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College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

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POLITICAL SCIENCE

BANGSAMORO ARMYS IN MAGUINDANAO

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: CECIL H, MANGANDILI

HOW BANGSAMORO ARMYS STARTED?

To break away from the current political upheaval against those implicated in the pork barrel
scam, allow me to share with you the Bangsamoro story. This will help us understand how the
Mindanao problem came to be.

The Philippines has a long history of Moro insurgency movements dating back to the Spanish
time. The Muslim population of southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago strongly
resisted colonization. The Muslim struggle was carried over to the American period when the
Moros fiercely fought the US troops.

During the late 1960s, violence associated with political disputes, personal feuds and armed
gangs flourished. By this time, tension between Moro and Christian communities escalated. By
mid-1972 partisan political violence gripped all of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.

After Martial Law was declared in September 1972 and when all civilians were ordered to
surrender their guns, the Moros rose into arms against the government. At first, they were small
isolated uprisings but it became bigger in scope and size. One group, the Moro National
Liberation Front, then chaired by Nur Misuari managed to bring most partisan Moro forces into
the fold of the loosely unified MNLF.

The MNLF was organized by Abul Khayr Alonto and Jallaludin Santos who were at that time
active with the Bangsamoro Movement. The word Bangsamoro was coined during the
inception of the MNLF. It took two weeks to decide on the name. Abul Khayr insisted on the
word Moro, because that one word carried in itself the history and symbolizes the struggle of
the Muslims in the Philippine archipelago. During the Spanish period, the Muslims were called
moroz and the Christianized population, indios. Professor Casan Cana, former MSU professor
came up with the Malay word Bangsa which means nation.

According to Nasser A. Marohomsalic, who wrote Aristocrats of the Malay Race: A History of
the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines, in the first two months of 1969, ninety Muslim young men
were secretly shipped to Malaysia and trained for more than a year in Palau Pangkor; forty-one
of whom were Maranaos, eighteen Maguindanaons, and thirty-one from Sulu, Zamboanga,
Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.

They were known as the Top 90. Seven of them secretly organized themselves into a
committee to provide leadership for the group. These were Chairman Nur Misuari, Abdul Khayr
Alonto, Jimmy Lucman, Caloy Bandaying, Uroh Salahuddin, Ramit Hassan and Salih Walih.

This core group coming from different areas and social standings within the Muslim
communities called their aspiration as the Bangsamoro Cause. To redeem the lands of the Moros
and create a nation of Moros, they called themselves Bangsamoro Army with the name MNLF.
Bangsamoro became a byword and now just as they had envisioned the Moros political identity.
In the 1924 Declaration of Moro Datus, asserting their independence they referred to themselves
as a nation of Moros. In the early 1970s the word Bangsamoro was first used because of the
MNLF. Today, Bangsamoro is the Muslim polity of the Philippines.
Marohomsalic further wrote, After the declaration of Martial Law on September 21, 1972, the
membership of the central committee was expanded to include Ahmad Bong Sumandal, Ali
Clay Sansaluna, Amelil Ronnie Malguiok, Salamat Hashim, Dimasangkay Dimas Pundato
and Bian Lay Lim.

The MNLF was the Bangsamoro army during those perilous times. These young men fought
valiantly. Alonto came down from the hills in 1976 in the spirit of the Tripoli Agreement. He
wrote the blue print of the first autonomous government with Marcos and other Muslim leaders.
Marcos signed PD No. 1628 on March 25, 1977 creating an Autonomous Region in Southern
Philippines. But still this did not appease the mujahideens. They continued with their
revolutionary ideals.

Misuari and Salamat Hashim (from the Top 90 men who trained) may have started out together
in the top echelons of the MNLF but by mid-1976 Salamat was already angrily complaining
about the Misuari-led Tausog dominance in the MNLFs Central Committee. Added to this was
the lack of representations of Maranaos and Maguindanaoans in the MNLFs Finance Committee
where large amounts of money were being dispersed at the whim of Misuari and his loyalists.

Salamat was also excluded from the international conferences, despite his being a fluent Arabic-
speaker (having studied in Cairo on a Nasser-funded scholarship) and his English-language
proficiency.

On December 26, 1977, Salamat broke off with Misuari and raised the banner of the MILF. The
rest we all know. The MILF became the dominant force in Mindanao.

In 1986, as CONCON delegate, Senator Ahmad Domocao Alonto was the proponent for the 1986
constitutional framework of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). But peace
remained elusive in the region because war and peace have become a business. As a result, we
have the Zambo siege and other incidents of such kind in the past that disrupted the peace in the
area.

I asked my friend Ayesha Merdeka, a former graduate of OB Montessori Center who has been
researching on the Bangsamoro Cause and the MNLF for more than 22 years, who the leader is
of the Bangsamoros? She said, The Bangsamoro is both the leader and the members while the
MNLF and MILF are the agents. I guess Misuari is trying to pull all non-Muslims and non-
Moro to twist this situation into some political struggle for leadership his leadership.

Ayesha further reminded me that: The Bangsamoro has an ongoing peace negotiation in Kuala
Lumpur with the Philippine government through the MILF. Leadership of the Bangsamoro now
lies in the hands of the MILF members. The MNLF on the other hand, as an agent of
Bangsamoro also await the outcome of the negotiations. Well, Misuari had the chance to
represent and lead the Bangsamoro in a democratic government when he became governor of the
ARMM. But he succumbed to graft and corruption and ended a failure. So, how can he lead the
Bangsamoro now?
Life is slowly returning to normal in Zamboanga. But is the Mindanao crisis really over? We will
never know what really happened that triggered the incident. Where is Misuari now? What is
going to happen to the MNLF members who are now in the custody of the government? What
about the peace talks between the government and the MILF? Will there be a sustainable solution
to the Bangsamoro plight by 2016?

For so many years now, we have been hoping and praying for peace. But as long as there are
well-armed men roving Mindanao beyond the writ of law, we can never have peace.

BANGSAMORO ARMYS PLAN

MANILA - A development plan for the proposed Bangsamoro region in the Philippines' southern
island of Mindanao has been completed despite a setback in the government's peace process with
the country's largest Muslim rebel group, the Japan International Cooperation Agency said
Wednesday.

