LABREL | CASE DIGEST | ART 285
CASE TITLE: ELSA S. MALIG-ON vs. EQUITABLE GENERAL
SERVICES, INC.
KEYWORDS: constructive dismissal
DOCTRINE: The rule in termination cases is that the employer
bears the burden of proving that he dismissed his employee for a just
cause. And, when the employer claims that the employee resigned
from work, the burden is on the employer to prove that he did so
willingly. Whether that is the case would largely depend on the
circumstances surrounding such alleged resignation. Those
circumstances must be consistent with the employees intent to give
up work.
FACTS: Petitioner Elsa Malig-on (Malig-on) claimed that on March 4,
1996 respondent Equitable General Services, Inc. (the company)
hired her as janitress in its janitorial services. The company paid her
P250.00 per day for a nine-hour work. After six years or on February
15, 2002 Malig-ons immediate supervisor told her that the company
would be assigning her to another client. But it never did despite
several follow-ups that she made. Eight months later or on October
15, 2002 the company told Malig-on that she had to file a resignation
letter before it would reassign her. She complied but the company
reneged on its undertaking, prompting Malig-on to file a complaint
against it for illegal dismissal.
The company denied Malig-ons allegations. It claimed that she just
stopped reporting for work on February 16, 2002 without giving any
reason. Consequently, the company wrote her two letters, first on
August 23, 2002 and again on September 2, 2002, asking her to
explain her continued absence. On October 15, 2002 Malig-on
showed up at the companys office and submitted her resignation
letter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner Malig-
on abandoned her work and eventually resigned from it rather than
that respondent company constructively dismissed her.
HELD: YES, Malig-on did not abandon but rather was constructively
dismissed by the employer.
According to the company, Malig-on simply dropped out of sight one
day on February 16, 2002 for no reason at all. Eight months later or
on October 15, 2002 she appeared at the companys office and
tendered her resignation. To the companys surprise, three days later
or on October 18, 2002 she went to the NLRC office and filed her
complaint against the company for illegal dismissal. Clearly, however,
these circumstances do not sound consistent with resignation freely
made.
First, when Malig-on reportedly dropped out of sight and the company
had no idea about the reason for it, the natural and right thing for it to
do was investigate why she had suddenly vanished. Indeed, the
company needed to write Malig-on immediately and ask her to
explain in writing why she should not be considered to have
abandoned her job so the company may be cleared of its
responsibility as employer. This did not happen here.
Second, if Malig-on had abandoned her work and had no further
interest in it, there was no reason for her to suddenly show up at her
former place of work after eight months and file her resignation letter.
Her action would make sense only if, as she claimed, she had been
on floating status for over six months and the company promised to
give her a new assignment if she would go through the process of
resigning and reapplying.
And, third, that Malig-on went to the NLRC to file a complaint for
unjust dismissal just three days after she filed her alleged resignation
letter is inconsistent with genuine resignation. It would make sense
only if, as Malig-on claims, the company tricked her into filing for
resignation upon a promise to give her a new work assignment and
failed to deliver such promise.
The company evidently placed Malig-on on floating status after being
relieved as janitress in a clients workplace. But, as the Court has
repeatedly ruled, such act of off-detailing Malig-on was not the
equivalent of dismissal so long as her floating status did not continue
beyond a reasonable time. But, when it ran up to more than six
months, the company may be considered to have constructively
dismissed her from work, that is, as of August 16, 2002. Thus, her
purported resignation on October 15, 2002 could not have been
legally possible.
The company of course claims that it gave Malig-on notices on
August 23, 2002 and September 2, 2002, asking her to explain her
failure to report for work and informing her that the company would
treat such failure as lack of interest in it, respectively. But these
notices cannot possibly take the place of the notices required by law.
They came more than six months after the company placed her on
floating status and, consequently, the company gave her those
notices after it had constructively dismissed her from work.
CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE VS TORRES
G.R. No. 189456 April 2, 2014
PEREZ, J.:
KEYWORD: Constructive Dismissal, Teacher in Chiang Kai Shek,
Resignation
DOCTRINE: There is constructive dismissal when there is cessation
of work, because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in
disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it
were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any
choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
FACTS:
Respondent Rosalinda Torres is a grade school teacher in
Chiang Kai Shek College. She was accused of leaking a copy of a
special quiz given to Grade 5 students of HEKASI. Petitioners
learned about the leakage from one of the teachers of HEKASI,
Aileen Benabese (Ms. Benabese). Ms. Benabese narrated that after
giving a special quiz, she borrowed the book of one of her students,
Aileen Anduyan (Aileen), for the purpose of making an answer key.
When she opened Aileens book, a piece of paper fell. Said paper
turned out to be a copy of the same quiz she had just given and the
same already contained answers. Ms. Benabese informed the
schools Assistant Supervisor about the incident. Mrs. Koo who is
also in charge of HEKASI AREA confronted respondent, who had
initially denied leaking the test paper but later on admitted that she
gave the test paper to Mrs. Teresita Anduyan, her co-teacher and the
mother of Aileen.
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Respondent explained that she was busy checking the
writing workbook when Mrs. Anduyan borrowed her special quiz for
HEKASI 5. Thereafter, when she left the Faculty Room for her class,
she was not aware that Mrs. Anduyan did not return the copy of the
special quiz back to her. Neither did she hand over a copy of the test
questions with the answers already indicated therein. Also, she
expressed her concern that Mrs. Anduyan could have taken a copy of
the test paper without her permission and without her knowledge.
Mrs. Anduyan denied that she asked for the special quiz
from respondent and that the latter forgot about the paper that she
allegedly took. She averred that the respondent willingly handed
over her the quiz so that she could see the copy of it.
Administrative Hearing: the Investigating Committee found
respondent and Mrs. Anduyan guilty of committing a grave offense of
the school policies by leaking a special quiz. The Committee had
actually decided to terminate respondent but respondent pleaded for
a change of punishment from termination to suspension of one month
without pay and forfeiture of all the benefits.
Respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal
and illegal suspension with the Labor Arbiter. She also sought
payment of unpaid salary, backwages, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits,
damages and attorneys fees.
Petitioners Contention: As per respondents letter, she offered to
voluntarily resign at the end of the school year, provided that her
punishment be changed from termination to suspension. Petitioners
claim that respondent, who was faced with immediate termination of
her employment, bargained for a better exit. Petitioners deny forcing,
coercing or pressuring respondent into writing said letter.
Respondents Contention: She averred that petitioner forced her to
write the written request for a change of the action on the charges
against her, from dismissal to suspension and eventual resignation.
Respondent reiterates that she never intended to resign but due to
intense pressure from individual petitioner who threatened that she
will not receive her monetary benefits, she was pressured to write the
alleged resignation letter.
Labor Arbiter: Dismissed respondents complaint. The Labor Arbiter
held that there was no constructive dismissal because respondent
was not coerced nor pressured to write her resignation letter.
NLRC: Affirmed the Labor Arbiters findings but ordering petitioners
to pay respondent separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service on the grounds of equity and social
justice.
Court of Appeals: Reversed the NLRC Decision and Resolution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner did not voluntarily resign
but was constructively dismissed. The appellate court cited
respondents years in service; her consistent denials of the
accusations against her; her alleged resignation letter which did not
contain any reason for her resignation; and the unsigned
memorandum of termination which militate against the voluntariness
of resignation. The appellate court also foreclosed any interpretation
that respondent was validly dismissed for a just cause because
respondent was already meted the penalty of suspension without pay
and forfeiture of her bonuses. The appellate court found it unjust to
penalize respondent twice for the same offense.
ISSUE: whether or not the schools act of imposing the penalty of
suspension instead of immediate dismissal from service in exchange
for the employees resignation at the end of the school year,
constitutes constructive dismissal
HELD : NO.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in
a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed for the favor of employment, and opts to leave rather than
stay employed. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an
office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by
the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with
the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and
after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.
