Defense and Security Issues in an

ASEAN Maritime Community: The

Role of the Navies
Carlyle A. Thayer

Presentation to
Towards an ASEAN-Centric Maritime Security
Community, 3rd Maritime Security Symposium 2017
hosted by
The Philippine Navy, Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Diamond Hotel, Manila
May 10, 2017
 2

Defense and Security Issues in an ASEAN Maritime Community:

The Role of Navies

Carlyle A. Thayer1

Introduction
The aim of this presentation is to present an outsiders views and perspectives on how
ASEAN Navies can contribute to fostering an ASEAN Maritime Community and the legal
and policy challenges that will facilitate this endeavor.

This presentation is divided into seven parts. Part one considers the geographic scope of
the maritime domain where ASEAN Navies will operate. Part two discusses the notion of
a maritime community. Part three delineates the roles ASEAN Navies might undertake.
Part four provides the over-arching policy architecture for ASEAN maritime community
building. Part five focuses specifically on the current role of ASEAN Navies. Part six
discusses the policy and legal framework that ASEAN might adopt to enable ASEAN Navies
to foster a maritime community. Part six offers some concluding remarks.

Part 1 What is the Geographic Scope of ASEANs Maritime Domain?

In 1995, the members of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) adopted the South
East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). This treaty defined for the first
time ASEANs geographic scope:
Article 1
(a) "Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone", hereinafter referred to as the "Zone", means
the area comprising the territories of all States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and
their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ);
(b) "territory" means the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, the
seabed and the sub-soil thereof and the airspace above them
Article 2
This Treaty and its Protocol shall apply to the territories, continental selves, and EEZ of the States
Parties within the Zone in which the Treaty is in force [emphasis added]. 2

Southeast Asias maritime domain may be divided into seven maritime sub-regions: the
waters adjacent to the littoral states bordering the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean; the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore; the waters to the south of Indonesia and Timor-Leste

1
Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy,
Canberra. Email: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au. Revised May 16, 2017.
2
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone; http://asean.org/?static_post=treaty-on-the-
southeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone.
 3

stretching to Papua New Guinea (Banda and Arafura Seas); the Celebes and Sulu Seas; the
waters to the east and north of the Philippines littoral; Gulf of Thailand and the semi-
enclosed South China Sea.
Southeast Asias vast maritime domain contains porous borders on land and sea that
make it vulnerable to such non-traditional security challenges such as typhoons and
tsunamis (along the so-called Ring of Fire), piracy, transnational criminal activity (people
trafficking, arms and drug smuggling, terrorism), marine environmental pollution, and
illegal migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, Southeast Asias congested
maritime domain presents hazards to marine vessels.
To complicate this picture virtually all littoral ASEAN states have maritime jurisdictional
disputes with their neighbors. The South China Sea is particularly complex because no less
than six parties have conflicting or overlapping claims to sovereignty over land features
and/or maritime boundaries and sovereign jurisdiction.
Southeast Asia is also the crossroads between the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans and
therefore straddles important maritime passageways or sea lines of communication.
The South China Sea poses the most severe challenges to ASEAN maritime community-
building, but ASEANs maritime extends much further to include the littoral areas of nine
ASEAN member states.

Part 2 What is a Maritime Community?

For purposes of this paper, a maritime community is viewed as a sub-set of a larger
security community comprised of a group of states that
regularly interact with each other
attained a sense of community (we-feeling or togetherness) or collective
identity
adopted formal or informal norms, institutions, and practices
become integrated economically, politically etc.
hold dependable expectations of peaceful change
rule out the use of force to solve disputes
A security community is not an alliance or collective defense arrangement; but individual
members may enter into or maintain defense relations with other states. In the case of
Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Singapore are defense partners in the Five Power Defence
Arrangements, and the Philippines and Thailand are treaty allies with the United States.

Taking note of two features of a security community dependable expectations of

peaceful change and agreement not to use force member states generally do not
structure their forces to defend themselves from other members of the community. In
the case of a maritime community security is viewed as interdependent as non-traditional
 4

security challenges cannot be resolved by one state alone. This opens the door to
cooperation to address shared challenges.

Part 3 What Roles Might ASEAN Navies Perform?

It is useful here to draw on Geoffrey Tills distinction between modern and post-modern
navies to consider what role ASEAN Navies might perform to advance maritime
community building.3

According to Till the roles of the modern navy include:

Sea control (war fighting, show of force, rapid deployment, versatility)

Nuclear deterrence/ballistic missile defense
Maritime power projection
Exclusive good order at sea (defense of national interests and sovereignty in the
territorial sea and protection of resources such as oil, gas, and fisheries in the
Exclusive Economic Zone) and
Competitive gunboat diplomacy
In contrast, Till enumerates the following roles for the post-modern navy:

Sea control (the use of sea for whatever purpose determined by government,
naval operations more likely in the littoral but not open ocean)
Expeditionary operations (dealing with shore based instability and threats from
the sea)
Stability operations (including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief)
Inclusive good order at sea (safeguarding maritime commerce and energy
infrastructure, protection of natural resources from illegitimate exploitation or
environmental damage, and all forms of transnational crime including piracy), and
Cooperative naval diplomacy
Generically, modern navies may be equated with the naval forces of the major maritime
powers, and smaller ASEAN Navies generally may be equated to post-modern navies.
Modern navies adopt a balanced fleet force posture, while post-modern navies generally
are not balanced fleets due to resource constraints. The condition of post-modern navies
puts a premium on relying on external partners for support and as sources of arms
procurements but it also puts a premium on cooperative naval diplomacy to secure and
protect the sea-based trade system.

