Sema v Comelec Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the
legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
558 SCRA 700 Political Law Municipal Corporation
Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM)
Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato
City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part
of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion
in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of
Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic
Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law,
the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan
(Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the
exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially
stated that the 1stdistrict is now only made of Cotabato City
(because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while
awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to
Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City
should be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was
winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan),
that province automatically gains legislative representation
and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in
effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the
HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still
there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created,
the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local
government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
created, should have at least one representative in the
HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district,
there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM
cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without
first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts
is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can
create are barangays not cities and provinces.
LCP VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),
represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas;
CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN
SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON,Respondents.
FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for
prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines
(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas,
assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a component
city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc,
by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the
Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10
and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En
Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution,
by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of
December 21, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section
10 of the Constitution
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section
6 and the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
First issue:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by
Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the
will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making
powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did
when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of
laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the
Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it
provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the
creation of local government unitsincome, population, and
land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income
requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh
and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is
countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting
for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in
their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the
concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009,
such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
LGC itself.
Second Issue:
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood
Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the
pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and
their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. versus
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050
February 10, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina
brought this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional.
Based on the NSO 2000 Census of
Population, the population of the Province of
Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was
afterwards conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a
population count of 371,576 inhabitants with
average annual income for calendar year 2002-
2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of
802.12 square kilometers as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The
Local Government Code, a province may be
created if it has an average annual income of not
less than P20 million based on 1991 constant
prices as certified by the Department of Finance,
and a population of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a
contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square
kilometers as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands or is separated by
a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute
to the income of the province.
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a
plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative.
With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was
created into a separate and distinct province.
Respondents argued that exemption from
the land area requirement is germane to the
purpose of the Local Government Code to develop
self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions.
Thus, the rules and regulations have the force and
effect of law as long as they are germane to the
objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Sec.
2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
(IRR) valid and constitutional.
Held:
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is
below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat
Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square
kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of
2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts
proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the
land area requirement, was null and void as the said
exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no
dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and
the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic
law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held the
Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May
12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050,
April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that
Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands, is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation
of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of
viability. However, with respect to the creation of
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided
for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit
to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province
under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands
or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-
created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy
decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but com was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus,
when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to
reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict
interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision
could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd,
awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that
consists of several municipalities and component cities which,
in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities
and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from
the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450
and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be
made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress
has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a
province with contiguous land area over one composed of
islands and negate the greater imperative of development
of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of
basic services to the constituency. This preferential option
would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-
square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because
the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to
one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an
indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has
been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at
the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary
(G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality
of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July
4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a
plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended
RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the
lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the
people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528
saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago
from an independent component city into a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of
Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition
raises a political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves
not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which
only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the
Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation,
merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA
No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was
the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other
petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their
city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC.
Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
Samson v. Aguirre
MOISES S. SAMSON (PETITIONER) VS. HON. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET (RESPONDENTS)
SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
J. QUISUMBING
(creation of municipal corporations)
SUMMARY: Samson, a councilor in Quezon City, assailed RA
8535 which created the City of Novaliches. According to him,
the RA failed to conform to the requirements of the LGC as to
certifications in income, population, and land area. It has not
been proved that the mother city would not suffer adverse
effects from the creation of Novaliches. Court held against
him. The presence and oral declarations of the government
officials armed with records during the public deliberations and
hearings are more effective certifications than mere certificates
which are routinely signed. The representatives all declared
that Novaliches exceeded the requirements. The QC mayor
was also present, and his conformity implies that there is no
damage done to QC. The non-receipt of copies is too
insubstantial to sustain invalidity of a statute. Samson failed to
overturn the presumption of constitutionality accorded
legislative acts.
FACTS:
President Ramos signed into law RA 8535, creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Samson,
incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City,
challenged the constitutionality of the RA. He sought to enjoin
its implementation, holding of the plebiscite, and disbursement
of funds as RA 8535 failed to conform to the criteria in the LGC
as to income, population, land area, seat of government,
having no adverse effect to its mother city, and furnishing a
copy of the barangay resolution. Also, he said the law would
amend the Constitution.
In answer, the respondents claimed Samson failed to
substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. He had
the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that
Congress considered all the legal requirements under the
Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A.
8535. Further, there is no document supporting the
unconstitutionality claim.
ISSUE: Was RA 8535 unconstitutional? NO.
There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a
statute. One who attacks a statute must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt. Samson has failed to
discharge the burden.
