SPENCER,J.

:
This is an action for damages resulting from a fire which completely
destroyedthebuildingandcontentsoftheK32Bowl(abowlingalley)
owned and operated by plaintiff in Wyandotte County. Judgment was
enteredforplaintiffanddefendantshaveappealed.
The building in which plaintiff's business was conducted was
approximately 75 feet by 135 feet in dimension. It was of masonry
construction and contained twelve bowling lanes together with all
necessaryequipmenttooperatetheenterprise.Plaintiffhadoperatedhis
bowlingalleyatthislocationsinceAugust,1959.OnApril8,1971,the
dateofthefire,thebusinesswasbeingmanagedbyJohnEnderleandhis
wifeDorothyasemployeesoftheplaintiff.
The defendants, doing business as Midwest Bowling
EquipmentCompany,hadbeenemployedbytheplaintifftorecoatthe
twelvebowlinglanesatK32Bowl,suchworktobeperformedonor
aboutApril8,1971.Recoatingisaccomplishedbyfirstcleaningthelanes
withasolvent,inthisinstanceChloroniteSolvent8,appliedtoatowel
whichisthenlaidonthefoullineandpushedandpulledtheentirelength
ofthelane.Thisprocedurerequiresaboutoneandonehalfminutesfor
eachofthealleys.Afterthecleaningprocess,alacquerisappliedtoeach
lane. In this case two fivegallon cans of DuraLastic Bowling Lane
FinishNo.505wereused.Eachcanhasacoverwithaspoutandseal.
Thecapisunscrewed,thesealremoved,andthelacquerispouredinto
what is referred to as a pour can, after which one person takes the
applicator,describedasasheepskinonapieceofmetalapproximately
fortyfour inches wide, and another takes the container of lacquer.
Commencingatthepindeckthefinishisappliedasonepoursthefinish
in front of the applicator being pulled by the other. The applicator is
dragged onto protective paper placed at the foul line in a manner
permittingtheentirelanesurfacetobecovered,butwhichwillavoidany
ofthefinishontheapproaches.Thesolventusedincleaningthelanes
willnotburnbutthelacquerfinishisahighlyinflammablecompound,
carrying a flashpoint of fiftynine degrees Fahrenheit. The procedures
usedareapprovedbytheAmericanBowlingCongressandarecommonly
used in the industry. The procedures followed by the defendants in
applyingtheseproductsaretheacceptedproceduresandaresubstantially
the procedures used by the defendants in the process of recoating the
lanesatK32Bowl"aboutadozentimes"betweentheyear1960andthe
dateofthefire.
In addition to his testimony concerning damages, the fact that he had
hiredJohnEnderleandhiswifeDorothytooperatethebowlingalleyfor
him,andthathehadnotbeeninthebowlingalleyforaboutoneweek
beforethefireoccurred,theplaintifftestifiedasfollows:
"ThelanesattheK32Bowlwereresurfacedatleastfivetimes.Thesuppliesused
tocleanandbuffthealleywayswerepurchasedfromMr.OctavioandMr.Sellers
and they were the individuals that regularly resurfaced and recoated the alley
lanes.AtnotimedidIobjecttoMr.SellersandMr.Octaviousingwhathasbeen
admitted as plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2, Chloronite Solvent 8 and DuraLastic
BowlingLaneFinishNo.505.Inmyopinion,plaintiff'sExhibits1and2arethe
productsthatareusedinamajorityofbowlingalleysinthecountryforcleaning
andresurfacingprocedures.Itwouldatleastbeoneofthemajorbrandsused."
ThedefendantSellerstestifiedthatonthenightofApril8,1971,hehad
arrivedattheK32Bowlaloneinhistruckinwhichhewascarryingthe
materialsandequipmenttodothejob;thatwhenhearrivedhecarriedthe
materials into the building and at that time Craig Spillman and John
Enderlewerethereandtherewerethreeorfourothersinsideplayingpool.
Heimmediatelyraisedthemasking,pushedthepinsintothepitinbackof
thealleys, andproceededwiththe cleaningprocess. Hedid nottouch
anythingrelatingtoanyelectricaloutletsorelectricalcurrents,nordidhe
takethepluginsoutofthepinsetterstorendertheminoperative,asthose
pluginswere"cutoffinfront."Hestatedalsothatheandhispartner
expectedthebowlingalleyoperatorormanagertohavethebuildingin
conditiontocommencetherecoatingprocess,themanagerbeingtheone
withknowledgeastowheretheelectricalcontrolswerelocated;andthat
thebuildingandequipmentwereunderthemanager'scontrol.Also,thatit
isnormalandcustomaryintheindustryforthebuildingoperatororowner
tohavethebuildingandequipmentinsideinaconditionsafeandready
fortherecoatingprocedure;andthatonthenightofthefireattheK32
Bowl,heandhispartnerreliedonMr.Enderletohavethebuildingina
safeconditionforthemtodotheirwork.Hestatedalsothattheelectricity
tothepinsettersandequipmenthadbeenturnedoffbyMr.Enderleatthe
controlintheofficeareanearthecashregister.Thisdefendantproceeded