For ASEAN Navies, sea control could include: demonstrating deterrence (or
compellence/coercion), assertions of sovereign jurisdiction in the host countrys EEZ,

3
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition (London and New York: Routledge
Taylor & Francis, 2013), 28-39. Till notes that the terms modern navy and post-modern navy specifically
link the development of navies to the nature of the state they serve and to competing attitudes towards
globalisaton, 28.
 5

maintaining a national presence to demonstrate an interest in an area, gathering

information or picture-building (maritime domain awareness), and show-casing new
technology.
For our purposes, cooperative naval diplomacy includes using naval assets to build
capabilities for national defense, secure foreign policy objectives, influence the behavior
of allies and friends through inducements and persuasion, build relationships and
promote regional engagement, and maritime consensus building.4
Cooperative naval diplomacy is best viewed as a spectrum of activities ranging from
maintaining a forward naval presence on behalf of regional interests to monitor and/or
address threats to good order at sea, combined exercises, port visits, and naval
diplomacy.5 It is this regional interaction that contributes to a sense of community arising
from shared security concerns. In other words, cooperative naval diplomacy is an
essential ingredient of maritime community building.

Part 4 ASEANs Policy Framework for Maritime Community Building

Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has sought to promote the twin goals of Southeast
Asian autonomy and ASEANs centrality in the regions security affairs. As an example of
the former, ASEAN adopted the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration in
1971,6 the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976,7 and the SEANWFZ Treaty in 1995.
As an example of the latter, ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.

Creating an ASEAN Community

In 1997, Southeast Asias leaders adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 that set out the goal of
creating a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a
community of caring societies.8 This was the first major step towards ASEAN community-
building.

4
The discussion in this and the following paragraph draw on Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First
Century, 38-40.
5
Y.Bhg. Dato Noor Aziz Yunan, Chinas Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea, and Carlyle A. Thayer,
Maritime Security and the Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea, Papers presented to MIMA
Conference on the South China Sea: Recent Developments and Implications for Peaceful Dispute Resolution,
The Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, December 12-13, 2011.
6
1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, adopted November 27, 1971;
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/zone.pdf.
7
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, February 24, 1976.
http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-
february-1976-3.
8
ASEAN Vision 2020, December 14-16, 1997.http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-vision-2020.
 6

In 1998, the 6th ASEAN Summit adopted the Ha Noi Plan of Action (1999-2004). It included
seven proposals to strengthen regional peace and security that touched broadly on
maritime security.9 These included:
7.6 Encourage greater efforts towards the resolution of outstanding problems of boundaries
delimitation between ASEAN member states.
7.12 Encourage ASEAN Member Countries parties to a dispute to engage in friendly negotiation and
use the bilateral and regional processes of peaceful settlement of dispute or other procedures
provided for in the U.N. Charter.
7.13 Enhance efforts to settle disputes in the South China Sea through peaceful means among the
parties concerned in accordance with universally recognized international law, including the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
7.14 Continue efforts to promote confidence-building measures in the South China Sea between and
among parties concerned.
7.15 Encourage all other parties concerned to subscribe to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea.
7.16 Promote efforts to establish a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea among the
parties directly concerned.
7.17 Intensify intra-ASEAN security cooperation through existing mechanisms among foreign affairs
and defense officials.

In 2003, the 9th ASEAN Summit adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (or Bali
Concord II) that set the goal of creating a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated
ASEAN Community by 2020. 10 The ASEAN Community was to comprise three pillars:
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural
Community. In 2007, at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the deadline for the ASEAN
Community was brought forward to 2015.

ASEAN Security Community

In 2004, the 10th ASEAN Summit adopted the Vientiane Action Programme (2004-2010)
and for the first time placed maritime security on ASEANs agenda. The Vientiane Action
Programme contained the following three references to maritime security:
Progressive accession and implementation of relevant International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
instruments thereby enhancing maritime safety and security and protection of the marine
environment
Promote ASEAN maritime security cooperation:
Explore the establishment of an ASEAN maritime forum

In addition, the 10th ASEAN Summit adopted the Plan of Action for the ASEAN Security

9
The Hanoi Plan of Action was adopted by the 6th ASEAN Summit on December 15, 1998.
http://www.asean.org/news/item/ha-noi-declaration-of-1998-16-december-1998.
10
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, Indonesia, October 7, 2003.
http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii.
 7

Community (ASC). 11 It clearly revealed that national sovereignty trumped collective

identity at this stage of ASEANs development. The Plan of Action stated:
The ASC [ASEAN Security Community] promotes an ASEAN-wide political and security cooperation
in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than a defence pact, military alliance or a joint
foreign policy. The ASC Plan of Action is mutually-reinforcing with bilateral cooperation between
ASEAN Member Countries while recognising the sovereign rights of the Member Countries to pursue
their individual foreign policies and defence arrangements. In addressing future security challenges,
ASEAN Member Countries share the responsibility for strengthening peace, stability and security of
the region free from foreign military interference in any form or manifestation. The ASC shall
contribute to the further promotion of peace and security in the wider Asia Pacific region. In this
regard, the ASC is open and outward looking, engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners to
promote peace and stability in the region...

The Plan of Action also included references to the South China Sea in the section on
sharing norms:
Ensuring the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC) through, inter alia: a. Establishing an ASEANChina Working Group on the Implementation of
the DOC; b. Establishing a review mechanism on the implementation of the DOC; and c. Working
towards the adoption of the Code of Conduct in South China Sea (COC).

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting

The 2004 ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action included a provision for setting up an
annual ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). In May 2006, the ASEAN Defence
Ministers met for the first time and began the process of institutionalizing defence
cooperation on a regional basis. The ADMM became a formal part of the ASEAN Political-
Security Council established by the ASEAN Charter (see below). The ADMM became the
capstone, or the highest defence consultative mechanism, in ASEAN over what had been
informal meetings of the service and intelligence chiefs.
According to the Concept Paper establishing the ADMM its objective were:
To promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security;
To give guidance to existing senior defence and military officials dialogue and cooperation in the
field of defence and security within ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners;
To promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security
challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and
To contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as stipulated in the Bali
Concord II and to promote the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) on ASC.
The ADMM has quickly evolved; four years after its founding it began to adopt triennial
Work Plans and Concept Papers. The ADMM focused mainly on non-traditional security
issues including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR).
The creation of the ADMM resulted in a hierarchical structure that provided the ASEAN
Navy Chiefs with a clear chain of command. The three service chiefs (Army, Navy and Air)
and the chiefs of intelligence formed the bottom layer of this structure. They reported to

11
ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action was adopted by the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, 29-
30 November 2004.
https://www.google.com.au/#q=Plan+of+Action+for+the+ASEAN+Security+Community+.
 8

the Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting which in turn reported to the ADMM.
ADMM Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM) assisted the Defence Ministers. The role of the
ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meeting (ACNM) is discussed in Part 5 below.

