Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Where one's ancestral land claims are still pending before the
National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) for the validation, his
rights over said ancestral land, if any, are mere expectations. They are
not the present and unmistakable right required for the grant of the
provisional remedy of injunction.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to
or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or
interest of some other person in the property. Hence, where a judgment
creditor, in registering a notice of attachment in her favor over the
properties of his judgment debtor and noticed that a third party has
already annotated an adverse claim over the same, he cannot be said to
be a buyer in good faith when he later buys the property at a public
auction. The previous inscription must prevail over the former.
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are
declared, the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable
prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and
boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. What really defines a
piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages:
(1) there is an injury WHETHER OR NOT physical, mental or
psychological clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) the culpable act or
omission is factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
article 2219 of the civil code.
When the property was mortgaged, only the tax declaration was
presented. Although a free patent title was subsequently issued in their
favor, petitioners failed to inform the creditor rural bank of such
issuance. As a result, the certificate of sale was not registered or
annotated on the free patent title. Petitioners are estopped from
redeeming the property based on the free patent title which was not
presented during the foreclosure sale nor delivered to the Register of
Deeds for annotation of the certificate of sale as required under Section 5
of Republic Act No. 720, as amended. Estoppel in pais arises when one,
by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies
and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
All lands of the public domain are owned by the State the
Republic. Thus, all attributes of ownership, including the right to
possess and use these lands, accrue to the Republic. The
registration of lands of the public domain under
the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into
private lands.
Article 124 of the Family Code, where one spouse sold a conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse, does not provide for a
period within which the latter may assail the sale. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code
governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect
from the very beginning. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no
action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to
Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
KOREAN AIR CO., LTD. and SUK KYOO KIM v. ADELINA A.S. YUSON
G.R. No. 170369, June 16, 2010.
It is not the filing of the action for rescission that marks the
violation of the lease agreement but the failure of the Martins to repair
and rehabilitate the property despite demand.
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for
by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The general rule is that one dealing with a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens System may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title issued therefor and is not obliged to go beyond the certificate. Where, in
other words, the certificate of title is in the name of the seller, the innocent
purchaser for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate, as
he is charged with notice only of burdens or claims on the res as noted in the
certificate. However, a buyer of a piece of land which is in the actual
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry,
the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code prescribed the rules on preference in case of
double sales of immovable property: (1) knowledge by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except when the second
buyer first register in good faith the second sale; and (2) knowledge gained by
the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register,
since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith.
Applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Article 1302 (2) of the Civil Code provides that it is presumed that
there is legal subrogation when a third person, not interested in the
obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval of the debtor. Article
1303 of the Civil Code further states that subrogation transfers to the
person subrogated the credit with all the rights thereto appertaining,
either against the debtor or against third persons. As the entity against
which the collection was enforced, Metrobank was subrogated to the
rights of Central Bank and has a cause of action to recover from RBG the
amounts it paid to the Central Bank, plus 14% per annum interest.
It is not the mere lapse of time that vests title over the land to the
claimant; it is also necessary that the land be an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain and that the claimant be in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the land. Listed down, the
acquisition through adverse possession of public lands requires the
following: (1) the land applied for must be an alienable and disposable
public land; and (2) the claimants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
VICENTE ADRIANO v. ALICE TANCO, et al
G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010
Under Article 1881 of the Civil Code, the agent must act within the
scope of his authority to bind his principal. So long as the agent has
authority, express or implied, the principal is bound by the acts of the
agent on his behalf, WHETHER OR NOT or not the third person dealing
with the agent believes that the agent has actual authority. Thus, all
signatories in a contract should be clothed with authority to bind the
parties they represent. In relation, the authority of government officials
to represent the government in any contract must proceed from an
express provision of law or valid delegation of authority. Hence, where
the petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that the
respondents general manager possessed such actual authority
delegated either by the Board of Directors, or by statutory provision,
there could be no real consent, much less a perfected contract, to speak
of.
In the instant case, Roche did not present evidence that the land
she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the
public domain. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all
requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. Since
Roche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she applied
for is inalienable land that belongs to the State, the Government did not
have to adduce evidence to prove it.
THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE
ALFONSO v. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGEASSOCIATION, et al
G.R. No. 134269, July 7, 2010
The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain
with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases. Whether under the Civil Code or
the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved. In the present case, since
petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3,
1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure
mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the
Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by
petitioners.
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force
of law between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties
based on their essential equality. A contract containing a condition which
makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of
one of the contracting parties is void. In the instant case, there was no
showing that either Solidbank or Permanent coerced each other to enter
into the loan agreements. The terms of the Omnibus Line Agreement and
the promissory notes were mutually and freely agreed upon by the
parties. The stipulations on interest rate repricing are valid because (1)
the parties mutually agreed on said stipulations; (2) repricing takes effect
only upon Solidbanks written notice to Permanent of the new interest
rate; and (3) Permanent has the option to prepay its loan if Permanent
and Solidbank do not agree on the new interest rate.
Article 1191 of the New Civil Code provides that the power to
rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. In
reciprocal obligations, as in a contract of sale, the general rule is that the
fulfillment of the parties respective obligations should be simultaneous.
Hence, no demand is generally necessary because, once a party fulfills
his obligation and the other party does not fulfill his, the latter
automatically incurs in delay. But when different dates for performance of
the obligations are fixed, the default for each obligation must be
determined by the rules given in the first paragraph of the present
article, that is, the other party would incur in delay only from the moment
the other party demands fulfillment of the formers obligation. In the
instant case, without a previous demand for the fulfillment of the
obligation, petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission
against respondent as the latter would not yet be considered in breach of
its contractual obligation.
A close reading of the CA Decision would reveal that the said court
used the phrase badges of fraud to refer to certain fraudulent acts that
attended the execution of the Contract to Sell and the Deeds of Absolute
Sale which would eventually tend to prove that the same transactions
were indeed suspicious as the said contracts were antedated, simulated
and fraudulent. Such phrase did not refer to any particular provision of a
law, hence, the general and ordinary meaning of the phrase prevails.
Article 2714 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no
proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith,
the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith.
Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on
the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the
award of moral damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court
deletes the award to Vergon of compensatory damages and attorneys
fees for the litigation expenses Vergon had incurred as such amounts
were not specifically prayed for in its Answer to petitioners third-party
complaint.
Roberto cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor, Belacho. Not
being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period
required for ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Robertos
favor. Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription has not been met because of the respondents claim to have
been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the subject property for
only twenty-four years, from the time the subject property was tax
declared in 1974 to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1998.
Even though the sale of the land to petitioner took place before the
judgment of the trial court in favor of Swift and the issuance of the writ
of execution over the property in question, failure to register it with the
Register of Deeds negated any priority which he may have acquired by
virtue of the earlier sale. Elementary is the rule that it is the act of
registration which gives validity to transfer or liens created upon land
registered under the Torrens System.
Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the aggrieved party has a
choice between specific performance and rescission with damages in
either case. However, if specific performance becomes impractical or
impossible, the court may order rescission with damages to the injured
party. Hence, where after the lapse of more than 30 years, it has become
impossible to implement the loan agreement as it was written,
considering the absence of evidence as to the rising costs of construction,
as well as the obvious changes in market conditions on the viability of the
operations of the hotel, it is deemed equitable and practicable to rescind
the obligation of DBP to deliver the balance of the loan proceeds to
Maceda.
Clearly, the DPWH gave two reasons for the rescission: 1) ALCs
failure to comply with Clause 10 of the RISA; and 2) its continuing
commission of acts amounting to breaches of contract, resulting in
negative slippage in its performance. Thus, the DPWH was entitled to
terminate the project and expel ALC from it
ISIDRO ABLAZA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
A contract is the law between the parties. Thus, from the moment
the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law. Also, the stipulations of the contract being the law between the
parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as they were
agreed upon and written, there being no law or public policy against the
stipulated forfeiture of payments already made.
Article 1665 of the Civil Code provides that "the lessee shall return
the thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, just as he received it,
save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of time, or by ordinary
wear and tear, or from an inevitable cause." Article 1667 likewise states
that "the lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing
leased, unless he proves that it took place without his fault." In other
words, by law, a lessee is obliged to return the thing(s) leased and be
responsible for any deterioration or loss of the properties, except for
those that were not his fault.
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL v. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL
and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
In the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from
5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardos
repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action
for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the
RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-
year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription
period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership
over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
CELESTINO SANTIAGO substituted by LAURO SANTIAGO and
ISIDRO GUTIERREZ substituted by ROGELIO GUTIERREZ v.
AMADA R. ORTIZ-LUIS substituted by JUAN ORTIZ-LUIS, JR
G.R. Nos. 186184 & 1869881, September 20, 2010
Under Art. 1311 contracts take effect only between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value
of the property he received from the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit
or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have
clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
An implied trust prescribes within 10 years from the time the right
of action accrues. A right of action implies the existence of a cause of
action and a cause of action has three elements: a) the existence of a
right in plaintiffs favor; b) defendants obligation to respect such right;
and c) defendants act or omission that violates the plaintiffs right.
Only when the last element occurs or takes place can it be said in law
that a cause of action has arisen.
The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule,
as they are not always awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.
Article 1881 of the Civil Code provides that "the agent must act
within the scope of his authority." Pursuant to the authority given by the
principal, the agent is granted the right "to affect the legal relations of
his principal by the performance of acts effectuated in accordance with
the principal's manifestation of consent."
Mortgagor has the right to pay the indebtedness at any time within
three years provided that, as in this case, he pays the interest for the
whole term of the mortgage.
Under Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
To prove good faith, the rule is that the buyer of registered land
needs only show that he relied on the title that covers the property. But
this is true only when, at the time of the sale, the buyer was unaware of
any adverse claim to the property. Otherwise, the law requires the buyer
to exercise a higher degree of diligence before proceeding with his
purchase. He must examine not only the certificate of title, but also the
sellers right and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. In
such a situation, the buyer must show that he exercised reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the four corners of the title. Failing in
these, he may be deemed a buyer in bad faith.
The term forbearance, within the context of usury law, has been
described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to
repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
Article 1769 of the new Civil Code lays down the rule for
determining when a transaction should be deemed a partnership or a co-
ownership. Said article paragraphs 2 and 3, provides; (2) Co-ownership
or co-possession does not itself establish a partnership, WHETHER OR
NOT such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits
made by the use of the property; (3) The sharing of gross returns does
not of itself establish a partnership, WHETHER OR NOT or not the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
property from which the returns are derived.
Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential
elements in a contract of partnership: (a) an agreement to contribute
money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide
the profits among the contracting parties.
Article 1797 of the Civil Code provides: The losses and profits shall
be distributed in conformity with the agreement. If only the share of
each partner in the profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the
losses shall be in the same proportion. In the absence of stipulation, the
share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to
what he may have contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be
liable for the losses. As for the profits, the industrial partner shall
receive such share as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
If besides his services he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a
share in the profits in proportion to his capital.
Article 1234 of the Civil Code provides that if the obligation had
been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor may recover as
though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment, less damages
suffered by the obligee.
There is no need for the publication and filing of the said DAR
Memorandum Circular with the ONAR as it is merely an administrative
interpretation. Interpretative rule is promulgated by the administrative
agency to interpret, clarify or explain statutory regulations under which
the administrative body operates. The purpose or objective of an
interpretative rule is merely to construe the statute being administered.
It purports to do no more than interpret the statute.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO
G.R. No. 184063, January 24, 2011
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause,
and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that
the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They
are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is
conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to
recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered despite
the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment.
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make
such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of
his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is
subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent
landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally
supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his
own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors land as
to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to
fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.
Where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been
paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab
initio for lack of consideration. Under Article 1471 of the Civil Code, if
the price is simulated, the sale is void.
The rule is long and well settled that there must be pleading and
proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be recovered. In
addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it
must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.
Neither may the principle of laches apply in the present case. The
essence of laches or stale demands is the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus,
giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. It would be the height of injustice if
respondents would be allowed to go scot-free simply because petitioner
relied in good faith on the former's false representations.
There are two ways which could indicate the presence of novation
and thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another
which substitutes the same. The first is when novation has been
explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when
the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The test
of incompatibility is WHETHER OR NOT the two obligations can stand
together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they
are incompatible, and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily,
changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not
merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the
essential elements of the obligation such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory
in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
The Court affirms the award of civil indemnity made by the trial
court for each count of rape. Civil indemnity is mandatory when rape is
found to have been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we
affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity for
each count. Moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of
proof other than the fact of rape, on the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
The Court has held before that the purchasers right "to request
for the issuance of the writ of possession of the land never prescribes."
