Politics of Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia:

A Comparative Study of the Philippines

and Indonesia

Dong-Yoon Lee

The purpose of this study is to explore the current status of terrorism and
the process of promoting anti-terrorism policies in Southeast Asia, and
to search for fundamental differences manifested in diverse policies of
the countries in the region. Amidst the growing fear of terrorism in the
international community, this research particularly focuses on the com-
parison of the terrorism situations and anti-terrorism policies in the
Philippines and Indonesia. The 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 was a
moment that triggered a worldwide international anti-terrorism coop-
eration in response to the increasing terrorist threat. In Southeast
Asia, however, policies and measures to prevent terror, initiated by
the ASEAN, were relatively weak. In particular, the Philippines and
Indonesia which both held presidential elections in 2004 sought
different policy lines due to the different domestic situations and dynam-
ics of political relations, in spite of an equal amount of pressure from the
international community. In the Philippines, the Muslim minority-
group-led separatist movement and armed combats were regarded as
threatening elements that caused nation-wide political unrest. More-
over, strong support on anti-terrorism in cooperation with the USA
operated as a tool that consolidated the political status of the Arroyo
administration. Meanwhile, an Islam-oriented Indonesia interpreted
international pressure for strong anti-terrorism policies as suppression
of Islam, and Indonesia faced strong resistance from domestic opposi-
tion parties and Islamic political groups, which in turn resulted in a
relatively ambiguous anti-terrorism policy. pafo_1025 247..269

Key words: terrorism, anti-terrorism policy, international environ-

ment, domestic politics, Southeast Asia, Philippines, Indonesia.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 caused tremendous shock and security
threat to the international community, and became a motivation that fostered

Pacific Focus, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (August 2009), 247269.

doi: 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2009.01025.x
2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

247
248 / Pacific Focus

international and domestic interests about international terrorism and anti-

terrorism policy. In particular, as it was discovered that Al Qaeda an
international terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden, which advocates
Islamic radicalism and establishes international networks with other Islamic
armed forces was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the international
community, with the support of the USA, started to put together an effort to
strengthen anti-terrorism policy and international collaboration in order to
prevent terrorist activities and networks of international terrorist groups.
Terrorism is not a new threat against the international community. Various
terrorist activities to achieve specific political purposes and ideological goals
have existed for quite a long time. However, as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
2001 were recognized as a notable case of transnational crime in the post-
cold-war era, multi-national and multi-dimensional cooperation in order to
prevent terrorism was called for. This is not only a single nations military-
security effort, but it also accompanies diplomatic and economic measures
that deal with many countries. In addition, as the need to strengthen anti-
terrorism efforts and cooperation was put forwarded by the USA and the
United Nations, policy coordination and cooperation to prevent terrorism and
to screen out terrorists among countries emerged as a major diplomatic
issue.1
Meanwhile, Southeast Asia was also overshadowed by international ter-
rorism with many minor and major terrorist incidents in the region, even
before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This has been one of the critical factors that
threaten the regional peace and security. Various armed secessionists or
separatist movements, with an intention to control territory, continued to
cause troubles for some Southeast Asian countries. Networks of Islamic
extremism had taken root in the Southeast Asian region since the early 1990s,
a decade before the world awoke to the War against Terrorism.2 As South-
east Asia has been widely acknowledged as a region with widespread
activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups connected to Al Qaeda, tension of
terrorist threats is on the rise in all countries, not only in Indonesia and
Malaysia, but also in Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. Therefore,
Southeast Asian countries could not ignore the international communitys
call for international cooperation on anti-terrorism policy, which necessitates
each countrys strenuous efforts in order to prevent and suppress terrorist
activities.
On the other hand, each Southeast Asian countrys policy in response to
the expansion of international anti-terrorism shows different levels of inten-
sity and stance. This is due to the distinct Southeast Asian conditions
and environment as well as the diverse domestic situation in each state
dynamics of domestic politics differ country by country, in spite of continu-

1. Lyal Sunga, US Anti-Terrorism Policy and Asias Options, in Uwe Johannen, Alan Smith, and
James Gomez, eds., September 11 & Political Freedom: Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Select Books,
2003), p. 250.
2. David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, Southeast Asia and the War against Terrorism: The
Rise of Islamism and the Challenge to the Surveillance State, in Johannen, Smith, and Gomez, Ibid.,
p. 142.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 249

ous pressure from the international community to promote anti-terrorism

policy. So, what are the characteristics of terrorism emerging in Southeast
Asia, and in what circumstances does it appear? How is each Southeast Asian
country developing its own anti-terrorism policy to cope with international
terrorism, and what are the differences of those states policies? What are the
reasons for the different aspects of anti-terrorism policies manifested by each
Southeast Asian state, and where does this originate?
In order to answer these questions, this study will investigate the Southeast
Asian terrorism phenomenon linked to the expansion of international terror-
ism, and examine Southeast Asian states anti-terrorism policies and their
processes. In particular, this research compares terrorism and the processes
of the anti-terrorist policy-making of Indonesia and the Philippines that have
different strengths and stances towards anti-terrorist policy. It also analyzes
the various elements that affect anti-terrorism policies in these countries.
Indonesia and the Philippines have different anti-terrorism policies due
to different dynamics of domestic politics in the middle of international
pressure and the regional environment requiring stronger anti-terrorism
measures. This research intends to reveal circumstantial factors that make the
anti-terrorism policies of the two countries different, examining these topics:
backgrounds and situations of terrorism in Indonesia and the Philippines, the
international and regional environments for anti-terrorism policy, and the
domestic politics that impacts on the policy.

