1. RICKY DINAMLING vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision1dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated November
25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, which affirmed with
modification the conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section
6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004 .

The facts of the case follow.

On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a
drinking session and went to the boarding house of AAA. 3 At that time, Dinamling and
the woman AAA were in an ongoing five-year relationship and they had two common
children (then aged four and two years old). Dinamling and his friend arrived as AAA
was putting the two children to bed. Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA and the
children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and a carton box for ducklings.
His reason for the eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as a "whore
house" wherein she "brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to leave as she
could not carry the children and their things, but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's
feeding bottle outside the house, causing it to break. She then went to the house of BBB
and requested the latter to fetch her children. When BBB and another friend went for the
children, Dinamling already had left with the older child and only the baby was left. The
baby was brought by the friends back to AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents
that happened between Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her
hair and kick her. When AAA went to the police, she was merely told that it was a family
problem that could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that time, a policeman himself. 4

Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., another incident occurred.
AAA was at the house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down
for AAA to come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which
subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she
already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was "good-
for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with
her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down
AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then
threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then
intoxicated, left on a motorcycle.5 AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some
back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry
so she was immediately brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19
weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days.
Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.

As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two (2)
criminal Informations in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in
relation to Section 6(f)7 of RA No. 9262. The two Informations against him read:

Criminal Case No. 1701:

That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological
violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two common children, resulting to
mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by repeated verbal and
emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterances directed against the
victim and a feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying
aggravating circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.

Criminal Case No. 1702:

That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological
violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two common children, resulting to
mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by boxing the victim on
the head, kicking her at the back and removing her pant(sic) and panty (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying
aggravating circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.

Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the cases
were tried jointly.8

For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae Codamon Diaz testified. For
the accused, only petitioner testified for and in his own defense. His defense was denial
and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town's police station at the time that the
offenses were committed.9

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4, 2009 finding Dinamling guilty of
both charges. For Criminal Case No. 1701, the court sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor.10 For Criminal Case No. 1702, the court ordered him to suffer imprisonment of
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed
and the one in Criminal Case No. 1702 was affirmed with the modification on the
penalty, by applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, such that Dinamling was
sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding his
defenses of denial and alibi as well as in discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature
of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony. Allegedly, the witness, Dr. Diaz, testified
that she was unsure if the abortion was a result of the mauling that AAA suffered or
could have been caused by an infection or other factors. 11

This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, but will modify some of the
penalties imposed by the appellate court.

The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the factual findings of the trial
court and the appellate court. As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review brought before this
Court.12 Time and again, the Court has consistently declared that questions of facts are
beyond the pale of a petition for review.13 Factual findings of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding on this Court. 14

But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact may not be
entertained by this Court in a petition for review, to wit:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
 (2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; (3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a

misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record,15

None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are cited by the petitioner as a

ground to grant his petition. But even assuming arguendo, and in the interest of
substantial justice, that any of the exceptions above were indeed invoked, as the
petition alleges that the appellate court failed to give weight to petitioner's defenses of
denial and alibi as well as to his stance that the testimony of Dr. Diaz exculpates him
from the crime, this Court, upon a close examination of the case records, still found no
error in the appellate court's finding of guilt in petitioner.

On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's
evidence. In particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise
to the charges was clear, categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of
credence. Herein below are excerpts of her testimony:

Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in the evening of March 14, 2007,
could you please tell the court what transpired?
A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around seven or eight o'clock in the
evening, I was letting my kids sleep (w)hen (Dinamling) came with a friend. They had a
drinking spree and x x x he started to evict us from that boarding house because
according to him, I (was) using that boarding house as a whore house (by) bringing in
partners, et cetera to that boarding house. That (was) why he was letting us out of it.
And he even told me that if I (had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the basura (garbage)
bag outside and I (could) use the carton where he placed the ducklings to pack our
things and leave the place. That night, I (did) not know how to carry them out and I was
waiting for him to stop talking and leave but he never left us up to the time he threw the
feeding bottle of my baby outside that caused it to break and that was also the time I
decided to go to the house of BBB because it is the place where my landlady (was)
staying.

xxxx

Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.

A. He threw it outside, Sir.

Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the accused that evening?

A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that time it was directed (at an)
innocent individual and that is very painful.

Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or fearful at the time the accused was
acting that way?

A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would again inflict those pain (on) us.

Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what happened next?

A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home with one of the kids but to my
dismay, even the milk of my baby was not there any more; that night because it was
around 11:00 o'clock, we had to use the feeding bottle of BBB's son together with the
milk because when they went to fetch the kids, the milk was gone.

Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it happened (sic) previously?

A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I was) prompted to go back
home and to my relatives for protection but he (came, followed) us where we (went).

Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007, what did he do, if any?
A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts hitting my head, pulls my hair
kicks me and there was a time I went to the police station but they said that (it) is some
kind of family problem that we could talk xxx over and so it was left that way. I thought
leaving him would be the best thing to do but he kept on following us. 16

xxxx

Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March 20, 2007. Will you please tell the
court what happened that late afternoon or early evening?

A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend because of what happened on March
14, 2007 when we left the boarding house.

xxxx

Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that place?

A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came and shouted words that (on) final
count, (I) should be out of that place.

Q. And what else happened?

A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.

Q. What transpired next?

A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him outside and I inquired (as to)
why he (kept on) following us when we (already) left the boarding house and then he
started shouting at me, shouting my family name, x x x x that I (was) good for nothing
and that I (could) sue him (in) court and he (would) pay me. So I said "I thought when
we already left, you were at peace with yourself already." When I was going down,
going to the barangay captain's house, he followed me. When I tried to go back, he
kicked me. He pulled my pants down and pulled even my panty and he said x x x he
(did) that to me because I was worthless.

Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down your pants and your panty?

A. Front of CCC.

Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?

A. Road.
Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses nearby, that road, that spot where
he pulled down your pants and panty?

A. There is a small store and people were looking at us. There are houses above and
then one of them told me he saw but he is afraid to come out.

Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?

A. Dark but then there was a street light near the residence.

Q. Was it still early evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About what time?

A. Around 9 o'clock.

Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along that road, what else happened?

A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left shouting at me, my family name.
It is very hurting because my family (had) nothing to do with this.

xxxx

Q. And what happened the following day?

A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock early morning of March 21, there
was pain at my back. That night when he kicked me, there was pain at my back. I said I
(would) just go tomorrow for medication but I did not reach the day because I was
bleeding. When I went to the bathroom, there (was) blood so I said I think I am going to
abort. There (was) blood already so I decided to go to bath before I (went) to the
hospital but when I went to take a bath, I already had profuse bleeding so they (had) to
carry me with the use of a blanket to the hospital. 17

AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third
child with Dinamling. She also testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even
fearing the sound of his motorcycle as that signalled that she or her children would be
abused. She previously filed with the police a complaint for physical injuries but nothing
came of it. Later, she learned from Dinamling that he had been discharged as a
policeman.18
The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said testimony of AAA which the
Court of Appeals has affirmed. Under such circumstances, this Court has little option but
to accord said findings with great respect, if not finality. The findings off act of the trial
court, as regards the credibility of a witness, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
supported by the evidence on record are accorded finality.19

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was "like
a corpse" because of Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of
maltreatment of her daughter, including the times that she saw her with "bluish spots"
and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking that she had received
from Dinamling.20 She knew that Dinamling was a married man when he had his
relationship with AAA21 and she knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live with AAA and
the children because he always went home to his own wife. 22

The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined in
Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in the two Informations filed against
petitioner. The provision of the law states:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial
of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the
elements of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; 23

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman
with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;24

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish;
and
 (4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions. 25

As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against petitioner Dinamling, the
elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the
victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year ongoing relationship with petitioner
Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two common children. AAA was often in
fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal abuse. In the evening of March
14, 2007, an incident occurred in which she and her children were actually evicted by
Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend and the
children, accused AAA of using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that
AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further humiliated AAA by telling
her to pack her clothes in a trash bag and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He
then threw a baby bottle outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave even
without her children. Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and left the
baby behind. AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but the latter found only
the baby. According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one,
as similar incidents had happened previously.

As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise
proven. In addition to the first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a
relationship with the offender, the prosecution was able to prove another incident of
mental or emotional anguish through public ridicule or humiliation when it showed
Dinamling acting in the following manner: a) by calling and counting down on AAA for
the latter to come out of the house where she was staying;

b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;

c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"

d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;

e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear
(panty) and calling her worthless;

f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name
as he left.

All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting the
public ridicule and humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain.
AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear
in her.

All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the
commission of the crime as prescribed in the law.

It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual
incidents. The testimony of the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration
of the act, as long as it is credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused because
evidence is weighed and not counted. 26 If, in criminal cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the
positive, categorical and credible testimony of a lone witness is deemed enough to
support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving a case of violation of Section 5(i)
of RA No. 9262, this Court shall treat in the same manner the testimony of a single but
credible witness for the prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of
truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward
manner, corroborative testimony is not needed to support a conviction. 29

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that
are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological
violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed and
penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.

The law defines psychological violence as follows:

Section 3(a)

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental

or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed
by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional
anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are
personal to this party.30 All of this was complied with in the case at bar. In the face of the
strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense of denial
and alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at
XXX Police Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those dates.32 However, on cross
examination, he admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police
station to AAA's boarding house.33

Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently
held as inherently weak34and which, unless supported by clear and convincing
evidence, cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim. 35 In general, a plea
of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the
offended party.36 The only exception to this rule is where there is no effective
identification, or where the identification of the accused has been fatally tainted by
irregularity and attendant inconsistencies. 37

In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward,
unequivocal and positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of
Dinamling as the perpetrator is not an issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew
each other very well as, in fact, they were at that time carrying on a five-year
relationship which had borne two common children.

Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove
that not only was heat some other place when the crime was committed, but also that
he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate
vicinity, during its commission.38 Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water.
Not only was his alleged location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX Police
Station where he was on duty, in the same municipality as the crimes' place of
commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this police station is just "two to three
minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused admits that he was in
the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be said that it
was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime, and his defense of alibi
cannot prosper.39

Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner Dinamling guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial
of the accused is a negative assertion that is weaker than the affirmative testimony of
the victim.40 It almost has no probative value and may be further discarded in the
absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witness to impute so grave a
wrong against the accused.41 As for alibi, it is not given weight if the accused failed to
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the
scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 42

But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz,
the substance of which allegedly frees him from responsibility for the incomplete
abortion of AAA's unborn child.

By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital,

brought a copy of a medical certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:

a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March 21 to March 24, 2007;

b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling, and;

c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion of the left elbow.43

The witness testified that she herself typed the medical certificate and had it signed by
Dr. Baguilat.44 Dr. Baguilat, however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of
the court from his current place of work.45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae
Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-gynecologist of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, who
testified that the medical certificate indicated that AAA was pregnant, but that her
incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her "mauling." 46 Dr. Diaz
added that the anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the contusion and
hematoma were caused by a fall, trauma, blow or impact to the patient's body.47 When
cross-examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other possible causes of abortion include infection
of the reproductive organ or urinary tract infection and intake of strong medicines, while
another cause of anemia is malnutrition. 48

Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an
uncertainty as to whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from
the crime.

The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's
physical injuries from the mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element
of the crime with which he is charged. Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two
informations against him. Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the
fact or existence of such physical injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction
or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime that
petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical
violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar,
when the physical violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the mental
and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven.
In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental or emotional
suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence
translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching,
kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical
violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven
that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional
distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence
done on her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a
result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.

The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also
alleged to have led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in
the information in the case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for
conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof or lack of proof of such injuries would
not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or physical injuries, in isolation, are not
elements of this particular crime.

As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-
physical suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social
shame or dishonor on the offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property
damage which are covered by the other subsections of the law's provision. The use of
physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or property harm to the victim, falls
under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have caused mental or emotional
anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if they lead to
such psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of
mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law.

As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory

testimony of Dr. Diaz, or even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such
fact does not lead to petitioner Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was
discussed above, the fact of AAA's miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not essential to
proving the elements of the crime, unless it is alleged to have caused mental or
emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not abortion but
the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an
aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under
Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the
presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty
prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less
than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or
psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. 49

For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating
circumstances which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and
proven with competent evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed. 50

It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any
of the crime's elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same.
However, from the fact of miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's
pregnancy, which is an aggravating circumstance for the crime and which is alleged as
such in the information. The pregnancy is proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well
as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course of such testimony to show
that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete abortion secondary to the
mauling."

Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the
incomplete abortion or miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did
not present contradictory evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions
and proof of pregnancy. The pregnancy was never put in issue during trial and on
appeal. Neither is the same in question in this petition. Therefore, it may be safely
concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been established and it may be taken
account of and considered as a circumstance that aggravates Dinamling's criminal
liability.

Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly modify the penalties
imposed by the trial court and appellate court. 51
As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance
attends the crime.1wphi1 Although it was stated during trial that the offense was
committed in the presence of AAA's children, such fact was not alleged in the
information and therefore will not be taken into consideration. 52 Nighttime, though
alleged, is not considered aggravating because it neither facilitated the commission of
the offense nor was it shown to have been purposely sought by the offender.53 The fact
of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has been alleged and
established. This single circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and
automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per
Section 6 of RA 9262 and also Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Hence,
petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a maximum penalty that is derived from
prision mayor in its maximum period, which is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the minimum
penalty should come from the penalty one degree lower than prision mayor which is
prision correccional, whose range is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.55 Therefore, this Court modifies the trial court's Order dated September 17,
2009,56 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and imposes on petitioner
Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision
mayor as maximum. The trial court's order for petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, is upheld.

As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1)
aggravating circumstance. Again, the single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the
accused's liability and automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals are to be modified. The
maximum penalty should be derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which,
again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. And
again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new
penalty to be imposed shall be imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of the penalties,
like the imposition on the petitioner of a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) and the order for him to undergo psychological counseling, as upheld by
the appellate court, are hereby affirmed.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA
9262 and are punishable by the same range of penalties as prescribed in the said law.
However, due to the greater ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal Case
No. 1702, the minimum and maximum lengths of the sentence imposed should
therefore be greater than in Criminal Case No. 1701.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of petitioner to

show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision. The assailed Decision dated
August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, are hereby AFFIRMED and MODIFIED only as to the penalties
imposed, to wit:

1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is ORDERED to serve

an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision
mayor as maximum. He is, likewise, ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling;

2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to

serve an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six ( 6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. He
is also ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
and to undergo psychological counseling.

SO ORDERED.

2. BBB,* vs. AAA,*

G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the Decision 2 dated November 6, 2009
and Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
89581, which affirmed with modification the issuance against him on August 14, 2007 of
a Permanent Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.

Antecedent Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTCs issuance of
the PPO against BBB:

Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only
in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a
previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents.

During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born
on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).

To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10,
2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including [CCCs], was
amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.

The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy
moments and heated arguments. The two however have contradicting statements as to
the cause of their present situation.

[BBB] alleges that [AAAs] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent arguments.
According to [BBB], [AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his
female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges, contrary to [AAAs] suspicion, are purely
professional. According to [BBB], because of their repeated fights, he was forced to
leave the family home to prevent the brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon
after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children
with her, which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also
caused the family expense to double, making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his
financial obligations.

[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to [BBBs]
incessant womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same,
would even curse [AAA].

The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBBs] alleged mistress, a woman by the
name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the presence of [BBB] himself,
who, according to [AAA], did nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to
leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at a friends house. She
however went back to the conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving
her son [CCC] at her friends house.

What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of [BBB] in
favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB]
would still treat the latter differently from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage.
[AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB] would buy food and toys for [DDD]
and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].

While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying the
rentals due on the condominium unit they were occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out.
[AAA] was likewise compelled to find work to support the family, after [BBB] has started
to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family. According to [AAA], the amounts
given by [BBB] were not sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing her to request
for loans from friends.

[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their
children. [AAA] alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG],
a friend of [BBB] who lives within the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go through
the guards logbook to monitor their every move, i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA]
leaves and returns back home, etc.

Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an
application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the
same permanent after due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

Finding good ground in [AAAs] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO). The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a
Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007], the dispositive portion of which orders:

"x x x x

a. Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying, or

otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain from insulting her,
cursing her and shouting invectives at her;

b. Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may cause
mental and emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her extramarital relations
with his mistress [FFF] and anyone else for that matter;

c. Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit environment,
specifically prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress[FFF] and anyone else to be with
them in instances where he would be allowed by this Court to see their children;

d. Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of 12
visits per year) at the latters residence for a maximum period of 2 years [sic]each visit,
subject to further orders from this Court. For this purpose, [BBBs every visit] shall be
accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA] as to the availability
of time and date of children for such visit, at the expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the
Court Sheriff is directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB] visited
the children;

e. Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of the
motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:

One (1) Hyundai Starex Van

1997 Model

Plate Number: WJP 902

Chassis Number:

Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443

f. Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further
orders from this Court;

g. Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month (not
Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support, inclusive of
educational expenses, groceries, medicines, medical bills, and insurance premiums,
starting from the month of January 2007 to be given within the first five (5) days of the
month through the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA] in receiving such
support;

h. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or
household member at a distance of 100 meters;

i. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any
specified place frequented regularly by the offended party and children and any
designated family or household member;

j. Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to Section 23
of RA 9262 with the undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the violence sought to be
prevented and that in case such violence is committed[,] he will pay the amount
determined by the Court in its judgment;
k. Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being prayed
by [AAA]) representing both reasonable attorneys fees and cost of litigation, including
cost of suit.

x x x x."5

Ruling of the CA

BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated August 14,
2007. BBB alleged that the RTCs (a) issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to
AAA of the sole custody over their children, (c) directives for him to pay attorneys fees
and costs of litigation and to post an excessive amount of bond, and (d) declaration that
he had an abusive character lack factual bases.

On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the factual
findings and dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter
to determine in the proper proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the children.
Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and
economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public
ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF
was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her
which did not help to dispel AAAs accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation.
Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages. The CA
likewise did not favorably consider BBBs claim that he cannot provide financial support
to AAA and the children in the amount required by the RTC as his income merely
depended on contractual hosting and events management assignments. The CA
emphasized that AAA was in the position to know the sources of BBBs income. Citing
Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article 2139of the Family Code, the CA, however,
ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to exercise custody over the
children, who at that time were already older than seven years of age.

The CA denied BBBs Motion for Partial Reconsideration 10 by way of the

Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010 which is likewise assailed in the instant petition.

Issues

Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS
DECISION TO MAKE THE [TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TPO)]
PERMANENT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS

AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST OF LITIGATION IN FAVOR OF [AAA].

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS

ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNTOF BOND TO KEEP
THE PEACE.12

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED INTO

EVIDENCETHE UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES ADDUCED BY AAA. 13

WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE

SPOUSES COMMON BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY
UNDER BBBS ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA
LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES.14

In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the
proceedings below relative to his financial position and AAAs supposedly baseless
accusations and demands from him. In addition, he posits that the text messages
offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists as to their
admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the current whereabouts and
circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued against him is rendered moot. He now has
actual care and custody of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological son,
resides in a college dormitory. BBB and AAA barely get in touch with each other except
when the latter initiates the same.

In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises factual
issues which are subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO, which under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to be immediately executory upon its
issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that BBB still verbally abuses her. BBB has not
posted the 300,000.00 bond required from him. He likewise has not paid the attorneys
fees and costs of litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who,
in the eyes of the law, is also among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that
in2010, she left DDD and EEE under the care of BBB only because the circumstances
then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then lapsed from the time she filed
an application for a protection order and still, no execution of the PPO ensued. She
could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus left with no choice but to
yield custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to BBBs illicit
affairs. AAA points out that since their children are all older than seven years of age,
they are already capable of choosing for themselves whom they want to exercise
custody over them.

Pending the Courts deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). 16 BBB
alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the
custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. 17

AAAs counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment to the
MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally distressed and sans the
formers advice and guidance. Atty. Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBBs illicit
relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued by the RTC.

In BBBs Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with due care
and full knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed. Further, BBBs alleged
involvement with FFF is an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment based on
compromise.

Disquisition of the Court

The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement.

The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by
rendering a judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to
reasons discussed below.

Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for
the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In
the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and
which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits
compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in
Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared that:

Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x x
x.22 (Emphasis deleted) AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to
mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support,
custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting
therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not
as an incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken
outside the ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the
prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to compromise applies.

The courts a quo committed no error in issuing a PPO against BBB.

Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in the CAs
ruling that the RTC properly issued a PPO against BBB and that a remanding of the
case to the trial court is necessary to determine who shall exercise custody over CCC,
DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the children as with whom they would prefer to
stay would alter the effects of the PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed
PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted
custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the
amount and manner of providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now
directed to determine with dispatch.

The Court notes BBBs manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable
settlement as regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and
support of DDD and EEE. While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise,
AAAs vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels the Court to exercise prudence
by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are,
however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid
issues, but the Court now requires the RTCs direct supervision lest the parties muddle
the issues anew and fail to put an end to their bickering.

No grounds exist which compel this Court to resolve the first three issues raised by BBB
since they are merely factual in character.

In Padalhin v. Lavia,25 the Court declared that:

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of
law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact.

x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is a factual issue which is beyond the
province of a petition for review on certiorari. x x x

In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject
to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant
petition challenges the existence of clear and substantial evidence warranting the award
of damages and attorneys fees in Lavias favor. Further, the instant petition prays for
the grant of the Spouses Padalhins counterclaims on the supposed showing that the
complaint filed by Lavia before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are
not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and not
legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.26 (Italics in the original and emphasis ours)

In BBBs case, he avers that the RTC and the CAs (a) issuance of the PPO, (b) award
of attorneys fees and costs of litigation in AAAs favor, and (c) directive for him to post a
bond in the amount of 300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues
presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of evidence. While the general rule that
only legal issues can be resolved in a petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes
exceptions,27 BBBs case does not fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in
accord with each other as to their factual findings, which are supported by substantial
evidence, thus, binding upon this Court.

The doubt raised by BBB anent the admissibility of the text messages as evidence is
not genuinely a legal issue.

In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 28 it is stated that any question as to the
admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party
raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages. 29
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages
which were sent by him and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However,
BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he
indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA. The Appellants Brief 30filed
before the CA stated in part that:

[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB] replied to.
It is totally obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in
response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA] to
bring the children home despite the entreaties of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the
past several months leading up to their separation, and up to the time that the instant
case has been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from [AAA]. 31 (Emphasis
and underscoring in the original and italics ours)

Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:

[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are
in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the parties. 32

In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the
messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the
messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny
ownership of the cellphone number from which the text messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text
messages requires an interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find
the same to be necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the text messages, he
pleads for this Court to consider those messages as inadmissible for allegedly being
unauthenticated. BBBs arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be
allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already
apparent.

The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA relative to the award
of support is not warranted. While CCC is not BBBs biological son, he was legitimated
under the latters name. Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to receive support from
BBB.

BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which
allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that
CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to
receive support from him. This Court is not persuaded.

Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children conceived and born outside
of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated." Article 178
states that "[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between
parents."

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCCs biological
father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the
celebration of BBB and AAAs marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation
was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431
of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive

upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.

At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds
application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous
representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC
remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is
entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his
fathers support.

Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before
the proper court the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the
same in the instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA, 33 the Court held that
"the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The childs legitimacy
"cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose."34 The instant petition sprang out of AAAs application for a PPO
before the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral
issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.

All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists a necessity to remand
the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over
the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and
manner of providing financial support.
The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors
when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of
the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and economic abuses
were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBBs claim that he now has actual sole
care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Courts revocation of the PPO
and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CAs order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the
question of custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they
can choose for themselves whom they want to stay with. If all the three children would
manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall
continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children would
choose to be under BBBs care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to
them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA
and any of the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may
accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give
depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to
Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBBs resources and means and the
necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount
of support, and the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is
reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual
responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as
well, thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best
interests of the children.

A final note on the effectivity and violation of a PPO

The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a
process to be trifled with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once issued,
violation of its provisions shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand
Pesos (5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6)
months.35

Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that "[a] PPO shall be effective
until revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was
issued." Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had
executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by compromise is sought to be
rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out AAAs vacillation anent the MOAs
execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have
imposed upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether or not AAAs half-
hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount to an application for the revocation of
the PPO. The Court, however, refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The
questions raised in the instant petition for the Court to dispose of revolve around the
propriety of the PPOs issuance. The Court resolves that principal query in the
affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without any
equivocation, files an application for its revocation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
6, 2009 and Resolution dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007,
issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162STANDS
except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)36 thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial
court for it to accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with dispatch the
following:

(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three children;

(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and

(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4, 2014,
respectively, are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

3. REBECCA FULLIDO v. GINO GRILLI

G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the May 31,
2013 Decision1and the September 24, 20142 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06946, which affirmed the April 26, 2012 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Tagbilaran City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 7895, reversing
the March 31, 2011 Decision4 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dauis, Bohol (MCTC)
in Civil Case No. 244, a case for unlawful detainer filed by Gino Grilli (Grilli) against
Rebecca Fullido (Fullido).

The Facts
Sometime in 1994, Grilli, an Italian national, met Fullido in Bohol and courted her. In
1995, Grilli decided to build a residential house where he and Fullido would stay
whenever he would be vacationing in the country.

Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Biking I, Dauis, Bohol, from
her parents which was registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 30626. On the said property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli.
Upon completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever
Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year.