Given the indications of voluntary resignation, the Court
ruled that there is no constructive dismissal in this case. There is
constructive dismissal when there is cessation of work, because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in
pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,
constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any
choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
There was here no discrimination committed by
petitioners. While respondent did not tender her resignation
wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making did not give her
any other option. With due process, she was found to have
committed the grave offense of leaking test questions. Dismissal from
employment was the justified equivalent penalty. Having realized that,
she asked for, and was granted, not just a deferred imposition of, but
also an acceptable cover for the penalty.
The fact that she waited until the close of the school year
to challenge her impending resignation demonstrate that respondent
had bargained for a graceful exit and is now trying to renege on her
obligation. Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio accordingly noted that
petitioners should not be punished for being compassionate and
granting respondent's request for a lower penalty. Put differently,
respondent should not be rewarded for reneging on her promise to
resign at the end of the school year. Otherwise, employers placed in
similar situations would no longer extend compassion to employees.
Compromise agreements, like that in the instant case, which lean
towards desired liberality that favor labor, would be discouraged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED
VICTORINO OPINALDO, Petitioner, v. NARCISA RAVINA,
Respondent.
Facts :
Respondent Narcisa Ravina (Ravina) is the general manager and
sole proprietor of St. Louisse Security Agency (the Agency). Petitioner
Victorino Opinaldo (Opinaldo) is a security guard who had worked for
the Agency until his alleged illegal dismissal by respondent.The
Agency hired the services of petitioner assigned him to PAIJR
Furniture Accessories (PAIJR) in Mandaue City.however, the owner of
PAIJR submitted a written complaint to respondent stating request to
relieve one of company guard and SG. VICTORINO B. OPINALDO
For the reason that He is no longer physically fit to perform his duties
and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health
condition.Acceding to PAIJRs request, respondent relieved petitioner
from his work. Respondent also required petitioner to submit a
medical certificate to prove that he is physically and mentally fit for
work as security guard.respondent reassigned petitioner to Gomez
Construction at Mandaue City after working for a period of two weeks
for Gomez Construction and upon receipt of his salary for services
rendered within the said two-week period, petitioner ceased to report
for work.The records show that petitioners post at Gomez
Construction was the last assignment given to him by
respondent.petitioner filed a complaint against respondent with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office in
Cebu City for underpayment of salary and nonpayment of other labor
standard benefits. The parties agreed to settle and reached a
compromise agreement. After almost four weeks from the settlement
of the case, petitioner returned to respondents office . Petitioner
claims that when he asked respondent to sign an SSS11 Sickness
Notification which he was going to use in order to avail of the
discounted fees for a medical check- up, respondent allegedly
refused and informed him that he was no longer an employee of the
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Agency. Respondent allegedly told him that when he signed the
quitclaim and release form at the DOLE Regional Office, she already
considered him to have quit his employment.
Respondent, on the other hand, counterclaims that she did not
illegally dismiss petitioner and that it was a valid exercise of
management prerogative that he was not given any assignment
pending the submission of the required medical certificate of his
fitness to work.
LA ruled that it was illegal dismissal
NLRC affirmed
CA reversed and uphold that the act of employer is valid excercise of
management prerogatives.
Issue: whether or not the dismissal is valid.
Held:
We disagree, Jurisprudence is replete with cases recognizing the
right of the employer to have free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion
to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to
instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including
dismissal, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative
where the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to
achieve its purpose takes form. However, the exercise of
management prerogative is not unlimited. Managerial prerogatives
are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining
agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. Hence, in
the exercise of its management prerogative, an employer must
ensure that the policies, rules and regulations on work-related
activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and
the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the
offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the words of
petitioner, he had been on a floating status42 for three months.
Within this period, petitioner did not have any work assignment from
respondent who proffers the excuse that he has not submitted the
required medical certificate. While it is a management prerogative to
require petitioner to submit a medical certificate, we hold that
respondent cannot withhold petitioners employment without
observing the principles of due process and fair play. Abandonment is
the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must
concur: (1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must
have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and, (2) there
must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever
the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act.
None of these elements is present in the case at bar.
5. SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. and SKIPPERS MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., LTD. v. NATHANIEL DOZA, NAPOLEON DE
GRACIA, ISIDRO L. LATA, and CHARLIE APROSTA
G.R. No. 175558 February 8, 2012
Carpio, J.
