IN RE: RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS.

303168 AND
303169 AND ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN LIEU OF
THOSE LOST, ROLANDO EDWARD G. LIM, Petitioner. G.R. NO. 156797 July 6, 2010

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and
issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought

Facts:

On December 29, 1998, Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial reconstitution of TCT No.
303168 and TCT No. 303169 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, and for the issuance of
owners duplicate copies of said TCTs. On October 15, 1999, when the petition was called for
hearing, no oppositors appeared despite notice. Whereupon, Lim was allowed to present
evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court whom the RTC appointed as commissioner
for that purpose.

On November 4, 1999, Lim formally offered his documentary exhibits. However, on

August 23, 2000, the RTC received the report from the LRA that Certificates of Title Nos.
303168 and 303169, covering Lot 7, Block 586 and Lot 5, Block 585 respectively, both of the
subdivision plan Psd-38199 are also applied for reconstitution of titles under Administrative
Reconstitution Proceedings, (Republic Act 6732).

On the basis of the LRA report, the RTC dismissed Lims petition on November 23, 2000,

In view of the report of the LRA that the subject titles are also applied for reconstitution of titles
under Administrative Reconstitution Proceedings, the Court resolves to dismiss the instant
petition, it appearing that there is forum-shopping in the instant case, considering further the
strict requirements of the law on the reconstitution of titles.

ISSUE: Did the RTC correctly dismiss the petition of Lim on the ground of forum shopping?

Ruling

We hold that the dismissal was unwarranted and arbitrary for emanating from an erroneous
application of the rule against forum shopping. Thus, we undo the dismissal and reinstate the
application for judicial reconstitution.

Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of his application for
the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial
reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were not identical.
 When he applied for the administrative reconstitution in the LRA on July
21,1988, he still had his co-owners duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but
by the time the LRA resolved his application on November 3, 1998, allowing the relief
prayed for, his co-owners duplicate copies of the TCTs had meanwhile been destroyed
by fire on February 24, 1998. Thus, the intervening loss of the owners duplicate copies
that left the favorable ruling of the LRA no longer implementable gave rise to his need to
apply for judicial reconstitution in the RTC pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No.
26.

The RTC should have easily discerned that forum shopping did not characterize the
petitioners resort to judicial reconstitution despite the previous proceeding for administrative
reconstitution. Although the bases for the administrative reconstitution were the owners
duplicate copies of TCT No. 303168 and TCT No. 303169, those for judicial reconstitution would
be other documents that in the judgment of the court, are sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. The RTC should have also noted soon
enough that his resort to judicial reconstitution was not because his earlier resort to
administrative reconstitution had been denied (in fact, the LRA had resolved in his favor), but
because the intervening loss to fire of the only permissible basis for administrative reconstitution
of the TCTs mandated his resort to the RTC. Indeed, he came to court as the law directed him
to do, unlike the litigant involved in the undesirable practice of forum shopping who would go
from one court to another to secure a favorable relief after being denied the desired relief by
another court.

Neither did the petitioners omission from the petition for judicial reconstitution of a
reference to the application for administrative reconstitution in the LRA justify the
dismissal of the petition. The petition for judicial reconstitution and the application for
administrative reconstitution addressed different situations and did not have identical
bases. Besides, only the RTC could grant or deny any relief to him at that point.

The motu proprio dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by the RTC although
the Government did not file a motion to dismiss grounded on the petitioners supposed
failure to comply with the contents of the required certification was yet another glaring
error of the RTC. A violation of the rule against forum-shopping other than a willful and
deliberate forum shopping did not authorize the RTC to dismiss the proceeding without
motion and hearing. Specifically, the submission of a false certification of non-forum
shopping did not automatically warrant the dismissal of the proceeding, even if it might
have constituted contempt of court, for Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, has been clear and forthright, to wit:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT, JOSE R. ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO,
NARCISO M. PINEDA, IAKI R. MENDEZONA, DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. REYES, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA,
DOUGLAS LU YM, SIGFREDO VELOSO AND JAIME GANDIAGA.
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012

CONCURRING OPINION

I CONCUR with the Majority Opinion written by Justice Abad. Like him, I find and hold that the
State already lost the right to prosecute respondents for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 by February 8, 1990, or ten years after UNICOM filed its Amended Articles of
Incorporation.