In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, 6 a memorandum of

agreement7 (MOA) and a special power of attorney8 (SPA), to define their respective
rights over the house and lot.

The lease contract stipulated, among others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot,
registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50) years, to be automatically
renewed for another fifty (50) years upon its expiration in the amount of P10,000.00 for
the whole term of the lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from
selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. The
pertinent provisions of the lease contract over the house and lot are as follows:

That for and in consideration of the total amount of rental in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, paid by the LESSEE to the
LESSOR, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the latter hereby leases to the
LESSEE a house and lot, and all the furnishings found therein, land situated at Biking I,
Dauis, Bohol, Philippines, absolutely owned and belonging to the LESSOR and
particularly described as follows, to wit:

xxxx

That the LESSOR and the LESSEE hereby agree as they have agreed to be bound by
the following terms and conditions, to wit:

l. That the term of the lease shall be FIFTY (50) YEARS from August 16, 1998 to August
15, 2048, automatically renewed for the same term upon the expiration thereof;

xxx

lease to any third person, without the written consent of the LESSEES. 9

The said lease contract was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Bohol.

The MOA, on the other hand, stated, among others, that Grilli paid for the purchase
price of the house and lot; that ownership of the house and lot was to reside with him;
and that should the common-law relationship be terminated, Fullido could only sell the
house and lot to whomever Grilli so desired. Specifically, the pertinent terms of the MOA
read:

NOW WHEREFORE, FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing premises, the

parties hereto agree as they hereby covenant to agree that the FIRST PARTY (Grilli)
shall permanently reside on the property as above-mentioned, subject to the following
terms and conditions:

1. That ownership over the above-mentioned properties shall reside absolutely with
herein FIRST PARTY, and the SECOND PARTY (Fullido) hereby acknowledges the
same;

2. That the SECOND PARTY is expressly prohibited to sell the above-stated property,
except if said sale is with the conformity of the FIRST PARTY;

3. That the SECOND PARTY hereby grants the FIRST PARTY, the absolute and
irrevocable right, to reside in the residential building so constructed during his lifetime,
or any time said FIRST PARTY may so desire;

4. That in the event the common-law relationship terminates, or when the SECOND
PARTY marries another, or enters into another common-law relationship with another,
said SECOND PARTY shall be obliged to execute a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE over
the above-stated parcel of land and residential building, in favor of whomsoever the
FIRST PARTY may so desire, and be further obliged to turn over the entire
consideration of the said sale to the FIRST PARTY , or if the law shall allow, the FIRST
PARTY shall retain ownership of the said land, as provided for in paragraph 7 below;

xxx

7. That if the cases referred to in paragraph 4 shall occur and in the event that a future
law shall be passed allowing foreigners to own real properties in the Philippines, the
ownership of the above-described real properties shall pertain to the FIRST PARTY, and
the herein undersigned SECOND PARTY undertakes to execute all the necessary
deeds, documents, and contracts to effect the transfer of title in favor of the FIRST
PARTY;

XXX.10

Lastly, the SPA allowed Grilli to administer, manage, and transfer the house and lot on
behalf of Fullido.

Initially, their relationship was harmonious, but it turned sour after 16 years of living
together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They could not agree who should leave
the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido demanding that she vacate
the property, but these were unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido
before the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 244.
Grilli's Position

The complaint stated that the common-law relationship between Grilli and Fullido began
smoothly, until Grilli discovered that Fullido was pregnant when he arrived in the
Philippines in 2002. At first, she told him that the child she was carrying was his. After
the delivery of the child, however, it became apparent that the child was not his because
of the discrepancy between the child's date of birth and his physical presence in the
Philippines and the difference between the baby's physical features and those of Grilli.
Later on, she admitted that the child was indeed sired by another man.

Grilli further claimed that he was so devastated that he decided to end their common-
law relationship. Nevertheless, he allowed Fullido to live in his house out of liberality
and generosity, but this time, using another room. He did not demand any rent from
Fullido over the use of his property.

After a year, Fullido became more hostile and difficult to handle. Grilli had to make
repairs with his house every time he arrived in the Philippines because she was not
maintaining it in good condition. Fullido also let her two children, siblings and parents
stay in his house, which caused damage to the property. He even lost his personal
belongings inside his house on several occasions. Grilli verbally asked Fullido to move
out of his house because they were not getting along anymore, but she refused. He
could no longer tolerate the hostile attitude shown to him by Fullido and her family, thus,
he filed the instant complaint.

Fullido's Position

Fullido countered that she met Grilli sometime in 1993 when she was still 17 years old
working as a cashier in Alturas Supermarket. Grilli was then a tourist in Bohol who
persistently courted her.

At first, Fullido was hesitant to the advances of Grilli because she could not yet enter
into a valid marriage. When he assured her and her parents that they would eventually
be married in three years, she eventually agreed to have a relationship with him and to
live as common-law spouses. Sometime in 1995, Grilli offered to build a house for her
on a parcel of land she exclusively owned which would become their conjugal abode.
Fullido claimed that their relationship as common-law spouses lasted for more than 18
years until she discovered that Grilli had found a new and younger woman in his life.
Grilli began to threaten and physically hurt her by knocking her head and choking her.

When Fullido refused to leave their house even after the unlawful detainer case was
filed, Grilli again harassed, intimidated and threatened to hurt her and her children.
Thus, she filed a petition for Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) against Grilli under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Bohol (RTC-Branch 3). In an Order, dated February 23,
2011, the RTC-Branch 3 granted the TPO in favor of Fullido and directed that Grilli must
be excluded from their home.

Fullido finally asserted that, although it was Grilli who funded the construction of the
house, she exclusively owned the lot and she contributed to the value of the house by
supervising its construction and maintaining their household.

The MCTC Ruling

In its decision, dated March 31, 2011, the MCTC dismissed the case after finding that
Fullido could not be ejected from their house and lot. The MCTC opined that she was a
co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by supervising its construction. Moreover,
the MCTC respected the TPO issued by RTC-Branch 3 which directed that Grilli be
removed from Fullido's residence. The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the instant case;

2. Ordering the Plaintiff to pay to Defendant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as Attorney's
Fees; and

3. Denying the prayer for the issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

SO ORDERED.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Not in conformity, Grilli elevated the matter before the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, dated April 26, 2012, the RTC reversed and set aside the MCTC
decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive right to use and possess
the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties. Since the
period of lease had not yet expired, Fullido, as lessor, had the obligation to respect the
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises by Grilli as lessee. The RTC
opined that absent a judicial declaration of nullity of the contract of lease, its terms and
conditions were valid and binding. As to the TPO, the RTC held that the same had no
bearing in the present case which merely involved the possession of the leased
property.

Aggrieved, Fullido instituted an appeal before the CA alleging that her land was
unlawfully transferred by Grilli to a certain Jacqueline Guibone (Guibone), his new
girlfriend, by virtue of the SPA earlier executed by Fullido.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated May 31, 2013, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC
emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the only issue to be resolved would be the
physical possession of the property. The CA was also of the view that as Fullido
executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and
use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli
who had the better right of physical possession. The CA stressed that, if Fullido would
insist that the said documents were voidable as her consent was vitiated, then she must
institute a separate action for annulment of contracts. Lastly, the CA stated that the TPO
issued by the RTC-Branch 3 under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262 was without prejudice
to any other action that might be filed by the parties.

Fullido filed a motion for reconsideration,13 but she failed to attach the proofs of service
of her motion. For said reason, it was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated
September 24, 2014.

Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DEPARTED

FROM ESTABLISHED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN DENYING THE PETITION
FOR REVIEW AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF RTC BOHOL BRANCH 47
EJECTING PETITIONER FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, WHICH EJECTMENT
ORDER IS ANCHORED ON PATENTLY NULL AND VOID CONTRACTS.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DEPARTED

FROM ESTABLISHED LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RTC BOHOL
BRANCH 47 EJECTING PETITIONER FROM THEIR CONJUGAL ABODE WHERE
RESPONDENT HAS BEEN EARLIER ORDERED TO VACATE BY VIRTUE OF A
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER THUS EFFECTIVELY SETTING ASIDE,
NEGATING AND/OR VIOLATING AN ORDER ISSUED BY A COURT OF CO-EQUAL
JURISDICTION.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED AND DEPARTED

FROM ESTABLISHED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN DENYING THE
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AMONG OTHERS, FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 1 RULE 52 VIS-A-VIS SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Fullido argues that she could not be ejected from her own lot based on the contract of
lease and the MOA because those documents were null and void for being contrary to
the Constitution, the law, public policy, morals and customs; that the MOA prevented her
from disposing or selling her own land, while the contract of lease favoring Grilli, a
foreigner, was contrary to the Constitution as it was a for a period of fifty (50) years,
and, upon termination, was automatically renewable for another fifty (50) years; that the
TPO, which became a PPO by virtue of the July 5, 2011 Decision 15 of RTC-Branch 3,
should not be defeated by the ejectment suit; and that the CA should have liberally
applied its procedural rules and allowed her motion for reconsideration.

In his Comment,16 Grilli countered that he was the rightful owner of the house because a
foreigner was not prohibited from owning residential buildings; that the lot was no longer
registered in the name of Fullido as it was transferred to Guibone, covered by TCT No.
101-2011000335; that if Fullido wanted to assail the lease contract, she should have
first filed a separate action for annulment of the said contract, which she did in Civil
Case No. 8094, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol; and that by signing
the contracts, Fullido fully agreed with their terms and must abide by the same.

In her Reply, Fullido insisted that the contract of lease and the MOA were null and void,
thus, these could not be the source of Grilli's de facto possession.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess. The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful
detainer case is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.

In this case, Fullido chiefly asserts that Grilli had no right to institute the action for
unlawful detainer because the lease contract and the MOA, which allegedly gave him
the right of possession over the lot, were null and void for violating the Constitution.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, Fullido was not only asserting that the said
contracts were merely voidable, but she was consistently invoking that the same
were completely void.19 Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could not
question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment suit unless she
instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is confronted
with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of
unlawful detainer.

Under the circumstances of the case, the Court answers in the affirmative.

A void contract cannot be

the source of any right; it
cannot be utilized in an
ejectment suit

A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in fact
or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity.20 It is one
which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered
into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone. 21Quod nullum
est nullum producit effectum. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that
void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.22 Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or
inexistent contract.23

A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate to set aside
a void contract even in an action for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v.
Nido,24 which involves an action for unlawful detainer, the petitioners therein raised a
defense that the subject land was already sold to them by the agent of the owner. The
Court rejected their defense and held that the contract of sale was void because the
agent did not have the written authority of the owner to sell the subject land.

Similarly, in Roberts v. Papio,25 a case of unlawful detainer, the Court declared that the
defense of ownership by the respondent therein was untenable. The contract of sale
invoked by the latter was void because the agent did not have the written authority of
the owner. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone.

In Ballesteros v. Abion,26 which also involves an action for unlawful detainer, the Court
disallowed the defense of ownership of the respondent therein because the seller in
their contract of sale was not the owner of the subject property. For lacking an object,
the said contract of sale was void ab initio.

Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer
because, precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source
of any rights. To emphasize, void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or
defense in any court proceeding, including an ejectment suit. The next issue that must
be resolved by the Court is whether the assailed lease contract and MOA are null and
void.

The lease contract and the MOA

circumvent the constitutional
restraint against foreign
ownership of lands.

Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural resources shall not be
alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands and in such cases,
the alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Concomitantly, Section 5 thereof states
that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The prohibition on the
transfer of lands to aliens was adopted in the present 1987 Constitution, under Sections
2, 3 and 7 of Article XII thereof. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands. The purpose of prohibiting the transfer of
lands to foreigners is to uphold the conservation of our national patrimony and ensure
that agricultural resources remain in the hands of Filipino citizens. 27cralawred

The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners. It also covers
leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all the rights of dominion.
In the landmark case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She,28 the Court struck
down a lease contract of a parcel of land in favor of a foreigner for a period of ninety-
nine (99) years with an option to buy the land for fifty (50) years. Where a scheme to
circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens is readily
revealed as the purpose for the contracts, then the illicit purpose becomes the illegal
cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an alien is given not only a lease of, but
also an option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot
sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to
dispose of it rights which constitute ownership. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril. 29

In Llantino v. Co Liong Chong,30 however, the Court clarified that a lease contract in
favor of aliens for a reasonable period was valid as long as it did not have any scheme
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition, such as depriving the lessors of their right to
dispose of the land. The Court explained that "[a]liens are not completely excluded by
the Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the
Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever
and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
acquire."31 The lessee-foreigner therein eventually acquired Filipino citizenship.

Consequently, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 471 was enacted to regulate the lease of
lands to aliens. It provides that the maximum period allowable for the duration of leases
of private lands to aliens or alien-owned corporations, associations, or entities not
qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines shall be twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon mutual agreement of both
lessor and lessee.32 It also provides that any contract or agreement made or
executed in violation thereof shall be null and void ab initio.33

Based on the above-cited constitutional, legal and jurisprudential limitations, the Court
finds that the lease contract and the MOA in the present case are null and void for
virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner.

