Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139

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Accident Analysis and Prevention

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/aap

The effects of risk perception and ight experience on airline pilots

locus of control with regard to safety operation behaviors
Xuqun You a , Ming Ji a, , Haiyan Han b
a
School of Psychology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xian, Shaanxi 710062, China
b
Department of Education, Xian University of Arts and Science, Xian, Shaanxi 710065, China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The primary objective of this paper was to integrate two research traditions, social cognition approach
Received 14 February 2012 and individual state approach, and to understand the relationships between locus of control (LOC), risk
Received in revised form 30 March 2013 perception, ight time, and safety operation behavior (SOB) among Chinese airline pilots. The study
Accepted 31 March 2013
sample consisted of 193 commercial airline pilots from China Southern Airlines Ltd. The results showed
that internal locus of control directly affected pilot safety operation behavior. Risk perception seemed to
Keywords:
mediate the relationship between locus of control and safety operation behaviors, and total ight time
Locus of control
moderated internal locus of control. Thus, locus of control primarily inuences safety operation behavior
Risk perception
Flight experience
indirectly by affecting risk perception. The total effect of internal locus of control on safety behaviors is
Safety operation behavior larger than that of external locus of control. Furthermore, the safety benet of ight experience is more
pronounced among pilots with high internal loci of control in the early and middle ight building stages.
Practical implications for aviation safety and directions for future research are also discussed.
2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction behavioral control) inuence aviation SOB (OHare, 1990; Hunter,

Safety operation behavior (SOB) refers to the non-technical
skills or social psychological skills that pilots perform and exhibit
during ight tasks, including communication and collaboration,
decision making, workload management, situation awareness,
and ight automation management, all of which help guarantee
modern aviation safety (OConnor et al., 2002; You et al., 2009).
However, as electromechanical systems have improved, the
relative contribution of human factors in aviation accidents has
increased such that approximately 80% of aviation accidents have
a component of human error (Jensen and Benel, 1977; Wiegmann
and Shappell, 1997). Consequently, a large body of research has
been conducted to identify the factors that affect SOB. Some
studies have demonstrated that pilot personality traits inuence
SOB including the Big Five personality factors (i.e., openness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism),
sensation seeking, and risk tolerance (Poropat, 2009; Berg et al.,
2002; Helmreich et al., 1997; Musson et al., 2004; Pauley et al.,
2008). Others have found that certain social cognition vari-
ables (e.g., attitudes, perceived risk, social norms, and perceived
This study was supported by the joint fund of Civil Aviation Research of China
(61079004) and by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of
China (GK201302051).
Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 29 85 30 38 52; fax: +86 29 85 30 32 36.
E-mail address: jiming@snnu.edu.cn (M. Ji).
2005; Stewart, 2006; Ji et al., 2011a). Based on this research, one
of the most popular strategies of promoting aviation safety is to
hire the pilots with the most appropriate personality traits and
change current pilot attitudes and risk perceptions related to risky
operations. However, several literature reviews have concluded
that the majority of these aviation safety campaigns have not had
any effect on the number of accidents (ODea et al., 2010). On one
hand, the role of individual state factors often has been ignored
with regard to these campaigns. Personality traits are genetically
determined (Eysenck, 1967) or due to habits acquired via social
learning, which suggests they are relatively enduring dispositions.
However, situational factors inuence individual states and are
therefore malleable across time and situations. In fact, the ight
operating behaviors of crewmembers can be classied as a dynamic
process that depends more on individual states than dispositional
traits. Several studies have supported this hypothesis (Stewart,
2006; Hunter and Stewart, 2009). On the other hand, the indirect
effect of these state factors might be underestimated with regard to
accident involvement and risky operation behavior. In particular,
the role of these state factors in the relationship between social
cognition variables and SOB has rarely been studied. Theoreti-
cally, individual state might affect an individuals perception and
appraisal of the environment (McCrae and Costa, 1995). Such
appraisals affect behavior. A similar observation has been found
in several studies (Mischel, 1968; Stewart, 2008). However, no
research has formally tested these relationships. To ll this gap, we
empirically examine two research questions: Are risk perception