Reckoning the prescription period

I disagree that the commission of the offense should be reckoned from the filing of the 1980
General Information Sheet (GIS). Instead, I find it more logical to reckon the commission of the
offense to the filing of the Amended Articles of Incorporation on February 8, 1980 in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although it did not reflect the subject investment
of UCPB, the Amended Articles of Incorporation filed on February 8, 1980 is indisputably the
only trustworthy evidence that proved the dilution. I note that the State itself presented the
Amended Articles of Incorporation to establish its allegations because the Amended Articles of
Incorporation showed that UNICOM had increased its capital stock to P1,000,000,000.00,
divided as follows: 500,000,000 Class A voting common shares; 400,000,000 Class B voting
common shares; and 100,000,000 Class C non-voting common shares, all having a par value of
P1.00 per share. The filing in the SEC and the subsequent approval by the SEC of the
Amended Articles of Incorporation on February 8, 1980 indubitably consummated the unlawful
transaction alleged in the information. Reckoning the prescription period from February 8, 1980
was really warranted by the records.

There was no interruption of 10 year period even assuming that said respondent had
truly been absent from the country in that period.

The applicable rule for computing the prescriptive period of a violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 is Act No. 3326 .The relevant provision is Section 2, which states:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.

I cannot accept the Minoritys insistence. I certainly doubt that the omission by the Legislature
from Act No. 3326 of the effect on the running of the prescriptive period of the absence of the
accused from the country was an inadvertent drafting error on the part of the Legislature. As
such, the omission does not give to the Court the license to apply Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code at will in order to supply the omission.

Bearing in mind that prescription is a matter of positive legislation and cannot be established by
mere implications or deductions, I construe the silence of Act No. 3326 on the effect of the
absence of the accused from the country as a clear and undeniable legislative statement that
such absence does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violations of special
penal laws. This construction entirely precludes the application of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code even in a suppletory manner.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 expressly provides only one instance in which the
prescriptive period is interrupted, that is, when criminal proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person. In that regard, the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription. Hence, the prescriptive period for criminal violations of R.A.
No. 3019 is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman either receives a complaint, or
initiates its own investigation of the violations.

Prescription should run from the date of discovery instead of the date of the commission
of the offense.

The transaction in question was evidenced by public instruments and records. There is good
authority for the view that when the offense has not been concealed, such as when it is
evidenced by public documents or is a matter of public record open to inspection, the State will
not be permitted to plead ignorance of the act of the accused in order to evade the operation of
the Statute of Limitations. As Justice Abads Majority Opinion sufficiently indicates, this case was
not like a criminal prosecution based on the secretive granting of behest loans as to which
reckoning the period from the date of discovery of the offense would be justified. The transaction
in question had already left the boardrooms of both UCPB and UNICOM when the SEC
approved the increase in capitalization. In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court applied the date-
of-commission rule as the start of the reckoning because the illegal transaction involved had
passed the hands of several public officials. Here, the fact that the increased capitalization was
approved and certified by no less than the SEC, the government agency established to protect
both domestic and foreign investments and the public, called for the use of the date-of-
commission rule.

Lastly, I need to remind that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which
is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted. As between Section 2 of Republic Act No.
3326 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, the former is controlling due to its
being more favorable to the accused. This interpretation also accords most with the nature of
prescription as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from
springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when
the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or
removal of witnesses. More than being an act of grace, prescription, as a statute of limitation, is
equivalent to an act of amnesty, which shall begin to run upon the commission of the offense
rather than upon the discovery of the offense.

I VOTE to deny the petition.

HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO),

Petitioners, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES, Respondent. G.R. No. 162217, July 22,
2015

The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have' always looked at
appeal as not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. The petitioners should have
faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited
their privilege to appeal.

Facts:

The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in
Poblacion, Iba, and Zambales. On October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in the MTC
of Iba against the Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales, 3claiming that in 1983, the
Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a substantial portion of his land without
his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to vacate the property
had remained unheeded. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. 4 Thence, the
Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of
appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the R TC in Iba, Zambales
to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69 which
ultimately granted the petition for certiorari.

The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the
reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied their
motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA "dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review for
not being the proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners
was ultimately denied by the CA.

Issue
Whether the petition for review, albeit the wrong mode, was a substantial compliance with the
proper mode of appeal.

HELD:
Rule 41 is the correct remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in the special civil action for certiorari brought by the defendant in an
ejectment suit

(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45. (n)

The petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from
their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the
clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of
the notice of appeal within the period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary
appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing
of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the
case. On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within the
reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non
compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under
Section 1, ( c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the
only way by which they could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the
RTC.

In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the
timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon
perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily
dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right,
but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a
matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment
rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary
appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion.

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs
from that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is
burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness
and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30
days from the perfection of the appeal. 18 This requirement of transmittal of the records does not
arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary. 19
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was
wrong. Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the petition for review.
Yet, the petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, albeit the wrong
mode, was a substantial compliance with the proper mode of appeal.
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have' always looked at
appeal as not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. The petitioners should have
faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited
their privilege to appeal. Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause that
could warrant the relaxation of the rules in their favor. Their bare plea for substantial justice was
not enough ground to suspend the rules. Acceding to their plea would conceal their
shortcomings in procedure, and thereby belittle the lofty objectives of instituting rules of
procedure. We cannot allow that to happen, for doing so would sacrifice the smooth
administration of justice guaranteed to every litigant. We have allowed exceptions only for the
most persuasive of reasons, like relieving the litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

MARIO JOSE E. SERENO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF

PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (APMP), Petitioner, v.
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) , Respondents. G.R. No. 175210, February 01,
2016

Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.

Facts:

On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and
certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates
on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July
2005.

On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the
petrochemical sector, wrote to request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23,
2005. Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter of June 20, 2005.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction dated January 3, 2006, to which the respondent filed its Opposition dated
January 26, 2006 and Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 2006.
RTC denied the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction but
directed the parties to file their respective memorandums after noting that the controversy
involved a pure question of law. Subsequently, the RTC rendered its assailed decision on
October 16, 200612 dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit. The RTC declared
that the "CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department heads or secretaries and
is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency communications;"14 and that the record of the
communications of such body "falls under the category of privileged information because of the
sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest. Hence, this appeal directly
to the Court on questions of law.16

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy
of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure.

HELD:
The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.

Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.

As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern or public interest.22 Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that
the public may want to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or
because the issues "naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen." 23 As such, whether or
not the information sought is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper
determination of the courts on a case to case basis.

The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related
materials, and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of
the country. Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the
overall growth of our country's economy easily makes the information sought a matter of public
concern or interest.

The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. 25 Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-
door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified
as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the nature of its
mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making.

The respondents are correct. It is always necessary, given the highly important and complex
powers to fix tariff rates vested in the President, 31 that the recommendations submitted for the
President's consideration be well-thought out and well-deliberated. The Court has expressly
recognized in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority32 that "a frank exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential
to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power.

Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the people, is
liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However,
the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must
be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption. 35 In case of denial of access to
the information, it is the government agency concerned that has the burden of showing that the
information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is
exempted from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee. 36 We reiterate, therefore, that the
burden has been well discharged herein.

In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the people and the
interest of the Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the protection of the
privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government
officials as well as to guarantee the well-considered recommendation free from interference of
the inquisitive public.