ASEAN Charter
The 2004 ASC Plan of Action contained an Annex making provision for the adoption of the
ASEAN Charter with the aim to
reaffirm ASEAN's goals and principles in inter-state relations, in particular the collective
responsibilities of all ASEAN Member Countries in ensuring non- aggression and respect for each
other's sovereignty and territorial integrity... the maintenance of political stability, regional peace
and economic progress; and the establishment of effective and efficient institutional framework for
ASEAN.12

In 2008, the ASEAN Charter came into force. The Charter gave ASEAN a legal personality
to enable it to negotiate with external parties. The Charters Preamble declared that
ASEAN was bound by geography, common objectives and shared destiny. 13
The ASEAN Charter set out its purposes as:
Maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-orientated values
in the region
Enhance regional resilience by promoting greater political, and security cooperation
To promote an ASEAN identity
To maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations
and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and
inclusive.

The ASEAN Charter set out principles that balanced national sovereignty and collective
responsibility. On the one hand, the Charter listed respect for the independence,
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all members and
collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity among its
principles. Other relevant principles included:
Respect for every member to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion
and coercion
Enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN
Centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations.

12
Annex for ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action. http://www.asean.org/news/item/annex-for-
asean-security-community-plan-of-action.
13
The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (The ASEAN Charter);
http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf and
http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/13.-May-2016-The-ASEAN-Charter-19th-Reprint-Amended.pdf.
 9

The ASEAN Charter also declared that, ASEAN shall maintain and establish dispute
settlement mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN Cooperation.14 In the case where there is
no existing dispute settlement instrument, the Charter prescribed the creation of
an appropriate mechanism including arbitration. 15 The Chairman of ASEAN or the
ASEAN Secretary General were empowered to offer their good offices or mediation.
Disputes that could not be resolved were to be referred to the ASEAN Summit, composed
of the ASEAN heads of state/heads of government for resolution.
Finally, the ASEAN Charter set up a new structure of decision-making by creating three
community councils: ASEAN Political-Security Council (APSC), ASEAN Economic Council
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. The work of these three council is overseen by the
ASEAN Consultative Council (ACC) composed of foreign ministers. The ACC reports
directly to the ASEAN Summit of heads of state/government.

ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint

In 2009, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint (2009-2015)
setting out three major objectives: a rules-based community of shared values and norms;
a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for
comprehensive security; and (3) a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly
integrated and interdependent world.16
In 2010, ASEAN established the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) whose remit was to focus
on a comprehensive approach to maritime issues.17
The 46th AMM in June 2013 reviewed progress on the ASEAN Political-Security
Community. A Joint Statement issued after the AMM declared with respect to the ASEAN
Political-Security Community:
21. Recognising that maritime security, including maritime safety, is crucial to a vibrant, peaceful,
stable and resilient Southeast Asia, we encouraged the strengthening of regional cooperation in
maritime security through, inter alia, capacity building, exchanging of experiences and sharing of
best practices by utilising existing ASEAN frameworks, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Maritime Forum
(AMF)/Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).

ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2015 was adopted in March 2016. Maritime
security was addressed in Part B (Peaceful, Secure and Stable Region). Point B.6 called on
ASEAN to Enhance maritime security and promote maritime cooperation in ASEAN
region and beyond, through the strengthening of ASEAN-led mechanisms and the

14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, June 2009.
http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/5187-18.pdf.
17
Chairs Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit, Bali, November 17, 2011, Points 14-17 (Maritime
Cooperation).
 10

adoption of internationally accepted maritime conventions and principles. 18

Part B.6 contained three sub-sections headed: B.6.1 Maintain the South China Sea as a
sea of peace, prosperity and cooperation, B.6.2 Promote maritime cooperation to
comprehensively address maritime issues, and B.6.3 Ensure peaceful, safe, free
unimpeded international navigation and overflight, in accordance with relevant
international laws.
Regarding maritime cooperation, Part B.6.2 listed twelve activities:
i. Enhance coordination among ASEAN mechanisms on maritime cooperation, such as the ASEAN
Maritime Forum, to comprehensively address maritime issues;
ii. Promote dialogue and cooperation on maritime issues in other ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as
the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum while ensuring ASEAN centrality;
iii. Enhance maritime security and safety in the region in order to ensure greater maritime
connectivity, anchored on secure and safe sea lines of communication and freedom of
navigation;
iv. Enhance maritime security cooperation, especially maritime law enforcement, including through
information sharing, to identify maritime security challenges and their potential impact on
regional peace and security;
v. Promote linkages between national, regional and international mechanisms on maritime
cooperation, particularly in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships;
vi. Promote closer maritime cooperation in the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, including the sustainable use of maritime resources and the protection of
biodiversity;
vii. Expand ASEAN maritime cooperation to effectively combat transnational crimes such as maritime
terrorism, smuggling of goods, people and weapons, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons,
piracy, hijacking, armed robbery against ships, as well as to address transboundary challenges
including oil spill incidents and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, through concrete and
practical activities, while maintaining the respective reporting lines;
viii. Strengthen ASEAN cooperation in enhancing maritime domain awareness and its increased
impact on security, safety, economy and environment of the region;
ix. Enhance cooperation in maritime safety and search and rescue as well as strengthen
implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation in Search and Rescue of Persons and
Vessels in Distress at Sea, through activities such as information sharing, technological
cooperation, exchange of visits of authorities concerned, tabletop exercises and field training
exercises at sea, as well as collaboration with Dialogue Partners and relevant international
maritime organisations;
x. Strengthen existing maritime cooperation mechanisms, in cooperation with relevant external
parties, with a view to augmenting the capacity to combat illegal activities at sea;
xi. Enhance cooperation with relevant external parties in combating piracy in cases affecting
nationals of ASEAN Member States in other regions; and
xii. Strengthen and expand activities on capacity building of maritime law enforcement agencies in the