0001-4575/$ see front matter 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2013.03.036
132 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139
Risk Perception
H3
Locus of Control
Flight Experience
Internal
External
H1
Fig. 1. Model of the safety operation behaviors.
and ight experience associated with the SOB? and, Does LOC lead
individuals to perceive different levels of risk in the same situa-
tion? To answer these questions, we tested the model shown in
Fig. 1. The following section describes the theoretical background
of the study, the constructs in the model, and the hypotheses.
1.1. Locus of control
Locus of control (LOC) is a concept from Rotters (1954) social
learning theory. It refers to the degree to which people perceive
that the outcomes of the situations that they experience are under
their control. This control consists of a set of expectancies that
are inuenced by ones own efforts (internal) or environmental
forces that are beyond ones control (external). Individuals with
an internal LOC orientation perceive that they have control over
the outcome of a situation, whereas individuals with an exter-
nal LOC attribute outcomes to external factors such as chance,
luck or the actions of other people. Stewart (2006) suggested that
one misconception of LOC is the assumption that it is a person-
ality construct. This misconception might be because the popular
dimension of internalityexternality (IE) is supercially similar to
that of introversion-extraversion (Jung, 1928), a personality con-
struct with similar descriptors. In fact, LOC describes situational
states and not dispositional traits. However, Rotters social learn-
ing orientation conceptualizes personality as a situational state
composed of self-attributions and expectancies rather than a dispo-
sitional trait. Self-attribution theory includes situations that might
be positive or negative. Individual excess might be attributed to
external factors or an individual succumbing to external factors
(Heider, 1958). Situational factors inuence expectancies and are
therefore malleable, whereas stable dispositions tend to be resis-
tant to change across a variety of situations. Another reason that
LOC is a situational state factor is founded in methodology. The
Rotter IE scale does not establish a typology. However, LOC scale
score distributions are often dichotomized to create a between-
participants variable for typical mixed factorial designs. Obviously,
performing a median split to dichotomize the data sacrices varia-
tion (i.e., information) in the dataset for simplicity and convenience.
Lefcourt (1982) emphasized that the practice of dichotomizing the
IE continuum into internal and external factors has led to the com-
mon erroneous assumption that LOC is a stable dispositional trait
within individuals. This notion has been perpetuated by much of
the literature, which has referred to as a personality trait. Conse-
quently, it is easy to fall into the trap of assuming that LOC is more
enduring and stable than it actually is. LOC scores are best inter-
preted as momentary samples of ones beliefs about causality or
rough expectancies under ones control. Thus, as a predictive vari-
able of attitudes and behaviors, LOC has been applied to a host of
settings over the last three decades, including traditional classroom
learning situations, industrial safety, and medicine.
Compared with the aforementioned professional staff (i.e., stu-
dents, construction and forestry workers, and doctors), pilots often
H4
H2
H5 Safety Operation
Behaviors
face emergency situations that require them to choose between
several alternatives with little time, the consequence of which
might include a possible loss of the aircraft or even the crew
(Stewart, 2008). Thus, extensive research has dealt with the role
of LOC in accident causality and risky operation behavior. Previous
research ndings have shown that pilots exhibit more internality
than externality (Hunter, 2002; Vallee, 2006; Joseph and Ganesh,
2006) and have found a signicant correlation (r = 0.20) between
the number of hazardous events (i.e., no-fatal accidents) experi-
enced by pilots and their internality score (Hunter, 2002). Pilots
who had lower perceived internality scores tended to experience
more hazardous aviation events compared with those with higher
scores. Wichman and Ball (1983) also found that internals tended
to hold stronger self-serving biases compared with externals. For
instance, internal pilots believed that they were signicantly more
skilled and less likely to have an accident than did pilots with higher
external LOC. Recently, researchers examined the relationships
between LOC, accidents, situation awareness, and workload among
operators of ground vehicles. They found that LOC predicted many
attitudes and behaviors that are consistent with aviation safety
including risk taking, risk management, the management of multi-
ple tasks, distractibility and time management (Arthur et al., 1991;
Guastello and Guastello, 1986; Ozkan and Lajunen, 2005; Stanton
and Young, 2005). In addition, Salminen and Klen (1994) found
a relationship between LOC and risk-taking behavior in a non-
aviation sample that consisted of Finnish construction and forestry
workers. They found that forestry workers had more external LOCs
than construction workers. Regardless of these between-group dif-
ferences, externals tended to take more risks than internals. Based
on these arguments, our rst hypothesis is the following: H1: LOC
predicts pilot SOB. Internal will be associated with a higher level of
SOB, and external will be associated with a lower level of SOB.
1.2. Risk perception
Risk perception is an important skill to identify with regard
to hazardous ight situations. This perception allows pilots to
overcome the complex cognitive demands that the aviation envi-
ronment dictates. Hunter (2002) dened risk perception as the
essentially cognitive ability to discern the risk inherent in a sit-
uation; this skill involves an accurate appraisal of the external
situation and ones personal capacities. Underestimating the exter-
nal situation or overestimating ones personal capacities leads to
a misperception of the risk. Compared with other professionals,
pilots are more likely to accurately appraise the probabilities of the
specic ight risks. Thus, risk perception is frequently considered
a factor that contributes to aviation accidents.
1.2.1. Risk perception and SOB
Pilots (OHare, 1990) and drivers (Trankle et al., 1990) might
fail to accurately perceive the risks involved in ying and driving,
respectively, which contributes to accidents. Pilots and drivers who
 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139
do not correctly perceive the risks inherent to the situation might
not take avoidance or other risk-mitigating actions, thereby caus-
ing accidents or incidents. The relationship between risk perception
and pilot SOB is clearly strong. Hunter (2006) found signicant, neg-
ative correlations between measures from the Risk Self-Perception
Scale and previous hazardous events. This result indicated that
participants who had been in more hazardous aviation events (a)
tended to rate the scenarios as lower in risk and (b) more inaccu-
rately estimated the safety of general aviation (p. 142). Ji et al.
(2011b) collected a larger sample of airline pilots (N = 257) and
found that pilots who perceived risk as high exhibited higher SOBs