"The right to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership,"
and it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a
parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof.
Quitclaims are also contracts and can be voided if there was fraud
or intimidation that leads to lack of consent. The preparation by Cecilio of
the receipt and quitclaim document which he asked Cornelia to sign,
indicate that even Cecilio doubted that he could validly claim 83.07% of
the price of Cornelias land. Based on the attending circumstances, the
receipt and quitclaim document is an act of fraud perpetuated by Cecilio.
Very clearly, both the service contract and the later receipt and quitclaim
document, the first vitiated by mistake and the second being fraudulent,
are void.
Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules does
not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of
the collision. The allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50
kilometers per hour, while the records show that he was driving at the
speed of 70 kilometers per hour. The Court is then convinced that
defendant Mejia was running real fast along EDSA when he saw a vehicle
on the opposite side suddenly turn left towards White Plains.
Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may
have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants
for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily
prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
The fact that it was Severina who actually conveyed the properties
to the said heirs of Rufino does not in anyway contradict the fact that the
partition was actually made by Teodorico prior to his demise. The basis of
their ownership to the property is indubitably the right vested on their
said predecessor-in-interest at the time of Teodoricos death. The
existence of the Deed of Donation is evidently a mere surplusage which
does not affect the right of Rufinos heirs to the property.
The land covered by TCT No. T-1,997 was not among the
properties, the spouses mortgaged with the DBP in 1962. As such, the
foreclosure made by DBP over the subject land was null and void.
Art. 1182 of the Civil Code provides: When the fulfilment of the
condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional
obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a
third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the
provisions of this Code.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law
in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which
only one marriage can exist at any given time. Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is
correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
The Court has previously upheld as valid the proviso in loans that
the interest rate would be made to depend on the prevailing market rate.
Such provision does not signify an automatic increase in the interest. It
simply means that the bank may adjust the interest according to the
prevailing market rate. This may result to either an increase or a
decrease in the interest.
The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate
thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the
object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the
necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.
RICARDO B. BANGAYAN v.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND PHILIP
SARIA
G.R. No. 149193 April 4, 2011
Since the Olivas were mere creditors, not partners, they had no
right to demand that the Antons make an accounting of the money loaned
out to them. Still, the Olivas were entitled to know from the Antons how
much net profits the three stores were making annually since the Olivas
were entitled to certain percentages of those profits.
The instant case is a sale of real property where the purchase price
is not paid in full. The unpaid sellers remedy is either an action to
collect the balance or to rescind the contract within the time allowed by
law. Since rescission is no longer an option considering that petitioners
have been in possession of the properties for a considerable period of
time, substantial justice dictates that respondent be entitled to receive
the unpaid balance of the purchase price, plus legal interest thereon.
The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule,
and it must have some factual, legal and equitable bases. Nevertheless,
Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the
plaintiff's act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to
incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest, and where the Court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt the obligor from
liability for a breach of an obligation due to an act of God or force
majeure, the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event
must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation
in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor
The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title
does not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care
and due diligence is required of them. Imbued with public interest, they
are expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals. Thus,
before approving a loan, the standard practice for banks and other
financial institutions is to conduct an ocular inspection of the property
offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to
determine the real owner or owners thereof. Failure to do so makes them
mortgagees in bad faith.
The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be
willful and deliberate in order to be considered as ground for
dispossession of an agricultural tenant.
Same: First, the subject matter or res involved in Civil Case No.
SPL-0991 is different from those in Civil Case No. SPL-0356. F&E
Corporation seeks to recover subdivision lots located in Phase 1 and 1-A
of Forfoms subdivision while the Olasos seek to recover their fully paid
lot in Phase VI of the same subdivision. Second, the parties in both cases
are different. The litigation in Civil Case No. SPL-0356 is between the
developer, F&E Corporation, and the subdivision owner, Forfom, while
the parties in the proceedings in Civil Case No. SPL-0991 are F&E
Corporation, as annotator of the Notice of LisPendens and the Olasos, as
fully paid lot buyers. Third, the prayers are different. In Civil Case No.