Case Doctrine: Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination
by the employee of the employment contract by serving written
notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. Given that
provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of
resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to
presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.
Termination by employee ; No written notice ; Seafarers furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning
FACTS: Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers,
De Gracia, Lata, and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV
Wisdom Star. De Gracia, et al. claimed that Skippers failed to remit
their respective allotments for almost five months, compelling them to
air their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Free Union.
Subsequently, De Gracia, et al. were unceremoniously
discharged from MV Wisdom Stars and immediately repatriated.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, De Gracia, et al. filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners contentions: One day, De Gracia, et al. arrived in the
masters cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they
were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened that they
may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding
payments due to them. This is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship
MV Wisdom to Skippers, which however bears conflicting dates.
Skippers also admitted non-payment of home allotment
for one month but prayed for the offsetting of such amount with the
repatriation expenses stating that since De Gracia, et al. pre-
terminated their contracts, they are liable for their repatriation
expenses in accordance with Section 19(G) of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 55,
series of 1996 which states that A seaman who requests for early
termination of his contract shall be liable for his repatriation cost as
well as the transportation cost of his replacement.x x x
LA: The Labor Arbiter dismissed De Gracia, et al.s complaint for
illegal dismissal because the seafarers voluntarily pre-terminated
their employment contracts by demanding for immediate repatriation
due to dissatisfaction with the ship. The Labor Arbiter held that such
voluntary pre-termination of employment contract is akin to
resignation, a form of termination by employee of his employment
contract under Article 285 of the Labor Code.
NLRC: Affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision.
CA: The CA declared the Labor Arbiter and NLRC to have committed
grave abuse of discretion when they relied upon the telex message of
the captain of the vessel stating that De Gracia, et al. voluntarily pre-
terminated their contracts and demanded immediate repatriation. The
telex message was a self-serving document that does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial evidence. For this reason, the repatriation
of De Gracia, et al. prior to the expiration of their contracts showed
they were illegally dismissed from employment.
ISSUE: Was there a pre-termination by the respondents-workers, De
Gracia, et. al, of their own employment contract?
RULING: NO, there was no termination of employment contract by
the respondents-workers. Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes
termination by the employee of the employment contract by serving
written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance.
Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a
written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it
is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.
In the present case, there was no written notice served by
De Gracia, et. al on Skippers to evidence their alleged resignation.
The telex message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore
conflicting dates giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the
document.
Consequently, For a workers dismissal to be considered
valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due
process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes
procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal
constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the
twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish
the employee with two written notices before the termination of
employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the
second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by
giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that
an actual hearing be conducted.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that
dismissal by the employer be made under a just or authorized cause
under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De
Gracia, et al. regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship
agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al. were repatriated because the
latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given
credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that
there was pre-termination of the employment contract akin to
resignation and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by
the CA, the telex message is a biased and self-serving document
that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. If,
indeed, De Gracia, et al. voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts,
then De Gracia, et al. should have submitted their written
resignations.
For these reasons, the dismissal of De Gracia, et al. was
illegal.
SHS PERFORATED MATERIALS VERSUS DIAZ
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Mendoza, J.
Constructive dismissal, probationary employee
DOCTRINE:
Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the right of all
workers to security of tenure. In using the expression all workers,
the Constitution puts no distinction between a probationary and a
permanent or regular employee. This means that probationary
employees cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to
qualify as regular employees
FACTS:
SHS Perforated Materials, Inc., is a start-up corporation registered
with PEZA. Petitioner Winfred Harmannshenn, a German national, is
its president, in which capacity he determines the administration and
direction of the day-to-day operations of SHS. Hinrich Johann
Schumacher, treasurer and one of the board of directors, is duly
authorized to pay bills, payrolls, and other just debts. He is also the
EVP of the European Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Both
entities have an arrangement where ECCP handles the payroll
requirements of SHS to simplify business operations and minimize
operational expenses.