than those who perceived risk as low. In addition, Simon et al.
(2000) found a relationship between risk perception and starting a
venture in an entrepreneur sample. They found that risk perception
directly inuenced the decision to start a venture. Consequently,
our second hypothesis is the following: H2: Risk perception will
positively predict the level of pilot SOB.
1.2.2. LOC and risk perception
Numerous studies have shown that internals have an ability
to attend to relevant cues and ignore those that are not relevant
(DuCette and Wolk, 1973; Gregory and Nelson, 1978; Sanders et al.,
1976). False cues are more likely to inuence externals than inter-
nals because the former were not vigilant enough. Internals relied
more on their sense of time, whereas externals time estimates
depended on deliberately false cues presented by the experimenter
(Stewart and Moore, 1978). Internals were better than externals
at detecting errors while proofreading a text and with regard to
perceiving subtle and incidental cues (Wolk and DuCette, 1974).
This ability is germane to aviation settings in which malfunctions
can occur under conditions of high workload. Internals should be
able to more quickly detect a system malfunction and concen-
trate only on the tasks that are critical to controlling the aircraft
(if the malfunction is serious). As a result, we believe that inter-
nals will show smaller latencies in detecting and responding to
possible emergency situations compared with externals. Similarly,
inaccurate risk perception can lead pilots to ignore or misinterpret
external cues that demand immediate and effective decisions to
avoid hazards. This ability suggests that LOC is associated with risk
perception. Based on these data, Vallee (2006) demonstrated that
LOC had a sizable effect on risk perception in a sample of pilots from
the United Kingdom. Pilots who believed that they could control
negative events (and prevent their occurrence) considered them-
selves less at risk than others. Thus, theory and empirical evidence
led to the following hypothesis: H3: LOC will predict pilot risk per-
ception. Internal orientation will be associated with a higher level
of risk perception, but external orientation will be associated with
a lower level of risk perception.
As noted earlier, LOC directly inuences risk perception, and risk
perception directly inuences pilot SOB; thus, LOC should indirectly
affect pilot SOB through its effect on risk perception. Based on this
theory, we extend the logic of Hypotheses 23 and posit the follow-
ing prediction: H4: Risk perception fully mediates the relationship
between LOC and pilot SOB.
1.3. Flight experience
Given that LOC is based on expectancy theory and that experi-
ence affects subjective expectancies, it is reasonable that a sense of
personal control should grow with experience. Harvey (1971) dis-
covered that internal LOC scores predicted the length a person had
occupied an executive government position: Senior administrators
with more years of experience had higher scores than those with
fewer years of experience. Age is another factor. Penk (1969) found
that internality is positively and signicantly correlated with age.
Consistent with this nding, Hunter (2002) found a signicant
133
increasing trend between internality and age. Thus, a related issue
concerns the point in the career cycle at which pilots become more
cautious. Stewart (2006) argued that internality peaks mid-career.
In the early stages of ones career, early experience builds stages.
In addition, experience allows an individual to quickly diagnose
a situation and identify a feasible course of action. Therefore,
experience allows the individual to overcome the effects of time
pressures because little need exists to compare the feasibility of
different action alternatives. In fact, Burian et al. (2000) found that
pilots who were at or below the 25th percentile of total ight hours
were more likely to commit an in-ight plan continuation error
in the context of weather encounters (i.e., decide to continue to
y in adverse weather) compared with those at or above the 75th
percentile. Experience often produces better diagnostic decision-
making skills; however, it may also reduce pilot perception of
risk, particularly as it relates to adverse weather. Therefore, more
experienced pilots might choose to divert a ight around adverse
weather or choose to continue. Furthermore, Li and Baker (1994)
found that the risk of a crash decreases in a nonlinear fashion
as total ight time increases in a case-control study conducted
among commuter air carrier and air taxi pilots. Thus, theory and
empirical evidence led to the following hypothesis:
H5: Flight experience will moderate the relationship between
LOC and pilot SOB.
In sum, the existing evidence suggests that both LOC and risk
perception are strongly related to SOB. The present study exam-
ined the relative importance of LOC, risk perception and ight
experience with regard to SOB in aviation. A central aim was to
investigate whether LOC has indirect effects on SOB via its inu-
ence on hazardous attitudes. Furthermore, we examined whether
ight experience signicantly moderates the relationship between
LOC and SOB.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
In total, 193 experienced male commercial airline pilots from
China Southern Airlines Ltd. participated in this research. The pilots
age ranged from 22 to 54 years (M = 35.84, SD = 10.62) and total
ight hours ranged from 367 to 3941 h (M = 2,912.38, SD = 775.36).
In addition, 4 ight experts from China Southern Airlines Ltd.,
including 2 ight managers, 1 check pilot, and 1 ight instruc-
tor, were invited to rate the level of the participants SOB, These
experts were aged between 37 and 46 years (M = 41.05, SD = 3.67)
and had a total ight time range between 8597 and 12,147 hours
(M = 10,103.25, SD = 986.56). These experts had received human
factors training as part of the Crew Resources Management (CRM)
syllabus. They rated pilot SOB performance based on their over-
all performance. All participants volunteered for this survey and
answered the questionnaires.
2.2. Measures
Data were collected on LOC, risk perception and SOB. Appendix
A presents specic measures including its items and (where appro-
priate) the relevant internal reliabilities, mean scores and standard
deviations of those items.
2.2.1. Aviation Safety Locus of Control (ASLOC) Scale
The ASLOC Scale developed by Hunter (2002) consists of 20
items ( = 0.75) and includes 10-item internal subscale ( = 0.69)
and 10-item external subscale ( = 0.73). For example, Pilots can
do very little to avoid minor incidents while working is an exam-
ple of external subscale. Participants responded to the items using
a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., Strongly Agree = 1; Strongly Disagree = 5).
134 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139
The internal and external subscale scores were computed as the
sum of the responses to the 10 items for each subscale. Each
subscale score had a possible minimum value of 10 (i.e., the lowest
level of agreement) and a maximum value of 50 (i.e., the highest
level of agreement).
2.2.2. Risk Perception Scale
The Risk Perception Scale, developed by Hunter (2006), consists
of 26 sentences that describe an event or situation. Seven of the 26
sentences describe non-aviation events (e.g., driving a car), and the
remainder are concerned with aviation. This scale includes 5 fac-
