MATTHEWPOLLACKandJANEQUIRION,individuallyandasnextfriendsofB.P.

,Plaintiffs,
v.
REGIONALSCHOOLUNIT75,etal.,Defendants.

No.2:13cv109NT.
UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,D.Maine.
April28,2017.
MATTHEWPOLLACK,Plaintiff,ProSe.
JANEQUIRION,Plaintiff,representedbyRACHELW.SEARS,MURRAYPLUMB&MURRAY,RICHARDL.O'MEARA,MURRAY
PLUMB&MURRAY&ZACHARYL.HEIDEN,AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNIONOFMAINEFOUNDATION.
REGIONALSCHOOLUNITNO75,Defendant,representedbyDANIELA.NUZZI,BRANN&ISAACSON,MATTHEWP.
SCHAEFER,BRANN&ISAACSON,NATHANIELA.BESSEY,BRANN&ISAACSON&STACYO.STITHAM,BRANN&
ISAACSON.
BRADLEYVSMITH,Defendant,representedbyDANIELA.NUZZI,BRANN&ISAACSON,MATTHEWP.SCHAEFER,BRANN&
ISAACSON,NATHANIELA.BESSEY,BRANN&ISAACSON&STACYO.STITHAM,BRANN&ISAACSON.
REGIONALSCHOOLUNITNO75,CounterClaimant,representedbyDANIELA.NUZZI,BRANN&ISAACSON,MATTHEWP.
SCHAEFER,BRANN&ISAACSON&NATHANIELA.BESSEY,BRANN&ISAACSON.
MATTHEWPOLLACK,CounterDefendant,ProSe.
JANEQUIRION,CounterDefendant,ProSe.
JANEQUIRION,CounterDefendant,representedbyRICHARDL.O'MEARA,MURRAYPLUMB&MURRAY&ZACHARYL.
HEIDEN,AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNIONOFMAINEFOUNDATION.

ORDERONPARTIES'CROSSMOTIONSFORSUMMARYJUDGMENT

NANCYTORRESEN,ChiefDistrictJudge.
BeforemearethePlaintiffs'motionforpartialsummaryjudgment,theDefendant'smotionforsummaryjudgment,andthe
Defendant'ssupplementalmotionforsummaryjudgmentpursuanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure56.(ECFNos.158,160,
258).Forthereasonsstatedbelow,thePlaintiffs'motionisDENIEDandtheDistrict'smotionsareGRANTEDINPARTand
DENIEDINPART.

LEGALSTANDARD

Summaryjudgmentisappropriatewhenthereisnogenuinedisputeofmaterialfactandthemovingpartyisentitledtojudgment
asamatteroflaw.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.56(a).Oncrossmotionsforsummaryjudgment,courts"vieweachmotionseparatelyand
drawallreasonableinferencesinfavoroftherespectivenonmovingparty."RomanCatholicBishopofSpringfieldv.Cityof
Springfield,724F.3d78,89(1stCir.2013).Facedwithcrossmotions,courtsmust"decide`whethereitherofthepartiesdeserves
judgmentasamatteroflawonthefactsthatarenotdisputed.'"Fid.CoopBankv.NovaCas.Co.,726F.3d31,36(1stCir.2013)
(quotingBarnesv.FleetNat'lBank,N.A.,370F.3d164,170(1stCir.2004)).

BACKGROUND

ThePlaintiffsinthiscaseareMatthewPollackandJaneQuirion(the"Parents"),astheparentsandnextfriendsoftheireighteen
yearoldsonB.P.UnifiedStatementofFactsSubmissionsforDefs.'Mot.forSumm.J.withCitationstoJointSumm.J.R.3
("DSF")(ECFNo.213).TheremainingDefendantisRegionalSchoolUnit75("RSU75"orthe"District"),whichhasbeenB.P.'s
schooldistrictsincekindergarten.DSF5.
B.P.isdiagnosedwithautismandalanguagedisorderthatisavariantofLandauKleffnerSyndrome.DSF3.Heisnonverbal
andhasverylimitedexpressivecommunicationskills.DSF3.B.P.ishappy,lovesschool,andhasmadesomeprogresstoward
hiseducationalgoals.DSF5.BythetimeB.P.beganattendingMt.AraratMiddleSchool,however,therelationshipbetweenhis
ParentsandDistrictofficialshadgrowntense.DSF21.
AlthoughtheParentsandDistrictofficialshavebuttedheadsnumeroustimesovertheyears,anincidentthatoccurredin
Februaryof2012isofparticularrelevanceforpurposesofthismotion.OnthemorningofFebruary10,2012,Pollackmetwith
PatrickMoore,RSU75'sdirectorofspecialeducation,andKellyAllen,B.P.'scasemanager.DSF711,40.Duringthemeeting:

PollackwasinformedthatQuirionhadbeen"spying"onacommunityfieldtriptoapubliclibrary.Pollackcalled
Quirionimmediatelywhoinsistedthatshehadsimplygottencaughtbehindtheschoolbusonherwaytothe
grocerystore.Laterthatmorning,QuirionemailedMooreandAllenascannedcopyofhertimestampedgrocery
receipttorefutetheaccusation.

DSF40.Moorelaterapologizedforthemisunderstanding.DSF41.
WhenQuirionpickedupB.P.attheendofschoolthatday,heacteduncharacteristicallyupsetandcriedforapproximatelyan
hourandahalf.DSF42.PollackandQuirionsoughtanexplanationforB.P.'saberrantbehavior,buttheschoolwasunableto
provideone.DSF4344,4748.NoneofthestaffmemberswhoworkedwithB.P.thatdayreportednoticinganythingunusual.
DSF47.Quirioncametosuspecttheremightbeaconnectionbetweentheaccusationthatshehadbeen"spying"onthefield
tripandB.P.'scryingspell.[1]DSF49.
InMarchof2012,QuirionfirstwrotealettertoschoolofficialsinformingthemthatsheplannedtosendB.P.toschoolwithan
audiorecordingdevicesoshecould"haveasemblanceofpeacethatheissafe."DSF78.AnRSU75attorneysentQuiriona
letterthefollowingdayinformingherthattheDistrictwouldnotallowB.P.toattendschoolwitharecordingdevice.DSF81.The
letterstatedthatpermittingB.P.torecordatschoolwouldviolatetheDistrict'spersonalelectronicspolicies,astatewiretap
statute,otherstudents'personalprivacyrights,andtheschool'scollectivebargainingagreementwithitsteachers.[2]DSF81.
OnJune12,2012,QuirionwrotealettertoBillZima,Mt.AraratMiddleSchool'sprincipal,againrequestingthatB.P.beallowedto
weararecordingdevicetoschool"asanaccommodationundertheADA."DSF83.QuirionspecificallyaskedthattheDistrict
"provideareasonableaccommodationfor[B.P.]'scommunicationdisabilitybyallowinghimtocarryanduseavoicerecording
devicesothat[she]canreviewitdailyforannouncementsandotherinformationthatthestudentsareexpectedtoconveytotheir
parents,aswellasfor[B.P.]tobeableto`tell'[her]abouthisdayatschool."DSF344."OnJuly13,2012,PatrickMoore
acknowledgedQuirion'sJune12,2012,letter,`assuringherthathewouldreviewherADArequestandscheduleatimetomeet.'"
DSF84.Quirionwrotebackthenextdaytosayshewouldbewillingtoattendsuchameetingbutwantedtoknowtheagenda
aheadoftime.DSF84."Ifthepointofameetingistoaskmetowithdrawmyrequest,Iwillnotwithdrawit,"shewrote.DSF84.
OnAugust30,2012,withanewschoolyearabouttostart,QuirionemailedMooreandZimatotellthemthatshewouldinterpret
theirfailuretorespondasanimplicitapprovalofherrequest.DSF85.MoorewrotebackimmediatelytorequestthatQuirionnot
sendB.P.toschoolwitharecordingdevice.DSF86.Moorealsowrote:

IwouldliketheIEPteamtoreviewthisaccommodationrequestandhaveanIEPdeterminationpriortoanyaction
onyourpart.IftheIEPteamdecidesthattheaccommodationisnecessaryandreasonable,requestapproved.If
not,youhavetheopportunityforallyourdueprocesssafeguards.

DSF347.QuiriondeclinedtheofferofanIEPmeeting.SummaryJudgmentRecord("SJR")6415(ECFNo.1997).ToQuirion,
therequestfortherecordingdeviceasanADAaccommodationwasdifferentfromaneducationalaccommodationunderthe
IDEA.DSF348.Sheexplainedthat"[w]hether[B.P.]isentitledtousethedeviceasanaccommodationforhisdisabilitythat
preventshimfromtellinguswhathappenedinschoolisaseparatequestionfromwhetherthedeviceisnecessarytofurtherhis
education."DSF348.
OnSeptember1,2012,MooresentQuirionaletterreiteratingtheDistrict'searlierobjections,asoutlinedintheMarch6,2012
letterfromDistrictcounsel.DSF87.Moore'sletterconcludedbystatingthattheDistrict"didnotgivepermissionforB.P.toattend
schoolwitharecordingdevice....IfB.P.comestoschoolwithsuchadevicewewillaskyoutoremovethedevice,andifyouare
notwillingtoremovethedevice,youwillneedtotakeB.P.home."SJR6418(ECFNo.1997)DSF351.
Twoyearslater,inSeptemberof2014,Pollackmade"anotherADArequesttoequipB.P.witharecordingdeviceorbodycamera
tobeabletotellPlaintiffswhathappenstohiminschool."DSF91.TheDistrictrespondedby"requestingadditionalinformation,
andremindingPlaintiffsoftheconcernstheDistricthasexpressedabouttheimpactontheeducationalenvironment,andthe
problemstheDistrictfacesinprotectingtherightsandconfidentialityofotherstudentsandemployeesandrequestedproposals
foraddressingthoseconcerns."DSF92.
InNovemberof2014,PollackprovidedSuperintendentSmithwithinformationregardingthebodycameraandrecordingdevice
anddisputedtheDistrict's"viewsconcerningtheimpactontheeducationalenvironment,andconfidentialityofstaffandother
students."DSF93.SmithrespondedinJanuaryof2015,writingthat"hedisagreedwithPollack'sassertionthatthepresenceof
audioandvideorecordingdevicesonB.P.wouldhavenoimpactontheeducationalenvironment,oftheconcernsaboutthe
impactthatsuchdeviceshavehadandwillhaveontheeducatorsintheschool,andindicatedhiswillingnesstomeetwith
Pollackinearly2015todiscussPollack'srequest."DSF94.SmithdidnotreceivearesponsefromtheParentsregardinghis
invitationtomeet.DSF95.
IndenyingtheParents'requestsforB.P.toweararecordingdevice,theDistricthasconsistentlyrelieduponitswrittenpolicy
coveringemployeeandstudentuseofcellulartelephonesandotherprivatelyownedelectronicdevices.SJR6151(ECFNo.
1996)DSF332.Thepolicyprovides:

4.Allstudentsareprohibitedfromusingprivatelyownedelectronicdevices,includingbutnotlimitedtocellular
telephones,Blackberries,IPhones,handheldcomputers,MP3playersandelectronicgamesduringclasses,study
halls,assembliesandotherschoolactivities.

a.Duringclassesandschoolactivities,allsuchdevicesmustbeturnedoff.

b.Theonlyexceptiontothisruleiswhenateacherorstaffmemberspecificallyauthorizesstudentstousea
personalelectronicdeviceforaspecificschoolpurpose(suchasenteringanassignmentinaPDA).

c.Ifthisruleisviolated,theteachermayreferthestudenttoadministration,orimmediatelyconfiscatethedevice
fortheremainderoftheschoolday,orboth.Disciplinemaybeimposedasprovidedbelow.