Manuel Diaz was hired by SHS as Manager for Business
Development on probationary status. He was also instructed by
Hartmannshenn to report to SHS office and plant at least 2 days
every work week to observe technical processes in the manufacturing
of perforated materials. Hartmannshenn expressed dissatisfaction
over his poor performance as he failed to make any concrete
business proposal or implement specific measures to improve the
productivity. In numerous emails, Diaz acknowledged his poor
performance and offered to resign.
Hartmannshenn arrived in the Philippines from Germany but Diaz did
not show up. The next day, Diaz served a demand letter and a
resignation letter for his salary was unpaid and is still currently being
withheld albeit illegally. Diaz, on the evening, met Hartmannshenn.
The latter averred that Diaz was unable to give a proper explanation
for his behavior and accepted his resignation letter, and consequently
demanded to surrender all company property. He agreed to the exit
conditions through electronic mail but later appealed for the release
of the salary. To settle the issue amicably, SHS counsel advised that
a check had been prepared but Diaz did not pick his check. Hence,
he was dismissed.
Labor Arbiter:
LA found that he was constructively dismissed because of the
withholding of his salary and had no alternative but to resign because
he could not be expected to continue working for an employer who
withheld wages without valid cause. LA also held that probationary
employment of Diaz as deemed regularized because of failure to
conduct a prior evaluation of his performance and to give notice two
days prior to his termination.
NLRC:
NLRC reversed the ruling and explained that it was a valid exercise of
management prerogative. The act was deemed justified since it was
reasonable to demand an explanation for failure to report to work and
to account for his work accomplishments.
Consequently, he could not have been regularized having voluntarily
resigned prior to the completion of the probationary period.
COURT OF APPEALS:
CA reversed the ruling of NLRC as salary is not a valid exercise of
management prerogative. As a probationary employee entitled to
security of tenure, he was illegally dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diaz is a probationary employee who voluntarily
resigned prior to the expiration of the probation period
RULING:
What made it impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely for Diaz to
continue working for the company was the unlawful withholding of his
salary. There is no sufficient proof that would warrant the failure of
Diaz to be present in the companys factories. It is significant to note
here, that Diaz prepared and served his resignation letter right after
he was informed that his salary was being withheld. It would be
absurd to require Diaz to tolerate the withholding of his salary for a
longer period before his employment can be considered as so
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely as to constitute constructive
dismissal. These circumstances are contrary to voluntary resignation
and bolster the finding of constructive dismissal.
Respondent was constructively dismissed and, therefore, illegally
dismissed. Although respondent was a probationary employee, he
was still entitled to security of tenure. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the
Constitution guarantees the right of all workers to security of
tenure. In using the expression all workers, the Constitution puts no
distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular
employee. This means that probationary employees cannot be
dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular
employees.
Probationary employees who are unjustly dismissed during the
probationary period are entitled to reinstatement and payment of full
backwages and other benefits and privileges from the time they were
dismissed up to their actual reinstatement. Respondent is, thus,
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges as well as to full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.
GWENDELLYN ROSE S. GUCABAN
G.R. No. 153982 July 18, 2011
KEYWORD/S: voluntary resignation; reorganization and streamlining
plan;
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Resignation the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a
position or office is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no
other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The intent
to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence,
the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation
must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to
terminate his employment.
FACTS:
Respondent Gucaban, a licensed civil engineer, joined the workforce
of petitioner San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. (SMPI) in 1991.
Initially engaged as a construction management specialist, she, by
her satisfactory performance on the job, was promoted in 1994 and
1995, respectively, to the position of technical services manager, and
then of project development manager. As project development
manager, she also sat as a member of the companys management
committee. She had been in continuous service in the latter capacity
until her severance from the company in February 1998.
In her complaint for illegal dismissal filed on June 26, 1998, Gucaban
alleged that her separation from service was practically forced upon
her by management. She claimed that on January 27, 1998, she was
informed by SMPIs President and Chief Executive Officer, Federico
Gonzalez (Gonzalez), that the company was planning to reorganize
its manpower in order to cut on costs, and that she must file for
resignation or otherwise face termination. Three days later, the
Human Resource Department allegedly furnished her a blank
resignation form which she refused to sign. From then on, she had
been hounded by Gonzalez to sign and submit her resignation letter.
