment
on the petition was returned unserved with postmasters notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, read:

RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following:

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

(b) Escheat;

(c) Guardianship and custody of children;

(d) Trustees;

(e) Adoption;

(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;

(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;

(h) Habeas corpus;

(i) Change of name;

(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;

(l) Constitution of family home;

(m) Declaration of absence and death;

2
 (n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far
as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse, provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal,
provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxx

By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared
presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter
alia:

xxx

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all casesprovided for in this Codes
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

x x x,

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the
filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
3
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, andall laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

seals the case in petitioners favor.

Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the
appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily
fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court
should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.

As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate
courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition 10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed
the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED
to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and
EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal
portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling
the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to
Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating
and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six
children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the
name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt

4
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights"
where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share
and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under
Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots
where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot 2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot. 3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443
to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 6 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of
such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under
the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already
distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against
herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding: 8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity.
There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial
separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil
Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary
action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to
rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.
XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.

5
 "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of
one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary
rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must
therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a
pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of
the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision 11contemplates a probate court when it speaks
of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve
the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned
the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by
the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts
pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 andMendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited
probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived".15

6
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may
not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership. 16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does
not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined,
the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules
of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of
these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Digest: http://documents.tips/embed/1-natcher-v-ca-digest.html

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO
SOLANO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO , J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course
to the petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent Amada H. Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.

In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
nowhere to be found.

7
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City.1 During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one
Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or
right to the properties in question."2 Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent
Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos.
129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.

In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this
development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's
decision alleging, among other, that3 -

13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the petitioner in 1983 (for TCT No. 7807) and 1984 (for
TCT No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part of her estate when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently, they
could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;

13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for escheating
the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The property should have
been escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court x x x x

On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an
answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by
the statute of limitations.

Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its
assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory
of respondent Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that -

Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings x x
x because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of said Hankins; and
therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, assign them to
respondent Pasay City government, order the cancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and order the properties registered in the
name of respondent Pasay City x x x x The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment filed before this
Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the action and
consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus whether or not the properties in question are no longer part of the estate of the deceased
Hankins at the time of her death; and, whether or not the alleged donations are valid are issues in the present petition for annulment which
can be resolved only after a full blown trial x x x x

It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of limitations against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this
stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that a person entitled to the estate
must file his claim with the court a quo within five (5) years from the date of said judgment. However, it is clear to this Court that herein
petitioner is not claiming anything from the estate of the deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985; rather she is claiming
that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is the owner thereof by virtue
of the deeds of donation in her favor.

In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the premises in question, is claiming ownership of the properties in question
and the consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of
respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Herein petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under Article 1144, to wit:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written
contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.

And Article 1456, to wit:

8
 Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. 4

In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay
City and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the merits for June 15 and 16, 2000.

In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner points out that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying petitioner's affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration, and
in setting the case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of decision despite
the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quoset forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules
of Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a
petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
on the matter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only provides for two (2) grounds for the annulment of judgment,
namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the discovery of the deeds of donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat
proceedings is an extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a ground to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction.

Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations
within which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in.

The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated to private respondent which will ultimately determine
whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in favor of the state.

We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in
and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the
state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." 5 Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and
usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated
property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall
have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but
a claim not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the
contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever
in a final judgment.

Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant
within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal
Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at least insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested
party" in an escheat proceeding -

In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person
alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose
the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in
the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he
claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied).

In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more
or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.

A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held inHamilton v. Brown,8 "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of
any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period

9
therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification
to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and
the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in
question."9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and
his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of
ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing
proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the escheat,
part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily
presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength
of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every
piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations,
conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 giving due course to the
petition for annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4 May 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The
decision of the RTC-Br. 114, Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner,

vs.
Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) against
respondents Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) and Luz R. Bakunawa (Bakunawa). Petitioner seeks to appeal from the 26 November 2009
Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 which reversed and set aside the 19 May 2008 Decision and 3 November 2008
Order of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 06-244. 2 The case before the RTC involved the Complaint for Escheat filed
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pursuant to Act No. 3936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 679 (P.D. 679), against certain
deposits, credits, and unclaimed balances held by the branches of various banks in the Philippines. The trial court declared the amounts, subject of the
special proceedings, escheated to the Republic and ordered them deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines (Treasurer) and credited in favor of
the Republic.3 The assailed RTC judgments included an unclaimed balance in the amount of P 1,019,514.29, maintained by RCBC in its Ermita
Business Center branch.

We quote the narration of facts of the CA4 as follows:

x x x Luz [R.] Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased ("Spouses Bakunawa") are registered owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, and TCT Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina Register of
Deeds. These lots were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government [(PCGG)].

Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan ("Millan"), through her representative, Jerry Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for "P 6,724,085.71",
with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there may[]be to effect a "completion of the sale". The Spouses
Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owners Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a down[]payment of "P 1,019,514.29" for the intended
purchase. However, for one reason or another, Millan was not able to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and
offered to return to Millan her down[]payment of P 1,019,514.29. However, Millan refused to accept back the P 1,019,514.29 down[]payment.
Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development Corporation ("Hi-Tri") took out on October 28, 1991, a
Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of P 1,019,514.29, payable to Millans company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation

10
("Rosmil") c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 [in 1991], praying that:

1. That the defendants Teresita Mil[l]an and Jerry Montemayor may be ordered to return to plaintiffs spouses the Owners Copies of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 324985, 324986, 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829;

2. That the defendant Teresita Mil[l]an be correspondingly ordered to receive the amount of One Million Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred
Fourteen Pesos and Twenty Nine Centavos (P 1,019,514.29);

3. That the defendants be ordered to pay to plaintiffs spouses moral damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00; and

4. That the defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the amount of P 50,000.00.

Being part and parcel of said complaint, and consistent with their prayer in Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 that "Teresita Mil[l]an be correspondingly
ordered to receive the amount of One Million Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Fourteen Pesos and Twenty Nine [Centavos] ("P 1,019,514.29")["],
the Spouses Bakunawa, upon advice of their counsel, retained custody of RCBC Managers Check No. ER 034469 and refrained from canceling or
negotiating it.

All throughout the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-91-10719, especially during negotiations for a possible settlement of the case, Millan was
informed that the Managers Check was available for her withdrawal, she being the payee.

On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the abovementioned case and without the knowledge of [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa], x x x RCBC
reported the "P 1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of Rosmil" to the Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances" as of January 31, 2003.
Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBCs Asset Management, Disbursement &
Sundry Department ("AMDSD") was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita.

On December 14, 2006, x x x Republic, through the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)], filed with the RTC the action below for Escheat [(Civil
Case No. 06-244)].

On April 30, 2008, [Spouses Bakunawa] settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan. Instead of only the amount of "P 1,019,514.29",
[Spouses Bakunawa] agreed to pay Rosmil and Millan the amount of "P3,000,000.00", [which is] inclusive [of] the amount of ["]P 1,019,514.29".
But during negotiations and evidently prior to said settlement, [Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri] inquired from RCBC-Ermita the availability of
the P1,019,514.29 under RCBC Managers Check No. ER 034469. [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa] were however dismayed when they were
informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC.

On April 17, 2008, [Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri] wrote x x x RCBC, viz:

"We understand that the deposit corresponding to the amount of Php 1,019,514.29 stated in the Managers Check is currently the subject of escheat
proceedings pending before Branch 150 of the Makati Regional Trial Court.

Please note that it was our impression that the deposit would be taken from [Hi-Tris] RCBC bank account once an order to debit is issued upon the
payees presentation of the Managers Check. Since the payee rejected the negotiated Managers Check, presentation of the Managers Check was
never made.

Consequently, the deposit that was supposed to be allocated for the payment of the Managers Check was supposed to remain part of the
Corporation[s] RCBC bank account, which, thereafter, continued to be actively maintained and operated. For this reason, We hereby demand your
confirmation that the amount of Php 1,019,514.29 continues to form part of the funds in the Corporations RCBC bank account, since pay-out of said
amount was never ordered. We wish to point out that if there was any attempt on the part of RCBC to consider the amount indicated in the Managers
Check separate from the Corporations bank account, RCBC would have issued a statement to that effect, and repeatedly reminded the Corporation
that the deposit would be considered dormant absent any fund movement. Since the Corporation never received any statements of account from
RCBC to that effect, and more importantly, never received any single letter from RCBC noting the absence of fund movement and advising the
Corporation that the deposit would be treated as dormant."

