Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, G.R . No. 154207

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - YNARES-S ANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
ALBERTO MINA , CHICO -NAZARIO, and
HON. ELEUTERIO F NACHU RA, JJ.
GUERRERO and HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Promulgated:
Respondents. April 27, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
grounded on pure questions of law , with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing
the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay
City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;[1] and the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2] that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for
petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law
Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial. [3]

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule
138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding
Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source
itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition

for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public

respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending
the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to
deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats,
the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de
oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the
crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No.
730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-
lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without
the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with
the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on
the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated
June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of
the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second
Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground
that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before
the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and
assigns the following errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT RESO LVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
INJUNCTION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE PETITIONER
H AVING ESTABLISHED THE NECESSITY OF GRANTING THE WRIT;
II. II.THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE L AW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIM INARY INJUNCTION
AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDE RATION OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BAS IS THAT [GRAVE] THRE ATS HAS
NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE S AID BAS IS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE L AW;

III. THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABE YANCE
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT[S] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE L AW WHEN
THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE
OF THE L APUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BUL ACAN CASES, AS WELL AS
BAR M ATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-
L AW YERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS). [ 4 ]

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the
nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
[5]

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and

implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730,
Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein
petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case
without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A- LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practi ce. A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular fou r-year p rescribed
law curriculum and is enrolled in a re cognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or offi cer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school .
Sec. 2. Appearance . The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school . Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be fi led , must be signed
by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic .

However, in Resolution [ 6 ] dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the
Court En Ban c clarifi ed:

The rule, however, is diff erent if the law student appears

before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple . In inferior courts, a law student may
appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a

justice of the peace , a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney .

In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation

personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an

agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar. [ 7 ] (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase In the court of a justice of the peace in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to In the court of a municipality as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:[8]

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted . In the Court of a

municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with
the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5
of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall
include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-
A.
In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed,
while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the
courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for
the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-
lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision
of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very
nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for
this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the
RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that
there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that
the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore,
petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from
an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and
crime against popular representation.[9]

The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [10]

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil
aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and,
hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under
the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners, vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

RELOVA, J.: +.wph!1

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for
less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively,
as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among
others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being
friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of
Paraaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners
Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the
Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in
plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf
from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo
San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of
Paraaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed
by said respondent judge.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: t.hqw

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by
an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor
as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: t.hqw

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Unless the offended party has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal
action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on,
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for
the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who
was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error
was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary
for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if
the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that
the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision
and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant
Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of
the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby
ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.

SO ORDERED. 1wph1.t

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a
Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning
of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness
or an offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput
and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a
criminal case.

Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect of
criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing
vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended
party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases. Orders set aside.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.