SJR6151(ECFNo.1996).TheDistricthasdisciplinedstudentsforunauthorizeduseofelectronicdevices.DSF104.[3]The
DistricthasnotpermittedB.P.tousearecordingdevicebecauseitdeterminedtherecordingwasnotforaninstructionalbenefit
and"thepurposeofthepolicyistosupporttheteachingandlearningenvironment."DSF101.[4]TheDistrictalsohad"concerns
abouttheeducationalefficacyandnecessity"oftherecordingdeviceanditsimpactonstaffandotherstudents.DSF102.[5]
Students,however,havebeenpermittedtomakerecordingsforeducationalpurposes,suchasrecordingspecificlessonswith
thepermissionoftheirteacherssothattheycanrefertotheaudioafterclass.DSF103,339.Atleastonestudent'sIEP
permittedandencouragedtheuseofarecordingdeviceinclassesduringschoolasanaccommodation.DSF341.B.P.,too,
waspermittedtousetwoelectronicdevicesatschool.DSF338.Formanyyears,B.P.usedanelectronicexpressive
communicationdevice("Vantage").DSF333.TheVantageisusedtoassistB.P.todevelopandutilizecommunicationabilities.
DSF335.B.P.usedthedeviceoftenduringhisschoolday,andseveralofhisIEPgoalsreferencedhisuseoftheVantage.DSF
33435.B.P.alsocarriedapersonallyownedAmberAlertGPSdevicemostdaysatschoolduringthe20132014schoolyear.
DSF336.
TheParentswantB.P.toweartherecordingdevicesothattheycanlearnabouthisday,thusfacilitatingtheirabilitytoadvocate
onhisbehalf,andto"discoverandidentifyanymistreatmentorabusebyschoolpersonnelorotherstudents."DSF35557.
Parentsdonotintendtolistentoalloftherecordingseveryday,butratherplantostoretherecordings.Theystatetheymight
listentothemtotrytodecipherwhathappenedatschoolifandwhentheyneedtoadvocateforB.P.andhiseducationor
randomlytoseewhatB.P.'sdayislike.DSF109.

PROCEDURALHISTORY

ThePlaintiffsfiledtwosuitsinthisCourt,thefirstinMarchof2013andthesecondinMayof2014.Thecaseswereconsolidated
onOctober23,2014.Afterabarrageofearlymotionpractice,thepartiesfiledcrossmotionsforsummaryjudgmentinSeptember
of2015onthePlaintiffs'claimsthattheDistrictviolatedtheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(the"ADA"),Section504ofthe
RehabilitationAct("Section504"or"theRehabilitationAct"),andtheFirstAmendmentbyrefusingtoallowB.P.towearanaudio
recordingdevicethroughouthisschoolday.IgrantedtheDistrict'smotiononJanuary27,2016,holdingthatthePlaintiffsfailedto
exhausttheIndividualswithDisabilitiesEducationAct("IDEA")administrativeprocessasrequiredby20U.S.C.1415(1).ECF
No.217.ThePlaintiffsfiledanoticeofappealinAprilof2016.
OnJanuary5,2016,beforeIruledontheparties'crossmotions,PollackfiledanewdueprocesscomplaintwiththeMaine
DepartmentofEducation.Inthehearingrequest,PollackallegedthattheDistrictfailedtopermitB.P.tocarryarecordingdevice
atschoolandsoughtanorderrequiringtheDistricttoallowB.P.tocarryandusearecordingdeviceforhisentireschoolday.
Def.'sSupp.StatementofFacts34("DSSF")(ECFNo.271).PollackclaimedthattheDistrictwasrequiredundertheIDEA,the
RehabilitationAct,theADA,andtheFirstAmendmenttoprovideareasonableaccommodationofallowingB.P.tousea
recordingdevice.DSSF56.
InMarchof2016,athreedayspecialeducationdueprocesshearingwasheld.DSSF13.Atthehearing,theMaine
DepartmentofEducationHearingOfficer("DPHO")statedthattheissue"withrespecttotherecordingdevicewas`whether
[B.P.'s]IEPshouldincludetheuseofsupplementaryaidstoproperlyprotecthimatschoolandallowhimtoeffectively
communicateandadvocateforhimself.'"DSSF14.[6]Elevenwitnessestestifiedunderoathatthehearing,includingPollack
andQuirion.DSSF18.Pollack"introducedevidence,testified,questionedwitnesses,andmadelegalargumentswithrespectto
therecordingdeviceclaim."DSSF1517.Inhiswrittenclosingargument,Pollackstatedthattherecordingdevicewas
necessarybecauseB.P."mustbeabletogatherandcommunicateto[hisparents]hisowninformationaboutwhathappensto
himatschool"andthat,becauseofB.P.'s"communicationdisabilitiesandhisinabilitytoanswerquestionsabouteventsthat
havehappenedtohim,theonlymechanismthat[B.P.]hastoprotecthimselfandadvocateforhimselfistorecordhisdayat
schoolsothathecan`tell'uswhathappened."DSSF2021.
TheDPHOissuedherdecisiononMay31,2016.DSSF23.SheheldthatB.P.wasreceivingFAPE.Underlyingthisconclusion
wereherfindingsthatB.P.hadbeengoingtoschoolfor12yearsintheDistrict"withoutarecordingdevice,andthroughouthis
entireeducationalcareer,hehasbeenhappy,haslovedschool,andhasmadecontinuousandsignificantprogress."DPHODec.
41(ECFNo.2541).SheobservedthattheDistricthadprovidedtheParentswiththehighestlevelofdetailaboutastudent'sday
thatshehadseenin14yearspresidingoverdueprocessdisputes.DPHODec.41.Notingthattherehadonlybeen"ahandfulof
incidentsofconcerntotheParents"andthattheParentsstatedunderoaththattheyfeltB.P.wassafeatschool,shedetermined
thattherecordingdevicewasnotneededforB.P.'ssafety.DPHODec.41.
Furthermore,theDPHOfoundthattherecordingdevicewasnotneededforB.P.tobenefiteducationally.Tothecontrary,she
notedthat"[t]hereisawealthofevidencefrombotheducatorsandtheparentofanotherchildwithautism...thattherecording
deviceactuallywouldbedisruptiveanddetrimentaltotheeducationof[B.P.]andwouldinterferewiththelearningprocess."
DPHODec.42.Basedontheevidenceputforthatthehearing,shefoundthatpermittingB.P.toweararecordingdeviceat
schoolwould"interferewithhisabilitytoreceiveFAPE."DPHODec.42.ShenotedthatPollackwas"unabletostatehowor
whethertheParentswouldusetherecordings."DPHODec.42.Thus,shefoundthattherewas"nodemonstrablebenefit"tothe
recordingdevice,and"thereisthepotentialforharm."DPHODec.42.ThePlaintiffsdidnotappealtheDPHO'sdecision.DSSF
26.
InSeptemberof2016,theDistrictnotifiedtheCourtofAppealsfortheFirstCircuitoftheDPHO'sdecision.Accordingly,theFirst
Circuitdismissedtheappealasmoot,vacatedtheportionofmyordergrantingtheDistrictsummaryjudgmentforfailingto
exhaustontheADA,Section504,andFirstAmendmentclaims,andremandedthecasetomefordeterminationoftheseclaims
onthemerits.Pollackv.Reg'lSch.Unit75,660F.App'x1,3(1stCir.2016).

DISCUSSION

I.ADAandSection504oftheRehabilitationAct

ThePlaintiffsclaimthattheDistrict'srefusaltoallowB.P.toweartherecordingdeviceviolatedtheADAandSection504ofthe
RehabilitationAct.TheDistrictcontendsthattheseclaimsarebarredbyresjudicata.

A.OverviewoftheLaw

TitleIIoftheADA,whichappliestopublicschools,providesthat"noqualifiedindividualwithadisabilityshall,byreasonofsuch
disability,beexcludedfromparticipationinorbedeniedthebenefitsoftheservices,programs,oractivitiesofapublicentity,or
besubjectedtodiscriminationbyanysuchentity."42U.S.C.12132.Similarly,504oftheRehabilitationActprovidesthat"[n]o
otherwisequalifiedindividualwithadisability...shall,solelybyreasonofherorhisdisability,beexcludedfromtheparticipation
in,bedeniedthebenefitsof,orbesubjectedtodiscriminationunderanyprogramoractivityreceivingFederalfinancial
assistance."29U.S.C.794.AlthoughtherearedifferencesbetweenTitleIIand504,thetwostatutesareinterpreted
consistently.SeeTheriaultv.Flynn,162F.3d46,48n.3(1stCir.1998).Thus,liketheparties,Ianalyzethestatutesintandem.
ThePlaintiffsassertafailuretomodifytheoryofliability.ToestablishafailuretomodifyclaimunderTitleII,aplaintiffmustshow:

(1)thatheisaqualifiedindividualwithadisability(2)thathewasexcludedfromparticipatingin,ordeniedthe
benefitsofapublicentity'sservices,programs,oractivitiesorwasotherwisediscriminatedagainstand(3)that
suchexclusion,denialofbenefits,ordiscriminationwasbyreasonofhisdisability.