On April 28, 2008, [Manuel Bakunawa] sent another letter to x x x RCBC reiterating their position as above-quoted.

11
In a letter dated May 19, 2008, x x x RCBC replied and informed [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa] that:

"The Banks Ermita BC informed Hi-Tri and/or its principals regarding the inclusion of Managers Check No. ER034469 in the escheat proceedings
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-244, as well as the status thereof, between 28 January 2008 and 1 February 2008.

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to what Hi-Tri hopes for, the funds covered by the Managers Check No. ER034469 does not form part of the Banks own account. By
simple operation of law, the funds covered by the managers check in issue became a deposit/credit susceptible for inclusion in the escheat case
initiated by the OSG and/or Bureau of Treasury.

xxx xxx xxx

Granting arguendo that the Bank was duty-bound to make good the check, the Banks obligation to do so prescribed as early as October 2001."

(Emphases, citations, and annotations were omitted.)

The RTC Ruling

The escheat proceedings before the Makati City RTC continued. On 19 May 2008, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision declaring the
deposits, credits, and unclaimed balances subject of Civil Case No. 06-244 escheated to the Republic. Among those included in the order of forfeiture
was the amount of P 1,019,514.29 held by RCBC as allocated funds intended for the payment of the Managers Check issued in favor of Rosmil. The
trial court ordered the deposit of the escheated balances with the Treasurer and credited in favor of the Republic. Respondents claim that they were
not able to participate in the trial, as they were not informed of the ongoing escheat proceedings.

Consequently, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion dated 11 June 2008, seeking the partial reconsideration of the RTC Decision insofar as it
escheated the fund allocated for the payment of the Managers Check. They asked that they be included as party-defendants or, in the alternative,
allowed to intervene in the case and their motion considered as an answer-in-intervention. Respondents argued that they had meritorious grounds to
ask reconsideration of the Decision or, alternatively, to seek intervention in the case. They alleged that the deposit was subject of an ongoing dispute
(Civil Case No. Q-91-10719) between them and Rosmil since 1991, and that they were interested parties to that case. 5

On 3 November 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of respondents. The trial court explained that the Republic had proven
compliance with the requirements of publication and notice, which served as notice to all those who may be affected and prejudiced by the Complaint
for Escheat. The RTC also found that the motion failed to point out the findings and conclusions that were not supported by the law or the evidence
presented, as required by Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Finally, it ruled that the alternative prayer to intervene was filed out of time.

The CA Ruling

On 26 November 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision reversing the 19 May 2008 Decision and 3 November 2008 Order of the RTC. According
to the appellate court,6 RCBC failed to prove that the latter had communicated with the purchaser of the Managers Check (Hi-Tri and/or Spouses
Bakunawa) or the designated payee (Rosmil) immediately before the bank filed its Sworn Statement on the dormant accounts held therein. The CA
ruled that the banks failure to notify respondents deprived them of an opportunity to intervene in the escheat proceedings and to present evidence to
substantiate their claim, in violation of their right to due process. Furthermore, the CA pronounced that the Makati City RTC Clerk of Court failed to
issue individual notices directed to all persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances, as well as to require them to appear after publication and
show cause why the unclaimed balances should not be deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines. It explained that the jurisdictional requirement
of individual notice by personal service was distinct from the requirement of notice by publication. Consequently, the CA held that the Decision and
Order of the RTC were void for want of jurisdiction.

Issue

After a perusal of the arguments presented by the parties, we cull the main issues as follows:

I. Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for failure to send separate notices to respondents by personal service

II. Whether petitioner had the obligation to notify respondents immediately before it filed its Sworn Statement with the Treasurer

12
 III. Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic

Discussion

Petitioner bank assails7 the CA judgments insofar as they ruled that notice by personal service upon respondents is a jurisdictional requirement in
escheat proceedings. Petitioner contends that respondents were not the owners of the unclaimed balances and were thus not entitled to notice from the
RTC Clerk of Court. It hinges its claim on the theory that the funds represented by the Managers Check were deemed transferred to the credit of the
payee or holder upon its issuance.

We quote the pertinent provision of Act No. 3936, as amended, on the rule on service of processes, to wit:

Sec. 3. Whenever the Solicitor General shall be informed of such unclaimed balances, he shall commence an action or actions in the name of the
People of the Republic of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the bank, building and loan association or trust
corporation is located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank, building and loan association or trust corporation and all such creditors or
depositors. All or any of such creditors or depositors or banks, building and loan association or trust corporations may be included in one action.
Service of process in such action or actions shall be made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and summons to the president, cashier, or managing
officer of each defendant bank, building and loan association or trust corporation and by publication of a copy of such summons in a newspaper of
general circulation, either in English, in Filipino, or in a local dialect, published in the locality where the bank, building and loan association or trust
corporation is situated, if there be any, and in case there is none, in the City of Manila, at such time as the court may order. Upon the trial, the court
must hear all parties who have appeared therein, and if it be determined that such unclaimed balances in any defendant bank, building and loan
association or trust corporation are unclaimed as hereinbefore stated, then the court shall render judgment in favor of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, declaring that said unclaimed balances have escheated to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and commanding said
bank, building and loan association or trust corporation to forthwith deposit the same with the Treasurer of the Philippines to credit of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to be used as the National Assembly may direct.

At the time of issuing summons in the action above provided for, the clerk of court shall also issue a notice signed by him, giving the title and
number of said action, and referring to the complaint therein, and directed to all persons, other than those named as defendants therein, claiming any
interest in any unclaimed balance mentioned in said complaint, and requiring them to appear within sixty days after the publication or first
publication, if there are several, of such summons, and show cause, if they have any, why the unclaimed balances involved in said action should not
be deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines as in this Act provided and notifying them that if they do not appear and show cause, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines will apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint. A copy of said notice shall be
attached to, and published with the copy of, said summons required to be published as above, and at the end of the copy of such notice so published,
there shall be a statement of the date of publication, or first publication, if there are several, of said summons and notice. Any person interested may
appear in said action and become a party thereto. Upon the publication or the completion of the publication, if there are several, of the summons and
notice, and the service of the summons on the defendant banks, building and loan associations or trust corporations, the court shall have full and
complete jurisdiction in the Republic of the Philippines over the said unclaimed balances and over the persons having or claiming any interest in the
said unclaimed balances, or any of them, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues herein, and render the
appropriate judgment thereon. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and summons upon the president, cashier,
or managing officer of the defendant bank. 8 On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances, service is made by
publication of a copy of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the institution is situated. 9 A notice about the
forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and published, directing and requiring all persons who may claim any interest in the unclaimed
balances to appear before the court and show cause why the dormant accounts should not be deposited with the Treasurer.

Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional
requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat
proceedings are actions in rem,10whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. 11 Thus, an action may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants. 12 Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the
res.13 Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and
constructive notice to all persons interested. 14

Nevertheless, we find sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated for the payment of the Managers Check in the
escheat proceedings.

13
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or
unclaimed property, without there being an interested person having a legal claim thereto. 15 In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the
status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or
abandonment by the depositor.16 If after the proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be
reverted to the state "to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers." 17 However, if interested parties have come forward and lain
claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. 18 We
emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby
the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned,
forgotten, or without an owner.19

Act No. 3936, as amended, outlines the proper procedure to be followed by banks and other similar institutions in filing a sworn statement with the
Treasurer concerning dormant accounts:

Sec. 2. Immediately after the taking effect of this Act and within the month of January of every odd year, all banks, building and loan associations,
and trust corporations shall forward to the Treasurer of the Philippines a statement, under oath, of their respective managing officers, of all credits
and deposits held by them in favor of persons known to be dead, or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten
years or more, arranged in alphabetical order according to the names of creditors and depositors, and showing:

(a) The names and last known place of residence or post office addresses of the persons in whose favor such unclaimed balances stand;

(b) The amount and the date of the outstanding unclaimed balance and whether the same is in money or in security, and if the latter, the
nature of the same;

(c) The date when the person in whose favor the unclaimed balance stands died, if known, or the date when he made his last deposit or
withdrawal; and

(d) The interest due on such unclaimed balance, if any, and the amount thereof.

