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Deborah K.W.

Modrak

phantasia, for instance, as when one sees a small golden disk in the sky but thinks that the sun
is larger than the earth (428b24). Phantasia has one foot in each camp; it is in some respects
like perception and in others like intellection and so Aristotle briey considers making it a
function of the two combined, but this option is quickly ruled out as well.

It is clear, therefore, that phantasia will be neither belief together with perception,
nor belief through perception, nor a blend of belief and perception.
(428a2426)

Having ruled out a quick and unqualied identication of phantasia with perception or
thought or the two combined, Aristotle sets out to build an account of phantasia which is
sensitive to the common features shared by both types of cognitive faculties. Phantasia has an
important role to play in the explanation of both the similarities of perceptual and intellectual
cognition and their dierences. First, however, the distinctive characteristics of phantasia must
be determined. One such feature is phantasias vulnerability to error, unlike perception;
another is phantasias widespread occurrence, nearly all animals possess it, unlike intellection;
yet another is its dependence upon perception for its origin and its objects.

Since phantasia is thought to be a kind of movement this movement cannot exist


apart from perception or in things, which do not perceive and in respect of it, it is
possible for its possessor to do and be aected by many things, and it may be both
true and false.
(428b1117)

Phantasia is described as a movement because it is an active awareness of certain objects.


These objects are the same as those realized in acts of perceptual awareness, namely colors as
seen, sounds as heard, etc. Phantasia plays a central role in our cognitive life, both as active
awareness and as a source of retained sensory information. All these features, taken together,
support the identication of phantasia with a kind of sensory experience that is distinguishable
from perception. Aristotles grounds for distinguishing between them are several.
For Aristotle, cognitive activities just are the realization of cognitive objects in acts of
awareness. The objects of phantasia are the same as the objects of perception; the only dif
ference is the requirement that the objects of perception must be actualizations of perceptible
qualities (colors, sounds, etc.) of external objects, which are the immediate causes of the
perceptual experience. Phantasia is dierent; it may, but need not, occur in the absence of an
external sensory stimulus. It cannot occur in cognizers lacking sensory capacities or in the
absence of past or concurrent sensory experience. Because its objects are sensory objects,
phantasia is able to bridge the divide between perception and thought. Perception proper is
constrained, not only by the requirement that its immediate cause be present in the external
environment, but also by the requirement of verisimilitude. Perception of proper objects
(sensible qualities such as color or sound) is always correct (427b12); and while other types of
perception admit error, for the most part perception provides accurate information about
perceptible, external objects. Because its connection with the external world is more atten
uated, phantasia is much more liable to error. In short, the picture of phantasia that emerges
from a careful reading of De Anima III.3 is one of a very versatile cognitive capacity; phantasia
is a distinct way of apprehending sensory objects and phantasia may represent its intentional
objects accurately or not, because unlike perception it is not constrained by a requirement of
verisimilitude. To summarize the conception of phantasia that underlies Aristotles ndings in

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