You are on page 1of 6

Aguilar vs.

San Pedro
Facts:

Petitioner Ivler was charged before the MTC for two separate offenses: Reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage of property (Criminal Case No. 82366). The first offense for the injuries suffered by herein
respondent and the second offense for the death of her husband and damage to the spouses vehicle. Ivler
pleaded guilty on the first offense and meted public censure as penalty. He invokes this conviction as a
ground in his motion to quash the information for the second offense contending it places him in double
jeopardy for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MTC refused quashal of the information thus
petitioners motion for certiorari was elevated before the RTC while moving for the suspension of the
criminal case before the MTC pending resolution of the prejudicial question as subject of his motion for
reconsideration at the RTC. MTC however proceeded with the criminal proceeding. The non-appearance of
Ivler to the proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his bail and order of his arrest was issued. By virtue of
this arrest order, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the motion for certiorari filed by Ivler on ground that
he loss standing to maintain suit. RTC dismissed said petition on this ground thus this petition to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner loses his standing to maintain suit?
Whether or not the petitioners right against double jeopardy a bar to another prosecution on the second
offense charged on Criminal Case No. 82366?

Ruling:

The court held that petitioner did not lose his standing to maintain his petition. The lower court based its
ruling from Rule 124, Section 8, second par. that provides that an appeal may be dismissed when an
appellant escapes from custody or violates the terms of his bail bond. The appeal contemplated in this
section is applicable on a suit to review judgment of conviction. No judgment has yet been rendered against
the petitioner. Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendants
absence in a proceeding merely renders his bondman liable, subjecting the bond to cancellation if it fails to
produce defendant before the court within 30 days. This does not ipso facto convert the standing of an
accused as a fugitive to lose his standing before the court. Moreover, the court observed that contrary to
the lower court contention that petitioner failed to attend the hearing without justified reason it failed to
appreciate the fact that there is a pending motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner which was left
unresolved by the lower court.
On the issue on double jeopardy, the two charges were prosecuted by the court under the provision of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes quasi-offenses such as negligence. What this
provision contemplates in quasi-offenses of criminal negligence is punishing the act of negligence that if
intentionally done will constitute a criminal offense. Thus, the law punishes the negligent act and not the
result thereof. It takes into account the gravity of the offenses in determining the penalty but not to qualify
the substance of the offense. It treats a negligent act as single whether the injurious result affects one or
several persons. The offense of criminal negligence remains as one and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions. The contention of the lower court to invoke Article 48 where light offenses such as
slight physical injuries cannot be complexed with grave or less grave felony such as homicide that the court
is compelled to separate both charges is untenable in this case. The principle of prosecuting quasi offenses
remain intact in the case thus the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of similar charges on
reckless imprudence. His prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for the second
offense by virtue of the principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
court.

People vs. Sandiganbayan


MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a Vice-Mayor of Toledo City, received cash advances amounting to P61,765.00,
by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law.
However, he did not liquidate the same. He was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan

Private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented its lone
witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.

On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion 4 for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On June 16,
2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 5 granting the motion. On June 30, 2006, private respondent
filed his demurrer6 to evidence. On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution
based on the testimony of the witness that accused had indeed liquidated the cash advances, weakening
the cause of action of the prosecution. Hence, Sandiganbayan found that the element of damages is
wanting in the case.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.

HELD: NO. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondents non-liquidation of the subject
cash advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions witness, that private
respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.

However, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage to the government arising from the
non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an essential element of the offense punished under the second
sentence of Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 as implemented by COA Circular No. 90-331. Instead, the mere
failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is the gravamen of the offense. Verily, the law seeks to compel
the accountable officer, by penal provision, to promptly render an account of the funds which he has
received by reason of his office. 16

Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law and its
implementing rules, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to
establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as the denial of the
prosecutions right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error committed by the
Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.

PACOY VS. CAJIGAL

FACTS: SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of Presiding Judge Afable Cajigal of RTC 68
of Camiling Tarlac. On July 4, 2002, an information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner
for shooting and killing his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the
respondent judge issued another Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder. The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for
Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta. Petitioner was to
be rearraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to
enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of
not guilty. Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. The MR was likewise denied. Thus, petitioner
went straight to SC and filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in amending the Informationafter petitioner had already entered
into plea to the charge of information for homicide.