withthecleaningprocessand,atthetimethedefendantOctavioarrived,
had cleaned six or eight lanes. His testimony was that after they had
finished applying the lacquer to lane 12 he carried the applicator and
someotherequipmenttohistruck.Hethenreturnedtothebuildingand
madeonemoretriptothetruck,takingwithhimthebucketandthetowel
thathadbeenusedforthesolvent.Whenhereturnedthesecondtimeand
wasapproximatelytenfeetinsidethefrontdoor,heheardMr.Enderle
say:"Lookwhatishappeningonalley12?Whatisthatonalley12?"He
thenlookeddowninfrontoftheheadpinonalley12andsawablazeon
theareawheretheyhadjustfinishedputtingonthelacquer.
ThedefendantOctaviotestifiedthatwhenhearrivedatthebowlingalley
atabout10:30p.m.onApril8,1971,JohnEnderleandamechanicwere
insidethebuildingandtherewerealsofourorfiveotherspresentwho
wereplayingpool.HetestifiedthathethenhelpedSellersfinishcleaning
thelanes,tapedpaperdownoneachfoullinetopreventanyfinishfrom
gettingontheapproaches,afterwhichtheysetthecansoffinishona
protective cardboard. He testified also that just he and Sellers did the
workandnooneelseassistedthemintherecoatingoperation;thatafter
theyhadfinishedthejobonlane12,Sellershadstartedremovingthe
equipmenttohistruckandhe(Octavio)hadgonetothespectatorseatsin
frontoflane4.AtthattimeeitherEnderleorthemechanic(Spillman)
askedwhatwasonlane12.Heturnedaroundandsawasparkofflameon
lane 12 close to the pin deck. He stated that he was standing
approximatelyseventyfeetawayfromwherehefirstnoticedtheflamein
thebowlingalleyandthathehadlefttheareawheretheflamestarted
approximatelyfiveminutesbeforehesawit.Theflamestartedonlane12
wherethelacquerfinishhadbeenapplied,jumpedtolane11,tolane10,
reachedthefoulline,stoppedandthenstartedgoingbackthesameway.
Inafewsecondsthewholeplacewasfullofflameandsmoke.Atthis
timethedefendantsstillhadsomeoftheirtools,thepourcansandempty
bucketstoremovefromthebuildingandthepaperwhichhadbeentaped
ontothefoullinestobetakenupbeforetheirjobwascompleted.This
witnessalsostatedthathedidnotpayattentiontowherethosewhohad
beenplayingpoolhadgoneandthatitispossibletheycouldhavegone
towardtheplacewherethefirestarted.HealsosaidthatSpillman(the
mechanic)hadfullaccesstothepremisesandthatneitherhe(Octavio)
norhispartnerhadanythingtodowiththemaintenance,inspectionor
repair oftheelectrical systemofthebuilding,whichwereexclusively
underthecontroloftheplaintiffandhisemployees.
Theonlyotherevidencecontainedintherecordonappealconsistsof
plaintiff'sexhibits3through17,whicharephotographsofK32Bowl
beforeandafterthefire;narrativestatementsofsevenpersonsregarding
thedamagessustained;andthenarrativestatementsofthreeothers,allof
whom operate bowling alleys, and all of whom indicated that the
materialsusedandproceduresfollowedbythedefendantsinrecoatingthe
alleys at K32 Bowl were materials and procedures normally used. It
appearsthatneitherEnderlenorSpillman,noranyofthepersonswho
wereplayingpoolinthebowlingalleythatnightwerecalleduponto
provideanyevidenceinthiscause.
Itwasonthisrecordthatthetrialcourtfoundthattherewasnonegligence
on the partofthe plaintiff; thatthe evidence adduced bythe plaintiff
establishedacauseofactionforrecoveryunderthedoctrineofresipsa
loquitur;andconcluded:
"Thethingwhichcausedtheinjuryherewasthehighlyflammablenitrocellulose
lacquer,whichwasunderthecompletecontrolofdefendants.Thiswastheorigin
ofthefire.Thefirecausingthedestructionofthepropertywassuchasinthe
ordinarycourseofthingsdoesnotoccuriftheonehavingthemanagementand
controlusespropercare.Thecircumstancesfurnishedevidencefromwhichthe
courtnowinfersnegligenceonthepartofthedefendants."
Thedefendantshavespecifiedeightpointsonappealbuttherealcruxof
this matter is whether the facts and circumstances revealed by the
evidencewillsupportapplicationofthedoctrineofresipsaloquitur.
In65AC.J.S.,NegligenceSec.220.25,pp.616617,itissaid:
"Asageneralrule,themereoccurrenceofafirewithresultantinjuriesdoesnot
raiseapresumptionofnegligenceeitherinthekindlingorthemanagementofthe
fire,andthedoctrineofresipsaloquiturisordinarilyheldinapplicableatleastin
otherthanexceptionalinstances...."
InthecaseofWordenv.UnionGasSystem,182Kan.686,688,324P.2d
501,itisstated:
"Itishornbooklawthatnegligenceisneverpresumedbutmustbeestablishedby
proof;thattheoccurrenceofinjurydoesnotestablishliability;andthatwhere
directproofislackingcircumstantialevidencemaybeusedtoprovenegligence.
Onetypeofcircumstantialevidenceisthatwhichcourtshavegiventhename
ofresipsaloquitur.Whetherthedoctrine,whichmeanssimply`thethingspeaks
