Ethics Digests Complete

Legal Ethics Cases (Alimurung) 2D 2012
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25,
1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with
a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)
ISSUE:
WN Christian Monsod has engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years?
HELD:
YES
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
BATES V. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

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FACTS:
Petitioners, who are licensed attorneys and members of the Arizona State Bar, were charged in a
complaint filed by the State Bar's president with violating the State Supreme Court's disciplinary rule,
which prohibits attorneys from advertising in newspapers or other media. The complaint was based upon a
newspaper advertisement placed by appellants for their "legal clinic." They were suspended for 6 months
by the State Bar, but were later on only censured by the Arizona Supreme Court, finding that the
advertisements were done in good faith. The ad read:
Do you need a lawyer?

Legal services at very reasonable fees
Divorce or legal separation uncontested (both spouses sign papers)

$175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
Preparation of all court papers and instructions on how to do your own simple uncontested divorce
$100.00
Adoption uncontested severance proceeding
$225.00 plus approximately $10.00 publication cost
Bankruptcy non-business, no contested proceedings
Individual $250.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee Wife and Husband $300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
Change of Name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee Information regarding other types of cases furnished upon
request
Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen

(The ad was clearly labeled as an advertisement, and gave the downtown Phoenix address and phone
number of the clinic.)
RULING:
The US Supreme Court exonerated them from the disciplinary charges. The petitioners were
acquitted on two grounds. First, the ban on advertisements violated the Sherman Act. Second, the
advertisements made were protected by the First Amendment being commercial speech.
The restraint upon attorney advertising imposed by the Supreme Court of Arizona wielding the
power of the State over the practice of law is not subject to attack under the Sherman Act. Commercial
speech, which serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking, is
entitled to some First Amendment protection.
Advertising legal services is not inherently misleading. Only routine services lend themselves to
advertising, and, for such services, fixed rates can be meaningfully established, as the Arizona State Bar's
own Legal Services Program demonstrates. Although a client may not [p351] know the detail involved in a
given task, he can identify the service at the level of generality to which advertising lends itself. Though
advertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to select an attorney, it would be peculiar to
deny the consumer at least some of the relevant information needed for an informed decision on the
ground that the information was not complete.
Appellants' advertisement (contrary to appellee's contention) is not misleading, and falls within the
scope of First Amendment protection.
(a) The term "legal clinic" would be understood to refer to an operation like appellants'
that is geared to provide standardized and multiple services.
(b) The advertisement's claim that appellants offer services at "very reasonable" prices is
not misleading. Appellants' advertised fee for an uncontested divorce, which was
specifically cited by appellee, is in line with customary charges in the area.
(c) Appellants' failure to disclose that a name change might be accomplished by the
client without an attorney's aid was not misleading, since the difficulty of performing the
task is not revealed, and since most legal services may be performed legally by the
citizen for himself.
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ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC INC
FACTS:
Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement similar to or
of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B (p381). Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of
said advertisement that claims that it is not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of
legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machine.
ISSUE:
W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of
HELD:
According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the 2 terms, legal support services and legal services, common sense would readily dictate that the
same are essentially without substantial distinction. The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the
impression that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers and that it renders legal
services. The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is
counseling illegal activities.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the
court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent clients in court since
law practice is not limited merely to court appearances.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Profession
Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts. The proscription against advertising
of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Exceptions:
o Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon
o Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the statement of his name,
the law firm, address and branch of law practiced.
Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of
the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded with a warning that the
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
IN RE: TAGORDA
FACTS:
1929, Luis B. Tagorda is a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial Board of Isabela. He made
use of a card that was in Spanish and Ilocano which advertised his services as an attorney and notary
public. The card also advertised his services in acquiring homesteads and affidavits. Also presented in the
case was a letter Tagorda made addressed to a lieutenant in his home barrio asking the latter to inform his
friends, relatives and the public in general that despite his election to the board he would still be offering
his services as lawyer and notary public. In the letter he also mentions his rates for aid in land registration
(3 pesos per registration).
ISSUE:
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W/N Tagorda violated law in advertising his services as a lawyer and notary public.
RULING:
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment. It is a violation of the (then)
Canons of Professional Ethics. But due to the fact that Tagorda was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
his youth and inexperience at the bar and his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future, only a
modest suspension is deemed by the court as punishment. Tagorda is suspended for a period of 1 month.
DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS V BAYOT
FACTS:
Estanislao Bayot, an attorney, was charged with malpractice for publishing an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune, in violation of the ethics of the legal profession, stating the following:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
He originally denies ever publishing the advertisement but subsequently admitted it and pleaded for
leniency since it only happened once and has had no case at law because of it.
Issue:
W/N Bayot should be liable for the advertisement?
Held:
Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 states that the practice of solicitng cases at law for the purpose of fain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice. Law is a profession and not a trade and a
lawyer degrades himself and his progession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism.
However, the Court merely reprimanded Bayot due to his plea for leniency and promise not to report such
conduct.
KAHN, JR. V. SIMBILLO
FACTS:
A paid advertisement appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer that read ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. Ms. Theresa Espeleta, staff member of Public Information
Office of the SC, called the telephone number in the advertisement. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases, provided
that it will not involve separation of property or custody of children. The wife added that the service would
cost 48,000.
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Upon furthur research, it was made known that similar advertisements were published on Manila
Bulletin and The Philippine Star. Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr, as Assistant Court Administrator filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services,
inviolation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Court. Atty. Simbillo argues that the
advertisement and solicitation were not prohibited. He even argued that the time has come to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and soliciting of lawyers.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed a Resolution, finding Atty. Simbillo guilty and
suspending him for the practice of law for 1 year.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Simbillo is guilty for violation of Rule 2.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 Sec 27 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
RULING:
YES, he is guilty.
The practice of law is not a business, it is not a money-making venture. It is a profession in which
the duty to public service and to the administration of justice is the primary consideration. The gaining of
livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business.
1. duty of public service
2. relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice
3. relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
4. relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice
Atty. Simbillo clearly commited the acts complained of. He admitted that he caused the publication
of the advertisements. And even while he pleads to the court for mercy, he advertised again his legal
services in an issue of Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. What adds gravity to the violations was advertising
himself as self-styled Annulment Marriage Specialist. By doing so, he erodes and undermines the stability
and sanctity of marriage. As he assures his customers that annulment can be obtained in 4-6 monthins,
he encourage people to dissolve their marriage.
The solicitation of legal business must be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the names of lawyers is allowed. Even the use of calling
cards and publication in reputable law lists is now acceptable. However, a lawyer may not properly publish
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his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program, for
it is not a reputable law list. In additon, it should not mislead or include false facts regarding the lawyers
name and other information.
Atty. Simbillo is guilty for violation of Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of CPR and Rule 138 Sec 27 of RoC. The
penalty is SUSPENSION from the practice of law for 1 year.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
HILADO V. DAVID
FACTS:
Blandina Hilado brought an action against Selim Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot
exected by Hilados husband.Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for
Assad. Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick et al. The
firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists an atty-client
relationship between him (Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the same case. It was alleged that
Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the former turned over papers to the latter. From
such documents, Francisco sent a written opinion to Hilado. Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco
from representing Assad in the case. Franciscos defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was
when the latter informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office, he
told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that the written opinion was
made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and only for the purpose of explaining to Hilado
why his firm rejected the case. David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for
disqualification against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed between
Hilado and Francisco.
ISSUE:
Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado?
Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad?
HELD:
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The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with Franciscos
signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his office; and that Hilados
purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Franciscos professional services. From these ultimate
facts, an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been
paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When a person consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and
receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case.
An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the employment to

which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the interest of the adverse party
is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of an attorney-client relationship.
The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of Court
(wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon).
The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents submitted by Hilado
will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that his firm did give
Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The letter binds and estops him in
the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And an information obtained from a client by a
member or assistant of the firm is information imparted to the firm.
The failure to object to counsels appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask for
counsels disqualification.
Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed.
*A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future
services, and induce him to act for the client.
TUMBAGAHAN V. CA
FACTS:
The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
Branch II, namely: (1) Civil Case No. 1257, for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of Lot Nos.
3050 and 3051 of the Iligan Cadastre; and (2) Cadastral Case No. IL-N-4, for the review of the decree of
registration issued by the Land Registration Commission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias and cancellation of
her titles to the same lots. When the cases were called for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the petitioner
relieved Atty. Salise as his counsel. Atty. Salise filed his withdrawal of appearance which was approved by
the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for trial. This time, the petitioner personally
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appeared and filed a written motion for postponement on the ground that he still had no counsel and was
not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other party, the motion for postponement was denied and the court
issued an order dismissing the two cases.
A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received on April 26, 1968. The petitioner received
his copy of the order on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the motion
was denied, he filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for being filed out
of time, counting the period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order of dismissal.
The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter
to represent him in his two cases.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly terminated the services of his counsels of
record-Attys. Melvyn Salise and Jose Amarga such that service on them of processes and notices would
no longer bind him.
HELD:
NO
There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of record may be considered relieved of
his responsibility as such counsel (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The withdrawal as counsel of a
client, or the dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the case
Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this case, the termination of the attorney-client
relationship between the petitioner and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the same relations
between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was
made with regard to the other counsel.
The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made of record; at
least so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the
litigation (Visitacion vs. Manit 27 SCRA 523). Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the
conduct of the case (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 31)
DONALD DEE V. CA | AMELITO MUTUC
FACTS:
In January of 1981 petitioner Donald Dee and his father went to seek the advice of Respondent
Atty. Mutuc regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey to Caesars
Palace and the possibility that Dewey might be harmed by the local mafias at the order or request of the
casino.
Thereafter Atty. Mutuc assured the petitioners that he would look into the matter, for which his
services were allegedly contracted for the amount of P100,000. Mutuc then proceeded to make calls and
visit to elicit additional information into the matter. The initial finding was that the outstanding balance of
Deweys account amounts to one billion dollars. However after further investigation by Mutuc, it was found
out that the debt was actually incurred by a certain Ramon Sy, and that Dewey merely signed the chits.
Petitioners were then informed of the findings and were also assured that Dewey would not be harmed by
the alleged mafias.
By June of the same year, respondent went to the casino to negotiate with its president to let
Dewey off the hook, and go after the real debtor Ramon Sy. The president of the casino then told Mutuc
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that if he can make Ramon Sy acknowledge the debt, then Dewey would be exculpated. Thereafter Mutuc
was able to convince Ramon Sy tro acknowledge the debt and brought a letter to the casino asking for a
discount, which resulted to the clearing of Deweys name in the casino.
Having resolved the problem, Mutuc proceeded to collect from petitioner the remaining balance of
their agreed professional fee. However despite several letter of demand respondent Mutuc never received
his fees. This prompted respondent to file an action for collection of the fees and other relevant expenses
incurred.
The lower court in resolving the case, ruled in favor of Mutuc ordering petitioner Dee to pay the
amount of P50,000. On appeal the CA initially affirmed the decision of the lower court, but was
subsequently abandoned when petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that Mutuc at the
time when he was rendering the alleged services for the petitioner was actually working for the interest
and to the advantage of the casino, and that Mutuc is not justified to claim professional fees considering
that there was conflict of interest involved. Therefore the CA found that the amount of P50,000 already
received by MUTUC is commensurate of the work he provided for petitioner. However this decision was
later on reversed and the intial decision was reinstated by CA upon the motion of Mutuc. Hence the instant
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Mutuc is entitled to the balance of the agreed professional fee in light of the fact
that he was allegedly working for the interest and advantage of the Casino.
2. Whether or not there was Attorney-Client relationship between the parties.
HELD:
The Court ruled that Mutuc is entitled to the balance of the agreed fees, and that at the time he
rendered services for petitioner he was not employed by the casino. The Court held that the conclusion of
CA in finding that Mutuc was employed by the casino during the period when Mutuc provided services to
petitioner was erroneous.
Additionally, the court found that the contention that the Casino only agreed to the suggestion or
advice of Mutuc is due to the fact that there was an existing Atty.-Client relationship between the two.
According to the Court even without any Atty-Client relationship a good lawyer who knows his craft even
without any atty-client relationship can convince the opposing party by mere negotiations.
Furthermore even assuming that Mutuc was indeed employed by the casino, the only reason that
the CA denied additional compensation was that it alleged that since Mutuc was already employed by the
casino, he was already receiving compensation from the casino. However there were no evidence to prove
such allegation, and in fact the Court already stated that CA was erroneous in finding that Mutuc was
under the employment of the casino when he provided service for the Dees.
Lastly, the Court held that the petitioners are stopped from alleging dual representation, since at
the time they seek the services of Mutuc, petitioners were not aware of the fact that Mutuc was employed
by the casino, and gave their consent to be represented by Mutuc. Mutuc having resolved the issue, the
petitioners may not question the validity of Mutucs act anymore.
As to whether there exists an atty-client relationship, the court held that the lack of a written
contract or agreement does not prevent the creation of the relationship. The court state that documentary
formalism is not an essential element to create the relationship, that to establish such relationship it is
sufficient that advice and assistance of an atty is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. That an acceptance may be express or implied.
JUNiO V. GRUPO
FACTS:
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Rosario Junio engaged the services of Atty. Salvador Grupo for the redemption of a land
belonging to her parents. She gave P25,000 to be used in the redemption, yet Atty. Grupo
did not redeem the property and has continuously refused to refund the money given.
Junio filed a complaint for disbarment for malpractice and gross misconduct
Attu. Grupo contends that the land could really not be redeemed anymore, and that since
Junio knew that the mortgage has already expired, she knew that it was just a last ditch
effort to redeem the property. Atty. Grupo then borrowed some of the money for himself to
help defray his childrens educational expenses. (personal request evidenced by a PN
executed in favor of Junio Atty. Grupo contends that their families were really very close
and intimate with each other Junios sisters were maids of Atty. Grupo)
Atty. Grupo claims that there was no atty-client relationship and further contends that he
did not ask for any fee, not even charity. He claims that his services were just acts of a
friend for a friend. (he claims that he is willing to pay, though)
IBP found that Atty Grupo violated a rule forbidding lawyers from borrowing money from
their clients unless the clients interests are protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice and suspended him indefinitely.
what he violated was the rule that a lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in all his dealing and transactions with his client. And that Atty Grupo did Not violate Rule 16
because Junio consented to and ratified to the use of the money, as evidenced by the PN.
The court is constrained to give credence to Atty. Grupos claims that the money previously
entrusted to him was later converted into a loan
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Grupo violated Rule 16?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
What he violated was the rule that a lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in all his dealing and transactions with his client. ( he did not give security for the loan and
he refused to pay the amount)And that Atty Grupo did not violate Rule 16 because Junio
consented to and ratified to the use of the money, as evidenced by the PN. The court is
constrained to give credence to Atty. Grupos claims that the money previously entrusted to
him was later converted into a loan
But in the dispositive portion, sabi he violated so ayun.
As to the contention that no attorney- client relationship exists: it is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid. All is needed is when a person consults with his attorney in
his professional capacity to obtain professional advice.
If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established.
Atty Grupo is suspended from practice of law for 1 month and to refund the money
NEGROS STEVERDORING V. CA
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FACTS:
Negros Stevedoring won a case against Delgado Stevedoring. Negros was then awarded around 175,000
pesos. Delgado appealed the decision to the CA dismissed the case because it was filed out of time. The
delay in filing was due to several mistakes;
The clerk (of the law firm) sent the Notice to File Brief to one Atty. Paredes instead of Atty.
Alcantara who was actually handling the case.
Atty. Paredes failed to inform Atty. Alcantara about the Notice he had mistakenly received
considering that they were both from the same law firm.
Atty. Alcantaras failure to by himself check the status of his case/appeal.
Delgado appealed the decision to dismiss based on the mistakes that occurred. The CA accepted the
excuses and allowed for the appeal to continue. Negros now comes to the SC claiming abuse of discretion
on the part of the CA for allowing the appeal despite being filed beyond the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA committed grave abuse of its discretion in reinstating the appeal of Delgado.
RULING:
Yes. The excuses of Delgado cannot be considered as good and sufficient. There was negligence by all the
three parties involved in the mistakes that occurred, more so for Atty. Alcantara, the legal counsel of
Delgado. Atty. Alcantara was complacent in waiting for the period of appeal to lapse without even inquiring
from the clerks as to whether such notice had already been received or by simply investigating the Court
of Appeals as to the status of his appeal considering that he already had the draft of his appelants brief
prepared and that he was just waiting for the Notice to file it. All these suggest that the lawyer concerned
failed to give the entire devotion he owed to the interest of his client and to exercise the necessary care
and diligence required of him as a member of the legal profession. The CA gravely abused its discretion
when it reinstated the appeal and admitted the appellants Brief, despite the latters failure to file it on
time.
ERACTORS INC. NLRC
FACTS:
Erectors Inc. assails the dismissal of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of its motion for
reconsideration, arguing that it was filed within ten working days from receipt of the decision allegedly in
accordance with the rules of the POEA. The SC asked Attys. Precillanao Adamos and Julian Barrameda
(replacing Atty. Andres Nacilla), counsels of Erectors, to furnish them the copy of the source of the alleged
rules. In their answer, Adamos and Barrameda manifested that the said rules can be found in the 1984
Rules & Regulations of the POEA however no such ten working day rule existed.
Due to this, the SC asked the lawyers to explain why they shouldnt be disciplined for fabricating rules for
the purposes of trifling with court processes. The lawyers, instead of furnishing the 1984 Rules &
Regulations of the POEA, only furnished photocopies of what they represented as the rules. The SC
affirmed the dismissal of the motion of reconsideration with the lawyers admonished. As if they never
learned, the counsels again filed another MR cited the 1984 Rules & Regulations (which only says ten
calendar days and not working days) which led the SC to ask the counsels why they shouldnt be cited in
contempt. In their Compliance, the counsels argue that they were motivated by counsels desire to fully
defend their clients interest or cause with their utmost/best efforts and within legal bounds but never to
defy or ignore final pronouncement of this Honorable Court.
11
ISSUE:
W/N Adamos and Barrameda should be liable?
HELD:
YES. The Court found that theres an utter lack of repentance or semblance of it due to the counsels acts.
A lawyers duty to his client does not mean freedom to set up false or fraudulent claims especially with
respect to provisions of law or administrative rules and that while layers are bound to exert utmost legal
skill in prosecuting their clients cause or defending it, their duty, first and foremost, is to the
administration of justice. The office of attorney does not permit, much less demand, to support a clients
case, violation of law or otherwise, fraud or chicanery. A lawyer must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.
It was due to the counsels erroneous persistence which cause delay in the final disposition of the case.
Ultimately, the Court suspended Adamos and Barrameda for six months for knowingly, deliberately and
repeatedly foisting non-existent POEA rules calculated to mislead the Court to decide in their favour.
SANTIAGO V. FOJAS
FACTS:
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas and Nordista prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Fojas for malpractice and
neglect.
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas and Nordista (Petitioners) were the President, Vice-President,
Treasurar and Auditor respectively of Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA). They allegedly
expelled Paulino Salvador from the union. Salvador filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) for the expulsion. The med-arbiter declared the expulsion illegal and directed the
union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador.
Salvador then filed a case with the RTC for claim of actual, moral and exemplary damages against
the petitioners. It was initially dismissed by the motion of pretitioners on the ground of res judicata due to
the decision of the Med-arbiter. But upon Salvadors MR, the case was reinstated. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari to the SC, which was referred to the CA (CIV PRO). Although they were denied by
the court, petitioners failed to file an answer to the Civil Case with the RTC for damages, which led to
them being declared in default. The RTC rendered judgment ordering the petitioners to pay actual, moral
and exemplary damages for a total of P 315,000. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioenrs claim that Atty. Fojas deceived them into believing that everything was in order for their
appeal to RTC. They demanded to acquire a copy of the complaint but Atty. Fojas refused. In was later
found out that there was no answer submitted to the court. Atty. Fojas admits the mistake, saying he was
a busy man but alleged that it was cured by his filing of motion for consideration. He added that the case
was a lost cause. He was supposed to elevate the case to the SC but Santiago illegally terminated his
services.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Fojas committed culpable negligence as would warrant disciplinary action for failure to file the
complanants answer in the Civil Case.
12
RULING:
YES, he is guilty of negligence.
No lawyer is obliged to act as an sdvocate of a person. However, once he agrees to take up the
cause of the client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed to him. He must serve his client with competence and diligence. Thus, his client is entitled to the
benefit of any remedy that is authorized by law and he may expect his lawyer to assert such remedy.
Atty. Fojas admits that it was duty to file an answer. In his motion for reconsideration of the default
order, he invokes forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume of pressure and legal work. However, in his
comment on this case, he justifies his ommision by saying that due to his overzealousness to question the
dismissal of motion to dismiss by the RTC, he filed a petition for certiorari to the SC, which was an honest
and excusable neglect. And when the CA (SC remanded the certiorari to the CA) dismissed the petition, he
again failed to file answer because of his overzealousness.
Overzealousness and volume and pressure of legal work are 2 distinct and separate causes or
grounds. Overzealousness presupposes full awareness of his duty to file an answer. Volume and pressure
of legal work is purely based on forgetfulness because of other commitments. Whether it was the 1 st or the
2nd ground, the fact remains that he failed to comply with this duty. his lack of diligence is compounded by
his errounous belief that the RTC committed an error and his refusal to file an answer even after he
received the CA decision. He never assailed the decision of the CA or the order of default by the.RTC,
showing no overzealousness. Pressure and large volume of legal work is not an excuse.
Atty. Fojas breached Canon 18 (A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE) specifically Rule18.03 ( A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
negligence is not excused by the fact that the case is a losing cause. If he was convineced that the
petitioners case were futile, he should have informed the petitioners, as required in Rule 15.05 of the CPR
(A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case). Even so, he
could have prayed for a reduction of damages awarded in the expulsion case.
Atty. Fojas is REPREMANDED and ADMONISHED.
ENDAYA V. OCA
FACTS:
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio Endaya and his wife. An answer was
prepared by a Mr. Ramirez for the spouses. At the beginning of the preliminary conference, spouses
appeared without counsel. Endaya sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Atty. Oca was
assigned to handle the case. At the continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion for amendment
of answer. Motion was denied. The judge then ordered all parties to submit their affidavits and position
papers. The court also said that 30 days after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of the
period for filing, judgment shall be rendered on the case. Oca failed to submit any affidavit or position
paper. Nonetheless, the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed because those who filed the case
were not really parties-in-interest. The case was appealed to RTC. Oca failed to submit anything again.
RTC reversed the MTC decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the property and pay a certain amount
for rentals. Endaya confronted Oca about the decision. Oca feigned that he did not receive anything. Upon
checking with the clerk of court, Oca did indeed receive a copy of the decision. Hence this administrative
complaint.
13
ISSUE:
W/N Oca committed professional misconduct
HELD:
Yes. Suspended for 2 months from practice of law.
In his comment, Oca put up the defense that he did not file any paper in the MCTC because it would
just be a repetition of the answer. Endaya filed his reply which just reiterated what he put in his complaint.
SC ordered Oca to file a rejoinder. Guess what, Oca once again failed to file anything. Oca explained that
he failed to file a rejoinder because he believed in good faith that it was no longer necessary. In the IBP
investigation, Oca once again failed to submit anything.
Oca only appeared once in the MCTC and practically abandoned the spouses thereafter. The facts
show that Oca failed to employ every legal and honorable means to advance the cause of his client. For
intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent practically closed the door to
the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. Oca cannot just appear only once for the spouses. A
lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated. Ocas story
shows his appalling indifference to his clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen
disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
However Endaya misrepresented that the original answer was prepared by a non-lawyer when in fact it
was prepared by a lawyer. He also assured Oca that he had strong evidence to support their case. Endaya
never gave anything to Oca to support their claim.The PAO is burdened with a heavy caseload. Given
these circumstances the professional conduct of Oca does not warrant disbarment.
JARDIN V. VILLAR
FACTS
Complainant is plaintiff in a civil case in MTC. A building contractor, he engaged the services of respondent
to represent him in the case which is a collection for the sum of 105, 744.80. The case went its usual
course, but despite several extensions given by the trial court, respondent failed to file his formal offer of
exhibits.
ISSUE
WN respondent is liable for negligence?
HELD:
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file brief, which as this court
held in Perla Compania v. Saquilabon, constitutes inexcusable negligence.
Respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He has not
met the extensions of time set by the trial court.
MARTINEZ V. BANOGON
FACTS:
Petitioner was the Counsel of the Respondents in a case in which the estate of the respondents relative is involved. That
during the pendency of the said case, the petitioner and respondent entered into a contact in which it was agreed that the petitioner
14
would be paid 800 pesos at the termination of the case, in which the parties expected the case to be terminated early. For some
reason or another the case was not terminated as expected and drag on for years.
During the pendency of the case petitioner filed a claim stating that the fees paid to him was not reasonable. Petitioner is
claiming that the reasonable amount should be 6000 pesos. Furthermore petitioner admits the existence of the contract but said the
same cannot be binding, since the compensation is unreasonable.
On the other hand respondent claims that petitioner has already been paid the full amount of 800 pesos and an additional
520 pesos for all other incidental services the petitioner might have provided. The lower court in deciding the case ruled for the
respondent stating that as a general rule a written contract for professional services controls the amount to pay therefore unless
found by the court to be unconscionable.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the professional fees paid to Martinez are unconscionable or inadequate for the services he rendered.
RULING:
According to the Court, they did not find anything wrong in the decision rendered by the lower court. The court states that
whether the fees as provided in the contract was unconscionable or not will have to be determined in accordance to some guiding
principles stated by the Court in previous cases. In which the Court states that the circumstances to be considered in determining
the compensation of the attorney are as follow:
1. The amount and character of services rendered
2. Labor, time, and trouble involved
3. The nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered
4. The responsibility imposed
5. The amount of money involved
6. The skill and experience called for in the performance of the service
7. The professional character and social standing of the lawyer
8. The results secured.
Furthermore the Court added that the lawyer being a seasoned practitioner is presumed to have sized up the entire
situation before entering into the contract.
Lastly the Court states that the amount of time employed alone is not an appropriate basis for fixing fees.
CANLAS V. CA
FACTS:
Francisco Herrera executed a mortgage over his 8 parcels of land in favor of L&R Corporation as a security for the several loans
which he obtained from the financing institution. Upon his failure to pay, L&R extrajudicially foreclosed the said lots. The lands were
disposed of in a public auction and L&R was the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, with Atty. Canlas as his counsel, Herrera was able to obtain a preliminary injunction against L&R to prevent it
from consolidating the title in the corporations name.
Two years later, the parties entered into a compromise agreement where L&R gave Herrera another year to redeem the foreclosed
properties subject to payment of P600,000. They also stipulated that Canlas shall be entitled to attorneys fees of 100k. The court
approved the compromise.
However, Herrera, due to his financial difficulties, was still unable to pay neither the several loans nor the attorneys fees which he
owed to Canlas. Canlas moved for execution insofar as his fees were concerned which the court granted although he was not really
able to collect the fees.
Subsequently, Canlas and Herrera met to discuss the relief for Herrera with respect to his liability to L&R on the one hand, and his
obligation to Canlas on the other. Canlas contends that Herrera earnestly begged him to redeem the properties. However, Herrera
maintains that it was Canlas who offered to advance the money provided that they executed a transfer of mortgage over the
properties in Canlas favor. (SC believes Herreras contention more)
They executed a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem, a document that enabled Canlas to redeem
the parcels of land and to register the same in his name. Herrera only discovered that the said lawyer registered the lots under his
name when he was about to secure a loan from a bank to finance a wet market project. Herrera contends that the said document
was falsified. The original document only transferred the rights of Herrera to redeem the property whereas the falsified document
stated that he was transferring all of his rights of the real properties.
Herrera filed for an action for reconveyance of the said lots and a petition to reform the said document to reflect the true agreement
between him and Canlas.
TC ruled in favor of Canlas. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
15
W/n Herrera should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than a pleading for annulment of judgment
W/n the attorneys fees that Canlas charged Herrera was reasonable
HELD:
Yes.
Judgments can only be annulled if there was a showing that there is extrinsic fraud. In the case at bar, extrinsic fraud was not
proved. (Herrera contends that The judge in the trial court colluded with Canlas in order for him to sell his land to Canlas.)
However, the Court was still unable to find merit in his petition/ The court cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding in
which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a technical knowckout over his client, of all people.
No.
Even Canlas himself admitted that his client lacks paying capacity and no financing entity wanted to extend him a loan. This
circumstance should have tempered his demand for his fees.
Lawyering is not a money-making venture and lawyers are not merchants. Canlas claim of attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000
was unreasonable. The extent of the services he rendered in the case is not impressive to justify payment of such amount. The case
itself did not involve complex question fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the
Canalas to support his demand. The fatc that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should
not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. The petitioners stature does not support such claim. The Court
reduced the petitioners fees on a quantum merit basis, to P20,000.00
***the contract is not void for it is not covered by the ban (remember sales?) but it is voidable because Canlas exerted undue
influence over Herrera (moral ascendancy of the attorney.)
***however, the property was already in the possession of an IPFV so Canlas was only held liable for actual damages. BUTHerrera
should still pay for the redemption price that Canlas paid plus attorneys fees so this will be set-off against the damages that Canlas
has to pay.
TAGANAS V. NLRC
FACTS:
Taganas is a lawyer for several janitors under the employ of Ultra Clean Services and Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. There was
a labor dispute between the said janitors and their employers. Taganas defended the janitors in the civil case for reinstatement, full
back wages, thirteenth month pay and emergency cost of living allowance. Taganas and his clients won the case and so Taganas
sought to enforce his attorneys charging lien which amounted to 50% of the amount awarded to his clients. The 10 out of the 14
clients were aggrieved for receiving a reduced award due to the attorneys charging lien and contested the validity of the contingent
fee. The four others agreed to the original amount.
ISSUE:
W/N Taganas contingent fee of 50% of the award to his clients is excessive.
RULING:
A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement between the lawyer and his client in which the lawyers professional fee, usually a
fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. It should be noted
however that Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that a contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law,
should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be the subject to the supervision of the court, as to its reasonableness. The reduction of unreasonable attorneys fees is within the
regulatory powers of the courts. 50% of the judgment award as attorneys fees is excessive and unreasonable considering the
financial capacity and economic status of Taganass clients. Also, petitioners contingent fee falls within Article 111 of the Labor Code
which puts a maximum 10% contingent fee for attorneys in labor cases. The decision of the NLRC to disallow the 50% contingent
fee is upheld, only 10% should be paid to Tagarnas.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION V. NLRC
NB: Please refer to p. 743-745 of the SCRA for the retainer agreement since it would be a waste of space to put it here. Also, this is
a long case so please bear with the proportional length of the digest.
Facts:
16
Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent (UNION) and Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz (ATTY. CRUZ) entered into a retainer
agreement whereby the Union obligates itself to pay Atty. Cruz a retainer fee of P3000.00 in consideration of his firms undertaking
to render the services. During the existence of the agreement, the Union referred to Atty. Cruz the claim of its members for holiday,
mid-year and year-end bonuses against Traders Royal Bank (TRADERS) which was filed with the NLRC. The Union obtained a
favorable judgment from the NLRC and was challenged before the SC by Traders. The SC modified the decision, deleting the award
for mid-year and year-end bonuses but affirmed the award for holiday pay differential amounting to P175,794.32. When he received
the order of the SC, Atty. Cruz notified the Union, Traders and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys lien over
the award for the holiday pay differential. He filed a motion with the labor arbiter for determining attorneys fees in and prayed the
amount of 10% of the total award (P17,579.43) be given. The labor arbiter granted his petition which led the Union to appeal to the
NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Union argues that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award for attorneys fees and argues that the said fees
should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the SC has already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the
NLRC. Also, there shouldnt be payment of attorneys fees anymore because of anything due to Atty. Cruz is already covered by the
P3,000.00 retainer.
On the other hand, Atty. Cruz argues that attorneys fees are mere incidents of the main case where the Union was awarded its
money claims and to include such fees in the case would presuppose that the fees will be paid by Traders to the Union. Also,
according to him, the P3000.00 retainer fee is not the attorneys fees contemplated for.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Cruz is entitled to attorneys fees from the award despite the P3,000.00 retainer fee?
Held:
YES but only to the extent of P10,000.00. The P3,000.00 retainer fee doesnt cover the services that Atty. Cruz rendered before the
labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the Union. It was intended merely as a consideration for the law firms commitment to render
services in Part A and Part B of the retainer agreement (see NB).
The SC had a lengthy discussion to make the judgment clear regarding the types of attorneys fees, retainer fees and the basis of
whats supposed to be reasonable compensation and will be dealt with here in seriatim.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary.
In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its
extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in litigation.
The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client unless they have agreed otherwise. It is the first type of attorneys fees which Atty. Cruz demanded before the labor arbiter.
The Court said that it was within Atty. Cruz right to make his claim for attorneys fees only after the judgment has been deemed final
by the SC . In such a case, lawyers have two options, either to file it before judgment is rendered \with the award being held in
abeyance until the main case from which the attorneys fees has become final, or wait for the final judgment just as Atty. Cruz did.
As regards the concept of retainer, there are also two types of retainer, a general retainer/retaining fee and a special retainer.
A general retainer is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may
arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The reason for this is that the lawyer is deprived of
the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost
opportunity.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client.
In Hilado, in reference to general retainer, the Court said that the payment of retainer has no relation to the obligation of the client to
pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform. In the case at bar, the SC said that the P3,000.00 fee is
not a payment for Atty. Cruzs execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, that the fee was independent and
different from the compensation which Atty. Cruz should receive.
Finally, with respect to what the Court deems as reasonable compensation, the Court surrenders that such is a question of fact.
However, it said that in numerous decisions, it has applied the doctrine of quantum meruit to prevent unjust enrichment. Based on
such guideline, which was already codified in Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the factors to be considered in
determining the amount of attorneys fees are:
1) the time spent and the extent of services rendered and required;
2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
3) the importance of the subject matter;
4) the skill demanded;
5) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;
6) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs;
7) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services;
8) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
9) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established;
10) the professional standing of the lawyer.
17
In the case at bar, Atty. Cruz based his demand for attorneys fee on the maximum amount that he can ask in accordance with Art.
111 of the Labor Code but such fact doesnt preclude the Court in lessening the amount given that what was stated in the law was
the maximum amount.
PADILLO V. CA
FACTS:
Veronica Padillo allege that she is the owner of a 251 square meter parcel of land with improvements in Quezon City, which she
bought from Marina de Vera-Quicho and Margarita de Vera. She blames Tomas Averia and Beato Casilang for unlawful refusal to turn
over the property in her favor. Thus, she claims for declaratory relief and damages.
Casilang denied the charges. He insisted that he already vacated the subject property, and thus, the case against him should be
dismissed. Averia counters with a motion to dismiss, on the ground of a previous decided case against de Vera-Quicho.
Prior to the institution of the case by Padillo, there were already 3 cases which involved the same subject property.
Case 1 which ordered de Vera-Quicho to transfer said property in favor of Averia
Case 2 where the Register of Deeds was ordered to register the deed of sale between Padillo and De Vera . ho
Case 3 a complaint for recission for recission of the deed of sale
The resolution to the motion to dismiss on this current was deferred until the resolution of Case 3 and Case 2 (there were a lot of
appeals). However, the motion to dismiss was denied by the Trial court while Case 2 was pending. The CA reversed the decision and
ordered suspension of this current case in the Trial Court until the final termination of Case 2.
After Case 2 was terminated, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Padillo. The CA revered again the ruling, on the grounds of res judicata.
Hence, she elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court was right in dismissing the case based on res judicata.
RULING: NO.
Res Judicata is applicable when (1) former judgment is final (2) rendered by court having competent jursidiciton over subject matter
and parties (3) judgment is bases on the merits (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Res Judicata is not applicable to this case due to the principle Law of the Case. Law of the case is defined as the opinion delivered on
a formal appeal. Once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between sam parties in same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether or not correct on general principles.
The law of the case on the matter of pendency of Case 2 to bar this current case has already been settled. Case 2 already became
final because no appeal was filed in the CA. even if errouneous, it has become the law of the case.
The court denies the monetary award asked by Padillo. The prayed damages was highly conjectural and speculative. It was not
proved. The rule is that actual, compensatory and consequential damages must be proved. Only the amount of unrealized income
will be given.
In additon, the award of moral and exemplary damages has no sound basis. There was no proof of bad faith and malice on the part
of Averia in instituting the case against Padillo. The law cannot impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
With respect to attys fees, the award is exception rather than the rule. It is not awarded everytime a party prevails in a suit. It is
only awarded in the instances specified in Art 2208 of the Civil Code. Attys fees as part of damages are not the same as attys fees
in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In addtion, it should be reasonable. Thus the award of P 107,000 attys fees by the CA
is reduced to P25,000
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank extended loans to Genbank
in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover.
1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the
bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.
1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and cronies.
1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami sila). In relation to this case, PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.
Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the respondents.
1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now
Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not take an adverse position to that
taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since
he retired in 1986.
Issue:
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza
Held:
No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.
18
The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with
the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter involved in the PCGG case against the
Lucio Tan group.
The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The role of Mendoza in the liquidation of
Genbank is considered insubstantial.
SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG
already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting desperate
Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it harder for the government to get good
lawyers in the future to work for them because of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to ones
work as a government counsel.
Concurring Opinions:
Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive period
Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor General, no Rule 6.03 yet)
Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and if applied
retroactively
Notes:
Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice
is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed with the government and the interests of the
current and former are adverse
Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits
lawyers from representing a private person even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are
entirely parallel
Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and
specific party
Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others
ABAQUETA V. FLOREDO
In this case, Atty. Bernardito Florido appeared as counsel for both petitioner Gamaliel Abaqueta and his ex-wife, Milagros
abaqueta. He first appeared for petitioner in 1983, in the special proceeding In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased
Bonifacia Abaqueta, wherein he declared before the court that the properties in that case were the sole and exclusive properties of
Gamaliel Abaqueta. Several years later, in 1991, he appeared for Milagros Abaqueta in Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel
Abaqueta wherein he declared that (p)laintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain parcels of
land, referring to the same parcels of land.
Additionally, petitioner claimed that in the second (1991) case, Florido deliberately gave the wrong address to the court
(Houston, Texas) when he actually knew that petitioner lived in Phoenix, Arizona. Consequently, he failed to receive summons and
was declared in default in that case. While the order of default was eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to
the Philippines, (~$10,000.00). He believed that respondents conduct constitutes professional misconduct and malpractice as well
as trifling with court processes. Petitioner also claims that florid did not secure his consent before representing his ex-wife.
Florido raised the defense that he is a very busy man, that his office handles 80 cases a year. He also maintains that since
he never had personal contact with the G. Abaqueta, and since eight years had lapsed since he represented him, and since the case
In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta did not include petitioners name, he had forgotten that he
had ever represented him. There was no bad faith in his representing M. Abaqueta; in fact, when he discovered that he had
previously served for G. Abaqueta, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which was granted.
However, the court found that Florido was guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
The court found Floridos claim of forgetfulness inexcusable since (1) Gamaliel is a unique name, (2) Charito Baclig (who is
Gs sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, and Ms sister) was the one who referred Florido to both of them, and (3) it should not have
escaped his attention that he was involved again with the same properties.
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is
whether or not on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. There is a
representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation,
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with
that of his former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. The relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes
lead to treachery, should be avoided.
With regards to the second charge: Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent fraudulently and
maliciously falsified the true and correct address of the complainant notwithstanding respondents knowledge thereof. Lawyers
normally do not have knowledge of the personal circumstances of a party in a case and usually rely on the information supplied by
19
their clients. The fact that respondent sent a letter to complainant at the latters correct address sixteen months before the filing of
(the second case) does not by itself prove malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros Yap Abaqueta
days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason to doubt the correctness of the address of the complainant given to
him by Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was complainants wife.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for Three (3) months. He is further
ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the court. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
ARTEZUELA V. MADERAZO
FACTS:
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that
respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her,
when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its postponement
although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do
anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant's consent. 10
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent
prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondent's office. Complainant
further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the
dismissal was with her consent.11
Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil
Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave
several notices to the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of
the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to grant respondent's manifestation and advised the
complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case. 12
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he could file
the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having
prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare Echavia's
Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked respondent's secretary to print the document.
Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the
amount of P500,000.00.13
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and therefore guilty
of conflicting interests?
HELD:
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse
party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse
party's conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is
enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and
conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish
only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty
As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the
latter's office, asked him to return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to present his secretary as witness, nor
obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint, after
reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it
was the complainant who prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to the
Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit
perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how she could have prepared Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as complicated as the present case.
Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial decision, having been an
adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the
membership of Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that Commissioner
Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not
find any hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside
20
ABRAGAN V. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
The case is about a disbarment case against respondent Rodriguez, wherein it was alleged by the petitioners that
respondent represented them sometime in 1986, and that after the case was won. Respondent disturbed the association, wherein
the petitioners are members, by selling their rights over the property without the consent of the petitioners. That after the petitioner
found out of the alleged selling of right, petitioners then severed the attorney client relationship.
In a later date petitioners hired the Atty. Salve for his services in the contempt case against the sheriff Loncion. In the said
contempt case, respondent allegedly represented the sheriff and against the petitioners. It was also alleged that Rodriguez later on
influenced Atty. Salva.
Additionally on January 12, 1993 respondent without the consent of the petitioners filed a motion to withdraw their exhibit
in a civil case 11204.
Aside from the unethical maneuvers of the respondent, to make matters worse, respondent allegedly fenced an area
consisting of 10,200 square meters within the lot 1982, which is the subject matter of civil case 11204.
On the other hand the respondent states that the land he fenced off was part of the attorneys fee paid to him for the
services he rendered. The case was then referred to the IBP for investigation. After the investigation it was suggested that the
respondent be suspended from practice for 6 months. For violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, which states that A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned parties, given the full disclosure of facts. The
recommendation was appealed to the IBP board of Governors and the same was affirmed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 1503 of Canon 15.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the recommendation stating that, even if the allegations of the petitioners pertaining to the selling of
rights without petitioners consent, the inducement or influence of respondent over atty. Salva and the fencing of the lot, were not
proved due to lack of evidence to back up the allegations, the court still finds respondent in violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 by
representing conflicting interest, when respondent represented against the petitioner in the indirect contempt case against the
Sheriff.
The court states that lawyers owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh their actions,
especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. That they must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times.
That due to the divided alleg9iance of respondent, his divided loyalty constitutes malpractice which may be punished under
sec 27 of rule 138 of the ROC.
QUIAMBAO V. BANABA
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Bamba by his client, Felicitas Quiambao.
Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director of the Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc (AIB) a family-owned corporation
engaged in providing security and investigation services. She contends that she procured the legal services of the respondent not
only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. Bamba acted as her counsel in an ejectment cases against
Torroba. About six months after she resigned from AIB. Bamba filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages against
her for the purposes of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as
counsel of record in the ejectment case.
Quiamba also charges Bamaba with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She claims that Bamaba was the one who proposed to her
that she organize her own security agency and that she would assist her, which made her resign from AIB. She claims that Bamaba
became a silent partner of the Quiambao Risk Management Specialties Inc. Bamba also convinced the borther of Felicitas to organize
another security agency, San Esteban Secuirty Services Inc., where Bamba served as its incorporator, director, and president.
The investigating commissioner of the IBP found him guilty and recommended suspension from the practice for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation but reduced the penalty to astern reprimand.
ISSUE:
W/n the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal
profession.
HELD:
21
Yes. The code provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given a full
disclosure of facts.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in
the same action or in an unrelated action. It I of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that
which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired
from one to the disadvantage of the other as the 2 actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case,
one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and he nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
Also, The proscription against the representation of conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however
slight the adverse interest may be- it applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyers private activity or in the performance of a
function in a non-professional capacity. In determining whether there is conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict. (This refers to his position as a legal counsel of AIB and incorporator, stockholder and president of SESSI)
TIANIA V. OCAMPO
FACTS:
This involves two administrative cases both dealing with the issue of disbarring one Atty. Amado Ocampo, 73 years old and a
practicing lawyer. The first case involved Ocampo representing one Concepcion Blaylock while at the same time giving advice to
Maria Tiania, the opposing party. The second case involves once again representing Concepcion Blaylock while at the same time
handling the documents of the Angel spouses, the opposing party.
The first case involved an ejectment proceeding in which Ocampo blatantly deceived Maria Tiania by saying that she no longer
needed to hire a new counsel as he would be representing her. Tiania was too late in discovering that Ocampo was serving the
interest of Blaylock. Tiania insists that Ocampo was her retaining counsel and that she reposed her unqualified trust and confidence
on him to defend her. Ocampo denies this.
The second case involved mortgage and sale of various real estate between Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation and the
Angel spouses. It was Ocampo who prepared the Deed of Sale in favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate Mortgage for the same
property to be signed by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock. Ocampo once again denies ever representing the Angel spouses, he
insists that all his dealings with Mrs. Angel were in representation of his client, Mrs. Blaylock.
ISSUE:
W/N Ocampo aws guilty of representing conflicting interests.
RULING:
Yes. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides; A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The court prohibits the representation of conflicting interests
not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him
with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary
cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. Taking
into consideration the advance age of the respondent, Ocampo is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
DONALD DEE V. CA | AMELITO MUTUC
FACTS:
In January of 1981 petitioner Donald Dee and his father went to seek the advice of Respondent Atty. Mutuc regarding the
problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey to Caesars Palace and the possibility that Dewey might be harmed
by the local mafias at the order or request of the casino.
Thereafter Atty. Mutuc assured the petitioners that he would look into the matter, for which his services were allegedly
contracted for the amount of P100,000. Mutuc then proceeded to make calls and visit to elicit additional information into the matter.
The initial finding was that the outstanding balance of Deweys account amounts to one billion dollars. However after further
investigation by Mutuc, it was found out that the debt was actually incurred by a certain Ramon Sy, and that Dewey merely signed
the chits. Petitioners were then informed of the findings and were also assured that Dewey would not be harmed by the alleged
mafias.
By June of the same year, respondent went to the casino to negotiate with its president to let Dewey off the hook, and go
after the real debtor Ramon Sy. The president of the casino then told Mutuc that if he can make Ramon Sy acknowledge the debt,
then Dewey would be exculpated. Thereafter Mutuc was able to convince Ramon Sy tro acknowledge the debt and brought a letter to
the casino asking for a discount, which resulted to the clearing of Deweys name in the casino.
22
Having resolved the problem, Mutuc proceeded to collect from petitioner the remaining balance of their agreed professional
fee. However despite several letter of ddemand respondent Mutuc never received his fees. This prompted respondent to file an action
for collection of the fees and other relevant expenses incurred.
The lower court in resolving the case, ruled in favor of Mutuc ordering petitioner Dee to pay the amount of P50,000. On
appeal the CA initially affirmed the decision of the lower court, but was subsequently abandoned when petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that Mutuc at the time when he was rendering the alleged services for the petitioner was actually working
for the interest and to the advantage of the casino, and that Mutuc is not justified to claim professional fees considering that there
was conflict of interest involved. Therefore the CA found that the amount of P50,000 already received by MUTUC is commensurate of
the work he provided for petitioner. However this decision was later on reversed and the intial decision was reinstated by CA upon
the motion of Mutuc. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUES:
3. Whether or not Mutuc is entitled to the balance of the agreed professional fee in light of the fact that he was allegedly
working for the interest and advantage of the Casino.
4. Whether or not there was Attorney-Client relationship between the parties.
HELD:
The Court ruled that Mutuc is entitled to the balance of the agreed fees, and that at the time he rendered services for
petitioner he was not employed by the casino. The Court held that the conclusion of CA in finding that Mutuc was employed by the
casino during the period when Mutuc provided services to petitioner was erroneous.
Additionally, the court found that the contention that the Casino only agreed to the suggestion or advice of Mutuc is due to
the fact that there was an existing Atty.-Client relationship between the two. According to the Court even without any Atty-Client
relationship a good lawyer who knows his craft even without any atty-client relationship can convince the opposing party by mere
negotiations.
Furthermore even assuming that Mutuc was indeed employed by the casino, the only reason that the CA denied additional
compensation was that it alleged that since Mutuc was already employed by the casino, he was already receiving compensation from
the casino. However there were no evidence to prove such allegation, and in fact the Court already stated that CA was erroneous in
finding that Mutuc was under the employment of the casino when he provided service for the Dees.
Lastly, the Court held that the petitioners are stopped from alleging dual representation, since at the time they seek the
services of Mutuc, petitioners were not aware of the fact that Mutuc was employed by the casino, and gave their consent to be
represented by Mutuc. Mutuc having resolved the issue, the petitioners may not question the validity of Mutucs act anymore.
As to whether there exists an atty-client relationship, the court held that the lack of a written contract or agreement does
not prevent the creation of the relationship. The court state that documentary formalism is not an essential element to create the
relationship, that to establish such relationship it is sufficient that advice and assistance of an atty is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. That an acceptance may be express or implied.
HORNILLA V. SALUNAT
Facts:
Benedicto Hornilla and Atty. Federico Ricafort filed an administrative complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commision
on Bar Discipline against Atty. Ernesto Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They allege that Atty. Salunat
is a member of ASSA Law and Associates which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). Also, Atty. Salunats brother is a member of the PPSTA Board.
Members of the PPSTA filed an intra-corporate case against members of the Board of Directors before the Securities and Exchage
Commission and the Ombudsman for unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Atty. Salunat entered his
appearance as counsel of the PPSTA Board. Hornilla and Atty. Ricafort argue that Atty. Salunat was guilty of conflict of interest since
he was engaged by the PPSTA and paid out of the corporate funds which they contributed.
Atty. Salusat refused to withdraw from the case and argued that he only filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency as regards the
Ombudsman case while a different lawyer handles the SEC case. He also points out that his brother being a member of the Board is
immaterial and he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board not in his individual capacity but in behalf of ASSA Law
Firm.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, after investigation, recommended that Atty. Salunat be suspended form the practice of law for
six months. The Board of Governors adopted a resolution approving the recommendation.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest?
Held:
YES, however, the SC found it proper to just admonish Atty. Salunat given that it was only his first offense.
Atty. Salunat is a Managing Partner at the ASSA Law Firm, which was the retained counsel of PPSTA, and yet he appeared as counsel
of record for the Board of Directors in the case Philippine Public School Teachers Association, Inc. et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of
Directors of the PPSTA. Clearly there is conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed a suit. By filing the Manifestation of Extreme Urgency with the Ombudsman, he already entered his appearance
therein, constituting the conflict of interest.
23
The SC said that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of
directors in a derivative suit brought against them and to do so would be tantamount to conflicting interests.
The Court also defined conflict of interest as when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
Another test is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithflness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY INC. V. ARQUILLO

FACTS
Ben Nicolas submitted a letter-complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against Atty. Macario Arquillo for deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and violation of his oath as Atty by representing conflicting interest.
It is alleged that in a case before the NLRC, Atty Arquillo represented both complainants and defendants. He represented 7
complainants and also represented 1 of the respondents/defendants, Jose Castro in the same consolidated cae.
Commissioner Dennis Funa found Atty. Arquillo guityl and recommended suspension for 6 months. The Board of Governors of IBP
modified the suspension to 2 years.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Arquillo was guilty to warrant the suspension
RULING: YES
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings with their clients.
Corollary to this duty, they should not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given
after a full disclosure of facts.
When a lawyer represents 2 or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined
by 3 separate tests:(1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-
bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that
may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired
through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys
duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty.
In this case, Atty. Arquillo represented both parties. He even filed a motion to dismiss in behalf of 1 respondent, Jose Casto and
drafted a position paper in behalf of 7 complainnants. His acts cannot be justified even by the fact that Jose Castro was absolved
from the complaints. It cannot be denied that he represented 2 opposing parties.
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of
both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same
general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.
NAKPIL V. VALDEZ
Facts:
Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos
Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil.
Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands titles were transferred to his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the
settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the
property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.
What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes.
The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI.
The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held
the lots in trust for Nakpil.
Issue:
W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Held:
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.
The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the
latter agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came
to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the
estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust
24
formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basis for Imeldas decision to
use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule
15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each
other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed
the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the
debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco was a complaint filed by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioners in this case, partners of the ACCRA Law Firm, were among the defendants. The reason they were involved in that case is
because ACCRA had performed legal services for its clients, which included the organization and acquisition of business associations
or organizations, with the correlative services where its members acted as incorporators or as stockholders. In the course of their
dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquired information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal
and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admitted that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceeding.
In that case, they were charged with conspiracy (with Cojuangco) and using of coconut levy funds in setting up various
coconut levy funded corporations, creating a monopoly, with the help of the president. Also they were charged with having used
insidious means and machinations in using ACCRA Investments corporation to acquire 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of
the UCPB (15M shares).
PCGG had excluded Raul Roco in that case since he had undertaken to reveal the identity of the principals for whom he had
acted. Petitioners filed a motion so that they may be excluded as well. PCGG set the following conditions: (a) the disclosure of the
identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds
of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective shareholdings. Petitioners refused, so the motion
was denied. This petition for certiorari is about that motion and its denial:
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of
this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG; (1) Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-
client privilege includes the identity of the clients (2) The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited
to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged clients but extend to other privileged matters.
:: Can the lawyers in this case invoke attorney-client privilege and refuse to divulge the identity of their clients and their knowledge
of his/their transactions? YES.
[1] It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are
being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously,
petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and
consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
(Discuss the fiduciary duty of the lawyer to his client here)
[2] As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in
our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the
client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the
privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Exceptions: 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his
identity is privileged. 3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime,
the client's name is privileged. Basically, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when
the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
The circumstances clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is
privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance. There is no question
that the preparation of the (documents requested by PCGG) documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to their
clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that
identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Second, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the client of a crime.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against
their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the
nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.
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An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of
the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the
case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing
to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners as parties-defendants in "Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
Dissenting:
Davide: (T)he petitioners did not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment, much less
compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever. They have no right to make such a demand for until they
shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion
I still submit that the lawyer-client privilege provides the petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal defendants in
Civil Case No. 0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short,
they are, allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the acts complained of for being nominees of certain parties. I find myself
unable to agree with the majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or that they have to be excluded as defendants,
or that they cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or
against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor.
Davide then explains that in the cases cited by the majority, the attorneys were not accused of any crime. In the case at
bar, the lawyers are themselves accused. It seems that the jurisprudence relied on by the majority find little room for application in
the present case.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of a crime in concert with the attorney,
even where the attorney is not aware of his client's purpose. The reason for the rule is that it is not within the professional character
of a lawyer to give advised on the commission of crime. Also, communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing in
reference to communications between attorney and client. But, the mere charge of illegality, not supported by evidence, will not
defeat the privilege; there must be at least prima facie evidence that the illegality has some foundation in fact.
Puno: I like to start by stressing the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a
crime or a fraud. Communications to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a
conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the
attorney to do so.
I respectfully submit that the first and third exceptions (see check mark) relied upon by the majority are not self-executory
but need factual basis for their successful invocation. The first exception as cited by the majority is ". . . where a strong probability
exists that revealing the clients' name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice." It
seems to me evident that "the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice" is a question of fact which must first be
established before there can be any ruling that the exception can be invoked. So it is with the third exception which as related by the
majority is "where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime." Again,
the rhetorical questions that answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that PCGG has "no case" against petitioners without
presentation of evidence? and (2) how can we determine that the name of the client is the only link without presentation of evidence
as to the other links?
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have not adduced evidence that they fall within any of the above
mentioned exceptions for as aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize the exceptions, hence, the order compelling them to
reveal the identity of their client.
LORENZANA FOOD CORP V. DORIA
FACTS
Lorenzana Food Corp (LFC) engaged the services of Atty. Daria as its legal counsel in 1981 and was designated as its personal
manager six months later.
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In 1983, Hanopol, an employee of LFC, filed a labor complaint against LFC for illegal dismissal. Attempts for amicable settlement
proved futile. Atty. Daria failed to appear for the 3 hearings set with the Labor Arbiter.
In the meantime, another labor complaint was filed against LFC. Hearings for both labor cases were set on the same day. Faced with
conflicting schedule, Atty. Daria decided to move to postpone the Hanopol case by calling the office of the Labor Arbiter, instead of
filing a written motion. His telephone message apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the latter decided in favor of
Hanopol, by default, and ordered LFC to pay approx. P6,500 in labor benefits.
While pending appeal for the Hanopol decision, Atty. Daria resigned from LFC. Atty. Udarbe took his place. However, during the
hearings for this case, no appeared in behalf of LFC. Thus, Hanopol filed a motion praying for the revival of Labor Arbiter's earlier
decision.
Atty. Loy, Jr was hired by LFC and he opposed Daria's motion. However, the Labor Arbiter already revived his earlier decision. But
Loy's appeal led the NLRC to order the remand of the case for further proceedings.
In addition to these, after Daria resigned from LFC, he assisted Roberto San Juan, another employee of LFC, in the preparation of his
counteraffidavit in an estafa case filed by LFC.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Daria is guilty of negligence and betrayal of his former client's confidences
HELD
YES. For failure to appear in 2 consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which resulted in LFC's
default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, he is guilty of NEGLIGENCE. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to LFC because
it deprived its successor-counsel, Loy, of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. Canon 18, Rule 3 states
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
For assisting San Juan in the preparation of the counter-affidavit, submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa, he is
guilty of betrayal of client's confidences. Canon 17 enunciates that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and
client has been terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his
former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.
.
GENATO V. SILAPAN
FACTS
Atty. Silapan rented a small commercial space (as his law office) in Genato's building in Quezon City. Atty. Dacanay, Genato's
retained lawyer, accommodated Silapan and even made him handle some of Genato's cases.
Silapan borrowed from Genato P200K which he intended to use as DP for the purchase of a new car. In return, Silapan issued a
postdated check of approx. P177K to cover for 6 months interest of the loan. Moreover, he mortgaged to Genato his house and lot in
QC.
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In 1993, Silapan introduced to Genato a certain Romero, who wanted to borrow money from him as well.
Subsequently, Silapan failed to pay the amortization of the car. The financing firm, City Trust Company, which financed the payment
of the car, demanded from Genato the payment of the car. Genato tried to encash the postdated check, but it was dishonored due to
closed account.
Genato filed a BP 22 case against Silapan and a foreclosure case of the real estate mortgage.
In 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car, Silapan asked Genato to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of
the car to him. However, Genato said that he will do so after the termination of his criminal case, where he wanted Silapan, his
former counsel, to offer bribe money to the members of the review committee of DOJ. He also wanted Silapan to offer bribe money
to the prosecutor assigned and to the presiding Judge.
ISSUE
W/N Silapan committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to Genato illegal practices and disclosing his alleged intention
to bribe government officials in connection with the pending case.
HELD
YES. Canon 17 provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him. An attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the
latter consents.
However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications is limited only to communications which are legitimately and
properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime. Thus,
the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for
Silapan to use it against Genato in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation and his professional competence
and legal advice were not being attacked in said case.
MERCADO V. VITROLIO
FACTS:
Rosa F. Mercado (complainant) is a Senior Education Program Specialist of CHED. Atty. Vitriolo is a Deputy Executive
Director IV of CHED.
Complainants husband filed an annulment case entitled Ruben Mercado v. Rosa Francisco. The case was dismissed.
Complainants counsel later on died. Atty. Vitriolo substituted the counsel who just died.
Later on, Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against complainant. (falsification of documents: birth certificates of her
children, making it appear that she was married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact she was legally married to
Ruben Mercado.
Complainant alleged that the criminal complaint disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for
annulment. She claims that in filing the criminal case, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential
relationship.
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4 years later, the results of the investigation recommended that Vitriolo is indeed guilty and should be suspended for a
month. Complainant then wrote Justice Davide that she is desisting from pursuing the case because she has found it in her
heart to forgive respondent. Such desistance has no bearing.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Vitriolo is indeed guilty of violating the privilege and confidential relationship of attorney-client relationship
HELD:
NO. Case dismissed.

Complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
The confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication.
Burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
A case in the Sandiganbayan involved three parties, Paredes Governor of Agusan del Sur, Honrada a Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer, and Sansaet lawyer of Paredes. All three are charged with conspiracy in the crime of falsification as several court
documents were made by Honorada and then submitted by Sansaet as defense for a criminal case of Paredes (for perjury and graft
and corruption), making it appear as if there was double jeopardy. The people sought to have Sansaet made a state witness to
ensure prosecution of Paredes and Honrada, the Sandiganbayan however denied the petition stating the privileged communication
between a lawyer and his client as barring any testimony that may be made by Sansaet to be used against Paredes (unless the latter
gives his consent).
ISSUE: W/N Sansaet may be made a state witness?
RULING:
YES. Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all,
the unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by the conspirators are not covered by the mantle of
privileged communication. The lawyer-client relationship protects any communication made between the two, making it privileged
and confidential. It may not be divulged unless permission is granted by the client. In this case however a distinction must be made
between confidential communications relating to past crimes AND confidential communication relating to future crimes. The
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which an attorney is bound to respect. Since
in this situation Sansaet was a PARTY to the crime itself, the communication he received from Paredes concerned a crime that was
yet to be committed. Sansaet qualifies to be a state witness.
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES INC. V. CA
Facts:
National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC) granted Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. (KIPI) a direct loan of P8,000,000 and
a P2,000,000 guarantee to secure PNB. As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by KIPI in favour of NIDC
covering a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in TCT No. 469737. KIPI then executed an Amendment of Mortgage
Deed covering the same parcel of land regarding letters of credit by PNB in favour of KIPI with foreign suppliers worth
US$1,564,826. Upon full payment of KIPIs account with NIDC and the 2,000,000 credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of
Release and Cancellation of Mortgage. By virtue of this release, NIDC returned the owners copy of the TCT to KIPI and registered
the Deed of Release with the Registry of Deed. However, PNB requested the return of the TCT due to unsettled accounts based on
29
the subsequent amendment of the mortgage. The return was made but after a year, PNB filed for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
property. KIPI contests the foreclosure saying that the release by NIDC had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage.
Issue:
W/N NIDCs Deed of Release is binding on PNB?
Held:
NO. PNB was not a signatory to such agreement. It is a separate and distinct personality from NIDC. NIDC was in no position to state
that Komatsus direct obligation PNB has been fully paid.
In relation to Legal Ethics:
The Court reprimanded KIPI for insinuating that Padilla Law Offices used the friendship and connection of retired Justice Teodoro
Padilla with the ponente of the CA decision for disposing the case in their favour as a birthday and parting gift. When the said
ponente declined and unloaded case, it was still allegedly raffled to another good friend of Justice Padilla. However, based on the
records, the case was directly raffled to the Second Division and there was no prior ponente to whom it was assigned.
The Court said that it should prove its charges and refrain from conduct tending to create mistrust our judicial system through
innuendos on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be proffered.
HEIRS OF HERMAN REY ROMERO V. REYES
FACTS:
The Heirs of the late Herman Rey Romero (Heirs) were interveners in a civil case. The subject matter is a property subject
of multiply sale, in fact, sold thrice over. It was concluded when the judge rendered the decision based on a compromise agreement.
Essentially, the compromise agreement ceded possession of the subject property to V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises Inc., (V.R. Credit
) in exchange for the Heirs and Elizabeth Reyes receiving certain sum of money.
Unfortunately, the building housing the branch of RTC Bulacan was gutted by fire. Thus, the case records were burned. The
Heirs filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case. After it was granted, the copy of the compromise agreement was
submitted, bearing only on the part of Reyes.
After 2 years, V.R. Credit has not complied its obligations with the complainants. They filed a motion for issuance of writ of
execution. V.R. Credit moved to dismiss on the ground that it was premature and Veronica Gonzales did not sign the compromise
agreement and has not been duly authorized to sign in behalf of V.R. Credit. Due to this, RTC denied the motion for execution and
declared the compromise agreement to be unenforceable.
Thus, the Heirs charge Atty. Venancio Reyes (counsel of V.R. Credit) of willful and intentional falsehood. Atty. Reyes denied
the charge, stating that it was a valid defense in favor of his client. In addition, he cannot assert based on his personal knowledge
that Gonzales actually signed the agreement.
The IBP found Atty. Reyes guilty.
I
SSUE:
W/N Atty. Reyes is guilty for willful and intentional falsehood
RULING:
Yes, he is guilty.
Lawyers are guardians of truth and rule of law. When they appear before a tribunal, they must act as officers of the court. In all their
dealings, they may not resort to the use of deception. The Code of Professional Responsibility bars them from committing any
falsehood or misleading the court.
Atty. Reyess contention that it was a valid defense in favor of his clients is untenable. Records show that Atty. Reyes
participated in the negotiation of the Agreement. On several occasions, he vouched for its existence and validity. he used it as a
ground to support his motion to dismiss the forcible entry case against his clients. When the Heirs submitted a copy of the
30
Agreement, he never raised any objection. His initial defense to the writ of execution was that it was premature, implying he acceded
to the Agreement. It was suspicious of him to raise the defense that Gonzales never signed the Agreement when he had no other
recourse.
Lawyers are obliged to protect their clients. However, their fidelity to their causes must always be within the parameters of
the law.
Atty. Reyes is suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.
IN RE:1989 ELECTION OF THE IBP
FACTS
National Officers of the IBP were elected and were set to take their oath of office. However this was disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some of the members of the court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceeding
and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspaper about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the
candidates especially those running for president of the IBP (Drilon, Paculdo and Nisce). The Sc en banc decided to suspend the oath
taking of the IBP officers elect and to inquire to the veracity of the reports. The court is concerned about the reported electioneering
and extravagance of the campaigns of the 3 candidates for president which was in direct violation of the by-laws of the IBP.
ISSUE
Whether or not the candidates were in violation of the IBP by laws
HELD
YES
IBP by-laws strict in holding that the elections of the national officers should be non-political this was not respected in the
previous elections. The setting up of campaign headquarters, island hopping to solicit votes, procurement of written commitments
and distribution of nomination forms, reservation of rooms, formation of tickets, slates or line ups of candidates, printing and
distribution of tickets and bio-data and other acts made a political circus of the proceeding and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates not only violated the IBP by-laws but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers to promote
respect for law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. The actuations of the candidates did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate the public esteem.
Hence the court ordered to annul the previous IBP elections and amended the by-laws. The original IBP by-laws was
restored giving the right to automatic succession by the Executive VP to the presidency upon expiration of the two-year term.
BERENGUER V. CARRANZA
Atty. Pedro carranza is being charged with deception; It is said that he introduced as evidence in a cadastral case an "affidavit of
adjudication and transfer" executed by the mother of his client, which said that her own mother (mother of the mother of her client)
had no other descendant except her, when in fact she had 5 other kids. Carranza raises the defense that he had nothing to do with
the preparation of the affidavit. The report of the solicitor general confirmed that Carranza had nothing to do with it. However,
respondent testified as to his being not very meticulous about the petition because there was neither private nor government
opposition thereto; "actually, respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not properly inform himself of the evidence
he was going to present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus,
respondent has contributed to confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for Relief...." (Solgen's
report). "There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then Solicitor General Barredo that there was
nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which
turned out to be false, in the preparation of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception obviously
cannot be sustained." But..."(w)ould that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer must be in the
negative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure to exercise greater care did result in the "confusion and
prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the circumstances, it would be to err on, the side of undue leniency if he would be held
blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity to his oath as attorney was less than entire." Even if there be no intent to deceive,
therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a
charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that he has not consented to the doing
of the falsity. REPRIMANDED and WARNED.
MUNOZ V. PEOPLE
This case is a Supreme Court Resolution of an administrative charge against Atty. Delia Sutton.
Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade, and
Associates, must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel, more specifically with
31
reference to a duty owing this Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition for
certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless disregard, to say the
least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When given an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her
appearance before us and thereafter in her memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and
so inexcusable. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear.
Hearing was held on the same year. A "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" was filed on December 1, 1971, signed jointly by
Sedfrey A. Ordoez (supervisor of Sutton) and Delia Sutton.
The Court found that the "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. Some members
of the Court feel, however, that it does not go far enough. While expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking that free
admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If
there were a greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate
misstatements. There ought to be, for the apology to gain significance, no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the
misdeed.
Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at
the expense of deviation from the truth. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to
create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of
public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up
by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." What is more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for
candor and honesty takes precedence. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be
meted out to respondent Delia T. Sutton.
ARTIAGA JR. V. VILLANUEVA
Facts:
This case is about the disbarment case filed by Artiaga against Villanueva for alleged unethical practices.
The case started with the controversy over 2 parcel of lands with revocable permit applications, originally the permits
belong to a certain Malabayabas and Suyo, which was later on sold to the client of Artiaga. However on a later date, when the client
of Villanueva filed for revocable permit application it was found out that the area being claimed has already been titled to the client
of Artiaga. Hence the dispute was brought to the Bureau of Lands for decision.
Initially the Director of Lands rendered a decision in favour of the client of Artiaga, however it was appealed by Villanueva
and the decision was change, after another appeal the final decision was in favour of the client of Artiaga. The decision being final
and executory an order of execution was issued however the client of Villanueva remained in possession of the said parcel of lands.
Thereafter a series of motions and case where filed by Villanueva as a dilatory tactics to seek a favourable ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Villanueva is considered unethical.
Ruling:
The court ruled that acts of Atty. Villanueva is in violation of his oath that he wll do no falsehood nor consent to doing of any
in court. According to the court it was clear that atty. Villanueva caused his client to commit perjury so that the forceful entry case
will fall under the jurisdiction of the court, this is shown by the intentional amendment to the original complaint par 5, wherein under
the original complaint the time line was 1960, while on the amended complaint the time stated is 1973, the court state that the
32
reason for such change is so that the action may still be filed or entertained by the court, since the action prescribes one year after
accrual of cause of action.
The court further states that it is expected that a lawyer will defend the clients cause with zeal, however in doing so it
should not disregard its duty to the court and the truth. Due to his actions the client was in another case charged with perjury, which
is detrimental to the client.
The court also found that atty. Villanueva is guilty of lack of condor and respect for the court and the rights of his adversary,
as shown in the case, the client of Artiaga has already won the case, however Villanueva filed urgent ex-parte motions and instead of
waiting for the result of such, he perfected his appeal, thus further delaying the implementation of the first lawful order of the court.
Furthermore when his appeal was denied, Villanueva turned to other venues such as CAR for positive results, in doing so he did not
disclose of the prior proceedings that was held in the court thus securing an ex-parte proceeding. In this case the court found
Villanueva guilty of forum shopping.
OCCENA V. MARQUEZ
Facts
Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea,
and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the
estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's estate.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to
them of P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the
executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners.
Respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P20,000.00.
Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P20,000.00.
Also, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having
made false averments in this Court.
Held
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust,
his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability
for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to
make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as
administrator, or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested
parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration. Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons
interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his petition directly with the probate court.
We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring
by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before
the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to
knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the
argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that
he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or
unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in
having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.
Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.
QUASHA V. JUAN
33
FACTS:
A sea vessel, MV San Vicente - registered in the Philippines, was chartered by foreigners and foreign companies to deliver cargo from
Sweden to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The payment scheme was supposed to be by time charter. Payment would have been in the
amount of US $ 3,200 a day. However, after two months, the foreigners failed to pay the daily hire. It had docked in Jeddah but did
not unload its cargo due to the fact of non-payment. Filipinas Carriers (FILCAR) exercised its lien over the goods transported as per
the Charter Party (their contract). FILCAR asked to court for sale of the goods in the ship to satisfy the debt of the foreign companies
to them. Later, the law firm of Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Valmonte Pea & Marcos intervened in the case on behalf of the agent of
some of the foreign companies/defendants of the case. The agents name was Ahmed Baroom and he was supposedly the agent of
AB Charles Thorburn & Co. and some companies in Saudi Arabia. Later, Baroom withdrew from pursuing the case but he failed to pay
his lawyers (Quasha). The law firm of Quasha then filed a writ of preliminary attachment in a different CFI (Pasig the original case
was in the CFI of Manila) claiming that it has a right to a portion of the goods as payment for its attorneys fees. The goods however
have already been sold by the respondent court, the law firm now goes after the proceeds of the sale.
ISSUE:
W/N Quasha is entitled to a portion of the goods or its proceeds?
RULING:
No. The law firm should have pursued its claim to attorneys fees in the same court as an intervention petition for recovery of
attorneys fees. The respondent CFI of Manila had already acquired jurisdiction over the goods as the case pending with it was
already deciding upon the question of who the real owner of the cargo was. In filing with another CFI, multiplicity of suits occurred.
The charging lien filed in Pasig was erroneous, an intervention petition for recovery of attorneys fees in the CFI of Manila was the
proper action that should have been taken. This negligence by the law firm entitles it to no relief, the instant petition must be
dismissed. Besides the goods have already been sold and delivered to a foreign buyer, the court has lost jurisdiction over it.
Everything is already fait accompli (already done and beyond alteration).
SURIGAO V, CLORIBEL
Facts:
Note -- There are two contempt cases here involving two different sets of people
First Contempt case:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International Minerals Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration,
Attys. Vicente Santiago and John Beltran Sotto made use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like "it
seems many of our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face" and insinuating favoritism
and partisanship of the members of the Court, notably Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro due to alleged interest in the case
(Castro's brother works for one of the parties). Santiago and Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the MR.
The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said statements.
Santiago insisted that the statements he made were inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just intended to
be in the MR's rough draft.
Second Contempt case:
Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again
contained language which the Court found disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of
town when the decision was written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of
graft and corruption in the judiciary.
The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that it the motion was already prepared by Santiago when he took the
case as was verified by Morton Meads, an employee from MacArthur.
34
Issue:
W/N the lawyers should be cited in contempt?
Held:
1st case:
YES. The language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the administration of justice which trangresses Section 3 (d) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court as well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the RoC which states that "a lawyer's language should be dignified in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". They are also expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers but their acts resulted in the contrary and are intended to create and atmosphere of distrust. The
inadvertence of Santiago's use of words can't be used as a shield to absolve him of any misdeeds.
2nd case:
YES. Even if the idea of the language used in the 4th MR came from Meads, both Santiago and Caling should've adhered to Canon 16
of the Code of Legal Ethics wherein "a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things
which a lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses
and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminated their relation". Santiago is also liable here since
Caling's represent didn't divest him of his capacity as counsel for MacArthur.
ADEZ REALTY INC. V CA
FACTS:
In a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land, Atty. Dacanay cites Section 13 of R.A. 26 which provides that
notice should be given to the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance is a material requirement for granting
petition for reconstitution of title. However, when he cited the decision of the CA in Adez Realty v. Honorable Judge of RTC Morong
Rizal, the phrase without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty was omitted.
Thus, the court directed Atty. Dacanay to show cause when he should not be disciplined.
Atty. Dacanay reasoned that it was a practice for him to dictate to this secretary, Alicia Castro. And if portions of decision
have to be quoted, he simply instructs her to copy the particular pages. Basically, he was saying it was the secretarys fault for
omitting the phrase. An affidavit of Castro was also given in court, supporting his defense.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Dacanay is guilty of falsification of judicial record.
RULING:
Yes, he is guilty.
Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat for any mistake is a common alibi of practicing lawyers.
Also, it is also suspicious that a secretary could have omitted the phrase without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty, without the counsel dictating it word for word and when it is an essential element to the original case.
Lawyers are duty-bound to check, review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted
portions to ensure their accuracy. If the client is bound by the acts of the counsel, with more reason should the counsel be bound by
the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders.
In this case, there was not merely a mere carelessness on Atty. Dacanays part, but also a malicious attempt to
gain undue advantage in the original case. Rule 10.02 of the CPR directs that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the contents of a paper or the text of a decision or authority. The distortion of the CA ruling is a grave offense and should not be
treated lightly because it is an attempt to misguide the last forum for appeal, the SC.
Atty. Dacanay is disbarred
SEEING THE JUDGE IN CHAMBERS
AUSTRIA V. MASQUIL
35
FACTS
Asturia was the plaintiff in a civil case involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan in which Judge Masaquel ruled in his favor.
Sometime later the defendant in the civil case hired a new lawyer in the person of Atty. Sicat, a former associate of Judge Masaquel
when he was still in the practice of law. Atty. Sicat then filed a superdeas bond to stay the execution of the sheriff and a motion for
new trial, all of which was granted by Judge Masaquel. Before the opening of one of the court sessions, Atty Macaraeg, lawyer of
Asturia saw Judge Masaquel to his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request that he inhibit himself on the ground that
Atty. Sicat was his associate. The Judge denied the request pointing out that it was not one of the grounds for disqualification of a
judge as provided in the rules of court. During the court session, he asked Asturia if he had authorized Atty. Macaraeg to approach
him in his chambers and whether he doubts the integrity of the judge to decide fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the
defending party was his associate, Asturia answered them all in the positive stating that he heard rumors that the defendant was
boasting that he would definitely win because of his lawyer. The Judge then declared Asturia in contempt. The Judge considered his
actuations offensive, insulting and lack of respect to the court. He was ordered to pay 50 pesos. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not it was proper for the judge to declare Asturia to be in contempt of court.
HELD
NO.
While the court consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter
related to the case pending in the court of said judge, it is not an act of contempt of court to see the judge in his chamber and
requested him to disqualify himself on the ground which the respondent judge might consider just and valid. The circumstances that
led the respondent judge to declare the petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any deliberate design on the part of the
petitioner to disrespect respondent judge. The petitioner has not misbehaved in court or in the presence of the respondent judge so
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. He simply expressed his sincere feeling under the circumstances. Certainly, any person is
entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that opinion is flattering or not. A judge as a public servant should not be so thin-
skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him.
RESPECT TO THE COURT/DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
ZALDIVAL V. GONZALES
FACTS:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The
Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP
Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707)
naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5
February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his
co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In
this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no
longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against
public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all
null and void.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The
Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media
in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578.
ISSUE:
WN Gonzales is liable for the contemptuous statements?
HELD:
36
This Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this
Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect
for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of
subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this
Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IN RE: PONCIANO B. JACINTO
Facts:
The Court has injitiated this action motu proprio because of the improvident language and conduct of Atty. Jacinto, counsel
in the Palmario v. SSS case.
Palmario v SSS case was about the question of Palmario where she was considered resigned from her last day of actual
service by the CSC. She was considered resigned after she failed to report to SSS after being absent for one year. There were
several motions for reconsideration filed to the SC but the SC dismissed the same because it just alleged facts without legal basis.
Atty. Jacinto included in his Special and Very Urgent Manifestation to the SC insults and threats in the most boorish and insolent
manner. He was warned it of a looming danger ahead if his motions are not granted ; averred that denial of his petition will make
the Court as superfluous as a hole in the head; broadly hinted that he will then give the media news of the most nauseating kind
involving the Court and made other irresponsible charges and insinuations that besmiorch the higher tribunal and undermine
popular faith in its integrity.
Held:
The Court suspended Atty. Jacinto. The above statements are clearly contemptuous. Every lawyer is expected to maintain
the proper decorum in his dealings with the courts of justice and is never justified in using scurrilous and threatening language in
pleading his clients cause. While criticism of jusidical conduct is not forbidden and zeal in advocacy is in fact encouraged, the lawyer
must always act within the limits of propriety and good taste and with deference for the judges before whom he pleads.
IN RE: ALMACEN
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen (passed the bar in 1941) was counsel for the defendant in the case of Virginia Yaptinchay v. Antonio H
Calero. It was a civil case which the trial court decided against Atty. Almacens client. He then filed motion of reconsideration and
furnished a copy of it to the adverse party. Such copy however failed to state the time and place of the hearing thereby making it a
useless scrap of paper. The lack of proof of service meant failure to perfect the motion on time (Atty. Almacen served it late and
therefore had no more time to correct his misteke). The issue was raised to the CA who agreed with the plaintiff in the case that it
should be dismissed. Atty. Almacen then raised the issue on certiorari to the SC who rejected it via minute resolution.
It was at this point that Atty. Almacen expressed his disappointment over the SC via filing a Petition to Surrender Lawyers
Certificate of Title where he would surrender his certificate to the Clerk of Court to be held in trust until the time comes when he
shall regain faith and confidence in the SC once again and therefore resume his practice of the noblest profession. Such petition also
contained lengthy accusations of constitutional violations and saying that the justice administered by the SC was not only blind but
also deaf and dumb. Asked to show cause as to why he should not be disciplined for his actions he replied with an answer that was
undignified, cynical embellished with sarcasm and innuendo, saying things like:
We condemn the SIN not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. x
x x We were provoked.
37
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER.
Atty. Almacen also quoted the bible as opening statement; But why doust thou see the speck in thy brothers eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? x x x Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to
cast out the speck from thy brothers eys. Basically, Atty. Alamacen felt extremely bitter at his motion being denied and the reason
for such denial being delivered only through a minute resolution.
RULING:
First off, the SC justified the need to reject numerous appeals with an outright denial or minute resolution. Were we to accept every
case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject we should be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The SC only accepts those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved.
Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further notice. The Supreme Court emphasizes that it is the RIGHT and
RESPONSIBILITY of every lawyer to criticize the decision of the Court but such criticism must be decent and proper. A critique of the
court must be intelligent and discriminating fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. Any time after this suspension
becomes effective Atty. Almacen may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. (We assume by
apologizing because he was unapologetic when he was asked to explain why he shouldnt be disciplined.)
RHEEM OF THE PHIL V. FERRER
Facts:
This is a case for contempt against Atty. Jose Armonio concerning his motion for reconsideration which contained words
which the Court deemed as disrespectful, sarcastic and makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of [this] Court blindly adhere to
earlier rulings and that the Court is patently inept[and] it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point
of perpetuation. An excerpt follows:
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether or not a particular
subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its
own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial courtThis error is
manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations
Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel Montecillo, Enrique Belo and Oscar Ongsiako are partners of
the law firm in which Armonio is an associate of. The partners of the law firm, in their return, offered their sincerest apologies to the
Court, stating that the contents of the MR is not meant to offend the Court, a result of overenthusiasm and that it was prepared by
Armonio personally who perhaps have become to emotionally involved in the case. The partners also assumed full responsibility for
the contents of the MR and admitted that not one of the partners was able to pass upon the final draft of the document.
Issues:
1. W/N the partners should be held liable?
2. W/N Atty. Armonio should be held liable?
Ruling:
1. Partly. The Court overlooked the shortcomings of the members firm but called attention to their lack of control of the contents of
the court pleadings given that such pleadings carry the name of their firm.
2. Yes. The Court admonished Atty. Armonio on the grounds that one of the duties of a lawyer to the court is To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers as well as maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude. Also, the Court said that it is incumbent upon lawyers to support the , courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
Ultimately, the Court took notice of the use of unnecessary language which it deems to jeopardize high esteem in courts, creates and
promotes distrust in judicial administration, while it might have been caused by overenthusiasm on the part of the lawyer, the
language used must still be within the bounds of propriety and due regard for the proper place of courts in the system of
government. Atty. Armonio cant escape responsibility and at best, the lack of intent to disrespect the Court merely lessens the
liability.
Trivia: The law firm in question is the firm of Atty. Alimurung.