JICA's Philippine office said the final report of Bangsamoro Development Plan 2, which it led in
crafting starting 2013, was turned over Saturday to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and its
development arm, the Bangsamoro Development Agency, at the rebel group's main stronghold,
Camp Darapanan, in Maguindanao province.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front forged a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro with
the Philippine government in March 2014 after 17 years of negotiations for a peaceful settlement
of the political and armed conflict that has stunted economic growth and affected people's lives.

But the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law for authorizing the creation of the Muslim-dominated
region with a more autonomous government, was not passed by the outgoing congress after some
legislators questioned the rebel group's sincerity following a deadly clash between government
forces and armed fighters in January 2015.

The same piece of legislation is expected to be tackled by the new members of congress set to
convene next month.

"We are optimistic that the peace process in Mindanao will be sustained despite the challenges,"
Susumu Ito, JICA's chief representative in the Philippines, said in a statement.

The Bangsamoro Development Plan 2 "will be useful for integrated development planning for
the whole Mindanao and outlines strategies for future development assistance that the region will
need to achieve inclusive growth," he added.
The plan is a result of JICA's Comprehensive Development Project for the Bangsamoro in
partnership with the Bangsamoro Development Agency.

It covers medium- to long-term goals through 2022 and 2028, respectively, and identifies 27 key
projects that may be funded by any interested agencies, including government and development
partners.

The proposed projects, which are mainly for agriculture, agro-industry, fishery, logistics
infrastructure, power supply, river basin management and flood control, may be implemented
even as the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law is being awaited.

Another 54 proposed projects under the plan are expected to help boost the economy of the entire
Mindanao, JICA said.

If implemented, the plan can create 550,000 additional jobs in the region and pump the average
regional gross domestic product to 7.4 percent annually.

"When carried out, the (Bangsamoro Development Plan) will help bridge the poverty gap and
enhance the connectivity of Mindanao with other regions," Ito said.

Citing data from the Philippine Statistics Authority, JICA noted that poverty incidence in that
region was at 59 percent during the first half of 2015, way higher than the national average of
26.3 percent.

"JICA shares the Philippines' collective vision for just and lasting peace and inclusive
development in Mindanao," Ito said.

Mohagher Iqbal, the rebel group's lead negotiator with the government who now heads the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission, was quoted in the JICA statement as saying that the
development plan "is not only historic but also an indispensable part of nation building."

Moro Islamic Liberation Front Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, for his part, was quoted as
saying, "Despite the non-passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, the MILF is supporting the
implementation of selected projects under the (Bangsamoro Development Plan) in core
territories hardest hit by poverty."

More than three million people are estimated to be in the Bangsamoro region, which covers
nearly 1.5 million hectares in land area, mainly in central to western Mindanao.

The armed conflict in Mindanao, spanning over four decades because of the Muslim rebel
groups' desire for independence or autonomy, has claimed the lives of some 120,000 people and
displaced millions of others.
It is also causing 20 billion pesos (about $425 million) in annual economic losses in terms of
damages to businesses and properties, as well as potential investments that turn away due to the
unstable security environment.

WORKS OF BANGSAMOROS ARMY.

The BAMA contributes the Bangsamoro Basic Law was a bill deliberated upon by the 16th Congress of
the Philippines which, had it passed, would have established a proposed new autonomous political entity
known as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, replacing the current Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). As an organic act, the Basic Law would have provided for the basic structure of
government for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, and enacted the agreements set forth in
the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which is the peace agreement signed between
the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2014.

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

On 15 October 2012, a preliminary peace agreement was signed in the Malacaan Palace between the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines. This was the Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro, which called for the creation of an autonomous political entity named Bangsamoro, replacing
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).[14]
The signing came at the end of peace talks held in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia from 26 October. These talks
were the last of 32 peace talks between the two parties, which spanned a period of nine years

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College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

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 POLITICAL SCIENCE

BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM FIGHTER

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: MONAIRA LIMBONG

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

Formed December 2010

Disbanded Group is active.

August 5, 2012: BIFF members launched attacks on eleven towns in the

province of Maguindanao, focusing on Philippine military targets.
First Attack
Fighting between the BIFF and government forces lasted until the
following day. (3 killed, 1+ wounded). [1]

July 5, 2015: BIFF members killed an off-duty soldier in the province of

Last Attack
Maguindanao. (1 killed, 0 wounded).

Updated August 27, 2015

The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), sometimes called the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Movement (BIFM), is an Islamic separatist organization based in the southern
Philippines. It seeks an independent Islamic state for the Filipino Muslim minority, known as the
Moro people, who live primarily in the Philippines Mindanao region.

The BIFF was founded in 2010 by Ameril Umbra Kato as a splinter group of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), itself a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
Kato had studied Islam in Saudi Arabia and was a member of the MNLF, which had emerged in
the 1970s. When Hashim Salamat, another MNLF member, broke from the group to found the
MILF in the 1980s, Kato followed him. Eventually, Kato became chief of the MILFs 105th Base
Command. Kato, who espoused an extreme version of Islam and admired Wahhabism,
persistently advocated an independent Islamic state even as the MILFespecially under Al Haj
Murad Ebrahim, who became MILF chairman after Salamats 2003 deathbegan to adopt a
more amenable stance toward autonomy instead of independence. Disagreements between Kato
and the MILF leadership became prominent in 2008, when Kato led his forces in a violent
campaign against non-Muslim villages. His group conducted raids, destroyed property, and
decapitated civilians for six months, sparking a brutal response from the Philippine military that
displaced over half a million people. Kato launched these attacks to protest a Philippine Supreme
Court decision, in which a peace agreement that the MILF and the Philippine government had
nearly signed was declared unconstitutional. However, Katos forces conducted their violent
campaign without the MILF leaderships permission, and in response, the MILF demoted Kato
and distanced itself from the attacks.

In December 2010, Kato left the MILF and established the BIFF, which mostly included
members of the MILFs 105th Base Command and mainly operated in the province of
Maguindanao. Kato announced that five thousand fighters had left the MILF to join the BIFF, but
the actual number was widely believed to be around three hundred

There is little information about the BIFFs early activities. The BIFF has mainly attacked
government forces and has also had skirmishes with the MILFs armed wing, the Bangsamoro
Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). The groups have fought mostly over control of territory in
Maguindanao.

In November 2011, Kato suffered a stroke that rendered him immobile. He remained in hiding,
with his followers moving him to various locations over the next few years. Soon after Katos
stroke, Mohammad Ali Tambako was appointed to replace Kato as the BIFFs leader. Tambako
has been referred to as the BIFFs vice chair or vice president, but he effectively led the BIFF
after Katos stroke

The BIFFs relationship with the MILF is unclear. The BIFF has launched attacks intended to
undermine the MILFs peace talks with the Philippine government, including a violent campaign
against eleven villages in Maguindanao that caused over 24,000 residents to flee their homes in
August 2012. However, later that same month, the BIFF announced a temporary halt of its
attacks at the MILFs request in order to allow for the scheduled resumption of MILF-Philippine
government talks in Malaysia. The peace was short-lived as fighting between the BIFF and
government forces soon erupted again

In 2013, Tambako left or was expelled from the BIFF after he led some supporters in an attack
on the Christian population of the city of Midsayap, during which his forces decapitated a
farmer. He then established another militant group called the Justice for Islamic Movement
(JIM). However, Tambako retained some influence over the BIFF and may have rejoined the
group a short time afterward; the BIFF and the JIM have reportedly worked together.

As the MILF and the MNLF have turned more toward political avenues for achieving their goals,
the BIFF has become one of the most prominent Muslim separatist groups conducting attacks in
the Philippines. On January 27, 2014, government forces launched Operation Darkhorse, a major
offensive against the BIFF. Operation Darkhorse lasted until February 2014 and resulted in
significant losses to the BIFF, including fifty-two deaths, forty-nine injuries, and the destruction
of four camps, one of which held the BIFFs facility for the production of bombs. The operation
also displaced over 35,000 people in the provinces of Maguindanao and Cotabato. While the
BIFF has expressed some willingness for peace negotiations, the Philippine government has not
engaged in talks with the group. In August 2014, the BIFF declared allegiance to the Islamic
State (IS), although the declaration seemingly entailed no more than a pledge of support and has
been viewed by the Philippine military as an attempt to exploit the global reputation of IS. IS has
not issued a response to the BIFFs declaration of allegiance. Meanwhile, the BIFF has
continued its attacks in Maguindanao, including bombings targeting civilians and attacking the
Philippine military.

On January 25, 2015, BIFF and MILF members were involved in an attack on Philippine Special
Action Force (SAF) troopers who were targeting two prominent bomb-makers wanted by the
U.S. and Philippine governments. Both bomb-makers were living under the BIFFs protection in
Maguindanao. One was a Malaysian bomb-maker named Zulkifli Abdhir, also known as
Marwan, who had provided bomb production training for various organizations, including the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); Marwan was killed during the operation. The SAFs second target
was another bomb-maker, Abdul Basit Usman, who was also believed to lead a special
operations division within the BIFF. Usman escaped during the battle. The SAF operation
resulted in forty-four SAF trooper deaths and a backlash against the MILF-Philippine
government peace process because of MILF members involvement in attacking the troopers.
 The BIFF suffered several leadership losses in 2015. Government forces captured Tambako on
March 15, and one month later, Katostill in hidingdied from natural causes. Ismael
Abubakar, who led the BIFFs political affairs division, was then chosen to head the BIFF. In
addition, Usman was killed in May, likely by bodyguards who attempted to collect the bounty on
him that was offered by the United States government.

LEADERSHIP

There is little information regarding the BIFFs leadership structure.

1. Abdul Basit Usman (Unknown to 2015): Usman was a BIFF member and
bombmaking expert who led a special operations division within the BIFF. He was a member
of the MILF before breaking away from the group with Kato, who founded the BIFF. Usman
had links to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and he was one of the
most wanted individuals in the Philippines. He was killed in May 2015, allegedly by
bodyguards who wanted to collect a bounty from the U.S. government.
2. Ameril Umbra Kato (2010 to 2011): Kato was the BIFFs founder and first leader. He
established the BIFF in December 2010 after leaving the MILF. In November 2011, Kato
suffered a severe stroke; he went into hiding and remained paralyzed until his death in April
2015.
3. Mohammad Ali Tambako (2011 to Unknown): Tambako was appointed as the BIFFs
leader after Kato suffered a severe stroke in November 2011. Tambako left or was expelled
from the BIFF in 2013 after leading some supporters in an attack on the Christian population
of the city of Midsayap, during which his forces decapitated a farmer. He then established
another militant group called the Justice for Islamic Movement (JIM). However, Tambako
retained some influence over the BIFF and may have rejoined the group a short time
afterward; the BIFF and the JIM have reportedly worked together. Government forces
arrested Tambako on March 15, 2015.
4. Ismael Abubakar (2015 to Present): Abubakar, also known as Kumander Bungos, is
the BIFFs appointed leader. He served as the BIFFs chief of political affairs before being
chosen to head the BIFF upon Katos death in April 2015.

GOALS
Islamist
Separatist

The BIFF seeks to establish an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines for the
Filipino Muslim minority, known as the Moro people. The BIFF was formed as a splinter group
of the MILF in response to the latters acceptance of an autonomy arrangement rather than full
independence during negotiations with the government. Kato, the BIFFs founder, espoused an
extreme version of Islam and admired Wahhabism.
 RESOURCES

Kato took many weapons from the MILFs 105th Base Command, the MILFs biggest and most
well-armed field division, when he broke from the organization in December 2010.
Consequently, the BIFF possesses a large stockpile of pistols, machine guns, sniper rifles,
improvised explosive devices, landmines, and more.

MAJOR ATTACKS
1. August 5, 2012: BIFF members launched attacks on eleven towns in the province of
Maguindanao, focusing on Philippine military targets. Fighting between the BIFF and
government forces lasted until the following day. (3 killed, 1+ wounded).January 28, 2014:
The Philippine National Police (PNP) blamed the BIFF for bombing a bus terminal in
Maguindanao in an attempt to distract government forces pursuing high-ranking BIFF
leaders. The BIFF denied responsibility for the attack. (0 killed, 2 wounded).
2. December 9, 2014: The BIFF bombed a bus in the province of Bukidnon. Philippine
authorities alleged that the attack was a test for new BIFF recruits and may also have been to
attempt to extort the bus company, which had previously received demands for payment to
the BIFF. (11 killed, 31 wounded).
3. January 25, 2015: Philippine Special Action Force (SAF) troopers targeted two key
bomb-makers in an operation in Maguindanao. During the pursuit, the troopers were attacked
by rebel forces that included BIFF members. Consideration of the Bangsamoro Basic Law,
an important element of the MILF-Philippine government negotiations, was temporarily
suspended after this attack. (~67 killed, 12+ wounded).

Sultan Kudarat Educational Institution

College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

 Reseach

In

POLITICAL SCIENCE

REASON WHY TAIWAN CLAIM WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: SHAINABAI, BIANG

In January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan).
She will take office later this month. As the first president from the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party in eight years, Tsais election represents a wildcard of sorts for the
ROCs ongoing claims in the South China Sea.

Whatever course she takes as president, her South China Sea policy will be governed by one
central dilemma. This dilemma stems from the difficult reality that ROC possesses a similar
position to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in the disputed waters, while it still aims to
pursue international standards of best practice. How has this dilemma shaped policy so far, and
how is it likely to evolve?

The 1992 Consensus One China, respective interpretations agreed to by the ROC and the
PRC poses preconditions on the ROCs foreign interactions. While both parties have worked
towards the gradual institutionalisation of the cross-strait relationship, the ROCs voice in the
international community has had limited impact. It has been barred from participating in
international and regional regimes and dialogues, including the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea.

The ROC and PRC positions on the South China Sea have significant commonalities. Both claim
the legitimacy of U-shaped lines, such as the so-callednine-dash line, and their sovereignty from
a historical perspective. But in terms of their status in the international community and their
interpretation of international standards, the two positions vary.

The ROC claims that in terms of either historical, geographical or international legal
perspective, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Shisha (Paracel) Islands, Chungsha (Macclesfield)
Islands, Tungsha (Paratas) Islands, as well as their surrounding waters, their respective sea bed
and subsoil belong to the Republic of China as an inherent part of the territory. The ROC
does not recognise any claim to sovereignty over, or occupation of, these areas by other
countries.

The U-shaped nine-dash line constitutes the main part of the ROCs historical claim over the
South China Sea. In December 1946, a map issued by the ROCs Department of Territories and
Boundaries featured 11 discontinuous U-shaped lines. In 1948, the government declared its
sovereignty and the right to maritime resources over the islands and reefs within the line. The
PRC later recognized the line when it was established in 1949. The current shape of the nine-
dash line was set down when the PRC government removed two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in
1953.

The ROC seems to have slightly adjusted the gravity of its claim. Recently, the ROCs claim has
focused more on the islands, their surrounding waters and continental shelf, rather than the whole
body of water in the U-shaped line. The ROC suspended its claim to the entire waters within
the line in December 2005, while still advocating its ownership of land features within the line.

The ROC has possessed the naturally-formed Taiping Island in the Spratlys since it sent troops
there in 1956. The island used to be the largest among the Spratlys, but it has been surpassed
with the PRCs island reclamation and construction in recent years. ROC presidents and officials,
including former presidents Chen Shui-Bian and Ma Ying-jeou, have visited Taiping Island in
order to reiterate and promote Taiwans territorial claim.

Among other claimants, the ROC has been engaged in conflict with Vietnam over Taiping Island
(Ba Binh Island in Vietnamese) and has disputed Vietnam and Malaysias joint submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the United Nations.

The ROC has also criticized the Philippines domestic and foreign activities. One recent conflict
between the ROC and the Philippines occurred in January 2013, when the Philippines
initiated international arbitration proceedings against the PRC at the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea. The ROC was not invited as a concerned party in this arbitration. It also
protested against an argument that appeared during the second hearing held in November
2015 that denied Taiping Island was a naturally-formed island.

Amid rising concerns in the region regarding militarization of maritime features and potential
clashes, the ROCs activities in the South China Sea have been focused on civilian purposes. On
26 May 2015, the ROC government proposed the South China Sea Peace Initiative (the SCS
Peace Initiative). The initiative led to the Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation
on Law Enforcement in Fisheries Matters between ROC and the Philippines on in November that
year.

The red marker shows the location of Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island), which is being claimed and
occupied by Taiwan. GOOGLEMAPS SCREENGRAB
TAIPEI, Taiwan As China builds artificial islands in a vast resource-rich South China Sea and
neighbors in Southeast Asia brace for possible conflict, Taiwan is cutting carbon emissions and
offering a hospital for humanitarian aid on the seas largest natural islet to seek international
approval for easing tension.
Taiwans unusual use of Taiping Island in the heavily contested Spratly archipelago may appeal
particularly to the United States, a staunch, long-time informal ally that has at least scrutinized
the legal basis for Taiwans maritime claims. Washington, seeking stable relations with China as
well, has also urged the six claimants to cooperate rather than fight.
Taiping, also called Itu Aba, and the Spratlys, which Manila calls the Kalayaan Group of Islands,
are within the portion of the South China Sea which the Philippines refer to as West Philippine
Sea. According to the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, the West Philippine Sea also
includes the Luzon Sea and the sea around Scarborough Shoal, which Filipinos also refer to as
Bajo de Masinloc or Panatag Shoal.
Taiwan, which lacks the diplomatic ties to negotiate with the other five governments with claims
in the South China Sea, has installed $1.29 million worth of solar panels on Taiping Island since
2011 to light a cluster of buildings and provide power for construction of a 200-meter (yard) pier
due for completion by years end, the head of the islands coast guard said Friday.
Panels covering 1,570 square meters (16,890 square feet), enough to save about 32,000 liters
(8,450 gallons) of diesel fuel last year, also will supply electricity to a five-bed hospital and
living quarters that accept seafarers of any nationality, Coast Guard Administration Minister
Wang Chung-yi said.
Taiping receives about 10 foreign boats a year from China or Vietnam, usually during storms.
The pier will make it easier for coast guard vessels or if needed someday naval ships to
dock, allowing more medical supplies to reach the five-bed hospital with a rotating staff as well
as a surgery ward. Taiwan also has built a military airstrip on the coast guard-controlled Island.
No one is in opposition. The United States approves, Wang said. When the situation gets
tense, our countrys stance is to take a novel approach. Cant we put aside the dispute? Taiping
Island has solar power and green energy that are telling the world we have a different perspective
on operating it.
Taiwans design for its 1,400-meter (4,590-foot) -long, 400-meter (1,312-foot) -wide islet
contrasts to the campaigns by China and Vietnam to landfill multiple islets, build military bases
and drive oil rigs into the ocean floor near the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos. China had added
some 2,000 acres (809 hectares) of land in the Spratly chain since last year, U.S. officials said.
Taiwan expects other countries, especially the United States, to respect its efforts, which follow
the May 26 announcement of a South China Sea peace and resource-sharing initiative by
President Ma Ying-jeou.
The 3.5 million-square-kilometer (1.4 million-square-mile) sea is rich in fisheries, supports about
half the worlds commercial shipping and holds an estimated 7 billion barrels of oil reserves.
Brunei and Malaysia claim parts of the same ocean.
In signs of growing tension, the Philippines reopened Subic Bay naval base this year and held
military exercises with the United States and Japan to help counter any threats from China.
Manila has also filed for arbitration in a United Nations court. Last year, Vietnam and China
clashed over Chinas placement of an oil rig in waters that both sides claim, touching off deadly
anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam.
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Because China claims sovereignty of Taiwan itself, using economic clout to bar countries
throughout the world from establishing diplomatic relations with Taipei, the government relies
on soft power to gain recognition.
The U.S. government says China has been unclear about the legal basis for its claim that
encompasses most of the sea. Taiwans government, the Republic of China, first adopted that
basis before 1949 when it ruled all of China. It sticks to that claim today.
Considering that the maps predate the Peoples Republic of China, the views of Taiwan are
also of interest, the State Department said in a study released last year.
The de-facto U.S. embassy in Taipei said Friday that Washington appreciates Taiwans call on
all claimants to exercise restraint, refrain from taking any unilateral action that might escalate
tensions, a reference to the peace initiative. It did not comment on the solar energy program.
Taiwan also may hope to remind Europe, where environmental programs are popular, of its
maritime claims, said Sean King, senior vice president with the consultancy Park Strategies in
New York and Taipei. Taipei is just trying to use a trendy issue like the environment to curry
international favor in general for its South China Sea posture, he said.
The coast guard head acknowledged that Taiping Island, dominated by coconut and papaya trees,
does not generate much pollution. The goal is to supply 20 percent of its energy through solar
power, up from 16 percent now, because that level matches international standards, he said.
Sultan Kudarat Educational Institution

College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

Reseach

In

POLITICAL SCIENCE

MUSLIM INDEPENDENT MOVEMENT

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: SARAH, PINTUNGAN

Muslim Independence Movement

In May of 1968 the establishment of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was
announced by its founder and chairman, the newly retired governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtug
Matalam. The MIM had as its formal goals the secession of Muslims "from the Republic of
thePhilippines in order to establish an Islamic State" (MIM Manifesto quoted in Glang 1969, 103).

A contemporaneous editorial in the Cotabato City newspaper (Mindanao Cross , June 1,

1968) noted the irony in the fact that Datu Udtug, the former governor of the province and
prominent advocate of Muslim-Christian political harmony in the region, had now founded a
Muslim secessionist movement. The proximate cause for the sudden political transformation of
Datu Udtug may be found in the circumstances of his retirement from the governor's office. In
1967, Datu Udtug became a political casualty of the national party politics about which he cared
so little. Following the lead of his brother-in-law, Congressman Salipada Pendatun, Datu Udtug
had been aligned for some years with the Liberalista Party. After an exceedingly bitter
presidential election campaign in 1965, won by the Nacionalista Party challenger Ferdinand
Marcos, Marcos led a Nacionalista push to unseat Liberalista officeholders in the 1967 local
elections. One of the targeted provinces was Cotabato, previously considered the unassailable
territory of Pendatun and Matalam. Marcos personally selected a Muslim Nacionalista candidate
for the governorship of Cotabato, Datu Abdulla Sangki. Sangki was a member of the Ampatuan
clan,[8] which was closely aligned with the Sinsuats, the persistent political rivals of Pendatun and
Matalam. The Sinsuats and Ampatuans had, that year, affiliated en masse with the Nacionalistas.

Datu Udtug, who disdained electioneering, was unimpressed by this challenge, but
Pendatun, a modern campaigner, took it quite seriously. Presumably, he was also aware that
were a Nacionalista to attain the governorship of Cotabato, his own position as congressman for
the province would become untenable. Pendatun persuaded the sixty-eight-year-old Udtug to
withdraw from the election by offering to run for governor himself in his stead. [9] Pendatun chose
Simeon Datumanong, a political protg, as his running mate for vice-governor. Datumanong
was a member of the Ampatuan clan and was chosen at least partly as a counterweight to the
Nacionalista candidate. Pendatun won the governor's race by a slender margin but decided not to
give up his seat in Congress after all. He never took the oath of office and Datumanong
automatically became governor.

Datu Udtug thus found himself in 1968 involuntarily retired from public office and far from
the reins of provincial power, which were now held by a youngster closely related to his political
foes. He reportedly felt abused by his old comrade Pendatun and more disgusted than ever with
national party politics. His resentment was intensified as theresult of a separate incident. In
August of 1967 his eldest son, Tuting, was shot and killed by an off-duty agent of the National
Bureau of Investigation. Datu Udtug was anguished at this loss and then deeply offended when
none of the newly elected provincial officials (with the exception of Pendatun) visited him to pay
their condolences. The compounded frustration of Datu Udtug at his sudden powerlessness
apparently led to his willingness to attempt a dramatic gesture to seek renewed respect and
recognition. In his effort to be once again taken seriously he was successful beyond his
expectations, at least in the short term.

Datu Udtug's MIM was never a popular secessionist movement. Its only public political
actions were pronouncements in the form of manifestos and declarations of policy publicized in
the national and international press and disseminated to politicians and Muslim leaders in the
Philippines and abroad. There was little apparent public support for the secessionist goals of the
movement among ordinary Muslims (George 1980, 152; McAmis 1974), and Datu Udtug himself
eventually retreated publicly from his initial positions. Nevertheless, the published statements of
the Muslim Independence Movement were taken more seriously by Cotabato Christians, the
national media, and the state than they were by Cotabato Muslims and, evidently, more seriously
than intended by Datu Udtug. In the months following the initial manifesto, the national press
carried headlines announcing that "War Brews in Cotabato." Christian settlers left some towns in
anticipation of a Muslim uprising, and the national government transferred combat-ready troops
to the province (George 1980, 135).[11]

The manifestos of the MIM also drew the prompt attention of those who controlled the
state. President Marcos met with Datu Udtug publicly in October of 1968. Marcos acknowledged
Datu Udtug's self-proclaimed role as "the leader of the more than four million Muslims in the
Philippines," presented him with his gold watch as a token of friendship, and appointed him
presidential adviser on Muslim affairs (Mindanao News-Bulletin October 25, 1968, quoted in
Glang 1969, 2829). The apprehension induced by Datu Udtug's essentially notional movement
appears clearly related to its timing, coming just six weeks after the disclosure of the Jabidah
Massacre. From the perspective of Manila, MIM appeared to be "a spontaneous southern
backlash against the notorious Jabidah shooting" (George 1980, 133). Despite appearances, and
notwithstanding Datu Udtug's implications to the contrary, the evidence suggests that the
Jabidah Massacre was less an impetus for Datu Udtug's movement than were his own personal
motivations. As George (1980) has argued, any provincial Muslim reaction to the Jabidah
Massacre would have emanated first from Sulu, the home province of the recruits, rather than
from Cotabato. By referring to the incident, Datu Udtug was, in all likelihood, merely making use
of media attention and Muslim anger generated by Jabidah, for personal ends.

The Muslim Independence Movement did, however, serve purposes and produce
consequences quite apart from the intentions or actions of Datu Udtug. The MIM acted as a
lightning rod, attracting mostly young, educated Muslims either disenchanted with or debarred
from Muslim electoral politics. For a period of time Datu Udtug's homestead at Pagalungan again
became a center of political activity. Udtug himself played a very limited role in MIM activities
after his initial efforts. He appeared content with the recognition he had garnered by signing his
name to manifestos and spent the rest of his life, until his death in 1983 at the age of eighty-
four, farming his land.While credible information on the covert political activities associated with
the Muslim Independence Movement is hard to come by, enough data are available to indicate
how the MIM, though never a broad-based movement, became a vehicle for the convergence of
old and new, established and anti-establishment, Muslim interests. In 1969, Hashim Salamat
established an organization, Nurul Islam, to promote Islamic renewal in Cotabato. By 1970
Salamat had aligned himself and his organization with the MIM. Presumably, Salamat was
attracted to the MIM by Datu Udtug's break with party politics, his call for an Islamic state, and
his willingness to associate himself with young and idealistic men. It is known that by early 1969,
Nur Misuari had also made the acquaintance of Datu Udtug and, more important, had made
common cause with the two most prominent Liberalista Muslim politicians of the day, Salipada
Pendatun of Cotabato and Rashid Lucman of Lanao. Misuari most likely had cemented his
relationship with these men as a result of the Jabidah protests in Manila, which received
significant support from opposition Muslim politicians.

Misuari became most closely associated with Rashid Lucman, a prominent Muslim
congressman and Pendatun's counterpart in Lanao. Lucman was also closely acquainted with Tun
Mustapha, the chief minister of the Malaysian federal state of Sabah. Mustapha had been angry
with the Philippine government since it first announced a claim to Sabah. Mustapha was also an
ethnic Tausug with many relatives living in Sulu and had become incensed both at the
recruitment of Sulu Muslims to invade Sabah and at their subsequent treatment at the hands of
Philippine agents (Noble 1983). The Jabidah Massacre served to confirm his worst suspicions of
Philippine intentions. At some point in early 1969 a decision was made within this group to
initiate a training program for Muslim guerrilla fighters. In late 1969, ninety young Muslim
recruits, most of them Lucman's fellow Maranaos from Lanaobut also Magindanaons and
Tausugsbegan military training in the forests of Malaysia by professional instructors (Mercado
1984; Noble 1983). Nur Misuari was among the group, as was the son of Rashid Lucman and
eight young Magindanaons. Although there is no evidence that Datu Udtug actively participated
in the decision to train Muslim fighters, and although only a small percentage of the trainees
were Magindanaon, this training has been referred to as an MIM program (see Mercado 1984;
Noble 1983). The training was evidently financed as well as sanctioned by the government of
Malaysia through the intercession of Tun Mustapha.
 Misuari's intentions in taking part in (and probably initiatingsee George 1980) the training
program are rather easily discernible. It is apparent from his 1968 editorial quoted above that he
had already accepted the inevitability of armed struggle to achieve Muslim secession. Given
those convictions, Misuari's association with established Muslim politicians was pragmatic. With
no resources of his own, and having disengaged himself from the campus-based Marxist
nationalist opposition, he turned to those apparently sympathetic Muslims who had their own
resources and, more important, access to potentially significant quantities of external resources.

The intentions of the Liberalista Congressmen, Pendatun and Lucmanboth of whom

publicly denied any association with the MIM or guerrilla trainingare much less easy to discern.
There is no evidence to suggest that their secret sponsorship of an armed force was a defensive
response to any immediate threat to their persons, or even to their positions. It was more likely
conceived as a new tactic in the evolving national party politics of the period. Both men found
themselves in 1969 aligned as bitter foes of an increasingly aggressive national president who
was actively strengthening (with money and arms) their Nacionalista Muslim rivals in their home
provincesin Cotabato, the Sinsuat-Ampatuan alliance; and in Lanao, Congressman All
Dimaporo. Pendatun and Lucman most probably saw the creation of a welltrained armed force,
whose instruction and supplies they did not have to finance and whose existence they could
deny, as a useful new resource in a mixed political strategy.

The Magindanaon recruits returned from Malaysia to Cotabato to train additional young men
and form part of the nucleus of the MIM youth sectionthe only dynamic segment of the MIM.
The rest of the active core was composed of Hashim Salamat and some of his fellow al-Azhar
graduates. Datu Udtug pledged to finance arms purchases but, according to Datu Adil, spent
most of the allocated funds on farm improvements.

Although never a popular secessionist movement, the MIM did have political consequence
as both a notion and a provocation. By articulating the idea of Muslim separatism at an
opportune time it galvanized a new non-datu and anti-establishment group into political action
while offering established Muslim politicians a novel weapon for opposing an unusually
aggressive ruling party.

The focus thus far has been entirely on the formation of new Muslim political elites and their
relation to the beginnings of a movement for political separation from the Philippine republic. To
understand how ordinary Muslims became inclined toward armed separatism requires the
investigation of an unprecedented string of violent incidents in Cotabato beginning in 1970.

Sultan Kudarat Educational Institution

College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

 Reseach

In

POLITICAL SCIENCE

CPP-NPA

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: ANA BAI D. AHMAD

Sultan Kudarat Educational Institution

College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

 Reseach

In

POLITICAL SCIENCE

NUMBER OF NON FILIPINO IN THE PHILIPPINES

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: HASYA S, NANGKONG

Foreign citizens in the country reaches nearly 200 thousand

Based on the 2010 Census of Population and Housing (CPH), the number of foreign citizens in
the country was 177,365 as of May 2010. They comprised 0.2 percent of the total household
population.
Three in ten foreign citizens (31.1 %) were residing in National Capital Region (NCR) at the
time of the census. Those residing in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao made up
22.3 percent of the total foreign citizens. Region III had 9.0 percent, Region IVA had 8.4 percent,
and Region VII had 6.0 percent of the total foreign citizens. Region IX had the least proportion at
0.5 percent.

Majority of foreign citizens come from the United States of America

The largest number of foreign citizens in the country came from the United States of America
(29,959 persons). The next largest numbers came from China (28,750 persons), Japan (11,583
persons), and India (8,963 persons).

TECHNICAL NOTES

As in past censuses of population, the 2010 Census of Population and Housing (CPH) used the
de jure concept of enumeration wherein households and persons are enumerated in the area
where they usually reside as of the census reference date. For 2010 CPH, the reference period
was May 1, 2010.

Included in the enumeration are citizens of foreign countries who have resided or are expected to
reside in the Philippines for at least a year from their arrival, except members of diplomatic
missions and non-Filipino members of international organizations and civilian citizens of foreign
countries who have their usual residence in the Philippines, or foreign visitors who had stayed or
are expected to stay for at least a year from the date of their arrival.

For the 2010 Census of Population and Housing (CPH), the data on citizenship were collected
using the question Is __________ a citizen of the Philippines? This was asked for all
household population. This question determines who among the members of the household
citizens of the Philippines are and who are not. For non-citizens, the question What country is
__________ a citizen of? was asked. This question determines who among the members of the
household is a citizen of a foreign country.

In this census, there were 92,097,978 household population. Of this total, 177,368 were citizens
of foreign countries. Among the foreign citizens, 24.8 percent had no response to the question on
country of citizenship (classified under Not Reported).

Citizenship is defined as the legal nationality of a person. A citizen is a legal national of the
country at the time of census, while an alien is a non-national of the country. Data on citizenship
allows the classification of the population into citizens and aliens.

REASONS WHY NON FILIPINOS ARE VISIT AND STAY IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. The stable and strong presence of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and Information
Technology Outsourcing (ITO) investments in the Philippines is one of the major factors
that help foreigners decide to invest on properties since this in effect increases the
number of expats in the country which in return create more needs for residential
facilities.
 2. Among Asian Countries, the Philippines is among the lowest in terms of Rental Rates. This is a
common option for Foreigners since most of the time they opt to have their properties
here in Philippines rented for short term or long term lease. Trending now is that more
and more companies have been purchasing properties for their clients to rent locally and
especially those from abroad. Companies also purchase condominium units for their
Expats who are members of the board for their personal residential use.

3. The Prices of real estate properties in the Philippines are relatively low when compared
to those located in the United States and even among its counterparts in the Asian region.
This makes investments in the Philippines attractive because their values are expected to
appreciate in years to come. Trending now is that more Foreigners buys several units of
properties on its Pre-Selling stage and sell it once the units have been turn-over to their
clients abroad - This is already similar to what strategy locals normally do with their
investments but it seems that the international market is following our lead as well.

4. Most development projects by different real estate companies are inspired

internationally thru different themes which pave ways for more options for
foreigners to choose from. Some will be developing a man-made beach and some
projects boasts of a technology driven (One-click) residential unit and others carry
international brand names like The Trump and Hilton which caters to high-level
executives and businessmen.

5. The Philippine Real Estate industry is now on a growth trajectory that is expected
to compete with Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia. This is the best time for locals
and foreigners to acquire more properties and find that right opportunity to make
more revenue sooner than expected.

6. Fitting in is easier in the Philippines.

The Philippines is the third largest English speaking nation in the world a fact of which some
Filipinos Ive met boast about. In my experience, they have every right to be proud. Filipinos
speak impeccable English in addition to the hundreds of other languages and dialects they
speak fluently which explains why the country has surpassed India as the preferred destination
for business process outsourcing (BPO) centers in the world.
 College of Nursing, School of Midwifery and Education

Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat

Reseach

In

POLITICAL SCIENCE

KADAMAY PROBLEM IN THE HOUSING

SUBMITTED TO: NOEL PEPITO NIERVO, Ph, D

SUBMITTED BY: HASYA S, NANGKONG

Kadamay magnifies
our housing problem
ON March 8 members of the urban-poor group Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (Kadamay)
illegally occupied idle government housing projects in Bulacan. These housing units were
intended for low-salaried uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
National Police, Bureau of Fire Protection and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.
Some of the units they seized were built by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for informal-
settler families living along waterways and danger zones in the metropolis.