Gucaban complained of the ugly treatment which she had since
received from Gonzalez and the management supposedly on account
of her refusal to sign the resignation letter. She claimed she had
been kept off from all the meetings of the management committee,
and that on February 12, 1998, she received an evaluation report
signed by Gonzalez showing that for the covered period she had
been negligent and unsatisfactory in the performance of her duties.
She found said report to be unfounded and unfair, because no less
than the companys Vice-President for Property Management,
Manuel Torres (Torres), in a subsequent memorandum, had actually
vouched for her competence and efficiency on the job. She herself
professed having been consistently satisfactory in her job
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performance as shown by her successive promotions in the company.
[ It was supposedly the extreme humiliation and alienation that
impelled her to submit a signed resignation letter on February 18,
1998
Gucaban surmised that she had merely been tricked by SMPI into
filing her resignation letter because it never actualized its
reorganization and streamlining plan; on the contrary, SMPI allegedly
expanded its employee population and also made new appointments
and promotions to various other positions. She felt that she had been
dismissed without cause and, hence, prayed for reinstatement and
payment of backwages and damages.
SMPI argued that it truly encountered a steep market decline in 1997
that necessitated cost-cutting measures and streamlining of its
employee structure which, in turn, would require the abolition of
certain job positions; Gucabans post as project development
manager was one of such positions. As a measure of generosity, it
allegedly proposed to Gucaban that she voluntarily resign from office
in consideration of a financial package an offer for which Gucaban
was supposedly given the first week of February 1998 to evaluate.
Gucaban, however, did not communicate her acceptance of the offer
and, instead, she allegedly conferred with the Human Resource
Department and negotiated to augment her benefits package.
SMPI claimed that Gucaban was able to grasp the favorable end of
the bargain and, expectant of an even more generous benefits
package, she voluntarily tendered her resignation effective February
27, 1998. On the day before her effective date of resignation, she
signed a document denominated as Receipt and Release whereby
she acknowledged receipt of P1,131,865.67 cash representing her
monetary benefits and waived her right to demand satisfaction of any
employment-related claims which she might have against
management.
Addressing in the affirmative the issue of whether the subject
resignation was voluntary, the Labor Arbiter found no proven force,
coercion, intimidation or any other circumstance which could
otherwise invalidate Gucabans resignation. The NLRC reversed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Finding that Gucaban has been illegally
dismissed, it ordered her reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and with full backwages, as well as ordered the award of damages
and attorneys fees. SMPI elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for certiorari. The CA found partial merit in the petition. It
affirmed the NLRCs finding of illegal/constructive dismissal, but
modified the monetary award.
ISSUE:
Whether Gucaban voluntarily tendered her resignation following the
presentation to her of the possibility of company reorganization and of
the resulting abolition of her office as necessitated by the companys
business losses at the time.
RULING:
No. Resignation the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a
position or office is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no
other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The intent
to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence,
the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation
must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to
terminate his employment. In illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is
the rule that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation,
on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee
indeed voluntarily resigned. SMPI was unable to discharge this
burden.
It is not difficult to see that, shortly prior to and at the time of
Gucabans alleged resignation, there was actually no genuine
corporate restructuring plan in place as yet. In other words, although
the company might have been suffering from losses due to market
decline as alleged, there was still no concrete plan for a corporate
reorganization at the time Gonzalez presented to Gucaban the
seemingly last available alternative options of voluntary resignation
and termination by abolition of her office. Certainly, inasmuch as the
necessity of corporate reorganization generally lies within the
exclusive prerogative of management, Gucaban at that point had no
facility to ascertain the truth behind it, and neither was she in a
position to question it right then and there. Indeed, she could not
have chosen to file for resignation had SMPI not broached to her the
possibility of her being terminated from service on account of the
supposed reorganization.
Another argument advanced by SMPI to support its claim that the
resignation of Gucaban was voluntary is that the latter has actually
been given ample time to weigh her options and was, in fact, able to
negotiate with management for improved benefits. Again, this
contention is specious as the same is not supported by the availing
records. Indeed, as clarified by Gucaban, the increased benefits was
the result of practice sanctioned and even encouraged by the mother
company in favor of those availing of early retirement and that the
increased basic monthly rate in the computation of the benefits is
applied to April and retroacts to January.