38
MONTECILLO V. GICA
FACTS:
Atty. del Mar represented Montecillo in a deflation case against Gica. The RTC ruled in favor of Montecillo however CA
reversed the decision. Atty. del Mar moved for reconsideration of the CAs decision with veiled threats by mentioning the provisions of
RPC on knowingly rendered unjust judgment and judgment rendered through negligence, and the innuendo that the CA allowed
itself to be deceived. CA admonished del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court to grant
reconsideration. On the second motion of del Mar, he insinuated that he will bring the matter to the President of the Philippines and
reiterated his threats. He was asked to explain within 10 days why he should not be punished. He responded by saying that the court
cannot be threatened and also sent a letter to the Justices informing that he already sent the letter to the President. He also
reminded them of another civil case he had against the justices of SC. He was found guilty if contempt by the CA and condemned to
pay a fine (200) and ordered to be suspended from the practice of law. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. del Mar is guilty of contempt of court
HELD:
YES.
1. It may appear that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines , is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officer but it is of paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
2. A just man can never be threatened is not at all true. Any man, just or unjust, can be threatened. If he is unjust, he will succumb,
if he is just, he will not.
3. A lawyer facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntary retire from the practice of law, an act which would
negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor. His accusations tend to
erode the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. (He wanted to retire because of
old age but the court did not allow it.)
BALAOING V. CALDERON
Atty.EduardoBalaoingfiledseveraladministrativecomplaintsagainstdifferentjudgesofOlongapoandZambales.
JudgeDojillothiscomplaintwasdimissedforlackofmerit.ButBalaoingwasrequiredtoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbe
disciplinarydealtwithforhavingsuppressedcertainmaterialfactsandforhavingengagedinforumshopping.Explanationwas
declaredunsatisfactoryandhewasseverelycensuredandwarned
JudgeMaliwanaggravemisconductforallegedfailureandrefusaltoissuethewritofexecutionpendingappealprayedforby
complainant.ThecourtwasdisturbedbyBalaoingsunrestraineduseofunsavory,defamatorylanguage.Thelatteraccusedjudgeof
wearinghisbrief(short)whileinchamberduringofficehours,itisundignified,especiallysowhenhisbodyhastracesoffungus,
whichmayhavebeenafflictedduringhis26yearsasAssistantCityFiscalofOlongapo,adirtcity.Thiscomplaintdismissed,
suspendedfor1yearandP1000
JudgeCalderonmisconduct,abuseofauthority,maliciousdelayinadministrationofjustice.Heallegedlydoesnotfollowthe
Circular,merelytreatsitasdirectory.Heautomaticallygrantspostponementsanddeferments,drinks(whiskylikewater)and
fraternizeswithlawyersclosetoMayorGordon,refusedtodeclaredefendantsindefaultdespiterepeatednonappeareances,andhe
sanctionsthesetupofhavinghislegalresearcherworkunderthesupervisionofanOICwho,accordingtocomplainant,isgrossly
inefficientandanotoriousswindlerwithnobackgroundinlaw.
OICLeonorManiagoBalaoingallegesthatwhenhecameoutofthecourtroom,hewascastigatedbytheformerforallegedly
callinghernotorious,swindler,insane,etc.
39
JudgeCalderonfiledhiscommentHesaidthecomplaintwasprecipitatedbyeventsinBalaoingvs.Gavilan,anactionfor
foreclosure.Balaoinginthatcasewasthehighestbidderinapublicauction.AcertificateofSalewasissued.Judgequashedawritof
possessionbecauseredemptionperiodhadnotexpired.ThisallegedlyinfuriatedBalaoing.Hencehefiledseveralsuits,oneafterthe
othermotionforinhibitionallegingthejudgesmentaldishonestyandgrossnessofignoranceofthelaw,petitionforcertiorari
andprohibition,acivilcasefordamages,apetitiontocitejudgeincontempt.Whenredemptionperiodexpired,judgeissuedawritof
possessionbutBalaoingdidnottakepossessionshowingdisinterest.
Asshownabove,Balaoinghasapenchantforfilingchargesagainstjudgesinwhosesalashehaspendingcases,wheneverthelatter
renderdecisionsorissueordersadversetohimand/orhisclients.Hefiledbaselessandfrivolouscomplaintswithnootherpurpose
thantoharassandexactvengeance.
BalaoingsactionsruncountertotheCanons.
Canon11Alawyershallobserveandmaintaintherespectduetothecourtsandtojudicialofficersandshouldinsiston
similarconductbyothers
Rule11.03Alawyershallabstainfromscandalous,offensiveormenacinglanguageorbehaviorbeforethecourts
Rule11.04Alawyershallnotattributetoajudgemotivesnotsupportedbytherecordorhavenomaterialitytothecase
Balaoingwasdisbarred.
MACEDA V. ABIERA
FACTS:
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA of the Regional Trial Court,