Kadamay leaders said they decided to occupy the idle houses because the governments housing
agencies have been ignoring their applications for free housing for the longest time. But their
illegal occupation deprives the intended awardees of their right to government housing
assistance. And the NHA said it will never allow any mob rule in its housing projects.

Kadamays occupation of government housing units reminds us of a statement made by former

Hawaii governor and housing advocate Linda Lingle: We have come dangerously close to
accepting the homeless situation as a problem that we just cant solve. Although this statement
was made about the American housing crisis in the 20th century, it painfully hits close to home,
given our current housing problem. The National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), an agency
under the Office of the President, said the countrys housing backlog, caused by the failure of the
housing programs of past administrations, has already escalated into a humanitarian crisis.
There is an urgent need for a comprehensive mass-housing program to guarantee the right to
decent shelter for the poor, NAPC Secretary Liza L. Maza said.
President Duterte labeled Kadamays action to occupy idle government housing units in Bulacan
as a form of anarchy. He has issued a strong warning for them to leave the premises or face the
full force of the law: If you want to ignore the law, you cannot do that. I will force the issue
with eviction. I will do what I have to do.

Following the Presidents warning, the NHA started issuing eviction notices to Kadamay
members occupying 5,262 housing units in seven NHA project sites in Bulacan. The NHA said
Kadamay members have seven days upon receipt of the eviction notice to leave the housing units
they occupied. The agency said Kadamay members who want to have their own housing units
must follow the NHA procedures, like answering the housing information form, screening
process and beneficiary selection.

The NHA assured Kadamay members that it will come up with housing programs and projects
appropriate to their needs, with necessary budget from the national government. Unfortunately,
the NHAs assurances apparently fell on deaf ears, as the barricades put up by the illegal
occupants around the resettlement areas were still standing as of this writing, with placards
saying the housing project is free and for the masses.

Most everyone agree theres an urgent need to find lasting solutions that are truly responsive to
the needs of the poor. As one public official quipped, We are sad it happened this way, yet, let
this be a reminder to the government to act now and provide housing to those who need it the
most.

To solve homelessness, we need to build lots of affordable housing. But the government has
failed to do that. The Duterte administration, however, has five more years to solve the countrys
housing backlog of around 6 million units.
 In early March 2017, thousands of members of Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap (Kadamay, 'Federation of Mutual Aid for the Poor') and other informal
settlers occupied an idle housing project of the National Housing Authority (NHA), in Pandi,
Bulacan in the Philippines.

Of the housing units in the Pandi site, 538 were awarded specifically to Philippine National
Police personnel. Utilities such as water and electricity are not yet available in some housing
units. As of March 2017, 1,848 out of 9,128 houses were completed by the National Housing
Authority (NHA).[3]

On March 8, Kadamay, an urban poor group, led an occupation of about 5,000 pending housing
units in five relocation sites in Bulacan. Members of Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(Kadamay) vowed to defend their barricades and occupation of these idle government housing
sites and units. They appealed to President Rodrigo Duterte to heed their calls.[4] Police reported
that about 5,000 pay for rally individuals reportedly occupied the housing units in Pandi
Residences 3, Pandi Village 2 and Padre Pio.[5] The National Housing Authority (NHA) stated
that 4,000 housing units in the area were invaded by the informal settlers.[5] Kadamay said this
was to protest against the failure of the Duterte administration and the housing authorities to
provide shelters in the area.[6]

On March 13, a group of families, composed of 500-1,000 members, occupied the housing units
in Bulacan.[7] Duterte warned that homeless settlers must follow the law or he would be forced to
remove them from the site.[8][9] Duterte labelled the occupation by Kadamay as "anarchy".
[10]
League of Filipino Students (LFS) national spokesperson JP Rosos condemned Duterte for
stating what Kadamay did was anarchy.[11]

On March 14, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) told Duterte that the occupation of
government housing units was not anarchy.[12] On March 16, the NHA officials processed 160
housing applications from families who occupy the idle units in Pandi.[13]

On March 20, Kadamay members attacked the front gates of the NHA in Quezon City, protesting
the eviction notices against the occupation on idle housing units.[14] Kadamay Chairman Gloria
Arellano lambasted the PNP, whom it called "fear-mongering" in response to the occupation.
[14]
Meanwhile, on March 21, about 15 Kadamay members attempted to enter the housing units
in Rodriguez, Rizal but were foiled by the police.[15]

The NHA issued eviction notices, on March 23, to members of Kadamay who occupied the units.
However, the urban poor group burned their notices once the NHA personnel left the area.[16] On
March 24, about 1,000 Kadamay members gathered again at NHA office to demand their rights
over 5,000 idle housing units and free Cable and internet.[17]ACT Teacher partylist
representatives criticized the NHA for the eviction notices they gave to them.[18] Kilusang Mayo
Uno, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, Makabayan, Gabriela and Anakpawis members teamed up
with Kadamay to protest the lack of housing programs for the poor.[17] According to the dialogue
between the Kadamay and the NHA on March 27, they came to an agreement that any units left
unclaimed after the May 30 deadline would be transferred to the informal settlers.[3]

The NHA announced a plan, on March 27, to expel 20,000 illegal dwellers from 5,262 housing
units in Pandi, Bulacan. However, the NHA withdrew the orders after Kadamay agreed to
undergo a validation process, which started on April 3, to determine whether the members are
eligible to steal the houses, according to Anakpawis Rep. Ariel Casilao.[19]

On April 4, Duterte announced that members of Kadamay may now live in units, as long as they
do not oust police officers and soldiers who currently reside there.[20] He also urged the soldiers
and police officers to give up their claims to their houses occupied by Kadamay, vowing to build
better housing projects by December.[21]

Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, on April 6, called the grabbing of houses by the Kadamay
members the "front organization of communists. Trillanes warned that the community may be
used as a "sanctuary" of communist rebels. On the same day, Duterte accused Kadamay of
involvement in "anarchical activities" as he promised to prevent any efforts to occupy other
housing projects.[