Art. 358. Slander.
Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 peso.
What is slander?
Slander is oral defamation.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood,
has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words
which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business, or means of livelihood.
(Villanueva V People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10,
2006)
Two kinds of oral defamation
1. Simple Slander
2. Grave Slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
Factors that determine the gravity of oral defamation
1. Upon the expressions used
2. On the personal relations of the accused and offended party.
3. The circumstances surrounding the case.
Illustration of grave slander
Grave slander is committed by a woman of violent temper, who
hurled at the complaint, a respectable married lady with young
daughters, offensive and scurrilous epithets, including words
imputing unchastity to the mother and tending to injure the
character of the daughters. (US v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166)
No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of
the compass of grave oral defamation.
Examples of Simple Slander
1. An accusation that the offended party has been living
successively and with several men uttered before several
persons, when intended to correct an improper conduct of
the offended party, a kin of the accused, is only a simple
slander (People V Clarin, 37 O.G. 1106)
Note: In Tolosa Case the same imputation was made. But in
the Clarin case, the purpose was to correct an improper
conduct.
2. Calling a person gangster. (Arcand v People, 68 Phil 601)
3. Uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some
provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only
a light felony. (People V De Modesto, 40 O.G.,Supp 11, 128)
Words uttered in the heat of anger or when passions are
running high, and not taken seriously by the offended party,
although they are clearly serious oral defamation under
ordinary circumstances constitute only slight oral
defamation(People V Doronila, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp11, 231
4. Defamation uttered in political meeting, considering that it
was committed on the eve of the elections when everyone
was excited and feelings were running high, is only simple
slander. (People v. Laroga, 40 O.G., Supp. 22,123)
Note:
The word Puta does not impute that the complainant is a
prostitute.
The slander did not be heard by the offended party.
Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this
title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another
person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos
What is slander by deed?
Slander by deed is a crime against honor which is committed by
performing any act which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt
upon another person.
Elements:
1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other
crime against honor.
2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or
persons.
3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon the
offended party.
Slander by deed is of two kinds:
a) Simple slander by deed
b) Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a serious nature.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes a slander by
deed of a serious nature or not depends on the social
standing of the offended party, the circumstances under
which act was committed, the occasion, etc.
Note:
Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not use of words.
Slapping the face of another is slander by deed if the intention of
the accused is to cause shame and humiliation.
Fighting the offended party with intention to insult him is a slander
by deed.
Pointing a dirty finger constitutes simple slander by deed.
Section Two. General provisions
Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is
in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed
and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article
is printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil
action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is
filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where
the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall
acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And, provided,
finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which have been filed
in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal action for written defamations
as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial
or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the
city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted
in accordance with the provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation
of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought
except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the
offended party. (As amended by R.A. 1289, approved June 15, 1955,
R.A. 4363, approved June 19, 1965).
Persons responsible for libel are:
1. The person who publishes, exhibits, or causes the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or similar (Art. 360,
par. 1)
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet.
3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper
magazine or serial publication (Art. 360, par. 2)
4. The owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous
article with his consent and all other persons who in any way
participate in or have connection with its publication. (US v
Ortiz, 8 Phil, 752)
Note:
The person who publishes libelous letter written by the offended
party is liable.
Liability of the editor is the same as that of the author.
Lack of participation in the preparation of libelous articles does not
shield the persons responsible for libel from liability.
Municipal court cannot conduct preliminary investigation of criminal
action for written defamation.
Venue of criminal and civil actions for damages in cases
written defamation.
The criminal and civil actions for damages in cases written
defamation shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province or city-
1. Where the libelous article is printed and first published; or
2. Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense.
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, 2. To act or omission of a public officer which, although not
the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears constituting a crime a crime, is related to the discharge of
that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it his duties.
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the 2. It was published with good motives
defendants shall be acquitted. 3. And for justifiable ends

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not

constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation
Note:
shall have been made against Government employees with respect
to facts related to the discharge of their official duties. Retraction may mitigate the damages.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation That the publication of the article was an honest mistake is not a
made by him, he shall be acquitted. complete defense but serves only to mitigate damages where the
article is libelous per se.
When proof of truth is admissible.
Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:
1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime
regardless of whether offended party is a private individual or
a public officer.
2. When offended party is a Government employee, even if the
act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime,
provided, it is related to the discharge of his official duties.
(see Ocampo v Evangelista, et al., C.A., 37 O.G. 2196; Art. 362. Libelous remarks. Libelous remarks or comments
Tumang v People, 73 Phil 700) connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article
354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor
In such cases if the defendant proves truth of the imputation the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Three requisites of defense in Defamation:
Libelous remarks or comments on matters privileged, if made with
1. If it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true malice in fact, do not exempt the author and editor.
The proof of the truth in defamation is limited only
1. To act or omission constituting a crime Liability of newspaper reporter for distorting facts connected with
official proceedings.
 addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an
envelope.
In the letter Atty. Pieraz was called stupid and his language
as [E]nglish carabao by the letter sender, Buatis Jr., and even put
Yours in Satan name and his signature on the closing part.

Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., Atty.

Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant.
Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not
only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him
telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."

The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was

denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the
organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan"
or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had
dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of
private-complainant in the second week of August 1995. Initially
during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had
signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty.
G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006 Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another
letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz.
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner,
vs. RTC found him guilty of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is
PIERAZ, Respondents. hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify
the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of
Facts compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary
Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and,
to pay the costs
 Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs decision to the
CA which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its
entirety the decision of the trial court.
Issue: The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner
is guilty of the crime of libel.
Ruling: Yes. He is guilty of the crime of libel
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must
concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it
must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 8
The last two elements have been duly established by the
prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to
someone other than the person against whom it has been
written.9 Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states that the same
was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated
the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel
complained of has communicated it to a third
10
person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the
subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
It is order then to resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to
whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any
publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez
v. Reyes,12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn.,
341), the court had the following to say on this point: "In
determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two
rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That
construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2)
The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
whole."
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in
the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is
defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao
English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts
aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent
as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these
very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule
as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago
dito."14
 Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory;
and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution
need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioners imputation is malicious
(malice in law).15 A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such
a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said
letter which showed petitioners good intention and justifiable G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal
inference of malice. JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by vs.

means of writings or similar means with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought
by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to
impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to
impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a
penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
SC Ruling: the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall
be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory
damages is DELETED.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
Facts
Due to a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
was charged before the MeTC of Pasig, with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in

Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Petitioner also sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without
acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the
motion.
RTC: In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A.
No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this
proved unavailing.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
(1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A.
2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
(2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Ruling:
(1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the
petition in S.C.A. 2803
(2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape
from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed
by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion
of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments
of convictions.
 The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the its Consequences on Persons and
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Property are Material Only to Determine
Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and the Penalty
jurisprudence.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers
penalizing quasi-offenses. (See Article 365)
the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence
sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject
offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a
to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in
fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
to that of a fugitive without standing.
or foresight, the imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 punish the intentional criminal act.
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses
set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case
Reckless Imprudence Bars
No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
 The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365
starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of
a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because
a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising
from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had
been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal
question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative.
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to
which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act
defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a
single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts,
rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, SC hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information
shall be filed in the same first level court.
The ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365
charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied
the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting
acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This Branch 157. Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. petitioner is Dismissed.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
SC GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,