A copy of the above sworn statement shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the premises of the bank, building and loan association, or trust
corporation concerned for at least sixty days from the date of filing thereof: Provided, That immediately before filing the above sworn statement, the
bank, building and loan association, and trust corporation shall communicate with the person in whose favor the unclaimed balance stands at his last
known place of residence or post office address.

It shall be the duty of the Treasurer of the Philippines to inform the Solicitor General from time to time the existence of unclaimed balances held by
banks, building and loan associations, and trust corporations. (Emphasis supplied.)

As seen in the afore-quoted provision, the law sets a detailed system for notifying depositors of unclaimed balances. This notification is meant to
inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar institutions
are under obligation to communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of this initial notice is for a bank to determine whether an
inactive account has indeed been unclaimed, abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If the depositor simply does not wish to touch the funds
in the meantime, but still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its
sworn statement.20 It is not the intent of the law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only
interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left without an owner.

In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the unclaimed balances are eventually escheated to the Republic, the bank "shall not
thereafter be liable to any person for the same and any action which may be brought by any person against in any bank xxx for unclaimed balances so
deposited xxx shall be defended by the Solicitor General without cost to such bank." 21 Otherwise, should it fail to comply with the legally outlined
procedure to the prejudice of the depositor, the bank may not raise the defense provided under Section 5 of Act No. 3936, as amended.

Petitioner asserts22 that the CA committed a reversible error when it required RCBC to send prior notices to respondents about the forthcoming
escheat proceedings involving the funds allocated for the payment of the Managers Check. It explains that, pursuant to the law, only those "whose
favor such unclaimed balances stand" are entitled to receive notices. Petitioner argues that, since the funds represented by the Managers Check were
deemed transferred to the credit of the payee upon issuance of the check, the proper party entitled to the notices was the payee Rosmil and not
respondents. Petitioner then contends that, in any event, it is not liable for failing to send a separate notice to the payee, because it did not have the
address of Rosmil. Petitioner avers that it was not under any obligation to record the address of the payee of a Managers Check.

14
In contrast, respondents Hi-Tri and Bakunawa allege 23 that they have a legal interest in the fund allocated for the payment of the Managers Check.
They reason that, since the funds were part of the Compromise Agreement between respondents and Rosmil in a separate civil case, the approval and
eventual execution of the agreement effectively reverted the fund to the credit of respondents. Respondents further posit that their ownership of the
funds was evidenced by their continued custody of the Managers Check.

An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee), 24 requesting the latter to pay a person named therein
(payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of money.25 The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of
any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer.26 Here, the bank becomes liable only after it accepts or certifies the check. 27After the
check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-drawer.

There are checks of a special type called managers or cashiers checks. These are bills of exchange drawn by the banks manager or cashier, in the
name of the bank, against the bank itself.28 Typically, a managers or a cashiers check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of
funds to be debited from the depositors account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank
issues the check in its name, with itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. 29Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary
obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. 30

Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case
the procurer of the managers or cashiers check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an
effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable: 31

Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the
delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may
be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as
to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner acknowledges that the Managers Check was procured by respondents, and that the amount to be paid for the check would be sourced from
the deposit account of Hi-Tri.32 When Rosmil did not accept the Managers Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of the
instrument instead of cancelling it. As the Managers Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to other persons, the
instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that respondents retained custody of the instrument. 33

Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never
made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Managers Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the
allocated fund is still held by the bank. 34As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the
Managers Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented by a managers check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the
instrument although accepted in advance remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left
inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.1wphi1

After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to remand the case for hearing to determine whether the claim of
respondents was valid. There was no contention that they were the procurers of the Managers Check. It is undisputed that there was no effective
delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As
it is obvious from their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the
Managers Check, should be excluded from the escheat proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is
state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note that there is nothing in the records that would show that the OSG appealed the assailed CA
judgments. We take this failure to appeal as an indication of disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the Republic.

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. The 26 November 2009 Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
107261 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Facts: Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa) are registered owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, and TCT Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina Register of Deeds.
These lots were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government [(PCGG)]. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan),

15
through her representative, Jerry Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for 6,724,085.71, with the promise that she will take care of clearing
whatever preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale. The Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owners Copies of said
TCTs and in turn, Millan made a downpayment of 1,019,514.29 for the intended purchase. However, for one reason or another, Millan was not able
to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her downpayment of 1,019,514.29.
However, Millan refused to accept back the 1,019,514.29 down[]payment. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri
Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out on October 28, 1991, a Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of 1,019,514.29, payable to
Millans company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation (Rosmil) c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a complaint
against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99. On January 31, 2003, during the
pendency of the above mentioned case and without the knowledge of [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa], RCBC reported the 1,019,514.29-credit
existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed balances as of January 31, 2003. Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn
Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBCs Asset Management, Disbursement & Sundry Department (AMDSD)
was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita.

Issue: Whether or not the escheat of the account in RCBC is proper.

Held: No. An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee), requesting the latter to pay a person
named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an
assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes liable only after it accepts or certifies the check.
After the check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the
depositor-drawer.

There are checks of a special type called managers or cashiers checks. These are bills of exchange drawn by the banks manager or cashier, in the
name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically, a managers or a cashiers check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of
funds to be debited from the depositors account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank
issues the check in its name, with itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary
obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.

Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case
the procurer of the managers or cashiers check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective
delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:

Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the
delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may
be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as
to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.

Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never
made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Managers Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated
fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Managers Check.
The doctrine that the deposit represented by a managers check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the instrument although
accepted in advance remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more than 10
years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.

G.R. No. 114217 October 13, 2009

16
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY,1 Petitioners,
vs.
ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY,
JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 150797

ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA TAN, and MA. EMMA SY, Petitioners,
vs.
BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY, FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY, LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA
FERRERA-SY, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the
Decision2 dated May 6, 1993 and the Resolution3 dated February 28, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other
hand, the second Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February 28, 2001 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

G.R. No. 114217

On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and
Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy,
Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578. 4

Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of
Sy Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang
from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada
Tan.5

Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including several businesses. 6

During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the
common properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee,
with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or private respondents. Thus, the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated
by Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of management and operation of the business of cinema of the common
ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro Sy.7

Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall
exclusively pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the
income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year
1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with the
income derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and maintenance. 8

On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil
Case No. 8578 by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April 2, 1981, the Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision
based on the pretrial order of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into by and between respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First
Partial Decision and Second Partial Decision had long become final, without an appeal having been interposed by any of the parties. 9

17
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:

(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income, produce and improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or
participations (sic) in the names of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants Zenaida and Ma.
Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties
in the names of said defendants which are enumerated in the Complaints in this case and all those properties, rights and interests which said
defendants may have concealed or fraudulently transferred in the names of other persons, their agents or representatives;

(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving widow, Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique,
Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children by his first wife, namely:
Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;

(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the
conclusion of the proper accounting which the parties in this case, their agents and representatives, shall render and after segregating and
delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband Sy Bang;

(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando
and Enrique, all surnamed Sy.

SO ORDERED.

On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown
partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied on August 16, 1982. 11

On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition (Disqualification) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with
Restraining Order was Noted.12

On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order,13 Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners
Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit;
and (2) in the second Order,14 the Judge ordered the immediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the
names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.

On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver, Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino
Sy.15

While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before the First Division of the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 61519. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on August 31, 1982, to
enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise, restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution dated
August 16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and the Order dated August 18, 1982.

On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.

On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by
petitioners on September 24, 1982. 16

After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the petition to the CA for proper determination and disposition.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision17 on May 6, 1993, denying due course to and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno
acted correctly in issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said that the act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in accord
with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated that in an action against several defendants, the court may, when a judgment is
proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. It found that the judges decision to defer
resolution on the properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect the resolution on the properties in the names

18
of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one another such that the
claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the subject of separate suits.

The CA also upheld the judges appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge did so after both parties had presented their evidence and upon
verified petition filed by respondents, and in order to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the order to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino, Rolando and Bartolome.

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994. 18

On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91 for failure of petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.