1. Samson did not present any proof, only allegations,
that no certifications were submitted to
the House Committee on Local Governmentas such
certifications attesting compliance with the LGC and its
IRR is required. Allegations cannot substitute for
proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by
Congress complied with all the requisites.
a. The representative from the Bureau of Local
Government Finance estimated the combined
average annual income of the 13 barangays for
2 years to be around P27M. Under the Local
Government Code, a proposed city must have
an average annual income of only at least
P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding
two years.
b. The representative from the NSO estimated the
population in the barangays that would
comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be
around 350,000. This figure is more than the
150,000 required by the Implementing Rules.
c. There is no need to consider the land area,
given these figures, since under the Local
Government Code, the proposed city must
comply with requirements as regards income
and population or land area. Other than the
income requirement, the proposed city must
have the requisite number of inhabitants or land
area. Compliance with either requirement, in
addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice
may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly
urbanized.
2. Samson averred that oral manifestations are not
enough certification. But in the hearings, the DBM,
DILG, and Finance Officials were present along with
other officers armed with official statistics and
reference materials. In their official capacity, they
spoke and shed light on population, land area and
income of the proposed city. Their official statements
could serve the same purpose contemplated by law
requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their
oath as witnesses in open session of either the Senate
or the House of Representatives give even greater
solemnity than a certification submitted to either
chamber routinely.
3. Samson failed to show that the representatives did
not also submit written certifications. Under the IRR,
written certifications are required to be attached to the
petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted by
interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in
the form of a resolution. Samson did not present a
copy to prove that it was without the written
certifications attached as required by law. It is
presumed that these requirements were met
appropriately in the passage of the assailed legislative
act.
Samson argued that the RA failed to specify the seat of
government of the proposed City of Novaliches as
required. However, this omission is not as fatal to the
validity. Under Section 12 of the Local Government Code,
the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of
 government after its creation. While Section 12 speaks of forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as
the site of government centers, such site can very well also claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance
be the seat of government, from where governmental and in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its
corporate service shall be delivered. erroneous interpretation.
Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the
adverse effect to Quezon City. Quezon City Mayor Mathay Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
was present during the deliberations and made no mention
of anything concerning such. As chief executive, he would 252 SCRA 695 Political Law Municipal Corporation
be the first person to protest any development that might
LGU Requirement Income Inclusion of IRAs
prove detrimental to Quezon City. This is indicative of the
non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in the
plebiscite, all persons concerned will obviously have the
opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on
the principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches. In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the
That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component
the petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the
of the City of Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid House of Representatives.
the RA. The evident purpose of this requirement, found in
the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City Council of the In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and
move to create another city and to enable it to formulate its
content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
comments and recommendations on said petition. The
Quezon City Council members are obviously aware of the
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
petition. The matter has been widely publicized in the
mass media. Surely members of the Council could not In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing
now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on
of the barangays petition to create the City of Novaliches. Local Government rolled out its recommendation for
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB
way result in a prohibited amendment of the 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution
merely apportions the seats of the House of
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the
constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and
that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the
income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a
city. That in the computation of the reported average income
of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not
be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally
from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the
computation of an LGUs income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the
senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in
abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on
its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only
conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the
HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said
HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of
an LGUs average annual income as was done in the
case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they
form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically
accrue to the local treasury without need of any further
action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably
rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil
is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund
or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and
meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code
that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding
support from the national government, its instrumentalities
and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.
Mariano v. Commission
G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of
Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of
 R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati HELD/RULING:
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H.
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall
Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
ISSUES:
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of
and bounds with technical descriptions Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and
Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Manila.
Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.
extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed
Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
by the Constitution
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant
Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end
made by a special law in itself.
 Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the
territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to
the courts to decide.
1. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as
the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate existence. The appointive officials and
employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed
by the city government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as
the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
 contingent events. Considering that these events may or may
not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover,
only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and
are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly
provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more
than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise
provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law.
Cawaling vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001
Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806
which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the
plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E.
Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The
City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating
Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond
the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal
requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.
 Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin
R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional ,contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
(in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which
requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a)
creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the
"one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the
Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging
two municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the
City of Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a)
of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"
is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows
the merger of local government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local
government unit through a division or a merger of existing
local government units is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No.
8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara
v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we
are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not
annul an act of the political departments simply because we
feel it is unwise or impractical.
3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of
the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is
not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough
as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each
other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of
the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny
to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.
We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality
of R.A. No. 8806.
Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010]
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264,
and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating
an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716,
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district
for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act
No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
Tan v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986
When the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered,
there are necessarily more than one unit affected -- the
parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result
of the alteration
FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos
and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay,
Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC
scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners
opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with
the Local Government Code because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental,
other than those living within the territory of the new province
of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros
del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is
lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing
statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition
was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a
supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.
ISSUE:
W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the
Consititution, which states that --
"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected."
HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held
that whenever a province is created, divided or merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval
of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected" must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the
existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units
would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte."
The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor
Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to
the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support their case,
should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the
applicable ruling, quoting that:
"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is
to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity
in the Constitutional provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which
proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite
shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act."
However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was
an unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed
new province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme
Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the
new province constitutes the area affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the
same is misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The
remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects
it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners."
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the
plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being
a patent nullity.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of
Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials
thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED."