CASE LAWS JURISDICTION

People vs Cawaling

Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Romblon promulgated a decision convicting former Mayor Ulysses
M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo for the
crime of murder.

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the
criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear
the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly
committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Romblon has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: Yes, the RTC of Romblon has jurisdiction.

In relation to Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, lists two requisites that must concur
before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense
was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six
thousand pesos (P6,000). Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that murder or homicide may be committed
both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said
crime.

Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were
public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas,
et al., "[I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve
charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]) Even before
considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine
whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and
employees in relation to their offices."

Principle: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time
of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case
by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of
another tribunal.

Exception to the Rule:

The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to
apply to actions pending before its enactment.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily
connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Foz Jr. Vs People

Facts: Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iloilo City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.

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Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain
allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged

Ruling: The petition was granted. The previous decisions were set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for by the
law shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city
where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation
in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News
was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the
libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the
Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such
allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of
the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information
failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of
Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of
libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.

Principles of Law: The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's
jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners
are not precluded from doing so. The rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case
cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law.

Exception to the Rule: Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was
considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said
case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the
instant criminal case.

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It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Macasaet vs People

Facts: In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and
Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper
"Abante" were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the
residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Quezon City has jusridiction over the case.

Ruling: In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of
the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged
libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first
published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article
was printed.

A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained
therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily
stating "Quezon City" at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the
information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either
because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time
the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts
jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these
statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the
information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before
the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay
the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power
to take cognizance of this case.

Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be
without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined
by the allegations of the complaint or information. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken

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as they are. The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts
alleged in a motion to quash such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability,
prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. In these instances, it is incumbent upon the
trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present
case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed
this action.

Principles: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to
where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.

Buaya vs Polo

Facts: Petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact
and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the
private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a
periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office
of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's
account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with
estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the
Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in
his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was
also denied.

It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is
based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu
City.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Quezon City take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.

Ruling: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Manila for further proceedings.

Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place. The subject information charges
petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,
Philippines.

Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction.

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Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place
where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is
damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business
and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly
caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Principles: It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to
be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried.

In order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for
the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by
law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings
the court may make after the trial.

Crespo vs Mogul

Facts: On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground
that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the
order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to
afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until
the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a
copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor
was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and
set the arraigniment

Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to
grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

Ruling: The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not
and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby
a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the
motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the
case.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be

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addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when
the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary
or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution except in
the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While
it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court, The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

Principles: It is a cardinal principle that a criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal
action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence
in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty
of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be
guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.

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People vs Sandiganbayan and Plaza

Facts: Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at
the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines
for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-
Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00). Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution on
July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper
court. Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials
and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.]
Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above,
who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to
office. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975
and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in
relation to public office.

In his Comment dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of
P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while
the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the
following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases
where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the
enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the
indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule
that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.

Ruling: This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan
and Amante is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier
case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that,
respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos
(P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P33,000.00).

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995,
which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the
present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the
Information having been filed on March 25, 2004.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense . The exception
contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is

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not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense: x x x.

The present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no
exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions
of R.A. 8249 shall govern.

Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among
others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below
may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions
thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other
offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Clearly, by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office,
necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their
office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the
offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to
have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had

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the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held
to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office .

Principle: An offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if "the offense
cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime. Exception: In
People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that the
offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it
had they not held their aforesaid offices."

People vs Sandiganbayan and Amante

Facts: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash
advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of
December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation
was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand
letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted
an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the
recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate
charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent
Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of
violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445.

The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said
court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION stating that
among others that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because
respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas
Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original
jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent
Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case against Amantefor lack of jurisdiction. Hence,
the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

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Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in
the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21,
2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as
well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'.
Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense
was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 where other
offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved.
Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May
21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her
office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Geduspan vs People

Facts: On July 11, 2002, an information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed
against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi
Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively.

Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a
Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26. In a resolution
dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and notice of salary
adjustment show that she was appointed as Department Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a government owned and controlled
corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the National Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code
for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Ruling: The petition lacks merit. It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as
salary grade 26. While the first part of Section 4a of RA 8249 covers only officials of the executive
branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other

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executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision
of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private
individual charged together with her.

The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth,

is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade,
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-

owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a,
Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was committed in relation to her office
as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person
as well as the subject matter of the case.

Binay vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three
separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code, and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The informations, which were
subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were
committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro
Manila.

The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861. On May 16, 1995, R.A.
No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On
the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et
al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.

While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again
redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on
February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997.

Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because:

(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not
classified as Grade 27.

(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975.

(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: The Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Court does not
subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.

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The Constitution states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, Congress shall take "into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and
the qualifications required for their positions. Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758 provides in
Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based "upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." In short, the nature of an official's
position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary . This is not only mandated by
law but dictated by logic as well.

The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one's position the level of difficulty, responsibilities,
and qualification requirements thereof relative to that of another position. It is the official's Grade that
determines his or her salary, not the other way around.

To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position
Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An official's grade is not a matter of proof,
but a matter of law, of which the Court must take judicial notice.

As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades list the Municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," under the catchall
provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner
mayors are "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.

Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.

Serana vs People

Facts: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex in UP Diliman. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-
wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and
her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed a criminal case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.The Sandiganbayan,
nevertheless, denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.

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In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over 1) estafa, 2) a government scholar
accused, along with her brother

Ruling: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

1. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.

2. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP
performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy,
the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is maintained by
the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.

Principle: The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No.
3019, as amended. The two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides
for their penalties.

It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.

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Sanchez vs. Demetriou (cited in Cawaling case) clarified that murder or homicide may be committed
both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said
crime, viz.:

The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct
and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, the offense
cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute.

Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether
done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator,
being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the
penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating
circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the
criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.

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