Politics of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Policy

Despite various conceptual definitions, the term terrorism within a

political context usually refers to attempts to persuade others of ones own
political position by the use of exemplary violence, or threat of violence,
instilling in the audience a state of heightened or absolute fear.3 In general,
terrorism means the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or
property to further political or social objectives,4 and the use or threat of
violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its
aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not
conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in
terrorist strategy.5 Basically, terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of
force to achieve when innocent people are targeted,6 and is defined as
unavoidably political in aims and objectives; violent or, equally important,
threatens violent; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions
beyond the direct victim or target; conducted by an organization with an

3. Damien Kingsbury and Clinton Fernandes, Terrorism in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, in Damien
Kingsbury, ed., Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 10.
4. William D. Perdue, Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Though Fear (New York:
Praeger, 1989), p. 2.
5. Walter Laquer, Reflections on Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, 65-1 (Fall 1986), p. 88.
6. Walter Laquer, Terrorism (New York: Little Brown, 1979); Syed Serajul Islam, The Politics of
Islamic Identity in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Thomson, 2005), p. 8.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

250 / Pacific Focus

identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure; and perpe-

trated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.7
Although the meaning of terror or terrorism may be interpreted differently
by terrorists and their victims, both positions agree on the socio-political
effects of terrorism and the fears from it. In particular, while recent repeated
Islamist terrorist acts are described as the resistance to the Western
Christianity-centered worldview, which is in conflict with Islam culture,
terrorist activity itself is perceived as a crime threatening human life and
public security in most secular and moderate Islam communities. Some Islam
radicals symbolize terrorism as jihad,8 and this has actually evolved into a
new form of war itself. Jihad became a global movement occurring every-
where the Muslim populations exist. Islamist terrorism is merely a part of
jihad, or struggle, to bring the entire world under the dominion of Islamic law
and to restore the Islamic world. But the general population in Islamic
societies regards violent terrorism resulting in uncountable innocent casual-
ties as unforgivable behavior, not as jihad.9
Terrorism has various patterns, such as the taking of hostages, kidnapping,
aircraft hijacking and downing, assassination, bombing, armed attack/open
firing, bio-chemical terror, and cyber terror, and these patterns are now being
expanded to rather complicated and compounded types.10 Terrorism in the
past was characterized as domestic terrorism targeting specific personnel or
groups in a limited region or territory, led by anti-government insurgents and
ethno-nationalist separatists. However, as the whole world has experienced
the threats of terrorism since the late 1960s, the international features of
terrorism have emerged and become dominant.11 Currently, terrorists are
reorganizing themselves systematically so as to develop the organization into
various systemic structures. Terrorist groups of individual countries are con-
nected to one another, and are establishing networks with specific purposes
or ideologies, while promoting multinational terrorism activities at the same
time.
In order to investigate terrorism and anti-terrorism policy in Southeast
Asia, three prospects should be examined: the international response to
terrorism, the regional security environment and the individual countrys
peculiarity.12 In reality, a countrys international relations and foreign poli-
cies, and the adjustment of domestic policies in accordance with them, are

7. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 43.
8. Jihad indicates a holy war that includes defense against offenders, social justice, and self-restraint
on desire as well as fighting until atheists and polytheists admit to the existence of God. Generally
jihad meant a holy war that aims for conquest and protection when the Islamists expanded to the
non-Islamic region in early Islamic history, and accordingly, it was an armed method that was used
when they protected themselves from the attacks of pagans such as non-Muslim Christians and Jews
under the only god, Allah, or when they attempted to convert others to Islam in a broader context.
9. Kumar Ramakrishna, Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 27-3 (2005), pp. 343369; J. Keith Akins, A Broader Conceptualization of Islam and
Terrorism, Joint Force Quarterly, 45 (2007), p. 66.
10. Perdue, op. cit., p. 2.
11. Laquer, op. cit., p. 88.
12. Carlyle Thayer, New Terrorism in Southeast Asia, in Damien Kingsbury, ed., Violence in
Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, op.cit., p. 53.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 251

the final results of the simultaneous application of the international environ-

ment and domestic political situations.13 In international relations, the adjust-
ment process of each countrys foreign policy and domestic policy is
perceived as a complex one. This is due to the interaction of the international
environment and regional dynamics surrounding these countries, on the basis
of the complicated application of these foreign policies or national interests
pursued by these countries. In particular, if the international environment
surrounding a country and the regional dynamics are in conflict with the
domestic political condition and national interests, adjustment of the coun-
trys foreign policy and the corresponding domestic policy decision-making
will be exposed to multiple pressures, and its development will also become
more complicated.
Academics emphasizing the importance of the international environment
and external pressure argue that the tool of analysis for decision-making
processes of international relations and domestic and foreign policies is the
international system.14 They emphasize the structural influence of the inter-
national system in international relations and behavior. On the other hand,
other scholars advocating the importance of the domestic policies of the
individual country in international relations argue that differences in their
domestic structures and the international context in which they are situated
have dictated the adoption of different strategies of foreign policy.15 They
assert that a country, which can be defined as the final decision-maker of
foreign policies in international relations, must consider domestic pressure
and international pressure at the same time and must focus on the importance
of domestic politics in the decision-making process of foreign policy.16
Recent researches designed to discuss the external pressure of interna-
tional relations and the decision-making process of domestic and foreign
policy consider the international environment, regional dynamics, and the
influence of domestic politics in line with these contradictory arguments.17
That is, as internal conflicts in the process of determining domestic and
foreign policies under international crises became intense, the domestic
political situation and power relations cannot be ignored. Therefore, as
exogenous pressures increase in accordance with changes in international
environments, decision-makers in a nation have no choice but to consider
both the pressure from the outside and the corresponding domestic resistance
and pressure.

13. Paul R. Viotti and Park V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993), p. 14.
14. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Melton Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1979).
15. Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign
Economic Policy, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies
of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 3.
16. Stephen D. Krasner, United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of
External Strength and Internal Weakness, in Katzenstein, Ibid., pp. 5187.
17. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic
Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Political Cleavages and Changing
Exposure to Trade, American Political Science Review, 81-4 (December 1987), pp. 11211137.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

252 / Pacific Focus

Figure 1. Decision-Making Factors of Anti-Terrorism Policies in

Southeast Asian Countries

International Pressures International Environments:

Domestic Pressures Spread of Terrorism vs Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Policy

Regional Environments:
Lax Correspondence of the ASEAN

Country
Bilateral Relations: State or Government
Strong Demand from
the US, Australia, etc. for
Anti-Terrorism Policy Domestic Environment:
Civil Society, Parliament,
etc.

This research, as shown in Figure 1, analyzes and compares various factors

and decision-making processes of anti-terrorism policy in Southeast Asia.
Basically, the anti-terrorism policy of Southeast Asian countries is getting
pressure from (i) the international community and the regional environment
coping with the expansion of international terrorism, and (ii) requests of
cooperation and of stronger anti-terrorism measures from the countries that
have bilateral diplomatic ties with a concerned country. The policy, however,
is fundamentally a result of the decision-making of a concerned country.
Therefore, the policy is also affected by domestic political environments that
respond to the international pressures. In particular, when external demand
and pressure is in conflict with national interests or the pressure from domes-
tic politics, anti-terrorism policy, at the level of policy-making, may produce
policies of various levels and stances, which are a dynamic adjustment and
mixture of international and regional and domestic factors.
Therefore, for an in-depth understanding of the adjustment process of
foreign policy and domestic policy of a country, which responds to dynamic
changes in international and regional environments, we must consider not
only the international environment and regional dynamics that influence a
countrys policy-making process, but also the domestic conditions and politi-

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 253

cal factors of an individual country that respond to external pressure.