for itself,' is to be applied depends on the character of the accident and the
circumstancesunderwhichitoccurred."
Thedoctrineofresipsaloquiturisintendedtooperatesolelyasaruleof
evidenceratherthanassubstantivelaw.(Biasv.MontgomeryElevator
Co.,216Kan.341,343,532P.2d1053.)ItisestablishedinKansasthat
threeelementsarenecessaryfortheapplicationofthedoctrine:
"...(1)Itmustbeshownthatthethingorinstrumentalitycausingtheinjuryor
damagewaswithintheexclusivecontrolofthedefendant;(2)theoccurrencemust
beofsuchkindornatureasordinarilydoesnotoccurintheabsenceofsomeone's
negligence; and (3) the occurrence must not have been due to contributory
negligenceoftheplaintiff."(Biasv.MontgomeryElevatorCo.,supra,Syl.1.)
"The rationale behind the doctrine is said to be that when the defendant
hasexclusivecontroloftheinstrumentalityhehasitwithinhispowertoproduce
evidenceofthecauseoftheinjury,whiletheplaintiffiswithoutsuchknowledge
andmustthereforerelyonproofofthecircumstances...."(Biasv.Montgomery
ElevatorCo.,supra,p.343.)
(See alsoArterburn v. St. Joseph Hospital Rehabilitation Center,220
Kan.57,551P.2d886.)
Defendantsarguethatthereisnoevidenceastothecauseofthefire.Itis
admittedthattheproductappliedtothebowlinglanesduringthetimeof
theapplicationwasundertheexclusivecontrolofthedefendants,andthat
just the two of them did the work and no one assisted them in the
recoatingprocess.However,defendantschallengethecourt'sfindingthat
the finish was "the thing" which caused the damage. They argue that
although the vaporsof the finish ignited, the source of the ignition is
unknownandthatthesourceofignitionisactuallythesourceofthefire.
Theypointtothefactthatthebuildingcontainedacomplicatedelectrical
system under the exclusive control and management of the plaintiff
throughhismanagerEnderle;thatneitherofthedefendantshadanything
todowiththemaintenance,inspection,repairorcontroloftheelectrical
systemorequipmentinthebuilding;thatitwasnormalandcustomaryin
theindustryfortheownerofthepremisesorhisemployeestohavethe
buildingandequipmentinsideinaconditionwhereitissafeandreadyfor
the recoating procedures; that there are many causes of fire such as
persons, electrical sparks, static electricity, spontaneous combustion,
cigarettes,matches,overheadfluorescentlightsdroppinghotsubstances,
etc.;andtheysaythatinthiscase"thething"whichactuallystartedor
causedthefireremainsopentospeculationandconjecture.
Ontheotherhand,plaintiffarguesthat"thething"inthiscasewasten
gallonsofhighlyflammablenitrocelluloselacquerbroughttotheK32
Bowl by the defendants, which they applied to the lane surfaces and
which never was out of the exclusive control of the defendants. He
contendsasthetrialcourtfoundthatthefirewouldnothaveoccurredin
theabsenceofnegligence;thattherewassubstantialcompetentevidence
presentedtojustifytheinferenceofnegligenceunderthedoctrinewhich
wasneverrebuttedbythedefendants;thattheelectricitytothepinsetters
andequipmentwasturnedoffonthenightofthefirebyEnderle,the
managerofK32Bowl;andthatthereisnoevidencethattheplaintiffor
anyofhisagentsoremployeeswereatfaultorcontributedtothecauseof
thefireinanyway.PlaintiffreferstothecaseofTravelersIns.Co.v.
Hulme,168Kan.483,213P.2d645,wherethecause(sometimescalled
thefoundationfact)wasfoundtobethedefendant'suseofgasolineinthe
defendant'sgaragewhereinplaintiff'scarwasdestroyedwhileawaiting
repairs.
Nothing is to be gained by reviewing the many cases in which the
doctrineofresipsaloquiturhasbeeneitherappliedordeniedtoagiven
statementoffacts.Itshouldbenotedthatweareheredealingwitharule
ofevidencefromwhichtheinferenceofnegligencemaybedrawn,noting
alsothatcourtsarereluctantindrawinganinferenceofnegligencefrom
thestartingoffiresforthereasontheyarefrequentoccurrencesandin
manycasesresultwithoutnegligenceonthepartofanyone.(Emighv.
Andrews,164Kan.732,736,191P.2d901.)
The case at bar is readily distinguishable fromTravelers Ins. Co. v.
Hulme,supra,fortherethefoundationfactwasdeterminedtobetheuse
of gasoline by the defendant, in defendant's garage and upon the
defendant's premises, while the car and all repair equipment and the
gasolineintheopencontainerwereinthesolecustodyandunderthesole
dominionandcontrolofthedefendant.Havingsodetermined,thecourt
thencouldreasonablyinfernegligenceonthepartofthedefendant.Inthis
casethelacquerfinishwasappliedbythedefendantswithoutassistance
fromanyoneelse;however,therecordbeforeusclearlyestablishesthe
factthattheywerenotaloneinthepremisesownedbytheplaintiffand
theydidnothavesoleandexclusivedominionandcontroloverthose