Kimanv.N.H.Dep'tofCorrs.,451F.3d274,283(1stCir.2006)(quotingParkerv.UniversidaddeP.R.,225F.3d1,5(1stCir.
2000))."Anentitydiscriminatesagainstadisabledindividualwhenitfailstomakereasonablemodificationsforthatperson."
Darianv.Univ.ofMass.Boston,980F.Supp.77,84(D.Mass.1997)."TorecovercompensatorydamagesundereitherTitleIIor
Section504,aplaintiffmustdemonstratethatthe[publicentity]intentionallydiscriminatedagainstherandcausedhereconomic
harm."Kelleyv.Mayhew,973F.Supp.2d31,36(D.Me.2013)(citingNievesMrquezv.PuertoRico,353F.3d108,126(1stCir.
2003)).
ThedutiesofapublicentityareoutlinedintheregulationspromulgatedbytheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeunder42U.S.C.
12134(a).Theregulationsprovidethat:

Apublicentity,inprovidinganyaid,benefit,orservice,maynot...[a]ffordaqualifiedindividualwithadisabilityan
opportunitytoparticipateinorbenefitfromtheaid,benefit,orservicethatisnotequaltothataffordedothers...
[or][p]rovideaqualifiedindividualwithadisabilitywithanaid,benefit,orservicethatisnotaseffectiveinaffording
equalopportunitytoobtainthesameresult.

28C.F.R.35.130(b)(1)(ii)(iii).[7]Furthermore,apublicentitymust"makereasonablemodificationsinpolicies,practices,or
procedureswhenthemodificationsarenecessarytoavoiddiscriminationonthebasisofdisability,unlessthepublicentitycan
demonstratethatmakingthemodificationswouldfundamentallyalterthenatureoftheservice,program,oractivity."28C.F.R.
35.130(b)(7)(i).

1.ModificationsNecessaryforMeaningfulAccess

"TheprotectionaffordedbytheADAischaracterizedasaguaranteeof`meaningfulaccess'togovernmentbenefitsand
programs."Theriault,162F.3dat48(quotingAlexanderv.Choate,469U.S.287,301(1985)."Meaningfulaccess"meansan
equalopportunitytogainanequalbenefit,notequalresults.Choate,469U.S.at72122seealsoTheriault,162F.3dat48.
Inafailuretoaccommodatecase,aplaintiffmustshowthattherequestedaccommodation"wasneededtoprovide`meaningful
accesstoapublicservice.'"[8]Nunes,766F.3dat145(quotingHenriettaD.v.Bloomberg,331F.3d261,27376(2dCir.2003)).
"Itnaturallyfollowsthatwhenanindividualalreadyhas`meaningfulaccess'toabenefittowhichheorsheisentitled,no
additionalaccommodation,`reasonable'ornot,needbeprovidedbythegrantee."A.M.exrel.J.M.v.NYCDep'tofEduc.,840F.
Supp.2d660,680(E.D.N.Y.2012),aff'd,513F.App'x95(2dCir.2013)seealsoPGATour,Inc.v.Martin,532U.S.661,682
(2001)(explainingindictainaTitleIII[9]casethatsometimes"anaccommodationmightbereasonablebutnotnecessary").
Thus,"anyrequestedaccommodationmustfirstbedeemednecessarytoensureanindividualwithdisabilitieshas`meaningful
access'tothebenefitinquestion."A.M.exrel.J.M.,840F.Supp.2dat680(citingSe.Cmty.Coll.v.Davis,442U.S.397,410
(1979)).

2.ReasonableAccommodation

Inordertoensuremeaningfulaccess,apublicentitymayneedtomakereasonableaccommodations."Reasonableness
`dependsontheindividualcircumstancesofeachcase,andrequiresafactspecific,individualizedanalysisofthedisabled
individual'scircumstancesandtheaccommodationsthatmightallowhimto[enjoymeaningfulaccesstotheprogram.]"MarkH.v.
Hamamoto,620F.3d1090,1098(9thCir.2010)(quotingVinsonv.Thomas,288F.3d1145,1154(9thCir.2002))(alterationin
original).Anaccommodationisnotreasonableifitimposesanundueburdenonthepublicentityorrequiresittosubstantially
alteritsprogram.28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7)(i).Theplaintiffbearstheinitialburdenofdemonstratingthattherequested
accommodationisreasonable,i.e.feasibleonitsfaceunderthecircumstances.Reedv.LePageBakeries,Inc.,244F.3d254,
259(1stCir.2001)(TitleIemploymentcase).Theburdenthenshiftstothedefendanttoshowthattheaccommodationwould
imposeanunduehardshiporrequireafundamentalalterationofitsprograms.Id.
TheADAisintentionallybroadinscope,butitdoesnotrequirepublicentitiestoprovideeveryrequestedaccommodation.A
plaintiffisentitledonly"toreasonableaccommodations,nottooptimalonesfinelytunedtohispreferences."Nunes,766F.3dat
146."Otherwise,arequestedservicewouldautomaticallybetransformedintoa`necessary'servicemerelybythefactthatitwas
requested."Martinv.HalifaxHealthcareSys.,Inc.,621F.App'x594,602(11thCir.2015).

3.EffectiveCommunicationsRegulation

Theinquiryinto"meaningfulaccess"is"guidedbytherelevantregulationsinterpretingTitleII."K.M.exrel.Brightv.TustinUnified
SchoolDistrict,725F.3d1088,1102(9thCir.2013).Atissueinthiscaseisthesocalledeffectivecommunicationsregulation.28
C.F.R.35.160.[10]Theeffectivecommunicationsregulationhastwocomponents.First,apublicentitymust"takeappropriate
stepstoensurethatcommunicationswithapplicants,participants,membersofthepublic,andcompanionswithdisabilitiesareas
effectiveascommunicationswithothers."28C.F.R.35.160(a)(1).Second,apublicentitymust"furnishappropriateauxiliary
aidsandserviceswherenecessarytoaffordindividualswithdisabilities,includingapplicants,participants,companions,and
membersofthepublic,anequalopportunitytoparticipatein,andenjoythebenefitsof,aservice,program,oractivityofapublic
entity."28C.F.R.35.160(b)(1)."Thetypeofauxiliaryaidorservicenecessarytoensureeffectivecommunicationwillvaryin
accordancewiththemethodofcommunicationusedbytheindividualthenature,length,andcomplexityofthecommunication
involvedandthecontextinwhichthecommunicationistakingplace."28C.F.R.35.160(b)(2).And"[i]ndeterminingwhattype
ofauxiliaryaidandserviceisnecessary,apublicentityshallgiveprimaryconsiderationtotherequestsoftheindividualwith
disabilities."28C.F.R.35.160(b)(2).However,apublicentityneednot"takeanyactionthatitcandemonstratewouldresultina
fundamentalalterationinthenatureofaservice,program,oractivityorinunduefinancialandadministrativeburdens."28C.F.R.
35.164.

B.ApplicationoftheLawtotheFacts

1.ApplicabilityoftheEffectiveCommunicationRegulation

TheDistrictcontendsthatthePlaintiffs'relianceontheeffectivecommunicationsregulationismisplaced.Itarguesthat,"the
regulationrequiresthatapublicentityensurethatthepublicentity'scommunicationswithindividualswithdisabilitiesare
effective."Defs.'Opp'ntoPls.'Mot.forSumm.J.6(ECFNo.166).ThereisnoauthoritysupportingthePlaintiffs'position,the
Districtargues,"thattheregulationrequiresapublicentitytoprovideauxiliaryaidsandservicestofacilitateeffective
communicationsbetweenastudentwithadisabilityandthatstudent'sparents,occurringinprivateandoutsideofschool,after
theschooldayisdone."Defs.'Opp'ntoPls.'Mot.forSumm.J.6.
Onitsface,theregulationestablishesaframeworktoensurethatadisabledindividualcaneffectivelycommunicatewith,receive
informationfrom,andconveyinformationto,apublicentity.Theregulationrequires"[a]publicentity"to"ensurethat
communicationswith...participants...withdisabilitiesareaseffectiveascommunicationswithothers."28C.F.R.35.160(a)
(1).Further,"[a]publicentity"must"furnishappropriateauxiliaryaidsandserviceswherenecessarytoaffordindividualswith
disabilities...anequalopportunitytoparticipatein,andenjoythebenefitsof,aservice,program,oractivityofapublicentity."
35.160(b)(1).
Theregulationalsoappliesto"companions,"butitisreferringtocompanionswithdisabilities.35.160(a)(1).Theregulations
interpretiveguidanceexplainsthatapublicentitywouldhaveadutytoprovideeffectivecommunicationtocompanionswith
disabilitiesinthefollowingsettings:

[S]ituationsincludebacktoschoolnightsorparentteacherconferencesatapublicschool.Ifthefacultywriteson
theboardorotherwisedisplaysinformationinavisualcontextduringabacktoschoolnight,thisinformationmust
becommunicatedeffectivelytoparentsorguardianswhoareblindorhavelowvision....Itmakesnodifference
thatthechildwhoattendstheschooldoesnothaveadisability.