tors: (a) general ight risk, which included 10 items ( = 0.87) that
address normal and high-risk ight operations; (b) high ight risk,
which consists of 6 items ( = 0.74) that describe high-risk ight
conditions; (c) altitude risk, which consists of 3 items ( = 0.78)
that assess the ight altitude as a risk element; (d) driving risk,
which consists of 3 items ( = 0.83) that describe different driv-
ing situations; and (e) everyday risk, which is dened by 4 items
( = 0.71) that deal with everyday life situations other than driving.
Participants rated the risk as if he or she would be involved in that
situation tomorrow. The measure used a common rating scale to
assign a risk rating to each scenario. This rating scale ranges from
1 (low risk) to 100 (high risk). A high score on this scale indicated a
high level of risk perception.
2.2.3. SOB Scale
The SOB Scale was developed as a research project of China Civil
Aviation Authority (CCAA) based on the Line/LOS Checklist Ver-
sion 4.0 (LLCv4, Helmreich et al., 1997). It consists of 27 sentences
( = 0.85) that describe a crews operational behaviors or situations.
This scale includes 5 factors: (a) automation system understanding
(7 items, = 0.73), leadership and management (6 items, = 0.69),
situation awareness and decision making (7 items, = 0.81), and
communication and cooperation (7 items, = 0.78; You et al.,
2009). Flight experts synthesized an appraisal of participants
based on their ight simulation training results, their real-time
line operation safety audit (LOSA) observation records, and their
airlines safety performance appraisals over the last two years. All
items were rated on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = poor, 2 = minimum
expectations, 3 = standard, or 4 = outstanding)1 for the following 4
ight phases: preparation/skidding, taking off/climbing, cruising,
and descending/approach/landing. Each ight expert rated all
pilots, and the Kandall coefcient of concordance for the four
appraisals was 0.874 (2 = 1027.56, df = 192, p < 0.01), which
showed that the pilot safety operation appraisals were signi-
cantly consistent. A mean score on each subscale was computed
based on the items within it. A high score on the scale indicated a
high degree of safety operation.
2.3. Data analyses
Cronbachs alpha coefcient was used to evaluate the internal
consistencies of the aforementioned measures (see Appendix
A). The moderating effects of risk perception on the relation-
ship between ight experience and SOB were estimated via a
1
Poor: Performance is signicantly below expectations. This category includes
instances in which necessary behavior was not present and examples of inap-
propriate behavior that were detrimental to mission effectiveness. Minimum
Expectations: Performance meets minimum requirements but ample room for
improvement remains. This level of performance is less than desired for effective
crew operations. Standard: This demonstrated behavior promotes and maintains
crew effectiveness. This level of performance should normally occur during ight.
Outstanding: Performance represents exceptional skill in the application of specic
behaviors and serves as a model for teamwork. This performance is truly noteworthy
and effective.
hierarchical regression analysis using SPSS 15.0. A structural
equation analysis was performed to investigate whether LOC has
a direct effect on SOB and whether risk perception mediated the
hypothesized effect of LOC on SOB using LISREL 8.70 (Joreskog,
2004). A conrmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the
measurement model and the t of the LOC and risk perception sub-
scales to their respective latent constructs. The following t indices
were used to assess the t of the model: the goodness-of-t index
(GFI), the adjusted goodness-of-t index (AGFI), the comparative
t index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA). GFI, AGFI and CFI values of 0.9 or above and an RMSEA of
0.08 or below indicated an acceptable t (Hair et al., 2006).
3. Results
Descriptive statistics and Cronbachs alpha coefcients were
calculated for each instrument in the study prior to analysis. The
numbers of items, mean scores, standard deviations, and internal
consistencies for all measures are listed in Table 1. The reliability
coefcients were acceptable in that they achieved the suggested
minimum value.
Table 2 displays the correlations between the variables. To sim-
plify the correlation matrix, latent variable scores (Joreskog and
Sorbom, 2001) were computed for risk perception and SOB. The
measurement models for the latent variables are shown in Fig. 2. As
shown in the table, the LOC measures were signicantly correlated
with risk perception and SOB. Risk perception was correlated with
SOB. Pilots who perceived the risk related to aviation accidents as
high were more likely to operate safely. In addition, both risk per-
ception and SOB were correlated with ight time. Pilots with more
ight time tended to perceive the risk related to aviation accidents
as high and operated more safely.
A structural equation analysis was performed to investigate
whether risk perception mediated the hypothesized effect of LOC
on SOB. Fig. 1 shows the tested model with standardized path coef-
cients. For clarity, only signicant paths (p < 0.01) are shown in the
gure. The t measures indicated that the proposed model t the
data well: 2 (41, n = 193) = 72.24, GFI = 0.91, AGFI = 0.90, CFI = 0.93,
NNFI = 0.90, and RMSEA = 0.063. The effect of risk perception on SOB
was signicant and positive (i.e., = 0.38, t = 3.29), which indicates
that high levels of risk perception increase the likelihood that the
pilot will engage in SOBs. This nding is consistent with previous
studies based on social cognitive theory. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was
fully supported. The direct effects of LOC on risk perception were
signicant. More specically, external negatively predicted risk
perception ( = .15, t = 1.96), whereas internal ( = .17, t = 2.01)
showed a positive relationship. All linear relationships were in the
expected direction. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was fully supported.
With regard to the direct effects of LOC on SOBs, only internal
had a signicant coefcient ( = .14, t = 1.92), which indicates that
high levels of internal increases the likelihood that a pilot will show
SOBs. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was partly supported. Although exter-
nal did not demonstrate an effect on SOBs, it had indirect effects
on SOBs via the mediating effect of risk perception. As shown in
the path model, 31% of the variance in risk perception is explained
by the difference in LOC. The lack of a direct effect of external on
SOBs implies that risk perception generally mediates the effects on
SOBs. That is, LOC indirectly affects SOBs by inuencing risk per-
ception. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was fully supported. To determine the
total effect of the LOC variables on SOBs, both the direct and indirect
effects of LOC were computed (Table 3). The total effects showed
a similar pattern found in the correlation analysis in Table 2. High
internal scores were associated with safety operation in aviation.
In contrast, the higher external scores were related to less safety
operations. However, external showed small total effects on SOBs
(i.e., the sizes of the standardized total effects).
 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139 135