Br. 12, San Jose, Antique, is administratively charged by District Public Attorney Napoleon A. Abiera with grave abuse of discretion
and misconduct relative to a civil case 1 pending before respondent judge, and with gross dishonesty and inefficiency in deliberately
falsifying his certificates of service, and failing to decide cases submitted for decision within the reglementary period prescribed by
the Constitution.
The charge of grave abuse of discretion and misconduct stemmed from the Order of 20 December 1990 issued by respondent judge
suspending complainant from the practice of law.
It appears that both counsel of the parties previously agreed to set Civil Case No. 2119 for hearing on 20 to 22 August 1990. On 20
August 1990, however, complainant requested the Court Interpreter for a second call of the case because he would first attend the
trial of another case in Br. 11 of the same court. 2 At 11:15 that same morning, after waiting for complainant in vain, Civil Case No.
2119 was called for the second time. However, neither the complainant nor his clients appeared. As a result, respondent judge
declared in open court that plaintiffs were deemed to have waived further presentation of their evidence.
On 7 December 1990, respondent judge ordered him

. . . to show cause in writing within five (5) days from today or not later than the close of office on December 12,
1990 why he should not be punished for contempt and/or otherwise disciplinar(ily) dealt with for abusing the court
in participating and agreeing in the reception of evidence for the defendants on August 21, 1990 but only to ask
maliciously later for its nullification and why no other liability should attach to him by reason of the heretofore
described acts and/or omission of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.
On 20 December 1990, respondent judge already issued an order suspending complainant from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Is the order of December 20 1990 valid?
HELD:
40
As a general rule, the acts done by a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though erroneous. 15
These acts become subject to our disciplinary power only when they are attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. A re-
evaluation of the case at bar presents no occasion for us to depart from the general rule.
The records show that Civil Case No. 2119 has long been pending presentation of plaintiffs' evidence. Yet, respondent judge has
been very lenient in granting motions for postponements to both counsel of the parties, more particularly to counsel for plaintiffs. Of
the twenty-seven (27) motions for postponement granted, seventeen (17) of these were filed by complainant as counsel for
plaintiffs, four (4) by agreement of the parties, one (1) by reason of the stenographic reporters' strike, and five (5) by motion of
defendants. 16 Finally, upon prior agreement of both counsel for plaintiffs and defendants, respondent judge set the case for hearing
on 20 to 22 August 1990.
Given this factual backdrop, complainant's non-appearance at the hearing despite his previous commitment and his personal request
for a second call of the case inevitably pushed the patience of respondent judge to the limit. In his Order of 20 August 1990,
respondent tersely declared that "(t)he complaint in the case was filed on 18 June 1986 and plaintiffs have not even rested their case
due to repeated postponements asked by plaintiffs. This Court cannot tolerate further delay in the proceedings of this case."
DISCOURAGE LITIGATION
CASTANEDA V. AGO
Facts:
Castaneda filed a replevin suit against Ago to recover certain machineries. Judgment was rendered in favor of Castaneda.
Levy was made to Agos house. Writ of possession of Agos house was also issued in favor of Castaneda. Ago filed a writ of
preliminary injunction against the writ of possession and sale of his house based on the fact that his wife wasnt impleaded and the
house was part of their conjugal partnership. (Apparently they only set up this defense after a lot of motions and delays. Hence this
cause of action is already barred by laches. The case has been going on for 14 years already)
Held:
The Court condemns the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those
who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in
the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.
CANTILANG V. MEDINA
FACTS:
This case seeks to annul the decision and prevent the execution of the judgment of one, Judge Medina in a case involving forcible
entry and illegal detainer. The lawyer who initiated this case is Atty. Revelo. In the previous case the party represented by Atty.
Revelo (who were squatters) received an adverse decision declaring that his clients should vacate the property in question and to pay
41
attorneys fees and reasonable compensation. Upon losing the case, Atty. Revelo failed to file a motion for reconsideration or a
motion for new trial or to appeal the decision. Hence the judgment became final and executory. However instead of accepting the
decision, Atty. Revelo filed a separate case in a different CFI (the case at bar) seeking to invalidate the decision in the earlier case
and preventing the execution of the judgment.
RULING:
Atty. Revelos case is without merit and is obviously resorted to solely as a maneuver to prevent or defeat the execution of the final
and executory decision of Judge Medina. Certiorari is limited to correction of defects of jurisdiction solely; it cannot be used for any
other purpose much less to defeat the right of the prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final judgement. Certiorari is not
a substitute for appeal.
As an officer of the Court it was Atty. Revelos duty to advise his clients, petitioners herein of the real merits of their case or the lack
of it. Had he done so, petitioners could have realized the futility of filing the present case and spared them the need to spend their
hard earned money by way of court fees (P 4,000+). Atty. Revelo failed in his duty to his clients, to be mindful of their welfare and
interest. The present petition is a sham and clearly unmeritous. He also failed in his duty to the court to promote and enhance
instead of defeat and frustrate the objectives and policies of society. The court says that in delaying the execution of the judgment,
Atty. Revelo was encouraging other squatters to continue in breaking the law as relief from the courts could easily be delayed.
SALAZAR V. DE CASTRODES
Facts:
This is a case stemming from an quiet title instituted by Bernardo Salazar regarding a parcel of land planted with coconuts
situated in Guindulman, Bohol against Bienvenido Libres, the brother of the defendants, whom he acquired the land by virtue of a
sale. Libres with neither legal right nor valid reason whatsoever, and employing threat and intimidation, claimed ownership of the
piece of land and gathered its coconuts and bamboos. The CFI of Bohol ruled in favor of Salazar declaring him as the owner and
ordering the defendants to vacate the land. A writ of execution was issued by the court, however, the defendants asserted a new
claim on the same property saying that it was part of the inheritance left to them by their father, Alipo Libres. The new claim was
never alleged in the initial case which was ruled in favor of Salazar. The latter case was easily shot down by the lower court, stating
the stipulation of the parties that they would be bound by the judgment in the previous case. However, the defendants continued
their appeal, alleging errors that were clearly devoid of merit.
Issue:
W/N the claim of De Castrodes et al is tenable?
Ruling:
No. The claims of the defendants are nothing more than a form of harassment being totally bereft of any support in law. The appeal
was found to be made too late by the Court and runs contrary to the elementary principle that the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is
limited to questions of law given that the grounds stated in the appeal are merely factual in nature.
As the Court stated:
It is thus apparent that on its face the brief for defendants-appellants is notable only for its flagrant and obvious disregard of what
the proprieties, not to say the decencies, of such a serious matter as an appeal to the Tribunal requires. Even if due regard be had
for the state of mind under which claimants to a piece of land, possessed of more than an ordinary degree of obduracy, might be
laboring under, still respect for the rule of law ought to have cautioned defendants in attempting, perhaps thoughtlessly, to delay
unduly the termination of a pending litigation and thus accord respect to the just claims of others.
Nor is their counsel free from blame when he could have informed them not only about the futility of such efforts, which was
bad enough, but also the barrier thus interposed against a fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the court, he owes such minimum obligation to this Tribunal. Unfortunately, he failed to live up to it. He should not
escape responsibility.
ENCOURAGE SETTLEMENT
42
PAJARES V. ABAD SANTOS
FACTS:
Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a case against Gloria Pajares for recovery of money (collection case). It was alleged that Pajares,
in the business of buying/selling merchandise in her stall in Sta. Mesa Market, ordered ready-made goods from Udharam. She made
partial payment but failed to pay the balance of P 354.85. Pajares, instead of filing an answer, moved for a bill of particulars;
requesting an itemization of goods, purchase dates, person who received the goods and purchase price. The MTC Judge Estrella Abad
Santos denied the motion for a bill of particulars.
She filed for certiorari to the CFI, alleging grave abuse of discretion of Judge Abad Santos in denying the motion for a bill of
particulars. Udharam filed a motion to dismiss petition for certiorari on the ground that (1) the allegations of the complaint are clear,
specific and sufficient to prepare defendant for her defenses and (2) the things prayed in the motion of a bill of particulars are
evidentiary matters beyond the nature of such motion. The CFI denied the certiorari. Thus, she elevated the issue to the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the allegations in the complaint sufficiently appraise Pajares of the nature of cause of action against her.
W/N the items prayed for in the bill of particulars constitute evidentiary matters.
RULING:
Yes to both.
The complaint filed by Udharam contained complete ultimate facts constituting the cause of action to appraise Pajares. In
addition, it was improper for appellant to request a bill of particulars, specifying in detail the goods, the purchase price, the purchase
dates and the person whom received such goods. These are all evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of a bill of
particulars.
It was observed that Udharam was one of Pajares creditors whom she used to buy on credit ready-made goods. Pajares
does not need evidentiary particulars to prepare her answer to the complaint. She cannot pretend ignorance and require a detailed
itemization and purchase of the goods. It was also found out that a month before Udharam filed a complaint, it gave a demand letter
to Pajares, requesting for the balance of payment. Pajares, acknowledging her indebtedness, reason that she sustained financial
losses in her operation. She requested that she be allowed to pay the debt in installments; P10 every 15 th and end of the month.
There was no error of law or grave abuse of discretion by the Judge Abad Santos in denying the motion for bill of
particulars.
The circumstances surrounding the litigation is frivolous and merely a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation. It
was supposed to be just a simple collection case. But due to the actions of Pajares, it dragged on for 7 years. Had the counsel of
Pajares (Atty. Moises Nicomedes) advised her to confessed judgment and ask for reasonable time to pay the debt, there would have
been no reason to incur litigation expenses and filing feels, as well as loss of time. Now, she incurred all of them, in addition to the
accumulated interest of her original debt. Lawyers should remember that there should be faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that any pleading filed in court, should have good ground to support it and it is not interposed for
delay.
Pajares is ordered to pay the debt and costs of litigation. The case shall be noted in the personal record of the Pajaress
counsel.
AVOID DILATORY TACTICS
ECONOMIC V. UY
FACTS
Uy moved for the dismissal of an ejectment case and for the payment of the back rentals secured by the superdeas bond
filed by the petitioner. The judge however limited his order to the dismissal of the case. The respondent sought for the amendment
for the inclusion of the writ of execution which the judge granted. Economic Insurance file for prohibition to an order of Judge
Cloribel granting motion of Uy Realty for a Writ of Execution against petitioner for the amount represented in the supersedeas bond.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judge erred in granting the inclusion of the writ of execution .
HELD
NO
43
1. Although through haste or inadvertence, the respondent judge ignored that portion and merely ordered that the appealed case be
dismissed, within the period however, before such ordered attained the stage of finality, a modification thereof was secured as a
result of the manifestation and motion of Uy Realty. What the respondent Judge did was clearly within his authority, and the
challenged order will stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny.
2. It is understandable for a party in the situation of the petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the law allows
it. In appraisal, however of such attempts to evade liability, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid
to do justice, not as a means for its frustration. Technicalities should always give way to the realities of the situation. ( the dismissal
of the case was only because of the filing of the supersedeas bond)
SAMAR V. ARNADO
In 1956, Rufino Abuyen filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission, a Notice of Inquiry or Sickness and Claim for
Compensation for a disease (TB) allegedly contracted while in the service of petitioner, Samar Mining Co., Inc. The latter received
from Attorney Pompeyo Tan, as Labor Attorney, a notice setting said claim for hearing. In a letter petitioner assailed the validity of
said notice and the authority of respondent Tan to hold the hearing, upon the ground that the authority therefor was vested by
Reorganization Plan 20-A and Executive Order No. 218 of the President in Department of Labor Regional Office No. VI, located in
Cebu City of which respondents Arnado and Tan are Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney, respectively and was beyond the
functions of respondent Tan, as such Labor Attorney.
The hearing pushed through, the petitioner did not appear, and decision was rendered for workman Abuyen.
In 1961, Petitioner commenced the present case for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, against Francisco
P. Arnado, as Regional Administrator of said office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer of said decision, and claimant Abuyen, upon the
ground that Tan had acted without jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering decision thereon, and that Arnado had committed
a grave abuse of discretion in sustaining and upholding said acts of Tan.
Jurisdiction? Yes. Reorganization plan 20-a provides clearly: "If a claim is controverted, it shall be heard and decided only by a
regularly appointed hearing officer or any other employee duly designated by the Regional Administrator to act as hearing officer." In
fact, when the petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, exhibit 1 thereof said "Tan had acted not as Labor Attorney but as
Hearing Officer designated pursuant to the authority granted him by the previous Regional Labor Administrator to try and hear the
merits of the compensation case..", thereby practically admitting that he had the authority.
Ethics: One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, through the
present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (which was dismissed for improper venue) petitioner
has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, for the compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioner's
contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again, the compensability
of Abuyen's disability had never been questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case, like the
previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "Often resorted to" in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) "as a means of
draining the resources of the poorer party" in this case a tuberculosis patient "and of compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of
Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.
MENDOZA V. DUAVE
FACTS:
Mendoza filed a case of forcible entry against Duave in the Justice of Peace Court. Duave contested the allegations and
claimed ownership of the land. The summary judgment was rendered in favor of Mendoza, making Duave appeal to the Court of First
Instance (CFI).
In CFI, Duave was declared in default for failure to submit an answer. A default judgment and writ of execution was
rendered against him. However, upon finding out that the cause of Duaves failure was the ignorance of legal procedure (the notice of
docketing was served on Duave, not his counsel), the default judgment was set aside and court gave him another chance to file his
answer.
Before the hearing, defendants counsel filed a motion for postponement but was denied. On the day of hearing, both
parties failed to appear. Plaintiffs counsel reason that the bridge in Bagsit, Zambales was impassable. Thus, the hearing was reset to
another day. However, it was again postponed to the motion of defendants counsel on the ground that he just recovered from an
illness and cannot make the trip to Zambales. As the hearing was reset for 2 nd time, defendants counsel again filed a motion to
postpone the hearing on the ground that he need to secure certain documents from his client. But the court denied such motion as
the case was already submitted for decision.
The court discovered that the land in question was inherited by Mendoza from their mother, Emiliana Tuason. It was also
found out that Mendoza already declared the land for taxation and that Duave grabbed possession of the land from Mendoza.
Judgment was rendered against Duave.
44
Duave asked for a motion for reconsideration. He argues that his counsel, Atty. Amor Deloso was the 3 rd lawyer to represent
him. He adds that when Atty. Deloso accepted the case, he did not have certain papers needed to prepare him for trial.
ISSUE:
W/N the motion for reconsideration by Duave should be granted.
RULING:
No.
There was sufficient time for Atty. Deloso to procure the documents from his client. Atty. Deloso entered as counsel on Sept
12, 1962. The hearing was on Nov 28, 1982. There was a two months difference, ample time to get the papers. The court also
presumed that Atty. Deloso discussed the case when he accepted Duaves case, making him ready for trial. In addition, he could not
have declared his readiness for trial if he did not have all the papers required.
Even on technical grounds, the denial of motion for postponement was valid, considering that counsel did not specify what
papers he needs to secure. Under the Rules of Court, a motion must be supported by an affidavit showing materiality of the evidence
and due diligence in securing that evidence, which defendants counsel failed do to so.
Defendants counsel even failed to attend the hearing, believing the motion for postponement is surely to be granted. It
should be stressed that a motion for postponement is up to the sound discretion of the court. Lawyers should not assume that the
postponement would be granted and deliberately be absent on the day of hearing.
It should also be considered that the case was one of forcible entry. It has the nature of summary procedure. Any kind of
postponements are not encouraged to protect the real possessors of the land. The case was expected to be done expedient and
efficient manner.
The claim that the trial court erred in reinstating its judgment in default on the ground that the defendant is no longer in
default is a mere technicality. The decision would not be any different were the court to render a new decision, because it would still
be in favor of plaintiff.
The lawyer is admonished for such dilatory tactics that undermine the nature of the action. The decision of the CFI is
affirmed.
SANCHEZ V. BRION
FACTS:
Bienvenido Sanchez and spouse were plaintiffs in an ejectment case Sanchez v. de Guzman. They won the case but the
writ of execution was stayed because of a compromise agreement. The compromise agreement provides that (a) Sanchez would
execute a deed of absolute sale of lot in favor of de Guzman and (b) de Guzman would pay 150k. The de Guzman failed to
comply with the agreement so a writ of execution was issued. Atty. Galileo Brian, counsel of de Guzman, filed several cases to
prevent the execution.
(1) Petition for certiorari and prohibition with RTC assailing the writ. When the court ordered a hearing to determine the
truth of the allegations, he appealed this decision to the CA and SC, which was denied.
(2) Complaint for breach of contract against the Sanchez spouses with RTC.
(3) Motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the alias writ of execution
(4) Another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC
(5) Yet another petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, which was earlier granted by reversed
Complainant Sanchez now files an administrative complaint against Atty. Brion for forum-shopping. Atty. Brion argue that
his honesty and good-faith in pursuing the cause of his clients should not merit administrative sanction.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Brion should be disbarred
RULING:
No.
Lawyers should remember that their primary duty is to assist the court in the administration of justice. Any conduct with
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Lawyers must not abuse the court
processes. The court has repeatedly reminded the lawyers to avoid resorting to forum shopping for it clogs the court dockets. Willful
and deliberate forum-shopping is punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court provided in SC Administrative Circular No.
04-94
However, the actions of the lawyer, Atty. Brion, does not warrant the supreme penalty of disbarment. He is CENSURED for
resorting to forum-shopping and WARNED that any future violation will be dealt with more severely.
45
MILLARE V. MONTERO
FACTS:
In an ejectment case in MTC, the court decided in favor of Pacifica Millare and ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the land. Atty.
Eustanquio Montero, counsel of Co, filed 6 appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment
(1) Appeal to the RTC, without paying the bond or rentals
(2) Appeal to CA
(3) Action for annulment of decisions and/or reformation or novation of decisions filed with the CA
(4) Petition for review on certiorari with SC
(5) Appeal and/or review by certiorari with CA
(6) Petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and preliminary issuance of prohibitory order with RTC
While the Rodolfo Millare and mother, Pacifica Millare move for execution of the original MTC decision, it was always deferred
due to one of the several cases pending. Rodolfo Millare files an administrative complaint against Atty. Montero. the SC referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP recommended the Atty. Montero be
suspended from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Montero should be suspended from the practice of law.
RULING:
Yes, he is suspended for 1 year.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to represent his client within the bounds of the law. It
enjoins the lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and warns him not to allow his
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. A lawyer is not a gun for hire. His advocacy of this clients cause should be within
the law. He should not knowing advance a claim or defense that is patently frivolous and meritless or groundless actions.
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility also requires the lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. It is unethical to abuse of wrongfully use the judicial process, like filing
dilatory or frivolous appeals only for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of judgment.
A judgment can only be annulled on 2 grounds (a) judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or
(b) it has been obtained by fraud. The judgment in the original MTC decision was already final and executory and Atty. Montero knew
it. However, he resorted to devious and underhand means to delay the execution of the judgment by filing 6 meritless actions and
appeals. He is guilty of forum-shopping.
Forum-shopping is improper because it constitutes abuses of the judicial process and improper conduct of the lawyer that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice. It is punishable by contempt of court. Thus, a lawyer who
knowingly files multiple or repetitious petitions subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of his
duties.
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS COLLEAGUES AND LITIGANTS
REYES V. CHiONG
FACTS:
Zonggi Xu invested in Chia Hsien Pan for business venture which requires the establishment of a fish ball factory. Xu later
found out that Pan had failed to build the fish ball factory. Thus, Xu, through Atty. Ramon Reyes, filed a complaint of estafa against
Pan. Pan and counsel Atty. Victoriano Chiong was issued a subpoena for preliminary investigation but failed to appear. On that
ground, Prosecutor Salanga filed the criminal complaint in RTC.
Atty. Chiong then filed an motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed a civil complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga, as well as dissolution of business venture in RTC. When the 2
counsels confronted, Atty. Chiong claimed that it was Pan who instituted the civil action against Atty. Reyes. He claimed that he
would suggest to Pan to drop the civil case if Atty. Reyes move for dismissal of the estafa case. However, no settlement was reached.
Atty. Chiong argue that he showed no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil action. He
allege that Atty. Reyes should be included because he connived with XU in filing the estafa case, which they allegedly know to be
baseless. He adds that Prosecutor Salanga is also rightfully impleaded due to irregularities in the criminal investigation.
Thus, Atty. Reyes filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Chiong for violation of Canon 8 of CPR (lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
46
counsel). The SC referred the case to the IBP. The IBP report states that the civil action was filed purposely to obtain leverage
against the estafa case. In addition, there was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga. The IBP recommended
suspension of Atty. Chiong for 2 years.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Chiong should be suspended for 2 years
RULING:
Yes.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. The civil action was for the collection of a sum of money, damages
and dissolution of an unregistered business venture. It had originally been filed against Xu, but was later modified to include Atty.
Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga. It was done only to gain leverage in the estafa case. If it were not so, Atty. Chiong would have used
proper procedural and administrative remedies, like going to the Justice Secretary or motion for reconsideration, motion for
reinvestigation or motion to dismiss. Moreover, he could have filed a disbarment case against Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga on
the ground of alleged improper conduct. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies.
Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification. Atty. Chiong took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as
a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client Pan. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their
comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal
constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not
influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive
behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. Atty. Chiong claims that it was his client, Pan, who insisted in impleading
Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of
their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. Their rendition of improper service
invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their
clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting
interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of professional duty.
NY V. DEPASUCAT
FACTS:
Johnny Uy and UBS Marketing Corporation (UBS) filed an action for reconveyance, cancellation of titles and recovery of
possession and damages in RTC against SK Realty, Ban Hua Flores, Ban Ha Chua (Uys sisters) and their children. Uy and UBS caused
the annotation of notice of lis pendens with the RD. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of forum-shopping. SK Realty et. al.
moved for the removal of the notice of lis pendens. Uy and UBS appealed CA.
Subsequently, Atty. Reynaldo Depasucat Atty. Su and Atty. De las Alas, counsels of SK Realty et. al., filed a pleading entitled
Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed Briber of Judges. The pleading states
that Uy confessed to bribery of judges on illegally taped conversations, on actual and by telephone, together with Judges Abastillas
and Moscardon in previous cases.
Due to the said pleading, Uy filed a administrative complaint against Atty. Depasucat, Atty. Su and Atty. De las Alas for
gross misconduct. He argues that as members of the bar, they should not do no falsehood or mislead the court. He asserts that the
pleading is groundless and totally immaterial to the appealed case. Uy claim that the pleading was filed only to put him in a bad
light. Atty. Depasucat counters that the bribery is true and already part of public knowledge because it is already part of a previous
administrative decision. The lawyers also argue that the pleading is relevant as it was in response to attempt of UY to reinstate the
notice of lis pendens.
The issue was referred to the IBP. The IBP report states that the filing of the pleadings was correct and true, but contained
abusive, offending and improper language. They recommended that the respondent lawyers be WARNED for the use of offensive
language and filing of pleadings immaterial to the case, and a repetition be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
W/N the lawyers be administratively sanctioned for filing of such pleading.
47
RULING:
Yes. They are REPREMANDED for misconduct in using offensive and abusive language and WARNED that a repetition will be
dealt with more severely.
The statement made by respondents-lawyers that Uy had bribed judge Abastillas was duly proven. This admission was
lifted from the transcript of the stenographic notes of the previous administrative cases. However, there was no records to support
the allegation of bribery to Judge Moscardon. In addition, the disbarment of Uys previous lawyer, Atty. Chua, on the ground of
corruption showed Uy had no participation therein. Half-truths are equally if not more pernicious than outright lies.
The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of
pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged has been enunciated before. It
rests upon public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in
some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. The ultimate purpose is to let the members of the
legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without
incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. However, such remarks or comments should not
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety.
As to the degree of relevancy necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts favor a liberal rule. The
matter to which the privileged does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that
no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not
be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. However, it must be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent
to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial. The statement that Uy is a
briber of judges is NOT relevant to the issue of the appealed case. The lawyers could have filed the same pleading in the trial court
before. Thus, it cannot be part of privileged communications.
Respondent-lawyers claim that the pleading was in response to the attempt of Uy to reinstate the notice of lis pendens.
Though they have the right to contest the reinstatement of the lis pendens, they went overboard by stating that Uy is a briber of
judges. It belied their good intention and exceeded the bounds of propriety. It is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
litigant; it offends the court before which it is made.
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. It must be
remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. The lawyers language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. It is the duty of the lawyer respondents to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.
In was also apparent that the pleading was filed only after the case was submitted for decision. It can be concluded that it
was done in an attempt tot affect the decision. The respondents-lawyers are guilty of such act and should be reprimanded. However,
a higher penalty is not warranted, considering it was due to overzealousness of the lawyers to their clients cause. Thus, they are
merely reprimanded and warned.
*Lawyer respondents petitioned to hold Uy in contempt of court for denying under oath that he bribed a judge. However,
the court found nothing contemptuous with Uys desire to protect his honor. Also, his denial was proven true because the
lawyer-respondents failed to substantiate the allegation (for Judge Moscardon). There was no sufficient showing of bad faith
in Uys filing of administrative complaint
UNLAWFUL SCHEMES, IMMORAL OR DECEITFUL CONDUCT
UY CHENG SENG V. MAGAT
GUEVARRA V. EALA
PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
The Securities and Exchange Commission received a quo warranto case questioning the election of specific directors of International
Pipe Industries Corporation. (the Puyat group) on the ground that a failure of vote counting resulted. A congressman proudly
appeared as Counsel for the Acero group. When respondents objected since based on the constitution, an assembly man cannot
appear as a counsel before an administrative body, he did not continue his appearance. Congressman then purchased 10 shares at
the price of P200, allowing him to run for director in order to intervene in the conflict.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in intervening in the SEC case, Assemblyman Fernandez is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an
administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
48
RULING:
Yes.
The congressman acquired only ten out of 262,843 shares. He purchased them after his appearance as counsel was objected to. This
is an implied appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a violation of the constitution. His purchase of the
shares was a mere afterthought that enables him to directly influence the case because the constitution prevents him appearing as
counsel.
LAXAMANA V. CA
FACTS:
The case began in 1960 while this decision was entered in 1978. This case involves a dispute over a certain portion of land (21.2
square meters) located in Sampaloc, Manila. The two parties involved are Laxamana and Mallari. Laxamana is the nephew of Mallaris
wife. Both parties are already deceased; it is now their heirs who continue to pursue the case. In the trial court, Mallari was able to
present his evidence ex-parte for failure of Laxamana and his counsel to appear in court. Mallari received a favorable decision. Upon
receiving a copy of the decision, Laxamana proffered the excuse that his counsel had misplaced the notice of hearing hence they
were not able to attend. The court refused to give merit to such excuse. Later on Laxamana discovered that his counsel was bribed
by the heirs of Mallari in the amount of 1500 pesos.
ISSUE:
W/N Laxamana was denied his day in court due to the corruption of his counsel?
RULING:
Although the ruling in favor of Mallari had become final despite the numerous protests of Laxamana (He filed numerous motions for
consideration in the trial court as well as certiorari with the CA and now the SC) such judgment may be invalidated if the there is
extrinsic or collateral fraud. The fraud must be such that it prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case
or defense; it must be such as prevented the losing party from having an adversary trial of the issue. The act of the successful party
in inducing the lawyer of the losing party to commit professional delinquency or infidelity constitutes extrinsic or collateral fraud.
There is extrinsic fraud when a party was prevented from having presented all his case to the court as when the lawyer connives to
defeat or corruptly sells out his clients interests. Lack of due process and extrinsic and collateral fraud vitiate a final and executor
judgment and are valid grounds for setting it aside.
The court reverses the decision of the lower courts denying the motion of reconsideration of Laxamana. Laxama must be given the
chance to prove his contentions which apparently have some semblance of merit. The case was sent back to the trial court to try and
come up with an amicable settlement, failing that Laxamana is allowed to cross-examine the witness of Mallari and to present any
additional evidence.
GARCIA V. MANUEL
Facts:
Maritess Garcia divorced her husband, Oscar Fauni, and approached Atty. Iluminado Manuel for legal advice regarding concerning
child support and her condominium unit in San Juan. Atty. Manuel agreed to take Garcias case for P70,000 and asked for P10,000
advance fees plus another P10,000 for filing fees. When asked why the filing fees seem to high, Atty. Manuel said that it was
because the fees were proportionate to the value of the property and support prayed for. Atty. Manuel sent a demand letter to Fauni.
Garcia then made consecutive inquiries to Atty. Manuel if the ejectment case was already filed, however, in a telephone conversation,
she discovered that the case was not yet filed. Agitated by the information, she immediately went to Atty Manuels residence. An
altercation between respondent and complainant took place which led to Atty. Manuel returning to Garcia the documents pertaining
to the case. No amount of money was, however, returned by Atty. Manuel to Garcia despite the latters demand for its return. This
led to Garcia filing a complaint against Atty. Manuel with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Manuel denied misappropriating
the P10,000 saying that the reason why he didnt file the ejectment case was because he had not yet received the registry return
card evidencing the receipt of Fauni of the demand letter and that since Garcia was also delayed in her payments to him, there was
an agreement that the P10,000 may be applied to her account.
The Investigating Commissioner Atty. Caesar R. Dulay recommended that respondent was less than honest to his client and
displayed lack of candor and fidelity to her cause based on 3 instances: (1) making it appear to complainant that as early a 17
49
February 1999, he already needed P10,000 for filing fees; (2) failing to advise his client as to the real amount of the filing fees; and
(3) failing to render an accounting of the monies received and intended as filing fees. Garcia was also guilty of misleading the
Commission by his claim of having received the registry return card on 7 April 1999, the truth of the matter being that respondent
already received the registry return card on 24 March 1999. He then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for one month and be ordered to render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant. The IBP Board of
Governors agreed with the findings and penalty.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Manuel should be held liable?
Held:
Yes.
Atty. Manuel committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant. Respondent Manuel fully knew
that the jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate had to be complied with before an ejectment case could be filed and yet he
asked complainant to raise the filing fee of P10,000 as early as 17 February 1999. He likewise cannot take refuge behind his claim
that he did not file the ejectment case because he had not yet received the registry return card. The records reveal that despite
Atty. Manuels receipt of the registry return card on 24 March 1999, he still did not file an ejectment case. Respondent also failed to
comply with the norms embodied in Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Moreover, a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall
deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account and
return the P10,000 for the filing fees despite complainants repeated demands.
We find untenable respondents claim that since complainant was already in arrears with his fees, it was proper for him to apply the
filing fees to his attorneys fees. It has been held that an attorneys lien is not an excuse for a lawyers non-rendition of accounting.
And while a lawyer is allowed to apply so much of the clients funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, the lawyer is however under the obligation to promptly thereafter notify his client.] Nothing on record supports
respondents claim that complainant was adequately notified as to the application of the P10,000 (for the filing fees) to her arrears.
Besides, the receipt dated 4 March 1999 states that:
In the event that whatever is left of the P10,000 after the filing of the ejectment case is insufficient for the filing fee in the other
collection case, the said balance shall be applied to the installment due for the retainer agreement.
A close reading of the receipt reveals that while it authorizes respondent to apply whatever would be left of the P10,000 (intended
for the filing fees) to the retainer fee, it clearly presupposes that the filing fee in the ejectment cases must have been paid already.
Atty. Manuel is suspended from the practice of law for 6 months.
FERNANDEZ V. GRECIA
FACTS
This is disbarment complaint against respondent for dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of pages from the
medical papers, which was material evidence in the complaint of his clients against petitioners. A prior disbarment suit was filed with
respondent before due to his alliance with a judge in extortion of businessmen who had cases in the judges court. Respondent was
disbarred but given another chance with the promise of mending his ways. And not a year has passed, that respondent is charged
with another disbarment complaint.
His client was the husband of a patient who was a patient in St. Lukes Hospital where the petitioners are doctors. The patient had
complications alongside her pregnancy but was released during Christmas day to be with her family. The next day, she was rushed
back to the hospital and she died later on together with the unborn child. The husband filed a case against the hospital and the
doctors. During one of the hearings, respondent borrowed the records from the clerk of court and reaped of pages from the medical
50
record. He then handed this over to his driver. He was being followed by one of the courts staff due to suspicion and got from the
driver the torn pages. The driver then disappeared. A complaint was filed against respondent and latter denied all accusations.
ISSUE
Whether or not the acts of respondent are unbecoming of a lawyer as to warrant his disbarment?
RULING
Yes. By stealing the pages of the medical records, he violated
Canon 1 and 7 of Professional Responsibility, which states:
Rule 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and of legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Integrity and good moral character is essential to a lawyer. By stealing papers of the moral record, which was important in the
deciding of the case, respondent showed his moral unfitness to become a lawyer.
ROQUE V. CLEMENCIO
Myrna Roque and Roberto Cruzado against attorney Feliciano Clemencio. Gross misconduct and oppression. Respondent was a Legal
Officer of the Commission on Audit appointed to investigate the charges filed by complainant Myrna D. Roque against COA official
Jovencio Panelo. He was eventually relieved of this duty upon motion by Roque. He is now being charged for gross misconduct (by
roque) since: a) he was seen in a beerhouse with Panelo's lawyer, b) he had "sat on" the complaint for almost a year, c) he had
conspired with his replacement investigator Atty. Tablang, and d) he drafted the decision against Panelo even though he had been
relieved as investigator in the case. He is charged with oppression (by cruzado) since: He summoned complainant Roberto P. Cruzado
(a lowly CoA employee) to the Office of the Chief, Security Affairs Service Unit, COA, and threatened him. After hearing, the IBP
dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. The SC rejected the findings of the IBP. 1. Although what Clemencio prepared was a draft
decision and not a final one, the SC decided that the manner in which a draft is prepared can influence the reviewing authority; in
fact, in this case, the final decision was substantially identical to the prepared draft. Also, although drinking with Panelo's lawyer does
not mean automatically that he is favoring him, a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 2. We take into serious
account the fact that respondent is a lawyer, a superior who threatened a subordinate complainant with dismissal and a court suit. A
man of the law should never use his legal expertise and influence in order to frighten or coerce anyone, especially the ordinary man
who looks up to him for justice. The excuse of respondent that a threat to prosecute is no intimidation deserves scant consideration.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, immoral or
deceitful conduct. He is required not only in fact to be of good moral character, but must also be seen to be leading a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. CENSURED and WARNED.
CONSTANTINO V. SALUDARES
FACTS:
InanAffidavitComplaintdatedApril21,1978,complainantLuisG.ConstantinochargesrespondentAtty.PrudencioS.Saludares
withconductunbecomingofalawyerforthenonpaymentofaloanwhichthelatterobtainedfromcomplainant'ssonLuis
Constantino,Jr.
ItappearsthatsometimeinAugust1977,respondentborrowedmoneyintheamountofP1,000.00fromcomplainant'ssonLuis,Jr.
Respondentprocuredtheloanpurportedlyforanurgentpersonalobligationpromisingtopayitbackpromptlythefollowingday.
51
Respondentfailedtocomplywithhispromise.SubsequentdemandsforpaymentwerethenmadebyLuis,Jr.buttonoavail.
HELD:
Ithasbeenheldthatwhenalawyer'sintegrityischallengedbyevidence,itisnotenoughthathedeniesthechargesagainsthim,he
mustmeettheissuesandovercometheevidencefortherelatorandshowproofthathestillmaintainsthehighestdegreeofmorality
andintegritywhichisatalltimesexpectedofhim(Quingwavs.Puno,19SCRA439[1967]).
Byhisfailuretopresentconvincingevidencetojustifyhisnonpaymentofthedebt,nottomentionhisseemingindifferencetothe
complaintbroughtagainsthimmadeapparentbyhisunreasonableabsencefromtheproceedingsbeforetheSolicitorGeneral,
respondentfailedtodemonstratethathestillpossessedtheintegrityandmoralitydemandedofamemberoftheBar.
TheforegoingfactualantecedentscompelUstoconcludethatfromtheverybeginning,respondenthadnointentiontohonorand/or
payhisjustdebt.Wecannotsimplycloseoureyestotheunwarrantedobstinacydisplayedbyrespondentinevadingpaymentofadebt
validlyincurred.Suchaconduct,tosaytheleast,isunbecominganddoesnotspeakwellofamemberoftheBar.Alawyer's
professionalandpersonalconductmustatalltimesbekeptbeyondreproachandabovesuspicion.Hemustperformhisdutiestothe
Bar,tothecourts,tohisclients,andtosocietywithhonoranddignity(Marcelovs.Javier,214SCRA1[1992]).
FAR CORPORATION V. IAC
BANOGON V. ZERNA
FACTS:
The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court sixty years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed
thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of judgment. After 14 years, a motion to dismiss was
filed. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioners came to the SC to question the
order of the judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of laches.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet
been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the
decree of registration. If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by
having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.
They should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years.
Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too
valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory,
especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and
indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of
distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen
popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the
law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and
intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty
by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
NADAYAG V. GRAGEDA
52
FACTS:
Atty. Grageda was a notary public in Iligan City and is now being charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer. Complainant (Nadayog)
entered into a pacto de retro sale with herself as vendee a retro. She bought the OCT to the respondent Atty. Grageda to be
notarized. She was suspicious of the certificate already and so she asked the attorney for advise to which Atty. Grageda responded
with assurances that the title was all right and that she shouldnt worry because he knew the vendor a retro well. It turns out
however that the OCT was stolen from the Register of Deeds. Because of this Nadayog lost 108,000 pesos in the failed transaction
that she entered into as the land that was sold to her was already sold to another ahead of time.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Grageda can be held liable for the flawed advise he gave to Nadayog.
RULING:
Notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document converts such documents into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. In this case, Atty. Grageda was well aware of all the defects in the OCT
presented to him for notarization. The copy of the OCT presented to him should be with the Register of Deeds only and with no other.
He should have explained this fact to Nadayog as well as the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as to aid
Nadayog in making an informed decision.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to clients, his profession, the courts and the public. To this
end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
LIBIT V. OLIVA
Facts:
Attys. Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali were charged by the NBI for allegedly falsifying a Sheriffs Return of Summons in connection
to a case (Cutingting v. Tan) they were handling thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or
dispensation of Justice. The case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
With respect to Atty. Umali, the complainant agreed to the dismissal of the case since the supposed signature of Atty. Umali in the
document was not his signature. However, in the case of Atty. Oliva, the IBP found ample evidence to prove that he has something to
do with the falsification citing that:
1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella.
2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the Manila RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law
office of Attys. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the respondent.
3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case, filed a
typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default
4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand
letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00.
5) The demand letter sent by Atty. Oliva and the falsified return were typed from the same typewriter.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Oliva should be held liable?
Held:
53
YES. Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers.
The Court said that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor.
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any
falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law
in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
HALILI V. CIR
NUNEZ V. RICAFORT
Disbarment case against Atty. Romulo Ricafort, a law dean, by Soledad Nunez. Nunez authorized Ricafort to sell two parcels of land
she owned for 40k, which he did sell, but the proceeds of which he did not return to her. She filed a complaint for a sum of money is
RTC-QC, which rendered default judgment in her favor, ordering Ricafort to pay 16k plus interest. Ricafort appealed, but it was
dismissed for failure to pay docket fees. Nunez moved for an alias writ of execution, partially satisfied, leaving 13.8k due; Ricafort
issued 4 checks to cover the amount, but which were rejected since the account was closed by him before the maturity of the
checks. Nunez filed 4 cases of violation of BP22 against him. SC found Ricafort guilty of the charges. The following acts commited
by him are abhorrent and incompatible with the office of a lawyer: a) dishonesty for failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale; b)
delaying tactics, by filing a frivolous appeal in the CA, by issuing postdated bouncing checks, and by asking for three extensions of
time with this court (SC) but never submitting a comment or explaining why he could not do so. This latter charge is tantamount to
disobedience of court orders. Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already
encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other
checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates. By violating Rule
1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers.
Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession. Respondent
also violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers
should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that
lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so. INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
CALUB V. SULLER
FACTS:
One January morning in 1975 Atty. Abraham Suller went to his neighbors house to borrow a blade. As he was a family friend the
wife of the complainant let him in. Thereafter Suller began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested, Suller
threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment Calub (the complainant) returned home to get
money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the
bed. She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending
herself. Criminal charges for rape were filed as well as a complaint for disbarment. Suller moved to postpone the complaint
concerning the disbarment until termination of the criminal case of rape.
ISSUE:
W/N acquittal due to failure of prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a valid ground to not disbar Atty. Suller
RULING:
Despite not being found guilty, the actions of Atty. Suller is grossly reprehensible as he had carnal knowledge of his neighbors wife
without her consent in her very home. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for miscounduct whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court. The court finds that the recommendation of the bar of suspension for one year is not sufficient punishment
for the immoral act of the respondent. The rape of his neighbors wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. Good moral character is not only a condition
54
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but, it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain ones good standing in
the exclusive and honored fraternity.
55