As can be gleaned from the contract, the lease in favor of Grilli was for a period of fifty
(50) years, automatically extended for another fifty (50) years upon the expiration of the
original period. Moreover, it strictly prohibited Fullido from selling, donating, or
encumbering her land to anyone without the written consent of Grilli. For a measly
consideration of PI 0,000.00, Grilli would be able to absolutely occupy the land of Fullido
for 100 years, and she is powerless to dispose the same. The terms of lease practically
deprived Fullido of her property rights and effectively transferred the same to Grilli.

Worse, the dominion of Grilli over the land had been firmly cemented by the terms of the
MOA as it reinforced Grilli's property rights over the land because, first, it brazenly
dictated that ownership of the land and the residential building resided with
him. Second, Fullido was expressly prohibited from transferring the same without Grilli's
conformity. Third, Grilli would permanently reside in the residential building. Fourth, Grilli
may capriciously dispose Fullido's property once their common-law relationship is
terminated. This right was recently exercised when the land was transferred to
Guibone. Lastly, Fullido shall be compelled to transfer the land to Grilli if a law would be
passed allowing foreigners to own real properties in the Philippines.

Evidently, the lease contract and the MOA operated hand-in-hand to strip Fullido of any
dignified right over her own property. The term of lease for 100 years was obviously in
excess of the allowable periods under P.D. No. 471. Even Grilli admitted that "this is a
case of an otherwise valid contract of lease that went beyond the period of what is
legally permissible."34 Grilli had been empowered to deprive Fullido of her land's
possession, control, disposition and even its ownership. The jus possidendi, jus utendi,
jus fruendi, jus abutendi and, more importantly, the jus disponendi - the sum of rights
which composes ownership - of the property were effectively transferred to Grilli who
would safely enjoy the same for over a century. The title of Fullido over the land became
an empty and useless vessel, visible only in paper, and was only meant as a dummy to
fulfill a foreigner's desire to own land within our soils.

It is disturbing how these documents were methodically formulated to circumvent the

constitutional prohibition against land ownership by foreigners. The said contracts
attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer scrutiny of the same revealed
that they were intended to transfer the dominion of a land to a foreigner in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntary executed the
same, no amount of consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional
agreement. The lease contract and the MOA do not deserve an iota of validity and must
be rightfully struck down as null and void for being repugnant to the fundamental law.
These void documents cannot be the source of rights and must be treated as mere
scraps of paper.

Grilli does not have a

cause of action for unlawful
detainer

Ultimately, the complaint filed by Grilli was an action for unlawful detainer. Section 1 of
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for
unlawful detainer, to wit:
Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provision of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.

[Emphasis Supplied]

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice
by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 35

The Court rules that Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Fullido.
As can be gleaned from the discussion above, the complainant must either be a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld. In other words, the complainant in an unlawful detainer case must
have some right of possession over the property.

In the case at bench, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli purportedly
drew his right of possession, were found to be null and void for being unconstitutional. A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no
rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. 36 Hence, as void
contracts could not be the source of rights, Grilli had no possessory right over the
subject land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the beginning
cannot eject another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grilli's complaint for
unlawful detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.

In Pari Delicto Doctrine

is not applicable

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the doctrine of in pari delicto. Latin
for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are
guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the
parties, when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari
delicto.37

The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted
exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this
jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as that principle of the law which holds that
no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good.38 Thus, whenever public policy is advanced by either
party, they may be allowed to sue for relief against the transaction. 39

In the present case, both Grilli and Fullido were undoubtedly parties to a void contract.
Fullido, however, was not barred from filing the present petition before the Court
because the matters at hand involved an issue of public policy, specifically the
Constitutional prohibition against land ownership by aliens. As pronounced in Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Lui She, the said constitutional provision would be defeated and
its continued violation sanctioned if the lands continue to remain in the hands of a
foreigner.40 Thus, the doctrine of in pari delicto shall not be applicable in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 31, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its September 24, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06946 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by Gino Grilli before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dauis-Panglao, Dauis, Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No.
244, is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED.

4. KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-
QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC

G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it
toothless in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated
September 13, 20102 and October 5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioners Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information which states:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
complainants back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the
complainants intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a)
of the Republic Act 9262.4

After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The
latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009,
he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought
payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then
inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict
on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.

The RTC Ruling

The RTC denied petitioners motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties
had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries
constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a)
of RA 9262.
Issues

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that
will favor the accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what
has been admitted should be quashed.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is
not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship.
Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The Court is not persuaded.

Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offenders
wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the
act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts
refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or
present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the
parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence
should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of
lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any
construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a
higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a
more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with
whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the
end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the
crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent;
the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to
private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction
of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:

SEC. 7. Venue The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2)
days to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship
between the petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information
and in denying the motion to quash the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and
October 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in
Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 09-5210.

SO ORDERED.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN CRUZ

G.R. No. 201728, July 17, 2013

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Marvin Cruz (Cruz) from the

Decision1 dated November 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 04363 which affirmed the Joint Decision 2dated January 20, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape.
Cruz was charged in three (3) separate Informations for Violation of Section 5(b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 and two (2) counts of Rape.

The Information for Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 charged Cruz with the
commission of the crime, as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Criminal Case No. L-8397

That sometime on October 23, 2007, in Brgy. Dulig, Labrador, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, taking advantage of
her minority, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously entice (sic) to have sexual intercourse
with AAA,3 a minor 17 years old (DOB-March 25, 1990) which degrade, debase and
demean (sic) the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said minor, to the damage and
prejudice of the said complainant.

Contrary to Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610.4

The two (2) Informations for Rape,5 meanwhile, charged Cruz, as

follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Criminal Case No. L-8398

That on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening of November 6, 2007 in Brgy. Dulig,
Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, thru force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously entice to have sexual intercourse with one AAA, a minor 17 years old (DOB-
March 25, 1990) against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to RA 7659 as amended by RA 8353.

Criminal Case No. L-8399

That on or about 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 2007 in Brgy. Dulig,
Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, thru force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously entice to have sexual intercourse with one AAA, a minor 17 years old (DOB-
March 25, 1990) against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to RA 7659 as amended by RA 8353.

On April 17, 2008, Cruz was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him. Preliminary conference was conducted on May 8, 2008 and after pre-trial, trial on
the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Rosalina Caoile, the
psychiatric consultant at the Region I Medical Center, Dagupan City who examined
AAA. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Cruz and his
relatives, namely: (1) his cousin Raffy dela Cruz (Raffy); (2) his sister Ma. Kristine Cruz
(Kristine); and (3) his aunt Lolita Corrales.

Based on the foregoing, it was established during the trial that AAA is a 17-year old
college student in St. Columbans College in Lingayen, Pangasinan. She met Cruz
sometime in March 2007 via text messaging through her schoolmate and his cousin
Raffy, who gave her mobile number to him. By June 2007, they became sweethearts
despite the fact that they still have not personally met. According to AAA, she agreed to
become his girlfriend after he sent her a text message that his days are already
numbered because he has leukemia. They finally met on October 22, 2007 when Cruz
and Raffy visited AAAs place.6

It was the version of the incidents that occurred after the two had a relationship that the
prosecution and the defense differed. According to the prosecution, Cruz forced himself
upon AAA on the three (3) separate incidents complained of, while the defense set up
the sweetheart defense.

The first incident happened on October 23, 2007 when AAA, accompanied by Raffy,
visited Cruz in his house in Barangay Dulig, Labrador, Pangasinan. After AAA ate the
snacks that Cruz prepared for her, AAA suddenly felt dizzy and sleepy. Since Raffy and
Cruzs family were no longer around, the latter took advantage of her state and forcibly
took her to his parents room where he forced her to lie down and got her naked. He
then mounted her and had sexual intercourse with her despite her resistance.
Thereafter, Cruz went out of the room. She followed suit and saw a male cousin of Cruz
in the living room. Raffy then arrived and she asked him to take her home. On the bus,
AAA narrated her experience to Raffy.7

On November 1, 2007, AAA broke up with Cruz through a text message. 8

The second and third incidents both occurred on November 6, 2007. AAA received a
text message from Cruz demanding that she visit him again in his house, claiming that
he was sick. AAA was constrained to agree after he told her that his cousin took a video
of their previous sexual encounter and threatened her that he will show the sex video to
her family and schoolmates. Cruz also forced Raffy, who accompanied AAA, to leave.
He then closed the door and windows and dragged AAA into a room where he
undressed her and forced her to have sex with him. He also warned her, huwag kang
pumalag, kasi kaya kong pumatay ng tao.9

After Cruz forcibly had sex with AAA, his friends arrived, causing him to stand up and
get dressed. AAA tried to put her clothes back on but he warned her to stay or he will
ask his friends to rape her. Scared, AAA remained inside the room while he had a
drinking session with his friends. Every now and then, he would go back into the room
and have sex with her. Cruz, at one point, lit a cigarette, covered her eyes and
threatened her that he will singe her breast if she continues to resist him. 10

It was only the following day that AAA managed to get out of the house after she asked
Kristine for her clothes. Upon reaching home, she told her aunt of her ordeal. 11

Cruz denied AAAs accusations. He professed his love for AAA and claimed that she
consented to the sexual acts.12

Decision of the RTC

On January 20, 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision acquitting Cruz of the crime
of Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 committed on October 23, 2007. He,
however, was convicted of the two (2) separate counts of Rape committed on
November 6, 2007. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. L-8397,

This Court finds accused MARVIN CRUZ ACQUITTED of the crime of Violation of
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt;

In Criminal Case No. L- 8398,

This Court finds accused MARVIN CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti[-]Rape Law of 1997. Thus, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In addition thereto, he is
ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ([P]50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and to pay FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ([P]50,000.00) by way of moral
damages.

In Criminal Case No. L- 8399,

This Court finds accused MARVIN CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti[-]Rape Law of 1997. Thus, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In addition thereto, he is
ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ([P]50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and to pay FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ([P]50,000.00) by way of moral
damages[.]

No costs.
SO ORDERED.13nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

The RTC found that Cruz failed to prove his sweetheart defense, that is, that he and
AAA were lovers and that AAA consented to the sexual relations. According to the RTC,
although they were lovers, Cruz failed to prove AAAs consent to the carnal knowledge.
Despite the lapses in AAAs testimony, the RTC found that it did not detract from her
statement that she did not consent to the sexual acts complained of. 14
 Decision of the CA

In the CA Decision15 dated November 28, 2011, Cruzs appeal was denied, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Joint Decision of conviction dated
20 January 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 68, in Crim. Case Nos. L-8397, L-8398, and L-8399,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.16nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

The CA found no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the RTC and gave full
faith and credence to the candid and straightforward testimony of AAA on how she was
sexually molested several times by Cruz on November 6, 2007. 17

The CA also disregarded Cruzs argument that his acquittal of the charge of sexual
abuse is tantamount to an acquittal of the two (2) counts of rape. According to the CA,
the fact that no sexual abuse was committed on October 23, 2007 does not mean that
no rape transpired on November 6, 2007. The CA emphasized the distinction between
the incidents that happened on October 23, 2007 and November 6, 2007. The CA,
moreover, expounded that being sweethearts is not a license for Cruz to have sexual
intercourse with AAA against her will.18

Hence, this appeal.

The Courts Ruling

The Court sustains Cruzs conviction for the two (2) counts of Rape.

It is well-settled that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the
result of the case.19 In the Courts assessment of the records, there is no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in part, reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; By

means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
 c. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. (Emphasis ours)

The Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA positively identifying Cruz as the one
who sexually abused her is worthy of belief. The clear, consistent and spontaneous
testimony of AAA unrelentingly established how Cruz sexually molested her on
November 6, 2007 with the use of force, threat and intimidation. Indeed, [a] rape victim
is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and
painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few
inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the
offended party.20

In this case, the prosecution was able to show how Cruz was able to manipulate AAA
into having sex with him against her will on two (2) separate instances on November 6,
2007, to wit:

(1) Cruz threatened AAA that he will circulate a copy of their sex video to her family and
schoolmates if she refused to go to his house and meet him in order to assure sexual
congress. Alarmed by the consequence of his threat, AAA had no choice but to go to
his place as he wanted, in the hope that he would keep his word that he will give her the
disk containing their sex video;21

(2) When Cruz and his friends were having a drinking spree in his house, he threatened
AAA that he will ask them to rape her if she puts her clothes back on. Again, AAA had
no choice but to do what he demanded, and thereafter repeatedly sexually molested
her;22 and

(3) Cruz held a lighted cigarette near her chest and warned her that he will burn her skin
if she continues to resist his sexual advances. Helpless, AAA had no choice but to
succumb to his demand.23

Cruzs defense that AAAs testimony that she received his messages on June 2007
instead of October 2007 is flawed,24 is immaterial and does not in any way detract from
the fact that he raped her several times on November 6, 2007. Moreover, Cruz failed to
present any scintilla of evidence to prove that AAAs testimony was not credible.

As to the sweetheart defense, it is said that love is not a license for lust. A love affair
does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his
beloved to his carnal desires against her will. 25 In this case, Cruzs argument that they
are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him and AAA on
November 6, 2007 have not been proven to be consensual.
Given the foregoing, the Court believes that the CA correctly affirmed Cruzs conviction
for two (2) counts of Rape. The minority of AAA was sufficiently alleged in the
Informations and proven by the prosecution during the trial. Such being the case, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code was
correctly imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.

As to the award of damages

The Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

Moral damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the
victim suffered trauma or mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the
basis thereof.26 Meanwhile, the award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory
upon the finding that rape took place. The award of civil indemnity is exclusive of the
award of moral damages without need of further proof because (t)he victims injury is
now recognized as inherently concomitant with and necessarily proceeds from the
appalling crime of rape which per se warrants an award of moral damages.27 Based on
prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of simple rape are, therefore, proper. 28

Both the RTC and the CA, however, failed to award exemplary damages. Exemplary
damages are imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 29 Given the attendance of an
aggravating circumstance in this case, that is, AAAs minority, exemplary damages in
the amount of P30,000.00 should then be awarded to AAA. 30

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
the damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 31

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 04363 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is awarded, in addition to the P50,000.00 moral
damages and P50,000.00 civil indemnity already imposed. These awards shall be for
each count of Rape committed against AAA.

The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
6. RALPH P. TUA vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch
22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA

G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Decision 1

dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.

On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2 for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the
issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph
Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22.
Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioners abusive
conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for
the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of
custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived
of her and her childrens financial support.

Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have
three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois,
born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her
Affidavit3 attached to the petition, respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a
time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his
gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation
case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there was also an instance
when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had
chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him
with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's
presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she
would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of
withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie
flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions
went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to
her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), 4 which we
quote in full:

Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective
for thirty (30) days from date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P.
Tua.

For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order, the
respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:

1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or through

another, physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse against the herein
petitioner (respondent) and other family and household members;

2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or

otherwise communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether directly or
indirectly or engaged in any psychological form of harassment;

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the Law are hereby
commanded to effect this Order immediately and to use necessary force and measures
under the law to implement this Order.

Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9, 2005 at 2:00 oclock
in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.5

In his Comment6 to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner
denied respondents allegations and alleged, among others, that he had been
maintaining a separate abode from petitioner since November 2004; that it was
respondent who verbally abused and threatened him whenever their children's stay with
him was extended; that respondent had been staying with a certain Rebendor Zuiga
despite the impropriety and moral implications of such set-up; that despite their written
agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal home, the latter
violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their conjugal dwelling with
their minor children and stayed with said Zuiga; and, that respondent is mentally,
psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody.
Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional
for being violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift
TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction and hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.

On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to avoid grave
and irreparable injury, issued a temporary restraining order to temporarily enjoin the
parties and their agents from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil
Case No. 0464-05.7

Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Manifestation,8 praying that the enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by
the RTC and all the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing9 was, subsequently,
conducted on the motion.

On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23,
2002 (sic) issued by the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case
No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.10

In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under RA 9262 is still
pending before the RTC; thus, the factual matters raised therein could not be passed
upon in the petition for certiorari filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of
the herein proceedings, petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the
RTC and which matter could not also be a subject of this petition which assails the TPO
dated May 23, 2005 and that the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC.

The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the RTC and
found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in
complete accord with the provision of RA 9262.

As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the TPO,
considering that the provision authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA
ruled that since the matter raised herein was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter could be resolved without having to rule on
the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that the requisites that the
constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT
COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER
ISSUED THE TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23 MAY 2005
WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE
CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.11

Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not deciding the issue of the
constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.

The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his Comment to

respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the
RTC. However, without awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause
of the Constitution. Contrary to the CA's finding that the matter raised in the petition filed
with it was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could
be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions,
we find that since petitioner is assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's
right to a protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must first
be decided upon. After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents
and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection
order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to declare RA 9262
unconstitutional.

Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA 9262

contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he would have been
afforded due process of law and had properly presented his side on the matter; that the
questioned provision simply encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic
constitutional rights which affects his life, liberty and property.

We are not impressed.

Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs)

refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a
TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty
(30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent
Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court
shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The
TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a
PPO.

In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a

violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge
and held:

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator
to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord
the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice
and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable
the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor,
and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 14

Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court
and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.

Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5 hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom,
reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature.15 The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is
in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights.16

As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently

provides:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of
this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If
the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the
time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before

the Punong Barangay.

Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and
to "maintain public order in the barangay." 17

Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any
indication of grounds for the issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the
issuance of the TPO is ex parte, there must be a judicial determination of the basis
thereof. He contends that the allegations in respondent's affidavit attached to the
petition, and without admitting the same to be true, are nothing more than normal or
usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are not grave or imminent enough to
merit the issuance of a TPO.

We are not persuaded.

We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs)

refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a
TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty
(30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on
the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the
assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of
the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application
after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means
that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of
the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit
attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for
the issuance of a TPO have been committed.

And Section 5 of the same law provides:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in

conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of

custody to her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of

financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal

right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,

occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or
properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his
immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following
acts:
 (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman
or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman

or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to

animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the

woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to
the woman's child/children.

In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the gun and
pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the
legal separation case; feeding his other children with the food which another child spat
out; and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from crying which was
repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her nape when he got furious that she was
asking him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their
agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the financial support for the
kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO. Petitioner's
actions would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a,
d, e (2), f, h, and i.

It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.18We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.

The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the hearing
on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court's
issuance of the Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The
Regional Trial Court of

Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent's Petition for a
Permanent Protection Order.

SO ORDERED.

7. JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings
of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own
bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or
even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-
2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence
and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27,
2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides for
protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further
acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law
enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.
She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent,
is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children.
He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law
office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home.
He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some
men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner
admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even
boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of
their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically
and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private
respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that
caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann,
who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for
squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for
fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware
of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he
would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of
despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her
wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house
instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost
every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she
intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent
that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives
with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he
would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had
previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a
single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells.
He is the President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are
both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one
corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to
not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use
of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills
for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby
depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
 Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or
family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and
if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the
name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or

anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove
things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the
family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter
the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the

Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified
TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit
and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm
licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his
possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental
of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

 g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006,
which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must
submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all
these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to
the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of
Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite,
and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if
the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered
to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION
PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an
amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following
additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they
go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two

sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental
expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of
support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on
the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a
notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one
vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-
Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond
from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to
the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
 a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the

conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8)
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and
make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the
conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental

and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the
Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their
children, private respondent filed another application 24for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering
the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of
replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with
long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to
go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-
Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-
Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610,
also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against
private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went
to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside
a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case
for qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads
as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through

another, acts of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise

communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees

or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J.
Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo,
driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard
Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of
1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three
children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the
children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their
tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and

Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of

Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508
and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to
 deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another
vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose

of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia
only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal
home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered
by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall
be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered
not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of
petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the
Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud
her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO
for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon
petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued
renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30)
days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as
may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it
would only be an "exercise in futility." 33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of
an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before
the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE

THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO

CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT

R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262
AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of
the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will
not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a

statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts
Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the
Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at
least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony
with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial
Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed
of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46 The Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co.,
Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262
could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the
same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an
opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any
claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from
being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo
because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of
R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows
the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further
hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will
be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in
the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done
in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing
when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said
order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB -
SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds
succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section
22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court.
Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was
improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall
not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty
(30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme
Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect
to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is
immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To
issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We
have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her
Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal
and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife,
gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under
the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became
R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better
known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence
Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 providing
protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time
giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the
same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's
groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to
include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the
household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the
efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims
really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like
to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves
"WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing
safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and
providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in,
common-law wives, and those related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this
to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The
understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just
women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get
me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially
in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men,
assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I
am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether
we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man
would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this
bill because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since
the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence.
While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men
also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law
is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to
men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and
standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the
family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold
inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment.
Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito
Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment
of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept
this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung
may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake,
puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove
the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter
of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old
children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by
their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only
women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in
the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A.
9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there
is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is
instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination
as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under
the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is
the essence of true equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think
men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles
in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power
comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression
of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed
its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the
full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared
with men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks
delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under
his control. I quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the

institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as
property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife
if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the
entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat
their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or
inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the
English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first
appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair,
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and
picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then,
the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the
public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern.
No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the
victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that
nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates,"
because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well,
and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true
incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million
severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their
male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife
beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most
visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic
isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they
perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in
shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of
income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed
by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The
United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the
equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have
been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these
women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the
CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To
cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations
omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence
against women and children show that

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing
55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were
2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total
number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD
cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on

violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with
violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200

2010 2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9

1,04
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 832
2

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
Lascivious 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ness

Physical 3,5 2,3 1,8 1,5 1,3 1,4 2,01 1,58

Injuries 53 35 92 05 07 98 8 8

Sexual
Harassme 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
nt

1,2 2,3 3,5 5,2 9,97 9,02

RA 9262 218 924
69 87 99 85 4 1

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

 Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubina
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
ge

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
/Kidnappin 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
g 29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

6,2 5,3 4,8 5,7 6,9 9,4 15,1 12,9

Total
71 74 81 29 05 85 04 48

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and
violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and,
perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United
Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or
five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever
experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had
experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence. 75 Statistics in Canada show that
spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their
spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses,
and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of
physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-
drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or
discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas,
parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing
animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the
same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may
be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must
be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-
drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The
mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative
of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation
by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This
was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President,
chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights
remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and
Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence,
subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the offender and then of
the legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No.
2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter
and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the
case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might
later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and
prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic
violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our
women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in
reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her
as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an
"illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of
being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested
property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender
sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination
through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is
an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration.
As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
"(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to
a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the
police, the prosecution and the judges." 85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments
of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified
on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified
by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties
shall accord to women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security
of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a

woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or

her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together
in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual

activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental

or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in

any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are
attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The
acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the
definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and
simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet,
petitioner insists92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or
properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague
that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the
use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-
Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they
and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the
husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator
to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord
the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is
to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice
and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable
the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor,
and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued. 106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process. 107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April
24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the
TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated
September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment
arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient
cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that
he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC
case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is
virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal
home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include
any, some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If
the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there
until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's

residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are
violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it
for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy
of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a

proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue
at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In
addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic
because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts
as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay
officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of
this Act.1wphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay
was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before

the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
(2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under
the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance
of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials
and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and
impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to
enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of,
or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented
by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an
act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight
against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a
hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment." Accordingly,
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
8. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which
dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen
(18) months old.5Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their

son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in

Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. 9 Respondent and his
new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the

Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner
also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged
against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality
of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him,
resulting in economic abuse to the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.17

Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which

respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19

Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection
order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien,
the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating

respondents obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family Code,
thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which equally applies to all
persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of
the obligors nationality.24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier
in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that
since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family
Code) in regard to a parents duty and obligation to give support to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child. 27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent
with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays
down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to
the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This
latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of law.

In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions
of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41,
whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first
mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is
elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e., whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of
law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights
and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves
a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future
cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA
would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioners contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of
a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is not
excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated to petitioner for any financial support. 33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code
on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family
rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged
to support petitioners son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws
on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While respondent pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. 43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support
to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by
respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of
the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign
law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal
of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just . Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable
under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
to petitioners son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family , or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support;

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial
of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child
is considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:[p]enal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting,
that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52 under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in
ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly,
the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioners child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the

Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) vs. DAISY R. YAHON

G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014

 DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to
nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated
March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No.
02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders and decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and permanent protection
orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary protection order (TPO).

Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under
the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A.
Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in
January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The
couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in
partner.

On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:

Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in form
and substance and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT.
CHARLES A. YAHON directing him to do the following acts:

1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing further acts

of physical abuse and violence against the petitioner;

2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her residence
or her place of work;

3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating

with petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm
or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his job;

5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.

The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area
where the petitioner and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and
Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for
assistance from the petitioner for the implementation of this order. They are also
directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan,
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal belongings in order to insure the safety of
the petitioner.

The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and obtain the
assistance of law enforcement agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth
implementation of this order.

In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent for
him to file an OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a
Preliminary Conference and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon.

To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondents retirement and other
benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any
retirement, pension and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista,
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court:

1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE

PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE
OF A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE
OR POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL
APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH
THE SAID HEARING.

IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY

CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE
COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE
PETITIONER AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE
SHALL BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the
scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and
requested for time to hire his own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file
an opposition or answer to the petition. Because of his failure to appear in the
subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation of
evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO).

Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately
refused to give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no
source of livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on
keeping their house), the RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give
respondent spousal support in the amount of P4,000.00 per month and fifty percent
(50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given
directly to respondent.5

In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO
as he continued making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed
to give her spousal support as ordered by the court.

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:

After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court finds
that there is a need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further
acts of violence that might be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed
that respondent who was a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at
the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly
inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the
petitioner. Respondent in several instances had slapped, mauled and punched
petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical certificates showing
physical injuries suffered by petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances of their
marital altercations. Respondent at the height of his anger often poked a gun on
petitioner and threatened to massacre her and her child causing them to flee for their
lives and sought refuge from other people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an
unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun at
her. Several police blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting the
incidents when she was subjected to respondents ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally,
petitioner was not spared from respondents abuses by shouting at her that he was
wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending
her threatening text messages. These incidents had caused petitioner great
psychological trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and these forced her to seek
refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner was also deprived by
respondent of her spousal support despite order of the court directing him to give a
monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, this court finds a need to
protect the life of the petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and
psychologically.

Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being no
controverting evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that the applicant has
established her case by preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the

petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER be issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES
A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.

Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles
A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and
other claims that may be due or released to him from the government and the said
share of petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondents benefits and
claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.

Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the
Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager
of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.

SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a
Manifestation and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP) 8 dated
November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making a limited and special appearance,
petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP Pension and
Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The
PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding
of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on
October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for
appropriate action on the TPO, and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of
releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahons
check representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by the
AFPFC, but to date said check has not been claimed by respondent.

Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the
TPO, the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of
summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally,
petitioner contended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger
to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded
in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not afforded due process and it was thus
improper to issue execution against the AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner emphasized
its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the TPO without violating
its right to procedural due process.

In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having
been filed out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007
Decision granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become
final and executory.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTCs
Order10 dated March 6, 2009.

On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the
nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to
automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement and pension benefits and directly
give the same to respondent as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent filed her Comment with Prayer
for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, manifesting that there is no information as to
whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit and that the latter has
repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of spousal support.

After due hearing, the CAs Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution 11 granting
respondents application, viz:

Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds meritorious
private respondents application for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-
month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given
to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned
retirement benefits has not yet been released to him. It appears that the release of such
pension could render ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue
enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents,
representatives, and any all persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining
pension that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.

SO ORDERED.12

By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and
affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution
may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its
enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal
support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No.
9262.

A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant
other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
to regain control of their life.13 The protection orders issued by the court may be a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a
protection order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay
Protection Order (BPO).14

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO,
PPO or BPO, to wit:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated,
and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his things and escort
respondent from the residence;

(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated
family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay
away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place
frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;

(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other
essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate
law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the
parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the
automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioners
or respondents removal of personal belongings;

(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the

petitioner;

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if
entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court
shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent
to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be
automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or
any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without
justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;

(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or
deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate
disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to
apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law
enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and
shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take
appropriate action on matter;

(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but
not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, child care expenses and loss
of income;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary
shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need; and
 (k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to
protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or
household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household
member consents to such relief. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTCs directive for the automatic
deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits and pension to be given
directly to respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing
the retirement and separation of military personnel.

The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, 15 which states:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall
not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if
a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this
Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due
such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be
applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)

A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x

xxxx

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or
monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial
agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances
and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability
arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work
except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.

In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court order directing the
Philippine National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits
and to deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latters conjugal
share is illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which
exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of
Rule 39 enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

xxxx

(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or
any pension or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two

laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will.17 Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the
earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of
the legislative will.19

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be
construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement
benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the
withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer,
which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws
to the contrary."

Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of
S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public
funds, citing the case of Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the
CA when it held that the garnishment of the amount of P10,500 payable to BML Trading
and Supply while it was still in the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications was
illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA therein relied on the previous rulings in
Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion 21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et
al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of the salaries of
government employees.

Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public
officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of
these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue
of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by
the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to
the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.23

We disagree.

Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its
coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers,
whether private or government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support
Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended
recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions
were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys
payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement
proceedings," the law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government
agencies attaching funds in their possession." 25

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate
the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the issue of constitutionality was raised
by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the
implementation of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A.
No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the
law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice
against women.

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
viz:

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments
of which the Philippines is a party.27

Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address
one form of violence committed against women economic abuse.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein
the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined
in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the

use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. Destroying household property;

4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.28

The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of
women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection
against threats to their personal safety and security.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator
to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord
the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November
29, 2011 and Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

10. MICHELLE LANA BROWN- ARANETA, for herself and representing her minor
daughters, ARABELLA MARGARITA B. ARANET A and A V ANGELINAMYKAELA
B. ARANETA vs. JUAN IGNACIO ARANETA

G.R. No. 190814 October 9, 2013

DECISION

VELASCO, J.:

The Case

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 are the May 11, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G .R. SP No.
105442 and its Resolution2 of December28, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said decision.

The assailed decision ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 08-023 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 207 in Muntinlupa City and nullified all the issuances it made
in that case, a petition for protection order under Republic Act No. (RA) 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,
commenced by petitioner Michelle Lana Brown-Araneta (Michelle) against respondent
Juan Ignacio Araneta (Juan Ignacio) before that court.

The facts
On April 14, 2000, Juan Ignacio and Michelle were married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA.
The union produced two (2) children, namely: Arabella Margarita (Ara) and Avangelina
Mykaela (Ava), born on February 22, 2003 and April 15, 2005, respectively. After a little
over seven years of disharmonious relationship, husband and wife separated. Since the
couples estrangement and de facto separation, Ara and Ava have remained in
Michelles custody.

In November 2007 before the RTC of Makati City, Juan Ignacio filed, pursuant to A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC3 or The Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors (Rule on Custody of Minors), a Petition for the Custody of
the Minors Arabella Margarita Araneta and Avangelina Mykaela Araneta (Petition for
Custody), with prayer for visitation rights against Michelle and her mother, Glenda B.
Santos (Santos). Docketed as SP PROC. Case No. M-6543, this petition was eventually
raffled to Branch 60 of the Makati City RTC (Makati RTC), presided over by Judge
Marissa Macaraig-Guillen (Judge Macaraig-Guillen).

1. Immediately issue a Provisional Order granting [him]visitation rights with

respect to the minors [Ava and Ara] x x x during the pendency of these
proceedings;

2. Immediately issue an ex parte Hold Departure Order preventing the departure

of [both] minors x x x from the country; and

3. After appropriate proceedings, render judgment granting him joint custody, or

alternatively, granting him permanent visitation rights, over both his legitimate
children x x x.4

To facilitate service of summons, Juan Ignacio, via a Motion and Urgent Manifestation of
November 27, 2007, would inform the Makati RTC that Michelle and Santos may have
transferred to No. 408 Anonas Street, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City (Anonas
residence), an address different from what he provided in his basic petition, referring to
the Molave Drive residence in the same village. In her Officers Return dated December
10, 2007,5 process server Linda Fallorin stated the following: (1) she initially attempted
to serve the summons upon Michelle and Santos on December 7,2007 at the Anonas
residence, only to be told by one Roberto Anonas, who refused to receive the
summons, that both were out at that time; and (2) on December 10, 2007, she was
finally able to serve the summons upon Michelle and Santos by substituted service
through the driver of Santos husband.

On December 18, 2007, Juan Ignacio moved for the issuance of provisional visitorial
order. After a hearing on this motion, the Makati RTC issued on December 21, 2007 an
Order7 allowing Juan Ignacio to visit her daughters on Christmas Day and New Years
Day. The visiting grant came after the court, taking stock of the Officers Return,
declared that it has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Michelle, but despite being
given the opportunity to file a responsive pleading, she has failed to do so.

Christmas and New Years Day 2008 came and went, but Juan Ignacio was unable to
see his little girls in those days for reasons of little materiality to this narration.

On January 2, 2008, Michelle filed in SP PROC. Case No. M-6543 a Motion to Admit
Answer and an Answer (with Affirmative Defenses and With Very Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Issuance of Protection Order).8

In her Motion to Admit Answer, Michelle acknowledged learning from her mother about
the delivery of the summons and a copy of the petition for custody to their Anonas
Residence. She, however, disregarded said summons thinking, so she claimed, that it
was improperly served upon her person. It was, she added, only upon learning of the
issuance of the provisional order of visitation rights that she gathered enough courage
to come out to present her side.9

In her Answer, on the other hand, Michelle owned up sole responsibility for the decision
not to allow her husband to see their daughters. In support of her plea for the dismissal
of his petition for custody, the denial of visitation rights pendente lite, and in the
meanwhile the ex parte issuance in her favor of a temporary protection order
(TPO),10 she recounted in lurid details incidents characterizing the painful life she and
her children allegedly had to endure from her husband whom she tagged as a drug
user, sexual pervert, emotionally unstable and temperamental, among other names. In
her words, Juan Ignacios "wild, decadent, irresponsible lifestyle makes him unfit to
exercise parental authority and even enjoy visitation rights." 11

During the January 4, 2008 hearing on Michelles prayer for a TPO, Judge Macaraig-
Guillen expressed her bent to maintain her jurisdiction over SP PROC. Case No. M-
6543 and her disinclination to issue the desired TPO. In her Order of even date, she
directed that the ensuing observations she earlier made be entered into the records:

1. She is not inclined to issue a [TPO] in favor of respondent at this time because
she initially questioned the jurisdiction of this Court over her person and only
resorted to this Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Protective Order after she realized
that the Court had every intention of maintaining jurisdiction over this case x x x.
It was emphasized that the Court does not issue Protective Orders over a person
who has not bothered to appear in Court x x x. Until the respondent herself
shows up in order to recognize the jurisdiction of this Court over her and in order
 to substantiate the allegations in her Urgent Motion, there is no basis for this
Court to address the matters contained in the said Urgent Ex-Parte Motion.

2. Secondly, x x x even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner is,
as respondent described him to be, temperamental, violent, a habitual drug user
and a womanizer, these qualities cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising
visitation rights over his children because these are rights due to him inherently,
he being their biological father.12

During the same hearing, the Makati RTC granted Juan Ignacio visitation rights on one
(1) Saturday and Sunday in January 2008 considering that he was unable to see his
children on the days granted under the December 21, 2007 Order.

Subsequently, by its Order of January 21, 2008, as would later be effectively reiterated
by another Order 13 of March 7, 2008, the Makati RTC resolved to deny admission of
Michelles answer to the petition for custody and declared her in default, pertinently
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Aranetas Motion to Admit Answer

of January 2, 2008 is herein DENIED for lack of merit.

Because of respondent Aranetas failure to file her responsive pleading within the
reglementary period, x x x respondent Araneta isherein declared in DEFAULT in this
proceedings.

As a consequence of this ruling, x x x the petitioner is allowed to present evidence ex-

parte to substantiate the allegation in his Petition x x x. 14

On January 21, 2008 also, Michelle interposed a Motion to Withdraw Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Protective Order, there pointing out that no right of Juan Ignacio, if any, will
be affected if the said urgent motion is withdrawn or expunged from her answer. And
obviously to sway the Makati RTCs mind of the resulting insignificance of such
withdrawal, if approved, Michelle cited the ensuing observation thus made by the court
during the hearing on January 4, 2008:

COURT:

Well, I agree, she should really appear but whether or not she should really appear here
and substantiate her allegations for the issuance of a protective order as far as I am
concerned is irrelevant insofar as the enforcement of petitioners visitation rights are
concerned, this case is for custody, this is not a case for the issuance of protective
orders that is only a counter manifestation that she is seeking. 15
It is upon the foregoing set of events and proceedings that Michelle, on March 25, 2008,
instituted, pursuant to RA 9262, a Petition For Temporary and Permanent Protection
Order16 (Petition for Protection Order) before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 08-023.Thereat, Michelle claimed, among other things, that in the course
of their marriage, Juan Ignacio made her and their children engage in sexual acts
inimical to their emotional, physical and psychological development and well-being; that
he engaged in perverted sexual acts with friends, victimizing her and the children; that
he has consistently failed and refused to support their family; and that he has a violent
temper and was consistently harassing and threatening her to get sole custody of the
children. Michelle volunteered the information that, per her therapist, she is suffering
from Battered Womans Syndrome.17

In the verification portion of her petition for protection order, Michelle stated that "there is
x x x a pending petition for the custody of our children in the [RTC] Br. 60, Makati City, x
x x Civil Case No. M-6543."18

The following events and proceedings then transpired:

1. On March 31, 2008, the Muntinlupa RTC granted Michelles prayer for a TPO
which, at its most basic, ordered Juan Ignacio (1) to stay away at a specified
distance from Michelle and the children, inclusive of their present residence and
other places they frequent; and (2) to desist from calling or otherwise
communicating with Michelle.

(2) On April 14, 2008, Juan Ignacio filed in Civil Case No. M-6543 a "Motion to
Dismiss Petition with Prayer to Lift [TPO]"19 anchored on several grounds,
foremost of which are the following: (a) litis pendentia, Juan Ignacio noting in this
regard that the Makati RTC is competent to grant in its SP PROC. Case No. M-
6543 the very same reliefs Michelle seeks in Civil Case No. M-6543, pursuant to
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on Custody of Minors; 20 (b) in view of item (a)
above, the Makati RTC, having first assumed jurisdiction over identical subject
matters, issues and parties, does so to the exclusion of the Muntinlupa RTC; and
(c) Michelles act of filing her petition for protection order before the Muntinlupa
RTC constitutes, under the premises, forum shopping, a practice proscribed
owing to the possibility of different courts arriving at conflicting decisions. Juan
Ignacio would in fact stress that the TPO thus issued by the Muntinlupa RTC
directing him to stay at least a kilometer away from his children already conflicted
with the Makati RTC-issued provisional orders granting him visitation rights over
them.
 (3) By Order of May 12, 2008, the Muntinlupa RTC, conceding the exclusionary
effect of the assumption at the first instance by the Makati RTC of jurisdiction on
the issue of custody on Ava and Ara and the likelihood of the issuance by either
court of clashing decisions, partially granted Juan Ignacios motion to dismiss
and accordingly modified the TPO issued on March 31, 2008. As thus modified,
the protection order, or to be precise, the reliefs provided in favor of Michelle in
said TPO shall exclude from its coverage the orders issued by the Makati RTC in
the exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending custody case.

In another Order of June 30, 2008, the Muntinlupa RTC denied Juan Ignacios
Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier May 12, 2008 Order on the ground that
such a motion is a prohibited pleading. 21

(4) Meanwhile, Michelle, in connection with certain orders of the Makati RTC in
the custody case, denying her motion to admit answer and its jurisdictional issue
pronouncements, went to the CA on certiorari via a petition docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 103392.

On August 28, 2008, in CA-G.R. SP No. 103392, the CA rendered a judgment finding
partly for Michelle, as petitioner, it being the appellate courts determination that the
substituted service of summons upon her in the custody suit was defective and irregular.
Accordingly, the period within which Michelle was to file an answer, so the CA declared,
did not start to run and, hence, the denial by the Makati RTC of her motion to admit
answer in the custody case and corollarily, its holding that she is in default, by virtue of
its Orders dated January 21, 2008 and March 7, 2008, were unwarranted and ought to
be nullified. Neither of the parties appealed the foregoing Decision. The CA Decision,
thus, became final. The fallo of the said CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders of 21January 2008 and 7 March 2008 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE while the Orders of 29 February 2008 and 31 March 2008,
in so far as the denial of petitioners Motion for Inhibition is concerned, are AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.22

Partly, the CA wrote:

x x x The pivotal issue x x x is whether the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner, and if so, whether the disposition of the respondent Makati
RTC judge in declaring her in default has factual and legal basis. Admittedly, the
summons and the copy of the petition were not personally served upon the petitioner as
explicitly required under Section 5 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC x x x.

Indeed, the records would show that the summons and the petition were served upon
the petitioner x x x by substituted service as they were received by x x x a certain Nilo
Santos at said Anonas residence, an address belatedly supplied by private respondent
himself. However, x x x petitioner had actually been informed of such substituted service
sometime in the second week of December 2007 and that she had opted to simply
disregard the same since she had thought that such service is invalid x x x.

Despite the fact that she had known of the existence of the petition a quo and the fact
that the service of summons had been made upon her by substituted service, petitioner
made a decision whether it be an informed one or not, not to move for its dismissal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person x x x. It was only upon the issuance of
the Provisional Order that she had opted to participate in the proceeding by filing her
responsive pleading to the petition. Unfortunately though, the respondent Makati RTC
judge denied her motion to admit and declared her in default on the basis of its
disquisition that the failure of the petitioner to file her responsive pleading is not due to
excusable negligence or other circumstances beyond her control.

Still and all, it cannot be denied that the trial court, previous to or at the time the
petitioner had filed her responsive pleading, has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the latter. The Rule on Custody of Minors specifically requires that service of
summons be made personally on the respondent and yet the trial court served the same
upon the person of the petitioner by substituted service without proof of exhaustion of
means to personally serve the same or the impossibility thereof to warrant the
extraordinary method of substituted service.

Surely, while the Rule on Custody of Minors provides that the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily in custody proceedings, the express provision requiring personal service
and the very nature of custody cases should have caused the respondent judge x x x to
adhere to the evident intention of the rules, that is to have both parties in a custody case
participate therein.

Regrettably, the respondent judge, relying on the Officers Return x x x, precipitately

declared x x x that the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. x x x

Sadly though, respondent judge, in grave abuse of discretion, assumed jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner and proceeded to act on the petition. Worse, x x x the
respondent judge denied the motion to admit filed by the petitioner and declared the
latter in default. While the petitioner had already submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court by way of her voluntary act of filing a responsive pleading to the petition a
quo, the period to file said responsive pleading, as already stated, in so far as the
petitioner is concerned has yet to commence, and thus, the filing of her motion to admit
answer cannot plausibly be considered as to have been filed beyond the reglementary
period. In this light, the denial of said motion and the issuance of the default order are
unwarranted and are reversible errors of jurisdiction x x x. 23 (Emphasis added.)

(5) From the adverse May 12, 2008 and June 30, 2008 Orders of the Muntinlupa RTC in
Civil Case No. M-6543, Juan Ignacio also repaired to the CA on a petition for certiorari.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 105442, the petition prayed that the Muntinlupa RTC be
enjoined from further taking cognizance of Michelles protection order petition as the
said case will infringe or intrude upon the Makati RTCs disposition of the custody
case.24

Michelle opposed and sought the dismissal of the certiorari petition on the ground that it
is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 22(j) of RA 9262.

Eventually, the CA issued, on May 11, 2009, the assailed Decision which, on one hand,
found Michelle guilty of forum shopping, a sufficient cause for summary dismissal of a
case, but viewed, on the other, Juan Ignacios petition for certiorari as a prohibited
pleading which, ordinarily, would then render it dismissible. In the veritable clash under
the premises of the effects of forum shopping and the rule on prohibited pleading, the
CA nonetheless ruled for Juan Ignacio, as petitioner, pertinently disposing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. Civil Case No. 08-023 is
ORDERED DISMISSED and all issuances made by RTC, Branch 207, Muntinlupa City,
are declared void. The RTC Branch 60, Makati City is DIRECTED to proceed with the
case with dispatch.25

The CA extricated itself from the foregoing legal bind on the basis of the following
ratiocination and the plausible suppositions interjected thereat:

In resolving the present petition, the Court had to consider two (2) things. First, pursuant
to Section 22 (j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, a petition for certiorari against any
interlocutory order issued by a family court is a prohibited pleading. Accordingly, if this
Court were to strictly follow [said] Section 22 (j) x x x, then the present petition for
certiorari must be dismissed. Second, the Private Respondent had first moved that the
Makati RTC issue a TPO and that when her motion was denied, she filed a petition
before the Muntinlupa RTC asking that the said court issue a TPO. In short, the Private
Respondent committed forum-shopping. And when forum-shopping is committed, the
case(s) must be dismissed with prejudice.

Thus, it falls upon this Court to balance the conflict.

This Court notes that the Muntinlupa RTC tried to balance out the conflicting
jurisdictional issues with the Makati RTC by stating in its first assailed Order that the
reliefs provided in favor of herein private respondent in the TPO x x x are modified, to
exclude from its coverage those Orders issued by the Makati Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction on the pending custody case. Be that as it may, the Muntinlupa RTC itself
recognized the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC and that the case before it would, in fact,
impinge upon the jurisdiction of the latter court when it stated that the disposition on the
matter by this Court may result in the possibility of conflicting decisions/orders. In short,
the Muntinlupa RTC itself acknowledges the fact that any future issuances, including its
eventual decision on the petition before it, would affect the custody case pending before
the Makati RTC and might even result to conflicting decisions.

Thus, in the interest of judicial stability, it is incumbent upon this Court to ensure that
this eventuality will not come to pass.

xxxx

To test the argument that a petition for certiorari is an absolutely prohibited pleading, let
us push the present case to its logical extreme.

What if a woman claiming to be a battered wife leaves one of her children with her
parents and another with a sibling of hers? She then went to another place, transferred
residency, and filed a petition for TPO. Her parents and sibling, who reside in another
locality, likewise files a petition for TPO in behalf of the grandchild and nephew/niece
entrusted]in their custody. x x x What if the family courts refuse consolidation? Is the
man devoid of any remedy and would have to spend his time shuttling between three
(3) localities since a petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading?

What if the woman went to another locality purposely in order to find a friendly venue x x
x? Again, if we are to strictly construe Section22 (j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC that man
would just have to bear the consequences since he cannot seek the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Or, what if both of the spouses do not reside within the courts jurisdiction,
but the judge refuses to grant a motion to dismiss due to his zeal? What remedy would
a man have since he cannot resort to a petition for certiorari?
The rules are not sacrosanct. If they go in the way of the smooth and orderly
administration of justice, then magistrates should apply their best judgment. If not,
courts would be so hideously bound or captives to the stern and literal provisions of the
law that they themselves would, wittingly or otherwise, become administrators of
injustice.

On the one hand, this Court hereby notes that Private Respondent herself recognizes
the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC to issue a TPO. It was only after the Makati RTC
denied her prayer for a TPO when she filed a petition before the Muntinlupa RTC asking
for the issuance of a TPO. It is thus highly disturbing that the Private Respondent
sought another forum in order to try to obtain a favorable judgment. Thus, as aptly
pointed out by the Petitioner, some sort of forum-shopping was committed.

On the other hand, if the Court were to dismiss the present petition on the ground that a
petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading, it would have to close its eyes to the fact
that the Private Respondent willfully committed forum-shopping. To dismiss the present
petition would, in effect, "reward" her for this negative act. This, the Court cannot
countenance.

xxxx

Accordingly, x x x Civil Case No. 08-023 must not be allowed to proceed any further.
Imperatively, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC remains unshackled, all of
the issuances of the Muntinlupa RTC should, by all means, be nullified. 26 (Emphasis
added.)

The CA denied Michelles motion for reconsideration per its equally assailed Resolution
of December 28, 2009.

Aggrieved, Michelle, for herself and for her minor daughters, filed the instant recourse,
her submissions revolving on the twin issues of forum shopping and the prohibition
under Sec. 22 of the Rule on Violence Against Women and Children 27 against the filing
of petitions for certiorari to defeat TPOs issued to promote the protection of victims of
violence against women and their children.

Michelle presently argues that the assailed Decision of the CA is based on an erroneous
appreciation of the facts of the case. To her, there was no forum shopping when she
filed her Petition for Protection Order in the Muntinlupa RTC while the custody case was
pending in the Makati RTC. Her stated reason: the absence in both cases of identity of
parties and rights asserted, on top of which the reliefs sought and prayed for are
different and not founded on the same set of facts.
To downplay the application of the litis pendentia principle, she argues that it was
impossible for her to apply for and secure a protective order under RA 9262 in the
custody case before the Makati RTC being, first, a respondent, not a petitioner in the
Makati case; and second, the venue for an application for protection order is, under RA
9262, the place where the woman or the offended party resides, which in her case is
Muntinlupa.28

Michelle would invite attention to her having withdrawn her motion for protective order in
the custody case before the Makati RTC before she filed her Petition for Protective
Order with the Muntinlupa RTC. Additionally, she points to the CAs Decision of August
28, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 103392 (2008 CA Decision), which held that the Makati
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her so that all issuances of the Makati RTC were
void. All these, Michelle claims, argue against the existence of litis pendentia.

The Issue

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioner, in filing her Petition for
Protection Order before the Muntinlupa RTC, violated the rule on forum shopping, given
the pendency of the respondents Petition for Custody before the Makati RTC and
considering incidentally that she filed said petition for protection order after the Makati
RTC had denied her application for protection order in the custody case.

The Courts Ruling

Before anything else, however, the Court wishes to point out disturbing developments in
this proceeding which ought not to be swept under the rug on the simplistic pretext that
they may not be determinative of the outcome of this case. But first, some basic
premises on record.