Table 1
Number of items, mean scores and Cronbachs alpha for all measures.

Measures Number of item Mean S.D. Cronbachs alpha

Locus of control
Internal 10 3.51a 0.43 0.69
External 10 2.54a 0.40 0.73
Risk perception
General ight risk 10 51.04b 12.73 0.87
High ight risk 6 67.88b 10.08 0.74
Altitude risk 3 72.16b 15.24 0.78
Driving risk 3 55.38b 12.51 0.83
Everyday risk 4 48.29b 7.56 0.71
Safety operation behaviors
Automation system understanding 7 2.99c 0.49 0.73
Leadership and management 6 3.31c 0.51 0.69
Situation awareness and decision-making 7 3.14c 0.52 0.81
Communication and cooperation 7 3.08c 0.48 0.78
a
Range 15.
b
Range 1100.
c
Range 14.

Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among measures of the study variables (n = 193).

Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Age 1.00
2. Total ight time 0.81*** 1.00
3. Internal .17** .05 1.00
4. External .15** .04 .26** 1.00
5. Risk perception a .04 .12** .19** .12** 1.00
6. Safety operation behavior a .06 .13** .16** .15** .28** 1.00
a
Latent variable score was computed for risk perception and safety operation behavior.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

Table 3 was not a signicant predictor ( = 0.05, p < 0.01). The interaction
Direct, indirect and total effects of LOC on safety operation behaviors in aviation
of ight time and internal signicantly predicted the performance
(standardized coefcients).
of SOB ( = 0.11, p < 0.01). Consequently, ight time moderated
Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect the relationship between internal and SOB. In addition, the study
Internal 0.14 0.07 0.21 applied tolerance, VIF, and DW tests to examine multicollinearity
External .06 .06 (Haan, 2002; Edriss, 2003). The tolerance was between 0.31 and
0.17 (T > 0.1), the VIF was between 3.19 and 6.03 (VIF < 10), and the
DW = 1.87 (du < d < 4 du ), which are acceptable values.
This study tested the moderating effect of ight time on the rela- To understand total ight time as a moderator of the results and
tionship between SOB and LOC using a regression analysis, and the examine its inuence, internal scores and total ight time were
results are shown in Table 4. After controlling for age, total ight divided into three groups: high (M + 1 SD), medium (M), and low
time and internal, the overall explanation rate of SOBs signicantly (M 1 SD). Fig. 3 shows the interaction of internal and total ight
increased in the regression equation. Internal signicantly pre- time with regard to SOBs. At a certain level of internal, pilot SOB
dicted the performance of SOB ( = 0.14, p > 0.05), whereas external signicantly improves as total ight time increases. That is, total