28C.F.R.Pt.35,App.A.Astheseexamplesdemonstrate,theregulationrequiresapublicentitytoprovideappropriateauxiliary
aidsandservicestoensurethatitscommunicationswithcompanionswithdisabilitiesareaseffectiveascommunicationswith
others.
ThePlaintiffsreadtheregulationasrequiringtheDistricttoensurethatB.P.'scommunicationwithhisparentsabouthisschool
dayisaseffectiveasnondisabledstudents.Pls.'Opp'ntoDefs.'Mot.forSumm.J.7("Pls.'Opp'n")(ECFNo.164).Butthisreading
oftheregulationextendsitsreachbeyondtheschoolhousedoorstocommunicationsbetweenparentandchildoutsideofthe
schoolsetting.ThePlaintiffshavenotcited,andIhavenotfound,anyauthoritysupportingsuchanexpansivereadingofthe
regulation.
ThePlaintiffsmarshalseveralargumentsastowhytheregulationappliestothefactsofthiscase,butnonearepersuasive.The
Plaintiffs'primaryargumentreliesonregulatoryguidanceforthepropositionthattheregulation"appliesnotjustto
communicationsoccurringwithintheschool,butalsotoastudent'sschoolrelatedcommunicationswithhisorherparents."Pls.'
Mot.forSumm.J.5(citingU.S.Depts.ofEduc.&Justice,FrequentlyAskedQuestionsonEffectiveCommunicationsforStudents
withHearing,Vision,orSpeechDisabilitiesinPublicelementaryandSecondary,at4(Nov.2014)("FAQ")).BytakingtheFAQout
ofcontext,thePlaintiffshavemischaracterizedtheagencies'guidance.TheFAQexplainsthattheregulation's

requirementsapplytoallofastudent'sschoolrelatedcommunications,notjustthosewithteachersorschool
personnel.Therefore,giventheongoingexchangesstudentsexperiencewithteachers,students,coaches,and
schoolofficials,anystudentwhorequiresasignlanguageinterpreterinordertoreceiveeffectivecommunication
 inanacademicclasswouldlikelyneedinterpreterservicesthroughoutthedayandmayalsoneedthemto
participateinschoolsponsoredextracurricularactivities.

FAQ4.Inthesesettings,theregulationisnotlimitedtocommunicationswithteachersorpersonnel.Readincontext,the
"schoolrelatedcommunications"discussedintheFAQrelatetoaccommodationsneededforcommunicationstakingplace
duringtheschooldayoratschoolsponsoredextracurricularactivities.ThePlaintiffs'readingextends"schoolrelated
communications"wellbeyondtheregulatoryguidance.Inmyview,thePlaintiffsstretchtoofarintryingtobringthiscasewithin
theeffectivecommunicationregulation.

2.ResJudicata

ThePlaintiffsmaintainthattheDistrictviolatedtheADAbecauseitsrefusaltoallowB.P.toweararecordingdevice"hasdeprived
B.P.oftheopportunitytocommunicatewithhisparentsabouthappeningsatschoolaseffectivelyashispeerswithoutdisabilities
throughitsfailureeithertomodifyitspolicyprohibitingtheuseof`privatelyowned'electronicdevicesortoprovideanauxiliary
aidintheformofapersonalvoicerecorder."Pls.'Opp'n12.Theycontendthat:

ThisdeprivationpreventsB.P.'sparentsfrombeingascapableasparentsofnondisabledstudentstoadvocateon
hisbehalf,therebydeprivinghimofanequallyeffectiveopportunitytoparticipateintheDistrict'sbenefitsor
services,toobtainthesameresultfromthoseservices,togainthesamebenefitsfromthoseservices,ortoenjoya
"privilege,advantage,oropportunity"theabilitytocommunicatewithparentsanyproblemsorconcerns
experiencedatschoolandthereforetohavehisparentsadvocateforhim"enjoyedbyothersreceivingthe...
benefitorservice."

Pls.'Opp'n12.Accordingly,thePlaintiffs'argumentisthattherecordingdeviceisneededtoprovideB.P.withequallyeffective
parentaladvocacysothathecanenjoythesamequalityofpublicschoolservicesashisnondisabledpeers.
TheDistrictarguesthatthisclaimisforeclosedbytheDPHO'sdecisionunderprinciplesofresjudicata."[T]heSupremeCourt
hasinstructedthat`federalcourtsmustgivethe[state]agency'sfactfindingthesamepreclusiveeffecttowhichitwouldbeentitled
intheState'scourts.'"BathIronWorksCorp.v.Dir.,OfficeofWorkers'Comp.Programs,125F.3d18,21(1stCir.1997)(quoting
Univ.ofTenn.v.Elliott,478U.S.788,799(1986)).ThepriordecisionatissuewasrenderedbyaMaineadministrativeagency,so
Mainelawgovernsthepreclusionanalysis.InMaine,"decisionsofstateandmunicipaladministrativeagenciesare...accorded
thesamefinalitythatattachestojudicialjudgments."HebronAcad.,Inc.v.TownofHebron,60A.3d774,783(Me.2013)see
alsoTownofBoothbayv.Jenness,822A.2d1169,1175(Me.2003)."Thedoctrineofresjudicataliterally,`thingadjudged'is
acourtmadecollectionofrulesdesignedtoensurethatthesamematterwillnotbelitigatedmorethanonce."Beeganv.Schmidt,
451A.2d642,64344(Me.1982).Thedoctrineiscomprisedoftwocomponents:issuepreclusionandclaimpreclusion.[11]
Macomberv.MacQuinnTweedie,834A.2d131,138(Me.2003).Issuepreclusionisthecomponentatissueinthiscase.
Sometimesreferredtoascollateralestoppel,issuepreclusionisbasedon"thefundamentalprinciplethatcourtsshouldnot
revisitfactualmattersthatapartypreviouslylitigatedandanothercourtactuallydecided."Millerv.Nichols,586F.3d53,60(1st
Cir.2009).Issuepreclusion"applieswhen(1)theidenticalfactualissuewasdecidedbyapriorfinaljudgment,and(2)theparty
tobeestoppedhadanopportunityandanincentivetolitigatetheissueatthepriorproceeding."Statev.Hughes,863A.2d266,
268(Me.2004)."Thedoctrineprecludescourtsfromrevisitingfactualmattersthatmeetthistest,evenwhenasecondaction
seeksadifferentremedythantheinitiallitigation."Miller,586F.3dat60.Thepartyassertingissuepreclusion"hastheburdenof
demonstratingthatthespecificissuewasactuallydecidedintheearlierproceeding."Macomber,834A.2dat140.
TheDPHOheldthattheDistrict'sactionsinnotpermittingB.P.toweararecordingdevicewhileatschooldidnotdeprivehimofa
FAPE.DPHODec.42,46.ThefactualfindingsunderlyingthisholdingwerethattherecordingdevicewouldinterferewithB.P.'s
abilitytoreceiveaFAPE,wasnotneededforhissafety,andwasnotnecessaryforhimtobenefiteducationally.DPHODec.41
42.AndalthoughtheDPHOacknowledgedPollack'sargumentthattherecordingdevicewasneededsothatB.P.couldgather
andcommunicateinformationtohisParentsaboutwhathappensatschoolsotheycan"fullyadvocate"forhim,shefoundthat
thedeviceprovidednodemonstrablebenefittoB.P.,andconcludedthatthedevicewouldbedisruptiveanddetrimentaltohis
education.DPHODec.42.
TheDPHO'sdecisionispreclusiveherebecausethefactualissuesinthiscaseareidenticaltotheissuesdecidedbytheDPHO.
ThethrustofthePlaintiffs'claimatboththedueprocesshearingandhereisthattheDistrictwasrequiredtoallowB.P.tousea
recordingdevicesothathecouldmeaningfullyaccessandbenefitfromtheDistrict'sprogramsandservices.Bothbeforethe
DPHOandhere,thePlaintiffs'theoryhasbeenthatB.P.needsthedevicetocommunicatehisdaytohisParentssothattheycan
effectivelyadvocatetotheDistrictonhisbehalf.ComparePollack'sclosingargumentatthedueprocesshearing,DSSF21
("Givenhiscommunicationdisabilities,andhisinabilitytoanswerquestionsabouteventsthathavehappenedtohim,theonly
mechanismthat[B.P.]hastoprotecthimselfandadvocateforhimselfistorecordhisdayatschoolsothathecan`tell'uswhat
happened."),withPls.'Opp'n1011("B.P.cannottellhisparentsanythingaboutwhathappensduringhisdayatschool.Forhim
tohavethebenefitofparentaladvocacyforhiseducationequaltothatofstudentswithoutsuchacommunicationdisability...
[theParents]mustnotbeforcedtorelyoninformationprovidedbytheDistrict.").
ThePlaintiffsmustestablishthattherequestedaccommodationisreasonableandnecessarytogiveB.P.anequalopportunityto
participateinandbenefitfromtheschool'sprograms.GiventheDPHO'sfindingsthattherecordingdevicewouldnegatively
impactB.P.'seducation,IseenowaythatthePlaintiffscanmeettheirburdenofestablishingthatthedeviceisreasonableor
necessaryundertheADAandSection504.[12]
Inarguingtothecontrary,thePlaintiffsmakethreepoints.First,theyarguethatissuepreclusiondoesnotapply"becausethe
burdenhasshiftedfromthePlaintiffsintheadministrativehearingtotheDistrictinthisaction."Pls.'Resp.toDef.'sSupp.Mot.for
Summ.J.3("Pls.'Supp.Opp'n")(ECFNo.266).ThePlaintiffscorrectlypointoutthatissuepreclusionmaynotapplywherethere
hasbeenashiftintheburdenofproof.SeeCrawfordv.AlliedContainerCorp.,561A.2d1027,1028(Me.1989).Theburdenof
proof,however,hasnotshiftedonthisissue.AlthoughtheDistrictwouldhavetheburdenofprovingthattherequested
accommodationwouldresultinanundueburdenorafundamentalalteration,see28C.F.R.35.164,itisthePlaintiffs'burdento
showthattheaccommodationisnecessaryandreasonable.28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7)(i)seealsoNunes,766F.3dat145Dudley
v.HannafordBros.Co.,333F.3d299,307(1stCir.2003)(TitleIII).
Second,thePlaintiffsnotethatunderMainelaw,"issuepreclusionappliesonlyto`suchfactswithoutproofofwhichtheprior
decisioncouldnothavebeenrendered.'"Pls.'Supp.Opp'n7(quotingSewallv.Taylor,672F.Supp.542,544(D.Me.1987).
Giventhis,thePlaintiffscontendthatthefactsrelieduponbytheDistrictwere"unnecessarytothehearingofficer'sultimate
conclusionregardingFAPE"andarethereforenotpreclusive.Pls.'Supp.Opp'n8.Forinstance,thePlaintiffscontendthatthe
findingthatthedevicewouldbe"disruptiveordetrimentalarelogicallybeyondthehearingofficer'sdeterminationofwhetherB.P.
wasreceivingFAPEwithouttherecordingdevice."Pls.'Supp.Opp'n8.Idisagree.Giventheargumentsadvancedbythe
PlaintiffsatthedueprocesshearingastowhytherecordingdevicewasnecessaryforFAPE,theDPHO'sfactualfindingthatthe
devicewouldactuallyinterferewithB.P.'sabilitytoreceiveFAPEwasessentialtoherconclusion.[13]
Third,althoughthePlaintiffsacknowledgethat"ordinaryprinciplesofissueandclaimprecision"canapply"incasesraisingboth
IDEAandTitleIIclaimswheretheIDEAadministrativeappealsprocesshasfunctionallyadjudicatedsomeorallquestions
relevanttoaTitleIIclaiminawaythatprecludeslitigation,"theyarguethattheDPHO"couldnotandhasnotconsideredanyof
Plaintiffs'ADA/504arguments."Pls.'Supp.Opp'n5n.5(citingTustin,725F.3dat1101).Thisargumentmisconstruesthenatureof
issuepreclusionandignoreswhathappenedatthedueprocesshearing.UnderMainelaw,issuepreclusiondoesnotdepend
onthelegalclaimsassertedintheprioractionit"concernsfactualissues,andappliesevenwhenthetwoproceedingsoffer
differenttypesofremedies."PortlandWaterDist.v.TownofStandish,940A.2d1097,1100(Me.2008)seealsoMiller,586F.3d
at60.Thus,althoughtheDPHOdidnothavejurisdictiontoactonthePlaintiffs'disabilitydiscriminationclaims,thefacts
establishedinthepriorproceedingcanstillbepreclusivehere.See,e.g.,Siegemundv.Shapland,247F.Supp.2d1,5(D.Me.
2003)(explainingthatissuepreclusionmaystillbeavailableastofactsestablishedinthepriorproceedingeventhoughtheprior
courtdidnothavejurisdictiontoheartheclaimsatissue).
ThesecondprongofissuepreclusionaskswhetherthePlaintiffshadafairopportunityandincentivetolitigatetheissueinthe
priorproceeding."Apartyhasafairopportunitytolitigateanissueifthatpartyeithercontrolsthelitigation,substantially
participatesinthatlitigation,orcouldhaveparticipatedinthelitigationhadtheychosentodoso."Hughes,863A.2dat269.
GiventheextentoftheParents'involvementatthedueprocesshearing,thisprongisalsosatisfied.Cf.Miller,586F.3dat63("Itis
clearthatsinceplaintiffsactuallylitigatedtheissuesinstatecourt,theyhadbothincentiveandopportunitytopresentthe
claims.").
BecausetheDPHO'sfindingsprecludethePlaintiffsfromestablishingessentialelementsoftheirclaim,theDistrictisentitledto
summaryjudgmentonthePlaintiffs'claimsunderTitleIIoftheADAandSection504oftheRehabilitationAct.[14]