SPL-0991, the Olasos want to cancel the annotation of the Notice of
LisPendens stamped on their certificate of title over the piece of property
described as Lot 10, Block 30, Phase VI of the Villa Olympia Subdivision,
which they bought from Forfom. In Civil Case No. SPL-0356, the prayer
was for the delivery of the certificates of title over 37 lots situated in
Phase 1 and 1-A of the same subdivision and the payment of a sum of
money and damages. For said reasons, the proceedings in Civil Case No.
SPL-0991 can continue independently of Civil Case No. SPL-0356.
and
"The land being the principal and the building the accessory,
preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the
choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the
builder to pay the value of the land."
JOSEFINA P. REALUBIT v. PROSENCIO D. JASO and EDENG. JASO
G.R. No. 178782. September 21, 2011
"In contracts, the law empowers the courts to reduce interest rates
and penalty charges that are iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant.
Whether an interest rate or penalty charge is reasonable or excessive is
addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. In determining what is
iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider the circumstances
of the case."
Under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of
the value of the improvements that the lessee made in good faith, which
are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, and which have
not altered the form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the
lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
reimburse.
The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule
and the court must state explicitly the legal reason for such award. They
are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal,
and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still,
attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages
may be recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where
from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss.
Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through
insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the
other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would
not have agreed to. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the
causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente),
inducement to the making of the contract. In this case, the Court finds
that the fraud alleged by Spouses Viloria has not been satisfactorily
established as causal in nature to warrant the annulment of the subject
contracts. In fact, Spouses Viloria failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Magers statement was fraudulent.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and,
thus, should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that
the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners complaint for
nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the
petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family
home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or
within a reasonable time thereafter. Having failed to set up and prove to
the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the
sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising
the same. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove
the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to
presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.
PETRON CORPORATION v. SPOUSES CESAR JOVERO and ERMA F.
CUDILLA, et al
G.R. No. 151038, January 18, 2012
There are four (4) persons who are liable to pay damages to
respondents. The latter may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously, pursuant to Article 1216 of
the Civil Code. These solidary debtors are petitioner Petron, the hauler
Villaruz, the operator Dortina Uy and the dealer Rubin Uy. To determine
the liability of each defendant to one another, the amount of damages
shall be divided by four, representing the share of each defendant.
The lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that
possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of
ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they
have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property
for more than 30 years up to this day. The petitioner has not established
when respondents possession of the properties became unlawful a
requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms
and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may
be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did
not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very
purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option
either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of
Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection
of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one
applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a single property.
The existence of the earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void
because a single property cannot be registered twice. A certificate is not
conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already
been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.
Clearly, a mere allegation of an earlier title will not suffice.
The grounds for the proper annulment of the foreclosure sale are:
(1) that there was fraud, collusion, accident, mutual mistake, breach of
trust or misconduct by the purchaser; (2) that the sale had not been fairly
and regularly conducted; or (3) that the price was inadequate and the
inadequacy was so great as to shock the conscience of the court. Hence,
where the case does not fall into any of the grounds, the validity of the
foreclosure must be upheld.
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties
are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of
time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.
Hence, where between the parties involved, only one was negligence,
said doctrine should not be made to apply.
Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the
land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land must have been
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act.
In this case, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, since there is direct
evidence on the issue of diligence or lack thereof pertaining to the lifting
of the genset. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. In any event, res ipsa
loquitur merely provides a rebuttable presumption of negligence. On this,
we have already pointed out that the evidence does not prove negligence
on the part of DMCI, and that due diligence on its part has been
established.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection or supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
Under Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and,
in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound
mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of
the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. In
connection to this, the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent
might even preclude any consequent trust implication. In a contract of
loan, one of the parties (creditor) delivers money or other consumable
thing to another (debtor) on the condition that the same amount of the
same kind and quality shall be paid. Owing to the consumable nature of
the thing loaned, the resulting duty of the borrower in a contract of loan
is to pay, not to return, to the creditor or lender the very thing loaned.