Adjustment of an individual countrys foreign policy and the following
domestic policy may change its policy line in response to environmental
changes of international systems, but sometimes a policy line that goes
against the pressure of the international environment may be promoted
according to internal conditions and environmental changes of domestic
policy. After all, differences in policy lines are caused by the multiple
application of pressures and transitional factors of various elements, such as
the international or regional environment and domestic political conditions.
Policy-making and priority of adjustment may also appear differently
depending on how the pressure from each level of policy-making and adjust-
ment is valued and influenced.

International and Regional Environment for Anti-Terrorism Policy

The pattern of terrorism until the 1970s is characterized by small-scale

terrorism, which refers to a specific groups attempt to attain political rec-
ognition, while those after the 1990s demonstrate a rather extreme and
systematic form with international linkage. Also, as shown by recent terror
incidences, characteristics of terrorism nowadays are not limited to specific
terrorist groups acting within the boundary of a specific country, but are
becoming more complicated with various forms, built by and acting via a
transnational network, based on religious and ideological ties such as those of
Al Qaeda and anti-American or anti-Western ideologies.18 Recent terrorist
activities in Southeast Asia are particularly characterized by transnational
linkages among locally brewed Islamic militant groups. In addition, their
activities are not confined to a particular country, but dispersed region-wide.
On an international level, the 9/11 terrorist attacks became the turn-
ing point that altered the international communitys perspective on terror-
ism. Since the 9/11 attacks, the international community, with the USA at
the center, has emphasized the necessity of international cooperation to
strengthen anti-terrorism measures. As a result, anti-terrorism cooperation
became more institutionalized with the participation of the UN and other
regional and multi-lateral organizations.19 The UN particularly reaffirmed
after the 9/11 attacks that terrorism activity is an international criminal
behavior that threatens international peace and security, and this affirmation
facilitated the strengthening of inter-state cooperation for anti-terrorism
policy.20
The most ardent advocate of anti-terrorism policy was none other than the
USA, the victim of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The anti-terrorism policy of the
USA is not new and it had been one of the most important factors that figured

18. Andrew Tan, The New Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It, in Johannen, Smith, and
Gomez, op. cit., p. 98.
19. Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya, Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Treat, The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, 18-1 (Spring 2006), p. 61.
20. See in UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and UN Security Council Resolution 1377
(2001).

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

254 / Pacific Focus

US foreign policy in the 1980s. After the 9/11 attacks, the USA in particular
introduced a rather strong policy plan in order to prevent and suppress
terrorism, as shown in the warning proclamation of its will to respond by
force against countries that nest or support terrorist groups.21 In November
2001, the USA disclosed the list of countries suspected to produce biochemi-
cal weapons with the potential to use them for terrorist purposes. In the
Presidents Annual State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush
designated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the axis of evil, countries affili-
ated with weapons of mass destruction.22 Since the 9/11 attacks, the USA has
been pursuing both multilateral and unilateral measures to establish a new
regulation and international order through direct involvement in terrorism
prevention. The USA clarified its constructive will and activity against ter-
rorism by attacking Afghanistan, an acknowledged nest for Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda, and also by attacking Iraq, which was suspected to possess hidden
stockpiles of biochemical weapons with potential use in terrorism.
As of now, the anti-terrorism policy of the USA has focused on deterring
terrorism through the establishment of a multilateral cooperation framework
such as international cooperation relations with alliances and discussion at
the level of the UN, while not only using direct armed forces in the War
against Terrorism but also expanding the police roles such as information
gathering and tracking the transferring route of terrorism funds.23 The Bush
administrations anti-terrorism policy shifted to a policy of pre-emptive
defense, which culminated in Washingtons engagement in Iraq. It went on
the offensive to forestall or prevent hostile acts by its adversaries, and, if
necessary, to strike terrorists abroad so as to keep the homeland safe.24 Also,
the USA has been pushing many governments to join such plans, even stating
that you are either with us or you are against us.25 Hence, with many
countries in the world agreeing to the US policy, the international environment
was favorable towards strengthening conditions of multilateral coopera-
tion relations in order to pursue a rather strong anti-terrorism policy.
Meanwhile, at the regional level, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), which had functioned as a regional cooperation body,
showed a relatively passive and lukewarm response to the demands and
pressure of this international environment. Since the destruction of the World
Trade Center building in New York on 11 September 2001, considerable
international attention has been given to non-state terrorist groups in South-
east Asia, including their claimed links to Al Qaeda.26 Therefore, the
international community, including the USA, started to demand launching of

21. Gilbert Rozman and Noah Rozman, The United States and Asia in 2002: Needing Help against
Evil, Asian Survey, 43-1 (January/February 2003), pp. 114.
22. The White House, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.htm>
(searched date: 26 September 2007).
23. Shah M. Tarzi, The Threat of the Use of Force in American Post-Cold War Policy in the Third
World, Journal of Third World Studies, 18-1 (Spring 2001), p. 39.
24. Desker and Acharya, op. cit., p. 80.
25. Sunga, op. cit., p. 251.
26. Lily Zubaidah Rahim, The Road Less Traveled: Islamic Militancy in Southeast Asia, Critical
Asian Studies, 35-2 (2003), p. 221.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 255