II.TheFirstAmendment

ThePlaintiffscontendthatB.P.hasaFirstAmendmentrighttorecordinschoolsothathecanprovidehisparentswiththe
informationnecessarytoallowthemtoadvocateonhisbehalf.TheDefendantsrespondthatthereisnoconstitutionallyprotected
righttorecordallday,everydayatschool.

A.TheGeneralFirstAmendmentFramework
ClaimsundertheFirstAmendmentareanalyzedinthreesteps.SeeCorneliusv.NAACPLegalDef.&Educ.Fund,473U.S.788,
797(1985).TheplaintiffmustfirstdemonstratethattheactivityatissueisprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.Clarkv.Cmty.for
CreativeNonViolence,468U.S.288,293n.5(1984).Second,iftheactivityatissueisprotected,thecontextoftheactivityis
analyzedinordertodeterminewhichFirstAmendmentstandardorstandardsapply.Cornelius,473U.S.at797.Andthird,the
Government'sjustificationforrestrictingtheactivityisexaminedtoensurethatitmeetstheapplicablestandard.Id.

B.ApplicationoftheGeneralFrameworktotheFactsoftheCase

1.StepOneIstheActivityProtected?

TheprotectionsaffordedbytheFirstAmendmentarenotlimitedtowrittenorspokenwords.Hurleyv.IrishAm.Gay,Lesbian&
BisexualGrp.ofBoston,515U.S.557,569(1995).TheFirstAmendmentalso"prohibit[s]governmentfromlimitingthestockof
informationfromwhichmembersofthepublicmaydraw."FirstNat'lBankofBostonv.Bellotti,435U.S.765,783(1978).Toguard
the"stockofinformation"fromwhichthepublicmaydraw,theFirstAmendmentalso"encompassesarangeofconductrelatedto
thegatheringanddisseminationofinformation."Glikv.Cunniffe,655F.3d78,82(1stCir.2011).
GatheringinformationthroughaudiorecordingisgenerallyprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.SeeAm.CivilLibertiesUnionofIll.
v.Alvarez,679F.3d583,595(7thCir.2012)seealsoMartinv.Evans,No.1611362PBS,2017WL1015000,at*7(D.Mass.
Mar.13,2017).And"[g]atheringinformationaboutgovernmentofficialsinaformthatcanreadilybedisseminatedtoothers
servesacardinalFirstAmendmentinterestinprotectingandpromoting`thefreediscussionofgovernmentalaffairs.'"Glik,655
F.3dat82(quotingMillsv.Alabama,384U.S.214,218(1966)).
InGlik,theFirstCircuitfoundthattheFirstAmendmentencompassesarighttomakeaudiovisualrecordingsofgovernment
officialsworkinginpublicplaces,subjecttoreasonabletime,place,andmannerrestrictionsnormallyallowedinpublicforums.
655F.3dat84.Thecourtheldthattheplaintiff,amemberofthepublicbutnotthepress,hadarighttofilmanarrestintheBoston
Commonwhichhethoughtwasexcessivelyforceful.Id.
ThePlaintiffsarguethattherightofB.P.toaudiorecordhisentireschoolday"isprotectedFirstAmendmentactivitybecauseitis
informationgatheringwithapotentialexpressiveuse."Pls.'Reply2(ECFNo.268).The"potentialexpressiveuse"isthe
subsequentdisseminationofinformationobtainedfromtherecordingbytheParentsasB.P.'snextfriend.ThePlaintiffscontend
thattheprimarypurposeoftherecordingistoidentifyandexposewrongdoinginB.P.'sclassroom.Pls.'Opp'n26.
TheDistrictmakesanargumentthattheParentshavenoFirstAmendmentprotectionbecausetheyhavenorightofaccesstothe
classroom.[15]AsforB.P.,theDistrictacknowledgesthathehasarighttobeintheclassroom,butitargueswithoutanalysisthat
B.P.'srightofaccessdoesnotincludearighttorecord.TheDistrictalsoclaimsthatbecausetheParents"havenoplansregularly
tolistento,letalonedisseminate,"therecordings,therecordingactivityispurelypersonalandenjoysnoFirstAmendment
protection.Defs.'Mot.forSumm.J.24.[16]
ContrarytotheDistrict'sargument,therearefactsintherecordwhichsupportthePlaintiffs'claimthattheyintendtoreviewand
disseminatetherecordingsiftheyfindthatB.P.isactingdifferentlyorhasanybruising,ashasoccurredontwopastoccasions.If
theyfoundthattherecordingssupportedtheirsuspicionsofmisconduct,theywoulddisseminatetherecordingsfurtherto
advocateagainsttheDistrict.SeeSJR530204(ECFNo.1991).
AtthemotiontodismissstageIsaidthat:

GlikseemstoanswertheDefendants'argumentthatthePlaintiffs'claimdoesnotimplicatetheFirstAmendmentat
all.WhileGlikmaybedistinguishablebecauseittookplaceinatraditionallypublicforumandonlyinvolvedthe
videotapingofasingleactofofficialabuse,thesedifferencesgotowhichFirstAmendmentstandardapplies,not
whethertheFirstAmendmentappliesatall.Ataminimum,Glikstandsfortheprinciplethatproducingarecording
withaplantoshareitwithotherscanbeacommunicativeactandcarriesatleastsomeFirstAmendment
protection.

Pollackv.RegionalSchoolUnit75,12F.Supp.3d173,199(D.Me.2014).TheDistricthasnotpointedtoanyconvincing
authoritycallingthisconclusionintoquestion.[17]Ibelieveitmakessensetotreattherighttorecordasanactivityprotectedby
theFirstAmendmentatthefirststepoftheanalysis.BecauseIconcludethatthePlaintiffshaveestablishedthattherequested
activitycanbeconductprotectedbytheFirstAmendment,Iproceedtothesecondstepoftheanalysis.

2.StepTwoWhatistheAppropriateStandard?
Atthesecondstep,Imustanalyzethecontextinwhichtheactivityoccurredinordertodeterminetheappropriatestandardto
apply.Therelevantcontexthereisapublicschool.TheSupremeCourthasinstructedthatalthoughstudentsdonot"shedtheir
constitutionalrights...attheschoolhousegate,"Tinkerv.DesMoinesIndependentCommunitySchoolDistrict,393U.S.503,
506(1969),theFirstAmendmentmustbe"appliedinlightofthespecialcharacteristicsoftheschoolenvironment,"andthus
students'FirstAmendmentrights"arenotautomaticallycoextensivewiththerightsofadultsinothersettings."Morsev.Frederick,
551U.S.393,39697(2007).Reconcilingtheseprinciplesisnoeasytask.
ThepartiesarguefortheapplicationofdiverseFirstAmendmentstandards.ThePlaintiffs,citingGlik,contendthattheDistrictcan
restrictB.P.'srighttorecordinschoolonlyiftheDistrict'spolicyisareasonabletime,place,andmannerrestriction.Becausethey
believethattheDistrict'spolicyiscontentbasedandthatitisbeingappliedagainstthePlaintiffsbasedontheirviewpoint,the
Plaintiffscontendthatthepolicymust(butdoesnot)withstandstrictscrutiny.Alternatively,thePlaintiffsarguethatTinkersetsthe
standard.See393U.S.503.TinkerwasastudentspeechcasethatstandsforthepropositionthatschoolsmusthonortheFirst
Amendmentrightsofstudentsunlesstherewouldbesubstantialdisruptionormaterialinterferencewithschoolactivities.
PlaintiffscontendthattheDistricthasnotshownthattherecordingdevicewouldsubstantiallydisruptormateriallyinterferewith
schoolactivitiesunderTinker.Pls.'Mot.forPartialSumm.J.18.
Foritspart,theDistrictcontendsthatGlikisnotapplicablebecauseitislimitedtopublicforums.TheDistrictalsorejectsTinker,
characterizingitasan"expression"case,andarguesthatthiscaseisabout"rightofaccess"principles.TheDistrictreliesheavily
on"rightofaccess"casesassettingtheapplicablestandard.ItplacessignificantemphasisonS.H.A.R.K.v.MetroParksServing
SummitCounty,499F.3d553(6thCir.2007),whichappliedaformofrationalbasisreview.[18]TheDistrictadditionallyargues
thatitsregulationisneithercontentnorviewpointbasedandshouldbeupheldbecauseitisreasonableinlightofthepurposes
servedbytheforum.Finally,theDistrictarguesthatevenifTinkerdoesapply,itstillshouldprevailbecausetherecordingdevice
wouldsubstantiallydisruptschoolactivitiesandwouldimpingeonotherstudents'privacyrights.Def.'sOpp'ntoPls.'Suppl.Br.7
9(ECFNo.263).