This explains why the ownership of the thing loaned is transferred to the
debtor upon perfection of the contract. Ownership of the thing loaned
having transferred, the debtor enjoys all the rights conferred to an owner
of property, including the right to use and enjoy (jus utendi), to consume
the thing by its use (jus abutendi), and to dispose (jus disponendi),
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Evidently, the
resulting relationship between a creditor and debtor in a contract of loan
cannot be characterized as fiduciary.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of
things, would not happen if those who had management or control used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a
sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.
INSULAR INVESTMENT AND TRUST CORPORATION v. CAPITAL
ONE EQUITIES CORP. (now known as CAPITAL ONE HOLDINGS
CORP.) and PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 183308 April 25, 2012
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529: One of those persons that
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, WHETHER OR NOT personally or through
their duly authorized representatives are those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
For one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a
thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that
such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the
thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No.
1073.
The court has already settled and upheld the right of the secured
creditor to foreclose the mortgages in its favor during the liquidation of a
debtor corporation.
Where a property is part of the estate that has not been fully
settled and partitioned, the heirs right of ownership over said property
is merely inchoate. This means that the impending heir has yet no
absolute dominion over any specific property in the decedents estate
that could be specifically levied upon and sold at public auction. Any
encumbrance of attachment over the heirs interests in the estate,
therefore, remains a mere probability, and cannot summarily be satisfied
without the final distribution of the properties in the estate. Hence,
where a portion of a parcel of land was sold at a public auction to satisfy
the writ of execution issued by the court but such land was later on found
to be part of the estate that has not been partitioned, said sale is void.
The highest bidder in the public auction does not become the absolute
owner of the property notwithstanding his possession of a tax declaration
over said property. A tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership.
Under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended
to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition
even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other
transaction. Partition may thus be inferred from circumstances
sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Hence, where the original
registered owners had either mortgaged or sold their respective shares,
in whole or in part, and the said owners successors-in-interest
eventually took possession of the respective portions acquired by them
beginning 1951 or thereabouts, introducing improvements and exercising
acts of ownership thereon, property is deemed partitioned. That their
respective shares of the original registered owners were merely
designated orally is immaterial.
R.A. No. 6552 recognizes the right of the seller to cancel the contract
but any such cancellation must be done in conformity with the
requirements therein prescribed. In addition to the notarial act of
rescission, the seller is required to refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value of the payments on the property. The actual cancellation
of the contract can only be deemed to take place upon the expiry of a
thirty (30)-day period following the receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the full
payment of the cash surrender value.
PARK HOTEL, J's PLAYHOUSE BURGOS CORP., INC., AND/OR
GREGG HARBUTT, GENERAL MANAGER, ATTY. ROBERTO
ENRIQUEZ, PRESIDENT, AND BILL PERCY, v. MANOLO SORIANO,
LESTER GONZALES, AND YOLANDA BADILLA,
G.R. NO. 171118 SEPTEMBER 10, 2012
An implied new lease will set in if it is shown that: (a) the term of
the original contract of lease has expired; (b) the lessor has not given the
lessee a notice to vacate; and (c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing
leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor. This acquiescence
may be inferred from the failure of the lessor to serve notice to vacate
upon the lessee.
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law
not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and
by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to
be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered
into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon
future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the
contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with
respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary
in nature.
The settled rule is that "a resort to judicial processes is not, per
se, evidence of ill will upon which a claim for damages may be based," for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
"Free resort to Courts for redress of wrongs is a matter of public policy.
The law recognizes the right of everyone to sue for that which he
honestly believes to be his right without fear of standing trial for
damages."
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make
one an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who
shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
It is basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it
is called by the contracting parties. The Shelter Contract Award granted
to respondent expressly stipulates that "upon completion of payment of
the amount of US$28,563 representing the full value of the House and
Lot subject of the Contract Award, the UNION shall execute a Deed of
Transfer and shall cause the issuance of the corresponding Transfer
Certificate of Title in favor of and in the name of the AWARDEE." It
cannot be denied, therefore, that the parties herein entered into a
contract to sell in the guise of a reimbursement scheme requiring
respondent to make monthly reimbursement payments which are, in
actuality, installment payments for the value of the subject house and
lot.