a rather strong anti-terrorism policy to Southeast Asian countries, where

many Islam radical groups, directly and indirectly related with Al Qaeda, are
located.27
In Southeast Asia, however, Islam is one of the major religions. More than
40 percent of the total population in the region is Muslim. While Muslims
form the majority in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, they constitute a large
minority in the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Cambodia.
Islam in Southeast Asian countries has always been defined by tolerance,
moderation, and pluralism.28 Most of the Muslims in Southeast Asia support
the secular state and eschew the violent and fundamental or traditional
interpretations of Islam. Nevertheless, the ASEAN, where there is a line-up
of Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, could
not pursue a strong anti-terrorism policy jointly following a call for anti-
terrorist cooperation, due to the particular domestic political situation of
individual countries. Moreover, they were unable to form active policy soli-
darity because of the domestic political condition of each country.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, all Southeast Asian
governments expressed sympathy for the victims and their concern about
terrorism in general. The ASEAN issued a brief statement of condolence and
a vague call for strengthening cooperation in combating terrorism around the
world. On 5 November 2001, the ASEAN heads of states signed the Decla-
ration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, in which they pledged to
enhance cooperation in combating terrorism and to abide by other UN
decisions. In particular, the declaration pledged to deepen cooperation
among our front-line agencies in combating terrorism and sharing best
practices.29 By May 2002, the ASEAN states reached an agreement to
standardize their criminal laws regarding transnational crimes. The USA
pressed the anti-terrorism treaty on the ASEAN in May 2002, not the other
way around. It was only with considerable US diplomatic arm-twisting that
the ASEAN accepted the agreement.
However, the ASEAN was less capable of inducing consensus and coop-
eration of the countries in the region to strengthening anti-terrorism policy,
because of the principles, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of
other states, quiet diplomacy, the non-use of force, and decision-making
through consensus.30 The ASEAN has taken on issues that they can reach a
consensus on, whilst turning a blind eye to controversial issues. Differences,
when they arose, were papered over and confrontation was avoided in refer-
ence to the ASEAN way.31 Furthermore, the ASEAN member nations
essentially maintained the principle of non-interference that excludes mutual

27. John Gershman, Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? Foreign Affairs, 81-4 (July/August 2002),
pp. 6061; Mark Beeson, US Hegemony and Southeast Asia: The Impact of, and Limits to, US Power
and Influence, Critical Asian Studies, 36-3 (2004), p. 452.
28. Islam, op. cit., p. 17.
29. ASEAN Secretariat, at <http://www.aseansec.org/5020.htm> (searched date: 29 September 2007).
30. Hiro Katsumata, Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict
Adherence to the ASEAN Way, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25-1 (April 2003), p. 106.
31. The ASEAN way refers to a set of diplomatic norms shared by the members of the ASEAN. A
central characteristic of the ASEAN way has been its cautious attitude towards formal institution-

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

256 / Pacific Focus

criticism and interference regarding domestic issues of individual countries.32

Without doubt, human rights issues, changes in the international environ-
ment regarding democratization, and the expansion of the ASEAN brought
about changes within the ASEAN. For example, the non-interference princi-
ple is changing into constructive engagement or flexible engagement
principles. However, there are still doubts on whether such changes in prin-
ciples are effectively practiced in internal conflicts of the ASEAN such as
Indonesias haze issues or the domestic political issues of Cambodia and
Myanmar.33
Consequently, in response to international pressure that demands the
strengthening of anti-terrorism policy and cooperation to prevent recurrence
and expansion of terrorism since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the ASEAN has
not proposed a common solution that would be effective in the region. Within
the ASEAN, while individual countries have not found fundamental coop-
erative solutions to prevent and suppress terrorism, they are developing
different attitudes and stances of anti-terrorism policies in accordance with
the dynamic relations of internal conditions and domestic politics at the
domestic level. In relation to the anti-terrorism policy, Southeast Asian gov-
ernments responded in different ways to their immediate political interests
and foreign policy objectives.

Politics of Anti-Terrorism Policy in the Philippines

Background of Terrorism

Unlike other countries, the terrorism issue in the Philippines is not new. In
196768, as the Sino-Soviet tensions increased, the Philippines Communist
Party (PKP: Partido Kommunista ng Pilipinas) was separated and then
established the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) with Jose Maria
Sison as a leader, who was a member of a pro-Chinese faction. In 1969, the
CPP, as their military wing, established the New Peoples Army (NPA), and
expanded guerilla activities based on the Maoist doctrines. In the mid-1980s,
the NPA was believed to possess some 25,000 combatants and to operate in
63 of the countrys 73 provinces. They also deployed various combat activi-
ties linked with an underground group known as the National Democratic
Front (NDF). But, purges, splits, and defections after democratization
reduced the number of NPA members significantly and it is now operating as
quasi-bandits on particular islands.34

alization. David Capie and Paul Evans, The ASEAN Way, in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, eds.,
The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 4549.
32. The ASEAN has given its clearest support to this principle in documents such as the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, both approved at
the first Summit in 1976.
33. Robin Ramcharan, ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 22-1 (April 2000), pp. 6670; pp. 7881.
34. Kingsbury and Fernandes, op. cit., pp. 4142.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 257

Despite the decrease in numbers, terrorist activities were on the rise, which
was enforced by Islam rebels particularly focusing on the southern region
since the 1970s. In the Philippines, where the majority is Catholic, Muslim
accounts for only around 45 percent of the whole population. Nevertheless,
they formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao
and Sulu, the southern region, as their focal point, and deployed an anti-
governmental armed dispute while advocating separation that will lead to an
independent Islamic country.35 Hence, many major and minor terrorist activi-
ties and local conflicts initiated by the MNLF continuously occurred in the
Philippines, and it continued even after democratization in 1986.36
The origin of Moros rebellion against Christians can be traced back to the
Spanish colonial period, but the initiatives of the Moro separatist movement
as an armed group after the independence in 1946 coincides with the proc-
lamation of the martial law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the
establishment of the authoritarian regime in 1972.37 Since then, in the south-
ern region of the Philippines, an intense battle and bloody retaliation had
continued between the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, and the Filipino govern-
ment. A peaceful solution initiative for the Moro separatist movement was
prepared when the government allowed the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM)38 in the middle of democratization of the Philippines
after the February Revolution in 1986, and was ultimately concluded with
the peace agreement that ended the civil war between the government and the
MNLF in 1996.
Nevertheless, Islamic armed forces conflicts were not completely settled in
the Philippines. The Moro Islam Liberation Front (MILF), which pursued a
more radical separatist route than the MNLF, did not accept the peace
agreement in 1996 and continued to carry out armed struggle. With Salamat
Hashim who parted from the MNLF in 1984 at the helm, they formed
their own armed organization, possessed their own guerrilla forces with an
estimated 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers. In particular, they are known to have had
a linkage to the 2000 and 2001 bombing attacks in Manila and the violent

35. Moro indicates the Muslim who resides in the Southern Philippines, concentrated in the Min-
danao and Sulu Islands. The language origins of Moro are known to be derived from ancient Mauri
or Mauretania, but it originated from Spanish leaders who were confused with the Moors, who were
widely known to them. Accordingly, Moro is used as a term that denounces Muslims in the
Philippines.
36. Moros resistance and separation movement against the central government of the Philippines was
expanded because some policies and regulations to maintain legitimacy and the reign of central
government in the process of the Philippines nation-building and integration from the early twentieth
century have caused the Muslim communitys mass poverty and social exclusion in the southern
region.
37. Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 156.
38. According to the Tripoli Agreement which was concluded in 1976, government of the Philippines
agreed in August 1989 to appoint thirteen provinces (one province added later) of Muslim region and
9 cities as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Accordingly, there held a refer-
endum on November 1989 whether to return self-administrative region, and four provinces became the
ARMM; in a referendum in August 2001 on the expansion of self-administrative region, one city and
one province were included in the ARMM.