a.ForumAnalysisandGlik

TheSupremeCourt'sdecisions"reflect,eitherimplicitlyorexplicitly,a`forumbased'approachforassessingrestrictionsthatthe
governmentseekstoplaceontheuseofitsproperty."Int'lSoc.forKrishnaConsciousness,Inc.v.Lee,505U.S.672,678(1992)
seealsoBernerv.Delahanty,129F.3d20,25n.4(1stCir.1997)("Generallyspeaking,thenatureoftheforuminwhichthe
speechisrestricteddictatesthelevelofscrutinyrequired.")."NothingintheConstitutionrequirestheGovernmentfreelytogrant
accesstoallwhowishtoexercisetheirrighttofreespeechoneverytypeofGovernmentpropertywithoutregardtothenatureof
thepropertyortothedisruptionthatmightbecausedbythespeaker'sactivities."Cornelius,473U.S.at799800.Instead,"[t]he
adequacyofthegovernment'sjustification"forcurtailingspeech"ismeasuredonaslidingscale."Berner,129F.3dat25n.4.
TheSupremeCourthasrecognizeddifferenttypesofforums."Atoneendofthespectrumarestreetsandparkswhichhave
immemoriallybeenheldintrustfortheuseofthepublic,and,timeoutofmind,havebeenusedforpurposesofassembly,
communicatingthoughtsbetweencitizens,anddiscussingpublicquestions."PerryEduc.Ass'nv.PerryLocalEducators'Ass'n,
460U.S.37,45(1983)(internalquotationsomitted).Inpublicforums,contentbasedrestrictions[19]mustsatisfystrictscrutiny,
andviewpointbasedrestrictions[20]areprohibited.WatchtowerBible&TractSoc'yofN.Y.,Inc.v.SagardiaDeJesus,634F.3d3,
11(1stCir.2011).Additionally,thestateisallowedto"enforceregulationsofthetime,place,andmannerofexpressionwhichare
contentneutral,arenarrowlytailoredtoserveasignificantgovernmentinterest,andleaveopenamplealternativechannelsof
communication."PerryEduc.Ass'n,460U.S.at45.
Attheotherendofthespectrumis"[p]ublicpropertywhichisnotbytraditionordesignationaforumforpubliccommunication."Id.
at46.Inthesenonpublicforums,thestatehasfargreaterleewaytolimitexpressiveactivity."Inadditiontotime,place,and
mannerregulations,thestatemayreservetheforumforitsintendedpurposes,communicativeorotherwise,aslongasthe
regulationonspeechisreasonableandnotanefforttosuppressexpressionmerelybecausepublicofficialsopposethe
speaker'sview."Id.Arestrictiononspeechinanonpublicforumcanbecontentbasedbutmuststillbeviewpointneutral.Seeid.
at49seealsoHotelEmployees&Rest.EmployeesUnion,Local100ofN.Y.,N.Y.&Vicinity,AFLCIOv.CityofN.Y.Dep'tof
Parks&Recreation,311F.3d534,553(2dCir.2002).
ThequestionpresentedinGlikwas"fairlynarrow:isthereaconstitutionallyprotectedrighttovideotapepolicecarryingouttheir
dutiesinpublic?"655F.3dat82.Thepublicnatureofthevenue"theoldestcityparkintheUnitedStatesandtheapotheosisof
apublicforum"wasreiteratedthroughouttheopinion.Id.at84."Insuchtraditionalpublicspaces,therightsofthestatetolimit
theexerciseofFirstAmendmentactivityare`sharplycircumscribed.'"Glik,655F.3dat84(quotingPerryEduc.Ass'n,460U.S.at
45(emphasisadded)).Glikdidnotapplyaspecialconstitutionalstandardbecausetheactivityatissuewasrecordingratherthan
speech.Instead,Glikusedtraditionalprinciplesofforumanalysis,andtheoutcomewasdependentonthenatureoftheforum.
[21]

TheDistricturgesmetorejectGlikandapplyrationalbasisreviewonthegroundthattheschoolisanonpublicforum.Public
schoolsarenotconsideredpublicforums,andthey"maybedeemedtobepublicforumsonlyifschoolauthoritieshave`bypolicy
orbypractice'openedthosefacilities`forindiscriminateusebythegeneralpublic,'orbysomesegmentofthepublic,suchas
studentorganizations."HazelwoodSch.Dist.v.Kuhlmeier,484U.S.260,267(1988)(quotingPerry,460U.S.at46,47n.7
(1983))."Ifthefacilitieshaveinsteadbeenreservedforotherintendedpurposes,`communicativeorotherwise,'thennopublic
forumhasbeencreated,andschoolofficialsmayimposereasonablerestrictionsonthespeechofstudents,teachers,andother
membersoftheschoolcommunity."Id.(quotingPerry,460U.S.at46n.7).Here,thereisnothingintherecordindicatingthat
B.P.'sschoolhasbeenopenedforusebythepublic,sotheschoolconstitutesanonpublicforum.SeeWardv.Hickey,996F.2d
448,453(1stCir.1993)(holdinginaFirstAmendmentemploymentretaliationcasethat"theclassroomisnotapublicforum,and
thereforeissubjecttoreasonablespeechregulation").
Atbottom,theDistricturgesmetoupholdtheschool'selectronicpolicybecauseitisrationallyrelatedtoalegitimategoalof
preservingtheeducationalenvironmentandprotectingtheprivacyconcernsofothersintheschool.Butthisargumentglosses
overthefactthattheSupremeCourthasdevelopedalineofschoolspecificcasesthatmustalsobeconsidered.

b.TinkerandOtherSchoolSpecificCases

TheSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyrecognizedthatstudents'FirstAmendmentrightsdonotparalleltherightsofadultsinother
settingsbecauseofthespecialcharacteristicsoftheschoolenvironment.SeeMorse,551U.S.at39697.InTinker,publicschool
officialsenactedapolicyprohibitingthewearingofanarmbandtoschoolafterlearningthatstudentsplannedtowearthe
armbandsasaprotestagainsttheVietnamWar.393U.S.at504.Thestudentsweresenthomeandsuspendedforviolatingthe
policy.Id.Inholdingthatthepolicyviolatedthestudents'FirstAmendmentrights,theSupremeCourtobserved:

FirstAmendmentrights,appliedinlightofthespecialcharacteristicsoftheschoolenvironment,areavailableto
teachersandstudents.Itcanhardlybearguedthateitherstudentsorteachersshedtheirconstitutionalrightsto
freedomofspeechorexpressionattheschoolhousegate.

....

Ontheotherhand,theCourthasrepeatedlyemphasizedtheneedforaffirmingthecomprehensiveauthorityofthe
Statesandofschoolofficials,consistentwithfundamentalconstitutionalsafeguards,toprescribeandcontrol
conductintheschools.OurproblemliesintheareawherestudentsintheexerciseofFirstAmendmentrights
collidewiththerulesoftheschoolauthorities.