RCJ failed to present any clear proof that it agreed with Master Tours to
abandon the lease of the buses and in its place constitute RCJ as
depositary of the same, providing storage service to Master Tours for a
fee. Further, it did not make sense for Master Tours to pre-terminate its
lease of the junked buses to RCJ, which would earn Master Tours P
600,000.00, in exchange for having to pay RCJ storage fees for keeping
those buses just the same. As already pointed out, the lease already
implied an obligation on RCJs part to safekeep the buses while they
were being rented.
NGEI MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE INC. AND HERNANCITO
RONQUILLO v. FILIPINAS PALMOIL PLANTATION INC. AND
DENNIS VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 184950, OCTOBER 11, 2012
Well established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot
be acquired by mere occupation. While it is true that tax declarations are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless, constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The bare allegation that one had been in peaceful and continuous
possession of the lot in question because his predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner from time
immemorial, cannot prevail over the tax declarations and other
documentary evidence.
ROBERT PASCUA, doing business under the name and style TRI-
WEB CONSTRUCTION v. G & G REAL TV CORPORATION
G.R. No. 196383, OCTOBER 15, 2012
Based on the AES Contract, the Court sustained the parties right
to amend the same by extending the option period. Considering that the
performance security had not been released to Smartmatic-TIM, the
contract was still effective which can still be amended by the mutual
agreement of the parties, such amendment being reduced in writing. To
be sure, the option contract is embodied in the AES Contract whereby
the Comelec was given the right to decide whether or not to buy the
subject goods listed therein under the terms and conditions also agreed
upon by the parties.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA JARALVE substituted
by ALAN JESS JARALVE DOCUMENTO, JR., EDGARDO JARALVE, et
al
G.R. No. 175177, OCTOBER 24, 2012
The Bank, given the fiduciary nature of its relationship with its
depositors, should have exerted every effort to safeguard and protect the
latters money which was deposited and entrusted with it. Hence, where
respondent was defrauded and lost her money because of the negligence
attributable to the Bank and its employees, the latter must be made
liable. However, while the Bank reneged on its responsibility to Dela
Rosa-Ramos, she is nevertheless equally guilty of contributory
negligence. It has been held that where the bank and a depositor are
equally negligent, they should equally suffer the loss. The two must both
bear the consequences of their mistakes. Thus, the Bank should only pay
50% of the actual damages awarded while Dela Rosa-Ramos should have
to shoulder the remaining 50%.
The attestation clause must state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages. Hence, where the attestation
clause states that last will and testament consists of 7 pages including
the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, but
actually, the will consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment, such
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself
but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. Therefore, the
discrepancy cannot be deemed substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law. For this reason, the will must be disallowed.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and
(6) interest, in proper cases. Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00
is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime. Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 should
be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. An
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
The diligence with which the law requires the individual or a corporation
at all times to govern a particular conduct varies with the nature of the
situation in which one is placed, and the importance of the act which is to
be performed.
In a case for quieting of title, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and
that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Hence,
where the plaintiff is not even named in the Original Certificate of Title
as the registered owner of the subject property, he cannot maintain said
aforementioned action and the same should be dismissed.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt or uncertainty affecting title to real property. The plaintiffs must
show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject
real property, but that they have a valid title to it. Hence, where the
plaintiff bought a property from the vendor, who was not in possession of
the property at the time of the transaction, the former should have been
wary and should have investigated the rights of the actual possessor. For
failure to do such, the buyer cannot be said to be in good faith and
cannot have any right over the property. Therefore, he cannot maintain
an action for quieting of title.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." They are,
however, not recoverable as a matter of right. They are awarded only if
the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. Hence, where revocation of a contract was done by
the respondents in bad faith but not in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner, petitioners are not entitled to
exemplary damages.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident
was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Hence,
where the accident would not have happened had the petitioner not lifted
the folding wooden counter top that subsequently fell on top of her head,
the doctrine cannot apply. The folding wooden counter top did not fall on
petitioners head without any human intervention.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable
beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. If a
contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he
may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to
the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of
a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. Thus, in order that a
third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred
to as a stipulation pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following
requisites must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor of a third
person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3)
The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the
third person - the favor is not merely incidental; (4) The favor is
unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated
his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) The
contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized, by the third
party.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They pertain
to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is
entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly
proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must
the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable.
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured.
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control. In determining their intention, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens System
need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title.
Art. 2041 of the Civil Code, provides: If one of the parties fails or
refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce
the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.