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258 / Pacific Focus

Davao City bomb attack in 2003, and it has been identified that they also have
a deep connection with Al Qaeda.39
Recently, the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) emerged as a more radical armed
force and more threatening group than the MILF, which continues to threaten
the public peace and security of the Philippines. Abu Sayyaf means Bearer
of the Sword in Arabic. The ASG was originally known as the Mujahidin
Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), founded in the mid-1980s, and was
renamed as the ASG in the late 1980s. While negotiations for further con-
cessions and peace between the government and moderate groups within the
Moros are going on, more extremist Moro rebels represented by the ASG
have been engaged in terrorist activities, such as bombings and kidnapping of
foreign tourists, to establish an independent Islamic state in the Mindanao-
Sulu region.40

Dynamic Interaction of International Pressure and Domestic Politics

The reason that the Filipino Islamic armed forces have recently emerged as
the focal point of interest to the international community is because they have
a strong connection with Bin Ladens Al Qaeda. The MILF, for example, is
assumed to have established a connection with Al Qaeda in the 1990s, and
have since strongly maintained their networks. The ASG, who asserts the
Islamization of the Philippines in an extreme manner, has also been known to
be actively involved in terrorism activities while forming international net-
works with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East. In particular, the ASG continued to receive financial support
from Al Qaeda, and is assumed to be deeply related to major and minor
terrorism incidences throughout Southeast Asia.41
Meanwhile, as the strengthening of anti-terrorism policy and international
cooperation were emphasized in the international community with the ini-
tiative of the USA since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the government of the
Philippines swiftly engaged itself in the cooperation framework devised by
the USA and other Western countries, and promoted an active anti-terrorism
policy to eliminate the Islamic armed forces within the country. Soon after
the 9/11 attacks, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo announced 14 Pillars
of Policy and Action to combat international terrorism and said that her
administration would go all out to assist the USA and implement UN
Security Council Resolution 1368. In relation to terrorism, the Arroyo
administration facilitated joint surveillance committee activities through
leveraging an anti-terrorism agreement between the three countries of the

39. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 90; International Crisis Group, Southern Philippines Backgrounder:
Terrorism and the Peace Process, ICG Asian Report No. 80 (Singapore and Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2004), p. 46.
40. Syed Serajul Islam, Ethno-Communal Conflict in the Philippines: The Case of Mindanao-Sulu
Region, in Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, eds., Ethnic Conflict & Secessionism in South & Southeast
Asia (New Deli and London: Sage Publication, 2003), p. 195.
41. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New Deli: Roli Books, 2002), pp.
174175; p. 184.

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 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 259

Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, while requesting military and financial

support from the USA to subdue Islamic armed forces in the Southern
Philippines. Subsequently, by March 2002, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(Republic Act 9160) was signed and the rules and regulations were imple-
mented. The Philippines also legislated the Anti-Terrorism Act, which allows
the authority to extend detention of warrant-less suspects for up to 72 hours,
to tap communication devices, and to freeze bank accounts.42 In December
2002, the USA and the Philippines reached a military agreement that allowed
railroad supply support by providing the Philippines major facilities for the
US anti-terrorism activities as well as military cooperation between the USA
and the Philippines for the next five years.
According to the serial arrangements, the US military, after landing in the
Southern Philippines in April 2002, was able to carry out a joint operation
that supported the armed forces of the Philippines, which launched the
clean-up campaign against Islamic armed forces. In fact, the Philippines had
to face resistance from a part of the population because the temporary station
of the US troops was an issue that violated its constitutional clauses since the
complete withdrawal of the USA from the Philippines in 1992 in accordance
with the newly amended constitution in 1987.43 Both the Muslim separatists
as well as other Filipinos condemned the US military operation on Philip-
pines territory. According to the critics, the influx of US troops into the
Philippines was foreign intervention.44 Nevertheless, the Arroyo administra-
tions anti-terrorism policy was all the more strongly expanded, which tried
to settle conflicts and fearful factors through the forces in the southern region
as the USAs troop stationing became visible for a certain period of time.

Domestic Political Effects on Anti-Terrorism Policy

The Philippines pursued foreign and domestic policies in a way that
strengthened anti-terrorism policy to eradicate Islamic armed forces within
the country, by adapting itself to the changes and pressure of the external
environment. Such policy is, without doubt, influenced heavily by the inter-
national communitys pressure and environmental changes of the allies
including the USA, but ultimately, it has a strong relation with the domestic
political condition of the Philippines to some extent. In order to settle domes-

42. Sinapan Samydorai, 9/11 Anti-Terrorist Measure and their Impact on Human Rights in Asia,
Johannen, Smith, and Gomez, op, cit., p. 226.
43. James Hookway, In the Clutches of the Eagle: US Troops May Be Unpleasant, But the Abu
Sayyaf Are Worse, Far Eastern Review, (7 February 2002).
44. In response to the criticism, the Arroyo administration has contended, U.S. forces stay tempo-
rarily in the Philippines simply to support logistics and fulfil duties as visiting forces. But this
explanation is an expedient to soothe anti-American public criticism because the US forces virtually
operate as stationary troops. Although the USA landed small-scale troops in the Philippines, the US
forces are carrying out joint military training and logistics support with the armed force of the
Philippines. And in order to avoid sovereignty-related constitutional constraints on stationing of
foreign troops in the Philippines, the USA replace their troops in the Philippines at regular intervals
within a statutory period. Renato Cruz De Castro, The Revitalized PhilippineU.S. Security Rela-
tions: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century? Asian Survey, 43-6 (November/
December 2003), p. 984.