Fig. 2. Path diagram of the relationship between LOC, risk perception and safety operation behavior.
136 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139
Table 4
Results about the relationships among LOC, total ight time, and SOB.
Variables Model 1 (SOB)
Step 1: controlled variables
Age 0.04
Step 2: predictor variables
**
Total ight time 0.11
Internal
External
Total ight time internal
Total ight time external
F 0.12**
R2 0.10
Adjust R2 0.09
All parameter coefcients are standardized estimates.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.
Fig. 3. The interaction effect of total ight time and internal to safety operation
behaviors.
ight time has a signicant moderating effect. When the internal
scores are low/medium, the pilots with more ight time exhibit
a higher level of SOBs than those with less ight time. However,
when the internal scores were high, the pilots with more ight
time exhibited the lower levels of SOBs than those with less ight
time. These results show that many hours of total ight time reduce
the positive effects of internal on the SOBs of high internal pilots,
whereas medium and few total hours of ight time did not greatly
affect them.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The primary aim of this study was to integrate social cogni-
tive and situational state approaches to explore the relationships
between LOC, risk perception, ight time, and SOBs among Chinese
airline pilots.
Our results revealed the direct effects of LOC on risk percep-
tion and the direct effect of internality on behavior. Specically,
high internal scores were positively associated with risk percep-
tion and SOBs. Pilots who had high internal scores were more
likely to perceive the risk of aviation accidents as high and operate
more safely in aviation. In contrast, pilots who had high external
scores were more likely to perceive the risk of aviation accidents
as low. A plausible explanation for these results is that internals
are better at detecting errors as well as at perceiving subtle and
incidental cues while proofreading text than externals (Wolk and
DuCette, 1974). Internals attended to relevant cues and ignored
those that were irrelevant (Gregory and Nelson, 1978). This abil-
ity is likely germane to aviation settings in which malfunctions
occur under conditions of high workload. Consequently, internals
Model 2 (SOB) Model 3 (SOB)
t t t
0.21 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21
** **
2.73 0.11 2.73 0.11 2.73
0.15** 3.24 0.14** 3.12
0.07 0.36 0.06 0.34
0.11** 2.74
0.05 0.31
11.52*** 17.83***
0.15 0.27
0.12 0.25
are most likely able to detect a system malfunction more quickly
and concentrate on the tasks that are critical to controlling the air-
craft when the malfunction becomes serious. These suppositions
are reected by their SOBs. In addition, the results indicate the
direct effect that an internal LOC has on SOB. Pilots with higher
levels of internal were more likely to exhibit SOBs. A possible expla-
nation for this result is that pilots who are more internal actively
restructure ambiguous situations and seek information that will
assist them to solve problems and make decisions. Thus, they tend
to take fewer risks than externals (Salminen and Klen, 1994). More-
over, their way of addressing danger is not to ignore them but act
to reduce the danger (Wichman and Ball, 1983). In addition, inter-
nal LOCs also showed indirect effects on SOBs via the inuence of
risk perception. Internal is an exogenous variable that inuences
risk perception, which in turn affects SOBs. Internal individuals
tended to perceive the risk related to aviation accidents as high
and showed more SOBs. Although the results did not demonstrate
a direct effect of external on SOBs, they showed that, similar to
internal LOCs, external LOCs had indirect effects on SOBs. Exter-
nal individuals perceived the risk of aviation accidents as low and
had fewer SOBs. In sum, internal showed a large total effect on
SOBs ( = 0.21), whereas external demonstrated a small total effect
( = 0.06). Based on these results, it is reasonable to believe that
LOC, especially internal LOC, could be used as a reliable predictor
of future pilots SOBs. In other words, strategies intended to pro-
mote aviation safety might be aimed at changing pilots senses of
personal control such as self-control, fatalism, expectancies, and
social alienation according to the situational state approach (Duke
et al., 1977).
Risk perception had a direct effect on SOB in the path model.
Note that risk perception includes ve factors (i.e., general ight
risk, high ight risk, altitude risk, driving risk, and everyday
risk), whereas SOBs encompass elements such as automation sys-
tem understanding, leadership, management, situation awareness,
decision making, communication and cooperation. The results
showed that different aspects of risk perception and different inu-
ences on SOBs exist. Furthermore, risk perception mediates the
relationship between LOC and behavior. However, LOC accounted
for 31% of the total variance of risk perception, which suggests
that risk perception also independently affected SOB. This result
is in accordance with OHare (1990), Hunter (2001), and Ji et al.
(2011a,b). In other words, risk perception accounts for additional
variance in behavior. Therefore, more research is needed to identify
the factors that cause inaccurate perceptions of risk. Such factors
might include how pilots assess their personal levels of compe-
tency, what causes these assessments to be inaccurate, how pilots
gather information from the environment, and how they identify
the cues associated with conditions of high risk. Only in this way
 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139 137