premises.Plaintiff'smanager,Enderle,wasthereand,accordingtothe
undisputed evidence, he turnedoff theelectricity to thepinsettersand
equipmentanditwashewhoexercisedgeneralcontrolofthebuilding
and contents. Also present in the building from the time this work
commenced were Spillman, the mechanic evidently employed by the
plaintifftomaintainthepremises,andthree,fourorfiveotherswhowere
playingpool,eitherascustomersorguestsoftheplaintiff.Itistobenoted
alsothatfromtherecordbeforeustheactualrecoatingoflane12had
beencompletedforapproximatelyfiveminuteswhenthefirebrokeout
and that the defendant Sellers had made his second trip to remove
equipmenttohistruckoutsidethebuildingwhilethedefendantOctavio
hadremovedhimselffromlane12tothespectatorseatsinfrontoflane4,
someseventyfeetaway.
InthecaseofQuerryv.MontgomeryWardCo.,Inc.,217Kan.104,535
P.2d928,itisstated:
"Inmanyofourcaseswehavepointedoutthatthedoctrineofresipsaloquituris
aruleofevidencethatpermitsaninferencethattheknownactorinstrumentwhich
producedtheinjurywasanegligentactoradefectiveinstrument,butitdoesnot
permitafurtherinferenceastowhatactorinstrumentproducedtheinjury.It
cannotbeassumedthatabsentnegligenceonsomeone'spartthefireinplaintiff's
apartment would not have occurred;andeven ifsuchanassumption couldbe
madeplaintiffstillhastheburdenofshowingthatnegligencecouldreasonablybe
attributedtodefendants.Ordinarily,thedoctrineappliesonlyinthosecaseswhere
theinstrumentalityorthingcausingtheinjuryisundertheexclusivecontrolof
defendant or defendants at the time of the injury and the surrounding
circumstancesaresuchastoleavenoreasonableconclusiontobedrawntherefrom
otherthanthattheoccurrenceinquestionhappenedbecauseofthenegligenceof
defendants...."(217Kan.atpp.108109.)
InBiasv.MontgomeryElevatorCo.,supra,itwasstatedwithreferenceto
exclusivecontrolthatitwasnotnecessaryfortheplaintifftoeliminateall
othercausesoftheaccident,and:
"...Allthatisrequiredisthattheplaintiffproducesufficientevidencefromwhich
areasonablemancouldsaythatonthewholeitwasmorelikelythannottherewas
negligenceonthepartofthedefendant.Iftheevidenceestablishesthatitwasat
leastequallyprobablethenegligencewasthatofanother,thecourtshouldrefuse
tosubmittothejurythenegligenceofthedefendantonthetheoryofresipsa
loquitur...."(216Kan.atp.344.)
Fromalloftheevidencemadeavailabletothiscourt,itwouldappearthat
thematerialsusedbythedefendantsinrecoatingthebowlinglaneswere
ofastandardgenerallyacceptedthroughouttheindustryforthatpurpose
and that the procedures followed by the defendants in applying the
materials were the normal and accepted procedures and had been
approved bytheplaintiff. There is noevidence inthis recordthatthe
defendantswereguiltyofanyactoromissioninoraboutthepremisesfor
which they were negligent, other than what might be inferred by
applicationofthedoctrineofresipsaloquitur,andanyfindingbythe
trialcourttothecontrarycannotbesupported.Thefirewhichstartedon
lane12ofK32Bowlcommencedapproximatelyfiveminutesafterthe
lacquerfinishhadbeenappliedandwhenallthatwaslefttobedoneby
the defendants was to remove their remaining tools, equipment and
suppliesfromthebuilding.Atthattimeneitherofthedefendantswasin
thevicinityofthepointwherethefirecommencedandneitherofthem
hadanymoredominionorcontroloftheappliedfinishorthepremises
themselvesthandidEnderleorSpillmanoranyothersofthepeoplewho
were then in the building. There has been no showing as to the
whereaboutsofanyofthosepeople,orwhethersomeofthemmighthave
gonetotheareawherethefirestarted,orwhethertheelectricitytothe
pinsettersandequipmentwhichhadbeenturnedoffbyEnderleinthe
controlintheofficeareanearthecashregistermighthavebeenturnedon
byhimoranother.
Wecannotconcludefromtheevidenceasrevealedbythisrecordthatat
thetimethefirestartedonlane12thelacquerfinishwhichhadalready
beenapplied,ifthatwas"thething"whichcausedthefire,waswithinthe
exclusivecontrolofthedefendants;orinfactthattheoccurrencemaynot
have been due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, his
employees,customersorguests.Itmaybethatthefumesfromthelacquer
finishwereignitedbysomenegligentactbuttheevidencehereissuchas
toestablishthat,ifinfacttherewasanactofnegligence,itcouldhave
beentheactofanyoneofsevenormorepersonswhoweretheninsidethe
building,andnotexclusivelytheactofthedefendants.Consequently,the
prerequisiteofexclusivecontrolwasnotpresentandthedoctrineofres
ipsaloquiturshouldnothavebeenapplied.
DEFENDANTS TRIAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENDANT/S