2009 Center for International Studies, Inha University

260 / Pacific Focus

tic political anxiety and the economic problem of the Philippines, the Arroyo
administration extracted the support and cooperation of the USA through a
strong anti-terrorism policy, and Arroyo herself also needed to consolidate
her political position and influence more strongly.
At the domestic political dimension, by compelling a strong anti-terrorism
policy that allows the USAs strategic activities in the southern region,
President Arroyo was not only able to consolidate cooperation and the
support system with the USA, but was also able to strongly consolidate her
political position in the middle of a series of policy-making processes to
expose anti-government armed forces in the southern region. As a matter of
fact, in the terms of domestic politics, President Arroyo directly undertook
the presidency when she was Vice-President in early 2001 following the
resignation of President Joseph E. Estrada who was involved in a corruption
scandal, but her political status was very much weakened due to riots by the
poor people in May 2001 and continuous economic downfall. Accordingly,
she utilized anti-terrorism policy efficiently in order to quickly settle the
rumors on the military coup detat that had been continuously discussed
domestically before the Presidential election in May 2004, and rumors on
strong challenge of the opposition as well as riots in the southern region, and
was able to harden internal political solidarity of the political powers.
On the other hand, the joint military training and related actions between
the US troops and the armed forces of the Philippines brought various
economic and financial resources that could help the economy as a side-
effect. Indeed, the economic condition of the Philippines had not changed
much after President Arroyo came into power and it was evaluated by the
public that the gap between the wealthy and poor was being aggravated.
However, through the strengthening of anti-terrorism policy as well as offer-
ing the USA the use of military bases in the Philippines again, they were able
to receive arms assistance worth $US100m under the pretext of security
assistance, an aid fund of $US20m that was necessary for the modernization
of the Filipino military, and also $US10m in the form of Defense Department
goods and services. In terms of economy, the Philippines were granted
$US1bn in trade benefits, guarantees for up to $US150m in agricultural
exports, and $US40m in food aid.45 Such economic achievement was used as
a major factor that consolidated President Arroyos political status and
power.

Politics of Anti-Terrorism Policy in Indonesia

Background of Terrorism
In Indonesia, where more than 90 percent of the population is Muslim,
most Islamic groups were taking a moderate and generous religious route, but
with the 9/11 terrorist attacks as motivation, Indonesia was misunderstood as
a hotbed of Islam radical groups and international terrorism. Unlike other

45. Abuza, op. cit., pp. 205206.

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 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 261

countries where Islam was a fundamental impediment to democracy and

secularism, Islam was a source of civil society and democratization in
Indonesia. However, prior to and after the democratization in Indonesia,
religious radicals or semi-military armed groups began to emerge, and by
adhering to a military framework which tends to solve all the conflicts by
force, they became a major challenge that interfered with law execution of
the newly established Indonesian government after the democratization.
These groups, which argue for an establishment of Islamic countries based
on Islam fundamentalism, identified the strengthening of anti-terrorism
policy that was initiated by the USA and Western countries since the 9/11
terrorist attacks as a serious challenge to Islam. As a resistance movement
against this initiative, they proclaimed jihad and deployed terrorist activi-
ties to guard and expand Islam in a violent way. In Indonesia, there exist more
than approximately sixty radical Islamic groups that are affiliated with armed
forces, and five or six of these groups are assumed to have direct or indirect
relations with terrorism activities.46 Above all, they have not only established
networks within the country, but have also formed international networks
with other overseas organizations, with regular military training and a series
of terrorism activities.
As a matter of fact, the political relationship between Islam and the state
in Indonesia has been marked by mutual antagonism and distrust.47 For
instance, the Darul Islam rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi, and
Sumatra, which were expanded by Muslim scholar Sekamardji Maridjan
Kartosuwirjo between 1948 and 1962 for the establishment of the Islamic
State, influenced more or less Indonesias Islam fundamentalist or separatist
movement groups.48 Although the rebellion was suppressed after the arrest of
Kartosuwirjo in 1962, their intention to establish an Islamic state was handed
over to many other Islamic groups and expanded to Islamic religious groups
which have various movement routes.
Currently, one of the most powerful groups in Indonesia that believes in a
radical route of armed riots, while arguing Islamic fundamentalism and
radicalism, is the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The JI is a militant Islamic organi-
zation linked with the international network, and is allegedly a force behind
the Bali bombing in October 2002. It is also suspected to have a strong
affiliation with Al Qaeda.49 The origins of the contemporary JI can be traced
back to the remnants of the Darul Islam movement.50 Amongst them, the
senior members trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
founded the so-called Komando Jihad group in the 1970s. In particular, the
JIs leaders, Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, had been arrested
and imprisoned in 1978 while deploying fundamentalist movements for the

46. Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 201.

47. Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2003), p. 13.
48. Rahim, op. cit., p. 213.
49. International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: How Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network
Operates, ICG Asian Report No. 83 (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002);
Gunaratna, op. cit., pp. 198199.
50. Thayer, op. cit., p. 53.

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262 / Pacific Focus

establishment of the Islamic state, with Solo as their base since the end of the
1960s, and after the release from prison, they moved to Malaysia and con-
tacted terrorist groups that had international networks.51
One of the powerful armed organizations in Indonesia that adhere to
Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism is the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI: Indonesia Mujahidin Council) and the Laskar Jihad (LJ).52 The MMI,
initiated by Abu Bakar Baasyir is known as a regional part in the JI, and is
initiating various religious conflicts while arguing for Islamic fundamental-
ism internationally and domestically, and establishing a keen network with
fundamental Islamic armed groups. The MMI, which owns the Laskar
Mujahidin as an armed suborganization, has deeply involved itself in reli-
gious disputes around Ambon in the Maluku area.53
The LJ, established by Jafar Umar Thalib in 2000, is involved in Christian
Islamic religious conflicts in Poso, Sulawesi region, and is known to have
combat forces of between 3000 and 10,000. Thalib, a leader of the LJ, served
in the Mujahidin Afghanistan between 1987 and 1989, fighting in the Abu
Sayyaf faction, and he met Bin Laden in Peshawar. After having returned to
Jakarta in 1989, he became a preacher and established a pesentren, a Muslim
boarding school, in the North of Yogyakarta. The ideology of LJ is deeply
conservative, opposing democracy and a female head of state as incompatible
with Islam, and is influenced by anti-Zionist and Christian conspiracy
theories.54