18
See; http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ASEAN-APSC-Blueprint-2025.pdf.
 11

region, including through engaging external parties, particularly Dialogue Partners. 19

At the most recent 30th ASEAN Summit held in Manila on April 29, 2017, the Chairmans
statement addressed maritime security and cooperation in these words:
We reaffirmed the need to strengthen cooperation and constructive dialogue on maritime security,
maritime safety, maritime environment, and other maritime issues, including search and rescue,
piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing
and other crimes related to fisheries, and other crimes at sea, through ASEAN led-mechanism such
as the AMF [ASEAN Maritime Forum] and EAMF [Expanded AMF], ARF, ADMM, and ADMM-Plus.
We looked forward to strengthening ASEAN cooperation to deal with these threats and discuss
with our Dialogue Partners cooperative frameworks and measures as soon as practicable. We
expressed anticipation of the forthcoming Seventh AMF [ASEAN Maritime Forum] and the Fifth
EAMF be held in Jakarta later this year.

ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners

ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF is a regional security dialogue forum, established in 1994, whose membership
currently includes twenty-seven countries in the Indo-Pacific Region. The original Concept
Paper for the ARF (1995) set out three phases of development confidence building
measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy (PD) and conflict resolution (later amended to
approaches to the resolution of conflict).20 Later the ARF decided that phases one and
two, CBMs and PD, could take place in tandem.
In July 2009, the 16th ARF Ministerial Meeting adopted a Vision Statement setting out the
ARFs goals to 2020.21 The following year the ARF Ministerial Meeting approved the Hanoi
Plan of Action to implement the Vision Statement.22 The Plan of Action identified five
areas of cooperation: disaster relief, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, maritime
security, non-proliferation and disarmament and peacekeeping operations.
With respect to maritime security the Plan of Action stated:
By 2020, ARF should serve as a regional forum for maritime security issues that promotes and
enhances maritime domain awareness, and develop concrete and effective regional responses to
maritime security challenges.
3.1. Support the work of the ARF ISM on MS [ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on
Maritime Security] as an established regional framework that addresses maritime security issues.

19
Ibid.
20
The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper; https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/12052.htm.
21
ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement, adopted July 23, 2009;
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2009%20ASEAN%20Regional%20Forum%20Vision%20Statement-pdf.pdf.
22
Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement, May 20, 2010.
http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/arf/20100520.O1E.html. Both the Vision Statement and Plan
of Action endorsed the development of the ARFs capacity for preventive diplomacy. In July 2011, the 18 th
ARF Ministerial Meeting adopted the Work Plan for Preventive Diplomacy.
 12

3.2. Promote compliance and adherence to relevant international legal instruments and regional
arrangements.
3.3. Forge close cooperation toward enhancing the safety and security of navigation, including the
implementation of standards, best practices, and data-sharing for small vessel registration on a
national and, as appropriate, regional basis, taking into account existing regional mechanisms and
frameworks.
3.4. Utilize the work of national and regional think tanks to assist the work of the ISM on Maritime
Security to enhance transparency in regional maritime security.
3.5. Promote regional maritime security capacity-building through concrete activities such as
information-sharing, exchanges of officials, and holding maritime security-related tabletop and joint
training exercises as and when appropriate.
3.6. Promote networking among ARF, ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), IMO [International Maritime
Organization], IORARC [Indian Ocean Region-Association for Regional Cooperation-], ReCAAP
[Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia],
as well as other maritime-related fora, as part of a comprehensive and mutually beneficial approach
to maritime cooperation.
3.7. Promote cooperation in maritime issues, including maritime security and safety and search and
rescue, through activities such as information sharing and technological cooperation in line with
national and international laws.
3.8. Forge closer cooperation in combating maritime terrorism and transnational maritime crimes
such as piracy, armed robbery against ships, hijacking, smuggling, and trafficking in persons, in
accordance with national and international laws through concrete and practical activities.

The ARF conducts its activities through two Inter-Sessional Groups and four Inter-
Sessional Meetings. Maritime security issues are addressed through the ISM on Maritime
Security. In July 2011, the 44th ARF Ministerial Meeting approved the ISM on Maritime
Securitys Work Plan on Maritime Security.23 It focused on information sharing, capacity
building, and training. A Work Plan for Maritime Security (2015-2017) was adopted in July
2015.
The ARF currently conducts biennial civil-military disaster relief exercises, known as the
ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx). The first DiREx was held in the Philippines in May
2009, the second DiREx was held in Manado, Indonesia in March 2011, the third DiREx
was held in Hua Hin, Thailand in May 2013, and the fourth DiREx took place in Kedah,
Malaysia in May 2015.

East Asia Summit

In 2005, in a major development, ASEAN elevated it relations with its dialogue partners
by creating the East Asia Summit (EAS) comprised of the heads of state/government of
the ten ASEAN member states and six dialogue partners - Australia, China, India, Japan,
South Korea, and New Zealand. In 2011, the Russian Federation and the United States
were admitted as new members at the 6th EAS. Leaders at this summit called for dialogue
involving EAS participating countries to utilize opportunities and address common

23
See: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/38893760/annex-h-arf-work-plan-on-maritime-
securitypdf-asean-regional-.
 13

challenges on maritime issues building upon the existing ASEAN Maritime Forum
(AMF).24

ADMM-Plus
In October 2010, the structure of the EAS (ten ASEAN members plus eight dialogue
partners) became the model for defence relations with the creation of the ASEAN Defence
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus),25 the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting-Plus
(ADSOM-Plus), and five Expert Working Groups (EWG): maritime security, counter-
terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations and
military medicine.26 In 2013 and 2016, the EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action and the
EWG on Cyber Security, respectively, were stood up. The EWGs report their deliberations
to the ADSOM-Plus.
Within two years the ADMM-Plus began a practical program of defence interaction
among its members. In July and September 2012, respectively, the EWG on Military
Medicine and EWG on Maritime Security conducted table-top exercises. The following
year ADMM-Plus members conducted their first practical exercises in four areas:
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, military medicine, counter-terrorism and
maritime security. The first ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise was held
in Sydney from late September-early October 2013.
During the ADMM-Plus second three-year cycle (2014-2017), two further maritime
security exercises were conducted the first in Singapore (May 2016) and the second in
New Zealand (November 2016).

Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum

The call by EAS leaders at their sixth summit to address common challenges on maritime
issues was followed up by the 20th ASEAN Summit that met in Phnom Penh in April 2012.
ASEAN leaders called for the expansion of ASEAN maritime cooperation through joint
collaborative efforts in marine related fields.27 This resulted in the establishment of the
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) comprising the ten ASEAN member states and
their eight dialogue partners. The EAMF was designated a Track 1.5 organization and
included, in addition to government officials, representatives from relevant stakeholders,
such as international organizations, maritime training institutes, ship owners, academia,

24
Chairmans Statement of the Sixth East Asia Summit, Bali, Indonesia, 19 November 2011, in East Asia
Summit Document Series, 2005-2016 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016), p. 94;
http://asean.org/storage/2017/02/59.-December-2016-East-Asia-Summit-Document-Series-2005-
2016.pdf.
25
The purpose of the ADMM-Plus was to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability,
and development in the region. About the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM Plus), February 6,
2016; https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html.
26
In 2011 the terms of reference for the five ADMM-Plus Experts Working Groups were approved.
27
2012 Phnom Penh Declaration on ASEAN: One Community, One Destiny, Point 6, Phnom Penh, 3 April
2012. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2012%20Phnom%20Penh%20Declaration%20on%20ASEAN-pdf.pdf.
 14

and civil society. The first meeting of the EAMF was held in Manila on October 5, 2012
back-to-back with the annual meeting of the AMF.28 The EAMF met annually from 2012
to 2015. No meeting was held in 2016 and the fifth EAMF is scheduled for 2017.29

Part 5 Current Roles of ASEAN Navies

ASEAN Navies Interaction (2001-2010)
Cooperation among ASEAN Navies commenced in 2001 when the Chiefs of Navies
convened in Thailand in what was termed ASEAN Navies Interaction (ANI). The second
and third ANI meetings took place at two-year intervals - ANI-2 met in Malaysia 2003 and
ANI-3 was held in Singapore 2005. There was a five-year break until ANI-4 met in
Indonesia 2010.
ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meeting (2011-2017)
A major turning point took place in July 2011 when the ASEAN Chiefs of Navies convened
in Hanoi and held their first formal meeting. Under the Terms of Reference the Navy
Chiefs agreed to enhance collaboration and cooperation between naval forces of each
ASEAN member.
The purpose of the ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meeting (ACNM) was to create a collective
platform to exchange views and opinions on regional maritime security issues in order to
enhance understanding, trust and confidence and to promote joint operations and the
capability of ASEAN Navies to meet future challenges. All ASEAN naval cooperation was
to take place on the basis of non-interference, mutual respect, the rights of sovereignty,
non-coercion, voluntary actions, and harmony in accord with basic principles of the
ASEAN Community. In sum, ASEAN Navies were now formally included in the ASEAN
community-building process set to commence in 2015.
Host Vietnam welcomed practical co-operation in humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, joint patrols, establishment of communication hot lines among naval units,
exchanges of intelligence, joint training and the exchange of delegations. 30 Vietnam
successfully proposed the inauguration of ASEAN Navy Young Officers Interaction.
Discussion at the ANCM-5 covered accelerating cooperation in maritime security
including anti-terrorism, search and rescue, and humanitarian activities; partnerships
among ASEAN navies; a hot line to improve coordination between naval headquarters;
and the expansion of naval cooperation outside the region. Finally, the ANCM-5 agreed
to meet annually with hosting on a voluntary basis and to hold their first tabletop HA/DR
exercise.

28
Chairmans Statement, 1st Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Manila, October 9, 2012;
http://asean.org/1st-expanded-asean-maritime-forum-manila/.
29
Brunei was scheduled to host the fifth EAMF. ASEAN has yet to explain why this meeting was cancelled.
30
ASEAN navy chiefs advance co-operation, Viet Nam News, July 28, 2011;
http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/213790/asean-navy-chiefs-advance-co-operation.html.
 15

In July 2012, the Republic of Singapore Navy and Indonesian Navy co-hosted the inaugural
ASEAN Maritime Security Information-Sharing Exercise (AMSISX) at the Changi Command
and Control Centre. AMSISX was attended by navy chiefs from Brunei, Malaysia and
Thailand. The exercise included not only the participants in Singapore but also their
respective countries operations centers that were linked up through the ASEAN
Information-Sharing Portal (AIP). The AIP provides a common platform for all ASEAN
navies to share maritime security related information in the region and enhance
information-sharing procedures among the ASEAN countries.
ANCM-6 was hosted by Brunei from September 2-4, 2012 on the theme Friendship at Sea
for Regional Maritime Peace and Security. The ANCM-6 discussed possible areas of
cooperation including marine environmental protection, marine scientific research,
safety of navigation and communication at sea, and search and rescue. This meeting
endorsed a proposal to establish an ASEAN Navy Chiefs Secretariat at Singapores
Information Fusion Center with priority to maritime cooperation, piracy, terrorism, and
search and rescue. Finally, this meeting endorsed the drawing up of an ANCM Roadmap.
ANCM-7 was hosted by the Philippines from September 9-11, 2013 on the theme
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, with aim the of enhancing cooperation and
interoperability. Philippine Navy Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano, host, stated that the
objective of the ACNM was to address many challenges of maritime security that
threatens current peace and stability of the region internal strife, global crisis,
transnational crimes, natural calamities, competition for resources, and even cyberspace
attacks.31
ANCM-7 was also addressed by President Benigno Aquino who stressed that when the
ASEAN Economic Community is established in 2015 it would be important for ASEAN
Navies to solidify their ties in order to protect the common seas to ensure freedom of
navigation, safety of commercial vessels and security of civilian passengers. Aquino called
for sharing lessons in conducting maritime patrols, search and rescue, interdiction of
pirates and other security threats. Aquino emphasized the importance of individual
sovereignty and regional solidarity.
The agenda for ANCM-7 included a review of past discussions, consideration of new
initiatives and the conduct of future meetings. Navy Chiefs exchanged views on recent
developments affecting regional maritime security and how to promote peace through
dialogue, consultation, and practical activities that would build confidence, trust, and
transparency.
The Navy Chiefs reaffirmed their commitment to existing bilateral and multilateral joint
and coordinated patrols that addressed maritime security concerns in waters bordering
their countries. They agreed to bring forward the implementation of agreed greeting and
communication procedures among ASEAN Navies as a CBM and to maintain direct

