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To cite this article: Thomas Diez (2004) Europe's others and the return of geopolitics, Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, 17:2, 319-335, DOI: 10.1080/0955757042000245924
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Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004
Thomas Diez
University of Birmingham
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Abstract In the context of European Union enlargement and the discussions about a
European constitution, the question of Europes identity has once again entered the
limelight of political debates. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are con-
structed through practices of othering, articulating a difference. In this article, I follow
Ole Wver to argue that for most of the time after the Second World War the most
important other in the construction of a European identity has been Europes own past.
This temporal form of othering offered the possibility to form an identity through less
antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international
society. However, since the 1990s geographic and cultural otherings are on the increase,
marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the
notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation-states.1
Europe/Europe
In her Journal of Common Market Studies lecture in 1997, Susan Strange posed the
question, Who are EU? (Strange 1998). She took her cue from Robert Reichs
problematisation of the simplistic notion of USAmerican competitiveness in an
age when it is difficult to determine which nationality a firm has or where
exactly it is located. This, Strange argued, was the same for the European Union
(EU). In addition, she pointed to the competition between EU member states in
terms of their national economic systems and their ability to attract investment
(Strange 1998, 104). Although this was not her primary concern, Strange thereby
questioned the notion of a European, or rather EU, identity that underlies (and
is constructed through) arguments of European competitiveness. Whatever
Europe is, it is certainly diverse, and some have indeed taken this diversity to
be at the very core of its identity. At the same time, this diversity makes it rather
difficult to pitch Europe against other international identities.
Stranges question, although in different terms than she elaborated, is becom-
ing increasingly pertinent to the political debate about European integration. A
short glance at some of the disputes in the late 1990s and early years of the new
millennium illustrates this: Is Turkey a European country? Is there a common
1
A previous version of this paper was presented at the workshop Other Europes,
organised by the Poststructuralism working group of the British International Studies
Association, Keele University, England, 16 May 2003. I would like to thank the workshop
participants, Alessandra Buonfino, Bahar Rumelili and the three referees of this journal
for their critical and constructive comments.
is the most obvious case outside the EU, but one could also list Norway, most
parts of former Yugoslavia, and a number of Eastern European states, including
Russia. Second, the very notion of Europe is contested. It is contested in
geographical as well as cultural terms. Take the case of Russia: geographically,
many would see Europe end at the Urals, but these not only run straight
through Russia, they are also a border drawn in particular historical circum-
stances, and by no means natural. Culturally, Christian Orthodoxy, despite its
common roots, has often been constructed as Eastern (European) and alien to
a Western (European) tradition, introducing a substantial divide that makes the
meaning of the very notion of Europe contestable.
When we talk about Europe, we therefore probably mean different Europes.
Europe is, in the terms of W.B. Gallie (1962), an essentially contested concept.
Consequently, what is often described as the search for Europes identity is not
so much a search as a construction or an imagination of Europe. There is
nothing special about this. All nations are imagined (Anderson 1991), and even
if Europe is not a nation in the traditional sense of the term at least, it is still
a kind of political identity that reaches beyond the immediate face-to-face
encounter and therefore needs imagination. Yet Benedict Andersons argument
was that imagining the nation was different from imagining previous forms of
identity, such as religious communities. Is the imagination of Europe different
from that of the nation?
From the angle of the discursive analyst, identities are constructed through
practices of othering that generate difference. This was of particular importance
in the modern, territorial state system, as I will explore further in the next
section. My main argument in this paper is that while the European Union
opened up the possibility of the construction of a political identity through a less
exclusionary practice of temporal difference (elaborated in the third section),
geographical and cultural otherings have since the 1990s become more import-
ant in the discourse on European identity (as elaborated in the fourth section).
If this observation is correct (and although I provide a number of illustrations,
the argument certainly warrants further empirical research), this represents a
return of geopolitics and undermines the idea of European integration as a
challenge to the modern territorial state.
Underlying this argument is a distinction between temporal and geopolitical
forms of othering. My claim is that otherings between geographically defined
political entities tend to be more exclusive and antagonistic against out-groups
than otherings with a predominantly temporal dimension. It is obvious that the
temporal and the geopolitical often cannot be separated (Rumelili 2004, 46).