will the interventions of aviation safety management and airline
pilot safety training be truly effective.
The present study also examined the moderating effects of ight
time on the relationship between LOC and SOBs. Flight experience
plays an important role in the performance of ight-related tasks,
especially because it compensates for age-related declines in cog-
nitive function (to some degree), and overlearned complex tasks
such as piloting are less susceptible to age-related deterioration
than abilities performed during novel situations (Yesavage et al.,
1994; Tsang and Voss, 1996). Our results indicate that total ight
time signicant moderated the relationship between internal LOC
and SOBs. Specically, a high total ight time reduced the posi-
tive effects of internal LOC on SOBs among high internal pilots,
whereas medium and low total ight times did not greatly affect
this relationship. In other words, when pilot internal LOC reached a
certain (high) threshold, the benet that ight experience has with
regard to behavior diminishes. Similar results were found in previ-
ous research, which showed that ight experience has a protective
effect against the risk of crashes (Li et al., 2003) and hazardous
attitudes in the early (but not the late) experience building stage
(Defense Research and Development Canada; DRDC, 2010). It is rea-
sonable to expect a curvilinear relationship between LOC and ight
hours with high internals peaking in their mid-careers. A possible
explanation for this nding is that high internal pilots might be
more invulnerable during the early and middle experience build-
ing stages but more cautious in the later stages. In other words,
they begin to realize that an experienced pilot can still make errors
and that he or she is not invulnerable. Therefore, an accident might
happen despite competency and prociency. Some evidence in the
literature (Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd, 2001) suggests that prior
experience with negative outcomes moderates optimistic biases. In
short, high internals might perceive themselves as being at greater
risk than before when they discover that bad things can happen
even when precautions are taken. Consequently, designing training
programs to minimize the tendency for moderately experienced
pilots to feel in control and the illusion of unique invulnerability
is possible.
To summarize, the results of the present study showed that LOC
indirectly affects SOBs by inuencing risk perception, the inter-
nal total effect on safety behaviors is larger than the external total
effect, and ight time moderates the relationship between internal
LOC and SOBs among Chinese airline pilots. Although one can-
not expect to change a pilots LOC directly, one can minimize the
tendency for moderately experienced pilots to perceive being in
control and change the risk perceptions related to SOBs to promote
aviation safety. Future research should explore the potential effects
of organizational-level variables such as safety culture (Cooper,
2000) and its relationships with LOC and SOBs.
Acknowledgments
The joint fund of Civil Aviation Research of China (61079004)
and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
of China (Gk201302051) supported this study. The authors thank
the four ight experts from China Southern Airlines, Ltd. and all the
airline pilots who answered our questionnaire. In addition, many
thanks are due to the anonymous reviewers for their supportive
comments.
Appendix A.
See Table A1.

Table A1
Mean and standard deviation of the items measuring locus of control, risk perception, and safety operation behavior (N = 193).

Item Mean S.D.

a
Aviation Safety Locus of Control Scale
(I) If pilots follow all the rules and regulations, they can avoid many aviation accidents. 3.71 0.64
(E) Accidents are usually caused by unsafe equipment and poor safety regulations. 2.71 0.42
(I) Pilots should lose their license if they periodically neglect to use safety devices (for example, seat belts, checklists, etc.) that are 3.30 0.57
required by regulation.
(I) Accidents and injuries occur because pilots do not take enough interest in safety. 3.45 0.43
(E) Avoiding accidents is a matter of luck. 2.51 0.38
(I) Most accidents and incidents can be avoided if pilots use proper procedures. 3.70 0.42
(E) Most accidents and injuries cannot be avoided. 2.67 0.41
(I) Most accidents are due to pilot carelessness. 3.53 0.43
(E) Most pilots will be involved in accidents or incidents which result in aircraft damage or personal injury. 2.42 0.51
(I) Pilots should be ned if they have an accident or incident while horsing around. 3.41 0.42
(I) Most accidents that result in injuries are largely preventable. 3.73 0.81
(E) Pilots can do very little to avoid minor incidents while working. 2.72 0.42
(E) Whether people get injured or not is a matter of fate, chance, or luck. 2.48 0.39
(I) Pilots accidents and injuries result from the mistakes they make. 3.38 0.43
(E) Most accidents can be blamed on poor FAA oversight. 2.57 0.41
(E) Most injuries are caused by accidental happenings outside peoples control. 2.60 0.38
(I) People can avoid getting injured if they are careful and aware of potential dangers. 3.52 0.42
(E) It is more important to complete a ight than to follow a safety precaution that costs more time. 2.42 0.39
(I) There is a direct connection between how careful pilots are and the number of accidents they have. 3.12 0.43
(E) Most accidents are unavoidable. 2.29 0.38
Risk Perception Scaleb
Start a light aircraft with a dead battery by hand-propping it. 73.2 16.9
At night, y from your local airport to another airport about 150 miles away, in a well-maintained aircraft, when the weather is 75.1 21.3
marginal VFR (3 miles visibility and 2000 foot overcast).
At night, take a cross-country ight in which you land with 30 min of fuel remaining. 72.4 15.7
Make a 2-h cross country ight with friends, without checking your weight and balance. 69.7 14.8
Fly in clear air at 6500 feet between two thunderstorms about 25 miles apart. 76.2 18.5
Take a 2-h sightseeing ight over an area of wooded valleys and hills, at 1000 above ground level. 69.7 16.4
During the daytime, y from your local airport to another airport about 150 miles away, in a well-maintained aircraft, when the 71.5 20.9
weather is marginal VFR (3 miles visibility and 2000 foot overcast).
Make a trafc pattern so that you end up turning for nal with about a 45 bank. 68.7 13.4
Drive your car on a freeway near your home, during the day, at 65 MPH in moderate trafc, during heavy rain. 66.9 15.8
Fly across a large lake or inlet at 500 feet above ground level. 72.3 16.5
138 X. You et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 57 (2013) 131139

Table A1 (Continued)

Item Mean S.D.