Id.at50607(citationomitted).TheCourtcharacterizedtheschool'sactionasaregulationof"purespeech,"asdistinguished
fromregulationsthatrestrictedstudentconduct.See393U.S.at50708("Theproblemposedbythepresentcasedoesnotrelate
toregulationofthelengthofskirtsorthetypeofclothing,tohairstyle,ordeportment.").Andinanalyzingtherestriction,theCourt
founditparticularlyimportantthattheschool'spolicy"didnotpurporttoprohibitthewearingofallsymbolsofpoliticalor
controversialsignificance,"butrathersingledoutaparticularsymbol.Id.at738.
TheCourtfoundthatthewearingofthearmbands"wasentirelydivorcedfromactuallyorpotentiallydisruptiveconduct,"id.at
505,andheldthattheschoolcouldnotbanthearmbandsbecausetherewas"noevidencewhateverof[plaintiffs']interference,
actualornascent,withtheschools'workorofcollisionwiththerightsofotherstudentstobesecureandtobeletalone."Id.at
508.An"undifferentiatedfearorapprehensionofdisturbanceisnotenoughtoovercometherighttofreedomofexpression."Id.
Thus,inTinker,theschoolcouldnotdenythestudents'formofexpressionunlesstherewere"factswhichmightreasonablyhave
ledschoolauthoritiestoforecastsubstantialdisruptionoformaterialinterferencewithschoolactivities"orwhere"disturbancesor
disordersontheschoolpremisesinfactoccurred."Id.at514.Wheresuchfactsexist,Tinkernotablybreakswithforumanalysis
andallowsschoolstoregulatespeechbasedonviewpoint.See,e.g.,Morganv.Swanson,659F.3d359,379(5thCir.2011)(en
banc)B.W.A.v.FarmingtonR7Sch.Dist.,554F.3d734,740(8thCir.2009)Harperv.PowayUnifiedSch.Dist.,445F.3d1166,
118485(9thCir.2006)cert.granted,judgmentvacatedasmootsubnom.Harperexrel.Harperv.PowayUnifiedSch.Dist.,549
U.S.1262(2007).
TheDistrictcontendsthatTinkerdoesnotapplybecausetheprivatelyownedelectronicdevicepolicyiscontentneutral,and
Tinkerislimitedtocasesinvolvingcontentandviewpointbasedrestrictionsonspeech.Def.'sOpp'ntoPls.'Suppl.Br.4(ECFNo.
263)(citingcases).ThePlaintiffscounterbypointingoutthatthepolicyallows"recordingwithan`educationalpurpose,'but
prohibitsrecordingforanyotherpurpose,"andisthuscontentbased.Pls.'Reply3(ECFNo.268)(relyingonReedv.Townof
Gilbert,135S.Ct.2218,2227(2015)).
EvenifIboughttheDistrict'sargumentthatthepolicyiscontentneutral,thePlaintiffshavealsoallegedthattheDistricthas
applieditspolicytoB.P.inaviewpointbasedmanner.TheycontendthatamajorreasontheDistrictobjectstoB.P.'srecording
andnottorecordingbyotherstudentsisthatthePlaintiffs'purposeistomonitorandscrutinizeschoolofficials.SeeDSF358
seealsoDSSF81(permittingvideorecordingofaparticularlessonsolongastheParentsagreednottoarguethatan
employeeshouldbe"dismissedordisciplinedorsanctioned"butpermittingpraise).Also,thereisevidenceintherecord
suggestingthattheDistricthasnotalwaysapplieditspolicyevenly.Forexample,theDistricthasnotobjectedtoB.P.'suseofa
personallyownedAmberAlertGPSdeviceduringschoolbecausethedevicedoesnotrecordnor"causethesameconcernsthe
DistricthasaboutPlaintiffs'requestedrecording."DSF337.Thereisthusagenuinedisputeofmaterialfactastowhetherthe
DistricthasapplieditspolicytoB.P.inaviewpointbasedmanner.SeeMorganv.PlanoIndep.Sch.Dist.,589F.3d740,745(5th
Cir.2009).
Finally,theDistrictattemptstodistinguishTinkeronthegroundthatitisan"expression"case.Defs.'Mot.forSumm.J.2021.But
thePlaintiffshaveassertedanexpressivepurposetodisseminateinformationobtainedfromtherecordingsintheeventthatthey
uncoverabuseorotherwrongdoing.Pls.'Reply2(ECFNo.268).IfinditrelevantthattheFirstCircuitinGlikdidnotdrawa
distinctionbetweengatheringinformationand"expression"eventhoughtheactivitythererecordinginanticipationof
disseminationwasnotpure"expression."Iviewrecordingactivityasapointonthecontinuumofexpressionitisthepredicate
actthatultimatelyfacilitiesexpression.
TheDistrict'srefusaltoallowB.P.torecordhisdaydoesnotneatlyfitthefactsofTinkernoranyoftheotherschoolcasescitedby
theparties.[22]ButalthoughTinkerisnottheperfectfit,itistheclosestfit.[23]Ittakesintoaccounttheuniquefeaturesofthe
schoolenvironmentanditallowsschoolstorestrictexpressionevenbasedonviewpointwheretheschoolscanforecast
substantialdisruptionoformaterialinterferencewithschoolactivitiesorcollisionwiththerightsofotherstudents.

3.StepThreeAssessingWhethertheDistrict'sJustificationforRestrictingthe
ActivitySatisfiestheTinkerStandard

UnderTinker,schoolofficialscanrestrictspeech"intwobroadsetsofcircumstances:ifthespeech`mightreasonablyleadschool
authoritiestoforecastsubstantialdisruptionoformaterialinterferencewithschoolactivities,'or,alternatively,ifthespeech
`collideswiththerightsofotherstudentstobesecureandtobeletalone.'"C.R.v.EugeneSch.Dist.4J,835F.3d1142,1152(9th
Cir.2016)(quotingWynarv.DouglasCty.Sch.Dist.,728F.3d1062,1070(9thCir.2013))."Foraschool'sforecasttobe
reasonable,courtsgenerallyrequirethatitbebasedona`concretethreat'ofsubstantialdisruption."Taylorv.RoswellIndep.Sch.
Dist.,713F.3d25,37(10thCir.2013).ItistheDistrict'sburdentoshowthattherestrictiononB.P.'sspeechactivityis
constitutionalunderTinker.B.H.exrel.Hawkv.EastonAreaSch.Dist.,725F.3d293,321(3dCir.2013).
Here,theDistricthasnotmetitsburdenbecauseithasnotattemptedtoapplytheTinkerstandardtothefactsofthiscase.
Indeed,theDistrictdoesnotevenraiseTinkerinitsoriginalmotionforsummaryjudgment,choosinginsteadtorelyonits
argumentthatthiscaseisgovernedby"rightofaccess"principles.[24]Giventheabsenceofanydevelopedanalysisontheissue
bytheDistrict,itsmotionforsummaryjudgmentontheFirstAmendmentclaimisdenied.
ThePlaintiffs'motionforsummaryjudgmentdoesnotfareanybetter.Thereisampleevidenceintherecordsuggestingthatthe
DistrictcouldhavereasonablyforecastasubstantialdisruptionifB.P.woretherecordingdevicetoschool.Thereisalsoevidence
suggestingthatDistrictofficialscouldreasonablyexpectthatallowingB.P.toweararecordingdeviceatschoolwoulddeprive
othersstudentsoftheirrighttobesecure.See,e.g.,C.R.,835F.3dat1152.Thus,viewedinthelightmostfavorabletotheDistrict,
ajurycouldreasonablyfindthattheDistrictwasjustifiedinrefusingtoallowB.P.toweararecordingdeviceunderTinker.