31
We have not lost Panatag PH Navy chief, Rappler, September 10, 2013;
http://www.rappler.com/nation/38579-philippines-panatag-navy.
 16

communications through hotlines to be maintained and regularly updated at the ASEAN

Information Sharing Portal in Singapore.
The Navy Chiefs approved the development of an ACNM Road Map, establishment of a
permanent ANCM Secretariat, development of an ANCM-Plus process with Dialogue
Partners, formulation of a common ASEAN Navies HA/DR Protocol and hosts for ANCM-8
and ANCM-9. The Navy Chiefs discussed a future Fleet Review to celebrate ASEANs 50th
founding anniversary.
The second ASEAN Navy Young Officers Interaction was held in Brunei in October 2013.
By the end of the year the ACNM had held three field exercises: ASEAN Militaries HA/DR
and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX); counter-terrorism; and maritime security.
In February 2014, the Philippines hosted an ASEAN Navies Workshop to draw up a draft
protocol on HA/DR cooperation outlining common procedures for planning, training and
operations. Thirty ASEAN Navy officers from eight countries attended (Thailand and Laos
were not represented). The workshop also reviewed mutually agreed Standard Operating
Procedures for organization, administrative support, planning and communications.
ANCM-8 was hosted by Thailand from August 27-28, 2014 on the theme Roles ASEAN
Navies after ASEAN Integration in 2015. The Navy Chiefs reviewed cooperation activities
currently underway; exchanged views on the maritime security situation in the region;
how to develop better approaches to search and rescue, piracy, maritime violations and
crimes, and maritime terrorism; and ASEAN Navies action plan for the next two years.
The Navy Chiefs also considered the draft ASEAN Navies Roadmap aimed at aligning
ASEAN navies to the same purpose and objectives and considered Thai proposals to host
an international fleet review in 2017 and a multilateral combined naval exercise among
ASEAN navies.
In October 2014, the Philippine Navy hosted the 3rd ASEAN Navy Young Officers
Interaction, involving two representatives from eight ASEAN Navies (Cambodia and Laos
were not present).
In June 2015, Thailand hosted the first meeting of the ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise
Standard Operating Procedure (AMNEX SOP) Working Group Meeting. This meeting
reviewed the AMNEX SOP before forwarding it to the ACNM-9 for consideration.
ANCM-9 was hosted by Myanmar August 20, 2015 on the theme ASEAN Naval Teamwork
Towards ASEAN Integration 2015. Navy Chiefs exchanged views on Fostering ASEAN
Naval Teamwork in Regional Maritime Security to build on established friendship and
cooperation to conduct activities that would enhance practical cooperation and build
mutual trust at multiple levels. The Navy Chiefs approved a ANCM Logo as a badge of
ASEAN Naval Cooperation.
ANCM-10 was hosted by Malaysia from August 22-25, 2016 on the theme Enhancing
Operational Interoperability. The Naval Chiefs were briefed by their host on Malaysias
plans for reorganizing its fleet and the experiences of the Royal Malaysian Navy in coping
 17

with the threat from Islamic State activities within the ANCM framework. The Chiefs
approved the INDOMALPHI tri-lateral joint patrol in the Strait of Malacca,
The Navy Chiefs discussed the current regional security situation including terrorism,
rising ethnic and religious conflicts, and challenges and threats to regional maritime and
aviation security. They also discussed procedures to deploy regular armed forces in
HA/DR missions, the training program for ASEAN naval cadets with practical exercises at
sea, and a maritime information sharing exercise in 2017.
ACNM-10 agreed on the need to develop CBMs, enhance sharing of information on
maritime and aviation security by promoting the role of the Regional Maritime Security
Information-Sharing Center and the ADMM-Plus Information Sharing Portal, and the
need for members to meet their responsibilities to effectively implement initiatives
previously agreed.

Part 6 Policy and Legal Framework for an ASEAN Maritime Community

This section discusses the policy and legal frameworks that will facilitate ASEAN Navies
contribution towards an ASEAN Maritime Community.

As noted in Part 1 above, the geographic scope of ASEANs maritime domain includes the
territorial seas and EEZs of all member states. The maritime domain of ASEAN littoral
states is contested by Chinas claim to indisputable sovereignty to the islands and
adjacent waters as shown on in its nine-dotted line map encompassing 62 percent or
more of the South China Sea.

Ever since China tabled its nine-dotted line map with the United Nations Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009 it has refused to clarify its claims. China
has not, for example, promulgated straight base lines around any of its seven artificial
features in the Spratly islands. The Arbitral Tribunal that heard the claims brought by the
Philippines against China ruled in July 2016 that China could not base its claims on
historic/historical rights. The Arbitral Tribunal also ruled illegal any attempt to draw
straight base lines around all the land features in the Spratlys. China also refuses to accept
the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and its final Award.

