THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 180245, July 4, 2012

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
TAKENAKA CORPORATION and ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
In 1997, the Philippine Government awarded to petitioner the
right to build and operate the NAIA International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT3). Petitioner then contracted
respondents [foreign corporations organized under Japans
laws, but only Takenaka is licensed in the Philippines] to
construct and equip NAIA IPT3. Respondents filed in London
Court collection suits against petitioner claiming that
petitioner made no further payments after May 2002. On 18
February 2005, the London Court decided in favor of
respondents.

On 1 March 2006, respondents filed a complaint in RTC Makati

to enforce London Court decision. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds of: (a) defective verification and
certification against forum shopping; (b) forum shopping; and
(c) payment, novation, abandonment or extinguishment of
the claims. Respondents opposed. On 9 May 2006, petitioner
moved to set its Motion to Dismiss for hearing and a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents to require
respondents to produce and permit the inspection of the GFA
by petitioner. It thereafter filed a motion for leave to serve
upon Takenaka a Written Interrogatories.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It also held that the Motion
for Production and Inspection of Documents and the Written
Interrogatories are modes of discovery that can only be
availed of after the Answer has been filed. Petitioner moved to
reconsider but was denied on 26 June 2006. Petitioner filed a
Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum against MIAAs Records
Custodian to bring papers proving MIAA's alleged payments to
respondent. On 22 September 2006, RTC granted the request
but was later quashed. Petitioner moved to reconsider but was
denied.

Upon filing of petition for certiorari, the CA concluded that the

RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motions to dismiss and to set in motion since both parties
filed an exchange of pleadings on the motion to dismiss
hearing on 7 April 2006. However, it ruled that RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied its motion for
production and inspection of documents and written
interrogatories because the rule provides that written
interrogatories may be served even before the Answer is filed
so long as leave of court has been obtained, and the motion for
production of documents or things may be filed while the
action is pending, which includes the period before the Answer
is filed. It further held that MIAAs Motion to Quash should not
have been acted upon by the trial court because it did not
contain a Notice of Hearing, making it a mere scrap of paper.
Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that it was grave abuse
of discretion for the trial judge not to grant the motion for
production and inspection of documents and written
interrogatories, because Section 1, Rule 25, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 23 provides that written interrogatories may
be served even before the Answer is filed so long as leave of
court has been obtained.

Ruling:

YES. Petition is Denied.

Parties Arguments:
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner
alleges that the CA erred (1) in ruling that the Complaint is not
fatally defective despite the fact that only a Special Power of
Attorney, and not a Board Resolution was attached to the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping; and (2)
in depriving petitioner the right to present evidence on its
Motion to Dismiss.

On the other hand, respondents countered in their Comment

that the petition should be dismissed outright because it was
filed out of time; it did not include a material portion of the
record below, i.e., respondents' Comment to the petition
before the CA; and the CA did not err in ruling that Mr.
Kurebayashi was duly authorized by respondents to sign the
verification/certification of non-forum shopping, because
under the laws of Japan, under which laws respondents were
incorporated, the board of directors of a Japanese corporation
may appoint one or more Representative Directors who shall
have the authority to perform all acts within court proceedings
and out-of-court acts relating to the business of the
corporation, and Mr. Kurebayashi was validly appointed by
respondents' Representative Directors to execute the
Verification/Certification.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

At the outset, respondents must be disabused of the belief

that the petition was filed late. Petitioner originally had only
until December 14, 2007 within which to file action. However,
the Court indeed suspended office transactions on December
14, 2007 due to the celebration of the Christmas party so the
Court's receiving section was closed. Petitioner, therefore, had
until the next working day, or until December 17, 2007, within
which to file the petition. As long as the petition was filed on
that last day of December 17, 2007, then it is considered to
have been filed on time. Records show that the petition was
indeed filed on December 17, 2007. Hence, it is of no moment
that the Secretary's Certificate attached to the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was notarized on
December 17, 2007, or later than December 14, 2007.

Having resolved the question on the timeliness of the petition,

we go on to discuss the main issues in this case.

The Court does not see any reason to overturn the CA's finding
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in denying the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to
Set the Motion to Dismiss for Hearing. The established
definition of grave abuse of discretion was reiterated
in Ligeralde v. Patalinghug[5] in this wise:

x x x By grave abuse of discretion is

meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum,
for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise
of power.[6] (Emphases supplied)

In this case, there is no showing of such capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment or arbitrary and despotic
exercise of power committed by the trial court. In fact, records
reveal that both parties were given ample opportunity to be
heard. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was, in fact, held
on April 7, 2006. Thereafter, both parties submitted their
pleadings setting forth their claims, arguments and supporting
evidence.Petitioner points out that at the April 7, 2006 hearing,
the parties were only allowed to file their pleadings, and no
actual hearing, or presentation of evidence, was conducted. It
is an oft-repeated principle that where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of due process.[7] Moreover, the issues that
petitioner seeks to tackle in the requested hearing on the
motion to dismiss, i.e., novation, payment, extinguishment or
abandonment of the obligation, are the meat of their defense
and would require the presentation of voluminous
evidence. Such issues are better threshed out during trial
proper. Thus, the trial court was not amiss in ruling that
petitioner already had the opportunity to be heard and there
was no longer any need to set another hearing on the motion
to dismiss.

It also appears from the RTC's Orders and the CA's Decision
that any and all evidence and argument advanced by both
parties were seriously taken into consideration by said lower
courts in arriving at their rulings. Such being the case, there
could be no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial
court.

Lastly, on the issue of the Verification/Certification, the court

has the power to give due course to the complaint even with
the supposed defect, if special circumstances warrant. Even
assuming arguendo, that the form used to show Mr.
Kurebayashi's authority to execute the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping is defective, petitioner
should bear in mind that this Court may relax the application
of procedural rules for the greater interest of substantial
justice. Thus, in Cua, Jr. v. Tan,[8] this Court explained thus:

x x x Although the submission of a certificate

against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is
not jurisdictional. Hence, in this case in which such
a certification was in fact submitted only, it was
 defective the Court may still refuse to dismiss and
may, instead, give due course to the Petition in light
of attendant exceptional circumstances.

xxxx

x x x [I]n the interest of substantial justice, the

strict application of procedural technicalities should
not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on the
merits. x x x

xxxx

x x x Indeed, where, as here, there is a strong

showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the Rules, the
Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the
interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing
that the rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They
were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid
the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are
not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have
always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the
application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is
always within the power of the Court to
suspend the Rules, or except a particular case
from its operation.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
This case is one of those that deserves a more lenient
application of procedural rules, considering that it affects one
of the most important public utilities of our country. In Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[10] this
Court has already stated that these cases involving the
construction and operation of the country's premier
international airport, has attained transcendental
importance. Therefore, the Court sees it fit to relax the rules
[11]

in this case to arrive at a full settlement of the parties' claims

and avoid further delay in the administration of justice.