First, as correctly stated in this petition, Michelle withdrew her Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Protective Order in the custody case prior to her filing of her Petition for
Protection Order with the Muntinlupa RTC. It should be made clear, however, that she
filed said motion to withdraw on January 21, 2008, or after the Makati RTC, in its Order
dated January 4,2008, had, for all intents and purposes, denied the said ex parte
motion. To recapitulate, the Makati RTC judge made it of record that she was not
inclined to issue a protective order in favor of a person, i.e., petitioner Michelle, who has
not bothered to appear in court, even assuming, she adds, that the person against
whom the protection order is directed, i.e., Juan Ignacio, is prone to violence, a drug
user and a womanizer.
Second, there is absolutely nothing in the 2008 CA Decision declaring that all issuances
of the Makati RTC were void. In order to bolster her position that the rule against forum
shopping was not breached in this case, Michelle matter-of-factly alleged in this
recourse that since in the 2008 CA Decision it was ruled that the Makati RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person due to the irregularity in the service of summons,
then "all the issuances or orders of the Makati RTC in the custody case were
void;"29 and "therefore, there was no litis pendentia to begin with since the RTC of
Makati City Branch 60 had no jurisdiction from the start." 30

For perspective, the 2008 CA Decision did not rule that the Makati RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over Michelle. Quite the contrary. As a matter of record, the CA in that
disposition found and thus declared Michelle to have voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the Makati RTC when she filed her Answer in SP. PROC. Case No. 6543
on January 2, 2008.But to be precise about things, the CA in that 2008 Decision found,
as having been tainted with of grave abuse of discretion, only that part of the Makati
RTCs disposition denying Michelles motion to admit answer for belated filing and the
consequent default order. Along this line, the CA merely nullified the Makati RTCs
Orders dated January 21, 2008 and March 7, 2008 which declared Michelle in default
and denied her motion for reconsideration, respectively. The ensuing excerpts of the
2008 CA Decision speak for themselves:

Sadly though, respondent judge, in grave abuse of discretion, assumed jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner and proceeded to act on the petition. Worse, without due
regard to the plain intention of the rule in ensuring the adjudication of the controversy
surrounding a custody case based on its merits, the respondent judge denied the
motion to admit filed by the petitioner and declared the latter in default. While the
petitioner had already submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by way of her
voluntary act of filing a responsive pleading to the petition a quo, the period to file said
responsive pleading, as already stated, in so far as the petitioner is concerned has yet
to commence, and thus, the filing of her motion to admit answer cannot plausibly be
considered as to have been filed beyond the reglementary period. In this light, the
denial of said motion and the issuance of the default order are unwarranted and are
reversible errors of jurisdiction, therefore correctible by a writ of certiorari. (Emphasis
supplied.)

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders of 21January 2008 and 7 March 2008 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE while the Orders of 29 February 2008 and 31 March 2008,
in so far as the denial of petitioners Motion for Inhibition is concerned, are AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.31

Withal, the Court finds it downright offensive and utterly distasteful that petitioner raised
the following as one of the issues in this appellate proceeding:

Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping when the Petition for
Custody of private respondent Araneta was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the RTC of Makati City Branch60 did not acquire jurisdiction because the
summons was not served personally upon herein Petitioner Michelle Lana Brown
Araneta.32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners above posture smacks of bad faith, taken doubtless to deceive and mislead
the Court. Indeed, nothing in either the body or the fallo of the 2008 CA Decision would
yield the conclusion that the petition for custody is being dismissed, as petitioner
unabashedly would have the Court believe.

Was there forum shopping? Did petitioner forum shop?

A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an

adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum
through means other than appeal or certiorari by raising identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, forum shopping is the institution of
two or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
come out with a favorable disposition.33 An indicium of the presence of, or the test for
determining whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other case.34

Litis pendentia,35 as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes vexatious and unnecessary.36 For the bar
of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring requisites must be present: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to
res judicata in the other.37
Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping (1) whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another; or (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court,
a party files another before the CA since in such case said party deliberately splits
appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is
dismissed, another case(offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (3) where a
party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain it
from the original court.38

The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their
luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these
rules results in the dismissal of the case.39

Considering the above doctrinal pronouncements on forum shopping, We find all the
badges of this deplorable, docket-clogging practice present in this case.

As a result or in anticipation of an adverse ruling of the Makati RTC,

petitioner sought the favorable opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC

As discussed above, the presiding judge of the Makati RTC, in the custody case, made
of record that she was not inclined to issue a protection order in favor of Michelle
because she did not bother to appear in Court and that the allegations against Juan
Ignacio cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising visitation rights over his children.
After this adverse ruling, Michelle sought the favorable opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC
by filing an independent Petition for Protection Order.

The cases have identical parties

Clearly, the Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same
parties who represent the same interests. The fact that Avaand Ara, who are parties in
the Petition for Protection Order, are not impleaded in the Petition for Custody is of no
moment because they are precisely the very subjects of the Petition for Custody and
their respective rights are represented by their mother, Michelle. In a long line of cases
on forum shopping, the Court has held that absolute identity of the parties is not
required, it being enough that there is substantial identity of the parties 40 or at least such
parties represent the same interests in both actions. It does not matter, as here, that in
the Petition for Custody, Juan Ignacio is the petitioner and Michelle is the respondent
while in the Petition for Protection Order, their roles are reversed. That a party is the
petitioner in one case and at the same time, the respondent in the other case does not,
without more, remove the said cases from the ambit of the rules on forum shopping. So
did the Court hold, for example in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,
that forum shopping exists even in cases like this where petitioners or plaintiffs in one
case were impleaded as respondents or defendants in another.41 Moreover, this Court
has constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the
plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not
negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is
dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.42

The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based on the same facts

Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 08-023 are
practically based on the same facts and are so intertwined with that in SP. PROC. Case
No. 6543, such that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which
party is successful, will amount to res judicata.

In the custody case, Juan Ignacio mainly asserted his right, as father, to visit his
children and enjoy joint custody over them. He prayed for a judgment granting him joint
custody, or alternatively, permanent visitation rights over Ava and Ara.

In disposing of the custody case, the Makati RTC is expected, following the rationale
behind the issuance of the Rule on Custody of Minors, to consider, among others, the
best interest of the children,43 any threat or danger of physical, mental, sexual or
emotional violence which endangers their safety and best interest, their health, safety
and welfare,44 any history of child or spousal abuse by the person seeking
custody,45 habitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substances, 46 marital
misconduct,47 and the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and
educational environment for the holistic development and growth of the minor.48

Michelles answer and motion for issuance of protection order in the custody case
contained allegations of psychological, sexual, emotional and economic abuse she and
her children suffered at the hands of Juan Ignacio to defeat his asserted right to have
joint custody over Ava and Ara and as argument that the grant of visitation rights in his
favor will not be in the best interest of the children. These allegations of abuse were in
substance the very same ones she made in her Petition for Protection Order.

Juan Ignacios rights and reliefs prayed for are dependent on and, to be sure, would be
predicated on the question of whether or not granting him the desired custody or at least
visitations rights over the children are in their best interest. In deciding this issue, the
Makati RTC will definitely have to reckon with and make a finding on Michelles
allegations of psychological, sexual, emotional and economic abuse.

Similarly, the Muntinlupa RTC must necessarily consider and make a determination
based on the very same facts and allegations on whether or not Michelle shall be
entitled to the relief she prayed for in her own petition, in particular, a permanent
protection order against Juan Ignacio.

Elements of litis pendentia are present and any judgment

in the pending cases would amount to res judicata

Any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata. Consider: If the Makati RTC were to grant Juan Ignacios
petition for custody, this would necessarily mean that it would be in the best interest of
the children if he were allowed to visit and spend time with them and that granting Juan
Ignacio visitation rights would not pose any danger or threat to the children.

On the other hand, a grant by the Muntinlupa RTC of Michelles prayer for a permanent
protection order would presuppose at the minimum that it would be to the childrens best
interest if Juan Ignacio is directed to keep away from them, necessary implying that he
is unfit even to visit Araand Ava. Conversely, if Juan Ignacios Petition for Custody were
denied, then it would mean that the Makati RTC gave weight and credence to Michelles
allegations of abuse and found them to be in the best interest of the children to bar Juan
Ignacio from visiting them. Thus, the Muntinlupa RTC should have no ground to deny
Michelles Petition for Protection Order pending before it.

The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against

forum shopping is present in this case

The grave mischief sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping, i.e., the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions, is
well-nigh palpable in this case. If the Muntinlupa RTC were to rule that Michelle was
entitled to a Protection Order, this would necessarily conflict with any order or decision
from the Makati RTC granting Juan Ignacio visitation rights over Ava and Ara. As aptly
pointed out by Juan Ignacio in his Comment such a conflict had already occurred, as
the TPO issued by the Muntinlupa RTC actually conflicted with the Orders issued by the
Makati RTC granting Juan Ignacio temporary visitation rights over his children. There
now exists an Order from the Muntinlupa RTC which, among others, directed Juan
Ignacio to stay at least one (1) kilometer away from Ava and Ara, even as the Makati
RTC recognized, in two (2) separate Orders, that he had the right, albeit temporarily to
see his children.49
In fact, Michelle was very much aware of the possible conflicts between the orders of
Makati RTC and Muntinlupa RTC. In her Opposition (to Urgent Motion for Immediate
Enforcement of Visitation Orders dated December 21, 2007 and January 4, 2008), she
recognized that the granting of visitation rights in favor of Juan Ignacio would conflict the
TPO and, therefore, the Makati Court would be rendering a conflicting decision with that
of the Muntinlupa RTC, viz:

x x x There is therefore, no conflict of jurisdiction in this case but since the petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which includes the issue of custody,
we submit that the matter of custody pendente lite including visitation, should not and
can not be resolved by this Honorable Court without conflicting with the Temporary
Protection Order of a co-equal court, the RTC of Muntinlupa City. x x xx

xxx

If the petitioner is granted visitation rights, the Honorable Court, with due respect would
be allowing him to violate the TPO against him; the Honorable Court would then be
rendering a conflicting decision.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

No less than the Muntinlupa RTC itself recognized the resulting aberration of its orders
conflicting with that/those of the Makati RTC. As it were, the former, in its Order of May
12, 2008, resolving Juan Ignacios Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Lift Temporary
Protection Order, categorically stated that there may be orders in the protection order
case that would possibly conflict with the orders issued by the Makati RTC in the
custody case. So it was that to address these possible conflicts, the Muntinlupa RTC
partially granted Juan Ignacios Motion to Dismiss by modifying the reliefs provided
under the TPO by excluding from its coverage those orders issued by the Makati RTC in
the exercise of its jurisdiction over the custody case. Pursuant to the foregoing Order of
the Muntinlupa RTC, the December 21, 2007 and January 4, 2008 Orders of the Makati
RTC, granting Juan Ignacio visitation rights on Christmas Day and New Years Day and
one (1) Saturday and Sunday in January 2008, are not covered by the reliefs under the
TPO. Hence, despite the TPO directing Juan Ignacio to stay at least one (1) kilometer
away from Ava and Ara, Juan Ignacio would still have the right to see his children by
virtue of the orders issued by the Makati RTC granting him temporary visitation rights.
The said Muntinlupa RTC Order reads:

Based on the pleadings filed, this (Muntinlupa) Court holds that since the Makati Court
first acquired jurisdiction over the issue of custody, the latter continues to exercise it, so
that any disposition on the matter by this Court may result in the possibility of conflicting
decisions/orders.
Wherefore, this Court partially grants respondents Motion to Dismiss insofar as those
matters covered by A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors are concerned, which are within the
jurisdiction of the Makati Court, but continues to take cognizance on matters not
included therein (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC) but within the protective mantle of R.A. No.
9262.

Consequently, the reliefs provided in favor of the petitioner in the Temporary Protection
Order dated March 31, 2008 are modified, to exclude from its coverage those Orders
issued by the Makati Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending custody
case.

The motions to lift the temporary protection order (except on those matter stated above)
and to cite petitioner in contempt of court are denied for lack of merit. 51 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Verily, the Muntinlupa RTC was aware that its issuances and its eventual final
disposition on the Petition for Protection Order would affect the custody case before the
Makati RTC, if not totally clash with the latter courts decision. We agree with the CAs
ensuing observation:

This Court notes that the Muntinlupa RTC tried to balance out the conflicting
jurisdictional issues with the Makati RTC by stating in its first assailed Order that the
reliefs provided in favor of herein private respondent in the TPO dated March 31, 2008
are modified, to exclude from its coverage those Orders issued by the Makati Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending custody case. Be that as it may, the
Muntinlupa RTC itself recognized the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC and that the case
before it would, in fact, impinge upon the jurisdiction of the latter court when it stated
that the disposition on the matter by this Court may result in the possibility of conflicting
decisions/orders. In short, the Muntinlupa RTC itself acknowledges the fact that
any future issuances, including its eventual decision on the petition before it, would
affect the custody case pending before the Makati RTC and might even result to
conflicting decisions. Thus, in the interest of judicial stability, it is incumbent upon this
Court to ensure that this eventuality will not come to pass. 52

Civil Case No. 08-023 should, thus, be dismissed with prejudice for being a clear case
of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed May 11, 2009Decision and the
December 28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. SP. No. 105442,
particularly insofar as these ordered the dismissal or subject Civil Case No. 08-023 and
the nullification of the orders made in that case, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.