Besides, whether there have been negotiations or not, the irreducible
fact remains that Gucabans separation from the company was the
confluence of the fraudulent representation to her that her office
would be declared redundant, coupled with the subsequent alienation
which she suffered from the company by reason of her refusal to
tender resignation. The element of voluntariness in her resignation
is, therefore, missing. She had been constructively and, hence,
illegally dismissed as indeed her continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely under the circumstances.
BMG RECORDS (PHILS.), INC. and JOSE YAP, JR.
vs.
AIDA C. APARECIO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioner BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. (BMG) is engaged in the
business of selling various audio records nationwide. It hired private
respondent Aparecio as one of the promo girls in its Cebu branch,
working from Monday to Sunday.
The version of the petitioners follows:
They narrate that Aparecio was initially performing well as an
employee but as years passed by she seemed to be complacent in
the performance of her job and had been comparing the salaries of
promo girls in other companies. It appeared that she was no longer
interested in her job. She and two other promo girls, Jovelina V. Soco
and Veronica P. Mutya, intimated to their supervisor that they were
intending to resign and were requesting for some financial
assistance. BMG made it clear that, as a company policy, an
employee who resigns from service is not entitled to financial
assistance, but considering the length of their service and due to
humanitarian consideration it would accede to the request after they
secure their respective clearances. Forthwith, the three employees
tendered their resignations, which were accepted. When they
processed the required individual clearance, it was found out that
they had incurred some shortages after inventory. Per agreement,
said shortages were deducted from the amounts due them. Thus,
Soco and Mutya received their last salary, a proportion of the
13th month pay, tax refund and financial assistance less the
deductions, and they executed their releases and quitclaims. Except
for the financial assistance, Aparecio also obtained the same yet
refused to sign the release and quitclaim, protesting the amount
deducted from the financial assistance. She was adamant but BMG
stood by the previous agreement.
The story of the defense is:
Aparecio filed a complaint against BMG and its Branch Manager,
Jose Yap, Jr., co-petitioner herein, for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, etc. She alleged that she was
illegally dismissed or terminated from employment; however, she was
asked by respondent to resign and will be paid all her benefits due
like a one-month pay for every year of service, payment of services
rendered, overtime and holiday pay, rest day, 13 th month, service
incentive leave and separation pay and to execute a letter of
resignation. She further alleged that she was under respondent's
employ for seven (7) years, seven (7) months and twenty-eight (28)
days when illegally terminated from her employment
LA: The labor arbiter dismissed Aparecio's complaint.
NLRC: The NLRC found that Aparecio was illegally dismissed from
service
CA: On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
WON respondents resignation was valid and no vitiation of consent
took place.
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RULING: Second, prior to the submission of her resignation letter, Aparecio and
YES. Reading through the records would ineluctably reveal that the two other promo girls, Soco and Mutya, approached their supervisor,
evidence upon which both the NLRC and the CA based their intimated their desire to resign, and requested that they be given
conclusion rests on rather shaky foundation. After careful analysis, financial assistance, which petitioners granted on the condition that
this Court finds and so holds that the submissions of Aparecio in all deductions would be made in case of shortage after inventory;
her pleadings failed to substantiate the allegation that her consent
was vitiated at the time she tendered her resignation and that
petitioners are guilty of illegal dismissal. Third, Aparecio, Soco, and Mutya submitted their duly signed
The Court agrees with petitioners' contention that the circumstances resignation letters, which were accepted by petitioners; and
surrounding Aparecio's resignation should be given due weight in
determining whether she had intended to resign. In this case, such
Fourth, Aparecio already initiated the processing of her clearance;
intent is very evident:
thus, she was able to receive her last salary, 13 thmonth pay, and tax
refund but refused to receive the financial assistance less the
First, Aparecio already communicated to other people that she was deductions made.
about to resign to look for a better paying job since she had been
complaining that employees like her in other companies were earning
much more;