China further compounds maritime disputes in the South China Sea by invoking its
domestic legislation as the legal basis to enforce its sovereignty. For example, Chinas Law
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf claims sovereignty over the
Paracel and Spratly islands and other land features in the South China Sea. Article 14
states that the provisions of this Law shall not affect the historic rights enjoyed by the
Peoples Republic of China.32
In past years China has interfered with attempts by the Philippines and Vietnam to
resupply their occupied land features. China also challenged foreign military ships and
aircraft on the basis that they are threatening the safety of Peoples Liberation Army Navy

32
Zou Keyuan, Chinas U-shaped line in the South China Sea Revisited, Ocean Development and
International Law, 43(1), 2012, p. 21.
 18

(PLAN) ships and facilities by flying through a military alert (or safety) zone. PLAN warships
and aircraft regularly shadow foreign naval ships and aircraft and on occasion interfere
with their right to freedom of navigation and overflight. However, the brunt of Chinese
assertiveness is conducted by white-hulled China Coast Guard civilian vessels.
In 2014 and 2015 China implemented a master plan to construct seven artificial islands in
the Spratlys. China has since built military infrastructure including three-kilometer long
runways on three features (Mischief, Johnson South and Subi Reefs). After the Arbitr4al
Tribunal Award China erected reinforced hangars adjacent to its runways and later added
close in weapons systems and structures to house surface to air missiles. ASEAN states,
both individually and collectively, have chosen wisely not to use their military forces to
confront China directly.
Chinas assertiveness, ambit maritime claims, and militarization of its artificial islands
pose major challenges to peace, cooperation and development in the South China Sea.
In addition, Sino-American strategic naval rivalry in the South China Sea adds a
complicating factor that has spawned an arms buildup in Southeast Asia.
But Chinas actions have also posed an opportunity for ASEAN states to assert Southeast
Asias autonomy and ASEAN centrality by collectively pushing for the full implementation
of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the negotiation
of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
But these efforts are not sufficient in themselves to bring peace and stability to Southeast
Asias maritime domain. There are two additional actions ASEAN can take to shore up the
legal and policy framework to facilitate the activities of ASEAN Navies in building a
maritime community. First, ASEAN states should conclude a Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asias Maritime Domain. Second, ASEAN states should work to
strengthen further the ASEAN Political-Security Community. These two actions are
discussed in turn below.

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asias Maritime Domain

ASEAN should adopt an ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asias
Maritime Domain (hereafter the Treaty) among its members.33 This Treaty would bind
ASEAN members to resolve territorial disputes among themselves and set an example to
the East Asian and global communities. ASEAN should enlist the support of its dialogue
partners to support this initiative. The Treaty should set out the geographical boundaries
of Southeast Asias maritime domain; following SEANWFZ these should include the

33
This proposal is a modification of an idea first presented by the author to Maritime Security: Towards a
Regional Code of Conduct, 8th CSCAP General Conference, Dangers and Dilemmas: Will the New Regional
Security Architecture Help?, sponsored by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, Hanoi,
November 21-22, 2011. This proposal was refined in two subsequent presentations: Thayer, Positioning
ASEAN between Global Powers, Presentation to the 14th Regional Outlook Forum, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore, January 5, 2012 and Thayer, Beyond Territoriality: Managing the Maritime
Commons in the South China Sea, Paper delivered to the 28th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, International
Institute of Strategic Studies, Kuala Lumpur, June 2-4, 2014.
 19

respective territorial seas, continental shelves and EEZs of all ASEAN members (and future
members).34 This Treaty should have a protocol of accession inviting all ASEAN Dialogue
Partners to sign.
There are five reasons why ASEAN should adopt a Treaty Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asias Maritime Domain:
First, security of Southeast Asias maritime domain is indivisible for all ASEAN members,
whether coastal or landlocked states.
ASEANs current proposed Code of Conduct with China, because it is focused solely on the
South China Sea, does not cover maritime approaches to the Malacca Straits or the
western seaboards of Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia, the Gulf of Thailand, the waters
surrounding the Indonesian archipelago and waters to the north, east and south of the
Philippines archipelago.
Second, international law, including UNCLOS, applies equally throughout Southeast Asias
maritime domain and not just the South China. It is applicable to all states.
Third, the treaty should incorporate the norms and legal obligations that may be
stumbling blocks in consultations between ASEAN and China on a COC but would appeal
to ASEANs other Dialogue Partners.
Fourth, China would be put under pressure to join other Dialogue Partners in acceding to
the treaty or bear the political costs of remaining outside its provisions.
Fifth, the treaty would reinforce ASEAN unity and Southeast Asias autonomy by placing
ASEAN at the centre of relations with outside maritime powers. The ASEAN Treaty would
overcome differences between claimant and non-claimant states by making all ASEAN
members stakeholders, including Cambodia, Myanmar and landlocked Laos.35 The Treaty
would also reinforce ASEANs corporate and legal identity and enhance its ability to deal
with external powers.
What should be included in a Treaty Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asias Maritime
Domain?
The Treatys Preamble should include pledges by all ASEAN members to bring their
maritime boundaries and claims into accord with international law, including UNCLOS

34
Such as Timor-Leste.
35
Cambodia and Myanmar were the only two members of ASEAN to remain silent when maritime
security/South China Sea issues were first raised at the November 2011 East Asia Summit Leaders Retreat.
Cambodia played a spoiling role when it was ASEAN Chair in 2012 by preventing any mention of South China
Sea issues in the customary joint statement; none was issued. Cambodia and Laos both demurred when
ASEAN foreign ministers held a retreat in early 2015 to discuss Chinas land reclamation activities in the
South China Sea. On Cambodias role in 2012 see: Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEANS Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10(34), No. 4, August 20, 2012,
1-23.
 20

with particular attention to eliminating excessive baselines and clearly distinguishing