CONCLUSION

Forthereasonsstatedabove,theDistrict'smotionsareGRANTEDINPARTandDENIEDINPART,andthePlaintiffs'motionis
DENIED.
SOORDERED.
[1]TheParentshavesuspectedthattheDistrictwithheldimportantinformationfromthemaboutB.P.'streatmentatschoolonotheroccasions.On
April29,2013,QuirionnoticedbruisesonB.P.'sarmsafterschool.DSF129.TheDistricthiredanattorneytoinvestigatethematter,buthedid
notuncoverthesourceofB.P.'sbruising.DSF138.TheParentsalsobelievetheywerenotgivensufficientinformationinB.P.'sdailyreports
aboutwhythemainschooldoorstothemiddleschoolwerelockedaspartofafiredrillthatoccurredinAprilof2013.DSF149.Additionally,on
September4,2013,PollackemailedanumberofDistrictemployeestoaskwhytheshadesweredrawninB.P.'sclassroomthatday.DSF143.
AndonSeptember12,2013,B.P.'ssistertoldtheParentsthatshehadseenB.P.sittingonahallwayfloorwiththreeorfourotherstudentsata
timewhenhisdailyreportindicatedhewasinhisclassroomreceivinginstruction.DSF147.
[2]Theletteralso"suggestedthattheDistrictwouldscheduleanIEPmeetingtodiscussQuirion'sconcernsaboutB.P.'ssafety."DSF81.Bye
mail,PollackdeclinedtheDistrict'sofferofanIEPmeeting.SummaryJudgmentRecord("SJR)634748(ECFNo.1996).
[3]ThePlaintiffs'requesttostrikebasedon"lackofpersonalknowledge"isdenied.Inresponsetobeingasked"haveyoueverheardofanystudent
beingdisciplinedforusingarecordingdevice,"SuperintendentSmithtestified"Ihave."Hethenwentontoexplainthathereceivedatelephonecall
fromaparentofastudentwhohadbeendisciplinedforviolatingthepolicybyusingarecordingdevicetotakeapictureofanassignment.SJR
571214(ECFNo.1991).
[4]ThePlaintiffs'requesttostrikeisdenied.TestimonyfromDistrictofficials,includingfromSuperintendentSmithandSpecialEducational
CoordinatorMoore,thatthepurposeoftheDistrict'spolicyistosupporttheteachingandlearningenvironmentisnotexperttestimony.
[5]ThePlaintiffs'requesttostrikeisdenied.
[6]Inherwrittendecision,theDPHOframedtheissueasfollows:"DidtheDistrict'sactionsinnotpermitting[B.P.]toweararecordingdevicewhile
atschooldeprivetheParentofhisrighttoparticipateintheIDEAdecisionmakingprocesstotheextentthatitdeprived[B.P.]ofafreeappropriate
publiceducation(FAPE)inviolationofstateorfederalspecialeducationlaw?"DPHODec.38.Thisappearstobeamisstatementoftheissue.A
thoroughreviewoftheadministrativerecordrevealsthattheissueactuallyraisedanddecidedbytheDPHOwaswhethertherecordingdevicewas
necessaryforB.P.toreceiveaFAPE.SeeSJR7398,7466,7560,7569,7582,7587,7592(ECFNo.2541).
[7]TheregulationsundertheRehabilitationActcontainsimilarrequirements.See45C.F.R.84.4(b)(1)(ii)(iii).
[8]"TheregulationsundertherelevantportionoftheADAreferto`reasonablemodification,'28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7),whilethecoordinating
regulationsundertheRehabilitationActusetheterm`reasonableaccommodation,'28C.F.R.41.53,butthereisnomaterialdifferencebetween
theterms."Nunesv.Mass.Dep'tofCorrection,766F.3d136,145(1stCir.2014).
[9]TheFirstCircuithasheldthat"reasonableaccommodation"casesbroughtunderTitleIoftheADA,whichprotectsagainstdiscriminationby
privateandstateandlocalgovernmentemployers,arepersuasiveauthorityinTitleII"reasonablemodification"cases.Kimanv.N.H.Dep'tof
Corrs.,451F.3d274,283n.9(1stCir.2006).Thelogicofthatholdingapplieswithequalforceto"reasonablemodification"casesbroughtunder
TitleIIIoftheADA,whichprotectsagainstdiscriminationinplacesofpublicaccommodation.Compare42U.S.C.12111,12112(applicable
provisionsofTitleI)with42U.S.C.12181,12182(applicableprovisionsofTitleIII).
[10]"InsofarastheTitleIIeffectivecommunicationsregulationhasaSection504analog,itis...theSection504communicationsregulationat28
C.F.R.39.160."Tustin,725F.3dat1099100.Thisregulationprovides,interalia,thatcoveredentitiesmust"furnishappropriateauxiliaryaids
wherenecessarytoaffordahandicappedpersonanequalopportunitytoparticipatein,andenjoythebenefitsof,aprogramoractivity."28C.F.R.
39.160(a)(1).
[11]TotheextentthattheDistrictcontendsthatclaimpreclusionbarsthePlaintiffs'disabilitydiscriminationclaims,thatargumentfailsbecausethe
hearingofficerlackedjurisdictiontoactontheseclaims.SeeMr.Iv.MaineSch.Admin.Dist.55,416F.Supp.2d147,175(D.Me.2006)seealso
18CharlesA.Wright,ArthurR.Miller&EdwardH.Cooper,FederalPracticeandProcedure4412,at285(2ded.2002)("Claimpreclusionis
readilydeniedwhentheremediessoughtinthesecondactioncouldnothavebeensoughtinthefirstaction.").
[12]AlthoughIdonotbelievethattheeffectivecommunicationregulationappliesonthesefacts,evenifitdidapply,thePlaintiffswouldnotbeable
toestablishthatthedevicewas"necessarytoensureeffectivecommunication"giventheDPHO'sfindingthatthedevicewouldnegativelyimpact
B.P.'seducation.28C.F.R.35.160(b)(2).
[13]ThePlaintiffalsomakeastructuralargument:anyfindingsappearingaftertheDPHO'sconclusionthatB.P."isreceivingFAPE"are
unnecessarybecausetheDPHO"couldhavestoppedthere."Pls.'Supp.Opp'n8.AstheDistrictpointsout,thisargumentisunreasonableunder
thePlaintiffs'theory,anycourtdecisionthatstatesitsholdingupfront"wouldrenderanyfurtherelaborationordiscussionofunderlyingfindingsmere
surplusage."Defs.'Supp.Reply5(ECFNo.270).
[14]ThePlaintiffsalsocontendthatissuepreclusionisunavailablebecause"[e]videncethatwasnotbeforetheIDEAhearingofficerisnowbefore
theCourt"andthatthisevidencecreatesadisputeofmaterialfactontheissueofpretext.Pls.'Supp.Opp'n910(citingWynnev.TuftsUniv.Sch.
ofMed.,976F.2d791,796(1stCir.1992)).Totheextent,ifany,thatthisnewevidenceisrelevanttoB.P.'sADAandSection504claims,itdoesnot
altermyconclusion.
[15]Initssupplementalbriefing,theDistrictpointsoutthattheFirstAmendmentclaimisnowmade"solelyinB.P.'snameastheParents'First
Amendment[c]laimshavebeendismissed."Def.'sSuppl.Mot.forSumm.J.15n.12(ECFNo.258).ThePlaintiffshavenotarguedotherwisein
theirsupplementalbriefing.TotheextentthattheParentsseektopresstheirownFirstAmendmentrights,thatclaimfailsbecausetheParents
havenorightofaccesstotheschool.Cf.Houchinsv.KQED,Inc.,438U.S.1,9(1978)("Thepublicimportanceofconditionsinpenalfacilitiesand
themedia'sroleofprovidinginformationaffordnobasisforreadingintotheConstitutionarightofthepublicorthemediatoentertheseinstitutions,
withcameraequipment,andtakemovingandstillpicturesofinmatesforbroadcastpurposes.").
[16]GiventheDPHO'sfindingthatPollack"wasunabletostatehoworwhethertheParentswouldusetherecordings,"DPHODec.42,theDistrict
contendsthatthePlaintiffscannotestablishthatrecordingisprotectedactivityundertheFirstAmendmentbecauseitconcernsapurelyprivate
matter.Def.'sSupp.Mot.forSumm.J.12(ECFNo.258).ButtheDPHO'sfindingsonthispointarenotentirelyclear.TheDPHOalsonotedthat
Pollackwouldprobablyjuststoretherecordings"andlistentothemiftherewassomeconcern."DPHODec.20.Giventhisambiguity,Icannotsay
thatthisissuewasessentialtotheDPHO'sdecision,and,accordingly,itdoesnothavepreclusiveeffect.
[17]Myownresearchhasuncoveredasplitofopiniononthetopic.Somecourtshaveheldthattherighttorecordinanonpublicforumgetspast
steponeoftheFirstAmendmentanalysis.See,e.g.,Leibovitzv.Barry,No.15CV1722,2016WL5107064,at*7(E.D.N.Y.Sept.20,2016)
(recordinginacourthouse)McDonoughv.FernandezRundle,No.1520038CV,(S.D.Fla.Sept.17,2015)(recordinginsideapolicestation).
Andsomecourtshaveheldotherwise.See,e.g.,Surlockv.DelaneyNo.5:11CV1121,2016WL3200273,at*39(N.D.N.Y.June8,2016)
(distinguishingcaseslikeGlikandnotingthat"[n]othinginthesecasessupportsthepropositionthattheFirstAmendmentprotectsaparent'srightto
placeahiddencamerainthebedroomoftheirchildwhoresidesinastaterunhomeforseverelyhandicappedindividuals").
[18]IfindS.H.A.R.K.v.MetroParksServingSummitCountyparticularlyopaque.499F.3d553(6thCir.2007).S.H.A.R.K.involvedplaintiffswho
plantedcamerasinamunicipalparkduringdaytimeparkhoursinordertorecordthecullingofadeerherdthatoccurredaftertheparkhadclosed.
The"overarchingquestion"asdescribedbytheSixthCircuitwas"whethertheplaintiffshadalawfulrightofaccesstotheinformation."Id.at560.
AlthoughS.H.A.R.K.mighthavebeenhelpfultotheDistrictinanalyzingtheParents'claimedrighttoaccesstheschool,itdoesnotprovidemuch
insightintohowtoanalyzeB.P.'srights,ashealreadyhasaccesstotheinformationthatheseekstorecord.
[19]InReedv.TownofGilbert,theSupremeCourtexplained:
Governmentregulationofspeechiscontentbasedifalawappliestoparticularspeechbecauseofthetopicdiscussedortheideaormessage
expressed.Thiscommonsensemeaningofthephrase"contentbased"requiresacourttoconsiderwhetheraregulationofspeech"onitsface"
drawsdistinctionsbasedonthemessageaspeakerconveys.Somefacialdistinctionsbasedonamessageareobvious,definingregulatedspeech
byparticularsubjectmatter,andothersaremoresubtle,definingregulatedspeechbyitsfunctionorpurpose.Botharedistinctionsdrawnbasedon
themessageaspeakerconveys,and,therefore,aresubjecttostrictscrutiny.
135S.Ct.2218,2227(2015)(internalcitationsomitted).
[20]Viewpointbasedrestrictionsonspeechare"anegregiousformofcontentdiscrimination"becausethey"targetnotsubjectmatter,butparticular
viewstakenbyspeakersonasubject."Rosenbergerv.Rector&VisitorsoftheUniv.ofVa.,515U.S.819,829(1995).
[21]ThePlaintiffs'citeRideoutv.Gardner,838F.3d65(1stCir.2016),insupportoftheirargument"that,atleastintheFirstCircuit,courtscannot
usetherecording'sforuminanalyzingwhethertherestrictionimposedonrecordingisvalid."Pls.'Suppl.Mot.forSumm.J.7(ECFNo.256)
(citing).InRideout,theFirstCircuitstruckdownastatelawprohibiting"ballotselfies"i.e.,sharingaphotographofavoter'smarkedballot.Seeid.
at68.Rideoutwasnotacaseabouttherighttorecordpublicofficials.RideoutdoesnotsupportthePlaintiffs'sweepingargumentthattheFirst
Circuithasabandonedforumanalysisinrecordingcases.WhilethePlaintiffsmaybecorrectthattheinteriorofapollingplaceisanonpublicforum,
theballotselfielawwasnotlimitedtotheinteriorofapollingplace.Instead,itregulated"theuseofimageryofmarkedballots,regardlessofwhere,
when,andhowthatimagery[was]publicized."Rideout,838F.3dat73.Giventhatthelaw'sreachextendedwellbeyondanyparticularproperty,it
isnotsurprisingthatthecourtdidnotengageinatraditionalforumanalysis.
[22]SinceTinker,theSupremeCourthasdecidedanumberofothercasesinvolvingstudentspeechandhasexplainedthat"themodeofanalysis
setforthinTinkerisnotabsolute."Morsev.Frederick,551U.S.393,405(2007).Forexample,inBethelSchoolDistrictNo.403v.Fraser,the
Courtheldthatschoolscanregulatevulgar,lewd,obscene,andplainlyoffensivespeech.478U.S.675,683(1986).InHazelwoodSchoolDistrictv.
Kuhlmeier,theCourtheldthatschoolscanlimitstudents'schoolsponsoredspeechtolegitimateeducationalconcerns.484U.S.260,266(1988).
AndinMorse,theCourtheldthatschoolscanrestrictspeechatschooleventswhenthespeechisreasonablyviewedaspromotingillegaldruguse.
551U.S.at403.StudentspeechfallingoutsidethenarrowexceptionsarticulatedinFraser,Hazelwood,andMorse,however,areanalyzedunder
theTinkerstandard.Pls.'Suppl.Mot.2(citingcases)butseeMullerv.JeffersonLighthouseSch.,98F.3d1530(7thCir.1996)(applyingforum
analysistoaschoolspeechchallenge).
[23]TheDistrictconsistentlyreliesonHazelwoodforthepropositionthatitcanrestrictB.P.'s"FirstAmendmentrelatedconduct`inanyreasonable
manner.'"Defs.'Opp'ntoPls.'Mot.forPartialSumm.J.27(ECFNo.166(quotingHazelwood,484U.S.at270).ButHazelwood's"reasonably
relatedtolegitimatepedagogicalconcerns"testislimitedtoschoolsponsoredspeech.SeeHazelwood,484U.S.at27171.TheDistricthasnot
attemptedtoarticulatehowB.P.'srecordingcouldbeconsideredschoolsponsoredspeech.
[24]Initssupplementalmotionforsummaryjudgment,theDistrictcontendsthattheDPHO'sdecisionprecludesthePlaintiffs'claimunderTinker
becauseshefoundthatthedevicewouldbedisruptiveanddetrimentalandwouldinterferewiththelearningprocess.Def.'sSuppl.Mot.forSumm.
J.1415.ButasthePlaintiffspointout,issuepreclusionisinapplicableherebecauseitistheDistrict'sburdentojustifyitsrestrictionundertheFirst
Amendment,whereasitwasthePlaintiffs'burdentoestablishthattherecordingdevicewasnecessarytoensureaFAPEatthedueprocess
hearing.SeeCrawfordv.AlliedContainerCorp.,561A.2d1027,1028(Me.1989).

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