Colonial encounters, for instance, often drew geographical distinctions on the
Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 321
othering: while it needs a definition of the self, this can be a loose definition (as
Europe has been and arguably still is), and it is circular in that the temporal
othering is itself part of the construction of the self. It generates a Europe that
refuses to fix the deeper meaning of the European idea and thus also remains
open to those who currently remain outside the borders of the European Union
(Elbe 2003, 121). The temporal othering therefore is only problematic from an
ethical point of view that privileges pluralism and non-antagonistic diversity
over the exclusivity, antagonism and hegemony that have so often characterised
modern international society, if there is a prior definition of the self based on a
geopolitical othering.
than this. It alerts us to what David Campbell (1993, 95) once called the radical
interdependence of our political identities. Our own identity is foundationally
linked to the other, or to many others, and these are present whenever we
invoke our identity as British or Europeans. The obvious puzzle posed by this
is, what are the processes of othering in those political speech acts that invoke
a European identity? And, who or what are the others? There is also perhaps a
more interesting question to be asked. If identity is always dependent on
difference, a critical theory addressing the problem of identity/difference de-
pends on the possibility of different kinds of difference: more or less exclusive,
antagonistic and violent ones. If there were no such possibility, the theory would
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become fatalistic and would no longer be critical. To raise this issue does not
mean to fall back into an idealist notion of a global identity without difference
and the conflicts brought with difference. Instead, there is a sense in the
literature that some forms of othering are more problematic than others. In
particular, the modern territorial state may be prone to violent forms of othering
because it links identity to a specific territory and therefore imposes centralisa-
tion and a hierarchy of identity. If that is the case, and provided that the
European Union is generally considered to be a novel form of political organis-
ation, does it offer an opening towards a less antagonistic, less violent form of
the articulation of identity and difference in international politics?
religions or classes, although the latter are often woven into specific construc-
tions of the nation.
The national identity of the modern state is a geopolitical rendering of
identity. The geographic organisation of political identities, however, requires
the imposition of identities over particular territories. This is a crucial difference
to the organisation of power and identity of the church. The power of religion
extends over believers only, unless it is coupled with worldly, territorial power.
While religion has historically been spread by force, its power does not require
the allegiance of a particular person as long as there is a community of believers.
In a world of states, the individual becomes recognisable only through belonging
to a state, and the state legally imposes an identity onto all its citizens: one can
convert to another creed without the involvement of pubic authority, but one
cannot convert to another citizenship as easily, since it requires some form of
legal procedure.
The pacification of the domestic sphere within the modern state does
therefore not constitute a linear progress, but is much more ambiguous and
involves itself in a twofold violence: the violence of imposing a national identity
within its borders, and the violence of imposing its borders and maintaining the
difference between national self and the other outside. History is full of exam-
ples of this violence, such as the hereditary enmity between Germany and
France that led to a series of wars during the constitution of Germany in the 19th
and 20th centuries. As often, the contest over territory and identity was most
fierce in the context of the border regions, such as Alsace/Elsass. The post-1945
European Movement therefore turned Hobbes on his head. The nation-state no
longer seemed the pacifier that guaranteed a good life, but the origin of hatred
and war.
Campbell qualifies this statement in the epilogue to the revised second edition
324 Thomas Diez
would produce a specific notion of what Europe is (see Diez 2001), but also by
drawing sharp distinctions between Europe and an other. Indeed, many have
commented about such attempts to construct Europe against Russia or Asia or
simply the East, against Turkey or sometimes Islam, or against America, and
specifically the United States.
Before I turn to these practices of othering, however, it is worthwhile to
pause, not least because it is clear that, in contrast to the US, none of these
attempts has as yet been so successful as to be able to claim hegemonic status.
This is obviously bound up with the general status of European governance as
more than just an intergovernmental cooperation (therefore the need to construct
a European identity in the first place), but not constituting a modern territorial
state in itself. Instead, the EU is a complex system of governance that John
Ruggie (1993, 172) has aptly described as multiperspectival, and by now there
are plenty of arguments following his line and conceptualisation of the EU as a
postmodern polity. Ole Wver (1996, 127) draws out the potential conse-
quences of this for how we conceptualise identity: In a post-sovereign state like
Europe we have to view identity simultaneously as something impossible to
fill, always incomplete due to the presence of the outside in the inside, but also
as defined by this impossibility.
Whatever the substance of this argument (which is in itself a construction
that works on the basis of an othering, on which more in a moment), the
ambiguity of the EU within a discourse of states offers the possibility that the
construction of a European identity might not follow the example of the US, or
that of states in general. Jacques Derrida therefore asked,
What if Europe was nothing but the opening, the beginning of a history, for which
the change of course, the change of the heading, the relation to the other heading
or to the other of the heading, would become a continuously existing possibility?
Could Europe in some sense carry the responsibility for this opening, which is the
opposite of exclusion? Could Europe in a constitutive way be the responsibility for
this opening? (Derrida 1992, 1718; emphasis in original; my translation)
This possibility of the opening puts into place an alternative horizon of an open
and diverse Europe, the boundaries of which can never be fixed and which
recognises its multiplicity and institutionalises an ethos of pluralisation (Con-
nolly 1995). In the next section, I argue that the traditionally dominant other in
the debate about European identity is compatible with such an alternative
horizon because it is a temporal rather than a geopolitical other. However, this
othering is increasingly contested.
Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 325
Europes other is Europes own past which should not be allowed to become its
future (1998, 90).
One could indeed make a long list of contributions to the debate about
European integration in which European governance and continued European
integration are justified by reference to Europes war-torn past and the need to
overcome this, and the representation of post-war (for a long time, Western)
Europe as a new Europe that has overcome the menace of war. Indeed, such is
the force of this argument that European Union representatives often strongly
identify with the notion of being a force for peace and human rightsthe notion
of a normative power (Manners 2002). Consider the following two speeches as
examples for this rhetoric.
Firstly, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in his speech on the future
of Europe at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000:
Fifty years ago almost to the day, Robert Schuman presented his vision of a
European Federation for the preservation of peace. This heralded a completely
new era in the history of Europe. European integration was the response to
centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and
again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars
between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still
is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic
ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the
transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.
(Fischer 2000)
Of course, Fischer is often seen as a federalist, and his speech was contested and
kicked off an intense debate about the future of Europe. The British Prime
Minister, Tony Blair, in a less high-profile speech in Glasgow on 15 February
2003, however, made a similar argument:
For hundreds of years, Europe was at war, the boundaries of many nations
shifting with each passing army, small countries occupied and re-occupied, their
people never at peace. Large countries fought each other literally for decades at
a time with only the briefest respite to draw breath before the resumption of
hostilities. For my fathers generation that was the Europe they were brought up
in. Today in Europe former enemies are friends, at one, if not always diplomati-
cally. The EU is a massive achievement of peace and prosperity. (Blair 2003)
only in relation to the future member states, but also in other locales of CEE. In
Bosnia, for instance, where the EU has been particularly active, Commission
President Romano Prodi, in a speech in Sarajevo on 6 April 2002, compared the
history of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a potted version of Europes own. He
continued,
Confrontation, nationalism and extremism must give way to a new outlook. Let
me make that clear: in a united Europe there is simply no place for such attitudes
or for those who hold them. European integration has allowed us to cast off this
narrow mindset. We no longer see ourselves solely in terms of nationality,
community or State The European Union is founded on dialogue, cooperation
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and mutual respect. Dialogue, cooperation and mutual respect are also vital for
the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no reason why the communities
that make up this country cannot cooperate in their common interest for the sake
of a better future for all. Just as many other former enemies are doing so
successfully within the Union. Dialogue and cooperation are just as crucial to
Sarajevo as they are to Europe. And Sarajevo, the European capital of a European
State, should stand as an example of multi-ethnicity. Regional cooperation is the
key to lasting peace. (Prodi 2002)
Central and Eastern Europe is not the first incarnation of the EUs temporal
other. The sanctions imposed by the other member states against Austria in 1999,
when the right-wing Liberal Party (FPO ) and its then head, Jorg Haider, who
was accused of racism, formed a coalition government with the Peoples Party
VP), can equally be read as an attempt to construct a European identity as
(O
human-rights-observing and peaceful, a moral community, against an Austria
that displayed non-European characteristics (see Diez 2000). As with CEE, the
problem with the sanctions was that while the public statements of FPO
politicians had been more than worrying, the othering of Austria conveniently
ignored that some member states, such as Denmark, pursued at least equally
problematic policies when it came to immigration, and displayed similar tenden-
cies towards racism.
new Europe now becomes old Europe, and old Europe (the incarnation of the
past as other in enlargement parlance) becomes new Europe (see also Joenniemi
2004).
Rumsfelds rhetorical move was particularly effective (and provocative to his
old Europeans) because it used an already existing discursive trope, turned its
meaning on its head and reinforced its geopolitical connotations. This seems to
fit into a wider move towards a return to geopolitics, also by EU actors, as
reflected most clearly in renewed efforts to contrast Europe to an Islamic world
or America. Europes temporal other, while still running alongside these identity
constructions as the quotes from Blair and Fischer at the beginning of this
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section have shown, is losing in importance. The next section provides some
illustrations of this return of geopolitical othering.
European Movement in The Hague in 1949 (European Movement 1949, 39), and
subsequently became a member of the Council of Europe and NATO, but not of
the predecessors of the European Union. When it concluded an Association
Agreement with the then European Economic Community in 1963, this was not
seen as leading to Turkish membership, although membership was mentioned
as an option that the association process should facilitate (OJ 217, 29/12/1964,
3687 [preamble]). The European Union could, however, no longer evade the
issue of Turkeys Europeanness when the country filed a membership appli-
cation in 1987: the EU Treaty stipulates in Article 49 that only European states
can join the Union.
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The ambiguous representation of Turkey has since been continued. While the
Commission and the Council have in principle agreed to Turkeys eligibility and
accepted Turkey as a membership candidate, the discussion about Turkeys
membership operates on several levels. There are, on the one hand, serious
problems with the political system, although a large part of these are currently
being rectified by an overhaul of the constitution. There remains the problem of
human rights violations, which include the Turkish involvement in northern
Cyprus if the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights is taken as the
measure. And there are serious problems of economic performance and admin-
istrative capabilities. Yet on the other hand, Turkeys Europeanness continues to
be questioned, both openly, and often also indirectly in discussions about
political, economic and administrative criteria.
This is a well-known story; therefore three examples from the last decade can
suffice. In 1994, the then head of the Christian-Democrat and Christian-Social
(CDU/CSU) grouping in the German parliament, Wolfgang Schauble, argued
that Turkey was not part of the Christianoccidental tradition and therefore
could not be a member of the EU (Suddeutsche Zeitung 1994). Three years later,
the heads of European Christian Democrats, after a meeting of the European
Peoples Party in Luxembourg, made their infamous statement to the same
effect.2 Finally, when the President of the convention for a European consti-
tution, Giscard dEstaing, was interviewed on 7 November 2002, he also stated
that Turkey is not a European country (BBC 2002).
One of the reasons why the Europe versus Islam discourse remained a silent
and minor one during much of the Cold War period was that the Europeanness
of the then EU members had not been challenged. One exception was the
application by Morocco in 1987 (see Rumelili 2004, 4143), which was not even
considered because Morocco was not deemed to be a European country, and
therefore did not spark debates similar to those about Turkey. During the Cold
War, the then Soviet Union came perhaps closest to being an other for the then
European Community, although, as Iver Neumann (1999, 111) argues, its
specificity as Europes other resides not along the spatial but along the
temporal dimension, as the country that is perpetually seen as being in some
stage of transition to Europeanization. Neumann notes that this is reflected in
discourses within Russiaas is the case with Turkey. The main complication
with the Soviet Union as a European other, however, was that it played that
function for the West as a whole, and that there is also an increasingly important
2
Turkish Press Review, 3 April 1997, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/chr/
ing97/04/97x04x03.txt .
330 Thomas Diez
discourse that represents America, or more specifically, the United States, and
therefore part of the West, as Europes other.
along the lines of standard practices of othering, and they are situated in a
longer history of European identity constructions against the United States.
When the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, declared 1973 to be the
Year of Europe without consulting the Europeans (see Urwin 1991, 160), he
unleashed a soul-searching enterprise that led to the Copenhagen Document
on European Identity, in which, among other things, the member states
declared their aim to be recognised by the international society as a single entity
with its own character (reprinted in Gasteyger 1994, 3025). For many, especially
those of a federalist persuasion, one aim of the integration process had always
been to turn Europe into a third superpower that would follow its own
economic and political path and could act as a mediator between the Soviet
Union and the United States. After World War II, the Socialist Movement for a
United States of Europe adopted the further aim of becoming a third force,
which found common ground with the conservative Count Coudenhove-Ka-
lergi, doyen of the European federalists, who thought a United States of Europe
would be the only way to survive in a world of Great Powers (Europe Unites
1949, 19).
Underlying these proposals, as well as later ones, was the notion of Europe
being different from the United States: less prone to laissez-faire capitalism, more
cultured, more concerned about the environment, as well as more peaceful. The
trade disputes between the EU and the US that have become more outspoken
since the 1990s are partly entanglements in these identity constructions, as is the
promotion of human rights and especially the abolition of the death penalty,
over which the EU regularly clashes with the US. The idea of the European
Union as a normative power (Manners 2002) is largely articulated in contrast
to the US, which is constructed as conducting its foreign policy by military
means rather than by the force of norms.