Dynamic Interaction of International Pressure and Domestic Politics

There had continuously been major and minor religious conflicts and
terrorism in Indonesia even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Bali
bombing in October 2002. Initiating from religious conflicts between
Christian and Islam in the Maluku archipelago at the end of 1999, there
occurred many cases such as the sequential bombing of Christian churches
on Christmas Eve in 2000, car bombing in Ambon in April 2002, and civil car
gun shooting in Iryan Jaya in August 2002, bus bombing in Sulawesi in June
2002, Bali bombing in October 2002, and the Marriott Hotel bombing in
Jakarta in 2003. Accordingly, the Indonesian government implemented
extensive clean-up operations in response to every terrorist action, in order to
investigate the cause, but its visible achievement is still very vague.
At the dimension of domestic politics, the reason that the Indonesian
government is continuing to pursue a passive anti-terrorism policy with a
limited achievement is because it is a religious and Islamic issue. In fact,

51. Kingsbury and Fernandes, op. cit., pp. 1719.

52. These two organizations have a continuous network with transnational Islamic armed forces, and
some of their members are known to have participated in Afghanistan war. Martin van Bruinessen,
Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, South East Asia Research, 10-2 (July
2002), p. 145.
53. Kingsbury and Fernandes, op. cit., pp. 2127.
54. Gershman, op. cit., pp. 6768; Kumar Ramakrishna, The US Foreign Policy of Praetorian
Unilateralism and the Implications for Southeast Asia, in Johannen, Smith, and Gomez, op. cit.,
p. 131.

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 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 263

because of international fever, which included the worldwide campaign

against terrorism led by the USA, Great Britain, and Australia, such an event
had certain impacts not only on the Islamic state movement, but also on
political Islam in general. Islamic parties, which maintain a strong presence
within Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR: National Assembly) and Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR: National Council), newly formed organi-
zations through democratic election held in June 1999 since the retirement of
President Suharto in 1998, were never able to accept strengthening of anti-
terrorism policy. For them, anti-terrorism policy could be regarded as a direct
suppression, and President Megawati Sukarnoputri could not develop a
strong anti-terrorism policy given the political dynamics of coalition govern-
ment.55 Especially following the constitutional amendment in August 2002,
Indonesia held a direct presidential election in 2004, and she was not able to
sustain any policy that is against Islam, which records more than 90 percent
of the population.56
Hence before the Bali bombing occurred, the Indonesian government took
a passive attitude internally, although they expressed support for the strong
anti-terrorism policy of the international community initiated by the USA
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Indonesian government came up with a
draft of the Anti-Terrorism Act, but many politicians expressed opposition
due to its violation of the constitution and its cruelty. Since the Bali bomb
attacks in October 2002, a new, tense relation between the USA and
Indonesia was developing; the international community including the USA
and Australia began to demand quick action by the Indonesian government to
apprehend the perpetrators of the Bali terrorist attacks. The Indonesian
police, to pacify the many terrorism cases, demonstrated a strong investiga-
tion intention by identifying and arresting a few members of the JI as
criminals, and ordering dismissal of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as
the LJ. Also, the Indonesian government has enhanced aviation security and
has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Combating International
Terrorism, which covers intelligence exchange, law enforcement coopera-
tion, and training.57
Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has not been able to prove the
direct relations between the JI and Al Qaeda and the arresting of those
responsible for the Bali bomb attacks did not go smoothly. They are having
difficulties in practicing anti-terrorism policy because of political pressure of
Islamic political power regarding terrorism investigations and the continuous
bombings by a few Islamic fundamentalist armed groups.58 There was a limit

55. Rahim, op. cit., pp. 222223.

56. In an online survey conducted by the daily newspaper Media Indonesia, a majority of the 2,400
respondents believed that Osama bin Laden was a justice fighter, and fewer than 35 percent
considered him a terrorist. Abuza, op. cit., p. 24.
57. Samydorai, op. cit., p. 226.
58. Of particular concern are the activities of paramilitary Islamist groups such as the LJ, the Laskar
Pembela Islam (Islamic Defense Front), and the MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council), believed to be
supported by the disgruntled members of the political and military elite sidelined by the post-Suharto
reforms. Rahim, op. cit., p. 215.

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on how aggressive Megawati could be toward Islamic militants, as she had to

contend with growing Islamic opposition and her vice president, Hamzah
Haz.59

Domestic Political Effects on Anti-Terrorism Policy

As a result, just before the first direct election for presidency in Indonesias
political history in July 2004, the Megawati administration was in a dilemma
between international pressure that demands stronger anti-terrorism policy,
and domestic political forces of Islamic power that are against external
pressure. First, in terms of international relations, if Indonesia did not imple-
ment a strong anti-terrorism policy, it had to face international isolation.
In terms of economic relations, the October 2002 bombing in Bali led to
an immediate 10-percent drop in the Jakarta Stock Exchange, as traders
contemplated the bombings effect on the years tourist industry, earning
$US5bn annually. The Indonesian GDP growth rate in 2002 fell by 3.4
percent, down nearly 1 percent point due to the bombing. Indonesia espe-
cially needed financial support from the international community such as the
International Monetary Fund for economic recovery after the financial crisis
in 1997; and assistance from the USA or Japan was crucial.
In accordance with this, Megawati visited the USA on 19 September 2001,
right after the 9/11 attacks, and promised full support to prevent terrorism;
the USA in return promised to support training expenses of the Indonesian
police and military that would be used to search for terrorists, as well as
$US400m worth of economic aid.60 However, such promises were not
immediately realized, since the Indonesian government hesitated in imple-
menting strong anti-terrorism policy. Although the Megawati administration
expressed strong intention on terrorism investigation and cooperation
through the imprisonment of Abu Bakar Baasyir, leader of the JI, and the
activation of emergency measures to prevent the terrorism threat in order to
maintain international trust and cooperation, the international community
including the USA and Australia still does not trust Indonesias investigation
intention and its ability.
On the other hand, if the Megawati government pushes a strong anti-
terrorism policy, there is no doubt that it will face strong resistance from
domestic Islamic powers. Indeed, anti-American and anti-Australian senti-
ments in Indonesia began to emerge with the pressure of the international
community on anti-terrorism policy, and the public is turning its back on the
government due to worsened economic conditions, which were gradually
improving before the Bali bombing terror. Also, before the presidential
election in 2004, oppositions, including Islamic parties, strongly criticized
the inability of the Megawati government and anti-Islamic anti-terrorism

59. He met several times with the LJ chief, Jafar Umar Thalib and also with Abu Bakar Baasyir. He
is the leader of the largest Muslim party and a staunch Islamist. He was a former opponent of Megawati
and blocked her ascendancy to the presidency in 1999. Abuza, op. cit., p. 191.
60. Abuza, op. cit., pp. 190191.

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 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 265

policy. As a result, Megawati and her party faced failure in both the parlia-
mentary election in April 2004 and the presidential election between July and
September in 2004.

Conclusion: Comparative Implications

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the international community has
continued to strengthen anti-terrorism policy and cooperation among coun-
tries, in order to prevent and suppress terrorism with the USA taking the
leadership. With the USA in the vanguard, multilateral cooperation was
consolidated, and the Afghanistan War was initiated in order to search for Bin
Laden and Al Qaeda, the forces behind the 9/11 attacks, and a war that aimed
to restrain one of the countries known as the axis of evil, Iraq, followed
suit. Despite such changes in the international environment, however, foreign
and domestic policy responses and cooperation of each country demonstrate
difference. This is because individual countries domestic condition and
political situation that react to the changes in the international environment
are different, and such disparities in domestic conditions yield different
outcomes in the promotion of anti-terrorism policy in each country.
At the dimension of the region, the regional environment of the Southeast
Asian countries that are known as a stage for a number of Islamic armed
groups related to Al Qaeda, was not able to resist such a trend either, while
having difficulties in maintaining a common policy solidarity regarding the
anti-terrorism policy due to the different opinions and conditions of each
ASEAN member country. The ASEAN, externally, agrees to the necessity of
strengthening anti-terrorism policy demanded by international community,
while internally, it is not able to promote a strong anti-terrorism policy due to
different opinions between the member states and lack of mutual agreement.
Two of the ASEAN member nations, the Philippines and Indonesia, show
different stances regarding anti-terrorism policy, because they have different
domestic political conditions despite the international communitys trend of
strengthening anti-terrorism policy.
From the analysis of this research, summarized in Table 1, we can find a
few important theoretical implications. First, a countrys policy toward
terrorism is a mixture of international pressure, response and reaction of
the region, and the domestic political situation. In general, the ASEAN
members policy cooperation and joint effort to respond to the international
pressure for stronger anti-terrorism policy was lukewarm. In this circum-
stance, the Philippines and Indonesia showed policy results of different
stance and attitude. In the Philippines, the government had more domestic
room to move and produced stronger anti-terrorism policy, in cooperation
with USA. On the contrary, the Indonesian government, despite pressure
from the USA and the UN, could not implement strong anti-terrorism policy
thanks to strong domestic rejection of the policy. Despite the same inter-
national and regional environments, the two countries policy results were
divergent because of different domestic situations.
Second, among these variables, as far as the Philippines and Indonesia are
concerned, domestic factors had a more decisive impact on the nature of

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Table 1. Comparison of Anti-Terrorism Policies of the Philippines and

Indonesia
The Philippines Indonesia

International Strong Demand and Pressure for
Environment Anti-Terrorism Policy
Regional Lukewarm Correspondence and Lax
Environment Internal Discipline
Domestic Adaptation to International Demand:
Politics Weak Resistance of Domestic
Politics (Minority of Muslims),
2004 Presidential Election
Policy Result Positive Attitude and Strong
Anti-Terrorism Policy
Electoral Victory of President Arroyo
Strong Demand and Pressure for
Anti-Terrorism Policy
Lukewarm Correspondence and Lax
Internal Discipline
Resistance against International
Demand: Strong Resistance of
Domestic Politics (Majority of
Muslims), 2004 Presidential Election
Lukewarm Attitude and Lax
Anti-Terrorism Policy
Electoral Failure of President Megawati

anti-terrorism policy than the international pressure and regional environ-

ment. Both countries had similar impacts from the international community
and regional organization, that is, ASEAN. However, the two countries had
different domestic settings. For the Philippines, domestic opposition to the
anti-terrorism policy was relatively weak since the Muslim population, which
is a potential veto group for the policy, was a minority in population. In
contrast, in Indonesia, not only was the Muslim population the absolute
majority, but there have already been widespread and strong Islamic political
organizations. This veto group of the policy constrained the policy autonomy
of the Indonesian government, resulting in a relatively weak anti-terrorism
policy.
Third, such domestic political factors can be explained by domestic politi-
cal dynamics and by the presidential elections held in the two countries in
2004. Facing the election, President Arroyo attempted to counter domestic
political instability and economic downturn with stronger and outward anti-
terrorism policy. Given weak antipathy towards anti-terrorism policy, the
strong push of the policy actually helped Arroyo in her election campaign.
On the other hand, civic rejection of the anti-terrorism policy got stronger
before the 2004 presidential election in Indonesia. Consequently, president
Megawati was in a policy dilemma between the international pressure and
domestic resistance of Islamic political forces. To solve the problem of
domestic political instability and economy, it might have been a better choice
to push the anti-terrorism policy. Nevertheless, Megawati could not ignore
the rejection of anti-terrorism policy by the Islamic political force in particu-
lar and by the public in general to win the 2004 election.
Fourth, this situational mixture produced different policy results. When
the international and regional environment were the same, the Filipino
anti-terrorism policy realized Arroyos electoral victory by bringing about
domestic political stability and economic rise. But, Megawatis policy inde-
cisiveness caught between the need of strong anti-terrorism policy and the

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 Anti-Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia / 267

objection by the Islamic political force gave her electoral defeat in Indonesia.
Arroyos anti-terrorism policy, congruent with domestic political dynamics
incurred the best result for her while Megawatis choice, despite the failure of
strong anti-terrorism policy, invited the worst political consequence.
In conclusion, a countrys promotion of foreign policy and adjustment of
domestic policy initially are both influenced by changes in the international
environment, but domestic factors cannot be omitted from the equation.
Although anti-terrorism policy in the international community was over-
whelming since the 9/11 attacks, joint policy efforts and international
cooperation of the Philippines and Indonesia in response to this pressure
was demonstrated differently. The Arroyo administration of the Philippines,
which could easily strengthen anti-terrorism policy domestically, has
strengthened its political status and benefited from economic advantages by
pushing forward an active alliance with the USA. Indonesia, where a strong
domestic resistance and resentment developed against the anti-terrorism
policy led by the Western countries, had to respond ambiguously and tepidly
to the demand of joint efforts in anti-terrorism policy and international
cooperation. This trait has continued to mark Indonesias anti-terrorism
policy, even after major terrorist acts in the country.

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