islands from rocks for purposes of maritime delimitation.
The Treaty should include provision for setting up an independent panel of technical and
legal experts who could be called on to assist in determining base lines and the
classification of islands and rocks.
The Treaty should commit all signatories to renounce the threat of and use of force to
settle their disputes over sovereignty and sovereign rights and disruption of good order
at sea including safety of navigation and over flight.
The Treaty should include a pledge to resolve all outstanding disputes regarding land
features in Southeast Asian waters, overlapping EEZs and delimitation of continental
shelves between and among ASEAN members.36
The Treaty should incorporate references to previous ASEAN treaties such as the TAC and
SEANWFZ and international maritime conventions such UNCLOS, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Convention on
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea,37 and other relevant conventions.
The Treaty should include a binding commitment to resolve all disputes through peaceful
means.
The Treaty should define militarization and include provisions for the demilitarization of
islands and rocks and prohibit the deployment of specified types of weapon systems, such
as land based anti-ship and anti-air craft missiles.
The Treaty should contain a provision requiring all signatories to cooperate in marine
scientific research, marine pollution, fisheries management, search and rescue, anti-
piracy and other agreed areas.
The Treaty should include a provision of a protocol; for ASEAN Dialogue Partners and
other interested states to sign on to the Treaty.
Finally, the Treaty should make provision for setting up a mechanism to handle complaints
and disputes that may arise. Such a mechanism should include the ASEAN High Council or
third party mediation or international legal arbitration.

ASEAN Political-Security Community

ASEAN must be more proactive in shaping consensus among its member as part of the
ASEAN Political-Security Community-building process. ASEAN should hold its members

36
Note the recurrent tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia over the waters around Ambalat; Jet
fighters, war boats ready to launch attack, Jakarta Post, June 19, 2015.
37
On September 7, 2016 China and ASEAN member states adopted a Joint Statement on the Application of
the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea.
 21

who are littoral states to the highest standards of transparency with respect to three
areas:
1. bringing their maritime zones into conformity with international law including
UNCLOS;
2. clarifying their claims to features and maritime zones in the South China Sea;38 and
3. providing a detailed account of the chronology of when features in the South China
Sea were occupied and report on the extent and purpose of all infrastructure
developments, including so-called land reclamation, undertaken since the DOC was
adopted in November 2002. ASEAN should review these accounts and assess whether
they violate the letter and spirit of the DOC regarding self-restraint in the conduct of
activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability in
the South China Sea.
In addition, ASEANs Political-Security Community Council should develop a whole-of-
ASEAN approach to South China Sea issues by directing its subordinate agencies (ASEAN
Defense Ministers, ASEAN Navy Chiefs, ASEAN Coast Guards, etc.) to develop effective
policies to address security challenges arising from disputes in Southeast Asiasa maritme
domain . Once ASEAN has established a common position, ASEAN officials should take its
policy proposals to ASEAN-centric multilateral institutions such as the ARF, Expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum,39 ADMM-Plus for endorsement.
Taken together, the ASEAN Treaty and a strengthened ASEAN Political-Security Council
would provide the policy and legal basis for ASEAN Navies to craft specific regional
programs for security cooperation and community-building.

Part 7 Conclusion
This paper has offered a brief stock take of current ASEAN and ASEAN-centric mechanisms
that focus on maritime security and cooperation relevant to Southeast Asias maritime
domain. Five major conclusions can be drawn:
1. Maritime security initially had no forum within ASEAN but now it has been
institutionalized into several multilateral institutions including the ACNM.
2. Maritime security is now formally on the ASEAN agenda at the highest-level.
3. Maritime security was once conceived of as state security it is now being viewed
as part of regional security.

38
See the discussion in Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Maritime Disputes
in the South China Sea, The American Journal of International Law, 107(1), January 2013, 142-163.
39
See the authors suggestions to the EAMF: Carlyle A. Thayer, Navigating Uncharted Waters: Maritime
Confidence Building Measures and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, Presentation to Enhancing
Regional Maritime Security, Freedom of Safety of Navigation through Practical Implementation of
Confidence Building Measures as well as Regional Instruments to Prevent and Manage Incidents at Sea, 3 rd
ASEAN Expanded Maritime Forum, Furama Resort Hotel, Da Nang, Vietnam, August 28, 2014.
 22

4. Discussion on maritime security has moved beyond general discussion to specific

proposals and activities.
5. Cooperative naval activities under the ACNM are contributing to ASEANs
community-building project in the armed forces and defense establishments of
member states.
From the above discussion, it is clear that ASEAN has adopted a comprehensive approach
to addressing security issues with an emphasis on non-traditional challenges and threats.
All ASEAN littoral states face similar challenges because Southeast Asias maritime
domain links these states rather than separates them. These challenges include:
Safety of navigation and overflight
Protection and management of marine resources
Marine environmental protection
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
Search and rescue at sea
Combating transnational crime, people trafficking, piracy, armed robbery,
smuggling and illegal unreported unregulated fishing.
ASEAN also has developed an elaborate architecture to deal with these issues under the
ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Community, including the ASEAN Political-Security Community.
Maritime community-building is nested in this architecture. Since 2011 the ACNMs have
set out systematically to address these concerns through regional maritime cooperation
including capacity building, technical cooperation and information sharing in the
maritime domain. Regional maritime cooperation thus contributes to community-
building among armed forces and defence establishments of the ASEAN member states.
ASEAN Navy Chiefs are constrained by the policy and legal framework adopted and
approved by their heads of state and government. At present multiple maritime disputes
in the South China Sea between ASEAN claimant states and China remain unresolved. This
paper suggests that an improvement in ASEANs legal and policy regime will create a more
conducive environment for maritime community building because ASEAN Navy Chiefs will
have a clearer picture of where they can sail, conduct combined exercises and perform
the constabulary functions of post-modern navies.
In addition, ASEAN has created a parallel structure to put ASEAN-centrality at the center
of ASEANs relations with its eight major dialogue partners: East Asia Summit, ADMM-
Plus, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum. This new architecture should serve as
insulation for ASEAN against strategic naval rivalry between China and the United States.
If ASEAN sets its priorities and seizes the initiative it can draw its dialogue partners into
cooperative naval arrangements that strengthen Southeast Asias autonomy and ASEAN
centrality. One example is to involve all dialogue partners in implementing the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) throughout Southeast Asias maritime domain,
including the South China Sea, under the auspices of an Expanded ASEAN Navy Chiefs
Meeting or ACNM-Plus.