COMES NOW, Defendant through the undersigned Counsel unto this Honorable
Court most respectfully submits this Memorandum and further avers, to wit:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed before the Honorable Court, a complaint for
Collection of the cost of actual damages due to the alleged fire caused in the Defendants
factory or place of business, collection of exemplary damages, attorneys fees and other
litigation expenses.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Defendant, Mighty Glue Corporation (MGC) is a corporation engaged in the
manufacturing business and its premises is located at Vic Traders Compound at 353-355
Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City which is beside plaintiffs premises, namely the Vic
Traders Corporation.

2. Vic Traders Corporation (VTC) is a corporation engaged in the merchandising and

trading business whose principal office prior to August 17, 2005 was at No. 353 Aurora
Boulevard, Quezon City.

3. The defendant manufactures industrial glues, vulcanizing cement, rubber cement,

leather dressings, leather varnishes and cutting dies, most of which need highly
inflammable and flammable solvents for their manufacture into finished products, such as
Tuluol, Pegasol and Barsol, among others. Specifically, the manufacture of leather
dressings and leather varnishes required as an element the chemical substance known as
nitrocellulose.
4. That on August 17, 2005. at about 11:30 a.m., a fire, preceded by explosions, broke out
allegedly from the Adhesives Department of MGC. The fire gutted not only the principal
office of MGC but likewise the adjoining building of VTC.