During the daytime, take a cross-country ight in which you land with 30 min of fuel remaining. 64.3 12.1
Jaywalk (cross in the middle of the block) across a busy downtown street. 58.7 21.4
Fly across a large lake or inlet at 1500 feel above ground level. 55.6 17.6
Drive your car on a freeway near your home at night, at 65 MPH in moderate trafc. 54.7 13.0
At night, y from your local airport to another airport about 150 miles away, in clear weather, in a well-maintained aircraft. 52.8 18.3
At night, take a cross-country ight in which you land with over an hour of fuel remaining. 52.4 20.8
Take a 2-h sightseeing ight over an area of wooded valleys and hills, at 3000 above ground level. 53.7
Fly across a large lake or inlet at 3500 feet above ground level. 48.3 16.6
Drive your car on a freeway near your home during the day, at 65 MPH in moderate trafc. 44.8 14.2
Make a trafc pattern so that you end up turning for nal with about a 30 bank. 46.7 17.2
Make a 2-h cross-country ight with friends, after checking your weight and balance. 40.1 18.7
During the daytime, take a cross-country ight in which you land with over an hour of fuel remaining. 38.2 15.7
During the daytime, y from your local airport to another airport about 150 miles away, in clear weather, in a well-maintained 36.7 17.5
aircraft.
Climb up a 10-foot ladder to replace an outside light bulb. 33.4 16.3
Take a 2-h ight in a jet aircraft on a major US air carrier. 30.8 18.7
Ride an elevator from the ground oor to the 25th oor of an ofce building. 21.3 15.1
Safety Operation Behaviors Scalec
Environment for open communications established and/or maintained. Crew members listen with patience, make eye contact as 2.68 0.12
appropriate.
There is appropriate and good group climate. Crew members do not interrupt or talk over, do not rush through the brieng. 3.57 0.13
When new staff, lines, airports, and other conditions, the crew members can take the initiative to share operational knowledge 2.69 0.23
and experience.
Cabin crew is included as part of team in briengs, as appropriate, and guidelines are established for coordination between ight 3.15 1.03
deck and cabin. Passengers are briefed and updated as needed concerning delays, weather, etc.
Crew members speak up, and state their information with appropriate persistence, until there is some clear resolution and 2.57 0.69
decision.
Tasks and workload are clearly distributed and providing enough time, which was accepted by other crews. 3.25 0.36
Captain shows leadership and coordinates ight deck activities. Strikes a balance between authority and crew member 1.98 0.51
participation, yet acts decisively when necessary.
Crew members can identify and report on their own or others work overload situation 3.65 1.23
Crew members can note the appearance of fatigue, and take effective means to demonstrate high levels of vigilance, such as 3.08 1.10
conversation, activities, caffeine, and moving and so on.
Operational tasks are prioritized so as to allow sufcient resources for dealing effectively with primary ight duties, such as 2.68 0.75
dealing with passenger needs, crew meals, company communications.
Operational plans and decisions are clearly stated to other crew members and acknowledged, and include cabin crew and others 2.98 0.38
when appropriate.
Briengs are operationally thorough, interesting, and address crew coordination and planning for potential problems, such as 3.27 0.56
rejected T/O, engine failure after liftoff and go-around at destination.
Caption can make an effective brieng, and can foresee the bias to occur during normal operation. 3.61 0.57
Automated systems are used at appropriate levels. When programming demands could reduce situational awareness and create 2.86 1.01
work overloads, the level of automation is reduced or disengaged, or automation is effectively used to reduce workload.
Guidelines are followed for the operation of automated systems. When systems will be disabled, PF and PM [PNF] duties. 3.35 0.89
Crew members verbalize and acknowledge entries and changes to automated systems parameters. 3.23 1.20
Crew Members exchange information regarding the FMC capabilities, limitations, and operations. 2.77 0.37
Aircraft automation systems are reviewed and conrmed regularly. For example, the best sailing condition, correct runway 3.34 0.87
proles.
When the plane goes into the automation status and system parameters are modied, the crew members notice each other timely. 3.32 0.31
PF and PM [PNF] duties established and implemented. For example, input dates and interaction checked. 3.87 1.34
Crew members demonstrate high levels of vigilance in both high and low workload conditions. 2.54 0.80
Crew prepares for expected or contingency situations including approaches, weather, etc. 2.79 1.01
Crew members stated critical information and/or solutions with appropriate persistence. 3.54 0.56
Objectively, without disguise to accept the work of the feedback. 3.68 1.03
When disputes occur, crew can still focus on current problems or situations and actively listen to the suggestions and comments, 2.97 0.64
and can correct their mistakes, thereby enabling the disputed issues to reach consensus and resolved.
Crew members ask questions regarding crew actions and decisions, e.g. effective enquiry about uncertainty of clearance limits, 2.69 0.23
clarication of confusing. Unclear ATC instructions.
Given to conduct a positive or negative feedback at appropriate times, as a direct learning experience to whole crew, such as the 3.15 1.03
comments on the take-off or landing.

I, internal; E, external.
a
Range 15.
b
Range 1100.
c
Range 14.

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