In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the
nullification of the Third Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the trial court to
proceed with the reception of further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578. 19 In particular, petitioners allege that the CA decided questions of substance
not in accord with law when it upheld the trial courts Third Partial Decision which, they alleged, was rendered in violation of their rights to due
process.

Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days May 26 and 27, 1982 to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on
May 26, the judge forced them to terminate the presentation of their evidence. On June 2, 1982, following petitioners submission of additional
documentary evidence, the trial court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8 and 9, 1982, at 2 oclock in the afternoon "in view of the importance
of the issue concerning whether all the properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective
wives (as well as those in the names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be declared or included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of
the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan." At the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented additional
evidence. Unknown to them, however, the trial court had already rendered its Third Partial Decision at 11 oclock that morning. Thus, petitioners
argue that said Third Partial Decision is void.20

They also question the trial courts First Order dated August 17, 1982 and Order dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and
appointing a receiver, respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing and without showing the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they
question the Second Order dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis pendens ex parte and without any showing that the notice was for the
purpose of molesting the adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. 21

On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an
extensive estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bangs death in 1971
until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widows allowance as provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in
possession and control of her husbands estate, or her share in the conjugal partnership. 22

In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance, petitioners argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code
(now Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of property" during the liquidation of the inventoried
properties.23 Considering that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not
entitled to widows allowance.

On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay
Rosita P25,000.00 as the widows allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the
estate is finally settled or until further orders from the Court. 24

In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past,
present and future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the case. 25 Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein Rosita and Enrique stated that they were given P1 million and a 229-square meter parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing as
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8578.26

Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and Opposition to Drop Rosita Sy as a Party. 27They said that it would be ridiculous
for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bangs estate, amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned by the
19
trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They alleged that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties when she affixed
her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, her frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City for guardianship over her person and properties. They also alleged that Enrique and
some of Jose Sy Bangs children would stealthily visit Rosita in Rosauros house while the latter was away. On one of those occasions, she was asked
to affix her thumbmark on some documents she could not read and knew nothing about. They claim that Rosita has never received a single centavo of
the P1 million allegedly given her.

In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,28 petitioners countered that respondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge the Sinumpaang
Salaysay. Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-Manifestation
was filed without Rositas authorization as, in fact, she had written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading. 29 Further, they averred
that Rosita executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay while in full possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the petition for
guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn certification from Rositas physician that "she (Rosita) is physically fit and mentally competent to
attend to her personal or business transactions."30

On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique
executed their Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 29, 1996. However, this development was made known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence,
the Court was not aware of this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners prayed for the reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and
dropping Rosita and Enrique as parties to the case. 31

In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents maintained that the Court should not consider the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondents alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the contents of the document or the implications of
her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that their mother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to by exhibiting four
documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay. The
second was a reproduction of the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with the amount changed to P100.00, the Transfer Certificate of Title number changed
to 12343567, and the size of the property to "as big as the entire Lucena City." The third purported to bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership
of gains to Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance to Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the
fourth contradicted the third in that it was in favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while disinheriting Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and
Rosalino. These, respondents assert, clearly show that their mother would sign any document, no matter the contents, upon the request of any of her
children.32

The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996. 33

Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that the Third Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties
without due process, but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles. 34

G.R. No. 150797

Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of
Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court), docketed as Special Proceedings No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named as
the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion to Order Court Deposit of Widows Allowance Ordered by the Supreme
Court.35 Then, he filed a Motion before this Court seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00 in widows allowance and P25,000.00
every month thereafter, as ordered by this Court in its September 23, 1996 Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners imprisonment should they fail
to comply therewith.36

On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their children, Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa
Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit to this Court, jointly and severally, the amount of P250,000.00 representing the widows allowance of the
incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from September 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00 per
month and every month thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each month. 37

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution.
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8,
1997 Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship court. 38

20
In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents favor, finding "nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro
Sys filing of the motion to order the deposit of the widows allowance ordered by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the
public respondents grant thereof in the order herein assailed. More so, when the public respondents actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme
Courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated September 23, 1996." 40 Thus it held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5, 2001, 41 petitioners filed this Petition for Review42 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying for this Court to reverse the CAs February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to
declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-
34.43 They argued that the Guardianship courts jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon finding in the
affirmative, appointing a guardian. Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, a widows allowance can only be paid in an estate
proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition were to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had the
exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the widows allowance. 44

They raised the following issues:

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship Courts Order dated 8 July 1997, and Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that:

The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had no authority to enforce payment of widows allowance.

II

The payment of widows allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present because the estate of Sy Bang the source from which payment is to be
taken has not been determined with finality.

III

The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widows allowance unduly modified the express terms of this Honorable Courts
Resolution granting it.45

Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship courts omission of the phrase "to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang" from the July 8, 1997 Order.
They interpreted this to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that the widows allowance be taken from their own properties and not from
the estate of Sy Bang an "undue modification" of this Courts September 23, 1996 Resolution. 46

On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and G.R. No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on
May 21, 2003 and June 19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in its August 11, 2003 Resolution.

Pending the issuance of this Courts Decision in the two cases, respondent Rosauro Sy filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in
Court of Supreme Courts Ordered Widows Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and Upon Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to Comply
Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had been ill and had no means to support herself except
through his financial assistance, and that respondents had not complied with this Courts September 23, 1996 Resolution, promulgated seven years
earlier.47 He argued that respondents defiance constituted indirect contempt of court. That the Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect
contempt did not help his mother because she was still unable to collect her widows allowance. 48

Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the widows allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated
that Rosita, together with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no legal ground
to cite them in contempt.49

On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauros Motion, to wit:

21
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow of deceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners
Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latters wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY of contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita Ferrera-Sy by way of a widows allowance pursuant to this Courts
Resolution of September 13, 1996, and accordingly ORDERS their immediate imprisonment until they shall have complied with said Resolution by
paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,600,100.00), representing her
total accumulated unpaid widows allowance from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00)
a month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court further DIRECTS petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widows
allowance for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.

This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.50

Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of P260,010.00 on April 5, 2005.51

Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for Execution 52 before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner
Rosa Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification. 53She alleged that, in accordance with Chinese culture, she had no
participation in the management of the family business or Sy Bangs estate. After her husbands death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and
liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had not
disobeyed its Resolution and to consider her motion.

Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification. 54 They stressed that
the P1 million and the piece of land Rosita had already received from Jose Sy Bang in 1996 should form part of the widows allowance. They also
argued that whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of Sy Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made
to pay the allowance when none of them participated in the management of Sy Bangs estate; Zenaida and Ma. Emma being minors at the time of his
death, while Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in the family business.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring Respondents to Deposit with the Supreme Courts Cashier its Ordered Widows
Allowance55 and a Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4, 2005. 56Petitioners opposed the same.57

On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of respondents motions and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. 58

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a Manifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clarification. 59 They
maintained that the issues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not been duly resolved. They argued that when this Court issued its
September 23, 1996 Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causes of
action against petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, the Guardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a
"temporary agreement" based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial assistance of P5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was
pending. Moreover, as a manifestation of good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the P430,000.00 out of their own funds in
partial compliance with the Courts Resolution. However, the same did not in any way constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in the present
case. They underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of the latters heirs, the
extent of which remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to adjudicate the liability for the widows allowance to be equally divided
between them and the other set of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.

On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an Order for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to
comply with the Courts resolution.60 They aver that the period within which petitioners were to comply with the Courts Resolution had now lapsed,
and thus, petitioners must now be incarcerated for failure to abide by said Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to refer petitioners counsel,
Atty. Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations of the Canons of Professional Responsibility or to declare him in
contempt of court. They alleged that despite the finality of the Courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a
Manifestation with compliance arguing the same points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not petitioners counsel of record in this case since he never formally
entered his appearance before the Court.61

In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to refer Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy. 62

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus Motion, 63 seeking an extension of time to comply with the Courts Resolution
and Motion to delete the penalty of "fine" as a consequence of voluntary compliance. They insist that their compliance with the order to pay the
widows allowance should "obliterate, expunge, and blot out" the penalty of fine and imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to comply with
22
this Courts Resolution, the RTC, Lucena City, found them guilty of indirect contempt and imposed on them a fine ofP30,000.00. They had appealed
said order to the CA.

They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms "joint and several" in the September 23 Resolution, and "collectively" in the April 5, 2005
Resolution. They argued that "joint and several" creates individual liability for each of the parties for the full amount of the obligation, while
"collectively" means that all members of the group are responsible together for the action of the group. Hence, "collectively" would mean that the
liability belongs equally to the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60 days to raise the necessary amount. They also asked the
Court to hold their imprisonment in abeyance until their "just and reasonable compliance" with the Courts orders.

Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another Manifestation stressing that Sy Bangs marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void.
They claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into believing that Rositas marriage to Sy Bang is valid.

The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005. Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration
of Petitioners,64 which petitioners opposed.65

In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005,66 the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest67 against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to detain them until they complied with this Courts April 4, 2005 and July 25, 2005 Resolutions.

Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion. 68 She informed the Court that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the
Court and its orders, she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise money to comply, but concedes that she was only able to raise a minimal
amount since she has no source of income herself and needs financial support to buy her food and medicines. She obtained her brothers help and the
latter issued six checks in the total amount of P650,000.00. She also alleged that she was not informed by her husbands counsel of the developments
in the case, and remained unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the case. She reiterated that she had no participation in the management of
the Sy Bang estate and received nothing of value upon her husbands death. She prayed that the Court would not consider her failure to raise any
further amount as contempt or defiance of its orders.

The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.

In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions with Payment of Widows Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting
of Warrant of Arrest on Humanitarian Grounds,69 petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma asked the Court to delete the penalty of indefinite
imprisonment considering their partial compliance and the partial compliance of Rosa Tan. They expressed willingness to deposit the widows
allowance with the Supreme Courts Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bangs estate. They reasoned that the money to be deposited is their
own and does not belong to Sy Bangs estate. The deposit is made for the sole purpose of deleting the penalty of indefinite imprisonment. They claim
that they are not willfully disobeying the Courts order but are merely hesitating to comply because of pending incidents such as the falsification
charges against Rosita, the resolution of the partition case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Rosita, and the pendency of Rositas guardianship
proceedings, as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they prayed for the Court to reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the warrant of
arrest.

On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution70 lifting the warrant of arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on
the condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued widows allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to
submit proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice.

In a Manifestation71 dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in
favor of Rosita with the RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the proceedings on February 28, 2006. 72

Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit of said checks, amounting toP1,073,053.00, does not amount to full
compliance with the Courts order considering that the accrued widows allowance now amounted to P4,528,125.00.1avvph!1

Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as
Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy
Bang.73 They argued that it is denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single out only the two children of the first marriage Jose Sy
Bang and Julian Sy and their heirs, as the ones responsible for the widows allowance. This ruling, they aver, does not take into consideration the
numerous and valuable properties from the estate of Sy Bang being held in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. They alleged
that two compromise agreements, both approved by the trial court, transferred properties to Rolando and Renato. They further alleged that
respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita, Rosalino, Enrique, and Rosita Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers and quitclaims over their
shares in the estate of Sy Bang for certain considerations. However, out of respect for the Court and their fear of incarceration, they complied with the
23
Courts orders using their personal funds which they claim is unfair because they have never participated in the management of the properties of Sy
Bang. They prayed that the Court pronounce that the liability for the widows allowance be divided proportionately among the following groups:
Iluminada, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma; Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome Sy and wife Virginia Lim; Rolando Sy and wife
Anacorita Rioflorido; and the heirs of Enrique Sy, namely, Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.

On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents Comment on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition 74 to the motion
filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution.
They argued that they had fully complied with the Courts orders. They alleged that on three occasions within the period, they had tried to submit 12
postdated checks to the Courts cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy of the Court not to issue receipts on postdated checks. They then
filed a motion before the RTC of Lucena City praying for authority to deposit the checks with the trial court. The motion was denied but, on
reconsideration, was later granted. The checks are now in the custody of the RTC. The only issue respondents raise, they claim, is the amount of the
checks. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to direct the NBI to effect their arrest.

The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to comment on the motion to include some of them in the payment of
widows allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were required to comment on a motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to
the NBI to arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. 75

Petitioners filed their Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the March 29, 2006 Resolution. 76 They reiterated their arguments in their
Urgent Reply to respondents Comment on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a Resolution by
the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, San Pablo City, finding probable cause to charge respondents with falsification of three marriage contracts
between Sy Bang and Rosita Ferrera. According to them, this development now constitutes a "highly prejudicial question" on whether they should
comply with the order to pay widows allowance. They claim that, while the filing of the information is merely the first step in the criminal
prosecution of respondents, it already casts doubt on whether Rosita is legally entitled to the widows allowance. They now seek partial
reconsideration of the Resolution inasmuch as it requires them to deposit with the Clerk of Court, RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58, new checks
payable to Rosita Ferrera.

Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation 77 on why they should not be made to pay the widows allowance. They argued
that the RTC had already decided that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised of properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma.
Emma, Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the same was affirmed by the CA. Pending the resolution of the appeal before this Court, this Decision stands.
Thus, petitioners claim that the estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is false. They also claim that, contrary to petitioners claims of being poor,
they still hold enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate, which had been transferred in their names through falsification of public documents, now
subject of several cases which respondents filed against them before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents further claim that the validity of
their mothers marriage to Sy Bang has been recognized by the courts in several cases where the issue had been raised, including the case for
recognition of Rositas Filipino citizenship, the guardianship proceedings, and the partition proceedings.

On June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties. 78 They averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving
behind his widow Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on August 28, 2004, leaving behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The
claims against Jose and Julian were not extinguished by their deaths. It was the duty of petitioners counsel, under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of
Court, to inform the Court of these deaths within 30 days thereof. Petitioners counsel failed to so inform this Court, which should be a ground for
disciplinary action. Hence, respondents prayed that the Court order the heirs of the two deceased to appear and be substituted in these cases within 30
days from notice.

In a Resolution79 dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for substitution and noted the Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to
include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy
Bang.

Respondents then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the Supreme Courts Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25,
2005, December 12, 2005, and February 15, 2006.80 They prayed that petitioners be given a last period of five days within which to deposit with the
Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued widows allowances as of June 2006.

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents manifestation and motion. 81 They argued that the resolutions sought to be
implemented were all issued prior to the DOJ Resolution finding probable cause to file the falsification charges against respondents. They contended
that the criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and not a "widow"; hence, there is no legal justification to give her
the widows allowance. They also reiterated their earlier arguments against the grant of widows allowance.

24
Meanwhile, Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with Motion for Reconsideration. 82 She argued that since the trial court had
already appointed a judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which includes Julian Sys estate, the proper party to be substituted should be the
administrator and not Julians heirs who never exercised ownership rights over the properties thereof.

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.

The Courts Ruling

G.R. No. 114217

Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.

The Third Partial Decision of the RTC

To review, the CA held, to wit:

The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer the resolution on the question concerning the properties in the name of
Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect the decision he rendered concerning the properties in the
names of Jose Sy Bang and wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria Sy, considering that the properties mentioned were separable and distinct
from each other, such that the claim that said properties were not their own, but properties of the late Sy Bang, could have been the subject of
separate suits.83

We agree with the CA.

Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 4. Several judgments. In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one
or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.

The trial courts Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the
status of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents
pending the presentation of evidence.

A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against
each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. 84

Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.

The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties
in the names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the
properties in the names of the other heirs.

The trial courts June 2, 1982 Order reads:

IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties in the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando
Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of the other parties litigants in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of
the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said question was
agreed to be submitted for resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby sets for the reception or for the resolution of said issue in this case on June 8
and 9, 1982, both at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon; notify all parties litigants in this case of these settings. 85

It is obvious from the trial courts order86 that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for the purpose of determining whether properties in the names of Enrique
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives are also part of the Sy Bang estate.

Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said:

25
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the parties in this case in the matter of whatever sums of money, property or
asset belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that came into their possession in order that the Court may be properly guided in the partition and
adjudication of the rightful share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latters estate; this becomes imperative in view of new matters shown
in the Submission and Formal Offer of Reserve Exhibits and the Offer of Additional Documentary Evidence filed respectively by Oscar Sy and Jose
Sy Bang, et al., thru their respective counsels after the question of whether or not the properties in the names of Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, and
Rolando, all surnamed Sy, should form part or be included as part of the estate of Sy Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of May 26, 1982; the
Court deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the part of any of the parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent of the
estate belonging to Sy Bang.87

The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated the details, then carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision.
The evidence that formed the basis for the trial courts conclusion is embodied in the Decision itself evidence presented by the parties themselves,
including petitioners.

However, notwithstanding the trial courts pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate cannot be partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the
extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section 1, 88 have been settled.89

In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of
them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.90

Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. 91 As this Court has ruled:

The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in
the action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:

"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will
not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his
complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of the properties x x x."92

Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial
Decision is but a determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There remained issues to be resolved by the court. There would be no final
determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the courts examination of the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and
Enrique. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court will have to make a pronouncement whether the properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the
trial court finally order the partition of each of the heirs share.

Appointment of Receiver

As to the issue of the judges appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say that the CA conclusively found thus:

The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Upon Order of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners
submitted their opposition to [the] petition for appointment of a receiver filed by private respondents. x x x.

Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third
Partial Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are
mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted,
dissipated, misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order
to preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was
the petitioners who violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and unwarranted
seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of private
respondent, Rosauro Sy.93

Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens

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Next, petitioners question the trial courts Order canceling the notice of lis pendens. 94

Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.

At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in
and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry
of the final judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or
not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. 95

While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As
provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party
who caused it to be recorded.96

This Court has interpreted the notice as:

The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property
in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally
determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered
by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment
of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. 97

The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were able to prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the
owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was also proven that the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be
annotated, was only 1/14 of the assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond
to protect whatever rights or interest Oscar Sy may have in the properties under litis pendentia. 98

G.R. No. 150797

In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CAs February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34.

We find merit in petitioners contention.

The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance ordered
by this Court.

Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widows allowance was made before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the
guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition (Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.

Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate,
shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

27
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them.

Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the
provision of the law that the widows allowance is to be taken from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent.

Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widows
allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. 99

In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court has pronounced that:

Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or
where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or
return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where
title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the
persons said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship
proceedings.100

Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate. 101

Other Unresolved Incidents

Payment of Widows Allowance

It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widows allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and
Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they
again argued against the grant of widows allowance after the DOJ issued its Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges against
respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a "widow" and,
therefore, not entitled to widows allowance.

This argument deserves scant consideration.

A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of falsification against respondents.

In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been defined as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause needs to rest only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 102

Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widows allowance to
be taken from the estate of Sy Bang.

We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with whatever the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.

Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as
Heirs of Sy Bang

On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the
Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.

28
The Motion is denied.

The widows allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bangs estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the
names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy form part of Sy Bangs estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial
courts Third Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties
belonging to Sy Bangs estate.

That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with this Courts order. Properties of the estate have
been identified i.e., those in the names of petitioners thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita. In any
case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate. 103

A Final Note

We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought about by petitioners propensity to challenge the Courts every directive. That the
petitioners would go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court is truly deplorable. Not even
a citation for contempt and the threat of imprisonment seemed to deter them. Their contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far
too long with practically no end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court processes is shameful, and they must not be allowed to continue with their
atrocious behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay the Court treble costs.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No. 150797 is GRANTED, while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is
DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena City is directed to hear and decide Civil Case No. 8578 with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED.
Treble costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SY BANG vs SY (G.R. No. 179955) April 24, 2009

FACTS: Sy Bang died intestate, leaving numerous properties and businesses. The heirs of Sy Bang from his second marriage filed a Complaint for
Partition before the RTC against the petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, as well as the other heirs of Sy Bang. A notice of lis pendens
was then annotated on several certificates of title covering properties involved in the case. RTC decided in favor of petitioners declaring all
properties, businesses, assets, etc in their names. The said decision was appealed to the CA. CA affirmed RTC decision.

To forestall respondents attempts to interfere with their property rights, petitioners filed a Petition for Quieting of Titles with Prayer for the Issuance
of Writ of Prohibition. Petitioners claimed therein that they were the absolute owners of the parcels of land (subject lots) which were all acquired
through their individual efforts and with the use of their personal resources.

Thereafter, complying with the order of the RTC, respondents filed their Answer to the Petition. However, before the case was heard, petitioner Jose
Sy Bang died. The RTC ordered Atty. Eduardo Santos, counsel for petitioners, to submit within ten days an authority from the heirs of Jose Sy Bang
for them to be substituted, as well as to secure the conformity of the other heirs who were yet to be impleaded or substituted to be continuously
represented by Atty. Eduardo Santos. Without complying with the above orders, Atty. Santos manifested in open court that he intended to file a
Motion to Withdraw the Petition for Quieting of Titles. The next day, Atty. Santos filed a Manifestation, signed only by himself, stating that petitioner
and children decided to move for the dismissal of the Petition to quiet title. On even date, the RTC issued an Order, treating the Manifestation filed by
Atty. Santos as a motion to dismiss the quieting of title case and granted the same.

Petitioners, now represented by a new counsel, filed a Petition for Relief from the Order of the RTC in dismissing the Petition for quieting of title.
Petitioners averred that contrary to the claim of Atty. Santos, petitioners Iluminada Tan and the other heirs of Jose Sy Bang were never consulted or
informed of the manifestation that sought the dismissal of their Petition for Quieting of Titles. Atty. Santos was allegedly able to secure the signature
of petitioner Robert Sy Bang in the second Manifestation by misrepresenting to the latter that the relief being sought in said case had been
satisfactorily granted by the Court of Appeals and the LRA, and that the only thing left to be litigated was the amount of damages, which might as
well be waived by signing the said Manifestation. Atty. Santos was also said to have collected full payment of his fees by misrepresenting to
petitioner Carmelo Sy Bang that petitioners had already won the case, and that there was no more need to litigate the same on the merits.

Petitioners further claimed that Atty. Santos continued misinforming them about their case. Atty. Santos wrote petitioner Iluminada Tan a letter
assuring her that the Decision of the Court of Appeals which recognized that the lots in question were the fruits of her familys labor, could not be
legally questioned anymore as entry of judgment was already made in said case. Atty. Santos further stated in his letter to petitioner Iluminada Tan
29
that he had also served petitioners interests well in the Petition for Quieting of Titles, given the declaration by the appellate court that the subject lots
were the gains from petitioners labor, which foreclosed any future claim of a third party.

RTC granted petition for relief. On appeal, CA reversed. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners petition for relief should be granted on the ground of extrinsic fraud? YES.

HELD: Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

Where fraud is the ground, the fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. The extrinsic or collateral fraud that invalidates a final judgment must be such
that it prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and the losing party from having an adversarial trial of the
issue. There is extrinsic fraud when a party is prevented from fully presenting his case to the court as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly
sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to
the court.

Petitioners base their Petition for Relief on the alleged extrinsic fraud committed by Atty. Eduardo Santos who, without petitioners knowledge and
consent, filed the Manifestation that induced the RTC to dismiss, in petitioners Petition for Quieting of Titles, thus, outrightly depriving petitioners
of their day in court.

In his Manifestation, Atty. Eduardo Santos insisted that he consulted and discussed in detail his move, together with three of the petitioners -- the
petitioners Sy Bang brothers, Jose Sy Bang, Jr., Robert Sy Bang, and Carmelo Sy Bang to have the Petition for Quieting of Titles dismissed.
Respondents point out that the said Manifestation was not opposed or rebutted by the petitioners; hence, it sufficiently negated petitioners claim of
fraud committed by their own counsel.

The Court is not convinced. Atty. Eduardo Santos Manifestation only stated that after petitioners Sy Bang brothers found out that the bank records,
which could have proven that their father Jose Sy Bang borrowed money to buy the disputed properties, could no longer be found, Atty. Eduardo
Santos advised the petitioners Sy Bang brothers that their only alternative was to have the Petition for Quieting of Titles dismissed. Atty. Eduardo
Santos even explicitly admitted in said Manifestation his belief that the ruling of the LRA in Consulta and the judgment of the Court of Appeals were
already adequate protection against any challenge to petitioners titles to the properties in question. Nowhere, however, in the Manifestation could the
Court find a clear and categorical statement that petitioners Sy Bang brothers, in fact, agreed to adopt the advice of Atty. Eduardo Santos to have the
Petition for Quieting of Titles dismissed. Neither can it be gleaned from said Manifestation whether petitioners Sy Bang brothers were aware of and
amenable to the filing of the first Manifestation, which Atty. Eduardo Santos signed by himself and filed with the RTC seeking the dismissal of the
Petition for Quieting of Titles.

Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court concedes that the petitioners Sy Bang brothers indeed gave their consent to Atty. Eduardo Santos to move
for the dismissal of the Petition for Quieting of Titles, there was utter lack of evidence to prove that said three petitioners were authorized by the
other 12 petitioners to act on their behalf, so that the consent of the petitioners Sy Bang brothers would have bound the other petitioners. The other 12
petitioners stand to lose substantial interest in the disputed properties by the dismissal of the Petition for Quieting of Titles, and their conformity to
such a move could not be merely assumed, but should be established by competent evidence.

In petitioners favor is the fact that, within two months from finding out about the RTC Order dismissing their Petition for Quieting of Titles,
petitioners secured the services of another counsel and filed a Petition for Relief to seek remedy for the unfortunate situation they found themselves
in. Said circumstances show that petitioners were not at all neglectful in the pursuit of their case as respondents would have this Court believe.

Petitioners were able to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Atty. Eduardo Santos committed extrinsic fraud against them. By virtue of his
Manifestation without petitioners knowledge and consent, thus inducing the RTC to dismiss the Petition for Quieting of Titles, Atty. Eduardo Santos
deprived petitioners of the opportunity to fully and fairly present their case in court. Such is the very definition of extrinsic fraud, which entitles the
petitioners to the grant of their Petition for Relief .

G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,

vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents.
30
 DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri)
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision, 2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the
Resolution,3 dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed
Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel,
Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside the Decision, 4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale
siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.

There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:

This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty
Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de
Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to
Sell) was entered into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the
latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to
him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor,
and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.

[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando]
based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for her
signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-
3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Her repudiation
was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2)
she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on
February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando]
has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged
Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation
there being no evidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so.

Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the
complaint was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied
[Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to
Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos] amended complaint.

Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she
was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of
[Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended
Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient
based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist.
Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo.

[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she
raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract entered
into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim
against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.

31
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the
filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C
with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with the Brosas spouses has categorically refused to be
examined again at the National Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated
April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr.
Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of
Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes
cannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship.
Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders from this Court.
Upon his taking his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the pending cases of Nelly
S. Nave with the end in view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in
the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.

SO ORDERED."

Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas
was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary period.

In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an
orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].

On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision
dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the
court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a party to the guardianship
proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late
[Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.

The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission
for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a
motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo
filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that
the same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied.

On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and
void and of no force and effect;

2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings]
similarly null and void and of no force and effect;

3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of
Calamba, Laguna;

4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept
of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void;

32
 5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income from
the time they took over possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said
income to the latter;

6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:

a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and

b. the costs.6

S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133,
solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay
Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since the year 1980.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M.
Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.

No pronouncements as to costs.7

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking the Decision, 8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the
guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and
thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into
should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings.

According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
having participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders
Jose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus
filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents
to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.

Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject
property as owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the
RTC the supposed transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.

In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.

Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:

33
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE
EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE
22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF
RESPONDENTS PABALES.9

It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

This Court is not persuaded.

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 10

It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, which read:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause
of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph
(c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."

The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:

The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

34
 The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issues.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76
SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are
commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although
such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record
of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. 12

Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to
be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the
litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before
the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata known as"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. 13

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.

Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues
between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of parties

SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his
late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.

A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation." 14

35
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to wit:

Rule 93

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident
minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court
having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of
the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of
Health, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient;

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.

SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall
fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition
residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special
notice thereof to be given.

SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of
the alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray that
the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.

SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and
it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their
respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or
both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified.

xxxx

SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city
where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo,
petitioner, with no named respondent/s.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can
be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person
is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed
36
as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to
and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.

It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they
will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts
and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.

Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves
relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings
on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 1987 15 and 19
November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the
father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale
was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf.

Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of
the Pabale siblings.

It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for
judgment.17 It must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November
2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for
judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.

The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court
before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence.
Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been
best served if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to
the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 19 Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.20

Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely
for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds:

While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings
considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary evidence
to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father
is not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court. 21

As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30
October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to
represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February
1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales presence at the
hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.

Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.

37
No identity of issues

Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of
judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.

In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.

In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said
sale void.

While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the
fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove
that she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition
in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.

Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long
as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. 23 The burden of proving
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.24

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C;
and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the
appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into
contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of
proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C.

Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having
become severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision,
prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986, 26 and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon
their examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired
her judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental
condition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe
Nave, which made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the
court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves
incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20
February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.

All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in
the former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:
1. Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision.

38
2. Cesnando Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific Performance with Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly
Nave who owns a parcel of land which the former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged on
their agreement when she refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings.

3. Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a guardianship proceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be
incompetent.

4. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings
intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed
by Nelly Nave dated February 20, 1984. Hence this petition.

4. Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that she subsequently entered into should be
declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata

RULING: No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The
decision on the former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that
Nave was competent and had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings.

Herein, the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata, namely; 1) bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness
of judgement. Bar by previous judgement means that the judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of parties, subject-
matter, and cause of action. While a bar by virtue ofconclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already
settled in a previous case. Hence, even of there is identity of parties, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgement can be conclusive only as
to the those matters actually controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R.
SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue,
Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer"
in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family
home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the
allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he
did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija,
Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ
of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding
the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
39
 The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas
corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive"
than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the
same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple
and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can
easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court
issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such
jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. The
enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy
is not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody
of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas
corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive"
apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in
obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot
seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The
creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the
legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over
such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the
case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are
uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount.
Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being;
whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and
well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the
Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the
regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such
cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word "exclusive" in the
Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving
minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court
in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the
other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of
Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court,
thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the
Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any
judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on
any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the
letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words
of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx

40
 It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New
Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in
mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must
prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature
should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject." 9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas
corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus
cases where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court
of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: 10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable
obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the
latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to
others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 1 otherwise
known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

41
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at
St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded
by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STCs high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of
Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escuderos students claimed that there were
times when access to or the availability of the identified students photos was not confined to the girls Facebook friends, 4 but were, in fact, viewable
by any Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her students Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol),
STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the schools Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma.
Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school principal and ICM 6Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally
abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is
more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises
scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the
RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. 7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants
inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date
of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB 8 on the basis
of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the
occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.

42
 3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not
the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
petitioners children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the
RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their childrens
privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of
the childrens right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same
Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the
petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as
to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the schools policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data. 10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the
controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

43
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 13 The writ,
however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus, the existence of a
persons right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the
perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the providers databases, which are outside the control of the end-usersis there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

Contrary to respondents submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

44
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in
the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his
or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." 19 It does not
necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not
prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities
whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right
which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technologya right which a great majority of the
users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was
briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right
to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case
at bar is the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. 23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent vulnerability
to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individuals right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use
of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
the landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of
the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal
information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializingsharing a myriad of information, 27 some of which would have otherwise
remained personal.

b. Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social
media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her
45
bulletin board, a user/owner can post anythingfrom text, to pictures, to music and videosaccess to which would depend on whether he or she
allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of
various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them." 28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to
connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is
established and both users are permitted to view the other users "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the
user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile
and shares certain information to the latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a users profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the
users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a
users information, these privacy settings are not foolproof." 33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall,"
except for the usersprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile
content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another users point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] and to put others in
the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the
opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy
setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that users particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct.
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. 35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. 38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that
if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom
list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the
photos visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the
very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.