5. Due to this circumstance, plaintiff VTC filed a complaint against defendant MGC for
claim of damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, cost of the
suit and other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.

6. Plaintiff VTC alleged that the fire was caused by the fault or negligence of defendant
and/or its employees in not taking the necessary precautions to avoid damage to others
and in failing to comply with the requirements of the authorities relative to the use and
storage of highly inflammable goods.

7. Plaintiff VTC further alleged that the cause of the fire was the presence of four drums
of nitrocellulose in the factory which were stored in MGCs Adhesive Manufacturing
Department, and such chemical is characterized as highly flammable.

8. On the contrary, defendant MGC stated that they had already stopped manufacturing
leather dressings, which one of its components is the nitrocellulose and that long before
the happening of the fire, the supply of said chemical had already been consumed.

9. Defendant MGC, also alleged that, the cause of the fire was the electrical malfunction
inside the factory, that the three electrical wires in MGCs premises parallel to the two
meter wide alley at the height of about 8 to 10 meters burning and their insulators were
peeling off and were burning rapidly towards their opposite ends, and not the allegation
of plaintiff that said defendant is negligent in handling those supplies of highly
flammable chemicals

ISSUE/S

The issues to be resolved in this instant case is:

Whether or not the happening of the fire was actually due to defendants negligence in
handling those supplies of highly flammable chemicals.
 ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

Defendant did not commit negligence in handling its supplies of highly flammable
chemicals.
Negligence is deficiency of perception or lack of foresight: the failure to foresee
impending injury, thoughtlessness, and failure to use ordinary care.
There was no negligence on the part of the defendant; that the evidence adduced
by the plaintiff established a cause of action for recovery under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor could not be given merit.
As a general rule and as a customary norm in some case, the mere occurrence of a
fire with resultant injuries does not raise a presumption of negligence. Negligenceis
neverpresumedbutmustbeestablishedbyproof;thattheoccurrenceofinjurydoesnot
establishliability;andthatwheredirectproofislackingcircumstantialevidencemaybe
usedtoprovenegligence.Onetypeofcircumstantialevidenceisthedoctrineofresipsa
loquitur, whichmeans,thethingspeaksforitself,istobeapplieddependingonthe
surroundingcircumstancesofthecase.
The plaintiff alleged that the presence of the four drums of nitrocellulose in
MGCs premises, which are highly flammable, were the cause of the fire, otherwise
stated,thepresenceofsuchfourdrumsofnitrocellulosespeaksforitself.Unknownto
saidplaintiff,atthedayofthehappeningofthefire,August17,2005,atabout11:00a.m,
beforethefirebrokeout,thefirealarmofthefactoryrang,duetothethreeelectrical
wiresinMGCspremisesparalleltothetwometerwidealleyattheheightofabout8to
10metersburningandtheinsulationswerepeelingoffandwereburningrapidlytowards
theiroppositeends.Thatsaidelectricalmalfunctioncausedthefireduetoitsexcessive
heatingcarryingelectricalcurrentbeyonditsratedcapacity.
Thatsaidelectricalmalfunctioncausedsmoke,fumesthenthefire,whichaffected
thepremisesofthefactorytouchingthosedrumsofnitrocelluloseandallotherchemicals
insidethepremises.Thatsaidelectricalmalfunctionwasbeyondperceptionorbeyond
the control of defendant. Consequently, exclusive control of the defendant in the
attendingcircumstanceswasnotpresentandthedoctrineofresipsaloquitorcannotbe
applied.
ThesituationofthatnitrocelluloseinsideMGCspremisesislikenedtoabombor
otherexplosivethatifintact,itwouldnotexplode,exceptwiththepresenceoruseof
detonator or any kind of outside energy. Without the presence of the electrical
malfunctionthathappened,saiddrumsofnitrocellulosecannotbesaidtohaveexploded
allalone.Itisbeyondperceptionofahumansmindthatthemanagementofthebusiness
wouldhavecommittednegligenceonhandlingthosechemicalsespeciallythattheyknew
ofitscharacteristicsofbeinghighlyflammable.

If the evidence, however, establishes that there was at least contributory

negligenceofthedefendant,thecourtshouldstillrefusetoadmitthetheoryofres
ipsa loquitor (the presence of the nitrocellulose), as being the ground of the
plaintiff.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to this
Honorable Court to render judgment in favor of the defendant on the absence of
negligence.