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Legal Ethics Cases (Alimurung) 2D 2012

BATES V. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

Do you need a lawyer?

Divorce or legal separation uncontested (both spouses sign papers)

Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC INC

DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS V BAYOT

Legal assistance service

KAHN, JR. V. SIMBILLO

The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business.

1. duty of public service

2. relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice

3. relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary

An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the employment to

Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed.

DONALD DEE V. CA | AMELITO MUTUC

ISSUE: WoN Atty. Grupo violated Rule 16?

But in the dispositive portion, sabi he violated so ayun.

ERACTORS INC. NLRC

WN respondent is liable for negligence?

TC ruled in favor of Canlas. CA reversed.

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION V. NLRC

DONALD DEE V. CA | AMELITO MUTUC

W/N Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest?

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY INC. V. ARQUILLO

LORENZANA FOOD CORP V. DORIA

NO. Case dismissed.

ISSUE: W/N Sansaet may be made a state witness?

KOMATSU INDUSTRIES INC. V. CA

W/N NIDCs Deed of Release is binding on PNB?

In relation to Legal Ethics:

HEIRS OF HERMAN REY ROMERO V. REYES

IN RE:1989 ELECTION OF THE IBP

ARTIAGA JR. V. VILLANUEVA

Whether or not the acts of Villanueva is considered unethical.

W/N Quasha is entitled to a portion of the goods or its proceeds?

First Contempt case:

Second Contempt case:

W/N the lawyers should be cited in contempt?

ADEZ REALTY INC. V CA

SEEING THE JUDGE IN CHAMBERS

RESPECT TO THE COURT/DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE COURT

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

WN Gonzales is liable for the contemptuous statements?

IN RE: PONCIANO B. JACINTO

RHEEM OF THE PHIL V. FERRER

Trivia: The law firm in question is the firm of Atty. Alimurung.

JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA of the Regional Trial Court,

On 7 December 1990, respondent judge ordered him

Is the order of December 20 1990 valid?

As the Court stated:

PAJARES V. ABAD SANTOS

AVOID DILATORY TACTICS

W/N the motion for reconsideration by Duave should be granted.

COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS COLLEAGUES AND LITIGANTS

UNLAWFUL SCHEMES, IMMORAL OR DECEITFUL CONDUCT

UY CHENG SENG V. MAGAT

W/N Atty. Manuel should be held liable?

Besides, the receipt dated 4 March 1999 states that:

Atty. Manuel is suspended from the practice of law for 6 months.

Yes. By stealing the pages of the medical records, he violated

Canon 1 and 7 of Professional Responsibility, which states:

FAR CORPORATION V. IAC

W/N Atty. Oliva should be held liable?