46
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in
nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so
that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their childrens Facebook
accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password. 39 Ultimately, they posit that their childrens
disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioners children testified, it was
Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them, 40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine
informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were public i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students act of showing the photos
to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that
the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the other students were able to view the photos,
their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account that her students, who are the minors Facebook "friends," showed her
the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escuderos students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez 44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent
to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed
that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;" 47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A users Facebook friend can "share"49 the formers post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared
or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends."
47
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As post,
which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (As own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends
or the public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expandedand to a very large
extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebooks proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion
or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby
resulting into the "democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken
to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons
who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. 52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minors
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of
any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that
they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
users contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the users friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your childrens ears." 53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. 54As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in
protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of
the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since
they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online
conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital
literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they
participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these
children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining
and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to
limit such risks, theres no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the
students rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace activities.1wphi1 Accordingly, they
should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are
willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically
and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more

48
importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be
allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their
rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a
right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place
the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to
keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook
is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates (NenitaDaluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, MyleneEscudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded
said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in
March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in
the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school.
They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their
rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;

49
 3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be
declared illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of gathering, collecting, or storing
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in
the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then
he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post
(status) on Facebook were published as Public.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a users posts on his wall (profile page):

(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
50
 (d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than Public. If it is true that the
students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher,
Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it
was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to
the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the
students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this case:

1. United States v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

2. United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.

3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): The law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but
also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x xx It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.

4. This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to customize their privacy settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its
policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a users information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.

G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M.
51
LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II,
ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES,
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO,
ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B.
MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G
CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G
LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected members of the Kuratong Bale/eng Gang, is once again before this Court this
time questioning, among other things, the trial qmrt's determination of the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions. 1

The Facts and the Case

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP
ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command
([TMC] led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent
Romeo M. Acop ), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out
between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved, including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O.
Mancao II, and 28 others (collectively, the respondents). 3 On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of
murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia,
Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty.

Upon respondents motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground
that none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutors
motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where trial had not begun. As a result of this new law,
the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.

Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R. 128096 4 but this Court upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered
the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the amended informations contained no allegations that respondents committed
the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as required by R.A. 8249.

Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal
Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims heirs also
executed affidavits of desistance. These prompted the respondents to file separate motions for the determination of probable cause before the issuance
of warrants of arrests.

On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial
following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive the cases against respondents by requesting the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation in their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and
P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested
investigation.

Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his co-accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court
denied the plea for temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-
52
accused liable as principals for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the filing of separate informations against them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.

On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC of Manilas order which
allowed the renewed preliminary investigation of the murder charges against him and his co-accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon City
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought the suspension of the proceedings in that court.

In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC of Quezon City from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any
proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before it. On August 24, 2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of
double jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89 was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years after
when they were not revived.

Upon the prosecutions appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5 the Court ruled that, based on the record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing provisional dismissals. The records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion for provisional
dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the heirs of the victims had no notice of any motion for such provisional dismissal.

The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed the RTC of Quezon City to try the cases with dispatch. On motion for
reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raffle of the criminal cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the
cases still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided over by Judge Yadao.

On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the
prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the
assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was denied.

On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch 81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the
family courts in view of the changes in the two informations. On October 24, 2003 the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti
cautela on the motions to determine probable cause.

On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecutions motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of
R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She also granted the motions for determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases against the
respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary investigations before the
Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of her order. It also filed
an administrative complaint against her for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment.7On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification with motion
for cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.

On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to recuse her, prompting the prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on
January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued another order, denying the prosecutions motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003 that
dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on January 26, 2004 Judge
Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecutions motion for reconsideration of its January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but also for
having become moot and academic.

On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the notices of appeal that it filed in the cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004
it filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The prosecution presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion in allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-raffled to
other than among the RTC of Quezon Citys family courts.

53
 2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she took cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the
prosecutions view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of family courts.

3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she did not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of the
cases.

4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable
cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence in support of the prosecutions motion for reconsideration.

5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her
court.

The Courts Rulings

Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents contention that the prosecutions resort to special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial court dismissed the criminal actions against respondents, the prosecutions remedy was to appeal to the CA from
that order of dismissal.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal. 8 Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an
order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy, and
adequate remedy.9 In other words, the prosecutions move was not a case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that
respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-
encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition
outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give
the People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. 10 In any case, the immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that
has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural
lapse.

1. Raffle of the Cases

The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge gravely abused her discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102
to 12 under a separate category which did not restrict their raffle to the citys special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC Administrative
Order 36-96. Further, the prosecution points out that she violated Administrative Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the raffle.
The presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.

The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle of the subject cases. The raffle maintained a separate list for criminal and
civil cases. Criminal cases cognizable by special criminal courts were separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate
heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this since it merely indicated that the cases were not being raffled for the first time.

The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from raffle since these branches remained without regularly appointed judges.
Although the pairing judges of these branches had authority to act on incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean that such
branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.

Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did not then object to the manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution
raised the question only when it filed this petition, a clear afterthought.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Courts October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the
prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive
Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.

54
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which
in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more
of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence
and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their
welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several
cases,11 for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus
involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point
out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as
party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the
respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among
others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

xxxx

(e) the judge knows the judges spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to
determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and
prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his duties
according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judges
rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12

55
Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following
her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadaos
dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply
accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false
information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order
dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadaos statement that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant
of arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this
constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for
disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative
complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecutions stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents.
The comment could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order holding that the
complainants evidence failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for
reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time
she filed her comment.

4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing,
deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadaos duty was to determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on
the basis of the investigating prosecutors resolution as well as the informations and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to
the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of
probable cause within five days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsmans findings when the latter conducted its
preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary
investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp.
Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.

The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de
novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence.13

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause
based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up
and were part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents. 14

The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents along with the criminal informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the
presence of probable cause against the respondents:

1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yus affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he said that on May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command Head,
ordered him to form two teams that would go after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the Superville
Subdivision in Paraaque City. Yu headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the police team
apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it turned them over to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned that the men
and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which he said that he was part of the perimeter defense during the Superville
operation. After the assault team apprehended eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos then went to the
office of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other police officers.

56
 According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out
and that this action had been cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval. Before Ramos left the
meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four male
suspects. In the early morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn
G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed responsibility for the incident.

3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he corroborated Ramos statements. Medes said that he belonged to the
same team that arrested the eight male suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects were
killed.

4. Mario C. Enads affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed having served as TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17,
1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car and
observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later that night, other police officers arrived and apprehended the men in the house.
Enad went in and saw six men lying on the floor while the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left Sucat in the early
morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but was awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire their
guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended suspects.

5. SPO2 Noel P. Senos affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he corroborated what Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of the
advance party in Superville Subdivision and was also in Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang were killed.

6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 199520 which narrated the events that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This
report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and Canson.

7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates.

The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports, taken together with the other documents of record, fail to establish probable
cause against the respondents.

First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly
heard the commanders of the various units plan the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City and actually execute such plan. Yus testimony is limited to the capture of the gang members and goes no further. He did not see them
killed.

Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the prosecutions own evidencethe PNP ABRITGs After Operations
Report of May 31, 1995shows that these men took no part in the operations against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a
comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command
(Acop), and National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list.
Notably, only Yus name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for commendations and
promotions, any omitted name would hardly have gone unchallenged.

Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence against the respondents, submitted in the course of the preliminary
investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted in a related robbery charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He
claimed in that counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations
since he was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18. 22 Notably, Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was on duty at the
TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23

Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving credence to Ramos and Medes statements, dismissed the robbery
case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of officers that it charged with the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of testimony of
these witnesses.

Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated, his role was limited to cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit, he no longer
knew what happened to them.
57
Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this
finding cannot have any legal significance for the purpose of the preliminary investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent
sufficient proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang members down.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present
additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. 24

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option under the above is for it to
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice. But that is not the case here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents
some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six
years after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five days required of
the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.25

5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but
allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited
the prosecutions use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its
proceedings. Thus:

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. Every court shall have power:

xxxx

(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

xxxx

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it,
in every manner appertaining thereto;

xxxx

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;

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There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadaos policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during
the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.26 The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the
private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position
on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecutions private recording of the proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an
unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on
being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official recording of the proceedings by the courts stenographer has
been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadaos policy against such extraneous recordings.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the following assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:

1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-raffle, granted the motions for determination of probable cause, and
dismissed the criminal cases;

2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the respondents for the immediate resolution of the three pending
incidents before the court;

3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse and the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory
disqualification;

4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and

5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.SO ORDERED

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