SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS
A.C. No. 4749. (2000)

FACTS:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of
years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On
the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law
practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he
filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good
faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a
senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.

HELD/RULING:

(1) NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and
default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers
a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquents name from the Roll
of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice
of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of membership or association
dues.

(2)YES. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule
10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
 Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced
age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,
we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his
IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
 ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN & MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN
vs. BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA
G.R. No. 169517 (2006)

FACTS:

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent lawyer filed a criminal case against
them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave
coercion & violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

Respondent avers that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake.
He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit
which was patterned after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had
previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one
for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and another for the parking
incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon. Respondent insists
that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he
is a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City. However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the
subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty.
Aquinos secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. Hence, it
was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City, which statement
referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, admitted the mistake in the preparation of the
complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he
assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his
occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting
himself as a practicing lawyer.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Balajadia is liable for indirect contempt.

HELD/RULING:

No. The Court has ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an
attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Sect.
3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are
punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the
orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is
the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes
it clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never
intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the
secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave
rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5
of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was
the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing
before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law
despite being previously denied admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law
and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not
licensed to do so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney
or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law. However, while the evidence on record
failed to prove respondents deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as
such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future
actions.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE

OF LAW OF BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
 B.M. No. 1678 (2007)

FACTS:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE/S:

Whether petitioner may still resume practice.

HELD/RULING:

Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved
and limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his
Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to have never
been terminated.

But this does not mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after
reacquisition, Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his
practice of law, to wit:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and;
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. L-10236-48 (1958)
FACTS:

This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the CFI of Manila, granting
a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that
the facts alleged in the amended informations, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court
with which defendants are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about
the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each
one of these cases.

. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized
to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions
of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and
therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including
the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar
were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on
March 18, 1954, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist
in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him and
each and every one of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and
manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration
of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and
dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there,
without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and
making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the respondents should be admitted to the bar.

HELD/RULING:

No. Although know that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought
admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were subsequently notified of the
resolution of the Supreme Court denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their
oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the Court, not only of such fact,
but, also that they will practice in all courts of the Philippines.
The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only before
the Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of
the Supreme Court denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a
denial of the right to take said oath, as well as prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking oaths
before a notary public, appellees expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenge and
defy the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive
manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder
and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice and
the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.