HELD: No. In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change
made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There
was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination
of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the mended Information for Murder are exactly the
same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, the Court found that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from
Homicide to Murder as purely formal.

PEOPLE VS TAN

FACTS: Two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1 and 56 of the
Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan for
wilfully not declaring that he is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the outstanding shares of Best
World Resources Corporation. After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty 11 to both charges and the
trial ensued. Petitioner made its formal offer of evidence, but the RTC issued an Order admitting certain
evidence and denying admission of others. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the RTC. Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence 15 and to
admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC issued another Order 16 granting respondents Motion
for Leave to File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondents attached Demurrer. The RTC also
ordered petitioner to file an opposition. Petitioner filed its Opposition 17 to the Demurrer to Evidence.
Respondent then filed a Reply. The RTC issued an Order 19 granting respondents Demurrer to Evidence.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 22 before the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC. The CA issued a
Resolution denying the petition. In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action
by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason,
the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred in precluding the people from prosecuting its cases against Dante Tan.

HELD: NO. If the Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence,
no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was
arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC
extensively discussed its position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main
reasons for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of
shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred
shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.

There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that
there is an error of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the
appreciation of the prosecutions case, there is to this Courts mind, no capricious exercise of judgment that
would overcome the defense of double jeopardy.

Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. 49 While petitioner insists that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently,
the CA did not err when it affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC.

PEOPLE VS LACSON
FACTS: Murder charges were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against 97 officers and personnel of
the ABRITFG by the PNP Director for Investigation and by kinds of the slain KBG members. On Nov 2,
1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder
against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases
were remanded to the Ombudsman, and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended,
downgrading the principal into an accessory. Hence, the case was later transferred from the SB to the RTV
not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses
charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as
required by RA no 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the prosecution recanted their statement
while the seven private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual
motions to make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest, to hold in abeyancethe issuance of the warrants, and dismiss the cases should the trial court find
lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed. On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Mendoza indorsed to
the Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate to file with the RTC.
The respondent, invoking their right against double jeopardy, then filed with CA citing Sec 8, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Crimpro bans. CA denied the petition. On June 6, 2001, 11 informations for muder involving the
killing of the members of the KBG were filed before the RTC of QC. The new informations charged as
principals 34 people, including Lacson and his 25 previously co-accused.

ISSUE: WON Sec 8 Rule 117 bars the filing of the new informations

HELD: No. When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not
give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the
essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.

The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the
CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not
hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse
is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of
proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is
bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings
before this Court.

While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable
cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter
invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public
prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a
motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of the
respondents motion for a judicial determination of probable cause will show that it contained no allegation
that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the respondents arrest as a prayer for
the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or not there
was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance
the issuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the
petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief. [48] A court cannot set itself in motion,
nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is
resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void.

VILLAREAL VS. ALIGA

FACTS: Aliga, then an accountant of Dentrade Inc, has custody of the personal checks of
Villareal, president of Dentrade Inc. She prepares the personal checks by typing its
contents and submits them to Villareal for his signature. After the signed checks are
delivered to her, she in turn, gives the checks to the messenger for encashment with the
bank. Information was filed against Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft thru
Falsification of Commercial Document for forging Villareals checks to misappropriate
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the amount of P60,000.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, Dentrade Inc. The RTC found Aliga
guilty of the crime alleged. However, It appearing that the amount of P60,000.00
subject of the offense was already returned by the accused, the Court hereby absolves
the accused of civil liability in this case. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
Respondent appealed to the CA, to reverse and set aside the judgment of the RTC on the
grounds that: (1) her admission or confession of guilt before the NBI authorities, which
already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because she
was not informed of her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of her own choice; and (2) the totality of the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused. Villareals motion for reconsideration for was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

HELD: YES. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the
findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be
violated. The case does not fall within the exception to rule on double jeopardy. ndeed, a judgment of
acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory upon its promulgation.

You might also like