This process of othering works, of course, both ways. Located in this context
is a popular bestseller of 2003, Robert Kagans Paradise and Power (2003), where
Kagan sets the paradise EU, where peaceful means and confidence in inter-
national norms dominate foreign policy, against the power US, which takes a
more realist(ic) view and relies on military force. While Europeans may
disagree with Kagan in the final analysis (i.e. that the paradise needs power
to exist, and that Europes foreign policy emerges from weakness), there is no
doubt that the paradise/power imagery is shared by many (the book has been
widely discussed in the media and on endless discussion forums), and that it ties
into the past as other discourse in that the past is a past of power politics and
unilateralism. (Read the above quotes from Fischer and Blair against Kagan.)
To focus on these othering processes is not to say that there is no difference
Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 331
between the conduct of foreign policy between the European Union and the
United States. Instead, foreign policy is itself interwoven with the discourse on
a European identity. In this respect, I would like to maintain an ambiguity in my
argument. On the one hand, I do believe that the EU constitutes a different kind
of power, both in its organisation of politics and in its pursuit of foreign policy,
and that its policies are less antagonistic. On the other hand, the dichotomisation
of paradise and power leads to forgetting the dark sides of Europethe still
present xenophobia and racism; the involvement of EU member states in the
arms trade; the waste of agricultural production; to name but a few. The
challenge therefore is to reinforce the difference without reinforcing the antago-
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threats, because the main existential threat is related to the self. In this respect,
I agree with Bahar Rumelilis argument that any temporal-internal differen-
tiation requires the presumption be made that the community is unequivocally
bounded (Rumelili 2004, 46), but, in contrast to her, I nonetheless see a decisive
qualitative difference between the self-reflexivity of the temporal othering, and
the antagonism and externalisation of threat in many forms of geopolitical
otherings.
Second, as indicated above, there has always been a subtext to the temporal
othering that presented Islam for instance as an other, but also the United States.
To the extent that this was thematised openly, however, until recently the past
as other argument provided effective boundaries for an antagonistic articulation
of difference. In that sense, while one might read the construction of Turkey as
the other that has to modernise as the temporalisation of a geographical
difference, similar to the construction of backwardness in the colonial discourse,
the significance of the arguments about Turkey is that they have become a
central, if contested, part of the discourse about European identity only over the
past decade. Indeed, as the discussion of Ataturks modernisation strategy in the
previous section has shown, the temporal othering was articulated long before
then.
Third, the past as other discourse exhibits some significant silencesthe
present dark sides of Europe referred to above, but also its colonial past and
the shaping of its identity through this historical context, and the shadows it
casts over the present. Yet, while this past cannot be eradicated, and while the
past as other discourse does not problematise Europes colonial past to any
significant degree, it does at least provide a reference point to address this past
in a similar way as the nationalism and wars within Europe. A geopoliticised
identity discourse is much more problematic in this respect, because it is prone
to replicate colonial attitudes of supremacy in that it relies on the construction
of an inferior other and a superior self, which in turn is transposed onto the
other, while at the same time omitting the kind of self-reflexivity exhibited in the
temporal othering outlined above.
The geopoliticisation of European identity constructions is, however, by no
means a necessary outcome. The ambiguity emerging in the 1990s is discursively
textured, and the responses discursively manufactured. Consider that the tem-
poral othering does not problematise the location and existence of Europe; it
knows where Europe is supposed to be (Walker 2000). The definition of and the
response to the ambiguity display modern traits supposed to have been over-
come. Their aim is to reinforce clear territorial boundaries rather than taking the
chance to rethink the possibilities of politics on the basis that Europe really
Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 333
isnt there (ibid., 2829). Instead of opting for the maintenance of the ambiguity,
many, it seems, are opting for its abandonment, although it remains to be seen
whether this is met with the ultimate success of installing a hegemonic discourse
of the other.
The return of geopolitics closes the opening presented by European inte-
gration and undermines conceptions of integration as a network horizon, in
which the European polity is envisaged not as a unitary entity with fixed
boundaries, but as a complex of interwoven regional and functional units (see
Diez 1997). Such a horizon is not devoid of differences. However, these are
constantly negotiated, overlapping and therefore not exclusive. They institution-
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